JPRS ID: 8500 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060011-2
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• Document Page Count: 58
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h~UK UI-r~l,1NL U5~ U~~~Y
JPRS L/85A0
6 June 19 79
TRANSLATIOyS Oy WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 34/79)
- ~ ~ ~
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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NO~C
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JPRS L/8500
.
6 Juna 1.979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 34/79)
CONT~NTS PAGE
F'~DCRAL REPUI3LIC OF GEEtMANY
i'roblems WiCh ~RG ~'oreign Aid ~�forrs OuClined -
(Mario it. Dederichs; 5"~RN, 26 Apr 79) 1
ShorCcomings in Nuclear Reactor Sa�eCy NoCed _
(Wolfgang BarChel, Peter Blechschmidt; STi:RN, 3 M~y 79). 4
FRAhCC
PFC Seen beclining in Strength
(Andre Lesueur; VALEURS ACTUELLE5, 7 May 79) 6
PSF's International Relations Secretary Interviewed
(Lionel Joseph Interview; PARIS MATCH, 11 May 79) 8
~'lighC Training Schools Receiving Alpha Jet Trainers 4~ . `
(Jean de Galard; AIR b COSMOS, 12 May 79) 11
Briefs
New 'L'HUt~tANITE' Editor 16
Approach to Cubans 16
_ POEtTUGAJ.
5oares Interviewed, Concerned Over President's Policies
(Mario Soares Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
30 Apr 79) 17
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CONTL'N'C5 (Contiinu~d) rn~e
Sl'AIN
I'ence ProspecCs for Basque Region Assesged .
(CAr1BI0 16, 13 May 79) 21 _
13~ckground lletails Given
~oreign Aff~irs Mini~ter Views Situation
Sgnch~z Urago Looks at Basque Problem, by ~'eXnando
Sanchez Drago
~ Views of Aueo~iomy Negotiator, by Antonio Fontan
PNV President Voices Vtews, G~rlos Gar.aicoechea
?nterview
Tarradellas' View of Basque Problem
Ma~or ~1.gures SCate Views
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COUNTRX SECTION FEDEFtAL REPUI3LIC 0~ G~RMANY
PROBL~MS WITH FRG ~OREIGN AID EFFORTS OUTLINED
Hamburg STEttN in German 26 Apr 79 pp 220-223
(Article by Msrio R. Dederichs: "'Risk a Failure Once in a While -
[Text] A atubborn bureaucracy, reluctant financing
and exaggerated FRG foreign aid failures are harming -
German foreign aid efforte.
The man from Baden who is ordinarily quiCe reserved was enthuaiaetic.
Rainer Of�ergeld, minister for economic cooperation, was fascinated when _
he was shown German pro~ecCs in Kanye in South Botswana--helpful inventions
for a country wiCh too much sun and not enough water: aolar ovena made
out of inetal boxes which bake bread in 5 hours; a windmill which operates
a waterpump; a power mill which in a few minutes ehells more kernela of _
the main food, eorghum, than a Botswana houaewife does in a day. Snys
Offergeld: "If thaC promises success, one must also risk a failure once
in a while."
During his firet year in the FRG Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ),
Offergeld has learned how cloaely success and failur~ are related when it
comes to foreign aid, for which Bonn is apending DM 4.7 billion in tax
money this year.
~ Even in Kanye, the decisive task of bringing technical improvements to the
people is still unsolved and a failure not imposaible. Offergeld says: ~
"If everything functioned as well there as it does here, we would not need
- any foreign aid." To be sure, to datE he has been spared any really big
failures; nevertheless, this is by no means an indication t'hat everything
is running smoothly:
On the Indonesian ieland of Jav~, Bonn will aband~n the Soropadan agricul-
tural pro~ect in July. On behalf of Offergeld's ministry, the FRG Society
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) invested DM 1.4 million and two German ex-
perts in the experiment of switching rice farmers to the higher-yield pro-
duction of corn, sorghum, soybeans and sweet potatoes. The awitch went
- well, but farmera were left high and dry with their producta--there is no
market for them. A BMZ expert complains that the GTZ and the Indoneaian
partners in the pro~ect "should have been better able to predict it."
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ron nr~~cznr. usc nrrLY
In ~gypt ~n attempti wae ~enrted a few weeke ngo tio sav~ the ~1 NnhdA gg-
riculCur~1 pro~ece (price tag: DM 16.5 million). A new pra~~ct direcCor
ie supposed ~o create order where hia predeceaeor took the third etep be-
fore taking care of the firat one. He had European cowe �lown in witllout
first inetructing the �ellahin in husbandry and �eeding. There were quar-
rels among the German experts and problems wieh Che ~gyptian administra-
tion, which assigned E1 Nahda to new agenciea severg~ times and thuB created
confusion as to ~urisdiction~
F'oreign-aid pnliCicians are now more ehan ever willing to admit mietakea.
Says GTZ Manager Hana-Joerg Elahorst: "We are continuously legrning new
things and knoco now that we could have done better with regard to many
~ pro~ecte." Offergeld, however, is nngry becauae Qovernment critics are
exaggerating failures and, as a consequence, are encouraging "a sentiment"
againat foreign aid "that ia unfortunately still wideLy prevalant among
the population." CDU experC Juergen Gerhard Todenhoefer, for instance,
brandished a half-finished accounting office report which criticized the
German Development Service (DED)--attached to the BMZ--for failures cost-
ing millions, massive mistakes in Che assignments of volunteers and sloppy
bookkeeping. In the meantime, the final verdict has been reached, and ac-
cording to the BMZ the accusations were dismissed as "not ~ustified, pre-
maCure and exaggerated."
~
Many develo~.~ing counCriea, however, consider German on-site preliminary
tests too thorc;~igh and too time-consuming. LasC year alone, the GTZ ap-
pointed 550 experts. "The Germana don't waste a single mark," said 2denek
Cervenka, director of research at the Scandinavian Africa Institute in
Uppsala, "but because of extremely bureaucratic and inflexible management
they are creating aid without real meaning. For instance in Costa Rica:
Because a third of the bauana harvest was rotting before being transported
overseas, DM 24 million was to be used to e~:pand Porto Li.mon, the Atlantic
seaport. That was in 1970. Subsequently, the Germans spent yeara exa-
mining and assessing. An agreement wae not reached until 1976 and con-
~ struction on the seaport (time of conatruction: 3 years) did not begin un-
til last year. In the meanCime, however, Japan expanded Puntarenas, Costa
Rica's Pacific seaport. It took only from 1972 till 1975.
Nevertheless, thorough preliminary studies can save a 1ot of money. For
instance, Bonn established the "economic infeasibility" of and withdrew
from the Egyptian Kattara Valle? project Chat would run into the billions. -
The object was to build an irr'_gation canal (employing atomic blasts) ex-
tending from the Mediterranean Sea to a desert vAlley located below sea
level. Anyway, the tests alone cost DM 11.3 million.
Bonn's aid is slow as well, because the enCire diplomatic apparatus with
_ foreign ministries and embassies has t~ be set in motion before an agree-
ment with a developing nation can be concluded. Moet of the Cime it takes
betwe~an 1 and 2 years before the concept reaches the final agreement. An _
addit:ional complication arises from the fact that pro~ects that take -
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several yeurs ~o compleCe (gpproxim~Cely on~-third o� all pro3~cCs) re-
quire tiha~ the government frequently has to renegotiae~ faur or �ive
eimes, because the lawa governing Che German budget restrict apecific and
- 1.egn1ly b~.nding financ~.~1 commitmente by the BMZ to a period ~f no mnre
than 2 year~. Being forced into "piecemeal �inattcing," a pro~ecC organi-
zer complainra, "makes continuoue planning impoesible. Suddenly the money
is available and pro~eces have to be found quickly," Nobody in the minie-
try is able to predict today how much money the Bundestag will approve
itt 1982, eay~~ for Peru or for Pakietan.
At any rate, it ia aupposed to be more than it has been to date. Bonn
has given its word before Che entire world: Acc.ording to a UN resolution,
- the FRG has agreed and is aupposed to increase ita share of foreign aid _
" Co 0.7 percent of its gross national product during this decade. In
1979, however, the real figure is only 0.27 percene, less than for most
of Che Western industrial nations. Conaequently, according to a con�i-
denCial government analyais, "the credibility of our argumenta euffers on
the whole in international negotiations"--in the near future at the Manila
World Trade Conference in May.
Whatever Offergeld ia concerned about, the chancellor is less disturbed.
Although the cabinet meeting on development problems decided this week on
a small supplement to foreign aid programs, Helmut Schmidt remains reser-
ved. "We are a small country and we are giving more than the entire S~-
~ viet Union," he proclaimed recently to petitionera in SouCh America. And
he is also not concerned about criticism in international meetinge: "Con-
� ferences like that have outlived their time. Ten yeare from now nobody
will talk about them any longer."
The chancellor seems to have a ehort memory. In 1973, when he was the
minister of finance, he promised to double the foreign sid share of the
FRG gross national product by 1978. Since then it has been reduced by
0.05 percent.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co
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COUNTItY S~CTZON FGAERAL R~PU~LYC OF GE1tMANY
SH~RTCOMINGS 'IN NUCL~AR REACTOR SAFETY NOTED
Hamburg STERN in German 3 May 79 pp 1'~9-201
LArCicle by Wolfganq Barthel, Peter Bl~ehachmidt; "A Hole in the Stack_'/ ,
/Text/ Federal Minister of the ?;?eeri~ar Gerherr Baum (FDP) has acknowledged
the citizens fears of the atom: The ~uts~anding critical quesCions musC now
be ~nswered." And even Kiel's Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU), up Co now a fen of
nuclear energy, is suddenly callfng for "a frank staCemenr of all findin~s."
That is Che end resulC of the near-catastrophe aC Harrisburg. ,
Only the German nuclear indusCry and the compet~nt supervisory end licensing
agencies are carrying on as before. They prefer Co discuss breakdowns and
mistakes behind closed dooors. There is, for example, Dr of Engineering
Wilhelm Schoch, member of the supervisory board of the Mannheim power plant
and of th~, Reactor Safety Commission (RSK). At an internal conference of
the nuclEar stack producer "KrafCwerk Union" ~(KWU) he reported"serioua dam-
age" and "dangerous crack~" in nuclear power plants. Then there is Dr of
~ Engineering Helmut Werner of the Strte Material Testing Institute ~(MPA) in
Stuttgart, who gave a lecture, comp?.ete with X-ray film, on cracka in nu-
clear power plants: "The faults described confirm the necessity to improve
basic safety."
Neither lecturea nor, of cou~rse, the X-ray film of the cracks have been pub-
lished so far. Yet Warner had been compelled to admit: "Phou~h these cracka
were up to 2.1 mm deep (while wall thicknesses range from 6.3-8 inn), the~~.+
were not initially spotCed by the inspection; the pipes were built in." In
June 1978 such a fracture in a live steam line had resulted in the eacape
of 145 tons of radicactive steam from the BrunabuetCel nuclear power plant. _
Schoch reported faults in feed water conteiners at Biblis A nuclear power
plant where cracks up Co 14 mm deep an.d 2~ meter long were found. The con- ~
Cainer wall is only 17 mm Chick.
To STERN both Schoch and Werner downplayed the significance of theae faults.
Schoch said: "We optimalized the construction materials by every means in
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our power, eo that a failure of pressurr tanks ie oue of the quesCion."
Werner's commenC; "All damage and faults were m~de good," The two experta
were not even willing to say in which nuclear power plants rhe X-ray film
- was tAken, The ma~ority came from Che Philippsburg T hot water reactor--
- nncl h nt wACer reactore are parCicularly prone to develop cracka.
_ Leak s and fractures, therefore~ are a conaCant topic at the meetinga of the
_ React or Sa�ety Commiasion, According to Che minutes of the 136th meeting,
Eor e xample, a report was given regarding ehe Isar nuclear power plant in
Ohu near Munich: "Another inspection of the diecharge linea found cracke up
_ to 40 mm wide running toward three circumferenti~il aeama."
With reference to the unfortunate Brunabuettel reactor, out of commiesion
- now f or a year, the RSK minutes complain that safety inspections "cannot -
- quite Avoid uncertainties" in view of amudgy welding seams at Che live ateam
, lines." Decoded this meana; The power p1anC may be but is noC necessarily
sa�e. The RSK minutes continue: "T~,e Stuttgart MPA poinrs out Chat in 1981
all o ri~inal interna], fixtures in the safety tenk...will be exchanged." And
- not onl,y thes~e, because the imp~rtant feed w~ter lines have lon~ ceased to _
be in good order.
Even the Kruemmel hot water re~ctor--though not even in service yet--is al-
ready demonstrating serious defects. Concerning the sheet connections aC
' the safety tank thp RSK briefly comments: "The construction does not meet
the a dvanced requirements with regard to the qualiCy of the safety tank."
L The e xperts eem not to have noticed that similar deaigna are used in the
- Isar and Brunsbuettel nuclear power plants.
Lately some doubts regarding safety seem indicated also for the Stade hydrau-
lic reactor (hitherCo considered a prize specimen), which has been operatinR
since 1972 and until now achieved 85 percent utilization, As far back as _
Janua ry 1976 Che RSK found that the reactor presaure vessel had become
brittle as the result of the action of the neuCrons freed by nuclear fiseion.
_ The RSK therefore called for a gr~ce program, according to which the reactor
would be operated at lower preasure and temperaturea--otherwiae the sa�ety
- of th e reactor (deaigned to serve for 40 yeara) could be guaranteed only up
to 1981.
On 20 May 1977 Prof Karl Kussmaul, director of the Stuttgart MPA, said in a
lette r Co the RSK: "I would like to stresa thaC U.S.light water nuclear power
plants do not use stronger steels liable to briCtle fracture." His summing
up: "Following Che obviously negative experiences af the past 7 years..,no
new nuclear power plants demonstrating an evidently smaller safety margin
than previously assumed should be Caken into service until all defects have
- been remedied."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co
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FOCt Ol~'FICIAL USI: ONLY
COUNTRY S~CTION
PFC SEEN DECLINING IN STRENGTH
Paris VALEURS ACTUELL~S in French 7 May 79 p 43
[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Communist Sociology"] _
[Texr] There is a posstbility that the Communist Party is in decline. This
is what Mr Jean Elleinstc~in, a hi~torian and one of the leaders of the dis- _
satisf3ed Communists, reports ~o VALEURS ACTUELLFS. It is also confirmed
by a geographical and sociological analysis of the are~s occupied by the
Communist Party.
A quick look at the results of the legislative elections reveals first of all
a continual erosion of its electorate, although it is slow. From 28.6 per-
cent in 1946 iC has shrunk to 20.55 percent in 1978, while passing through -
25.75 percent in 1956 and 22.5 percent in 1967. This phenomenon may be due
in part Co the reappearance of a strong socialist movement. And to the
improvement in living sCandards.
An analysis of its electorate also shows that the PC [Communist Party] seems =
to have lost the bet involved in the sCrategy called "the union of the
people of France." This consisted of making the PC, starting with the union
of the left, a greaC national party representing all strata of society on
the model of the Ita~ian Communist Party.
Now the PC is still - and this is its refuge as well essentially a workers'
party. According to an inquiry made by IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute],
its electorate is in fact 52 percent composed of factory workers and 15 per-
cent of office workers. As for the cadres, which the PC has tried to seduce,
specifically after 1974, they do not make up more than 2 percent of its
electorate. `
A more and more localized g~ographical spread corresponds to this very typical
- sociology of its electorate. The abandonment o~ the countryside as well as
the difficulties that the PC has in spreading its words o� order in a rural
setting explain the astonishing shrinkage of the Communists among the
peasants: the peasants do not represent more than 2 percent of. its voters,
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compared to more Chan 10 percenC in 1968. The consequence: the Commun~.sC
vote is more and more urb~n.
A scruCiny oL the map shows this: the zones under strong Communist in�luence
~re rhe most industrialized (the surroundinga o~ Par~s, north Pas-de-Calais,
Meurthe-eti-Moselle, Bouches-du-Rhone). A reading of the figures confirms
it: the PC �inds nearly 30 percent o� its strengCh in the region of Paris,
while this re$ion r.epresents only 17 percent oP the rrench populaCion.
Without pre~udicing Che "historic decline" which Mr Giscard d'LsCaing
promised, rhe "marginalization" of the Communist Party has been be~un by
Che "specialization" and the localizaCion of its voters.
As Far as Che party iCself is concerned, it is noC posaible to speak of a
decline. The PC is recruiCing, even if :its declared effectives (700,000
adherenes) arc much fewer tl~an tho~e that it claimed in 1946 (1 million).
However, Che organization really seems fragile.
First, the rate of rotaCion of the PC's members is unique in France: every
ye~r, 10 percent o� its member'ship is new. This mobiliCy resulCs without a
doubt from the mezhods of recruiting used by Che Communtsts, which are
adaPted to circumstances.
This rotation also implies that the majority of the adherents of ~he PC have
been members only a short time. Thus, three-quarters did not join ehe
Communist ParCy until aft~r the events of riay and June 1968. And more than
half of the present militants came to the Party after the signing of. the
common program in ~972. That explains the reticence of the base with regard
to the PC's withdrawal trom the union of the left.
However, those movements are practically without any consequence at the top.
Out of the 121 members of the Central Committee, only 22 joined the PC after _
de-Sralinization in 1956 and only one Mrs France Merlin after the
signing of the common program. Hence th~ stability of the apparatus.
The composition of the Party itself is a little closer to that of its
electorate. An inquiry carried out by the Political BureaL confirms it.
Mr Paul Laurent, secretary for organization, made the results pub~ic on
28 April: the effective militants of the PC are 51 percent factory workers
and technicians, 28 percent white-~collar workers, 11 percent intellectuals
(and teachers), 3 percent farmers, and 3.5 percent artisana and trades-
people. ~
The directing organisms do not contradict this image. Gut o~ 121 members on -
the Central Committee, 59 workers (or former workers) can be counted, 23
- teachers, 22 office workers, 11 middle- and upper-rank cadres and 6 farmers.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1979 "va].eurs actuelles"
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COUNTI2Y S~C~rrort F~ANCE
PSF'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SECRETARY INTEHVIE~:rED -
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 11 ~iay 79 P 43
Linterview with Lionel Joseph by Laurence i~Iasurel7
Lfiext7 At 41 ~ Lionel Joseph is nationa,l secretary of the PS~'9 -
responsible f~r international relations. -
_ L~uestion7 Now you are the number tw~ person in the Socialist
Party. Is it harc? to follow Pierre i~lauroy?
LAnswer7 In some respects~ I am not followin~ him; he was
concerned with party coordination~ and that is not one of my
- responsibilities. For the rest~ it isn't easy~ because I
c.on't have al1 the experience he had. But as I don't have
important duties in the provinces~ as he c~id~ I wil]. be more
available than he was. And besides I know this new party as
well as he did~ for he may have bel~eved a little too much in
the permanence of the old party.
~uestion7 But the party militants recognize Mauroy as the heir
of trad.itional social~.sm. That is not true of you~ is it?
LAnswer7 T:auroy's decisions in the past 6 months have cut
nim o.ff somewhat from traditional socialism. Besides~ you have
to understand that the new PS has had the time to create its
own tradition. I am a fairly ~ood expression of this tradi-
tion. And I will add that I am the son of a socialist who
joined the party in 1924. So the old tradition is by no means
alien to me.
L~uestion% I~Jhen someone looks at the new organization chart
of the PS~ do they get the impression that the new generation
has taken the place of the old one?
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L~nswe~ Nc~. ~h~re ~re severa~. pe~ple well ov~r 40 in the
secret~riat. But it was normal for a yaun~ party tid have
le~d~rs irom its dwn a~e group. Lve f~e1 tih~.s phase is necessary
tr bett~r "blerid" the PS ati head.
~ ~~,?uestin] Is ~hi:.~ ''re~uvenation" operatiion aimed ~gainst
R~c~rd7
~Answer~ Nn. $uti i~' Michel Rncarfl thinks so~ it is because
he has prr.~lerr with h~.s own you~h. When you are 50 years oia,
you have tic, ~ct your age .
LQuestion7 :!hy do you think Gedrges :~farchais refuses to con-
_ clude a nan-aggression pact with the P57
LAnswe) You just have to see t~iarchais' behavior on tielevison
to understand why our proposal might embarrass him. ~:is atti- _
tude actually ~ustifies our ~.rnposal. 47e will keep it open.
Lauestion7 Is the PC~ as h:itterran3 said~ looking f'or"allies"
other than the PS?
LAnswer7 Since the PC can not offer any political alternative
by itself (with less than 25 percent of the votes)~ and if it
cuts itself o�"f from its soctalist partner~ it might be tempted
to look �or other allies. But its groblem in such a case~ is
that the oth er political forces are not on~.y on the right~ but
are actually reactionary. So wh at sort of alliance can it have?
LQuestion7 But Marchais did say that "a new union has to be
built at the grass roots level, based on concrete ob~ectives
corresponding to the workers' needs."
LAnswer7 You always have to start froe~ the workers' needs.
That isn't the prabler~. The first problem is that the PC~
whatever it may say is taking no fnitiative toward any union
at the grass roots ~.evel~ and moreove:~ it is rejecting any
_ moves we make; the second problem is that it pushes off into
the future the union of the left, wnile the problems of the
workers nee~ attention now.
LQuestio] Do you feel tr.at the PC is definitely reno~ancing
the union of the 1E:ft strategy? -
LAnswe] Iv'o~ for it ~,roul~ then have to face ver;~ quickly the
most serious problem in its quite long history~ the problem
of the grass roots level, including those in the FC~ who want
a union of the left.
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LQu~stion7 bo you think you can dd as we~.1. or 10 June as ynu
did in t~ie cantonal e~.ections7
LAnawe) Yes ~ w~ w~ul.d be disappo~.ntied if we didn' ti. And
dc~ing betitier wnuld have very grea~ political significance.
COpY~ICHT: 1979 pgr cogedipres~e 5A
?679
cso: 3~00
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~Oit OF~ICIAL US~ UNLY
' COUNT1tY S~CTIbN FRANC~
FLICH'T TEtAINING 5CNOOL5 itEC~IVING ALPNA JET TRAINERS
pttrig Aitt & COSMOS in ~rench 12 May 79 pp 21-23
[Arti~le by Jenn de GalardJ
[Text~ ~or ell the world'g air forces Che arrival of a new aircraft in one
of the units of those forces always conetitutes a apecial event. In 1973,
within the sp~ce of 6 months, once with the arrival of the first Daseault-
Breguet Jagu~r aircraft (twin Rolla Royce/'Turbomeca Adour turbojet engines)
at the 7th ~ighter Squgdron ~t Saint-Uizier in June, and again with the arrival
of the first DaRSault-Breguet Mirage F1 aircrnft (5NECMA (National Company for
Aircraft Engine SCudy and ManufactureJ Atar 9K50 turbo~et engines at the 30th
Fighter Squndron gt Reims in December, the [FrenchJ Air Force Cwice experienced
such evente.
In 1979, with the arrival at the Instruction Base 705 at Tours, where the
Instruction Group 314 (GE 314)--otherwise known as the Christian Martell Fighter
5chool--is inatalled, of the French-German (Dassault-Breguet and Dornier) Alpha
Jet train~ng and combat aircraft (two SNECMA/Turbomeca Larzac enginas) the Air
~orce will again, 6 yegrs later, experience such an event.
~or it, and in particular fnr the Air Force School Co~and (CEAA), which has
direct ~urisdiction over the GE 314, the delivery of the Alphg Jet to the units
constitutes a grand "first" for more reasons than one.
~ In the first place, because the Alpha Jet was specifically designed aa a combat
training airplane and thi~ is the first time that the C~AA and GE 314 will
have avail,~ble an airplane which, from its initial $tudy phase, was designed
for training fighter pilots. Up to now the Fighter School and the CEAA, with
the T33 at 'Tours and Mqstere IV at Cazaux (8th Fighter Squadron), had available
two aircraft which had very largely served their time in the operational units.
Next, the excellent performance of the Alpha Jee as a trainer puts it close to
modern fighter airplanes which the student-pilots trained upon the Alpha Jet
will fly in Che ~nits. The operating attitudes, up to now between 15,000 and
25,000 feet with the 'f33, will henceforth be between 20,000 and 40,000 feet.
The equipment with which it is outf3tted (with ILS [instrument landing system]
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like the ~1 nnd inCidenc~ indic~tnr, lik~ th~ Jn~ugr} wi11 f~Cilit~e~ pr~p~rn-
eidn af ~eudent-pildt~ for np~rgtinn o� th~ir fu~ur~ ~rm~d ~irplnn~~~ B~sid~b
eh~y wi11 le~rn with n h3.gh perform~nce ~irplane how ea p~ll nut nf ~~pin. -
L~st, a fortungCe cnmbin~tinn af ~ircumgt~nc~s--in tihia c~~~ iti mUSt inde~d be
g~id ehgt ~nme d~l~y in gt~reing production of th~ fir~e ~irplan~~ b~~~u~~ ~f
~dminigtr~tiive glnwn~s~ ~nd, on ehe drh~r hgnd, p~r$igt~nt d~1ny~ 3.n realizgtion
nf infr~gtru~ture progr~ma ae the Tourg bae~ and in th~ ~cheduled d~~ivery of
rhe fir~t cnmpnnent pgrtg--has re~ulC~d in ehe Air ~nrc:e. ~or th~ fir~t tim~,
= having available nn aircraft whiGh is arriving et the uniCg wh~~ averything ie
r~ady Ca receive iC: mech~nics tr~ined, building~ compLeted~ ap~re peYt~
~rdGked, and in~truction manu~ls publi~hed.
~ ~specially for th~ ~igheer 5chnol, now und~r comrn~nd of Lt Col Mich~l Gaillu~d,
' who ig gssieted by hi~ eeCOnd in comcmnd, Lt Col Jgcquee Ft~tie, ~nd for a11
hi~ in~eructorg gnd m~chanicg (in Chis case the Sp~ci~liz~d Aircrgft Equipm~nt
SupporC gnd itepair Group 15/314 (CERMAS 15/314J under cnmmgnd of Ma~ Denis de
G~uville) th~ arriv~l of th~ A1ph~ J~t ig a breath of new 1if~. It eng~nderg
g new motivation in all per$ottnel wieh Ch~ view of putti.ng inCO operation,
upon the ground gnd in the air, an girplgne whoge outstendin!3 qunlitiee have
- already b~en empha~iz~d by the aircrgft type qualificgtion eenm, now at the
military Aircraft Test Center tCEAM) of Mont-de-Marsan, and which wi11 enable
higher perfnrmance, and hence more intere~ting, misgiong to be .lccompliehed.
For inetruction in general the Alpha Jet offerg the advane~g~ of having two
er?gineg which n~k~s it gafer and facilitatea application of pracedureg; it is
capable nf high performance and highly man~uverable, which makes poeaibl~ its
use under a wider range of flight conditione. Especially for the inetructora,
who generally occupy the rear aeat, it provides the two-fold advantage of
great comfort and excellent forward visibility, Which is importanC during ~
landings. ~ ~
Organization ~;t the Fighter School
In additid� to a staffing sectian, an operations office, and a studies director-
ate responsible for the courses of study and sup~rvision of student-pilot in-
struction on the ground and in the air, the GB 314 includes: a ground instruc-
tion squadron which provides the begianing courses for the young future pilote;
four flight instruction squadrons (EIV); one equadron, called the Standardizetian
Squadrnn (responsible for training instructors~ defining standardized pro-
cedures, final examination of students, and all missions outside the acupe nf
- instruc~f.on, properly speaking); and a squadron for oa-the-~round training of
flying personnel (responsible, in particular, for use of the Alpha Jet aimula-
tor; the first such has been in place and operational since the beginning of
the yedr; a second will be installed in June). The GE also supervises the
training provided to mechanics and pilots by the Mobile Inetruction Wing (EMI)--
so called because such a unit is usually moving from place to place ns required
by new ~quipment items in the various units in whose use pilots, mechanics,
and service personnel must be instructed. Instruction by the EMI is given by
25 mechanic-instructors from the Rochefort Technical School who have at their
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~o~ o~~rcint. us~ orn,Y
digpo~~~ ~ev~ral "e~aching mock-up~" (�11ght nontrol~, el~cericnl cir~uit~,
air coriditionin~, fu~1, w~~pnng, radie, ~nd navi~~Cinn) which en~bl~ ~tud~nt~
to be in~Cru~eed.
~nntruGtir~n ~ctivity nf th~ GE 314 in 1977 rppreeent~d 14,080 i'ligtte hour~ ~nd
gg cc~mmig~iong ~nnfprr~d (df which eight wer~ gr~need to fnreignerg ~nd ninp
tn n~vy p~rsdnn~l); in 19~8, 15,000 flighe hnurs gnd 100 cc~mmig~idng Confprred
(n~ which 14 w~re gr_~need tn fc~r~~gn~r~ nnd 13 Cn ngvy personn~l). AeeiviCy
plnnned for 1979 ig 15,400 h~urg (125 ~~nunigginn~, nf whtch J.~~ wi].1 be grant~d
to fdr~ign~re gnd 21 to n~vy p~rednn~l); by th~ ~nd of Apri1, 6,025 houre h~d
been r~xlized. Of the toC~1 r~maining it is plnnned Ch~C ~bout 2,60d hnur~ wi11
be ~C~eeeed with the Alph~ Jet. 7'h~ G~ c~ntemplat~a ueing each Alph~ Jet ~baut
Z5 hnurs p~r mdneh in th~ b~ginning~
B~fnre the Alpha Jet Arrived
~iefore ttie A1ph~ J~t ~rrived gt Tour~ iC w~n n~c~ssnry eo cnrry our an infrb-
struceure building program nn Che bage, principally for Che benefit of ehe
G~R1~tAS, respongibl~ fdr firgC echelon n~intenanre at ehe Ingtruction Bes~ 705
in ~ddiCion to prnviding g GERMA5 in Che unitg. 5hops were built, three hangar~
renovat~d, a pnint shop establieh~d fdr ehe first tim~, two ~et engin~ te~t
stands con~trucred, gnd a fabricgtion center and liquid oxygen depot ~rected.
T'he~e were Ch~ technical facilities whiCh had been deliberately giv~n priority.
Nane nf the GE instru~tion buildings were renovated. But the buildings to
house the gimulntors (mobilc cabing and breakdown cotmnand postg) gnd to hnuge
the mock-ups and ~tI benches were cnnsCructed.
As for the personnel, the arrival of the Alpha Jet at Tours was preceded by
the retraining of a nucleus of GE instr~~ctors and a first group of GERMAS
mechanics in the C~AM at Mont-de-Marsan.
At the beginning of May the G~ had nine instructors reCrained after 50 hours of
courses (1 we~k by the ~tI) and 23 hours 20 minu[es of flight t~me in 18 flights.
The Pighter 5chool on 8 May had six Alpha Jet girplanes. ~or its part, dn eh~t
date the C~RMA5 could count upnn some 45 mechanics, ~lso retrained at Mont-de-
Marsan (pr~ctical course) after havin8 taken an initigl course with the EMI
at Tours.
prAgressivc Entry Intn 5ervice
'Ihe first Alplia Jet of the ~ighter Schoal, pi2oted by Col Guy Cassagne, com-
manding officer of Instruction Base 705, landed at Tours on 3 May. The next
day five more Alpha Jet airplan~s coming from Mont-de-Mersan, accompanied by
two otherg from the C~t landed at Tours, under escort by th~ CE commanding
- officer.
$y the end nf rtay the ~ighter School will have 10 Alpha Jet airplanes at its
disposal. Between now and 30 June seven neW instructors will have been trained
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~n~ o~~ici~., us~ orn.Y
by the nine nnw r~eurned frnm Tnur~; beew~en th~ ~nd nf June ~nd 15 Augu~t
eh~re wi11 b~ 10 mdr~ di th~m~ At th~C tim~ the~~ 26 ingtructor~ wi11 be
divid~d b~eween the 1~e ~1fghC In~tru~einn 5quadrnn and Ctt~ St~ndnrdixuti~n
5qugdron~
Ie ig eh~ l~e ~light Ingtruction Squadron, equipp~d ~ntirely with A1ph~ Jet
~irpl~nee ~nd n11 of whne~ 1n~erucCorg will hav~ b~en reCrained, which wi11
. [gt~arringj 15 Auguge, prnvidp training and instrueti~n ea ehe firet group of
gtudenCg (~nming from ehe Schdol of Che Air ae 5alon) who will form the 79/b
clg~g, compleC~ly Crained upon Che Alphe Jet.
P1~ns for cdnv~r~ion th~r~~fter ro rh~ Alpha Jee nre ~g fnllnwe:
~rd ~IV--converaion ~ecnmplieh~d in M~y 1980; Che squndrdn wi11 then h~ve 27
Alph~ JeC airplnnes;
2nd ~YV--convereinn accompli~hed in October 1980 (42 airplnnes);
4th ~IV--c~nv~rsion accomplished at eh~ end of Febru~ry 1981 (52 airplanea);
and
5C~nd$rdixaCion Squndrdn--convnrsion accomplished et the end of June 1981
(65 ~irplanes, the full flcet planned for the GE).
In October 1981 the lst Squadron of the 8th Fighter Wing nt Cazuux will be
equipped with the Alpha Jeti; the 1tttCer, at the end of 1982, will huve 30 nir-
planes available in its two gquadrons.
Advantages of Training on the Alpha Jet
5tudent-pilot training on the T33 extended over 33 weeks (34 for non-commis-
sioned officera and fuCure officers) and includes in particular, 105 hours 30
, minutes of flying time in 82 flights. With the Alpha Jet the course of instruc-
tion will extend over 29 weeks (30 for non-commiseioned officere): 3 weeks of
ground instruction by the ~NII and in th~ simulntor; 3 weeks of progressive
instruction in EliQht up to t}~e class "cut"; 3 week~ of mixed instruction;
and ZO weeks of full time instruction in flight during which 89 hours 30
minutes of flying time will be effected in 71 flights. The gain is therefore
as follows: 4 weeks in the total course, 16 hours of flying time, and 11
flights. Of course, much recourse will be had tu the simulator which will be
used notably to have the student acquire a mental piloting process similar to
that he must have in [he air for piloting the aircraft, for controlling the
engines, and for the reflexive actiong (survival, emergency). The use of the
simulator will particularly permit saving a number (10) of actual flight hours
(blind flying at high altitude). It ia planned for the instruction to include
12 sessions in the simulator before the class "cut," nine of them pre-flight;
in total, 29 sessions during the full course of instruction, corresponding to
37 hours 20 minutes. By way of comparison let us point out Chat the future
Hawk pilots of the Royal Air Force spend 21 hours in 21 sessions in the simula-
tor; the future Alpha Jet pilots of the Belgian Air Force spend 25 houre in
25 sessions in the simulator.
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~OFt OF~ICIAL US~ dNLY
'~he prdgr~gginn nf th~ itt~Cru~tidn in flighe nn rh~ Alph~ .ree w~.ii not di�fer
appr~cigbly frdm th~t which hae been ~dopted fur training dn ehe T33. The
- gc~honl. comm~nd, c~rrainiy, in ehig ca~~ hag b~~n anxinua ro 3nnov~t~, but nor
en r~volutionize. 'Th~.~ wi11 be gn evnJ.ving program, p~rh~pe modi�ied in ~CCn~'d-
anCe wi~h lpggon~ l~~rned during iCa operation, or gt the end of the firse few
cdurs~g~ In gny evene it wi11 be compLeCely reviewed in 1981. witih Che arrival
nf Ch~ Alph~ JeC in th~ 8eh Wing for ehe purp~ae of bete~r adaptetion to �ight~r
~ircrgft~
In fnCC, it is nnt poggible eo cnnCemrlate establiehment nf ~"revoluCionnry"
ingeruceion program witn ~ new airplgne nnd, in ~ddition, wh31e ehe acCivity
of p wing ~4uipped with n n~w airpl~ne g~ner~lly decreg~eg in the weelcs fn].-
lowing ~rr{v~~. df eh~t ~irpl~ne, Cher~ cgn be no que~tiion of rh~ ~ighter Schaol'~
decre~ging its ~Criviey sinne rhe number of pilotg it muse erain ie going, on
Che contr~ry, Cd incrense ench year.
WiChin tihe scope of technical assistance, two representaeives of D~~sault-
greguet ~nd dne of SN~CMA-Turbomeca are now at Tours, after having been aC
Mont-de-rt~rsan. At present, periodic airfrgme inspections are planned every
600 hourg; the ~ngines wi~l be removed every 250 hours. These capabilieies
are gning to be grgdually increased.
COPYRIGHT: AIR & COSMOS, Paris, 1979
ii,7o6
C50: 3100
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;
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.
CbUNTRY SI:CT~ON ~~JC~
BRIEFS
NEW 'L'HiTMANIT~' ~DITOR--It~ne Andrieu, editor-in-chief of L'HUMANITE, will
probably be replaced soon by Franaette Lazard, his assiseant, who has ~ust
become ~ member of Che PCF Politburo. (Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in ~rench
25 May 79 p 83J
AF'PROACH TO CUBANS--France has approached the Cubans in an efforC to get
Chem eo stop printing the auConomisC propaganda tracts that hr~ve been
- distributed in Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guyana. [Text] [Paris PARIS
rWTCH in French 25 May 79 p 83]
CSO: 3100
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~
~OR 0~'~ZCIAL US~ ONLY
C(~UNTRY 5~CTION POItTUGAL ~
- SOARCS INTCItVI~WED, CONCERNED OVER PRESIbENT'S POLICIES
Paris LE NOUVEL OBS~l2VATEUIt in French 30 Apr 79 pp 60, 61
/Interview with Mario Soares, secrerary general of the Portuguese Socialist
Party and �ormer prime minister, by special correspondenC Rene Backmantt,
daee and place noti given/
LText/ Mario Soares, ae 55, has rwice been prime miniseer
since Che hecCic time of Che CarnaCion Revolution. Now in
the republic's reserve resources, the secretary general
o� the Portuguese SocialisC Party perceives that ehe
pluralise democracy of which he dreamed for his country
is beginning to look very peculiar: Che right is galloping
back, and in Lisbon a curious "government by presidential
iniCiaCive," without a parliamentary majority, is in
power. Mario Soares told us abouC his extreme anxiety.
/-Question 7 On Wednesday, in a rather tense and gloomy political atmosphere,
~ despite the organized festivities, Portugal celebrated'the fifth anniversary
of the Carnation Revolution. Many things have changed since the euphoric
spring days of 1974. Sometimes one has the impression of a return to the
past. ~~hat do you think about it?
/-Mario Soares 7 We have taken a few steps backward, it is true, but I am
still convinced that we have made a lot of progress. What were the basic
objectives of the 25 April movement? First, end the calonial wars: that
is done. We have completed decolonization, and today our former colonies
are sovereign countries. Second ob~ective: overturn a retrogressive fasc-
ist regime and bring in a pluralist democracy: that is done too. We have a
few problems of the political-institutional type, but we have established
political and trade union democracy. Third objective: development of the
country, reform Qf archaic economic and social structures, and integration
of Portugal into r,'urope. We have also made some progress in that direction.
The admission of Portugal to ~rope has been requested; we have gone ahead
with some nationalization, and created xorkers' commissions; We have taken
a few steps toward self-management and Worker control of enterprises. All _
these attainments have been consolidated by constitutional guarantees. But
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- FOIt n~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY,
still, 3.t is true that we are now seein~ an oi'fens~.ve by the extrema right
to 1lquidste these gugrantiees and create gn authoritarian regime with the
appe~rance o~ be3ng democratic. , '
_ ~Question
~ Is this the pro3ect a.f, the extremo right only? Does it not also
belong to the ~.nstitutional r3ght, present in the parliament? Or is that
what you are ca113ng the extrome right?
~
Mario 5oares 7 There are some people of the right in the t'ortu~uese parlia-
ment, but I believe that the Portuguese parliamentary right wants, more or
1ess, to play the game of democracy. Having s~id so, it is true that so:ne
men ar~ thinking about establishing an authoritarian regi.me of th~ president-
ial and mil3tary type. And that ia a real danger. For there is a Portuguese
rightist tradition: the sidonist tradition, so named for President Sidonio
Pais, who was 889~85~ri8tr~ in 1919. He was a dictator president-general. He
tried, by using his persona:i power, to destroy the democratic regime, which
h~d been established by the founders of the first republic. This tradition
was rev3ved in 1926 by the 28 May people, Gom~s da Costa and Salazar, with a
few slight differences. But that is the line to tahich belong the present
calls for a providential man capable of instantly solving all the country's
problems.
~Question
~ How do you interpret what in Lisbon is already being called the _
'~witch hunt'~? In the diplomatic corps, the press, radio, and television,
people are being dismissed from their functions because they support the
left, and especially for being socialists. _
~Mario Soares ~ It is true that this government, the fourth constitutional
~overnment, has started a vast plan of placing men devoted to it in key posts. _
Socialists have been disrrdssed, it is true, and more generally, progressives, _
so that they could be replaced by others. It is not yet What could really be
called a witch hunt, but there are alarming signs, notably, as you have men-
tioned, in information and the diplomatic corps.
To my mind, the replacement of the present ambassador to France, Antonio
Coimbra Martins, for example, is very distur.bing. Coimbra Martins is a
great ambassador who has done a lot for Portugal. The present good relations
between Portugal and France are to a large extent his work; his role was a
decisive one in the n~gotiations that preceded the establiahment af diploma-
tic relations with China, and also in the improvement of our relations With
the Arabic countries. The serious thing is that Coimbra Martins has been
relieved of his functions and not appointed to another post. It is not
unusual for a diplomat to be transferred; what is less normal is his being
purely and simply eliminated from the service.
`~uestion
7 Some people are saying that you socialists are partly to blame
for the appearance of this witch hunt climate? When you were in power, you
dismissed the communists from certain posts where you thought they might be -
dangerous, anci t,oday, it is the socialists being chased out.
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- ~'OI~ d~~'ICIAL US~ dNLY
' ~Mario ~oareg~ As you know, wa came to poWer at a ti.me when the pC
_ ~ 5panish Communist Part~ w~y trying to ~etze it by force us3ng ~talin~.an
methods. That must not b~ forgotton. If a danger o� the saune sort should
- pres ent itsnlf again, we should have no.choice but to repeat the same meas-
ures to preserve pluralist democracy as we conceive of it. But ~ince
~5 November, we have nev~r tried to throw th~ commui~ists into a ghettop
on the cnntrary. We have tried to reintegrate them ii~to ngt~on~i i~re,
which is not easy, because they have not ler~rned anythi�p. I think we did
- what we had to do and what we could do, but now there is a si.tuxtion that
is getting out of our oontrol and against which we must rise in protest. In
1975 th~ danger came �rom, let us sqy~ the commun3stss we did everything we
could to pravent their coming to power, to chase them away from it. Now
_ there is danger from the extreme right. We shall do a11 we can to preserve
the country, What we want is a pluralist democracy, but I have to admit
- thgt it is dif.ficult~
~Question
7 Putting Portuguese policy of the last five years into some
pers pective, one notes that since Apri1 197l~, the gov~rnments succeed3ng
- each other are, in a general way, more and more toward the right. How do
you explain that?
fMario SoarQS
7 It is true that there is a gradual slipping toward the
right, and what in my opinion is serious is that there is also a military
shadow being cast over the civilian life of the country, as a result of the
atti tude of the head of state, who has become the center of power. The gov-
ernment is no more than an epiphenomenon, invested with the co~t'idence of the
= head of state although the president heads~ the present government very
little, really.
fQuestion
7 Do you mean that the present government does not represent the
reality of the political forces and their relationships within the country?
~Mario Soares 7 That is right. The government is not at all representative;
it has no parliamentary representativity because today it is supported only
by the CDS fSocial Democratic Center Party
7-- and even then~ with reserv-
ations and criticisms; and even less popular representativity becausQ nobody,
in the country, is concerned about politics. E~rerything goes on as if it did
not exist. In any case, it does nothing. It could not even get its budget '
voted in.
fQuestion
7 But then what is the underlying explanation for this sliding
toward the right and this personalization of poWCr?
/-Mario Soares
7 The turning point, in my opinion, was the revocation of the
second government of which I was president. The first one of xhich I was
president was overthrown by an association that was as strange as it was un-
' heal thy: that of the PC and the two parties of the right: the PSD ~Inde-
pendent Social Democratic Party 7 and the CDS. Perhaps today the communists
regret wi~at they did, but they did it, and it cannot be forgotten.
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~Olt O~~ICTAL US~ ONLY
But my ~econd governm~nt taas overthrown by an action of the president oi' th~
r~publSa~ a direct persona~. intervention. adneral Ean~s wanted to itnpose a
f~.rst government of' his own choice: that wag the m3nistry of Nobre da Costa.
He w~s not able to succe~d in this. He started the same thing with the pres-
ent goverrunent, and it is not working, either.
We are facing a rightist government~ that is clear. A rightist'government
which sti11 respects certain forms, which o~f course we must not disceunt,
�or worse things could happen. -
~Question ] Agrarian reform, like decolonization, was considered one of
the ~'ruits o~ the April revolution. What is left of it?
_ fMario Soares~ There have been some occupations of lands that we wanted
to put into a legal framework. We got a law through the Assembly of the
Ftepublic and we wanted to have it applied. There were some exaggerations in
the application of the law after the fall of the socialist government, to
be exact and �rom it had resulted an explosive situation in Alente~o. By
the expedient of credi.t, as well as by repressiona there is now a.n effort to
stifle workers who are 3n the collective production units of the PC or in the
- socialist cooperatives.
~Question 7 What about the arn~y?
/-Mario Soares 7 In the army, all the changes about which we have spoken are
even more evident. There are captains' meetings again. The principal army
posts are now in the hands of inen oi' the right, and there are in the hier-
archy officers who exert upon the units a pressure that is growing heavier
day by day. Some have even recently emerged from the past, with the mental
habits of the past.
COPYkIGHT: 1979 "le nouvel observateur"
12149
CSO: >>00
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S'OR Ol'F~C~AL US~ ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION SPATN
PEACE PROSPECTS F~OR BASQUE R,E)GION ASSESSED
Baekground betails Given ~
Madrid CAMBTO 16 in Spanish 1j May 79 PP 16~ 1'j, 19-21, 23~ 24
~Text~ King Juan Carlos de Borbon ie prepared to intervene in the ~
Bagque issue and to promulgate the etatn~e at Guernioa, the birthplace
of Basque na,tionalism, where a tree is the eymbol of all the traditions
and the history of the Basque provincea.
_l
Such a meeting between the Spanish crown, as the representative of the
new democratic order, and the representativea of Basque nationalism would
once and for all put an end to the Basque-Spaniah confrontation that
has charac�terized the past century arid a half of Spani~h and Basque
history. Tn the opinion of reliable circlea, the "Guerniaa ~abrace"
would mark the end of a procesa of democratia normalization that began
Whpn King Juan Carlos took the throne after General ~anco's death. -
Not only the grovernment but the oppoeition as well would be in total
agreement with auch a move. At thfa L~oment the neW g~overnment is
hurriedly working out an entire pacification strategy for the Basque
Country that would conclude with the "Gue.rnica embrace" and the approval.
of a wideranging Statute of Autono~}r~the g~eneral guidelines of rrhich
would be simflar to thoae of the 1936 statute. ~~'he appointment of
Antonio Fbntan as miniater of territorial aiiminietration has hastened
the Mad~id government's deaire to reach an uuderstanding with the Basque
Countr,Y, which for more than a century has struggled amid misunderstanding~
oppresaion, terroriem and in~ustice.
It is noon on 7 June 1968, and a number of shots shatter the calm in
the Guipuzcoa torrn of Villabona. A civil guard, Jose Pardines, is
fatally xounded at point-blank range. The ETA ~Pasque Fatherland and
Liberty Group~ ha~ ~uat been born to the sound of gunshots.
It is nuon on 28 April 1979, and the noise of the traffic in the Vizcaina
village of Durango is punctuated by the sourd of aome exploaione. Municipal
policeman Pedro Ruiz 1~odriguez ie hit by txo bursts of submachine gun
fire at point-blank r~ang~e and collapaes to the ground mortally rrounded.
The ETA has ~ust comm;~ced ita latest crime.
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POR 0~~ CTAL US~; ONLY
But between I'ardines and Rodriguez therQ is a hi~tory of blood and
suffertng. The EPA has killed 130 pereone, and 40 of its members have
~allen in aonfrontations with �~he foroes of publ.ic order, figures tha~
have oauaed Joaep Taradellas, the pre~ident of the Catalan Legislat3.ve
Aesembly (Generalitat), to eay that the Baaques are in "a quasi civil
war."
Their problems stem from a former civil war. The Yergara einbrace, which
put an end to the first Carlist war, brought a wave of centrallam to
the Basque Country, ae the cutbacks on tax privileges be~a~.
~ ~nother civil war, the second Carlist conflict, brought th~ aboli~ion
of the system of privileges. The privileges were revok~d on 21 Ju1y 1876,
and the Basque people then began the~~ tong ~,~urney through the desert
recovQr them.
Traitorous Provinces
But the cloae of another civil war, that of 1936, ehowed that they had
not yet g~c~ne through the worst. On z3 June 1937 ~anco threw around
all his dictatorial weight and not only revoked the economic pacts that
had replaced the privil~~ges but also declared Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa
"traitorous provinces."
- mhe laxge and deep wound opened up by the 1876 revocation act, and
which was only briefly closed durs.ng the yeaxa of the Second Republic~
wae3 to be conatantly irritated during the 40 years of the Franco
dictatorship.
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa are no longer traitors. They have had tr~ xait
mar~y years, until November 1976, to get rid of that Franco-imposed
acarlet letter. But they do not want to wait ar~y longer to get rid of
the laws that for 50 years have reflected a misunderstanding of the
Basque identity.
Joseba Elosegui, the old Basque whose deep-seated nationalism led him to
set himself on fire in Franco's presence 10 years ag^o at the Anoe~La
jai-alai court in San Sebastian, described things very clearly to
CAI~IO 16.
The historic PNV ~Basque Nationalist Party] member seea it like this:
"The currently deteriorated situation in the Basque Country is mainly
due to despair stemming from the f~uatration of Basque nationaliets."
To the man who burned like a torch and Was miraculously saved, "Basques
no longer believe in nice words. Our history offers all too mar~y exawples
of attempta to deceive a people characterized by their honesty and good
r
faith."
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~It O~CIAL USb; nN1,Y
A Probl~matiu S~~tute
_ ~1od~gui, like no mar~y othe~ Basque~, wants~ a sta~ute for the D~que
- Country, a,nd he war?~n iti to be the on~ thati all of the B~qu~ pblitical
fbrces paesed on ~b ~e~ember 1978 ~t Guernic~, tt~e draf~ of whioh wae
e~nt to th~ Cortes an th~ la~t d~y of tihe yoar.
"M~drtd i~ ~rur?ning a~erioug risk if it triee tn w~ter down that draft
gt$tu~e, r+tiich ~'a11~ within tihe gu,i,delinee of tihe conetitution if ~he
latter is in~erpretefl in a broadly liberal way?~" ~loseguS eaid.
It is ahat the Basques have alWqyrs wa~nteds a ete.tute of autonosqy to
r~pl~ce in eome wc~y their revoked privileg~s. They v~re not able to
aChieve ~his either with the government of Al~oneo XII or of Alfoneo XIII,
but ,~ugt a few days after the Second Republic had been proclaimed~
repregentative~ of 427 eity governmente met at Estella on 14 Junn 19~1
to c~ll for a unified gtatute.
~ut the enthuaiasm of the dawn of the republic also had cold vater
poured on it. They had to rrait 5 ye~r~ fbr the Sp~n,ish Cort~s~ meeting
in Valencf a, to approve the atatute, xhich some Basque oircles regarded
a~ s poor relative of the Eatella draft.
Their enthusiasm r+ae dempened not so much because of the xait but
b~cauae the Cortes re~ected it aa being unconetitutional 1 voek after
t}~.Qy nad introduced it. Among other thinge~ the draft stipu]ated the
"the right of the Basque Country to establieh its o~+n concordat with
the Vatican."
We can get an idea of rahat they vere asking for by seeing vhat was left
to the Spanish state: individual aad social ri~ta~ the criminal and
commercial codee and international relatione. Thore were also cutbacks on
the wqy from Lstella to Valencia, and the atatute that was agproved on
1 October as a"granted charter" d.id not last, nnr was it extended to
all Basques. It survived only 254 days~ until Franco swept it away with
a stroke of hia p~n. It was tried only in Yizoqqa, becauee the
other Basque provinces had alreadyy been occupied by F~anco's troope.
Franco not only did away xith the statute; he imposed his repressive
lar+s and declared war on Basque nationalism. There are still ma~or
upshots of those attitudes. Membere of the Security Fbrces in the
Basque Country have told thie magazine that they are axare of the
gap betxeen them and the people they are suppoaed to serve.
According to those members, wl~o did not want their names publiahed,
the people see in the Security Fbrces the representatives of a poxer
that oppreases them and view as undesirable the units that meted out
the long and harsh repression that Franco aent them.
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~tiFt 0~'x'ICIAL U~~ ONLY
mhe ;~curity ~'or~~~ knnw that ineurmountable barriere h~v~ been ereet~d
th~t the peoplp re~ect a~ the very l~~~t ~d thati mar~y nf thQm hat~.
Mont af ~h~m 1~a pergon~ that the ~`7'A h~~ elain over it~ higt:_,~ belong~d
to ~he~~ f~~~a~.
~n 1i~,ht of thi~ ~i~ua~ion, the conelu~ion that CAMBIO 1ti'g douraes -
r~~~hed w~g that a~ they are now, the SeaurSty ~broeg d~ not eerve the
p~opl~. 'I'he ~ti~tut~ could r~solve the problem by ee~tin~ u~ nati3ve
$nsqu~ police ~orce~ a~thdugh gmall numb~ra of ~tate polioe ~uld remain
but not aat exc~pt in extreme ei~uations.
:ri the opinion o~ those intervie~?ed, two af the policemen r+ith poats -
~f responaibility in Vizcaya ~nd Cui;~uzcoa, the native polic~ force ahould
be quickly rynd carefully egtablished oo that this seriou~ fncal paint
of social disorde~, a p~opl~ and a police force ati odd~, aar~ be _
eliminated aa ~onn ag pogsible.
During the 4d Ye~g of the Franco dictator~hip moat of the $agque
p~dple ciid not forge~ their former politicians, whethQr fn exil.e,
pergecuted nr dead. Out of all of them, the membere of th~ F'NV gre
th~ one~ vho have kept the flame of the underground burning the brfghte$t.
"Eugkadi," the Baeque Homeland
5abino Arena founded ~he B~que Nationaliet Farty in 190~, and +.t
too~ up mar~y of the Carlist and privileg8-related aepirationa.
Arana also coined the word "Euskadi" and in a show of independent
ideology proclaimed that "~skadi ia the homelaad of the Basques."
The party still needed a alogan, and this one quickly emerged: "Jaungoikoa
eta lege Zarralc" (Cod and the old laws). It became the rallying cry
of the militanto, rrhose numbere quickly multiplied~ especially in Vizcaya.
ThQ recently formed party held a great attraction at the time of ita
founder's de~th, as Primo de Rivera's dictatorship peraeouted them
harshty. But then came the republic, and the P1~V was legalized,
- r~rinning 10 doputy seatg in the Cortes.
As the gunfire of the Civil War resounded all over Spain and a8 the
statute was approved in Valencia, Jose Antonio Aguirre~ the ma~}ror of
Guecho~ was natced the first president of the Basque Country Government
and he formed his government team, ~?hich included I,eizaola and Teleaforn
- MonZOn.
Mola, who had rebelled in Navarra, was advancing along the northern
front. The Basque Government, supported by the Socialists, r+as forced
to create a volunteer a~p. Isolated and with a statute that took effect
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~It OF~CIAL U9~ dNLY
only in Yi~c~ya in hand~ the ~~eque~ organized ~heir c~wn m~rahar~t
marine, aoin~d maney and even ~~nured cLiplomatia repreAenta~ion f~om
a number of Qountriea.
dn Ap~~l 1937, the "holy cti.ty" of the ~aequ~ Countiry~ QuerxiioQ~ was
bombsd by the German Air ~broe with F'rarian' a apprnval. fie later denied
thi~ arid aoou~e~. ~he ~aoquea th~meelvee of having deetroyed the a3ty.
M~r~y y~~~ 1at~r~ on 27 April 197q~ at a plenary ees~ion th~t the
democr~?tic oitiyr council of Cuernica held to eommemora~e the annivereary
of the bombing, it pass~d a~aeaeure strippSng Franco of xhe Gu~rniaa
medal of diamonds.
7'he UndQr~ound
'Pxc~ r?onthg after the bombing of the ~asque cfty, Bilb~,o fe11 to I~rar~co' e -
trocsps. '1'hougande of persone vere ahot or imprisoned~ and alos~ tio
25b,000 Baeques vent into exile at the olose of the aa~.
Franco did away rrith a~y~thing that smacked of a etatute or autonoapr ~nd
br~nded Viscoqya and Guipuzcoa traitors. Political partiea Were
persecuted to the death. The PNV went underground and from the g~overnment
in exile encouraged the Basque reaietance inside the country, ahere
it was and kould in recent years continue to be the ma~ority force.
In 1945, ~en Aguirre thought that the United 3tater~ wa~ going to play _
the role of liberator a.fter the allied victory, a vave of aativiam wae
unleashed in the Basque Country. There Was a harsh crackdoan; 43
milftatits were beaten~ and the nationaliat Inakf Santurun was ahot to
death in San Salvedor del Valle.
The r~ord "~skadi" appeared for the first time in large graffiti~ and
the "ikurrina'~ also made mimerous underground appeararicQS. Basque
guerrillae fought alonE the Pyreneea border with the approval of the
government in ezile, and on 1 May 1946 the first ma~or domeetic strike
took place: more than 12,000 trorkere on the le.ft bank of the Nervion
stflpped xorking.
There was no statute, no party, no freedoma, but the PNV kept hopes
alive ar?d in 1946 set up a rad.io atation in I~ance to broadoast
propaganda. "~ekadi Lfbre" xas to fa11 silent mar~r years later, in
~954, xhen Fraricois Mitterand, the then minf ster of the interior,
- ordered i t closed doti+n.
The Statute ot 1936
The statute of ~936 under ~fiich the PNY governed for the 254 d~ys trom
the time that it rras passed until ite death at the haade of I~anco fe
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~fJR 0~~~'ICxAL V~~ ON~Y
a~a~.n v~ry mucH in the n~ae. R~l~~ble politia~ ~irel~e ~r~ givin~
a~dur~nc~s that th~ Suajc~~ governmen~ is pr~par~d ~o put it in~o ~ff~o~~
amd at the eame tim~ th~ Cong~re~g o~ De~ut~e~ is debating the draft
apprnv~d at Guexnioa on ~6 Deaember of 1a~t rrith ea�? eYe toW~ard~ _
_ p~eii'y~.ng the ~asque Country.
- Jon C~tanares~ ~he m~?or o� Bilbao~ a member of tih~ pNV~ a 54-year
old bachelor ~d the holder nf a degree in eaonomio saien~en, voicee
this catego~i~~1 verdiat= "A Wideranging s~a~u~e muet be appn~ved
quiokly," he told this magaz3nE.
"'I'he statute o~ 1936," he aent on -co s~r~ "could have been valid Sf it
had Ueen arnrov~d ~ year a~o, and although a rapid recog~i.tiion rroLld
g~i11 be positive and valid~ toda~y mar~r people are g9ing tio vieW
i~ ~ g p1oy. It ig dang~roua ~o try and adulterate ~he current
' drart gtatute, ~nd ~he government ti+ill have to chang~e it~ aay~ ~d
meet itg commitmen~e."
Neverthelesa, a epokemnan of the Bgs que dele~ation in pari~ mad~ it
knoo+n that a recognition of the 1936 statute ~tould, in additiion to
a~knoaledging historical legitimaay, open the doora to a rapid return o�
"Lendak~ri" Laixawla. A number uf nationaliet leadera in Bilbao share
thi~ viQa.
This is xhat the PNV ia na~ying. What about the g~overnment? Antonio
Oyarzabal, the currQnt civil g+~vern~r of Guipuzcoa, ahere he uas born
43 Y~~s ~ in the torm of Azpeitia~ and a ce~reer diplomat vho haa
asked to be relie�~ed as governor~ describes the statute fn three ~rordat
"Necessary, urgent and feasible."
In Oyarzabal's viex, the atatute muat mark the end of this atruggle,
this war of attrition between Spain and the Baeque provinces. Ite
pa3sage can no lo~:i,~r be dcl~ynd. A_.. ~r~::~W~'` '~'ald only a~gravate
- the situati~n.
What if the 1936 gtatute is passed and goes into effect until the
draft now in Congress is acted upon? "I think that that idea ~rould be
a bit reactionary," Oyarzabal adds. "That statute aae promu.lgated under
abnormal circumstances. The country deaerves to have ua exercise aome
imagination in order to kindle everybody's hopes."
Ottaindia: A Prisoner of War
He was condemned to death but saved by the skin of his teeth. He xae
one of the historic membera of the ETA and sat on its Executive
Committee; at the Burgos trial he said that he vas "a prisaner of war."
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~
~
~R 0~'F'ICIAL US~ ONLY
- He ia no longer u~th ~h~ ~1'A~ but M~io Onal.ndia h~g no~ ~bandoned
p~liti~~. ~i~?erly ~ underground m~2mb~r of ~~~~ivi~t ~wup, he
3~ now the ~~ar~tary g~neral of th~ EIA ,~P~r~y for th~ Ba~que
R~volutic~n~~ ~ legal p~r~y tha~ b~lc~uug~e to ~h~ Ca~i~~on af ~he ~~~qu~
Left.
Onainci~ta gpeak~ firn?1y about ~tro thinges o� hoW d~arly it eoa~ ~the
~ov~rnment party when 1~ ~ried to pugh the ~NNV out l~~t ~utumn, for the
sol~ ~urpo~8 of eon~olida~ing ~ atrong UCD ~Demnera~ie C~ntier Union,]
in the Basque Country~ and of how a Watiering do~+n or postponement of th~
atatute ~?pproved at Guerniaa "eould ~~ad to il~rther frustra~iong on the
part of th~ pgople snd to a r~d.iealism for r?hose aoneequencee the
g~v~rrr?cnment alone ~rould be reepansible."
Th~ f~rmer ~'I'A membar a1~o haa aa opinion regarding the 1956 s~~tutes
"The only ob~eative of' ~uch a move by Madrid," he agserte, "is to r~ach
an egreement with th~ ~'NV, in order to al~at~er the hegemer~y achieved
by the ma3ority of tha ~agque parties."
Zn addition, Onaindia has analyzed the danger thgt could be involv~d in -
an emergency passag~e of that atiatute, "which tirould certainly en~ail a
postponement of the draft that ie now before the Congreea of Deputies."
The Song of the PNV
When one o.�, this magazine's orriters aglced the honorable Josep
Tarade2laa rr2~y the EI'A had emerged, the Catalan politician's ~nswer
vent ri~t to the poSnts "E~rerybody knows that it ia the child of ~
PNV splinter group."
The sons have branded their parents do-nothings. In ~952 a number
of youths tounded the group F~cin. All of them came from nationalist
families and accused the PrN of having stood still in time. They themselvee
adonted more radica2 stands.
They became very radical and in ~956 cu.iminated their political
transformation xith the creation ~f the ETA. The founder~ and firet
leaders of the group rrere Benito del Valle, Txillardegui, Julen
Madariaga and Jose Manuel Aguirre.
Fbr 2 years they limited themselveg to streetaide graffiti, 'but in 196~
they revealed their in~entions. They set off two bombs at the Bilbao
~ police station and in the elevator of the Yitoria civil g~overnment
- building. On 18 July of that same year they failed in an attempt to
derail a train carrying Yar veterans to San Sebastiar~.
The vain attempt cost the EPA dearly. The firet massive dragnet wa8
undertal:en, and more than 100 ETA members rrere arrested and sentenced -
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' ~it n~~O~AL U~~ OI~LY
~o b~ta~en 15 and 20 ye~.rb tn 3ai~. 7'he founder~ and lac~dore f].ed~ -
Cra~sed ~he Py~~nae~ ~nc1 ~.3vQd in ex3.~.~ in ~~~nae.
With ~heir in~e~tion~ r?ow qui~t~ ~lear~ ~hey ha18 ~he orga�i~~;~ion'a
first aaeembly in 1~6~~ and ~he ~7I'A defined i~ee1~ a"revolution~y~
' unrepentant and an~~.-r~cin~ movement of national liber~,t~fon."
A few mo~e yea~~ hacl to p~s before thQ ~ntire scope o~ the movem~nt
- beaame known. What was or3gin~].1y ~IcSn ia noW ~ terroria~ organization
- tha~ pulls the ~rigg+er over and over~ as er~ily as it announaea i~e
"drmands"s to~a1 amneaty, the aithc~car+al of ~he forcee of publin ord~r
~~rom the Basque Country, ~he right of eelf-determina~ion, recogni~fon
o~ Baeque ~ an offiaial la,nguag~ and in?provement~ ~n tY?e condi~ione of
_ aorkera.
7'his is the ideolo~y ttra~ motivates the group and exal~g ite firs~ fallen:
X~bi ~chevarrieta, who periahed in a confrontation aith polioe 3 hourg
after the ~TA's first victim aas mortally frounded, and ~iatakio
Mandizabal~ the head of the milit~uy front, rrho aas riddlod with
bullets in Algorta on Holy Thuroday, 197~�
Two years later, after Carrero Blanco had been bloan up by the exploaivea
that the EI'A had sQt aff~ two other front-lfne EPA membera vere
executed on 27 Soptember 1975~ T~~ a~d Otaegui. vere their names.
I,erchundi: from the E'1'A to the Communistg
ftoberto Lerchundi's political movements have been vezy simple: he
belonged to the ETA and he is now xith the Basque Communist Party,
of ahich he has been secretary general aince November 1978.
- I,erchundi, alias "Bubi," was born in Bilbao in 1948� A doctor by
profesafon, he is m~ n he ~oin d the Conmmuni~ts~ lliseviews ~ehe~ETA
from 1969 to ~973~
quite clear regarding the Basque issue.
"If the ETA's bid holds up," Bubi told this publi~ation, "r+e r+ill ~11
have to give some thought as to why thia is so and confess that its
bid still attracts a lot of people. It is also true that the short-
sightednes~ of the government, ti+hich has regarded the Basque pxobl~m
aa 3ust another problem, not as a ma~or one, has also facilitated
the violence. This government is gambling its very future in the Basque
Country."
Like the other former ETA member Onaindia, Lerchundi describes as a
"pirouette" what the grovernment apparently wants to do aith the ~936
statute. "Md it's of no u$e to us," he notes.
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~'OR OF'~"ICIAL US~ ONLY
~Ie defends ~h~ clraf~ atatute that is b~fore Congree~ and "whiah ie
pe~~ectly onneti~u~ional~ and neg~otis~ione ou~t to be undert~lsen wi~hout
pre~ucLi.~ea. mryin~ ~o go baok to a~ormer ~olutlon is not viable,
inaamuah ae ~he po1~.~ioa1 forae~ tha~ appraved the e~e?tu~e a~t the time
dn not have the ~ame repreeenta~ivene~s~ and ~ime~ have aha~g~d."
5ymbolia Monzon
He groWe old elegantly, oane in hand, ~he number one man in ~he
ang~rieat nationglist movement. g3.e name is Tele~foro Monzon. He is
74 Yeare old, was born in Vergara, was a monarchist and the Basque
interior minfeter during the C3vi1 War~ ae r+e11 as a deputy on two
prfor occasion~ in different legislatures of the republic. He
collaborated in drawing up ~he 1936 statute. He 13ved in exile in
Franae while F'ranco was alive.
Monzon is nostalgic~ beaauae when CAMBIO 16 asked for his opinion
on the posaibility that ~he 1936 statute might again be unearthed~
the old national3st did not heaitate: "Which statute do they want
~o give baak to us by decree? The one that the Spanieh Republic
granted to the Basque provinces in 19~6, in a desperate situation,
~fter having denied us ar~y sort of autonon~r ,for 5 yeara, or the statute
of f1~11-fledged soverelgnty that the Basque Country experienced and
symbolized from Oetober 1936 to June 1937, in other wordg, 9 montha of
a Banque state. The Basque Country uae a soWereign state."
Monzon does not ansuer our reporter and continues the questions: "What
are they g+oing to return to us, 3ust the writing in a pamphlet called
the Basque statute, arriving by plane from Madrid~ and rrhich vas never
viable in the Basque Country, or the reality of a de facto atate that
we used to Irnow and that was swept axay frith the blood and tears of
an entire people?"
The ETA, a Deadly Eacalatfon
Franco is dead. Democracy is entering Spain through half-opened doors.
riot all agree, but mogt feel that the developsnent is irreversible;
except the ETA, which stubbornly adherea to its advocacy of independence
and keeps the Basque Country permanently tense.
There have been times after Franco's death vhen the aachinery of the
state and the ~+overnment began to grind, and this has been xhen the ETA has
pulled the trigger, kidnaped or extorted revolutionary to118. Mar~y
industrialists have left the Basque Country, and many businesses are
broing under. The ETA addresses itself to public opinion as if it had
declared a formal war on the Spanish state.
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I~'OR 0~~ C~AL U5~ ONl.Y
mher~ i~ no ~itt~a for eleation nanpa,.t~r?g durin~ a w~r. ~'he L~.'A is no~ -
~.a~al, but no L'I'A aympathi~;er, c].oak~d ~.g an independent, ran 1n ~he
June ~q77 elec~ions either~ with one exaeptiont ~'rane3eco Le~anend~.a~
_ who, however~ was unable ~o ~tand up under the toneion of hie lonely
etruggle and tende~ed his resignation before ~he houses were diasolved
Sor ~h~ 1 March elections.
~'PA ha~ n~i.d ~ha~ 3.t ie s~ruggLing for the lreedom of ~thr~ Ba~que Coun~try,
und criticism has rained down on it~ with ~he charge that it ie
n~zvggling a~ai.nat democracy. Fach murder that it commits provokes -
ou~or3e~ in Spain~ but in the Baeque Country demonstratione ase organized
~c which people astoni.shingly shou~ "ETA~ herria zurekin!"(E'rA~ the
people are with you), if not "~A~ kill theml" '
Herri Bat~suna
When LetaraQndia left the Congress nf beputiea, hQ also left his party~
the ~3asque Left (E~sk:adiko ~zkorra), but he was not an orphan for long
because the seed of ~rhat would become Herri Hataeuna wgs alreac~y present.
melesforo Monzon has been one of the most vieible figures in the creation
oF ~hat party, which practically overnight has become the second leading
party in the Basque Country, eapecially in the municipal electione
rather than the general balloting, nrhere it won four deputy seats and
one senatorial position.
It is in the municipalities ~hat Herri Batasuna has its strength. Tn
commentin~ to this magazine on the chances for the 1936 statute, Monzon
said: "We have to put an end to the 150-year war and br~ng about a
new Iberian Peninsula. The war in the Basque Country could end tomorrow
if the terms are acceptable. Until such time the Basque Country
must be mobilized and prepared for the greatest of sa,crifices, with
Herri Ba~asuna, the number tw~o Basque political force, and with unified
action."
A Va.lid Spokesman
Herri Batasuna was formed by people from mar~y parties and with
differing ideologies, a.lthough almost all of them agree with the ~.~mande
- that the ETA formulates with such facility. The shadow of the ETA has
drawn near Herri lBatasuna, which has practically bec~me the political
- snorkel of the terrorist organization.
But the Basque Country needs a valid spokesman to negotiate with Madrid.
- Julen Guimon, a l.awyer, professor of constitutional law and a UCD
deputy from Vizc2~ya, admitted as mu,ch to this magazine: "The UCD has not
found a valid spc~kesman. The gnvernment has a great responsibility, but
not a11 of the casds are in its hand, because the Basque problem is
everyone's responsibility, and not everyone is meeting it."
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~'OR OFFrC~AL U~~ ONIaY
"mhe ~olution," }~o ~dded, "ia obv~.oue].y negotiations freQ from
exaQeaive publicity and with a determination to ar~ive a~ ati ag~ceement.
The neg~o~ia~3.ons could be aonduc~ed based on ~he firat draft of ~he
e~atute ~ha~ befoxe Congreee and on a quick aaaeptanc~ di the 1936
s~a~tute."
~n Guimon'e view, "aoaeptance of ~he 1936 atatu~e would be a s'tarting
poin~ in whtch eaah party'e honor wou].d be preeerved. Nei~her would
such a so~ution cloee ~he door ~o improvemen~t~ or to tihe poseibility
of updating certe.in issueA."
Sf the 1936 sta~ute was not a awindle then, why ehould 3.~ be now?~the
UCD deputy wondere. "Ftowever~ by trYing' to defend the draft aubmitted
to Congresa at all costs," Guimon add~, "we could come up againet eome
dif.~icult problemg, suah as tha~ the sovereignty and ~he posi~ion of
the IfiN might be faced }?i.th ~P~eag~'~ ~pr~ses."
Santiago Brouard, a 5~-Ye~ old doctor from Bilbao and the president of
the Hasi (a party that belonge to Herri Bataeuna), seea things
differently. Ta him, peace in the Baeque Country is pogaible
immediately if the government ~dbasingethemaelveacon politicalprealitiea.
of the Basque Country aeriously,
What Do the Basques Want? -
Herri Batasuna, KAS ~exPanaion unknown~ end E'PA, Brouard reca].ls,
eay a number of minimum conditions have to be met for peace to be
possible in the Basque Country: total amneety~ an end to represaion of
political refugees in France~ flill democratic freedoms including the
legaliza*ion of all political parties, even thoae advocating independence,
a staggered withdrawal, with a fixed deadline~ of the represaive forces
from the Basque Country, a national statute of autono~y withincludin to
sel�-determination and including the entire Basque Country, S
Navarra.
"Under these conditions," the president of the Hasi said forcef~Zlly,
"peace rrould come immediately. The buainess of the 1936 atatute is a
diversionary ta�:tic to create ezpectationa so as not to take care of
other problems."
Well then,but what do the Basques want?, Taradellas wondered in the
presence of a r.eporter from this magazine. And after he accordingly
reviewed the conditions that the ETA is demanding~ specifically the
withdrawal of the forces of public order, he again wondered: "But who
is going to believe that the g~overnment, no matter what government we
have here in Spain, is going to abandon the perhaps 30 or 40 percent of
the citizens of the Basque Country who are not Basque?"
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~on o~scx~ us~ orr~Y
mhe ~'1'A' e ex~remi.a~ condi~ione ~o un~cceptable. But evaryone~ bo~h
inr~ide and ou~eide the Nasque Country~ eg~reeg that in one wqy or
ano~her we have to geek a solu~ion to the Baeque quea~ion~ beoauge Spain
is gamb~.3ng r~.th 3~a lag~ oppor~unity to end a war ~ha~ hae las~ed 150
" yea~s. The solution aeems to be a paot betwoen the m~~ority politioa].
forass in the Baeque Coun~ry w~.~h the government, either ~hrnugh the
implem~n~ation of the ~936 statute or the quiak enQatm~n~ of the draft
~tatute that 3a before Congrese.
mhe forcner etep does no~ rule out the latter, but either of the two
_ w~~u1d result in the immedi~te return to the Basque Coun~ry of Lendakari
LeizaAla, which would conclude his extle and open the door to peaae.
A deoision ie ur~ent. Baaque Socia].ist Enrique Mugiaa sa3d 1n a apeech -
at the Sig1o X3C~ Club: "A statute right away or aivil war."
I~'oreign Affairs Minigter Yiews Situation
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanieh 13 May 79 P 21 ;
,[-Text,] Mistakes Can Be Ironed Out ~
Marcelino Ore~a Aguirre, 44, ~e minister of foreign a.ffairs and a UCD
deputy from Guipuzcoa, is also optimiatic about the posaibility of a
pact at the present 3uncture.
Ore3a, a true "kamikaze" who won ~iis deputy seat despite a11 the forecasts,
' admits that "there have been a:.ot of historical miatakes in connection
with the Basque people," and he does not ob~ect to listing them: "the
- disappearance of the privileges, the elimination of the economic pact~
the disregard of ri~ts that stemmed from their historical constitution
and that should never have been altered without a free decision by the
people..."
In the minister's view, the solution entai.ls conatitutional recognition
of respect for the historical rights of the Basque people and the
reestablishment of the General Boards. "All that we have left to do
now," he adds, "is to approve a statute that is acceptable to the
majority of the parties and that gives back to the Basque people the civil
peace that they need."
"When the fatef~.il law abolishing the privileges waa passed 103 years ag~o,"
explaina Mr Oreja in his g~overnment office at Santa Cruz Palace, "Mr F~ilio
' Castelar sa3d that they were r~?i.tnessing the funeral of a race's freedom
With the same feeling of withdrawal and pain rrith rrhich people alw~ys
witness the sublime melancholy of death. Tod~}r~ faced with tragec~y,
injustice, pessimism, crime and misunderstanding', the Basque people want
new hope. We must all work hard at thi.s task."
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~+'U~t O1~C~AL US~ ONLX
_ 5anchez Dra~go Look~ A~ 13~eque Problem
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanioh 1~ Me~}r 79 I~p 23"24
~Ar~icle by ~arnando 5anchez Dra~g~o�~
~"me~) May the geven-headed eerpent; of the Ba$que ~.oun~ry help me.
In this ma~ter tha Ba~ques are like feministe and Jaw~. Woe be to ~hem
who dare to get involved in their business Without belonging ta the
groupl I oaxt alreac~Y see the eaaks full of vonomoue mt~.i.l overflowing
rqy ma~.lbox, and in truth I am really aorry, becauae there i~ no~hing
that T~rould like leas than to oarn the ani.mos3.t~yr of individua].e with
whom I have a].wayg had~ ever sinco the dungeons of Caxabanahel~ ~riendl.y,
eurrealistic and closely linked relations. Pitfalle of ~he 3ob.
As if thia r+ere no~ enough, the Basque quarrel is beginning to eecape
my underetanding, even thougY? there was a time when I thought tha~ I
had a firm grasp of it. Toda~y, I no longer do, and I think that the
same perplexity a.fflicts a7.1 Spanishh outaidera. Toda~y they could only
begin to unraveY the ball of yarn, and I am not even sure of that.
My con~'usion stemfl from trro disconcerting episodea, both of which
~ occurred recentl~r. The first one took place around October when~
sponsored by television~ I traveled to the ETA sanc~uary oS Ataun ~o
interview tho ethnologiat~ anthropologist, prehiatorian and hietorian
Mr Jose Miguel Barandiaran, wl'io to all Basquea, whether Spanish or
~asque na~ionaliats~ is a symbol of concord rising above the discoxd of
stands and ideas. "Aitatx~," little father, they call him~ the bomb-
throwers, renegades and "shut down Spain" advocates finally agreeing
on something.
Jose Miguel, a Baro~as-like priest who has seen mac~y years pass from
under his beret, received ua at his small country housQ at the foot
of the Aral.ar and near the atringthfa stroke of hisepen severalSmillenia
max~y moons ag~o, thus returnin6
of prehistory to his region's history. But getting back to where I Was,
two supposedly "abertzales" (patriotic) youths asked for permisaion to
be present at our ta.lk. We granted it, they listened, and towards the
very end I brought up the rislqr businesa of the ETA, be~hessticky ught
it unavoidable to try and elicit his opinion regarding
busineas of who is most and best informed about all of the iesues in the
_ Basque Country. For these reasons I remai.ned sober; avoiding
drunkenness and trying to place the ETA within historical coordinates
of Basque irredentism far predating those of Franco' s tirili~t. Mearn+hile,
Jose Miguel fell to lee~rard in no man's Watera~ without course, and
bundled up in his double fur-lined ~acket like a nona~enaxian priest
and squirau.ng to understand (if not back up) the ~'TA stand ("You should
see how they come out of the barracks."~ as well as his simultaneous
conviction that "in spite of everything, that road leads us nowhere."
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~`0~2 O~C~AL U5~ ONLY
Tha chi~chat ended, and we 1.ef�b, wi~;hout 33asa;id~.aran bui; wi~h ~ha two
onlookerg~ ~o have an unpl.eaaant meal. o~ frui~ and pork nhop~ naarby.
And what an unpleaeant meal ~.t was~ not because of ~he via~ua.l.~ ~,r? the
reg~.on, maY God preserve i~, but because as we ate, emotions w~11ed up,
di~een~ aroge, there wae shoutin~ and motionir~g (you ~an ~.magine why),
and finally~ as our finr~]. aourse was being served, the "aber~zales"
laehed out at met "Who arg you, you Madrid newsmari, to ~sk Jose M3.gue1
about the E1'A? You should have asked hi.m abou~ the Royral Soaietyt"
mhat wae exactly What they said~ and I thus began to auepect what ~
h~~l always refused to believe: that in the Basque Country'e holy wax
(no ~~rcasm here) therQ is not onl.y a miracle ~,nd a eearch for .freedom,
a].though there is muoh of both~ but also~ and in troubled waters,
conf`ueion, misleading commentary, brainwashing, blacl~ail, faecinm and
even i.ndustry. I do not know what kj.nd of 3ndustry th~.e might be nor
who benefi~s from it, but I do know th~~ in almoat 15 years of
~ournal.istia travels ~hrough Agian and Afriaan countrie~, and ae such _
irredentiat, no black, Muslim or Vietnamese evex treated me like ~ha~.
The seaond episode took place in February~ the day before the elections~
during the presentation of ~y work "Garg^oris y Habidis" in emoldering
Bilbao. Aasuming that it was relev~.nt, I spoke there about the mythe~
fables and olden da~ys of the Basque Country that were montioned in the
book; t~bout Basque as a poasible link with the language of the Atlanteana;
about the "lauburu" and the "eguzkilore;" about the method of prophecy
using the flight of birds; about ~he serpent Erensuguia's relation to
the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl; about Juan de Echa~ide, the alleged
di~coverer of America; about tubalism; about the jai-alai that the
Mayas played and called pok-a-tok...and all of thia~ and much more~ waa
skeptically received, amid smiles and sarcasm, by a youngish, pseudo-
intellectual, swaggering, Carbonarist Basque audience that was, of
cnurse, nationalist to the very core. Acrobatics from Sabino Arana,
they surmised, to ahore up a myth: the greater antiquity and resulting
strangenesa of the Basques in comparison to the other ethnic groups of
Spain.
And since all the while they apPlauded mpr book and a~}r person, I
c~:duced that their motive was not rqy meddling into the Basque Country's
dirty ar clean linen~ but the public's unthinking resistance to
acknowledge the l~ypothesis of those untransferable origins, without
- which the proclamation of the holy war is neither understandable nor
justifiable.
I have been kicking around the country for many months now for the -
same reason that brought me ~o Bilbao~ and the people with whom I have
talked, no matter what the region, have always quickly and 3oy.f~11Y
swallowed the bait of the ancient roote (cosmogonies, archetypea,
customs) that justifies my book in t.he eyes of all the Spanish tribes.
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~
~'O~t O~~zCIAL US ~ UN1~Y
How ~hen o~n wa conerrue ~nd expl~.n ~he abeurd �aot tha~ of n~y fellow
aountrymen only the children of
the ~3asquo Coun~ry~ and o~ ~hem ~hoee
who mos~ resolu~tely advocate independon~e~ re~eot for peychologiaal
reaeon~ the pQdig~ree of a differentiating faa~or the emphaeie on which `
has provokod BO 1IILiC11 l~~.F3C0~dY
T am a~aoiat: every con~radi.a~ion conceal.e an eri~.i~i~i;enment. Reflec~ing
on ma~~ere after the ].etdowri, I~hought: Wouldn'~ the Basque
Country''e "casus be11i" evaporate from ite own pot if w~ let it stew
in its own ju3ce? Wouldn't the v3olenae thus w~.nd down, and at a
g~ood pe~co~ beoauee no one would bother 3ndulging in it w3.th his shadow?
From tha~t po3nt on, wouldn'~ the ETA and its memberg, aatutely or
absen~-mindedly, shif~ into the mechanical. proceee of reconciling all -
of the con~radict3.ons, not aoun~ing the oneg brought direatly f`rom
~~utside, that are today frac~ing the apparent homogeneity of the
Basque nationalist movemen~~ which~ in my view, is only the reault of
belligroren~y 3n wh3.ch it is confined?
My gpace is running out (what ag~or~y th3a buainess of writing!). What
I propose can be suamled up as follows: sign a separate peace, as Christ
taught us to do, and in two phases. One: have them leave (it is
uselesa to epecif~r who, as ueeless as proposing tnarital reconciliation
to a cuckold without the offender leaving the nuptir~l bed). Two: drastic
autonor~r right away. The Madrid poli~iaians cannot continue to deal
with matters on an individual basis when the overall phenomenon haa
more faceta than a fly's eye. Much less can they try to etubbornly
encourage f5com above an anti-Basque movement that to the people down
below already looks somewhat like the anti-Sephardic Jea movement of
yore. This is a crude conspiracy whose acheming is not only treacherous
but wigrateful. Those who have been luxuriating for such a short time
in the soft lap of democracy ought not to ~orget~ and no doubt have not -
forgrotten, that their life is like, because of and thanks to the
execution of Carrero. If the a.dmiral ha.d been in the driver's aeat when
his maker called his number, we would all at this moment still be in
the catacombs with our shackles on.
A problem of the Basque Country or a problem of Spain? Let us not
confuse the latter w~th the former, nor the former Mrith the g~overnment's
zeal to come up with a scarecrow to fri~ten those who are fri~tened
by the a~y or with a scapeg^oat on rd~ich to foist off dead people tirho
are difficult to bury. The problem of Spain is not in the Basque
Country; it runs from north to south and is to be found, in particular,
_ in the Moncloa.
Yiews of Autonorqy Negotiator
Madrid CAN~IO 16 in spanish 13 May 79 p 29
_ ~Article by Antonio Fbntan~
[Text] Antonio Fontan is the minister in charge of handling the
complex issue of the autonomies. A former president of the Senate and
a former editor of the daily paper MADRID, Fontana has been accepted
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FOit O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
by almoat al~ of the iiaaque political parties as an honeet negatiatar
Who can coo~. down and settle the burning Baaque probl~m. CAI+IDIO 16
asked hj.m for his imprea~~.ons on the eve of the big negoti~,~tions. The
following is hia z�ep1y.
Zn recent years we have ac:hieved in Spain a political transition .for
which history offers fQw precedents. There have been neither purges nor
retaliations. Ibr the firat time aince 1808 we are a country wi.thout
axiles and in which no one is in prison for ideo7.ogical and political
reasona. Moreover, we have put together a forw of government in which
- opposin~ par~ies and ideologies can live together and which~ moreover~
is capable of accepting a.l.l of the aountry's variety and richness. The
principle of ~the autonomies has been sanctioned as an axis of the
pol3tical organization of Spain's various peoples, but in ~eeping with
state uni.ty and solidarity among citizens and communities. The most
telling reaffirmation of these principles was the acceptance by almost
all politica]. forces, with hardly at~y reaei-vations, of the consi;itutional
provision that "recognizes and guaranteea the right to autonovqy of
nationalities and regions" along with "solidarity among all of them," as -
well as the unity of the na~tion.
This ha.s come about because Spain's palitical transition has coneisted
of a prudent and systematic articulation of a series of political
affixmations. The principle of the autonomiea is the major affirmation
that the country's repr~sentative political forces now have the duty
to develop.
This should not take place one by one, individually~ but rather in
common cause, one's own autonomy and the autonomies of others. Baaque -
autonoaLy must not be looked upon as an individual grievance to which
the rest of Spain must accede, but rather as the fulfillment of a
commitment of which we are all part and from which we wi11 all benefit.
~ It is within the historical framework of these considerations that I
would like to place my responae to the editors of CAMBIO 16, who have '
asked me for some statements or to write a few wnrds on the "Basque
problem." Firet of ali , I have to say that I der~y the existence of a
"Basque problem," just as I would der~y the alleged existence of a
"Catalan problem" or a problem of the identity and self-realization of
ar~y other people in Spain. There is a Basque fact, just as there is a
Catalan fact and other facts, with more or feWer points in common,
relating to the rest of the peoples who together constitute the Spanieh
state. But these facts are not antagnnistic~ nor do they generate
mutual inccmpatibilities. The Basques and "Basqueness" are a problem ~
neither of nor for Spain. They axe~ I repeat~ a fact, a reality. Spain
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!~'d[t U~~IGIAI, US~ tlNLY
withou~ th~ Dasc~ue Countiry ~nd aittinut th~ ~l~.~qu~g aould not be 5p~,in;
it would be ~nm~thing o1n~. Maredvar, 3t rrould b~ 1ik~ ~ t~o~ Without
ronta, beaguae owr country h~;~ itg r~~tn in the north~ in tih~ va~t
eradle extiending from ~'inis~~rre to ~~g~~ in whoee g~eogr~phia oenti~r
w~ find the territory and peopl~ of the ~naqua Country~.
Cdntrary tio r+hat ~ome people might be ineline8 ~;o thinl~, thi~
hiatnrically, culturally and politically differenti~t~d yet united
reality is noa finally in a po~ition to onae agaln fit ir? p~rfecl;ly
aith the form of
governm~nt, a~t~~e with autonomies~ that our nountzy
haa taken on. 7'he ovez~+helmingly ma~ority oi' the Banque peopl~ hav~
a~lmoaledged this~ and quito recently. On 1 Max~h and 3 Apri1~ the
BasquQ poople, like thQ peoplea elsewhere in Spain, a~nt to vote in t2r~
~en~ral and local e1QC~iong, which there algo inaluded ballotir~ tio
reotore the hiatoria Goneral Bo ards in tiho~e territorSe~. In both
abnolu~e and rel~tive numbors, the voter turnout W~n hi~er than Sn
previous electians, which prov~a that throu~out Spain the~e in the
~ detiermination to aettle political iesuee throu~ the peaceful and '
democratic method of the ballot box.
Commentators differ in their interpret~tione of the eler.tion result~,
and naturally so do the parties, which try to put the s~atieticg in
the most favorable Iight for their political posfti~nn and interegts.
It is true that radical options g~arnered more votes than mar~y people
h~rl anticf pated, but it ie no lese ~rue that these rrere truly free
electiona in Which all options were able to compete and that the ones
that MP could term extremfets rron the support of only a minority.
The overwhe]mtngly ma~ority of the Basque people have voted deci~ively
for pQaceflil political and gocial coexietence xtthin the $tate that
in one Wa`y or a,nother, with one ideolop,y or another~ is advocated by
the parties that rron 80 percent of the votes cast. All of ~hese parties
advocate recognition of the Basque Country's own peraonality, through
a statute~ but always in keeping wi~Mh the unity of the state and the
nolidarity of the other peoples ~+ho constitute it.
This type of autonomy, a,n autonorqy that is not a ne~ation of ar~ything
but rather an affizmation, is the road that opens on to a horizon of
hope not only for the Basque Country but for a11 Spain.
PN1i President Voicea Views
Madrid ~~sN~IO 16 in spar?~st~ ~3 rtay 79 pp 30-3~
~Interviex xith the president of the PNV~ Carlos Caraicoechea]
~Text] A Basque native of Navarra, an -
attorney and the holder of a degree in economics,
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t~ot~ o~~Fici~, us~ oNt.Y
~he pr~s~.c~~nt; o~ ~h~ PNV, ~aa~los Gera~.ao~ahea
Urri~a, a 41-y~ar old ~c~sidgnt of Y~rnplona~ is
~iimly ~nd ab~olutely oonvinood tha~t p~acie io
po~rible in the 8a~que Country "it we ac~ quiokly." -
He knoWS atiat he ie talking abou~ beaause he is
the 1e3der of the party that oontrol~a AO peraent o~
the Bagqu~ oity haxla, holds a p~rliainentary mr~osity
in the zone and tod~y repreeen~t~ ~he ma~ority? of
the Hasque people.
Under the curren~ ciroum~tanees ~here are few people
~?ho doubt tha~ a eolution to the "Basqae problem"
nRCegsarily invalves the PNV, of Whoee
Etii~kadi Buru Batzaar (ite number one boc~y) Carlos
Caraicoechea is preeident.
7'he F'NV preeident alao l~ows that r+e have to begin
~aking the stepa towards peace in the Basque
Country immedia~ely~ "becauee we have very little -
time left before irreveraible situations a~tre
artth us." Nevertheleas, he is opt~.rniatic. In
his law office very near the Pamplona bullring
- Caraicoechea foreca$ts the atorm that loomg on
thc~ horizon but talks about how to deal with it.
Peace Is Possible
ln ar~y case, this politician, a key pgrson today
throughout Spain~ is prepared to weather the
storm and r~ain on board with the satne determination
with rrhich he learned to speak Basque Suat 8~rears
ag+o or `rith the same teria,city rrith which he learned
Latin so that he could read all of ~hat laaguag~e's
clas$ics "~ust because I r+arbted to."
Beneath a serigraphy of the sculptor Chillida
and a pen and ink drar+i.ng that depicts a corner
of the Basque coast, betxeen the past and the -
future, the president oS the PNV told CAMBIO 16
what, in his opinion~ are the steps that We
must take so that the Basque Country can achieve peace.
CAMBIO 16: To What extent is peace poseible toda`y in the Basque Country
and under r+hat conditions?
Carlos Garaicoechea: I think, of course, that peace is poseible. What
we need to dn is kindle our imagination and courage to come up ~?ith the
tonls that carl make it possible.
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~'n~ OFFICIAL US~ UNLY
A~thdu~;h it edund~ triti~~ W~ hav~ Ua~n in~inten~tly r~pr~ting ~hat -
~nlitio~.1 m~~our~a ~r~ th~ only ona~ th~t Can re~tore n~rmalcy ~nd
~oexiot~nae 1n th1~ country. To dg~o, ~hc~ poli~ical mea~ure~ have not
been t~ken~ a~ leae~ not in the requlred ~phere.
C 1~: Wha~ would these mea~ures be?
C.G.t mhar~ ar~ ciif~er@nt politSaal aonsider~tionn nt aach moment~ a~nd -
I thlnk ~h~~ w~ h~ve miseed a grea~ opportw~i.ty over the la~~ Z yeare ~o
take a number of t~mpo~rary meagures toWarde the autonompr arrar~g~emant
that i~ conatitutionally possible todqyr. I am no~ g~oing to refer to
those mea~ures but ~o the ones that are poegible tod~y, especially ~he -
ma~or atep of the autanou~r s~atute~ along r?ith the ael~'-gevernment
arrangement for the Baeque Country that is included in it.
C 16: Sg the eurr~nt dra�t sta~ute non-nego~iabl~?
C.G.: mhe draft ia up for discussion by the parliar.~entary bodtes `
stipulated by the constitutfon~ and such diseuanion~, or nagvtiationa,
have to adhere, in our vieW, to the mechanics of thQ conatitution~l
ny~tem, not the content of
~he drt~ft. An analysi~ er?d a recansider~tion
wiYl be pertinent to the degree that the repreeentativos of the assembly
of Basque legislators demonstrate that the content is or is not
uncon~titutional.
A Balancing Tool
C 16: Neverthelesg, there i~ the feeling that the PNV is presenting
the draft statute as a"take it or leave it" proposition...
. C.G.: If that feeling ezists, it is an errc~neous one. The PNV has
wanted to pursue a honest and realistic pulicy towards its people and
conceived a statute that is viable at the present time. From our
point of view, this draft is a tool to balance the political demanda
oS the Basque people With the political conditioning factors that xe are
~oing to encounter in Madrid. Since xe honestly feel that it ie a
balancin6 point, we honestly believe that any attempt to pare it back
ahatters the equilibrium of the draft statute. _
C 16: One of the draft's key points fs the financial issue..�
C.G.: As far as finances are concerned, it is clear that we want to
_ recover the historical system, ahich we viex as a ri~t that rre xere
atripped of, the economic pacts in other rrorda. The economic pacts
oup~t to be reestablished as the foundation of a truly autoaomous finance
arrarig~ement. The draft mal:es it clear, however, that We pledge to
~ coorciinate tax regulations with the rest of the state and that we also
pledge to have our tax burden no lighter than elser+hF:re in Spain and to
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~~~t OFFIC~At, U5~ dN1~Y
~ ~ontribu~a aqui~gbly tio g~eneral tax r~v~nu~~ gnd ~o inter-prdvin~e
dolid~.ri~y. With a11 df ~hese premig~d~ th~ i'inanola]. errangemant oSfers
every guaran~toe ~~o ~h~?t no one shou].d o~y ~ha~ we r?ar~t a"~ax haven~"
th~~ r~re are divisivo~ diseriminQtory~ e~c. .
C 16: Wil~ ~a~ques p~r income ~ax~ for example7
C.C.: Of course. We Basques h~ve never ~ried ~o get at~ound theeo taxes~
Which ar~ ~t least~ and I emphasi~~ t.hat rrord~ ~ heavy aa ar~rwhere elsa
in Spatn.
t
Bg~que police
C 1Gt A~aeque pnlice foreQ is another key issue...
C.G.s Yeg, and ~iret S rreu].d like to mak~ a clarifiaations ve vant our
own public order~ no~ because o~ ar~y ~pecial deaire but ag an impor~ant
and logical element in our aspirations for eelf-government. Yt ie true
th~?~E people arQ eapecially seneitive about this iseue as a result of
ahat has been happening ir~ the countzy in recent times, as well ae the _
teneion, if that is the proper r~ord~ that e~.ate bettireen
~he current forcea of public order and the Basque people.
Now then, we believe that thie autonomoua poliae force is anmpatible ~
with a state police for thoae mattera that exceed the bounde of etrictly
Basque ~urisdiction, as~ for example~ immi@cation, etc. I al8o feel
that r~ must also disaount the concern that aome sectors often voice
about our police force being a breeding groundg for inffltrations and
. terrible ~ituations. In this countYy, if someone had wanted to
infiltrate, he could have done it in the atate security bodies long
C 16: Daring the transition period coulu the t~ro police Sorces, the
state and the autonomoua units, coexist in the Basque Country? -
C.G.: Yes. If they xere subordinate to the institutfona of self-
government for a reasonable period of time, there could be a gradual
transfer of jurisdiction.
C 16: Is a Basque police force gning to be capable of coping arith
terrorism?
C.G.: In the first place, I think that, to begin rrith, a Basque police
force is going to do aWay With a aituation that no one likes. When it
takes up this jurisd.iction of gublic order, it xill mean a substantial
reduction in the use of violence and in a number of activities by
sectors that today more or less actively revolve around that philosopl~y.
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Sa w~ will nd~ dnly h~v~ a much lee~ aomplica~~d pictu~~Q~ but ~he poopla,
in ~dditidn to th~ poliae~ wi11 f~ailitia~~ polia~ wo~k. mhe peopla are
~roin~ to back up ~he3r aativi~3~$, a~id that w~y we are goinf; ~o have a -
muoh eaoiQr ~o~ution ~o ~he Ba~que problem. ~
C 16: ~enp~.e oi't~n nqy about you that ~he ata,tutC l.:~ ~ust the first stQp
~owarda ind~pendence...
C.G. s~~m ~oin~ to ~ie~r~y explcLin what out ~ta~ld is iii rel~tion tn
1;he ig~ue nf the 83nquQ Count~yr vis-a-v~.s the rest of ~patn. iJe h~ve
alway~ ~dvncated a restora~ion of th~ privilegea. Wha~ dne~ thi~ m~nn?
~efor~ the privilege~ were taken away~ we had a aort of monarchic~.l
cot;,"oderation~ in termn of the political ~onaepts ~f the ~time. The
hf storically Bgaque ~erritories had their own politi~al power in tha form
in~~i~ui;lonal bodies auch as ~he General Boards or th~ Cortea of
PJ~,varr~. In other wordo, ~here was a complete poli~ioal and institutSonul
picture with native political sovereignty and a paat with the Crown that
meant voluntary par~icipation in a number of state bndieg th~t the crown
reprQSented a~ the ~ime. To ug, a restoration o~ the privfle~es means
putting in up-to-date language, fn cwcrent politfcal concepts, tt~at
preaence o� the BasquQ Country in the state. In othCr worcia~ it means
fn th~ first place: a return to selt-government with th~ degrees of
political ~ower that those institutionn used to represent, and second,
a return of the o~~iginal title to that political power to the ~asque
people by rein~tituting the voluntary pact in the makeup of the st~te.
t~le are Willing to try out coexistence within the ~tate, but I would
like to state firmly that ag fa~r as we are concerned, our people are
the natural and sacred political institution. And there i~ no Way that
we would want to nacrifice this because of an unconditional obligation
to belong to a certain type of state.
Historic Wei~ht
C 16: Could the statute that the BasquQS drew up in 1936 be reestablit~hed
now as a temporary solution?
C.C.: 'tes, o;f course. Speaking quite personally, I think that at
pre~ent the ~936 statute could be an interesting transitional me~ure.
Individuals and political groups who are questioning the current draft
statute here in Spain would have to take a more receptive stand in
relation to that one. Moreover, I think that I remember Adolfo Suarez
hi~self sa`yin~ that everything in the 1936 statutp is conatitutional.
Therefore, a person who has made such a statement ought not to have ar~y
qualm~ about reestablishing it.
C 16: Would the people welcome its reestablishment?
C.G.: I thfnl: so. It would be much less controversial among the
$a.sque people than the new draft, which contains opposing stands, perhaps
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:
~o~ o~Fic~~t, us~ ortt.Y
du~ ~o th~ 3.ntlusna~ of ~h~er par~i~~.n po~it~.ono. Aa ~ hurely p~ovi~~.on~l _
mea~ur~, ~he iq~6 e~atutp eould attraat wider fnllowin~ ~3 a repul~
of th~ ~n~iro hia~oric~l weight, all ni' ~ha emo~ional. memorie~...
Tnmo~rdw Ig Too L~te
C 16: About how mu~h ~ime is 1ef~ ~o ms]ce dectsinnr~ t~lat w~.ii ~ettle
th~ n~sque problem?
C.C.: Time...A faw mdnths ~go I said that we had about 6 or 6
months. Now there er~ about 4 or 6 monthg 1eft, ta put it in number~.
rl~}lE ~i~uatinn is ~et~ing worse quia}:1y; tho ~a~.i.calixation ia more
evident every d~t, and the poli~ical skeptici~rn ~hat f'ue~.s ~hig
radic ali~ation i~ incre~,aing to an incredible extent. ~hi~ is the
kind of skep~~.cism whereby me,n~y peaple ~.re developfng the conviction
th~t there i.s no baaie to ~he political method.
Mo~eover, I~hink that time is going by very quickly. What is poseible
~dd0.Y mi~ht not be tomorrow.
O~ten in proc~3ses of na~ional emanaipation, solutions thatwere ragarded
a~ acaeptable one day have not been feasible when the attempt was ma,de
to adopt them as a la~t recourse, because the natfons were sub3.eat
to dynfunics that led to much more radical options.
~r~aa~iias~ View of Basque Problem
iradrid CN~'~IO 16 in Sp~ni sh 13 May 79 P 32
~Interview with the president of the Catalan Legislative Assembly,
J~sep Tarradellas.]
~Text~ In the opinion of 80-year old Josep
Tarradellas, the president of the Catalan Legislative
Aasembly, a solution to the Basque Countzy problem
entail3 a much-needed unity of action atnong Basque
political forces. If they sit down at a table and
ne~otiate, peace is possible, the Fionorable
Tarradellas says.
To mar~y he is an ambitious politician wrapped up
in himaelf. To othera he is a political genius
who has led his fellow Catalans to the highest degree
of autonou~r in Spain today~ without f~.tss and without
serious confr~ntations with the central g'overnment.
T~.rradellas' opinions on the situation in the Basque
Country and the w~}r that the Basques have conducted
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_ th~ir neg~n~iationa with M~id have been very
aontroveraial. The Honnrable ~'arradel~.as spoke
with CAMB70 16 about.thia iesue and a poeeiblo
peaoefl~l golu~ion for ~he Be,sque Country. ~
CAN~In 16t Do you think that peaae ie pose~.bJ.e in the Baeque Country? _
Tarradellass Ye~, I have alwayg ~hought eo. Eut the ftrat annd3tion
is that ~he Basques si~ down at a table and talk. They have tn be
pragmatic. mhie wae how we Catalans reaahed qu9.te ~atiafaatory
solutione~ and without violenae.
Around a Table
C 16: And why do you think that the Basques have not eat down at the ~
negotiating table?
T: Perhaps because of the violence going on. S told them this onae,
and they got angry with mes that it wa~ a amall civil war among Basqued.
But they have to overcome this. They have to etart talking~ discuseing
things and having it out around a table because without solutions
this thing is going to xind up worse. If they reaah an underatandj.ng
among themselves, they can and will be listened to by Madrid. We
Catalans are obaessed about pacts, and even though I do not want to
giv~ the Basques a.t~y advice~ becauae then they get ar~gry with me, I can , -
tell them to arrive at a paat, reach an agreement among themselves and
then hammer out a pact with Madrid if they can. And even if they were
not to reach an agreement with Madrid~ they could atill be quite right
in saying to their people that they exhausted all avermes. But
they are not groing to get ar~ywhere with gunshots.
C 16: Can Iierri Batasuna and the PNV reach an agreement?
] T: Wi~y not? The political forces of Catalonia have come to an
~ agreement, because the questioa is whether they really want to reach
_ such an agreement.
C 16: But you don't have the ETA...
T: This business of the ETA! This is a domestic problem for the Basque
Country; it is a problem of Haeque nationa.lista. Because wY~jr did the
ETA emerge? Everybody lrnows that it is the child of a PNV splinter
group. And wh~y did thia ideological split occur? Simply because of
something that did not take place in Catalonia~ thanks to which we have
been able to arrive at a pact with the government. When we rep~:blicans
crossed the border in defeat, we had two options: one, wage wWr; twos
reach an agreement...But there was another problems who ought to speak
on behalf of our coun~:ries? The Basques felt that they themselves
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4 ;
I'OR OF~C~I~.L US~ ONLY
ought to oonduo~ policy inside the ~aeque Country. x fe~t that ~his
was no~ posaible and ~ha~'a why I did no~ Form a governmen~t in exile.
The Bagques did. Why didn'~ T? ,For one ~i.mple reasont beoause I
i;hought that the new generationa that were born undQr Franco would no~
ag~ee to let a gx~oup of defea~ed men aonduc~ the domestia poliay of
the Basque Coun~ry or Ca~alon3.a from Coahabamba or wherevc~r. During
I`ranao's 40 ye~s ~here were very re~pectable persone who ~;hought that
domegtic pollcy aould be aonduat~d from Pasis. The resul~ of all this3
Well, that I, who reflzsed to form a governmen~, am here, and the ETA
is stronger every day. But lookj.ng to the present rather than the
1~ast, I would say that they have to etart talking, that the Bagques
have to reach an agreement among themselves, beoause othorwi.se the
problem will get bigger every day.
_ C 16: You were one of the first pol3ticians who said ~ha~ we had ~o
nego~ia~e with the ETA. Could negotiations have been undertaken at that
point?
T: T th:~nk ~o. The hi.ghe~t representative of the ata~e asked me that
same question...Look, I'rance had an extremely serious problem with
Algeria, and while De Gaulle was saying that he was not going to
ma,ke agreements, he wae secretly doing so. As far as we are concerned,
if policy is not made in the streets, it's of no use, but at
certain times you don'~ have to make it in the s~reete, but rather
in a quiet room apeaking in low voices.
C 16: And is it more diffioult now to reach an agreement with the
ETA than 2 yeass ago? ~
T: Yes, much more difficult~ and the difficulties are aggravated as
times goes by. But what are politicians? Men who resolve serious
problems, not easy ones. To be a politician is to get involved where
no one else would, to get imrolved in sticlqr matters. That's w~y,
no ma.tter how hard it might be, they have to take the firet step~ they
have to reach an agreement.
C 16: And for example, what if Herri Batasuna does not arrive at an
agreement with the PNV but the FNV does come to an agreement with the
government? Do you think that such a pact could be the basis for
peace in the Basque Country?
T: It would be a big mistake. Nothing can be done without unity. I
have traveled to France to speak with Mr Leizaola~ whom I hold in great
esteem. I have often been in Saint Jean de Luz and Bayonne talking
with activists, and ~y attitude has always been the same: if they
fight among themselves, they are not going to settle ar~ything, and -
moreover, that benefits the government.
6
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~o~ orricrnr. us~; om.Y
A Ques~ion of Nerves
C 16: And wha~ oould happen i� ~he PNV' ar~d Herri Bata~una do not aome
to an agreemen~t?
ma A disaster. I~h~.nk that 3~ is a question of narcres, a].though
Madrid ie the winner in ~he long run beoauee i~ has more expe~ierice.
The govern?nen~t has won 3n aonneoi;3on with ~he Nav~a problem. Look,
1a~t June when I aame to Madr3d to negot3ate, under dramat3.a aonditione~
at Qn~ point I aame out and said tha,t a mi.llion peop7.e were g~oing to take to _
~he etreets 3.n Catalon~.a~ and Suarez told me, good~ 7.et them. We must
not think that violenae ia going to force the goverr~nmen~ to purnte a
policy ~hat Spain doee not want. Ae fas as the 8asquo p~.roblem is
conaerned, the government can wa3t, Spain aan wait, the Basques are ~he
ones who cannot wait. I hope that they realize that the only solution
ie to come to an agreemen~.
C 16: Do you think that peaae w~ould come if the government gave the
Baeque Country the 1936 statute?
T: That wouldn't resolve ar~ything, because then they would want the
1979 version. I don'~ want to discuss whe~her the Baeques are right,
fax from it. I am discussing tactica. I~y friend Monzon sayas 'tWe
wan~ this," but S know a little bit about hox things are, and if that _
_ were given to them, tomorrow they would want more.
Ma~or Figares State Viewa
Madrid CANIDIO 16 in spa.n~sh 13 ~?9 pp 35, 37-39
~Text] Twelve figures from the world of politics, law, the arts
and intellectual pursuits, and who have an interest in the problem of
the Basque Counti-y~ feel that peace is not ~nly poesible but necessary.
They explained to CANIDIO 16 what roads they feel lead to it.
Justino de Azcarate, a aenator by royal appointment, wa.s born in Madrid
74 years ago. The minister of foreign relations of the Second Republic
for just 1 day, he was imprisoned in Yalladolid when the Civil War
broke out. After being exchanged for Raimundo Fernandez Gtiiesta in 1937,
he went into exile and established himself in Venezuela, where he
remai.ned for 38 years.
I am g~oing to talk very briefly about the handling of the Autonomar
Statute of the Basque Country.
First of all, we have to recover a"good form" so that all of ua together
(not against each other) can serve the coamion goal of restoring order
and harmony, in other words peace, to the livea of all people who work,
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p1a}r, ~leep and have ~ongstand~.ng or recen~ roo~s ~.n ~he B~,sque
Country and who do not wan~ ~o live e].sewhere. -
We mus~ diacusa ~he Baaque problem immedi~tely. ~'h~.e ie ~he manda~e
~hat the B~sque peop].e have iesued through bhe munic3pa~. bal].o~ing a~nd
expresaed w1.th aompasable urgency through the varioue po].it~.oal group~
or par~iee.
This desire must be met. T thj.nk that the voting e3gatfied an i.mpl3oit
and even explicit re~ection of violenoe~ because "terror3am" ~hat
w~zits ~o cLi.scues ~hin8's e.nd that votee is not reall.y terrorism.
Now then, before they begin the very dangerou~ diacussion of every
paxagxaph and every word, a11 of the national and local poli~ical forces
muat achieve a detente, give the3r exprese, broad and categorical
poli~ical. support to ~he granting of ~he Basque Country statute of
autonuu~r and accept the powere and ~urisdia~3.ons etipulated in the
consti~ution.
The Baeque problem is a na~ional problem~ and it is on that level that
- the solemn pledge should be made to re~ect dealings w3~h or recognition -
of an,y political force that by resorting to v3.olence opposes the
peaceful arrangement of autonom~y that the Basque people deaire.
T alludea previously to the now imminent debate on the wording af the
draft statute introduced laet 29 December. Without a prior, ~ormal and
~oint declasation, I feas that a dangerous attrition might take place
which would lea.d to dead-end situations~ to the ma~.ntenance, with the
best good fa,ith, of rigid and intranaigent views. In a word, and
although it might seem contradictory to what a discussion is, the ,
co~ission and its members ought to lrnow, as they begin their aessions~
that they will be able to conclude their work only through a general
agreement.
Now is the only time that we have to carry out thi.s difficult, but
fea~ible, unavoidable task. ~
I am sure that the enormous rnamber of "newscomers" to the Basque Country,
who axe so close to this their "land," will help to make the proceas of
transference safer a.nd more balanced. "Without pause but without haste"
could once again be a good gu3deline. _
- I am sure that the Basques will soon wind up putting the services of
their "first" home in better order and wi.ll then continue to revel
in what naturally belongs to them because it belongs to all.
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FOIt OrFICIAL US~ bNLY
- J.M. Leizaola, ~he 62-Year Old I'reaident of ~he Easque Govex~nmen~ 3n Ex31o
Peaoe iA very pos~ible in the Baeque Country. I am f1~11. of hope and -
have a~o~al determi.nation to ~ervo ~his goa7.. ,Le~ us not �orget that
~he phenomenon of v3.olenoe and ~errorism tulfo~tunately exi.~ts in mar~y
coun~ries. Nonethelese, we al1 have ~o struggle ~o p~cify our aountry, _
by foll.ow3ng ~he example of aaun~ries like Germat~y ~that have been ab~e
to shake off ~h3s onele,ught.
Although the prooees of au~ono~r in the ~asque Country cauld he~ve been
quicker, I~think that over the last 2 months we have antered po~itive
dynamic in terms of a aolution to the problem. r am optimistic at ~his
point becauae of the eincere intexeat ehown by a rnimber of Ma,dxid
politicians in reso'iving ~he groblem.
W3th regasd ~o the pos~3bility that the 1936 etatuto will be approved
ver.y soon, th~.s ahow~ that the conditione and etands are poeit3ve at
- the moment for seeking formulas that are aceeptable to a11. How oan
I say ar~,ything again$t that statute when what we have ao fas alxaye
defe~ded firmly and honestly has been precisely the legitimaay that
that same statute conferred on us.
At the moment I am outside all of thi.s, and mar return will be deaided
by both the people and the representai;ives of the polit3.ca1 forcee. Sf
things do not change, I will continue in m~ post. I am no desertor.
Anton Menchaca, 56, formerly in the Navy and now the owner and president
of the Menchaca Shipping Company in Eilbao.
Based on the current strife-torn situation~ I think that a remedy, not
a solution, to all the problems ~rould be for the Baeque legielatore
to obtain a atatute as similar as possible to the one they introduced~
for the simple reason that this would satisf`y the aspirationa of most
of the segments of the Basque people...If the legislators do not come
back soon with such a statute, the new formal democracy might loee
prestige in our region, and the moet important path tor~ra.rds a solution
would be closed off.
I think that the Basque people, even se~nenta that have not been
nationalists and some of them even a.dvocates of integration or Francoista,
defend the atatute today, because they realize that it is the only
_ viable option. With regard to the potential incompa,tibility or
unconstitutionality of the current dsaft, the law is flexible and
ambiguous enough to satisfactorily handle the country's problema. I do
not think tha.t the problem can be resolved by ueing Sagasta's method~
by putting it in a big closet to be taken care of by time. Time wi11
have the opposite effect and complicate matters f~irther.
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~OR 0~'~ICIAL US~ ONI,Y ~ y'
Miguol Cas~ell~, a na~ive of Se.n Sobas~3.un and a notary, a fornaer vioe -
pre~iden~ of Baeque Chris~~.an, Democracy (Gi].-Roblee),74 years of ag~e. .
Tho real reaaon for the ~ear and tonsion that exi.st in ~he Baeque
Cauntry today is primar~.ly, and rio one aan really dony ~this~ the long
yeaso of ~tragedy that ~he 8asque people have suffered. -
We must not take the 3esue of paaification l~.ghtly; we mu~~ examine i~ _
aoneaient3ously, and to do th~.s we need to restore Spai.n'g ~rue faae and
also overcome exi.at3.ng anti-Basque at~itudes. .
~1'he autonorc~r statute cou].d be ~he solution. The Baeque Country haa
given evidence of be3.ng able to govern i.teelf with3.n the framework o�
Spain as a whole.
I porsonally th:tnk that a xe].1�tra9.ned nstive police forc~s aould eventually
function better than the current police force. It is ~otall.y puerile _
to think that a native police force could turn into an axmpr.
The Guernica s~ratute must be recognized qu3ekly. I recall ~hat abou~
2 years ago the Span3.sh Communj.st Party called for the reestabliahment of _
the 1936 atatu~e, which was perhaps usef~.il at the time but not now~
although if it enablea a Basque government to be set up agai.n while the
Guornica draft statu.te r,ontirrues w~der discussion, I think that it
could be a proper measure.
Luis de Michelena, born in Renteria on 20 August 1915, a linguist and
philologist, chairma.n of ~�:he Depaxtment of Sndo-El~ropean and Basque
Linguis~tics of the Divisipr~ of Philology at Vitoria and Salamanca,
member of the Acade~y of the Basque Language.
I think, naturally I woul.d say, that peace is possible. I am talkin~
about a real peace, one that makea possible coexistence in the f~ill
sense of the word and that enables our country, which has been restra.ined
by coercion for so mar~y yeaxa, to develop.
We have lived ~oo long under a fear born of manifest or concealed
violence to want a situation like that to contiriue in one form or
another. This does not, of course, mean that the conflicts and their
causes are going to disappeax.
If there is life, there is conflict, but the conf`rontatione that life
causes should take place within regulated channels. This means that
right here and now I believe exclusively in political.solutions. But
this pri.ncipled belief muet be borne out by the facts, and if such
~olutions fail because of stubborn emotions or too much partisan "akill~"
it would wind up being a catastrophe for the entire Basque people.
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I~OIt 0~'FICIAL US~ nNLY
- Tn ~he firet p1~,ce, x am opeaki.ng e~.mply ae a w~.tnees tn "o7.d memoriea. n
Now ~hen, as such S can only eay tha~ ever since S was 15.yeare old~ x
- have alwaye though~ a neoeseary aondi~ion ~o ~hat,our aopixa~ione would
no~ be poi~onod and poieon ue a11 wae for the Baeque Coun~ry to en~oy
- autonortpr. Sn no wa,y do I believe ~hat our hia~oi�ioal righ~e expired
wi~h ~he former r~g3me, 'but S do think that they mua+: be brought up ~o
date now wi~th~.n a d3.fferen~ .�ramework. That framework~ wh~.ch Jo~e
Antonio de Agvirre foreaaw, ~o men~ion ~us~ h3m, 3~ a s~rai,~u~e of
au~ono~r, whether it is oalled tha~ or ~rthing elee.
Since I cannot believe in c~i.rec~, agaembly-style demooraay~ wht.ch failed
in ~he dqy~ of Athen~~ Z am w9.th the ma~or3ty of the xepresentat3vos
that we havo elec~ed. In other words~ I am favor of the Guerntca
statute, and ~ only fear is ~hat aome people w~.ii ~~,bout w~,tering it
down wi~h such determi.nation that they will make it invalid for the
urgent and immeci~.ate goal ~hat we are pureuing. _
- I am with Aguirre, with A3uriaguerra and so mat~y othere and I eincerely
believe that a Basque st~tute that is not nj.ggaxdly wa.tered down 3.~ an -
indtspensable requ3rement for channeling our problems along the politiaal
path of negrotiated conflict, not the military path of armed conflict,
and I i~a~ +h~,t all of those reeponaible on both aides finally see it
that w~y.
Manuel de Iru3o, a former deputy from 1921 to 1930, a PNV deputy in ~he
_ Cortes in 1933 ~d 1936, mini~ter of the republic in 1936, mini.ater of ~
3us~ice 3n 19~7 a.nd minieter without portfolio in 1938, president of the
Aesembly of Basque I,egielators f~om 1977 to 1979, former ~enator ar~d
current ahairman of the Peninsular Federal Council of the E1~ropean
Movement, born in the capital of l~avarra e6 year~ ago.
_ It is urgent to begin eerious discuesions with Madxid about enacting
the current statute that the assembly of legislatore drew up an~. signed
at Guernica last yeax. I have no doubts or hesitatione about wagering
_ on the s~atute, while trying to make the mos~ of it. Let ue not forget
that the draft statute Was ratified also by the PSOE ~Spariish
Socia,liat Workers Party�], Etiizkadico Ezkerra and the UCD itself.
The only thing that I ask is that our cvrrent leaders not forget about
the broad-based national movement that e~d sts today in the Basque
Country. If the statute is sabstantially watered down, the people will '
not accept it, and we could lapse into civil disobedience.
If effective and sincere solutions for the Basque Country come quickly,
I am comrinced 1~hat violence will subside. We, like th~ people in
:~adrid, have to open ovr eyes and open the doora that have been shut on
our aspirations for decades. I do not think that We can wai.t mach longer.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONT,Y
- I'atr~.cio de la Sot~~ from 8i].bao~ holder of a master's deg~ree in
econom~.cs from Cornell Un3.versity. He returned ~o Spa3n in 1957 af~or
20 yaars in ax9.1.e and ~oined the management o� ~he Franao Eapanola de
' Alambre~ ~3.rm, where he is curran~~y president. He was recen~ly eleoted
v3.ae pxeeiden~t of ~he Bilba.a Chamber of Commerce.
The sta~tute of au~tono~y can rapidly se~tle the Bar~que Count~r's
_ problems. T~rn in favor of ~he economi.c pacts and 2 think that wi~h
our orm financo asrangement we would suoceed in solving mar~?' of our
problems. The basic problem ~ha~ I am refer.ring to is whe~ther we ~.re
gotng ~o continue depending on Madrid~ as we have, becauae Z do not
chink ~ha~ 3~ doee muah good. M~,drid has lost 3.te 3.mage in the ~a~que
Country, and in turn the Basque Country has lost confidence in Ma~trid.
The recen~ elect3ona showed th~,t the pol3cy of oentral3em bas led
a ma~or segment of our popula~ion ~o extremis~ standa. CeMtraliem and
its ca~tastroph3.c policy in recen~ yeass has to a large extent created
Herri Bataauna. 2'he current radicalization is due to d3.sillusionmen~
and weariness with so m~y promises, and we are all responsi.ble. We
axe the fore~lu~ners of democracy~ but it bothers u~ when ~hey continua
to kid us.
Jose Maxia Setien~ the bishop of San Sebastian since 19 Maxch 19?9. _
1~ Basque speaker, he received his deg~ree in ~heol.ogy from the Gregorian
University of Ramo and earned a doctorate in canon law.
Peace is possible in tho Basque Country~ not only as an abstract
postulate or an ethical imperative~ but ae an historic situation that
we must achieve. But peace will not come merely by elimi.nating violence
ae long as sociopolitical and cultural relations do not develop towards
normalcy, as required by the c~ynami.sm of a people that ase becoming
increasingly more awase of their own iden.tity, along with the tensions
and conflicts prompted by abnormal past eituations in hiatory, the
lack of proper soaiopolitical institutions and the decided wi11 to
live.
The Basque people's gociopolitical process of self-affirmation must
become independent of the dialectic of actions and represaions triggered
by violence. This is possible; moreover, it will be ~the path of gemiine
pacification.
ZJe can foresee that without the statute it will be impossible to
- satisfy the Basques. The political and insti~tutiona,l adjustments
required for the affirma.tion of the Basque people's identity c~.nnot
take place without a special provision, the basic expression of which
muet be the distinctive quality introduced by the statute or another -
su.i.table judicial format.
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~OIt O~~ICIAL USL bNLY
mhQ mont appropri~t~ oolution wj.ll bn th~ onn tha~ ia in keeping w1.t;h
- the hintnrical a.r~aran~a~ attain~d at ~hie moment~ wi~hnut the dagma~ic
g~pro~he~ that brinE to politian a~everity tha~ runo cour~tor to
the evolut~.on of hidtnry. Wo mug~ prevent the Parliament f'rom becoming
a forum for th~ diecuseion oS politioal or ~ud~.aia,7. theoriee~ in nrder
to eeek c~u~ suitable formul~s ~that ar~ duly flexi'~1Q and in keeping
wi~h hi~{;orlcal demand~.
R~nnn f~ubial wa.~ born in ~'rand~o (Yizaa,ya) ~.n 1q06, spen~ 21 year~ in
~ai1, wae preaident o~ ~he PaOE and ie currently a~enator from
'Jizc~y?a and the chariman of the Basqug General Council.
Peace ia poe~ible~ ar?d wo must a11 set about seeking~ i~. Yf we had
_ been in a more '.~uoyant economic situation~ ~he solution would have
come more eanily and leso tengely.
We have to ooncern oureelvee ~rith tWO thingg in order to deftise the
sit~iation ~hat the Basque Country is g+oing through. Firet~ thQ economia
aituation~ over which the Basque Country has no control becaueQ it is
~ reflected throughout Spain. Nonetheloss~ it is hitti.ng ba~;ic neatore _
here hard, such as iron and steel and shipbuilding. 5econd, the rapid
formulation of a s~atute whereby we Basquea can eecure the aelf-
government ~hat wo exercised in 1936 with an efficiency tha,t no one can
take aw~Y from us. As the survivora of that period~ we remember those
months of war r~rhen from nothing we had to create a political adminietrative
machine with an ara~r and merchant marine. We must not forget~ however,
th~t wo attained that dQgree of self-government in a special eituation
of str.ife.
Moreover, a poaitive awarenesa has arisen today that can be channeled
towards the attainment of peace~ if we see to it that the statute that
has been drawn up is not xatered dor+n, so that it can satiafy the
overwhelming ma~ority of ~`he political forcee that are active in thi.s
region.
Recognition of the 19~6 atatute could create a false ~nag~e in p~ople'a
minds because it would be he.rd to enact at the present time. T'nere ia
the dar~ger of a backslide in �this regard, and a true solution to the
problem necessarily entails tr~e current draft of the Guernica a~atutQ
and urgent di~cuseion of it in Madrid. The negotiations cannot be put
ofF a~y longer, because this tirould only lead us into a dea.d-end street
that radical groups would tak~+ advantage of to contirrue th~eir violent
3ctivities.
Ju,a.n Linz, Span~.ah sociopolitical analyst and currently a professor at
Yale University. He t~ught previo~ssly at ~iarvard and the Autonomoua
University of Madrid. He received his doctorate from Columbia
University and has an honorary PhD fram the University of Granada. He
is presently preparing a wideranging atudy on the Basque problem.
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~OEt O~~ICIAL US~ nNLY
PQrhapA wo havQ to dietingu9.sh betweon probleme. 1) T~h~.nk that if
wa al~ ~ealize how d~.�fiaul~ the problem in, ~h~~ no one oan have a
perfeat~ short-term eo].ution~ we will have to neg~~ia~e. 2) Pe~ae between
thQ cen~ral government and nationalism ent~.i~e an agreement amor~g a].1
Basque forces a~ to what ~heir realis~ia ob~eativeg a~e and negot3atione
th~t all are rrilling to undertake. ~'he ma~or diffiaul~y in thie regard
ie the explioi~ or latent conflia~ among Baeque~ sa to ~h~ir viewe o�
~;he future, their bargainSng pla~forms.
No solution will be definitive or satisfactory to all. Autono~qyr within
the conatitution that we Spanierds and a l~ge plurality of the $asqueo
:~pproved is the nnl.y ahort-~orm eolu~ion, although there are Basques
who wo~il.d like to go ft~r~her. The problem ia for all Ba~ques to
- po~tpone tha~ "further step" and negotiate with a single voice rtithin
tha~ framework. I do no~ view thts as easy beaauge of the ;.ompeti.tion
between the PrN and Iierri Bataswia.
A more or less brnad autonomy ~rithin the consti~ution must be negotiated
with deliberate apeQd but without a deadline and, if possible, xith
a united nasque delegation and another delegation of state paxties _
who agree beforehand on minimum and m~dmum pointa. This lat~er aspect
i~ also difficult, because the etate parties have electoral interests
- in the Basque Country. Once an agreement has been reached, the signers
should consider it their duty to defend it to their votera even though
it mi~t not reflect their highest aopirations end to impose, aith force
if necessazy, on a minority that might not aaaept it and keep trying to
impoae a utopian solution.
Julio Caro Baroja, historian, ethnologist, anthropologist, member of
the Hoy