JPRS ID: 8511 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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~RS L/esii
14 June 19 79
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~
TRANSlATIONS ON NEAR FJ~St AND NORTN AFRICA
CFOUO 25/79)
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- JPRS L/8511 -
1. 4 June 19 79
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AN~ NORTH AFRICA -
(FOUO 25/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
ISRAEL
Ieraeli Arab Intelligentsia Examine;'.
(Elie Rekhess; THE JERUSAI.EM QUARTFItLY, Spring 79).... 1
Intereat Groups in Israel
(Yael Yiahai; THE JERUSALFM~QUARTERLY, Spring 79)..... 20
SAUDI ARABIA
Royal Succession Possibilities Viewed
(THE MIDDLE EAST, May 79) 37
Yamani Would Double Production for Peace �
(TEiE MIDDLE EAST, May 79) 41
WESTERN SAHARA
Militarf Situ.~tion Viewed as Favorable to POLISARIO
(Mino Vignvlo; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 23 Apr 79)........ 42
- a- [III - NE ~ A- 121 FOUO~
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ISRAEL
_L
ISRAELI ARAB INTELLIGENTSIA EXAMINED
Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM QUARTERLY in English Spring 79 pp 51-69
[Article by Elie Rekhess]
[Text ] In the sixties the Arab inteWgentsa in Israel were ~efined by a
veteran analyst as 'a group of cit~zens who read books and news�
papers, are aware of c~rrent economic and public af~sirs, and
have economic, political ~nd social demands'.' This wa, a racher
in~clusive definition - it embraced not only teachers, universitp and
high school graduates and memben of the liberal professions, but
aLw Knesset members, mayors and heads of local councils,
membe~ of municipal and local councils, officials, qQ�~:s and
pciests - yet it reflected the social reality in which the IsraLli Artbs
found themselves atter the estaLlishment of the state. During the
years preceding the Warof Independence, and during the course of �
the waz itself, a decisive majority of the local Arab intelligentsia
_ had fled the country, leaviag the remainiag Arab population -
- without its spiriwal, cultural and political ~lite. Since then far�
reaching changes have taken place in the structure and
composition of Arab society in Israel. Today, a correspor.ling
definition of the Arab intelligenLsia in Israel, in terms of its self� '
peroeption, would L~e based primarily on the criterion of secondary
and higher education and would include high school graduates,
awdents, and graduates of institutions of higher learning.
In absolute.terms, or c~mpared to the Jewish poputstion, the
number of educated Arabs in Israe! is still rathec small.
Nonetheless, snce the establishmer,? of the swte their ranks have
considerabfy, indeed iropressively, expanded. The substantial
~'owth in the nurabers of educated Arabs ~n [srael is an outcome of
~ E. Ael~hess is the Diiecta of Td Arnv Univers+ty's Shibah Center [or Middk
Entan wd Afr.can Susdies and head of the Israeli Arab Dak ther+e.
~ 1[icJ~arJ Asaf, The Acab Intslligentsia in IQad' (Hebtewl, Amot. June~luly
1965, pp. 51-59.
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the expansion, et ell levels, of the school system in the Arab sector.
The number of pupils attending secondgry schools has increesed
from 3,115 in 1965 to approximately 20,000 in 1978. The number
o[pupils reaching the last year of high school rose trom 258 in 1965
~0 3,085 in 1976. The numberof matriculants has increased eccor�
dingly, lead(ng to a significant growth in the Areib student =
_ populadon. In 1966 there were 268 Arab students attending
Is~aeli universities; in 1978 there were more than 2,000. In
addition, about another 300 atte~d regional colleges and several
hundred more are studying abroad, especially In Eastern blx
countries.
The increase in the number of students has led, in turn, to a
growth in the number of Arab university graduates in Israel.
Between the years 1961-1971, 328 Arabs and Druze received �
academic degrees frum institutions of higher learning in Israel -
the annual figure rising from six in 1961 to eighly two in 1971.' It
has been estimated that at the end of the seventies the ranks of
Arab and Druze graduates will increase by 250-350 annually. In
1978 there were about 2,000 Dnue and Arab university graduates
in Israel, and by the end of the decade there will be, eccordingly,
~ over 2,500 holding at least one university degree - in addition to
many ihousands of Arab and Druze students end high school
graduates.' �
Attractiora of Education
. The prospect of a liberal profession is drawing large numbers ot
Arab youths to Israeli universities. According to a study published
' in 1975' Arab high school pupils show a decided preference for
higher education leading to entry into the liberal professions, as
-y opposed to sttadies qualifying them for salaried posts. This is ap�
parendy the reason for the marked tendency Funong applicants to `
apply w the professional faculties Imedicine, pharmacy, law,
engineeringl. This tendency is especially conspicuous in the field of `
law; between the yean 1961-71, seventeen per esnt of all Arab ~
graduates graduated from law faculties, as opposed to seven per
cent of a?1 Jewish graduates in 1970.' A survey conducted by tbe _
Hebrew Univeisity in Jeivsalem indicated that in 1970 nearlyoae
half of the Arab students would have liked to hav~~ transCerred w
the faculties of inedicine or pharmacy.
The practice of one of the liberal pmfessions raises the status of
= Elie Aekhess. 'Survey of Graduaus of Lsstiwtions of Highcr Leamiog in las~~
from the Minority Croups 11961-711' IHebrewl. Slu'veys 1 IBelow. SL^'~1'�
1961- 711. ?he Shibah Center for Middk Eastem and African Swdies. Tel A~~r
~ University. I973, pp. 6. 22. _
~ lbid..pp.6-7.
~ ~ SArni Ma~`f. Avrahun Benj~min. T?~e Attitude of Mab Sodety in isrne! Towav~ _
Ttd~nico!�vantwnal Bducation (Hebcewl, The Stutiwu !or Research a~
Devebpment of Arab Eduution. School of Education. Haifa ClrtiversicY� 1975
~ Rekhess. SLrvty, : 96l -71. p. ?~'1.
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~e prab graduate and gives him social prestige. Moreover, since
~~e hlgh demand for these proCessions in the Arab sector ensures
qWclc absorpt~on into tha labour force, a liberal profession frees the
- preb graduate from dependency on the government establishment
and enables t~m W become economically independent within e
t+elatively short period of tlme. The opportuNties evailable to
greduates of the humanitles and social sciences, on tha other hand,
are more lltutted and are largely confined to the governa~ent
bureaucracy.
lilgher education and professional ststus are the bedrock of a
new power base for Arab youth in Israel. The new stratum of
educated Arabs which is ooming to the fore draws its strength not
only from traditional sources Isuch as family origins and presdge,
or inheclted econocnlc powerl but from u~dividual aChIevements.
Clear evidence of this emerges from a study conducted by Dr. Ss~ni _
Mar i. High school pupils and their parents were asked w rank six
factors determining social status. The results were as follows:
. Porents pup~ _
acaclemic education academtc education
profession profession
ooaaecttons with the conaections with the
establishment estsblishment
money ~.y
P~bBe P~P~Y
P~'aP~Y clen prestige
Aa can be seen, the attitudes of parents and chil ~iren are st~ikingly
- similar. Both groups attribute greater importance Lo the
achievement than w the ascriptive aspects of status. For both,
_ academic educatic�n and profession are gradually replacing
prnperty and lineage as the major determinants of status! -
The gi'owth in the number of Arab students also stems from the
feeling widespread in Arab society chat 'the key to success in the
present time is the adoption of the scientific achievements of the
West, Science is transformed into an article of faith and a magic
iu;~.;::a for success.' An article on Arab ac~demics in Israel, that
appeared in the Arabic press, atuibutes tbe influx of Arab youth
into the universities to 'the su~ong feeling among our youth and
their parents that our generation is the generadon of s~ience, the
generadon of the scientific revolution, the generation of rational
thought and of the total planning of life for the sake of progress'.'
- The author also restates ihe view, current in the Arab world after
the 1967 waz, thatthe shock of defeatinduced growing numbers of -
Arab youths w choose scientiSc vocadons. An examination of the -
fields of study of Arab youths in Israel confirms the e~stence of
such a teadency. Of all the students graduating from the Hebrew
University between thc years 1961-71 only seven per cent
' A~tar I �aenjamio. op. cu.
~ AI�ItGltdd,Jmuaryl0,1975.
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graduated in the natural sciences, es opposed W thirty per cent of
the Arab students In 1971.' ~ '
Problems of Education
M Arab hlgh school graduate entering unlversity must overcome
many dif'6culties, not the least of which is the problem of language.
Many studants complain that their limited mastery of Engltsh and
Hebrew handiceps them in theL~ studies: it makes it difficult for
them to undeistand lectures, read professional ltterature, end ex-
press themselves oreUy and in writu~g. Dif~cult3es in ac~justment
also stem from the teaching methods prevalent in the Arab sector,
as pointed u:it by Dr. Butrus Abu Mana of Haifa University: 'In
Arab society the child is not permitted to argue, disag~~ee or criticize
a source of authority. The method of education in the Areb high
school is based not on analysis, but on rote learning. The written
word is sacrosanct, This is a legacy from many generations and
much time will pass before we rid ourselves ofit. ln the university,
on the other hand, the student is expected from :us first day to
challenge, disagree, and analyze.''
Another source of the Arab student's frusvation is the leck of
suitable counselling at the stage of registration and course
selection. In a study nf Arab university graduates it was found that
only a small minority had access to reliable up�to�date information
when making their applications. Many received no advice or
= counselling whatsoever, while others relied on the guidance of -
. friends, acquaintances and parents.10 As a result, Arab students
were over-represented in the faculties of the humanities, law,
medicine and pharmacy, and under-represenced in the faculties of
social sciences, natural sciences and engineering - as opposed w a
more symmetrical disUribution of Jewish students between the
humanities, the social sciences and the exact sciences. There is also
a heavy concentration of Arab students in thp departments of
Middle East tustoiy and of Arabic language and literature. The
Arab student assumes that he will have an advantage over others
in these fields, but after commencing their studies many are
disappointed and want to switch to a different departmen~ In a
survey of university graduates it was found that evecy fifth Areb
student~ had changed his chosen field of study at least once in the
_ course of his university career. As b result of the lack of appropriate
counselling many Arabs graduate in fields for which there is no
demand on the labour marke~ The consequences of this are quite
serious."
The problem of occupational integradon is, in fect, a central
theme in the complaints of the Arab intelligenLSia against
� Rel~hess. Suvey, l96l-7J.
� Interview in 71ie Nmold 1)ibune. May 25,1972.
~o Rekhess, Survcy,1961-71.p.8.
- ~ ~ 16id.
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government policy, it being frequendy asserted that the channelg
of InteBi'auon into lhe Israeli economy c?ra ban~ed to the young -
educated Arab. On the one hnnd, the economic inE'raswcwre of
~e prab sector has not yet developed sulHciently to absorb ali the
thousands of educated Arabs seeking employanent: the level of
-J industrializadon of the Arab private sector is low and its economic
resources rather limited. On the other hand, the Jewish privete
secwr which oft'ers e wide range of employment opportunities, is
for the most parc not open to Arab graduates, who are often ~
rejected on security grounds.
- The limited ecaployment opportunities available in the privete
sector and restricted possibilities in the government and publ~c sec-
wr leave one major channel for Arab graduates of the humanities
and social sciences: teaching.~~ The percentage of graduates
absorbed in the educat3onal system is, in fact, considerable, and
while this undoubtedly contributes to a higher standard of
teaching in the schools, it also contributes w the fnstretion of the
graduate Krorking in a profession which is not always the most
_ fitting for his talents and education.
Maay Arab graduates see employment by the government
bureaucracy, other than teaching, as a challenge and a symbol of
equality and integration. The actual situadon, however, is fairly
disheartening. The government of I~ael, faced by the rapid
increase in the nu.mbers of Arab university graduates, has on more
tha~~ one occasion taken up the problem of the emptoyment of
_ Arabs with higher education, and has adopted measures to reUeve _
their distress. In May 1976 it was decided w establish a unit for oc-
cupational counselling and guidance in the Arab sector." This unit
was intended to encourage Arab high school pupils W enter
vocadonal courses, to provide counselling for high school
graduates intending to continue their educadon, guiding them in
light of their aptitudes and the state of the labour market, and to
deal with the empioyment problems of Arab university graduates.
Attempts have also been made by the Prime Minister's Office to ab�
sorb qualified Arab gra~uates in the civil service. Thus, for
example, at the end of 1977 the Ministry of Educadon decided to
take on thirty two Arabs in supervisocy and advisory posts, in the
prepazadon of school curricula, and in the prevention of early
school leaving.'� It transpired, however, that the success of the
~ government's policy depends not only on the budgetary slotting of
positions, but even more so on the receptiveness to the policy at the
level where hiring decisions are actually made. A lack of openness
among the Jewish public &equendy stems from prejudices
r~garding Arab competence, ~om ideological opposition w the
See Aachel Peleg. Avrahem Benjamin. Higher Education cnd the Ambs iri israei
(Hebrewl. Tel Aviv, 1977, pp. 82-83.
t~ The proposal was included in the recommendation~ aaached to the survey of
grsduates of itutitutions of hIgher educadon, SLrvey, 196i-1971.
u A!�Anbd'. November 3.1977.
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- '~mploymant of Arabe in senior pasw in tho Jewlsh ecnnomy, f~om
U~n ml~taknn nuUa~ thn~ tha udlulilleh~uen~ Ie nul lntarnatod ln
encauraging the employment of Arabs, and from the fear of
frlctions of e national nature at work.
Jewish high school and university graduates are also confionted . -
by problema resulting from the lack of suilable guidance, of incom�
~ patibility between fleld of study and actual employment,
diFFiculties in finding employment, frustratton, and the like.
However, in the Arab sector these problems take on an added edge,
frequendy one with a distinct]y uational colouring. ' ~
Many Areb students come from vWege backgrounds. The sharp
trans{tlon &om the closed iurel environment with its cor~servat3ve
and traditional patterns of lifo to e large modern city is oR,en
accompanied by a sever,; value crisis. In most cases, despite the
expectation that the campus could serve as a fertile meeting -
ground for the cultivation of friendly relations and mutual
understanding, integration between the Arab and Jewish students
is not effected. In many cases, the in~ olvement of Arab students in
nationalist political activity convibutes to their alienetidn from thR
Jewish student body," Neither does withdrawal of the Arab
students from the general student bndy inw separate frameworks
of their own, as is the case on all campuses, help lower the barriers.
The Israel�Arab conilict has a pronounced effect on the relations .
between Jewish and Arab students. In times of political tension,
stresses on the campus build up and are sometimes released in
acrimonious verbal exchanges or violent clashes between
. . extremists on both sides. This occurred at the end of 1975 when
Arab students at the Hebrew University ref used to do guard duty at , ' ~
the students' residences. An admiivstrative order obliguag them to ~
do so triggered a faz�ranging debate in which Arab and Jewish
students truculendy advenced nationel and ideological
arguments. The Arab swdents committee azgued that as long es
the right of self determination was withheld from the Palestinian
people, Arab students could not be obliged to do guard duty, which,
in their view, was part of the state's security system."
Another oonflict broke c; ut at the begiru~ing of 1978 at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem campus when Jewish students atbempted
to prevent the Arab students committee from organizing e
demonstradon against President Sadat's peace initiative. A similar
c^ frontation took place at Haifa University in March 1978, when
Jewish students prevented Arab students from , holding a
co~ference on the situadon of the Israeli Arab on the grounds that
'this is an Israeli university and not a Fath training camp'."
The housing problem weighing on the Arab student weU
illustrates the complexity of the social incegretion between Jews
~s SeePeleg�Her~jamin.HigherEducntionandtheAmbsinlsruel.pp.91-92.
~6 Leefle[publishedbytheCommittee,November29,1975.
Ha�Are~, March 30, 1978.
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~d prabs In Israel. Thet.tewish families refuse to rent them rooms
~S a complalnt &equendy voiced by Arnb students, and cases of
promises and controcts broken upon dis^overy nf the prospectivc~
~odger's Arab identity are not uncommon. Desplte the ei~orts oC the
~vorsity authorities und swdents unions to solve the housing
problems of Arab students in the framework of tha unfversity ~
cestdences or outslde the campus, the pressures remain great and
the same dlfRculties crop up everyr year anew (especially in the Tel
Aviv areal.
Yet another crlsls faces the Arab graduats with ~he compledon of
his studies and his return to his native villoge or Wwn, There, the
graduate must somehow bridge the gap between the values of the
Westernized society to which he was exposed tn the Jewish city
and the traditional values of his town or village. ConNcts arise
~,vith parents who expect their son W bear his share of family
burdens, es he had done before he dep~rted for his studies. One of
the characteristics of the Arab intelligentsia is ics youth, and the
age gap between it and the parent generadon is yet another factor
leading to the isol~�aon of the Arab intellectual in the society of his
origin." The gau between the rural-conservative and modern -
urban ways of life, the inter�generational ideological conflicts, _
employment problems, lack of social and culturel facilities at the
eppropriate level, difficulties in finding a mate with a suitable
educational background - all these compel a considerable number
of Arab graduates from rural backgrounds to leave their original
- environment and settle in urban areas.
Patterru of Political Involvement
The Arab intelligentsia is permeated with a sense of mission and
- social responsibility. Their being university graduates and '
students has led them to an elitist self-percepdon and they see
themselves as the standard bearers of progress and change. They
feel a personal commitment towazds the society which grants
them special status and expects them to act for its advancement.
Thus, for example, ihe well-known poet Salim Jubran speaks of
'the right of the people to expect the intelligentsia to constitute a
powerful and valuable force which will take up its position in the
front lines of the march Wwards progress'."This perception of the
mission of the intelligentsia (risalat al�muthaqqafin), typical of the
developing states in the third world, is widespread in the Arab
world. Underlying it is the view that the duty of the intellectual is w -
work for the advancement and renewal of society, w liberate it
from outmoded patterns, to fight for social justice, improve human
relations, foster brotherhood and solidarity, raise moral standards
bypersonal example, culdvate cultural values, contribute w scien- `
u See: Yeleg�Benjamin, op. cit., pp.109-110.
A!-ltti/tdd.July 19.1974.
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tiHc educet3on and provide the people with intellecwal loeder-
shtp.m
The question is, to whut degre~ the normative belief in the mis~
sion of the inteLigencsia is transleted into effective acdon, Arab
academics were esked to relete to this question in the fremework
of the survey of Arab graduetes conducted in 1971, and the
epologedc tone of their answers was an indication of their um
easiness about the gep between word and deed. Many excused
their lack of activity on the grou~~ds that channels of acdon were
barred to them. They placed responsibility for this on others, _
bl~aming those who 'paid tao much ettention to the elders and
sl'taikhs and members of the previous generation, push~.ng the
young people aside'. T}ieir criticism ,vas also directed against the
government officials dealing with the Arab sector, who were
deliberately attempting, in their opinion, w perpetuate the
hegemony of the older generation and preserve the status of the
elders in the political, economic and social structure: 'The _
government finds the rule of the old men convenient. It wants the
flattering image of a young inteWgentsia only for external con-
sumption.':'
Since this survey was�conducted there appears to have been a
major change in the attitudes of the intelligencsia towards the
question of their involvement in Arab society in Israel. We are now
witnessing the emergence of an activist polif.ical movement in
which the intelligentsia plays a central role. Its representatives
have become one of the principal forces contending for power in
the internal stavggle for the future l~adership of the Arabs in Israsl.
- On the village level the change is reflected in the rising proportion
of the young and educeted assuming positions of local leadership.
The struggle to take over posidons of iniluence in the villages is not
an easy one, since the intelligentsia has to fight the adhesiveness of
traditional and conservative elements which draw their strength
from e wide network of personal and clan ]oyalties. Nevertheless,
some of the intelligentsia have succeeded in upsetting the
traditional structure of their villages and in making a breach in the
old order. The most important foci of influence through which the
intelligentsia are attempting to consolidate their position in the
villages are the instit;itions of local government. The elections to
local councils, in which this stratum of Arab society can compete
with other forces in a free and democratic way, has enabled them -
to increase their representation on the councils. -
According w data published by ihe i~:inistry of the Interior, the
percentage of the young participating in election campaigns in the
villages has grown stsadily. This is evident in the age structure of
m On intellectuals in Saznaria see: Shimon Sheaiir, Rine Shepira, Shira Tivon, I~ael
Shtokman, Elie Rekhess, 'The Professional Elite in Samaria' (Hebrewl, SLrveys,
Shiloah Centerlor Middle Eestem and Ahican Studies, Tel Aviv University,1975,
pp. 205 -206. -
Rekhess.Sl~rvey.1961-7:.p.157. -
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the candidetes elected to local governing bodies; in 1973, 23 per
cent of the candid~tes were 40 0~ under, while 9 per cent oC lt~ose
elected were 30 or under, and ubout 33 per cent were 40 or un�
der."
The recent change in the law governing municipal elections, by
_ which the mayor or head of the local council is elected on ~ per�
sonal basis, has Increased the chances of the intelligentsia to
consolldate its power, as vaas demonstrated in the elections held in -
Novecnber 1978. At the same time, we should be careful n~t to
exaggerate the significance of the change taking place in the
alignment of forces in the villages. The intelligentsia is still
dependent on fract{onnl forces within the Arab village, and the suc-
cess of their efforts to assume leading roles in municipal activides
depends on assistan~e &om the heads of family alignments and on
_ the power of the clan coalitions. While the system of personal
loyalties and structure of traditional institutions have undoubtedly
been shaken, these &ameworks are still far from breaking down.
In this context, the role played by intellectuals of village origin in
the consolidation of the National Committee of Arab Heads of Local
Councils should be pointed out. This body, set up in 1974 with the -
; aim of advancing the municipal interests of the Arab secwr, has of
late increased greatly in influence and prestige. Tre involvemenr
- members of the Committee in the events leading to 'Lanr' ~ay'
(March 30, 1976) greatly enhanced its importance. There can be
- no doubt that the participadon of intellectuals such as A~mad -
Masala~a of Dabbdriyya, Jamal Tarabiyya of Sakhnin, and Jalal
Abu Tu'ma of Baq'a al�Gharbiyya changed the character of the
Committee and contributed towards its consolidation as a
representative bady fighting for the rights of Israeli Arabs in evecy
sphere, including she national.2'
_ The political involvement of the intelligentsia in cura] disvicts
does not reflect group activity, but is the outcome of individual
initiative on the part of a few key figures who succeeded in putting
together local coalitions. In the towns and on the nadonal level
patterns of activity of a dif'ferent sort have emerged. Ever since the
Six Day War, and wi~'~ added impetus after the Yom Kippur War,
the Arab intelligentsia has been establishing in various parts of the
country independent frameworks of action unrelated W the
institutionalizad party organizadons. These bodies arose in order
to advance ihe common struggle of various interest groups within
the Arab intelligentsia: in 1971 the Natianal Union of Arab Univer-
sity Graduates was founded; in the same year a committee of -
Nazareth-born university graduates was formed (similar
~'Ekctioas to the Local Authorides in the Arab Sector-1973' (Hebrew Ministry oC
the Interior, Local Gm ernment Section, Minorities Depaztment, Javsalem,
Merch 1974, p. 8. ~
~ On this involvement see Elie Aekhe~, "fhe Araba of Israei and Land
Expmpriation in the Calilee: Hackground, Evenu, and Implications' ~Hebrewl,
Occasiona! Popers, Shiloah Center for Middle Eestem and African Studies, Tel
Aviv Universiry, 1977. _
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Gammitt~g have al~n beeen inrm~d in other placesl; every
ingtitution oi' hi~her leernin~ has gn Ar~b 5tudents Committee, all
of which are united in u Nmtion~l t".ommittee found~d in I975; ia
1974 e Netinnal Committee of Arab Hip,h School Puptls was
founded in nazareth.
The inltle~dve tor the faunding of th~ Netion~l Union of Arab
Ur~ivec~ity t;raduates came in 1971 from radical ctircles, wh[eb
included the l~wyer Mu~amm~d M1&'r1, formerly of the
_ nationelist nl�Ard movement; I?r. Mu~gu~mad Hejj Muhammad,
one of th,~ hPqds nt' the Sucielis: List which ~wod fnr the 5ixtb
Knesset; br, ~snile Tiuna, a lceding figure in the Rnkal~ IT'he
Hebrew~language acronym of New Communist List, the Israeli
Cosncnunist Pa~tyl, and the lawyer Abd al�~~ DarAwisha, a
Raka$ activist imm N exareth. The declared nbjectives ofthis body
, were to act for the cultural and soci~l bett.erment o1' the Israeli
Arabs; improve the gt$nd~rds of ~duc~tion in Arab schools at
every level, and to eradic~te illit~r~acy among the Arab populatk~:
to encourage second~ry and unive~ity education; to press for the
education of Arab girls, and to liberate the Arab women from tLe
chains of the past in order to obtain social equality; and w act far
the protection of the ri~hts and claims of Isr~el's Arab cit3r.enaia a11 -
cultural, sociai and economic spherea.
~ It was not by chance that their platiorm concentrated on socaal
' rather than political Issues.ladeed, the organiaers stressed thatthe
Union had 'no orgaaizational or ideological ties to any political
- party or vrganiza~on whatsoever; it would accept university
graduates aad students without any reference to party alTiliation
or ideological oudook'. This approach apparendy stemmed fro~m
the assumption that open political involvement mlgt~t lead Lo a
harsh reaction on the part of the authorities, even to the outlawiag -
of the ~rgaaization.
The Union of Arab University Graduates was a short-lived aBair
that did not succeed in establishing itself. The reasons forits failure
seem to be related w the dif5culties encountered in creatiog a
aationwide organizational swcture that could embrace ia-
dividuals o! dif(erent backgrounds, outlooks aad re~oas. Tbe
organizers apparendy came to the conclusion thatthe time hadrwt
yet arrived in which dive:se gmups within the academic
population could unite ia the service of common goals. It appear~
that the activist carcles among the intelligentsia learned tbe lesmm
of the Unioa's failure, aamely that organizations on a local bas3s
had a p~eater chance of anocass. ~
This view was retlected in tbe activities of the Commiu,ee o~
Nazareth Universiry Graduates. This ,p~oup of free pd+ofessionals.
iacludiag Dr. Rashid Saltm. Dr. MIs KardGsh, the en~oeer
Bish~ra Mu'amatar, lawyer WalId F3bC~m, Dr. Basim TGma, 8od
lawyers Kam~3 D~hir and Aa'iq JarjGra, began W take form att2~e
~ beginaing of 197~, 'out of a feeling of respo~sibility Wwards t6e
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people', and a feeling of eoliderity which sl~mmed, according tn -
- tlrem, frc~m 'the ~x~lt~d ~uals Irnpn~ad upnn u~ by uur nratinn~lity
~nd our sxial staws'.u Th~ group's sense nC its own potenti~i
power, a feeling which intens'J'ied as it~ membership expanded,
induced the founder~ to take steps to oust th~ ~existing municip~l
leaderahip and to find solut~ons co burning pmblemg in tl~e ~elds of
eduut~on, ~acYitation end tranaport. The Ngr.aret~~ university
graduates searched for channeis of actjviry which wdul~ grant
them leverage in t~e nuuung oCthe town. Ltke their counte~p~ts in -
the villages, they too understood that the way to implement their
goala wa~ through the tnstitutions of lxal government. However,
ia contrast to the situetton in the villages, clan and fenily interests
" here played a minor role.
The Nazateth activists su+essed the non-patty character of their
organizatinn and cheir willingne~s to estabL'sh g'front with aay
party? that wiU undectake to ect on behalfof an agreed progr~mn~e
w develop the wwn end jts services'. After failing to reach aa _
,agreement with the representat~ves of the Labour Alignment, they
decided to join forces with the Communist Pacty: it was thus that
t6e Democara~c fmnt came into being, uniting under one root the
Nazareth graduates, representatives of' the local branch of the
Commuaist Party, representatives of the Ixal Chamber of
Commerce, students and other 'loyal elements in the town'.2' The
entry o~'the academi~s inw the election caznpaign as a united bodY -
together with the Communists weighed the scales in their favour
and gave tbe majoriry on the local council and the mayorship to the
Demaratic Front. The academics obtaiaied aa impressive victocy:
four of their representatives were elected as memben ot' the
municipal council Iconsisting of seventeen membenl and two of
th~m were appointed deputy mayors. This represzntation reflects
the growiag power ot the int,elligentsia aad the importance
at~uted to them by ot}ier forces ia the p~litical arena - fust and
forem~st by the Comcnuaist Party.
' Nazareth also served as a focus for the orgarsization of Arab high
sc~hool pupils. In April 1974, after the groundwork of setting up a
network of local branches in high schools ttunughout the Galilee
area had been completed, a National Committee of iiigh School
Pupi}s was founded in Nazareth. O~x established, this committee ~
began cooperating with the Arab students committees and
adopted similar patterns of activity.
Alihough the Arab students in insuwtions of higher learniag ia
Israel insist on their rip,ht to organize themselves in independent
~rameworks, separate from the geaeral Swdents Union. their
esgaaizations ar+s not recognized by the univeisity authorities. The
Acab studenu argue that they are confronted by speaal problems
which cannot be solved by the general Swdeau Union. The
~ ~ A!�Itsi~dd,.lanuary 12.1971:January23.1973.
n lbid.. January 24.1975.
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expgnsion of the networlc ~f uNvprsit~ea in Israel haa led w an
1 increes~ in the number of Arab students cnttunitt.ees, and they gre "
today fou�d on every campus. The nideat is the commiuse at the
Hebrnw Unfversity of Jetvs~lem, fnandod dt th~ end of the filties.
The studenta commiuees act ta relieve the distresses and
difficulties of the Arab studenu on their campuses. Thus, for
er.ample, the Tel Aviv University conunittee irtitieted e public
campaign with the aim of ensuring accommodauon for Arab
students in the University residenccs and improving the standard
of the ofi-campus apartments rem,ed on their behalL They also
appealed w public opinion aga;nst the behaviour of the policx who
wok Arab swdents inw custody fc;r interrogatSon at uareasonab3e -
hours, in their view for no reason whatsbever. In Jerusalem t2~ey
organized against the obligation of doir~g guard duty at the
studenta r~sidences in Jerusalem; protested against the
� discxunination which they claim exists against Arab candidates in
various faculties such as medicine, engineering, and geography;
and touk action against attempts to resvicttheir social activities on
campus. Considerable attention is paid by the students cotnmittees
to social and cultural activities. Recent]y a number of evenings ot
Palestiaiaa folklor~ have been organized, ar~ activity reflectia~g the ~
emphasis placed on the nationa~ i,ssue. Evenu ofthis nat~ue arenot
infrequent]y vansfotmed inw palitical plattornis and provide a
pretext for acrimonious debates between Jewish and Arab ~
rtudents. The Arab swdents committees also bring out single -
editions of newspapers lfor fear that regular publication would not
be permitted by the authoritiesl such as a!�Sabbdr in Haifa, d�
Shaykh Mu'anis in Tel Aviv, a!-Jarmaq. Jam~hlr at-TdCa aad
!ia'y aI�Ta1Ca in Jerusalem.
- In the summer of 1975 the Union of Students Commiuees setup a
� loan and grant fund f.~r Arab students, and in a short time oollected
a quarter of a million Israeli pounds f�m the villages. Swdeat
activists visit Arab schools, lecture on university life, and
recommeud vied aad tested methuds of getting ac~c:epted lsuch as
t,aking aptitude tests in Arabic, choosing departments which do aot
demand entrance examinations, etc.l. In Jerusalem the sWdeata
have also ~et up an office to provide new candidates with advioe
' aad guidaace.
Another field in which the intelligentsia are active is ia organiring .
protesu against all manifestatioru of discrimination and injust~a
stemming, in theu opinion, from government policy vis-Q-vis the
- Arab minority. These activities take the 4'orm of orgaaiz3a6 -
demonstrations, distributing leaflets and manifestos, and
composing protest lett~ers. 7'he imolvement of the intelligentsis
was particular2y coaspicuous in the laad expropriations oon-
troversy i~ the Galilee at the beginning af 1976. The Natiooal
Commiuee of Arab High School Pupils vigorously denouaoed tbe -
'Judaization of the Galilee', while tbe Arab swdeat oommit~s
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~mbadced on a mWtsnt campatgn ag~t the implementet~on of
the ~6r~mme.
7't~e org~nizadons oC tbe intelligentsia also show a h~gh degre~ ot'
involvement tn problems of a distinctly nAdongl chgrgct~r nnd in
questlons aoncerning the fate of ~'~e Pal~atlnlan people. Although
~e platforms of these organizetions do not refer to political activity
as an end in itaelf, they do contain v~gue and equivocal
{orenuladons such as: 'ooncern for human issues In the Arab sec�
wr ~ or'the comcnlttee will participate in all lorms oCtht swggle of
the Arab nation in thIs countcy, in view of the common fate and
siogk goal of a~ the members ot our nation'.~ These Connuladons '
ac+e intended w stress the role the intelligentsia is duty bound to -
play, not only in the swggie to ensure ita own specific rights, but
also in the natlonal�polit~cal swggle of the Palestinian pcwple in
geueral and ot the Israeli Arab in particular.
Ideoto~icn~ Sh~ts
Political developments in the area since 1967 have led broad
sections of the Arab intelligentsis to re:ormulate their posidons on
the basic issues of their r~tional existence and political fuwre in
LSraeL The range of attiwdes includes a radlcal pole arouad which
rally a number of small groups not organized ia any party
- frameworlc. Some of them apparendy operate clandestinely. These
gitiuptn~gs show strong identiSca~on with the various Palestiaian
organizations.
At thc end of 1974, duriug the period in whlch the prestige of the
PLO c~se to unpreoedert~ ~eights as a r~sult of the Rabat
nsolutions and Arafat's appearancein the UN, a number of Arab
swdenta in L~ael publicly identified with the PLO. T6us, tor
example, one student said: 'After decades of hvstration and in-
feriority a Palestinian body has arisen, called the pLO, as the
orgaaization rPpresenting the Palestinian people. I don't say that I
myself hold to the ideology of the PIA and I am not necessarily a
di4cple of Arafat or any other leader. The main t~ung is that a
reoognized repr~sentative body with which we can identify has at
long last arisen, one which gives substance w the Pale~tiaian entity
aad propuses a solution w the conflictr
Some o~' those who identified emotionally with the Palestini~n -
ozganizations even responded w outside incitement encauraging ~
Israeli Arabs to join the ranks of ehe terrorisis. A good many of
these were fr~om the inte!ligentsia. Thus, for example, in 1968 the
chaicman of the Arab students commiuee in Jerusalem was
oonvicted of givic:g shelter w a member of the Fath: among those
who planaed and executed the explosioa in the Hebrew University
campu~ cafeteria in 1969 were students studying at that
" l[andestoofAeab scaeenueommitsees m saaeL 197s.
~ Ma'a~ir.Deoember27.19'f~.
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.
FOE~ OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
instiwt~on; in 1971 the Nnzareth lewyer D~hAmishe was errested
on the char~e of organizing a t,errorist network; in 19~2 e awdeat -
at the Technion was sent~nced to four yeara imprisonrment for ~
belonging W the ~ath and plaiuw~g to blow up the swdents' club at -
the Techn;on; emong thca members of ~he Jewish�Arab spy and ter�
ror ring exposed at the end of 1972 were Arab teachers, atudents
and high school graduates, These facts, however, should be seen iu
a wider context in which a sense of propoit3on is presecved.
Consideriag the range of possible actions and the resezvoir of
potendal reclvita, the ext,ent of hdstile activities is very much thet
of e marginal phenomenon. Never,heless, their higher degree of
political awareness end national consciousness does impel a
relatively higher propottion of Arab intellecwals, as opposed to
other sectors of the Arab public in Israel, w pazticipate inhostile ac-
tivity.
Since 1976 a group of radical swdents in Jezusalem, who~ee
members support the 'rejection front', has been attracting public
etteation. A political manifesto published ~iy this group during the
elections to the Arab swdents committee in Je:usalem atthe endof _
1977 clearly demoastrates the extent of erosion which has talcen
place in their auiwdes towards the state. The manifeno stated, in-
ter dia:
(11 The right of self-determination of the Palestinian people
applies not only w the popu~tion concentrated in the West
Bank, Gaza, and the Arab world, but also to the Israeli Arabs.
r~'emed to as 'the masses of the Galilee and the Triangle'.
121 The PIA is the sole legal representadve of the Pale.~tiaiaa
Arabpeople and must be seen asa'uni,fying fiameworkforall
~ the units of tbe Palestinian revolution including the re-
jectionist front'.
l3) Support should be ~ven W the idea of setxing up a'national
authority' in all parts of Palestinian~ land as an intsrim
solution, without peace, recognition or negotiatioas.
(4) UN resolutions 242 ~nd 338, the renewal of the Geneva
Convention, and the Sadat peace initiative should all be
tejected.
(5! The right of ihe refugees to repaviation should be.suppozLed
by means of a vigomus and prolonged stivggle against those
~ who uprooted them."
T2~ nationalist activities of this radical Jerusalem group also
iacluded an auempt to strengthen ties with swdents in Arab
univecsities on the West Bank for a joint political struggle. 'Ibe
swdeats commiuee suppoiu~i and identified with the swggle of
the swdents atBirZayt Unive~ity againsttbemilitazygovernaoent
aad the college authorities, and also published a leatlet p~ia8
~ se~ fs,mt~o ot~ ~ sa~a~u co~u~e. neo~~r 6.1977..od
aac. at�fayr. neoembc 17. len. '
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rgainst thc atttwde of the mllitary governmeat tawgcds the
studenta at Bedilehem Unlversity,
'~he demand that the right of the Arebs of Israel to sel[�
det~rn~inedon be recognized cons~tut~s e scrfous turning point in
~he Arab auttude toward.a the st~t~: the I~ne lx:tween this demand
�nd the presentstion oCirredentist demands is perilously thin 7'his
demand represents a basic change in the vadidon~l attitude ot'the
vast maJority of IsraeU Arabs, moderates and radlcals alilce, who
unW now have seen their fate es connected with the future of the
gwte of Israel and havg rejected separadst nodons. At the
beginntng of 1978 it be~:ame cl~az that the idea of the Arabs of
Israei being entlded to self detecmination was not held only by
merobers of the Jerusalem swdents oommiuee. A similar demand,
- though more moderate, was put forward by 56 Arab intellectuals
and membecs of the liberal professions in the Galilee. The
manifesto they published expressed the signaWries' support for the
establishment of a Palestinjan state alongside the State of Israel la
ptinciple c+ejected by the more radical cic~clesl, but at the same time
argued thet as they were an iategral part of the Palestinian people
'any solution w the Palestin~an problem must include official
cecognition and intetaational guaranteesof the nadonal identityof
the palestinians residinF in Israel, of their right to stay in their
motherland, and to retrieve their lands, their villages, their
property, and the est~tes of the Waqf which were rnnfiscated'.r
The list of signatories npresented a broad specwm of the Arab in� _
telligentsia. Among them were the lawyer Mu~ammad Tawfiq
Oayw~n from Umm�al�Fahm, a leading member of the Abnd' a!-
Balad or 'Sons of the Village' movement, which has become well
known for its radical positions and po6dcal activism, while other
signatories have in the past been regarded as holding relatively
moderate views.
The Arab intrellectuals in the Communist Party do not share the
views of the signatories of the ManifesW of the 56 or of the poGtical
platform of the radical students. In fact, the activides of the
radicals have sharply challenged the Communists, who have
always been careful W present themselves as a polidcal party with
a legitimate programme working strictly within the framework of
the law. In the opinion af the radical groupings, the adherence of
the Communist Party to UN r~solutions 242 and 338 restricts its
freedom of manceuvre and nazrows its bargaining position by
clo6ing off other more desirable options Isuch as the return to the
Partition Plan of 19471. The Communist Party supporten, on. the
other hand, accuse the radicals of 'rigidity that bellows all or
nothing'. In the opinion of S~lim Jubran of the Communist Pacty,
they are 'nervous, nan~ow�minded separationists who lay claim to
a monopoly of patriotism and loyalty w the revolution'. Instead of
'unrealistic ma~dmalist slogaas Jubr~n suggests working quiedy
~ At�Fg~, Febcuary 25,1978.
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_ and cons{swndy for 'the att.airunent of eve~ything that can be
j etwined - however small - without giving up the ultimate goals',10
- The tension existing between student supporters of the
Communfst Party and thc more radf cal student circles came w the
fore in Januaiy 1976, when th~ UN Security Council wes debating
the Palestinian problera tn the presence of a PLO observer. 'fhe
dispute erupted over e telegram of protest which the Javsalem
- students commiuee wanted W send to the General Secretary of the
UN. The Communist Party supporters on the committee propased a -
moderate formulation in line with the oft'icial Party positioa,
_ referring w the right of the Palestu~ians to set up an independent
state alongside the Stste of Israel. The radicals vigorously opposed
this formuladon whlch, in their opinion, implied recognition of the
State of Israel, The two camps failed tc~ reach en agreement and
the telegram was not sent~
The tension between the two groups reached a climax in the sum-
mer of 1976, tollowing the exFulsion of the Communist Party sup~
porters from the Jervsalem Arab students commlttee. The official
reason given for disbanding the committee was that its members
had displayed a compromising and defeatist attitude on the
question of guard duty for Arabs on the Jeivsalem campus, and
that they had 'surrendered to pressure from the authorities'. The
expulsion led w denunaadons in the Communist press, which
~ttacked 'schismatic nadonalistic groups trying to traffic in the
slogans of exveme nedonalism for which the Palestinian people
have already paid a heavy price ia the form of e long-lasting
tragedy'. The editorial in aI�Ittihdd. the Communist Party organ, -
harshly criticized the 'remnants of Tratskyism, Maoism, Matzperi
- and left-wing extremism, which are actually serving the interests
_ of the Israeli regune, which would like to bring back the days of
At~mad Shuqayri and A~mad Sa'id'." ja the 1977 ~lectiont to the _
Jeivsalem Arab swdents committse the Communists did not
succeed in retrieving their hegemony, and were, in fact, pushed W
the sidelines. In defence of their position they have repeatedly
argued that the extremism of the radicals is self�defeating, since it _
makes it easier for the likud govemment to 7aunch its auackS on
the Arab students'" andobstrucLs Arab-Jewish cooperation on the
campuses. The continuous attempts by the Communists W regain
oontml of the Javsalem swdents committee met with success in
the 1978 elections when the Rakah�sponsored Front list gained the
majority. This succ~ess was not repeated in Haifa, where Rakoh
supporte~ lost the elections.
T6e vocifernus activides of the radicaLs and Communist Pacty
10 Zohn�Drrrkh,January28.1976.
AI�Itt~hdd. June 21. 1976. The nemes of A~mad Shuq~yri, first head cf the P10
and A~m~d Sa'id. commentata~ on the Egyptian 'Voia of tbe Arabs' ndio
statioa, were botb identi6ed befoc+e 1967 with tbe sbgan proposing that lsrael be
drivm iato the se~.
/brd.. J~nuary 24, 1978.
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~upporters som~dmes creute the misieading impression that th~y
r,epresent the whole nf'the Arab InteWgensia in Israel. While it is
we thet a radical style has become e common identit'ying Ceature
among Areb untversity students, it is oEten no more than neturel
expresston of youthful exuberance. In many cases it is a passing
phese that extends no further than the untversity days themselves.
Tbe Arab student, who begins hIs university studias at an early
age, Snds on the campus almost unlimlted scope for free and
unrestricted political accivity: It is no ac~dent that the campus is
called haram, i.e., a'prohlbited area' in which the students are
protected from the reprisals by the stete euthorities. When his
atudies are over, however, the graduate returns home where he is '
once mone forced with a restraLiing and sobering reallty. The
_ process of growing up and setdL~g down, the need W estsblish -
himself econr.~nically and socially and his c~esponsibilides w his
family in many cases all lead to the renundation of radicalism end
w the adoption nf a more balanced and moderate world view.
It should also be pointed out thet alongside the redical camp Is a
solld body of moderate Arab academics and professionals who
have adopted a positive Areb idendty which, in ~`~eir opinlon, does
not oonIIi:t with their identificetion with Israel. They choose to
emphasize their acceptarice of the situation and w expc~ss their
loyalty as citizens of the state. This approach is formulated in the
platfo:a? of the Study Circle for Change and Co�existence, which
was founded by mecnbers of the younger generat3on and the intel-
ligentsia close W the Labour Party in the summer of 1975. This
~oup, which according to its founders comprises some 1,200
members in 58 towns and villages, has defined itself es a'nucleus
of moderate socialist opinion, sharing the values of the I.abour
Pariy except for those values which are not bindiag on the Arab
citizea, such as Zionisai . The primazy aim of the group is
'discussion and educational and intellectual ectivity about all mat-
ters relating to the integration of the Israeli Arab inw the social and
eoonomic system of the State of Israel'.~~ Nonetheless, the
nationalist revival among Israell Arabs has not leR the moderate
camp tmtouched. Harstily criticized and accused of'questionable
- loyalty W the nation', they have been obliged W adopt an image of -
national pride and to add their voices to the swelling tide of Arab
nadonalism. The representatives of the moderate wing of the Arab
lntelligentsia appear w have come to the conclusion that in the race
s for the leadership of the Arabs of Israel, an image of national self-
as.gertion is essential, and that it is the only way to compets suc-
o~sfally with the extiremists. -
Condusion
The change which has taken place in the patterns of activity of the
Arab mtelligentsia in Israel since 1967 and the erosion in their
fla�Artts, May 19,1975. ~nd the platform of the drc1e.
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' polltical atdtudes are the outcome of ~wo pnrnllel yet interrelaWd
processes; the svengthening oC the Pxlestinian element of their
national identity on the one hand, and 1he inner dynamics of the ~
development of Arab society tn Isreel on the other.
As a result of cheir close oontact with Jewish society, the Arabs of
Israel have been exposed to a process of rapid modernizetion,
which hes manit'ested {tself in the gradual brenkdown . of
vadit~onal structures and institutions. The older social and
political leadership has been replaced by an educated generation
representing a stratum of young Arabs possessed of a strong sense
of social mission and national pride. This stratum harbours
accumulated feelings of neglect, deprivetion and discriminetion,
their bitterness and frustration being the result of difficuldes
encountered in Integreting tnto the Israell social and economic
- sysiem. Moreover, caught between the conflicting influences of a _
conservative vadit3onal culture and those of a modern Western
culture, they are also in the throes of a severe crisis of values.
~ The close acquaintance of the Arab intelligentsia, especially the
university students, with Jewish society has led to e steep rise in
- their level of e.~cpectadons, both collectively and as individuals. The
development and level of achievement of the Jewish population
are the only criterion by which they are prepared to judge the
situation of the Arab minority. The awareness of a considerable
~ social and economic gep between the two sectors only deepens
~ their sense of estrangemen~ The difTerences between the sectors
are perceived as the outcome of unsuccessful and discruninetory?
government policies, which ignore the urgent needs of the Arab
population. The impressive advances made by the Arab sector
~ since the establishment of ihe state: the transformetion of a
backward rural soaety inw a progressive society with a
Qourishing agriculture; the development of a comprehensive
educadonal system; the creation of an infrastructure of suodern -
services in rural districts and the rapid economic growth which
has led w a general rise in living standards - ell this is taken for
granted and earns litt]e appreciation.
On the other hand, the last two wars between Israel end the Arab
states have had far-reaching effects on the national consciousness
of the Arab intelligentsia of Israel. The encounter with the Arabs of
the administered areas after the Six Day War exacerbated the
problem of national identity for Israeli Arabs and svengthened its
Arab-Palestuuan component. The contact between the two
communities reinforced feelings of solidarity and unity end
imp~lled many to re-examine the content of their Arab nationality.
After the October War of 1973 this process was gready intensiSed
due w the str~ngthened status of the PIA and ~he rise in the
prestige of the Arab world. The feeling among the Arabs that Israel
had been weakened at home and abroad and lacked a powedul
and confident leadership, the unrest on the West Bank in the wake
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o[ the Rabet rosol'udons - all these imbued tho Arab inteWgentsia
w(th e aense of sa~'�confidance, and encourngad their leadcrs to
- refuse to eccept the stbtus quo end to emberk on e swggle for the
' reatizetlon of thelr rights,
It was this reassessment of the situat3on whlch ggve birth to a
consciousness among the InteWgentsfa that condicions were ripe
for the setting up of Independent frameworks withtn whlch the
� swggle could be ca:~ducted by legal means. This development in-
dtrecdy reflects one of the most significant espects of the process of
change in Arab society in Israel: the gradual replacement of
frameworks based on local�family loyalties by frameworks of
nationel allegiance, The committees of high school pupils, studenLs
_ and graduates were founded to deal with the specific problems of
rhe various groups concerned, but at the same tlme they also serve
as an organ~Zational infrastructure for nadonal political ectivity.
The dividing line between a struggle for the realization of civil
rights and a stivggle for natlonal rights is often blurred.
The stratum of the Arab intelligentsia is continuing to expand at a
- rapid rate and in the future is bound to grow in importance and
become a powerful a~d influential force in the political and social
life of the Arebs'of Israel. The lack of adequate solutions to the per-
sonal and collective proble~4s of this stratum of the population will
almost certainly lead to an intensification ofhostility and bitterness
among its members, and consequendy to an increased tendency
wwards polarization and alienadon, together with a further
emsion in their attitudes towards the stste.
COPYRIGHT: The Middle East Inatitute, Jerusalem _
CSO: 4820
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FOit OFFICIAL U5E ODiT~Y
ISRAEL
INTEREST GROUPS IN ISRAEL
Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM QUARTERLY in English Spring 79 pp 128-144 -
[Article Ly Yael Yiahai] -
[Text ] When a group of Israe?.~ was asked which of them wes a member
uf an interest group only e few raised their hands. The meJorlty,
which belonged to the Generel Federetion of Labour (Histadivtl,
did not think of themselves as a'group'. The minority, which
- belonged to other unions, did not want to identify themselves in
_ public with an 'interest'. The word 'interest' does not have a
positive connotedon in Israel's political life. 'I'he word 'pressure',
although it expresses a common daily activity, is well nigh tabu,
and 'self-interest' is a pejorative term. We shall examine here the
background against which these ettitudes developed.
Interest groups in democradc societies play an essentiel role in
bringing the citizens' needs w the attention of the authorities.
Although there is no consensus as to how much these groups
_ influence puhlic policy, the absence of active interest groups is
generally taken as a sure sign that the system in question is not
functioning as a'healthy' demacracy. The absence of voluntary
public organizadons testifies to a blurring of the boundaries
between state and society and a lack of communication between -
the people and the government. Interest groups not only assist in
bolstering democracy, they are a result of democracy. To a certain
extent they are also an affirmation of its presence, since they
constitute a focus for citizens' participetion in government on
condition that there is a clear dividing line between the interest and
the foci of power - the government, the parliament and the political
- parties.
- ' Yael Yishai is a lecturer in the Department of PoliUcal Sdence. Haifa Univeisity.
Her fields of interest are parties, interest groups and poGcy. She has published a
book. Factionolism in the Labour Movement IHebrewl, and is author of some
dozen anicles on releted topia.
17YK Jeruwkm Ouarterly. Nwnber 11. Sp~ 19791
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Although Israel belongs to the famlly of demncratic states, the
quest~on of interest groups nevertheless poses n problem. Thls
problem stems Crom Cour espects of the Israeli political system
whlch dlstinguish !t from other damocractos:
(11Israel is a centralist stete; there is a hlgh concentrat(on of
power and authority in the hands of the government. Many
. areas of social end economlc activity are dependent on
government support. The government is the largest employer
and consumer, it owns e considerable percentage of the
country's land, its airllnes, sh~pping lines, and railroad and
telephone netwarks. Until recendy, it was impossible to
import an electrical eppliance for domestic use in Israel
wlthout obtaining an import licence from the government.
' Although the change in adminisva~on has brought e partiel
- reduction of government involvement in daily life lexpressed,
among other things, in the liberalization of foreigr currency
controls and the abolition of the need for import licences) the
tendencyr prevails.
12) Israel is a'partystate', i,e., a state in whi~h political parties
play a decisive tole in shaping polltical and social life.
Although striking ch~nges have taken place in this area since
Be~jamin Akzin wrote about it in 1955,' and the role of the
- parties in educadon, employment, etc., has been greatly -
reduced, there are still many fields which are dominated by
the parties, including the broadcasting system (which is state
ownedl, health services, agricultural setdEment and the
distribution of land.
(3) There is a public consensus. Despite an enormous growth in
the population and socio�economic diversification, Israel has
preserved, w a great, although d'unuushing, extent, an
'operative consensus'. Thus, despite religious, ettu~ic and
economic divisioas, it has been able to build a stable political
society. This consensus applies W Israel's basic goals -Jewish
polldcal sovereignty and the ingathering of the exiles. Since _
long before the establishment of the state, Israel's a'ens
have left it to the top echelons of government to make all major
decisions.
- (4) There is a saliency of ideologies in Israel. 'Vision' is a popular
word in Israeli polIdcal parlance. One of the parties competing
for representation in the Knesset in the last elecdon pro� -
claimed, in its attempts to win electorel support, that it was
the 'party with values'. 'Interest', on the other hand, reflects
- narrow, not national, needs.
These four characteristics raise questions as w how interest groups
can exist in a centralist system, controlled by perties, resting on a
~ B. Akzin, 'The Role of Perties ia lsaeli Demxrary, Journol ojPolitics, Vol. 17
119551, pp. 507-45.
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.
~oK n~rzci~ us~ orr~Y
comprehensive consensus with a national ideology at its core.
There is also the quesdon oC the legitimecy accorded them by
society, and oC the borderllnes be~ween them and the government _
'~odies they deal with - borderlines which must be clearly drawn if
the state is to function democrat3cally.
Overview
- Interest groups usually have either a social' or an organizetional
basis.' The social basLs refers to groups which are the product of ~
- the occupationol diversity which comes with socio�ec~notnic
development. The ensuing disruption of ~ocial balance pust,es the
'inJured' inw groups. The organizational basis refer$ to interest
_ groups growing out of an individual's initiative and investment.
In Israel both these sets of circumstances have been much in
evidence. There has been an enormous population increase (from
half a million to over three million) as a result of J~wish
, immigration, and a growth of the gross national product. The rise
in the standard of living was accompanied by the creation of a
social gap, and the development of industry and of agriculture
have created social groupings with diverse interests. The variety
of approaches to Israel's security problems has also found
expression in the formation of citizens' organizations. Entre-
~ preneurs have also been plentiful, A highly politicized state lilce -
Israel was fertile ground for the growth of potential leaders and
the development of interest groups, which today form a dense and
intricate network in the country.
Israel is a pluralistic society, with a decisive Jewish majority and
other national minorities. The Jewish population itself is a rich
cultura] mix. In addition to cultural and economic gaps, there are
those between the religious and the secula~ , the traditional and the _
modern. Political attitudes range from those who advocate the
establishment of a Palestinian state w those who would like to see
Israeli rule extended to both banks of the Jordan. Israel is not only
e multi-party society, but also a'multi-group' one. Unof'fiaal
estimates claim that there are over 600 public organizations in
Israel, not counting small groups li.e., which are not listed in the
telephone directory) or sub-groups of roof organizations. The latter -
number in the hundreds. -
In 1955therewereonlyfortytwopublicorganizationsregistered
in Israel.� But while in the past there was one organization of
~ Israeli businessmen, today there are separate bodies for big and
small businessmen, and a number of bi-national Chambers of
Commerce. Evecy new cultural group has formed at least one -
= See D. Truman, The Covernmenta! Praess. New York IA Knop111963.
~ SeeR.H.Salisbury,'MExchangeTheoryoflntereslGroups',MidwestJournaloj
Politica! Science, Val. 13 IFebruary 19691, pp. 1-32.
~ M.Aterled.l.ThelsraelYearbook19551IsreelFublicationsl,pp.273-4.
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imrnlgrnnts' association, For example, thnre ara currently threo
orgunlzadons oC immigrants t'rom tho Soviet Unlon; two whir.h
split ~long puc~ty lines, ~nd ~ third group of Ceorgiiin immi~rF~nts, -
hatives of innumerable towns and villa~QS ln Poland and
Lithuania have est~blished nr~anlzations of their own.
Th~s has also been the pattern in professional organizations, The
= Union of High School Teachers broke away Crom the Union of
Primary School Teachers. The Architects Union broke awey from
the Fedaration of Engin~~ers and Architects on the grounds that it
did not represenc their interests. The architects funcdon sepurately
fmm the Engineers Union, which is an integral part of the General
Federation of Labour (Histadrutl. With all these sub�divisions,
there is also the tendency to create roof organizadons or at least to
cooperate on specific issues. For example, managers' groups heve
unIted, inW the Economic Organizations Coordinating Board
which has 15 sub�divisions,
Interest groups are as varied in Israel as they are in other
- countries. Some see their primary aim as the protection of th~
material interests of their membecs, and some are ideological.
There are 'producers' groups, for those who proc~uce goods or
services, and 'consumers' groups, for those who use them. A
distinction should be made between public and private interesl
groups. 'Public interest' refers to the common good; 'private', to �
the benefit of a specific group or individuals.
- The ecological groups Iten in number) which are united under one
roof organization, Life and Environment, con.atitute one oC the
major public interest groups. They deal with issues such as noise
and air pollution, the preservation of natural resources, and the -
prevention of damage to the environment. Israel's five consumers
organizations are divided on a sectoral basis (one belongs to the
General Federation of Labour, one is religious, and one consists
- mainly of irnmigrants from Hnglish-speaking countries). There are
two organizadons concerned with the defence of citizens' rights.
Grnups working for the individuals' welfare include the Family
Planning League, the Public Health League, and the Israel Cancer
Association. Groups have also been formed to influence foreign and
security policy, such as Gush Emunim and Peace Now. Mo~! of
these groups were founded in the past decade, and are concerned
largely with settlement policy in the terricories gained in the Six-
Day War. '
Private interestgroups are those concerned with the promotion of
the specific interests of either their own metnbers, or of others
outside the group. The fi~t type includes organizadons of
employees, employers, merchants and retailers, farmers and
prnfessionals. The oldest and mcst powerful union is the General
Federation of Labour ( Histadrut?, which includes some thirty-eight
~ade unions. The Histadivt is more than a'group', since almost
sixty per cent (58.496) of Israelis belong to it. There are three other
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~'OIt OI~~ICLAL US~ UNLY -
labour orgnn~zedong in I~rael:'t`he Ngt~onal ~ederadon of I.abour,
~nd th~ Labour FederetSor~s orthe M~rrechi and dfAgudeth ta~ael,
egch oC them aiBliaWd sa a politic.~l psrty, As fbr ~npl~yert, their
organi~edon~ ~re unit~ed under the rootcr$anitation known utbe
Cont~linattt~ guard. :uiost proa~inent in thir C~t~gt~? at~e t!r
Msnu1'acturerg Assodatiott, th~e ~~rm~r~ A~socfadon, th~ Ch~ml~r
of Commero~ and the ~uilder~ ~nd Cc~nvactot~ As~ci~tkn. Tl~e
'producera' ~lsn includ~ the m~cnl~~ ~f the liber~l prnf~stlo~
unit~d inw 16 interest grdv~. 5ome of th~ pmfe~~ional
orgac~izations also functlon as vade wtions within the Hi:tadivt,
Priv~te intereat groups ~l~o ~ncoc~pas~ e plethora af ~tluitc ~d
- other categories. There as~e aver forty ~t}utic orge,r~itations in tawl
whosp membership is ba~d on cnunuy ot nrigin. Atw~her ~noup -
includes women's org~niz~tions. Here, t~n, a~bdivisfonr have
formed: the conventfonal chariry and voluat~ar groupt Icu~h u
Wtz01, and the more recxnt militant grvupa wl~ich htwe ~~malkr
membership and sre ooncerned with womea's libenti~. Tlie ltt-
ter, althou~ their goala ere rel~ted ta a g~oup, caa h~diy be callsd
private interezt p~oup~, dna the femiatst ~movr.mRnt. ~t kart. !s
concemed vrfth changing the a~ucture vf:ocity and aot ody wS~
promoting the intec+essts of the femsle wc.
There are, in addidon, a anall number of fiiend~ip k~uai wit1~
other states aad organi:at3ons w'hose goal is maialy wdal, iuc6 as
the Rotaty C1ub or the Freem~ons. Oa the wt~k, public societja
wbose mein aim is to prvvide theirmembe:s with a~urtainmeatia
their leisun houra are far less common ln Israel tban io othv
Western ~ountiies. �
My discussion of irn~erest groups in Israel taust martion tboK
representing the deprived. Although not alweys iastiwtion~li~ed
end often ephemeral. these ~oups are part of t2~e poWicel
laadscape of the couatry. 7~?ese include ~bup~ of loc ~ behalfofl
the poor. sucb as the Black panthtrs or tbe Arab m{noritp. w~ a~ -
The Committee for the Defena o[ Arab Land. T'his caugo?y abo
iacludes nl{gious extremists such as the Committee !or tl~e
Protection of the Sar~ctity of Israel snd othec actrame groupt wt~
are geaerally organized around a speciSc iuue. ~
5aucwral Aspects
' Aa examination ut the swcture ot iates~st gcoups - that b, tbdr
formation. membeaship patt~erns and sourcxs of finandng - wLU
help a decermine thar dependeacy on governmeatal resau~.
a'~c
Many interest g~oups ia l~rael ana founded with lutl governmeat
sanctioa. All the ~oups ooooa~ned with tt~e quality ot tbe
environmeat wer~ founded by decisioos takw by oc~ or anotber -
goverament body. For acampk, the Council !or a Beautiful Isrsel
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- FOR d~~ICfAL U5~ nN;.Y
wu ~et up in ar,c;nrdance with ~ deci~inn taken by ~ Knes~et
c~oquttitt~e tn 1968. Th~ ~gme i~ true of the getter Homes 5nciety,
tLe Council for ~he prevent~nn nf Noiee ~nd Air Pollut~on and the
Itoad Accidenta I'rcwent~n Cow~cil. But not enly neutral groups
wtu~ ~ims ar+c ide~ingicrally incontrovcrtibk wera cr~at~ed by
~ovarnm~c~t ded~fona: Gu~h ~mudm, foc r.x~mpk, wa~ ~lto
e~tablifch~d 'fi�m above'. This group, whose aim was to s~etde the
whok of De~r Yisrae! tn iv biblical hi~taric bouadarje~, was
fornkd by a factlon of the National l~ellg~ous Paity. The foundation
- atd orggnizatio~n of the Mnvement tor a 5ec~re Peaoe, which
wPPo~ ~8~~t p~~Y in the negottatlon~ with Egypt, wu
inspir~ed by the ,~etvt p~rty,
Ev~ the wrt of voluntary organizatjon which ia tl~e West b
almost alwsys private has reopived the nsmp of government ap.
pevval in ttra~l. T1~e Centrelor Volunt,ary Servioe: wasfounded by
tbe government in 1g7~ in order to talce voluateer orgaaniizat~ocu
- fot hiellping the handicapped and disabled under its wiog.
'['6e :ame appliea w oonsumer drg~uizatio~. 1'be Israe! Con-
amer Cour~cil, which coordiastes con:umer piv~cctjon ~tivitJes
throughout the countJy, is regis~t~red as g private�governa~ent _
oompanY. witb ~eveaty five per cent of ita shares held by the
)diniwy of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.
T~e Hiatadrut, Israel's largest and most importaat iatec+est giroup,
pce~eata a special case. Both its origins aad its nawne diS'er from
tl~e othert.
Udika its counterparts elsewhere ia the world, sl~e Hbtadtvt i~
not a fede~ratjoa ed'vade uaions but a manolithic aad aavalited
a~cgaaization. It has a number of other unique feauurs: it does not -
ooooan itaelf simply with representing tlae worlcers' inte~~ests but
eo~tea what ia, ia eH'ect. a'atate within a state'. the tcope of
whase activities and fuactions enoom~pa~s all at~eaa of social aad
po~itical life ia tbe oouatry. It deals with educational and ctiltural
activities, social security, and medica! savices. ,(~evrat ha-OvQin~, -
ooe of its subsidiariea, is a~aat ooacern which supplie: about _
tweaty per eent of ihe net national producL
'Tbus, the Histadivt can hard)y be desaitx,~d as aa in~ group
lt~sually defir~ed as confinir~g itself w byluendng tbe govenuneatl. -
It was also founded jn special cic~cumstances. servin~g as a tool for
tbe labour parties, especially the malaitY P~Y ~duth ha-
Avodah. later Mapai. latax the Ati~nmeat! ia buildiag tbe aation
aad ita soc3o-economic iafrastruswn. As S.N. E~tadt has
pa~nted ou~, tl~e puipose of the Histadivt was to create eo~ditions
far tLe development and orgaa:zatioo of a new woiicing class,
ratl~ex than to protect the int~erests of aa e~aistiag one. its
~t was part of a oompz~ehemive politica! prop~ama~e
~ oc~aating ia penies aad not in spontaveous populariaitiative. In
tbe pre-state period t2u Histadivt oontroUed most of tbe social
fimctioas -seuJement, educatioa.6ealtb. aad e~rea seanity. YVhen
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statehc~od was att~fned, most of the$e functions were transfemed
tn ~overnment instiwtions, although the swtus and !'unctions of the
Htat~drut are sti11 fer beyond those nf a normal trade union. Over
the years the Histadrvt underwent political changes as labour =
or6anizations identltied with pazties of the right ~tered its ranlcs.
- but it continued tfl malntai~? close co~uaecdons with the polidcal
~lite as long ~s the labour parties were in power.
Confmntai~ons betw~en the heads of the Hlstsdrut and tbe
econamic ministers 1n the government were not infrequertt and the
General Secretaiy of the Histadrut occasionally showed inde-
pendence and took a firm stand on workers' rights considered
incompatible with national economic intEr~sts. gut these acampk!s
were more the except~on than the nile. In general the Histsdivt
a�d the government acted like two aiv~s of the same body - tbe
political pacty whose policy they acted on and whose intes~stathey
represented.
With th~e shif~ to the Ltkud government the situation changed
drastically and the Nist~drut found itself in the apposition. This
change, whose oonsequences are not yet evident, may well have a
decisive influence on the alig~ment of interest graups in Israe.l.
Although 'hunger marches' have in the past been organhed by
parties in opposition to the leadership of the Histadiut, the
resour~es ~ontrolled by the ~tter groups were ia no wap
comparab3e to those of the Histadrut today. At the same time. 30 "
per cent of Histadrut members are Likud supporters. which limits
its power as a labour organization. This siwation demonstraus
how closely involved the iateres~.group in Israel is with thepolitical
parties - especially when 'iaterest' is usuaUy defined in'terms of
aational goals.
MerrtbenhipPntterns .
With one e~cception, membership in interest groups is voluntary.
The exception is the Israel Bar Association, established by the
Knesset l 19611 as a statutory body in which membesshir is oom�
pulsory for aU lega! practitioners lexcept judgesl. Otber profes-
sional organizations, such as the Engineen and Architects Union
and the Medical Federation aspire W the same status, but the
goveinment has shown no signs of respondi~ng to their demands.
Membership in other public organizaUOns is voluntary and
depends on incentive, whether they ofTer information se~vices ~
the protection of professional interests or status. Membership in
such groups is not the nile in Israel. Apart from the Histadrut, aily -
about thirty per cent of adult Israelis are members of public
organizations.' A larger number paztir.:;ate sporadically in tbe
activities of interest gmups. The most conspicuous reward is that
- offered by the Fiistadrut, which provides its members with the all-
~ E. xau and )A. eurrv;uh 71~t se+cvtanmcw~, of ~uur: ataur a�d
Cwnnwruousion u~ Isroet. Londoa IFaber and F~berl 19~6. P. 135. -
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important medical aenricc~?. it oontrob the larg~st sick fund in
trael, Kup~t ~ioWn, which providc~ over seventy pcr eent 171,8~61
af t2~ populm~nn with m~dic~l ca~re. UnW Ihc prr.scnt govt~rnment
ianpkments its plgn t~ ins~tutc ngtionnl hCUlth insur~ncx I~guinst
the bitter opposit~on o[ thc Histadrut Sick ~undl mnst Israclis will
oontinue co c~qutr~ the servic~ of Kup~t ~tolim. Acoording co the
present arrangemcnt th~re is no pauibility oC arpareting ~
m~mberahtp fr~ the Histadrut Sick Fund from membership tn the
trade unions. Thts ralses the question oC how voluntaiy Eifstadrvt
metnbership is, since surveys have shown thgt a large percentage
of its members joined mainly because ot the sick Cund.
So~u+ars of
Pinanang
Tt~e actlvities of interestgroups in Israei ~c~e fi~quendy finanad by
the atate. As already men~oned, some of the groups were
established by governrnent d~c{sion, and the state is their ch~ef
~ouroe of financing. The activities of the tsrael Consumers Couneil -
and of the Council for a Beautiful Israel are fu~anced entir+ety by the
national budge~ In addition, the state treasury streams money
(direcdy and indirectlyl ir:to a wide range oC public organizations.
Tt~e Defence Ministty paiticipates in the financing or organiza~on
of disabled war veterans and bereaved families. The Minisvy of
Absorption participates {n the budgets of ethnic organizat~ons, and
the Minisvies of Health and Weltare aUocate money to voluntaryr
social welfare organizations.
M excepdon to the rule of public financing are the employen and
labour organizations - but even here things are not so simple. The
Hutadrut, which possesses huge resources, sts~eams money,
direct]y and indirectly, into the political pazties. Acoord.ing to the
law called the Wage Protection Law, partof the money paid in dues
w i~he Histad~vt by its members is allocated to its p_fFiliated pazties �
on the basis of their relative electoral s~trength lunless the in-
dividual member has express2y ot�^^'^~ ~--,-~~mentl. A
.y..
nuinber of cases of corruption, too, whose details are still obscure,
6avs been connected with the tralufer of money from the
Histadrut and its instiwtions co party polidcal fuads. At the same
- time, the Histadrut itself is a beneficiary ofgovernment funds - at
least with regard to its chief uutiwtion - Kupat Holim - which
n~oeives a large annual subsidy from the state. -
Does the massive participation of the swte in the budgetsofpublic
organizations create dependenoe or represent a pauern of a
avrporative system? There is no clear-cut answer to this question.
It u dif5ailt for an organization supported by the state treasury to
oppose the government or auack its poGcies. Butsuch funding does
not aea?.e a one-sided dependence so much as it ex~r+esses a -
muwal dependence resting on a consensus - an ott,en unspuken
agreement on the rules af the game.
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Ta~ets of Adivity
lnten~t groups may try to influence the public~ oth~r groups, ar tbe
government lia which cnse theyr become pnessun groupsl. Withia
the government pressures may be put on the legisiewre tmembets
of the Knesset or its oommiuees) or on th~ execut3ve IMinist~ecs or
their aenior offidalsl. 'I1~ey may also aim et the source of power -
the parties, their lead~ or of~ctals. The !'od af' interest gtvup~'
efY'ortg may be seeu aa the cenves of power in tbe state. Who,
acoording to tliis formula, niles the 5tate o~ Isra~17
No generalization could answer this question; she fod of activity
have vaiied from group to group and from issue W fasue. But
certain vends do predominate, '
5ince Israel is a pazty swte, interest grouPs might heve been
expecu~d to dtc+ect their effoits wwards the political patties. But
this appears m be we of a very limited numberofcases, atleast iit
sn far as party forums are oonoerned. The campatgn of the Iarael
Medical Federation against the Health Insurance Bill proposed by
the Alignment government in 1976 is one example of ea effe~tive
appeal to a political party. In this case, one of the smaUerparties in
tbe ooalition Ithe Independent Liberal partyl prevented the law
from beiog passed. almost cau$ing a govemment crisis. By turoing -
to the Independent Libeeral party, the Medical Federation hoped to
reinf'orce its opposition to the National Health Ir~surence Law. ~
Althougb some religious interest groups also maintain clflse
oonnections with relfgious political pazties, this is rwt a oommon
occurrence. Aa exception to this rule is the case of the'seulemeat
organizatioa5 Isuch as Kibbutz Artzi-ha-Shomer ha-Tia'ir) w6use
oonnections with political parties are open and unequivocsL -
Most inter~st groups claim to be apolit~cal, but what this in fact
means is non-party-political. Some of their leaders are opeiily
associated with political parties tsuch as Dr. Ram Y'uhai, chairman
of the Medical Association, who is a oentral 6gure in the Labour
party, or Rabbi ~iaim D.-ukman, one of the leaders of Gush
- ~munim, who is a National Reli~ous Party Kne.sset memberl. But
, the interest groups claun that they are won-partisan. ie.~ that they
oonsist of inembers of diiT'erent paties and are not identi5ed with
the idedogy of a pazticular one. Even the representatives of
ideological movements sucb az Gush Emunim claim thst they are
unaffiliated and have no aspirations towards influencing any par-
ticular party.
~ What the groups do, in fac~ is try and iniluence repres entatives of
the party in the seat of power, i.e., in the Knesset or the
governmeat Researchers assume that interest gruups sim at tbe
centers of power -in pazliament_.-y systems, the ex~cutive; aod in
presidential systems. the legislawre. T'6e prinaple applies, to a -
great eactsn~ in Israel. too.
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It appeers that most of the epplic~dnnsof tnter+estgroups in tsrael
ere indeed dir~ct~d tnwerds the exeCUdve. But contrary to the ep�
- proach etra~siny, thu ~x~w~+r nl'~!w purtir.,r, mnatnl'thntrr.nntnr.tx un!
wlth th~ s~~~lnr civll aervice, whlch is apulitlC~l. Thn LUtud's
ascension did not (ncurdrast~c changcs in tho upper echelons of the
government. Although the new ministers brought their close
easistants with them, many of the incumbent top ofl9Cials
- remaL~~d In their jobs. It is these key Bgures who ar~ the main
targets for the inst~tuttonalized {nterest groups, esp~ecially the
producer groups.
. The Knesset, too, serves as a focus for the actlvities of the groups,
eapeclallY with regard to proposed legislation. At the final stage of
~ legislation, when the proposed bill is dLSCUSSed in oommtttee alLer
having passed the 6rst reading in the Knesset, appticadons are
oRen made. Aut these are more for the sake of publ~aty thgn
anything else. In the majority of cases, the applicat~ons will thus be _
made to the government adminisvadon.
The noa�producing groups, espedally the deprived groups, select
other targets for their activities. As in other Western oouatries,
these groups, which lack political resources, need a neference
public and the assistance of the medie. Ecological groups are also
u~nly concerned ~nrith arausing publ~c awareness.
Most leaders of inter~st groups claim that they are trying to
_ influence the public at large, whereas in fact most of their oontacts
are with speafic officials. They would rather avoid ca~eating the -
Image of a'lobbyist' seeking favours on a personel basis.
Direct political action is actually widespread, convary w the
Image of I~ael as a sodety in which the public seldom raises its
voioe and leaves the business of politics w its repne,sentatives.
While street demonstrations and individual and group penetration
inW the world of poliGcal decision�making are not an everydap
occurrence, they are nevertheless an integral part of the Israeli
political scene.
The widespread notion thet lsraelis took w the st~eets orily alter
the Six�Dap War, in order to express their opposition w or suppoct
for government policy ia security and foreign afI'airs, is faLse.
Angcy demonstrations took place in Israel at the beginning of the
fiRies against unemployment and poverty end agein in 1965 on a
variety of social and political issues. Problems ooncerned with
religion. welfare, security and foreign alfairs, and even with inter-
nel political arrangements, found an oudet in the direct action of
intene~.;t groups. Since Sadat's visit (November 19,1977) Israel has
been humming with direct polidcal action on questions of foreign
policy. Most of the demonstradoas have centred on the economic
aituation, welfa~ and foreign policy, and only a[ew have been
conoerned with environmental issues. w6ich are aot high oa the
~ist of priorities for Israelis.
~ Consultation is one of the most common ways of influencing the
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~dministrat~on, which ne~ds the fn!'ormadon, expertlse and
c~peret~on lt cen gain from relavent groups. Consulwdnn mey be
the otfic~al pcocedure, es in Scandinavia, or arbitrery, as In
~ngl~nd, where cwnsulting interest groups is subjece to the decision
of the government in every case.
Israel generally follows the English exemple, wlth the notsble
excepdon of the Hlstadru~'Che N etional He~lth Insuranc~ BW waa
pass~d without prior consultation with the Medic~l Federetion,
and the Educetional ~teform I.aw without prior consultat~on with
the teachers' organizetions. In economic effairs, however, the
participation of interest groups is much greater. Otfidal
consultation procedures exist isuch as in the Labour Reladons
Board and the Economic Advisory Board to the Minist~er of
Financel side by side with unof't'icial consultstions between the
shapers of economic policy end the heads of labour and employers
- organizations. Of cow~se, previous governments tended W be closer
to the labour organizadons, as the present government Ls with the
employers' orgenizatlons. ln both regimes Israel's economic pollcy
is the product of advise-and-consent strategy betHreen the
. government and the interest groups concerned. This does not
mean that Israeli Ministers always consult with interest groups
before introducing new measures les in the case of the New
Economic Policy launched in 1977, centering maWy on the
liberalizatlon of foreign currency controlsl. It means, rather, that
feults in government-sponsared policies which only become
evident atter they are of~cially announced are usually rectifled
later as a result of group pressures li.e.. consultadonsl.
Interest groups may be represented in the Knesset, by one of the
members of the house or by a professional representative
(lubbyistl; or in the adminisvation, by committees oomposed of ~
representatives of the government and of the groups. A number of
Knesset members can be identified as representatives of the
interest groups who clearly appointed them as their represen-
tatives in the party. This discussion' does not relece to factions
which constitute otfiaal interest groups in the polidcal parties.
Many Knessetmembers represent factions in theirparties, without
necessariiy being idendfied with extra-parliamentary intcr~st
groups. These include mauily the representatives of the moshav
and kibbutz tnovements, which, while fitting into the categoiy of
interest groups, are identified almost oompletely with political
parties. Other interest groups represented in the Knesset include
the Histadrut, the Teachers Union, the Public 'Transport
Cooperative, the Black Panthers, the Farmers Union, the Contrac-
tors Centre, and the Engineers Union. Even the leminisi
movement, due to a forwiwus combination ot circumstanoes,
succeeded in sending a representetive to the Knesset tor a short
period as a member of one of the political pazties. Most Knesset
members. however. are not willing to be unequivocally linked with
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int~restgr~ups, tendtng rather to IdenWjr thems~ives with broader
eocial stretn, in keeping with the Israelis' tendency to reJect
partJculerist inWrests,
- The perttes, on th~ ather hand, have no objectlons to absorbing
lobbyists, In the extreme pmportlonal representedon system used
in Israel, IdentUicatlon with a group is expected to bring vntes W
the p~ty, and it is thus commnn practice for parties W coopt
t+epc~esentatives of groups, or even for the groups themselves to
stand for the elections on separate Usts. The femL~ist movQment,
the Yemenite Union end the Bl~ck Panthers all ran for the last
elections~ without, however, wiiu~ing a singie seat.
Do lobbies exist in israel in the same form as in other Western
states? The answer to this quesdon is both yes and no. No, since
there are no Inws or other arrangements enabling professionel
lobbyists to operate in the leg~slature. Nor ac+e there any adequate
arraagements for consultadnns and the provision of informadon to -
members of the legisiature. For the most part, the Knesset relies on
the experts within Its ranks for advice on specific issues.
Applications w interest groups are infnquen~ The answer is also
yes, since the better�organized interest groups send professional
representatives whose role is to keep ebreast of the agendas of the
Hne.4set committees and maintain coatact with powerful
members. The Israeli lobby hes developed in another and
unexpected direction: Knesset members who sympathize with the
positioas of various interest groups le.g., low�ineome groups,
politicel doves and hawksl without necessarily having been
recnuted by them, secve as their spokesmen in the Knesset itself,
Whlle there is no knowing as yet how permanent or regWar a _
featur~ of the Iscaeli political ~.ene this kind of lobbying will
become, the phenomenon of cutting across party lines which it
represents is certairily a new one in Israel. ~ _
Int~rest group c~epresentadon in government bodles operates
maiiily by means of committees or boarrls consisting of -
government ofTiaals and lobbyists. As a result of the extr~emely
centralized regime many areas of social activity are onlered and
regulated by committees of thi.s type. In Israel there is a'polidcs of
water , of housing, of agricultural produce, and even of cement,
which is doled out by public committees. These areas, like many
others, are controlled by 'boards' which are partly public
organizations li.e., interest groups) and partly government bodies.
M example of this is the flvit Board. wtuch began as a voluntary
framework and attained stswwry status iw 1973. Although the
direccors of the board. which regulates fruit production and
marketing in Israel. are appointed by government ministers, half
of its members are from the general public. The public in this case
mear~ 'orgenizations which in the opinion of the ministers are
representative of the growers', ie., the Farmers Union and the
moshav and ki6buts movements. Thes~ organizatioas, while they
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ar~; ostensibly professional ('growgr's' nrganizedons as deflned by
the lawl are ~Cw~IIY p~Y�Pnudc~l, stnCQ their members are
identified with political pazties. 5ince the seven parties in question
(Labour, Mapem, Liberals, ~ierut, National Aeligious, Independent
Liberal and Poalei Agudath lsraell all have atT~lleted egricultural
setders organizadons, the Board has become an arena tor Inter-
party squabbles rather than a sectoral forum for tnterest groups
acting in the same fteld. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that
the connecdon between the setders organizedons and the pollttcal
parties is today much weaker than ic used W be, While some
organizadons are sdll horoogeneous to the extent that over eighty
per cent of their members vote for the same party IKibbutz Art~3 for
Mapam, Kibbutz ha�Me'u~ed Por the Allgnment, end the ~ierut-
Betar Moshav Movement for the Likudl, the phenomenon of a split
vote has already made its appearance in others - such es the
Moshav Movement whec+e forty three per cent support the
Alignment and twenty seven per cent voted Likud! If thls trend -
continues it is likely to create a new pattern of interest group ac-
tivity, If party divisions between the setders' organizations (which
are the mairi interest groups in the country In areas such as the
production and marketing of egricultural products, water and
landl are replaced by parcy divisions within them, the swggle for
the allocadon of resources is likely t.o be directed more by real
interests and less by pazty�political considerations.
The status of the otherorganizadons pazticipating in government
committees is less insdtudonalized. In Israel, as in other counvies,
it is accepted practice W set up such committees to discuss dif'ficult
or controversial issues a!'!'ecting the pulblic. Such a committee was
appointed, for example, w discuss the question of inedical servioes
in the countcy. Although its composition was ostensibly based on
personal expertise ar.d group representetion, it was in fect
composed of representatives of political sveams or, more precise-
ly, of people whose opinions were known to the minister in charge
end favoured by hiau.
The 'old boy' network is in full force in the two highest ~olitical
institutions in Israel - the Knesset and the Government~ The
political ~lite remaiins largely a network of personal reladonships.
The quickest and most popular means of clarifying or seuling
issues are still the telephone or personal contacts. Most of the
interest groups have a pawn in one of the political instiwtions,
, even if he is not their oft'iael representadve. Since the 'iron law of
oligarchy' applies to interesl groups in Israel as it does in other
places, the leadership tends w stay put and personal relations
develop around them. These may be manysided and multi-
purpose. Representadves of interest groups (whether it be a profes-
sional group of accountants, an ideological g~up such as Gush
� lnspecwr General of Ekctions. titsut~.s of Ekcnons to the fVinth Knesset, M~y 17.
1977. Jeru~alem ICentnl Bureau of Sutistlal. 19~7. PP. 57-69.
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Emuntm, or a'deprived' group such as the Assoctadon of Large .
Famllles) will find at least one party leader, bureaucrat or Knesset
member prepared to use hls good of~ices on thQir behalfend nct I'nr
them at other levels of the pollticul power swctura. 'I'his is the
chein reaction method, which nssumes thet maktng conwct with
one focus of power wW lead it t~~ influence other foci,
It would thus eppear that while interest groups are in many
lnstances pazt of the system of government in Israei, tt~s system is
spread over a wlde network of organlzat~ons. Government in
Iarael has many arms, some of which are manned by -
representstives of interest groups, wlth plenty of room for exerting
pressure and maneuvering beeween the wide range of power foci.
lmpact
How effect3ve the influence exerted by pressure groups {s nemalns
a mysteYy. It is dlf~icult to pinpoint whet precisely influences
government decisions, especially v~hen oontradicwry pressures
have been at play, Whether the government responds to group
pressures, or bases lts decisions on ideological grounds is ditficult
to deternune. In Israel, as in other countrIes, it depends on the
power of the group, the power of the government, and the reladons
between the government and the group.
The pow~r of the group is measured by its resources, its internel
coh~sion, and the extent to which its values coincide with those of
the socfety and the governmenG
Some groups are stronger than others in the matter of resources.
The stronger ones include groups such as the Histadrut and the
Manufacturers A4sociation. As .for the labour organization, its
grsat heterogeneity is the source of both its strength end of its
weakness. The government's partiality W the Industrial sector is
not the result of powerful 'pressure', but of national considera�
dons.
It hes been hypothesized that a significant change in values eook
place during the past year. The virtual consensus that united the
nadon seems to have been stronger when the Labour Alignment
was in power. Despite the Likud's electoral vicWry, its more
extreme positions, especially in foreign and security aEFairs, have
caused the emergence of groups which challenge its policies loudly
and dramatically. While it is difi'icult to imagine the government
yielciing W the pressures of groups in polar opposition to the main
points of its policy, {t would be reasonable to expect some soEtening
of positions in response to strong pressures. The quesdon is: if suc-
cess Is one of the maln incentives which encourage such groups to
car:y on, how long will they sustain their pc+essures without the
prospect of visible rESUItsT
Goverament power is also a changing variabie. Its strength
depends not only on lts numerical power Ithe number of votes the
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coalltlon commands in r~ladon w the opposidonl but elso on its in�
ternal cohesion, on the pressw~es nC the vnrious facdons within the
pa~rttes, etc, A'weak' government is more llkely to respond more ~
e~sUy to outside presaures, especially when these have tr~d~donal�
- ly be~n ntunbered among their supporters, -
Reladons between the groups and the government e~re almost a
matter of tred~don, bespite the groups' denl~l nf being 'pc~littcal',
many of them in fect funcdon withln politiCal constellations from
whlch it would be difT'icultw detecl~ them, Only e few groups ere at
the centre of such consteUauons li.e� maintalr? open connecdons
with e specific party, such es the Greater Land of Israel Movement '
with the I.Ikudl, but many more function witliln them, albeit on
their fringes. ~
The amount of intluence exerted by the group on public policy
depends on how close thev are to the government in values and
power resources, and how,arge their demands are, Groups which �
are closer w the government, such as the Rafah settlers, are likely
to bring about greater changes in poli~cal declsions, without any
reledon to their objective power or resources.
During Israel's first thirty years its government showed a
~ t~ndency to respond to strong group pressures, although there are
so~e who hold that this response was only super8cial. The
absence of manifestations of mass violence in Israeli politics seema
to point to the government's responsiveness to group pressures, e
view which is elso supported by other facts. Despite the cenvalism
_ of the Israeli potitical system, i! offers e wlde range of channels of
Influence on policies and politicians. A deprived minority will
always find an opposition party or less deprived sector in a large
public organization which will be glad to represent its interests. ,
Legitimation and Succ~ess
A twofold question arises in a discussion of interest groups in Israel:
lal how much legitimizetion do the groups gatn and how well do
they sustain it? and Ibl how fnr do the groups succeed in
maintaining their separateness from the stateT
Interest groups appear tc be geining legitimization in Israel. The
test of this is in their very existence and in the range of' thetr
activides. Interest groups have grown markedly in Israel, both
with regard to swctur~es and procedures. They heve increased in
number, their impact is greater, and it eppears, although no
conclusive research has yet been done on the subject,'that their
confidence is growing. The proposal to set up a group to intluer~ce
the government will not be as lighdy dismissed today as it was in
the past, and it will be easier to harness the resources to do so.
Groups are active in every area of public life and in many difFerent
6elds. The League of Use~ of Public Transport, The Society for tha
Preservat3on of the Heritege of Iranian Jewry, and the Peace Now
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movement ac~e only n few ex~mples of the newer interest groups,
Stress ia stlll plnr,~d nn tho public intorest, Even a qroup of sailnrs
demanding a wego rise wlll play down the economic basis of th~ir
demand ~nd stress their attempt to tmprove the situadun oC the
Iaraell navy, The basis of legitimlzatlon sWl focuses on ideals
rather than lnterests, One of the paradoxes of the Isreell potidcal
system is the multipllcity af parttes on the nne hand and the
sanctificat~on of uniry -~n other words, the r~ecdon of group
essoclation - on the other. This phenomenon may be wderstood In
the light of the dif4'erent goals of the party and the group. The goels
of the fot~mer are seen as 'natlonal', albeit from a spec(fic point of ~
view, whereas those of the latter are based on 'self Interest'.
The second question Ls more complex and has no clear�cut
answec, The pa~rties still control mattars in Israel, with the result
that the 'spontaneous' founding and operadon of interest groups is
quite otten organlzed &om above. This mey be readlly understood _
in the llght of the crucial roles played by the parties in the process of
' nedon�building, which demanded the integradon of difl'erent
social elements and did not grant legitimizetion W divisions on the
besls of Interests.
At the same time, changes are taking place in Israeli society -
changes of which the recent transfer of power was only one
expresston. The change of government revealed that there were _
four types of interest groups, distinguished by thely degree of
Independence fmm, or integretion with, the government:
Ia) Integrated groups. These are groups which constltute almost
an arm of the governmen~ They include (1) groups whtch are
socio-economically and fdeologically close w the polidcal ~lite.
Under the labour government these were mainly the kibbutz
and moshav movements and Histadrut; while the -
Ltkud government is closer to the liberal party associations of
industrialists and businessmen. The change in regime led to a
change in the groups, but not In the pattern of Interaction
between them and the central polidcal insdtutions.121 This
category also includes ~ groups which are ideologically
'neutral', acting as regulatory mechanisms of the government -
rather than expressing special group interests, such as the em
vironmental and consumer groups, etc. As under the previous
regime, the latter are under state patronage and continue their
previous patterns of activity. although here and there changes
in the leadership have taken place.
(b) Nori�Integrated - Here, too, we &nd two types of groups: (1)
those which the government depends on for the smooth
functioning of socio�economic life in the country Isuch es the
Histediut and its subdivlsionsl, and (2! the opposidon groups.
Whlle the positive tie that e~sted between the government
and the Histadrut {n the past has been replaced by a dependent
reletionship, there is still close cooperadon between the two.
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In the opposition groups, the polidcal organization whlch
, ruled Israel for a genoretton found an additional channel for
polidcal activity. The organizadon of interest groups
consdtuted an acdve extra�parliementary oppos{tion to the
ne w regime, The outstending example of this is the Peace Now _
movement, whose members share common vlews regarding
forelgn and securlty policy.
In between these categories are ephemeral, polldcally neutral,
organizacions which emerge to meet the needs of their members
and have no obvious oonnectlons with the government. The impect
- of these groups on government decisions iS very wesk and they
make little impression on the public. , -
The future is hard to predict. Interest groups are only one piece in
the Jigsaw puzzle of the polltical system in Israel, which hes up W _
now rested on a broad netlonal consensus regarding the goals of
Zionism. This consensus has never been seriously challenged and
has placed personal lor personal�group) interests low on its scale of
velues. The shattering of this consensus, or one cridcal change ia
the system, may lead to drastic changes not only in the nature of
interest groups in Israel but in the entire political system.
COPYRIGHT: The Middle East Institute, Jerusalem
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SAUDI ARABIA -
ROYAL SUCCESSION POSSIBILITIES VIEWED
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English May 79 pp 25-28
[Text] Internal movee to put t~e Houee of ~aud in order, possibly
culminating in a oabinet reebuf$e and e reeolution of the
eu~eceeeion problem, hsve enabled the oil-rich Arab etate to throw
ite wefght on one eide of the ecalee caueing eatisfaction in the Arab
world and diemsy in America. Tew~ik Mishlawi in Beirut examines
the emerging renlitiee and oil policies in this new light. Bob Lebling
in Waehington reviewe the Ul9-9audi "epecial relationehip", while
Mark Bruzonksy reporte on poeeible U8 anti-boycott meaeureB that
may further etrain relatione.
C rown Prlnce Fahd of 9eudi Arabia left
Riyadh unexpectedly in Merch for what Faieal. Since then, Fahd hae
an ofHcial ennouncement 24 houre later been the principsl power-wielder
called "medical checkupe" in Spain, Thie in the deeert Kingdom that eits
Mp, coming et a crucial moment in the on the world's largest oil reeerves.
hietory of Saudi Arabia and the Middle Eeet A few dsya before his un-
ee a whole, caueed c~oneiderable concern and echeduled trip to Spain, Prince
snxiety in royal cuclee, Fahd had presided over a etormy
The ailing King Khaled, hitherto seen cabinet meeting. At the top of
mainly es a figurehead, euddenly began to
s~~ ~~~i~ by ~g the agenda were the Egyptian-
pereonai charge of etate at~'aire, including Ieraeli peace treaty, which hae
foreign policy, Government eourcee in divided the Arab world, and U3-
Riyedh, confueed and bewildered Saudi relatione, which hsve been
b etrained for over a year.
y pereietent rumoure of a It wea perhape the ftret time
oonflict among the prfnces, thst Saudi leadere hsd found
wondered whether thie could themselvee in euch s highly
merk the end of Fshd's role and complex eituation where crucial
the beginning of Kheled e
effective control. decieions hsd to be made quickly
For nearly four yeere, Crown to maintain the Kingdom's pre-
Prince Fahd, who is also ~ret eminent position and influence
Deputy Prime Minieter, hes been ' in the region, ~ es`pecialIy after the Iranisn -
handling affaire of the etate on revolution.
the atrength of s written Preeident Sadat'e eeneational drive for
authorieation from the King, peace with lerael wse a formidable challenge
dated 3 April 1976, a few weeke to Ryadh, which has been hie principal
after the aseeseiz~ation of King political and financial eupporter eince he
became Preeident nine years ago. �
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~nR d~~~cini, vs~ dNi.Y
It had been decided laet year to leave '~e ~'?t vieit ta 3aud1
Sedet frep tn pnacttee hie dramutt~ Arebta by UJ befenee Secret~ry
dlplnm~cy ar lon~ de he kept hie promiee to NarolQ g~vwn was ~aid to t~ve
brtr~g about e oompreheneive peace r~ttl~� bmuqht the ronHict bet+~en the
ment, two gt�upe ta a heed. 5iy,nificettdy, wl~en
~~t in eubeeyu~nt mnnthe, 8audi Arabf~, p~ Abduli~h, the
Natia~al Cuatd Cnmmar~dpr, h~d elrpady
' like other coneen~etive Areb ~t~tee, be~ame tot ~ vi~it 1a 3yria, where hr jtw~td
increaeingly eceptir.~! ~bout the initietive. gydan Defet?a Miniater Majcrr�Ceneral
The uncertaintv kept dormant the eeede of ~ ,
die te b~tween ri~~al Mt~fa'1'tae in ~n tnepe~tion wurnf Sytisn
pu princee within thp p~ititx~e far.ing Iar~l. M ~ key
Saudi rcn~al famil~, ~g~ ~ S~udi recu~ity, AbdulWh
- Ae time went by, de~~elopmenW [n thp ~
region medp Seudi leadere reeliee that Ypd rt home Cor the twlke
the decieieme had to be taken, and ~~d�
differencee of opinion n~~er whet policv to ~~~�Ut N�'rth
edopt could no longer be igntired, The cruz Ye�~ ~~t'~ Ytmen
of the dleagreement wae whether or not ~~~b~'~ Mini"ter Pri~e
Seudi Arabta ehnvld eupport the U9� SW~� ~'~~d""
~poneored peece efforta between ~qypt ~nd ~~Y ~d t~~alied the 1,~man S~udi
lerael. aontjet~es~t ~erving with the Arab I)etett+ent
'1'he Htat ~7ctim of thie conflict ot viewe ~t~roe in Lebrtwn. O~ally thi~ mwe wa~
waA Kamel Adham, the 80-yeat�ntd politir.~l ~ Y~~ ~+Q
edvieor to King Khaled and to hie P~ n~en in the Middle ~ut wid
predeceseor, F'aieaL A teree ofEicisl an� tl~Srud'uuvemact~cd.
nouncement three mnnthe ago eaid King C~~t ~~~~7' K~ ~+'e
Khaled had eccepted Adham'e eeeig~atlon, frditiondly Icrpt ~ec~+et but ~peculative
but qave no explanation. Unofficiel reporte
eaid Adham w�ae e eteunch advocate of ~~~~Yal F~mi1y. Some wun~n
greater Saudi eupport for F'reeident Sedat'e Sulten, wlx~ ie etfectivelv
peare initiati~�e and cla,er co-~peration with ~ ~ ~ ~y ~ ~
the U5. ~~I ~"P~'~'~~'~ bY hi~ riv+~l,
Adhsm'e diemieeal wes the PrtnoeAbdulW~.
fuet indication of e~vwing Arab ~d KP~ ~d that Prina Ab�
nationaliet ttYnd within che duil~h h~d deployed the bulk d hir 36,OU0�
rulinx femily towarde caution in ~
N~
relecione with ttte US end
- eeetteint o~er Sadet'e drive for tkh t~ion from the twt dthe oountry.
peece. Thie trend is repottcdly Ca+6rtnat~~on at this ~s nearly impoeribk
led tn~ Secvnd Deputy F'remier but tbe tivalry bet~een Abdullah ~ad
Prince Abdullah Ibn-Abdel�Aziz, s~ ~~llY teaaeded a~ an open
who ie aleo Commander of the ~et. and botb ~te kttowc to hitve
tiational Guerd. He ie suppotted ambltioos towat+dr t6e thtvne.
~ !n� Foreign Miniater Prince Seud On the w6ok, it ~eem~ tls~t t6e
al�feiaal, :~ationel Secutity aatimalist Baa1t i~ ~ainina in in8uence af
Chief Prince Muteab and the eho~n by o~'icW $audi wpport tot Arab
Gcn~emor of Riyedh, Prince l~e+dlinets oppwed to the F.~yptian�iaraeli
+ 5alman. pe~oe treaty. Tbe new. moc+e active tok d
On the nppoeite eide are key 87�ywr~old Kinr K~~a1~d ma~y be p~ttly
prvV~'eet membe~ of the ~inyal nsp~w bk fa thii.
Femih~ who ad~rocate formal Ia an iatervitw writb a Lebu~e
' long�terrh eecurity arrangementa puMicatian on 1 Apil King Khalr~d
N7~It the US. Thia group ie dtteavricslly denied U5 intelligenoe t+epate
ieportedly led by Crawn Prince that be planned to abdinte in ~iu montlu
Fahd, and includee Defence & timt 6or health etror~e. Atl,er two suceeaeful
Aviation P~iniater Prince Sultan open-htart opentiocu, 6e iaid, he [dt yMdl
Ibn�Abdel�Aziz. Interior ~ad wu fully apable of carryin` out h~
Minieter Prince tieyef and Oil ~+e~ooiibilities.
Minieter Shnikh Ahmad Zeki
Yamani. who, tho~agh nat a
member oi ihe Royal ~amily,
a~elde rnneidereble power.
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~'0[t Ot~l?fCtAL U5~ ONLY
tn tltr ubr~c~e of ~tinoe ~ehd, he rroeived Mittiet~t t~f etute Tehet hae repeet~edly
fot+ei~n dtate~mpn including Ku'
~Nueanin nf atgu~d for a luw level c~f' producticm ta cnn�
Jadan and k~dent Ahtnad Heiwn H~Icr r~rvp the netiun'e reenuroee, Yansar?i, nn tl~
d
of ttMq, ttpIxd co lettten ~rom oeher he~di af a,her ha~~d believee 9sudi Arabia b duty
~4te and aontedkd 5auc~i policy at tLe bcwnd ta meet. the woTld'e oil neede and
B~~d axtfermcr wo
Minirttr 3aud ai.~diarl,~~
htr~,~~g�~~ ehould eneure etability in the fntemeticmal
~5audi delegatian w ~u eoon�my~
pport Arab punitive A third, but pa4wpe leee onndpic~,
G~ie~ ~a~ ~~~�'~r thr itete� oontroverey ctimcxmr the Army and
Pired inform~tion media gevr pro. Nuticmel Guerd, prince Sultan, tt~ tkfen~e
minence W hie activitier w~ r daily baw. Minieter, has bpen trying tu puEh plene tor
'Che dr~matic nutcntne nf thp c~nfrtmce enpanding and et~engt}~enin8 the Army and
ww ~ gvod indicatinn o[ exeMlv who wiu Atr ~orne~ with c~on~criptinn goinq into egert
It~ining thr upper hand in 5audl Anbi~. thL yeu. Natianel Guar~d Commander
VVe~tem dipinmatic eotuti,,ee In Jeddah tww Prina Abdt~llah view~ thie with euepicion.
make no ~erret of what they raU t6e 't'!~e nat~oneliet princes believe th~re are
"etruggle for inHuence" betM^ea~ the limite W whst a etra~g and wphi~ticated
"~N'~" and the "dovee" in the Ray army can dn. Tlky are eware of the rialu en�
~amily. Thr diplomab Insiet. haMevrr, the~ t~iled in buyiry~ ooetly weapune at the
thie ie not a"etruggle for pvwer,~ aimed et eYpen~e nf eoorwmic dev~elopment and they
rn�erthiowin~ the mnnarrhy or changing the know that eupemonic t'ighter~ and nther sd�
4~~m of go~�emment. vanoed weapvne vrill do li~.le to F?t~eerve in�
Un the rontrary, t~one of' t}~ p~~ tert~l eecurity,
wishe~ t~~ ~ee the monarthy overthto~m, Furthtrmcme. elthough they are intereeted
'"I'hey ail ha~�e an intetemt in keeping it. tor in limited militery aroper~ti~n with the
if it quen, the~, w7wld ell loee," one dip~omet U5, tlky do ncrt went WeshingtAn to intrude
s~cid. 'I'he lact that the conHict has bea~ eo too fer int~ Saudi alYaini. While admittiry~
ts,ctfully contained. thanlci tn Ki~g the need for US oo-opetetion end eupport
Kheled's patemat and conciliatory ~pJ~, ~Y P~er W keep tithtr optione open, by
ehows clearly that the edv~~ arc keen reletione with the Mab
~ ~o pre~en~e a neceaeary minimum of handline etetea. and even hinting et the
rohe,ion end solideriry in the family. pasible eetabliehment of diplomatic
UwallY informed eources in e+elatiune with the Soviet Union.
hcn+�ever, forrcast that there vviil 'Ihe ckareet example of thix new trend in
cabinet re~hufHe in which Crown Prince Saudi policy came fix~m Cvmmerce Minister
~ahd, who (eeV 1et drn.~n by the drematic S~~ ~~m, who eaid in e reant
tNiat in Saudi foreil~ polir~. will take v~Yr eP~h in the IJS, "I hope we don't run into
the ~oceiqn Minietrv. foreign Minister d~~1ty or vaireelistic eipectatione We
5aud el-Paiaal will be put in charK~e dOil & will have t~wble ir: aur reletionship if you
MineraG. rtplacing Yaman4 who will ~ ue to force other oil produa~ to hold
Faecome MiniRter of Ptanning. 'I'he pre~en~ ~'n P~~ and to promote accep~tance d'
_ ltini+ter of !'larviing. Hi~hnm e1�;~Taze~. w~l ~~'pu~-~aeli peaoe Uenty by dher
becumeAmban,adrntothe(,ts, Arab countriee and Paleetinian
'1'he ~�exed i~ue d the succeeeion hae Y~ ~ count on ~~ur
epParentiy been ?eeolved. with Fehd firat in mod~ate attitude in both eleas if ynur ~ide,
line follu?~~ed by prina Abdullah end chm P~+cularly Cot~reee~ under~tarxle that
Prince `ultan. Although thie ~eeme to there are limite to what we can do.�,
prePen�e the balenre t~etween the tw~o Hut Solaim'e temarlca wet,e apper+ently
cam~,, it in fact maintaine the vptimietic aompaied with what the Gcn�ern-
predorninence vf the nationaliata, {a Fa}d ment wei planning at hvme. Saudi endon~e-
i~ nc~t in Ka~d health. In the event ot ~ ment of the boyoott of Egypt eurprieed even
tihaled'e death. thettfore. real pon~er w~ou)d ~ the Arab herdline~s. let alone the US. E~'Pt
probabl~� de~+~ke upon Abdulleh. aad Iarael. For the Americarffi it wee e let�
bifierenc~a betv?'cen the tvw camps do+va; the F.gyptians saw it ae a etab in the
~tend be?ond f~xeign Policy Shaikh back: for the Arab hacdliners it wae e major
Yamani end Fw~ Cbef Deputy. Abdel�Eiedi ~~~5'�
al-Taher, the Govetncx d Petevmin, haye like r:x~et dher Arab ccxintried. Saudi
be~en leadin~ rivel current~ d thovght vn oil. Arabia ineista on e"jtut and oc~mpreF?erai~~e
pmductian Pc~~cY. anc~r oontrovasial peea" eettlement in the Middle Ea~+t be~ed
iaeue on which Policymake~ are s~~arp:; on oomplete tsraeli e~ncuadon of all Areb
divided.
39
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~OIt O~~ICIAL US~ t~NLY
temu~rie~ ~?c~cupied durinK thr 1fl67 war, in� estebliehing a~ignificant utronqhold in the
cluding the Areb rec,~tar uf Jecuealem, nnd
reoognitinn of the leg4timatc righb c~' the ~W�� Yemen, the Marxiet
Paleetintan people, inCluding the right ta ~~tly been forcpd to toe the
etlf�determination and ~tatehond. Unlike Areb line. Ryedh e re~xnt mutunl�~erurity
the redicel etate~+, hawr~~er, 5nudi Arebie p~M ~ Baath Sorialiet regime in Iraq,
waa ready u> euppurt Yres,dent Curter'e (ee~ Tareq A:it intcrview p~9), where e
~ece ellort prtn�ided em~ nettlem~nt weu+ h~ ~u~~munl~t cemprian he~ been
ba~eci on theee amditinne, under wey, ~hcriw an undenw~ding on the
A eeperete ~gy~pt�I9fAp~l peace, nn the P~, leaden that t1~e $yrian end
ather hand. wa~ cc~mpletely unercepteble. ~q~ ~~v, while aroperettng cloeely
Nardlinern in Uamasrue, geghdsd, Tripoli, Maecow~ ere ideologicelly oppoeed w
and Algie?a were viewed with n d C0m��~~'
psthy in Riyedh, and th_ pregeu~re
mount
d. 1"he Saudie are adept at uaing a com-
The tightmpe poiicy which Saudi Arabie binetion of moneybe~t diplomscy and
hed bern pu~icy~ dina Sedat'e vinit to I~lamic kadee'hip w maintain their in�
Jm~ualem in Ncw~ember 19?7 was no tonger Mab etata and the
ecaptable, u~d a derieion had to be made. P~~ ~8ani~atione. Steengthen~nB
,~You're arith the Atabs cx egainet the Arabe~ Aceb wlfderity, e~hancing blam ind
there is no third way," iraqi E'RSident Beicr helping tt~e poorer Areb etetee cwt of their
told the $eghdsd eonference. finencial difficulties are enough to keep
Soviet aommuni~m awsy, they argue.
3everal factan icwfluencid the Seudi i~'oceiga Minister Saud al�Faisal recendy
decieion. Apact Gvm the preaeut+e at home,
Ssudl kadees v~e deeply oonoemed about ~~t the mnin cause of inatability in the
regional developa~ente like the trvolution in Middle Eest wne not Soviet influence, but
Iran, the Syri~�Ireqi reppeochemrnt, larael e oavpetion of Mab land+. Thue he
Soviet e:psruiao ie Aaie and the Hom o[ Pi"P~~ the fundamental differecke
Africa and the amitude of the U5. betw~een Saudi Arabia end the US. Seudi
Saudi Arabie h~ theee principal objetts Arabia eeems to heve realieed w~?ere ib in-
in the Middle F~st: w keep the USSR out d t~erests lie. And the US would do w~ell to un-
the tegion, to maintain Areb solidarity. deretand that ha~ing Saudi Arabie ineide -
~ w~der Seudi le~da~iup if poeeibk. aru! to ~~b fold could be an edvantaqe.
~chie~ti a juBt ~dtlement of tM Arab~Iarael Saudi Arabia has ite m+r ~?ey of retaining
oon8ict. AU an d cqual impoctana. but ~~*~P ~ the Arab world, not by Naeeer-
Waehin~ton ha~ faited to appreciete thi~. styk demagogy but by subtle diplomacy.
Saudi leadas wRre clearly not pleaeed with like otha oonservative regimea. it neva~
Pce~ident Certer'e Runboat dipbmacy wanted to kad, aily to influence.
eimed at protecting them against Soviet- Ite immediate concem ie for the liS to un- _
inspired agitation in the erea. ~d T~ ~udie hate to be
Despite differences in Areb socisl P~+ and will react redicslly undet
eysteme. the Saudis fvmly believe that T~ �i'~ t� wait peuendy
So~1et rnmmuni~m has little chance of for a Middle Eest ~ettlement, but not foc
ever.
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5AUDI ARABIA
YAMANI WOULD DOIJBLE PRODUCTION FOR PEACE
London THE MIDDLE EAST in Englieh May 79 p 28
(Excerpt]
In an e~'oct o~rEimul~te wodd taterat in the s~ Ahm~d Zvc Yaroani, ttk
~nrch Ior a ju~t a~d oompoebensive ~ett]e� architect of Saudi Mbi~'~ oil pdicy,
ment ot the Mb-Lc~el~ oonflict, Saudi ~ thL ~~"double edgrd weapon,"
Mbia is ~~udouble ib oil productio~~, ~iowevet the mini~ter. quite ewat+e af hie
noa ~+ound 9 m~lian ban+eL a day. oountry'~ al ~neosth, ha come up anth an
"We will aot bedtate Lo pc+oduoe twioe eu embar~o d a Ji~aent lcind. Thir, ~din6
much d we ~n peaducins now, if tlut to wuro~s clore to him. arouW require Saudi
Arabia to loeep ib preaat kveL of pm�
~ettlement tn ~ Middle
F~ist,'k 3ap
tdi dudiaa u~d rlow w~odd demand to grow.
~avemment ~ouroer told Thc Middfe Ewt Eventually t6e imp~ct d wch e poGcy
reoa~tly. aould be juet a~ bi~ r an outtis6t embargo.
Without wrh peaoe~ tbeY ~dded, "tbee+e T~ aP~ ~ the Saudi Govemment
- will continue te be a tight dl merlcet, aod he~ r6elved a detailed t~echnic~l and
oil-aoruumees �~71 hsve to inteoafy t6eir ~cmomic plao" 6om the Arabian�American
eearch for w6ditute iourees af ~~W~7?. (ARAMCO), 6or e:pendin8
bably more e:pensive to find d~
p,~, the aountry'~ a7 pavductioe capaaty to 16
The Seudis aee in a poeitiat to ~ay that~ ~ Pa daY until "more
' But they cuk aut ~a oil emb~e~o ~imilar to favourable aooditians emer~r". 'Ihe plnn =
thdt impoeed d~ the 1973 Arab-Lraeli he~ been ahelved "ev~en tbough it hed been
wnr. P~+~Pnred at tbe request", the
eourcYe eaid.
COPYRIGEiT: 1979 IC Magazines Ltd
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- ' WESTERN S~AHARA
MIISTARY SITUATION VIEWID AS FAYORAB?~E TO POLISARIO
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Mino Vignolo: "Haw the Armed Vanguard of FOI,ISARIO Lives and
Operates 3n the Western Sahara; In the Desert With the Tactics of American
Indians"]
(Text~ ~om our special correspondent in the Western Sahara--In this corn~r
of the Sahara one fights and one dies in silence. The spotlights of the
international political scene are focused somewhere else and make people
forget that a ferocious war is in full swing in one of the most desolate and
fascinating places in the world. For its right to existence the people of the
Sahel [Saharaui] are fighting for a stretch of xind-lashed rocks and sand,
almost as large as Italy, against the men of a king who does not want to give
up his dream of bringing about a rebirth of "the Great Nbrocco."
This is a people that suffers within the extensive tent-cities around Tinduf,
the Algerian city situated at the crossroads of the frontiers between Algeria,
Morocco, Mauritania and Western Sahara, and within the great centers on the
Atlantic Coast which is still occupied by the Moroccans and Mauritanians who
3 years ago received this portion of the Sahara as a gift f'rom Spain.
_ At E1 Aaiun, at Dakhla (formerly Vila Cisneros), at La Guera and Tichla life
has been an inferno for those Saharani who failed to escape before the arrival
of "invader" Auteh Ahmed Ould Baba, an imposing old man with a long gray beard,
who has just escaped fram the fo~mer Rio de Oro, that part of the territory -
Which today is occupied by the Mauritanians with the aid of Moroccan troops. -
The old man led a ma.rch across the desert leading to freedom 123 persons among
whom were the elderly, the women, and the children who were living at Dakhla.
"We avoided those zones patrolled by Moroccan aircraft; we de~red hunger, cold
and thirst, because we could no longer endure living sub3ected to the foreigner.
Thefts, torture, sex abuse...these are the rule in the occupied cities. Every
Saharan has a dream of living in an independent Sahara." The deteruu.nation of
these people leave an impression upon the observer. Everyone is fighting his
battle for independence; they are all guerrillas. There has never been a
census taken of these nomadic "chilciren oP the clouds." Estim,ates run from
350,00o to one million persons; the more frequently mentioned number is
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75~,~~ ~r H~drami, memb~r of the ~:xecutive Commititie~ of
I'dLISAit~O
(popul~r Front for the Liberation nf Saguia El H~mra and Rin de Oro) told ~
us: "When Qod created the World He gave this portiinn of the Sahura to the
Saharatti. mhis is our land and h~s be~n so aince th~ beginnin~ of t3.me.
We have never been either Moroccans or Algerians, nor Mauritanians. We have -
always fought for the preservation of our independence, and if need be we
shall continue to fight on against anybody." _
POLISARIO is something more th~n a 1.iberat3on movement. "It is the soul of
the people" as stated by Ahtned Baba Misken, an intellectual. who hails from
Tiris, region on the borders of Rio de Oro and Mauritania. In a few
instances an armed vanguard has thus blended in with the rest of the popula-
tion despite all sorts of difficu].ties. Mao's doctrine that every guerrilla
should move about within his society like a fish in water is being put fnto
_ full practice here. ~ver since 20 May 1973 the men of POLISARIO have been
fighting for the independence of their coutttry. The enemies have changed
and the Spanish colonialists have been replaced by the Moroccans and the
Mauretanians.
The Aiadrid Accord was the prize for the stroke of genius of Morocco's King
Hassan who launched the famous "green march" by hundreds of thousands of
poor devil.s sent on the gamble cal.culated to conquer this 1and. The Western
Sahara territory was a temptation because of its subsoil wea?~h, especially
for its enormous deposits of phosphates. In Madrid, Rabat and Nuakchott the
people thought that a handful of nomads could not rebel. This was failure
to take into account the character of the Sah~,,.rans who, after all, were known
for some time for their warlike qualities: "warriors, caravan raiders, a
maraudin~ and ferocious people." This was the opinion expressed in an off'i-
cial document of Moroccan emperor Sidi Mohamed back in the middle of the
seven hundreds. These were people who recognized no other authority but that
of God.
Todav La.nu Rovers have replaced the dromedaries and the rare horses; -
POLISHRIO's guerrillas, like their raiding guerrilla ancestors, appear from
nowhere; they strike and withdraw.
The Western Sa.hara has become a trap for the N,~roccan Ar~y involved in a war
of attrition. During the "Huari Boumediene" offensive, named in honor of the
great protector and which was launched on 1 January, the Saharan Liberation
Ariqy carried out more than 100 military operations even in southern Morocco.
Among the men of King Hassan the zone bounded by E1. Aaiun, Smara and Tan-Tan
is referred to as the "death triangle."
POLISARIO has invented the "desert guerrila." "We have demonstrated to the
world that we can fight and win in the desert." So stated Mohamed, a Saharan
youth whom we met in the course of a visit in a refugee camp in Dakhla Prov-
ince, this being a portion of the territory handed to Nlauritania by Madrid
_ r~st of which is naw a liberated zone. "With our light armaments we have
the upper hand over an ar~y which is considered to be one of the best in
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Africa and ts equ3.pp~d w3th he~,v~y arbil.~ery, bomb~r~ ~r~d helicopterg." ~'he
~iret rul~ of a gu~rr311~ 3g to hide. 7'her~ ar~ no trees here and no great
citi~s where it is ~ssy to disappear. How~v~r, ~or th~ S~h~ran youth the
desert 3.a not a~ naked~ as ~mpty, ~nd as flat as 3m~gined by a sbr~ng~r.
All you need to know ar~ itg mountainous promin~nces, the water wells, the
shelterg and t~ae sparse vegetation.
The S~harans have adapted ~h~ir traditional virtueg to the new ~xig~nc3~s.
From time 3mmemori~l the tr3bes of th3~ reg3on hav~ fdught against each
oth~r nnd against the ~erber tr3bes of the north. 7'hey have never laid
down their arms against the European invad~rs. The POLISA1tI0 Front deserves
most of the credit for overcoming tribal division and for creating a national
identity, thanks in part to the confining influence imposed by the drought
and the threat of the eneu~y beyond them.
The basic mater3al, namely the fighter, waa alreac~y th~re and it was ~ust a
matter of organ3zation. Every Saharatt comes out of a military "acsdertqr"
which is unique in the world. As a rule the recruit of a classic ar%y hag
never touched a r3fle and he does not have any idea of what combat is a11
about. For the Saharan the family rifle is a domestic thing with which he
has lived since birth and which he began to use in his adolescent years.
Thanks to the stories told to them by their elders during the long desert
nights, they learn the battles of the past by heart.
These involve centuriea of experience, of living history, and the entire
country (unknown and frightflil, in the eyes of a foreigner) becomes an i~ense
maneuvering ground and an enormous general headquarters map upon which tl~e
POLISARIO fighter learns his trade. Political mobilization has done the rest.
The Saharan warrior knows that he is fighting for freedom and for the exist-
ence of his people. The only difference between modern soldiers and their
ancestors is that the Land Rover and the Kalashnikov gun have replaced the
dromedary and the saber. The Land Rover has become the true queen of the
desert. Its speed and toughness, combined with t;he extraordinary ability of
the drivers, are making this vehicle into a deadly instrument of surprise
attack. They are kept uncovered so that the fire can be directed in all
dii�ections. The firepawer is impressive: either 10 men armed with the
Russian Kalashnikov light machinegun or the Belgian Pal type, or else eight
men armed w~ith a bazooka or a 105 cannon.
An operatiAn ordinarily carried out is the attack on convoys bringing fuel,
provisions and arms to fixed posts. These assaults take place between dunes
and depressions, using the same techniques of the American Indians who set
ambushes for the pioneers' caravans. Convoys are attacked at about noon when
- the reflection of the blinding sunlight is the greatest and when the first
signs of fatigue are felt. Tt is also the time which permits withdrawal at
, sunset. Usually groups of inechanics stay behind where the battle took place;
these are the soldiers who pa.tiently and expertly take apart a truck, an
ar.mored vehicle or I,and Rover-- daalaged or rendered useless--for the purpose
~~f obtaining spare parts from them.
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Off
icer~s of t;he Nbr~cCan ~toy~~ Arm~d ~'orces ~dmit with bitterne~g th~t th~
"gtroii ~.n th~ de~ert" prom9.gec1 ~o ~h~m ~ years ago by K3ng Hassun has turned
out to be ~n ill.usion. 7.'h~ f
3ret units h~d e~rrived fu11. ~onfid~nc~ that
they wou].d b~ rec~ived as l.iber~tdr~, but th~ ~cornful. r~fusal to do so on
th~ par~ of the popul~tion ~nd th~ f'1.ight t~ th~ r~fug~e camps o~' Alg~ri~ plus
the v3ctorious att~?cks nn the p~rt nf
the ~'OL~3A~0 sd1.d3.ers, undermi.n~d th~
mor~le of Hasg~.n's troopg. Add~d to ~his i~ th~: lack of' motivation; th~
- Nbrocc~n sd1.d3~r.who cgme h~re to fi~ht fbr the s~cred Cau~~ of th~ r~unifi-
c~tinn of
th~ fatherland 3g ful~ of doubts. He 3s b~g3nning to r~aliz~ th~t
he is risking his life to make it possibl~ for King H~ssan to s~ve his faC~.
The mflitary situation has wors~ned ~ver s3nae last summer after the fall of
Ould baddah's r~gime in Maur3tania ~nd the unilateral eeasefir~ decreed by
POLISARIO with resp~ct to the Mauritan3ans. ~ver since then tihe desert
~ttacks have b~en ~oncentr~ted on th~ Moroccans. Once 3so].$t~d, ~very b~?se
in the Western Sah~h~ b~~ome~ a targ~t of the S~haran~~ 7'he Nbroccan Armed
~'orces Headquarters ia recording hundreds of dead ~nd wounded ~nd great
losses in war materie].--all of ~his not in confrontation w3th a handf'ul of
rebels but with a real arn~y made up of warriors renewing thos~ ancient legends.
COPY~2IGHT: 1979 ~ditorial~ del "Corriere bella Serra" s.a.s.
7964
cso: 4404 ~
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