JPRS ID: 8497 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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JPRS L/8497
6 sune ].9 79
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
CFOUO 23/79)
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6 June 1.9 79
. TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 23/79) _
CONTENTS PAGE
INT~R-ARAB AFFAIR5 ~ ~
Maurieanian Government Receives SubsCanCial Aid From Arab
States I
- (THE MIDDLE EAST, Apr 79) 1
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
Morocco, Mauritania AtCempting To Protect Fishing Areas
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Apr 79) 4
AFGHANISTAN
'ASAHI' Interviews Afghan Officials on Current Political
Climate
(Ninakawa; ASAHI SHIMBUN, 20 May 79) 6
IRAN
Conflicts Between Moderates and FundamenCalista Reported
(Bernard Ullmann; SPECIAL, 19 Apr.79) 8
Taleqani Influence Seen Rising in Disintegrating Revolution
(Alain Bradfer, Frxncis Monheim; SPECIAL, 26 Apr 79). 17.
Briefs
Khomeyni Questions Lebanese Shi'ite 16
IRAQ
'AL-WAT~1N AL-'ARABI' Reports Officials Visit to France,
Press Conference
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 May 79) 17
Kurds Fight Internal Dissention, External Enemies
(THE MIDDLE EAST, ctilay 19) 21
- a- [ I I I- NE F~ A- 121 FovO )
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CONmCN'I'S (Continued) Pnge -
/ Ba'th~.ets Cut CPI Down to Size
(TH~ MIBDLE EAST, Apr 79) 24
JORDAPI
Econou~ic Develop~nent Falls Short of Target
(Rami G. Khouri; THE MIDDLE EAST, May 79) 26
KUWAIT
Lonrho Control BaCt1e 5Cudied
(TKE MIDDLE EAST, May 79) 28
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INT~R-ARAB AFFAIRS
MAURITANIAN GOVERNMENT RECEIVES SUBSTANTIAL AID FROM ARAB STATES
London THE MIDDLE EAST in ~nglish Apr 79 pp 104-106
[Text] The Mauritanian Miniater of Finance & Commerce, Sid'i Mohammed Ould
Bnei~ara, told THE MIDDLE EAST on taking over his cabine~ post offer after
~he coup d'etat in Nouakchott last July that the economic situation -
inherited from the previous regime was "catastrophic".
Foreign reservea, he said, were down to $20mn, eufficient for only one
month's imports, and there was absolutely no money in the Treasury, which
was anyway running a$SOmn overdraft with the Central Bank. The former ~
government had been obliged to take 16Qmn ouguiyas out of the state
inaurance company, SMAR, to pay employees and the money had to be repaid.
There was litCle doubt at the time that the aituation was as bad as Ould
Bneijara painted it. The question is now being asked, however: what steps
is the new Government taking to reverse the alide inCo bankruptcy?
~On the plus side, the new ment would require changes not and it will take many more such
leadership has received sub� only in economic structures but years to overcome the long�term
stantial xid, meinly from friend� in the people's mentality. In the socio�economic changes caused
ly Arab scatea in the form of gifts short term, he said, a complete by eight years of drought.
end soft ;oans. ~or the tirst time, survey of the economy was being Added to the eftects of the
too, it hns succeeded in obtain- carried out and investment drought, of murse, the guerriqa
ing [uncis from the STA1dEX legislation was being revised to war has brought economic tuin.
scheme operated by the liberalise the economy. Iron-ore production, hit by
E u ro p e a n E c o n o m i c The intemational economic sebotege, fell during the first
Commu~iity for developing� community endo~ses these plen9 three mont}~ of 1978 to 30;'0
country signatories to the Lorr~~ for economic recovery in genernl below normal. Output for the
convention. In :~tauritania's terms, advising the Government whole of laet year slumped to
case the4e funds were to com� to concentrate on streamlining some 6mn tons, which is 2mn
! pensate for the shortfall in the flow of foreign funds inw the tons below the figure at wliich -
output of iron ore. Finelly - 3nd economy and on fiscal reforms. production begins W be profi�
most importAnt - it has seen a Meny experts thihk the acid test table. Thia is particulnr!y
tentative end to the three years is whether the Govemment can cruciel for a country wherz _
" of war agninst the Po!isario put ti[e into the staggeringly in- (eccording ':o the lete~t World
front, fighting the joint efficient administration. Bank Atlas} everege income a
!uioroccan-~iauritanian an ex- Although some economic hesd ataod et only S270 in 1977
ation of the ~Yestem Sahara~ difficulties can be recti&ed, and where iron exports account _
On the other hend, it was others are proving extreme'.y for over 80% of foreign revenue.
clear that medium-term and dif[icult to uvercc~me. N'or une Immediate:y a!'ter last year's
long�term measures were thing Mauritania hes been hit coup funds poured into
needed to rectify the "errois of by the lethal Sahelian drought. 1Vlauritania from Arab countries
the ~ast". According to Ould Lest year was the fust year of which were previously loth cu
Bneijara~ long-term improve� reeseneble rainfell since 1969, pump money into what
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nppeared eo be a bottomlese pit. ~
The Saudis, for inetance, had been incensed eo find a consignment of
weapona bound for NouakchotC still sitting on a Marseilles whar� four
moneha later. Funds sent to pay for Chem had aimply been channeled into .
current expendi.eure. Indeed it was subsequent 5audi refusal to release
funds which deF?lt the coup de grace to the old regime.
Reassured by ehe change, however, Che Saudis promised $100mn to
Che Government of Ould Sa1ek almost immediaCely~ Some $30mn was
deaCined for budgeCary support and $70mn as a long-term development
loan. Morocco also gave $15mn as a gifC for Che budget, forming the ,
firat alice of a promised $60mn.
Libya (alleged].y vying with Saudi Arabia) provided $lOmn -
and leunched a number of co� sipart fruin irun-ure And under� widened even further with
operation projects ~nd Kuwait e~pl~iited fisheries, MAUrilnnie imports expected to rcech -
pmvided $15mn as a l~nn at hAS few naturel re.~urces, ex� $388,2mn, costing ebout lH7ce
3.6%� interest. The IMF and pori,illy ~ince its li~~estock herds as much es exports, projected at ,
France have also allocated heve atill not recovered fmm ihe $180.2mn. It is hoped now thet
funds, amounting to $9mn and dmught. This factar holds down the heevy toll of defence ~
$2.2mn respectively. econ~~mic growth to a slow 1.5So spending (accounting for ,
These donnrs were reassured a year, lagb7ng behind a pc~p� mughly 60% of A4auritnnia's
by the political stebility which ulation gmwth rete of 2.25i meagre budget) can at last be ,
followed the coup, and the (with a 50~ infant mortality). reduced, although this cannot i
' influx of aid ~taved all 1t is hoped, nevertheless, that happen on a significant scale :
i?nm^diate ec�onomic pr~blems. the private sector may take off until the de facto censefire
Sinc~:+ then, ho~~ever, there has later this year end force the observed by the Polisario is
been a noticeable political shift grc~wth rate up. MaivitAnia has translated inW e lang�term
tuw~xrds Libye and Algeria, nlso made strenuous efforts A6Reement.
rnmbined with incrnesingly since the coup to reschedule Precisely beceuse of the ~
o~~er1. tension between hlecks foreign debts of ~me $750mn. paucity of natiiral te~urcea,
nnd Rerbers, and it is not The World Aank's report for ~eat stre:~s ia plac~d on continu-
k n o w n, u n d e r t h e 1918 put the country's debt� ~ng iron�ore production es the ,
circumstances, whether servicing ratio for 1976 at 37~"0 of back�bone of the economy. The
il9orocco will release the exports of goods and services - biggest scheme the country has
remainder of its pmmise8 funds. the highest ratio in the bank's ever undertaken, the Guelb pro-
One factor causing majur list. ject, is designed to prolong pro-
donors to monitor aid to This state of affairs was duction until well into the next
~tauritania ~ery clc~sely is that causeci in part by a 37 c increase century by opening new mines
- e~�en though the sums involved in budget expenditure between when the deposi~.a near Zouerate
;ve nnt ~�~t, thcy ne~�erthrl~ ~s 1975 and 1976 end an increase of ere exhausted. Unfortunately,
rr1,r~~.~~nt n~ery hi~;h per re,~ut 27�'r between 1976�]977, putting thia scheme, although vitel for
invr~~m~�nt, ~s 11~iiritAnia's a hea~y strain on the balance of Mauritania's future, has hed
{~c~~,~il;+t inn nuinhcrs only. payments. Last year the ~tbacks.
l.5mn. .1rndhrr prnhlNm ic thet, balance-of-payments deficit Under Mohktar Ou1d
Daddah, the Socicte :~ationale ~
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Induatrielle et Miniere (SN~M) was changed ~rom a atate company to a
mixed venture, largely at ehe request of Arab atatea who were eo con-
eribuCe money Co the scheme. This pracess ha~ conCinued under Ould Salek,
and four Arab donore have now given firm promisQS Co subscribe Co the
$900mn pro~ece.
_ But tt f irat upset came with the resignation on 3 Jttnuary of Tsmail Ould
Amar, SNIM's Secretary General, on Che mysterious grounds thae he could
"no longer fulfill his ~ob." His post has bee~ taken by Ely Ou1d Alla�.
Another setback was the refusal by both Kuwait and the Arab Mining Company
Co accept Mauritania's evaluation of SNIM's asseCs as $360mn. At the
end of January they finally settled on $290mn. Since then, Kuwait, the
Arab InvesCment Company, Morocco and Che Islamic Development Bank have
agreed tio subscribe a total of $98mn for tt?e capital of the new SNIM.
Libya and Iraq are also expected to take part but details are not yeC
known.
This is only half Che baCtle, however. Eccnomic experts agree that this
pro~ect is vital for Mauritania, but Chey warn that it will noC break even
unless efficiently administered. They stress that the capiCal coat is
huge and that burgeoning administration 3n Nouakchott threaCens to eat
up profits, which are already declining because of the unfavourable world
siCuation.
Hopes for the long term are pinned on fishing, which is potentially an
even bigger earner than iron-ore and contribuCed $14mn last year.
The British White Fish Authority recently estimated that 3mn tons of
fish is caught in MauriCanian waters every year, at least 2mn of which
is caughC illegally. They warn that immense difficulCies are involved
in making this sector profitable for the country aC large. Mauritanians
are also anxious to improve agricultural output, held up by delayed
irrigaCion schemes. But agricultural self-sufficiency will tal:.: at least
20 years to attain, even without a recurrence of dr.ought.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4420
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NORTH AFRICAN AF~'AIRS
MOROCCO, MAURITANIA ATTEMPTING TO PROTECT FISHING AREAS
London THE MIDDLE EAST in Engllsh Apr 79 p 106
[Text]
~ I Iierdly n week gc>es Uy withuut CPa~u~+h nnri ~~rrrk anrciinee.
~ame incic~ent Uetwecn pntrol TinnF�~i c,irdinr~ n~pm:.~~nt ~i}nut
}x~ats from Morocco and f~ ;~~I ~1ora~cnn fi~h ~~x1x~i'.~
Meuritania and' foreign fishing s+nd m~~rt~ then t~Alf of fhea~~ rue
~~cascls warking the rich Atlnntic ++hs~~rbed by the Fur~~~u~~jn
Cf)AS~AI WA~ffI9~ which run from Soviet Union, Suuth Africa,
Tan~iers in the nurth to beyond Jepan, Spuin and Portugal.
Noundhibou in the south, Boats fmm these countries work
Most recently, e series of with ultra�modem refrigereted
attacks by Polisario guemllas fish�processing and canning
ngainst South African and 3hips. $oth the g~vernments
Spanish ressels, which the concemed and Polisario have
liberntion movement alleges are mede repeated protests, but
fishing illegally in the Westem most of the owneis of these
Sahara's temtorial waters, has floating factories tend to ignore
led to a significant reduction of them.
fishing activities along this Over recent yeara both
stretch of the seaboard, Morocco and Meuritania have
This 3,OOOkm�long coagtal been attempting to develop
zone contains some of the their own fiehing and canning
world's richest fishing grounds, industries, but their bc~ets are
~tiith Western Seharan watera small nnd aut of date nnd
alone possessing an estimated cannot comp~te w~th the better-
2bn, tonnes of fish. The annual equipped vc~sela from the
catch in this area is conser- de~�eloped slates.
~atively estimated at upwerda At the same time, Morceco
of 2mn. tonnea. has been especially hard hit by a
VVith the growing world need E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c
for protein, these fishing Community decision giving
grounds have attracted a preference to Portuguese,
veritable armada froih the ~
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mnrket, '~1ur~~ec~n's ~n~cr� iurea, Soviet ~hi~ ~ecre grnnted si~?icd:u?on. ~
s~~~~~~inli.ntiuninthincl~tnninisa ~4~~~rial fiahing r~~;~~te in Previously Mnuritsnia hed
~eriui~s ~~~rnknegs, ?~1,,mccAn ~~~atere, esteblished e system of licence f
1~1ur~xcan fitihrrinen h~~ve '~~,~q ey,rcement, h~~~.~~~~~~r, agreemente with the principal ~
. l~~~en cnmplf~i~iing thxt over� lnuched off H minur ciirl~~~ii++tie fishing natione, but thie ~
- fi~hing by fureign bunts hne inrident because Algerin nnd tirrangement proved unaatisfna
l~~iided t~ mdu~~e their cntc}~, a ~h~ Poli4fvio thought th~~t King tory ss }'oreign vessels fpiled w ~
~c~riuus matter since the ~ocal }i~i~,~~ wAy using it tu nchieve supply the Nouadhibou�Unatd
caiining induetry depends ~n e de fecto recn6mitic~n fmm canning industry with en
~I~~ndy Supply of 8sh, Sludies Mc~cow of Muroccen ~~untm) aseuredflow~ffieh,
ere under way to see whether uver the ~'~'ralem SnhNra, In 1978, for exsmple, unly
mndrrn fishing bnuts cen be pa~ignrio Secr~tary~�Grnerel 60,000 tannes of fish cnme
rlinrlered, ~t~d expnnsjon of ~;Vfohammad Abdel�Aziz later aahore out of a lolal r.nlch
onshore refrigeration facilities ia told The Middle ~ast that hie estimated at between S(10,U()0
nlsoheingconsidered. movement hed receivtd and lmn tonnes. What is more,
The state-owned Office assurnnces from the Soviet the Meuriianien Govemment
� Netional dea Peches is going )eadership lhat th~ a6~reement received e mere $lYmn in
a}iead v-~th a srheme to covered only Moroccan wnlere royelties and feea from i,qhing
m~~deniise the Moroccan Heet. If and did n~~t involve the disputed compenies feu e cetch vnlued nt '
budgetary restrictions do nnt Saharan ~one. amund $lbn ~
- affect its pr~gramme, 12 snrdine Mauritania's Minister of Putting the new fishing pro-
nnd nine tuna bc~et,v as well ~ 18 Financz & Comtnerce, Sidi grntnme into ection, the
trawle~s worih ~45mn, are to be Mc~hammed Ou1d Aneijara, hns Mauritanian Minisf.erof Fiching
bought in the nexttwoyears, also stressed that his country ie & Marine Economy, Ahmad
'The MoroccAn Minister of In- to put a great emphasia on the Ould Bou~eif, negotieted the
duatry & Commerce, Abdel- fiwhing industry in its economic basic principles of a three�~�ear
Kamel Reghaye, signed a reco~~ery plan (see preuious draft agreement on fishing co�
fishing co�operetian agreement urticle). To reach thie goal operation with the EEC. Under
H~th the So~~et Union last year. Nouakchott has decided to form this acheme, which should cume
In exrhange for Soviet aid in joint ventures with both Arab into effect in 1980, the FEC
training A'loroccan crewa, ~d Europeen states. So far countries will tske part in joint
finencing feasibility studies for guch ventures have etsrted H~th ventures end provide technical
canning facilitiea and the Libya and Iraq, and an agree� akills. In the meantime they w~ll
}x~tisibility of forming joint ven- ment with Egypt ahould be be granted special rights. t~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4420
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AFGfiANISTAN -
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'ASAHI' INTERVIEWS AFGHAN OFFICIALS ON CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japaneae 20 May 79 morning edition p 7 OW
[Article by ASAHI SHII~BUN correspondent Ninakawa]
~ [Text] New Delhi, lg May--One year after the Taraki regime came into power,
Afghanist$n still has ~any things wrapped up in mystery, eapecially ita fu-
ture direcCion and act~al developments in tha country eince the revolution,
partly because of the secretiam that is unique Co socialist nations. This
correspondent recently visited the country ta talk to leaders of the Popu-
lar Democratic Party abouC their views.
Was the political change last year a revolution or a coup d'etat? President
Taraki has already defined it as "a revolution from above using military
- force." He has used clasaic Marxiat terma such as auperstructure and sub- ~
structure, saying that he planted party members among the military ranks to
work fo r the revolution, unable to await changes within the substructure.
The cen tral figure in this operation was Prime Minfster Ami.n.
When I met with Minister of InformaCion Katawazi, he casually said: "My
assignment as a party member was to maneuver within the m{litary. A team
of four men headed by Amin, now prime minis~er, was exclusively asaigned to
that task; I wae one of them."
Katawazi is 29 years old. He became a party member when he was 14, inspired
. by a"progresaive novel" authored by President Taraki.
The revolution from above has continued even after the revolution. Presi-
dent Taraki and the prime minister like to make speeches on every available
occasion, and the subatance of these speeches is apparently designed to
educate party members and people in their ways. It seems that socialist
ideologies have not yet fully infiltrated the party ranks. It ia sa~d that
- teachers and students of Kabul University form the main force of the party. -
,Information Minister Katawazi declared that "soldiers are children of the
people and, as such, will never act againet the revolution. There is no
neutral person within the military either."
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Laet summer, (Kadil), the minister of natiional defenae and one of Che heroea ,
~.n the revolution, was arrested together with other leadere and military
men of hie faction for alleged~.y planning a coup d'etaC.
Some Wes~ern diplomatic sources and ~ournaliats once claimed thaC (Kadi1)
and his colleagues had been executed; however, what actually happened to them
sti11 remains a myetery. In this connection, a leading member of the party
said that "A11 of them are alive and in ~ail. They will eventually be referred ~
~ to an open trial." ~
Is the fear of personal cult not involved in the revolution from above?
Portraits o~ President Taraki are seen everywhexe in the country, and in
this connection, a party member said: "Mosquea, according to custom, public-
1y show who their sCate leader is. We hang Preaident Taraki's portrait here
and there although it is aguinat our will to do so. By doing ao, we are
trying to attract the masses who atill live feudalistically."
Concerning foreign policy, all party offi.cials concerned clearly stated that
"Afghanistan~~attaches importance to ita relations with the USSR." Geologi-
cal Scholar and Planning Minister Alemyar said: "Despite its own difficul-
ties, the Soviet Union is increasing its grar.ta. Soviet workera who come
here under technical cooperation programs are working hard for us in epite of
low salaries." Not only Alemyar but also other party members I met ehowed ~
their displeasure with Pakistan, Iran and China.
Party members and sympathizers are excited over the warm meseagea aent from
socialist nations such as the Soviet Union and East European countries. Even
neutral persons in Afghaniatan re~oice over the fact that their counCry has
become a focus of global attention even if it involves only socialist na-
tions, and Chat many fri~endly delegations are visiting it. By comparison,
the Weatern nations were too cold, said even those considered to hold anti-
government standa.
COPYRIGHT: Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 1979
CSO: 4105
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ZRAN
CONI'LICTS BETWE~N MODERATES AND I'UNDAMENTALISTS R~PORTED
Brussels SPECIAL in French 19 Apr 79 p 28
[Artic].e by Bernard U1lmann: "Iran: the Black Terror"~
[Text] The Iranian terror has found its second wind. Haidly
had the body of Amir Abbas Hoveyc~a been laid out on its slab
at the morgue in Tehran than the crackling f3re of the subma-
chine guns began once again at Ghasr Prison and just about
everywhere in the provinces. The latest corpse-Yaden tumbrils
are like a WHO~S WHO of the former Government. The l.ist in-
- cludes in particular two former SAV.AK directors, General Nass~r
Moghaddam and General Hassan.Pakravan. The latter, who was al-
so minister of information and ambassador to Paris from 1969 to
1973, had the reputation of being the only "humane" leader ever -
placed at the head of the fearso~ue political police~ which no
doubt explains why the Shah relieved him of his functions in
i96i. Another choice victim of the firing squad was Abbas Ali
Khalatbari, the minister of foreign affairs from 1971 to 1978.
But no one cAn claim that the pure, hard justice of the Ayatol-
lah is attacking only the great of this world. It has even
numbered among its victims a simple soldier of the imperial
guard, who had certain].y never dreamed that his name would be -
associated with those uf so many prominent persons.
Anrioyed by the protests aroused abroad by these summary execu-
, tions, the Revolutionary Tribunal has, in self-justification~
rediscovered the sentiments of Andre Vishinsky, the terrible
prosecutor at ~he great trials of the thirties in Moscow.
"What is the most important accomplishment for our nation~"
asks the Tribunal in one of its communiques, "satisfying the
" Western press or annihi].ating all the counter-revolutionaries?"
As for the Ayatollah, he is of the opinion that there is not
even a need to hold trials. "These people~~' he declares~
"should have been executed the very first day. Without a trial.
I am sorely distressed to see that Westernism is still rampant -
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am~ng ug." What wbuld he hav~ s~id ii' in order tin g~t rid ot'
t~nv~yda~ L-we s~p~r~te trial.g hacl bc~n nece5~~ry~ extend3.ng dv~r
twn-ye~r p~ricr~l, ~s wag th~ c~~e witih Ali ~hutta, who h~~ b~~n
ti~n~~c: oy a Cdvernm~nt thordughly Ic~lsmic ag hig own.
~tn th~~ ub3~n~e uf ~h~ Sh~h~ pr~g~ntly gunnin~ him~a~.f ~n g~rmu-
_ ci~, ttbv~ydc~ quitie pn~gib].y th~ mdgt noticworthy v~.ctiim to fail
un~fer tti~ ~ranian reign ~f ~~rrdr, ~ t~rror whic:h fitiH in~o ~hc
prr:ci~~ pn~.itiCal ~~~nt~xt t~hati df' th~ currenti ~trug~le i'or pow- -
er betw~~n th~ i'und~uent~lig~g of Khdme~.ny and ~he "mac~~r~~~s"
oi' LhF~ stttmp c~f l3ttL~rgan.
Th~~ oppogitinn was C091~~.i'itt~'CI last w~~lc~nd ~.n ~he gh~p~ of
tih~ ~
rebi~,matidn oi' Minigt~r oi' Foreign A~'f~irs K~rim S~nd3abi~ preg-
ident oi' the ~01~ ~r~ni~n d~mo~~ati~ partiy. pr3me Minist~r ~a~-
ar~an, whn had ref
u~ed the r~s3gna~3.csn of Sand3abi or~ce b~~'ore,
tiad tn ~ive in this tim~.
~ut oppusitian tia tihe Khomeiny committ~~s is a1.eo mgnifesting
i.tgell' in certain Mo~lem circ].~g. Thus 3ti wag tih~t twn song of
th~ Ay~tollah Taleghn~ni, the ~spiritunl leade~ oi' '~ehran, were
heid under arresti fdr gevr:ral hourg by "Khomeinist" trdopg.
mal~ghani hims~lf, oftien ~~?ii~a the "ited Ayatnl].ah~" fled th~
c~pital. Did he believe thgt his life was being threatened?
Did he wigh td demonstira~e hi~ digggr~ement with Khomeiny publiC-
ly by "symbolicelly dying"? Did he go into hiding? At the be- -
~inning of th~ week, the mogt varied array of hypotheaeg on tihi~
gub3ect were circulating, wi~h no pagsibility of verifying eny of
them.
The fttc~ that the Tehran press has publisheri the gist of the "Is-
la~mic Cod~" pro3ect hag brought to light the importance of what
i~ ttt stake. This new wording of a text alree~dy under discussion
for some time hag led the minister of ~ustice~ Dr A~sadollah Mo-
basheri~ a~urist of the old school, to the point oi' resignin~.
~or the Code tries to nssure the permainhnce of the revalutionary ~
tribun~l~, whose exercise of authority had been originally limit-
ed to gix months; or to give them an extend~d autharization of at
least ano~her year. This time, however, Bazargan did not threat-
en to leave his post, as he had done before on 16 March after the
first r~pp~arance of Hoveyda before his ~udges. Better still~ he
refused to aacept the departure of his minister of 3ustice, plead-
ing the need for "Government solidarity."
Hut the punishment of the "traitors" is certainly not the only do-
main in which the voluntarism of the real power of Iran~ namely,
the anonymous members of the Revolutionary Council, is clearly
manifesting itself.
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I~'aced aitih th~ ~i~~ in p~i~c~ and wi~h an in~v3tab~.~ ~.nf1~~~dn
~+f't~r montih~ of ~trik~~ ~nd riot~ ~ th~ Ay~tol~.ah thr~at~ning
td inf
lict the "wh~.p of' ~elr~n" on ~h~ mgr~h~nt~ df ~h~ gax~ar~
whb ti~d numb~red ~mong h~.g ~tiaunChe~ti ~uppor~ern. ~or ~hn ~'ir~~
timc, ~t~000 ~oble~d m~r~hsnt~ nre manl.fe~ting in ~h~ ~~re~~~ of
mehrxn. Thererore ~he autihori~i~~ hav~ comm~.t~ed th~m~elve~ ~o
f~ncling ~ob~ fo~ ~v~~yan~ b~fc~r~ ~ric~ ~nd of ~h~ year. guti na
one lcnnw~ wh~~h~r tih~ numb~r df ~obi~~~ pet^~on~ 3.~ now ~hree or
~our mi:.lion. Khnm~~.ny ~~ili promi~~g ~o pravid~ decent hou~-
~.n~ i'or a11 ~h~ pov~rty-~~ricken o~' ~h~ aountry, who hav~~ to
fu~ther Compiicatie m~t~erg, no~ b~en ~a11~.ed in ~?ny r~cen~ c~n- ~
gus. A11. ob,jec~iv~g wh~ch would d~mand ~ deci~ivg n~w ~.mpetu~
to th~ economic machin~ry o~' ~he na~ian, inciuding tihe r~sump-
ti~,on ni' petroleum exportatiion et ~h~ pre�revolutiionary ievel.
~n i~s a~t~mpt ~o b~ a~ ona and ~he ~ame ti3me ~nti~marxi~~ and
an~icap~.~nligti, ~.n ~.~g veh~menti re~~c~i.on o#` any for~~.gn con- -
tractg, ~nd in ~.tig delibera~e increg~~ o~' tih~ numb~r o� ~ummary
- executi~.ong~ ~h~ "H1ttck Revo~ut~.on~" ahich i~ trying ~o rebuild
tih~ r~ation outi of tiha ~?ghe~ of' ~he "Nhitie R~volu~ion" of ~h~
Shah, hes certia~.nly noti cho~en tih~ e~c~y road.
COpYRYGHTt L~~xpre~s et Special
8117
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IttAN '
TALEQANI INFLU~NCE 3EEN RISING IN DI3INTEGRATING REVOLUTION
Sruesels SP~CIAL in Freer.h 26 Apr 79 pp 25, 26
[Article by Aiain ~radfer and Francie Monheim~
CTextJ Revolutione never are born by chance. They arp born from neceesity.
The necessity for a people to escape from tyr,~nny; Chat of finding their oam
identity again.
' The necesgity for each individual ~oman or man to be himself and to
live in freedom.
That ia true of the Iranian Revolution as well as of othere. Perhapa even
mar~ than of others.
Never in history has a revolution been ao radical and has been carried out
in so little time. Nev~r has it appeared so fragile either even if
irreversible menaced not from outeide but from the divereity and the
contradiction of the forcea that make it up.
Three months after the departure of Mohammed Reza Shah and the triumphal
recurn of the ayatollah Khome~rni, the people in charge of the new regime are
facing th~ rebellion both r,f the progres~ive intell~ctuais, tt~e unemployed,
the students. the emergence of the beaaar. cert8in ministers of the govern-
m~nt, the old political clase, the partisans of the ayatollsh Teleqani
spirieual leader of Tehran the fedayeen (Marxist-Leninist militia) and
of the saoud~ah~deen (progressive Islamic militia); and then, on the borders
of what Was the shah'e empire, of the Kurde iu the a~st and of the Turkomans
in the east.
In ahort, the Iran arraye@ agaiust Khomeymi follows the Iran arrayed agaiast
the ahah.
s
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Nc~ More Money
In eh~ ~~hr~n bex~~r, thst labrynth of atall~ whieh wa~ ehe crueible of rh~
Islamic r~volution, St hae been the traffickers who hav~ ~ince had commend
of the ~treet. 2hey offer in chang~ counterfeie bilia bearing rhe effigy of
Khomeini; they sell prohibited alcohol and ar a very high price the cigarettee
which cannot be found eleewh~re.
C~:.
And ~rhile ehee~ eraffickers are geetiag rich, million~ of Iraniane quietly
�uunder in misery. There would be between 5 and 6 million unemployed out of
a population of 30 million inhabitente. Hundreds of thousande of them have
loet their ~obe beceuse the gr~~t pro~ecte conceived in the time of the shah
have been etopped: whether 3t 3s a question of the nuclear plente ox~iered
from FitAAMATO~ (Franco-American Atomic Conetruction Companyj in France or
from KWU (expaneion unknown) in Germany, of the T~hran eubway, or of the
construction of great tirunk roada.
Th~e money? "The coffere heve been pillaged by th~ riotera and the uneasy
clients have refused �rom t~en on to deposit their funds," a Tehran banker
explaine. He eetimatee ~ho~ funde ~hat the popular r~volution ha~ caused to
_ disappear from the cofferg at SO percent, Without f~~rgetting the funde ahich
l~ft Iran at the eame time es the sh~h and the more fortunate people of hie
entourage.
More unlucky cloeures at the moment of the great demonstratione in December
and January, the larger part of rhe enterprisee have not been able to rp~~en
their doors preaisely for lack of money, lack of raW materiale end lack of
parts for inetallation or for repair (this is epecifically the case of the
_ entire automotive indusCry).
Demonetratioes by the unemployed have followed the ~iemonstrations of the women
who protestQd againat the retrograde etatus that tne Khomeyni committees Wanted
to impose on them. In certain cities, such as Iefahan, those demonetrationa
have resulted in hundreda of deaths, the ayatollah having ordered the Army to
open fire on ~he crdwd. Pretext: the unemployed were led by commuaieCs or
by leftists aho are according to the ayatollah "sons of Satan"....
_ More than one million uriemployed are occupying the Ministry of Labor et Tehr~n;
they also are accused of "co~nter-revolutionary intrigues"; that meana that
they can expect from one day to the next the aorst of repressions....
Who profits from the arrest of a few of the most dynamic sectors in the eco-
. nomic life? The Iranian right and the Khomeyai co~oittees are in agreement
in accusing the communist Tudeh Party of Wanting to profit from the destabi-
lization of the nes~ regime to deal an underhanded blow against it. These
~ accusatioas are even more insistent because the Tudeh, animated by a Marxi~m
With Stalinist huea~ is without any doubt the best structured political
organization in the country. '
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~Ott O~~ICIAL US~ ONI.Y
Orher~ ~ccu~e the righe ~nd more p~rticularly the agenCs o� SAVAK the
hah'g po].itical police who hav~ succeedec; in pae~ing through th~ me~hes
of the net woven by the revolutionariea. ~ecauee in Tehran today, from the
13b~ra1 bourgeoi~i~ to tha Ielamic progreeeivee, no one deniee iC~ if SAVAK
h~e lowered iCe head~ 3f i~e most vieible legdere have been ehot, it does
not coneider iCself defeated for tihae reason~
Di~drganizat~.on of Power
Whgt cr~gCeg chnds in Iran is the laxity and at the samp time the ~xcesaea
of Khomeyni. The ayatollah ia incapable of defining a concre~e pro~ect in
the name of politics and economice (the very notion of "Islamic Republic" ie
toc vague); furth~rmore, it is incapable of conCrolling its own troopa. This
i~ why the committ~ea anting in hia name are committing the worst exactione
~imilar to thos~ of SAVAK precisely and atCack Che government and Che
intellectuals, as well as the feday~en or the moud~ahideen (Marxist or
Islamic militia which gre organized and dieciplined).
Khomeyni'e laxity is demonsCrated by the dieorganization of the power which -
he ~et up. At its head: the Revolutionary Council~ a collection of some 15
membera whose compoeition is kept aecret "for reasons of aecurity." It is
known only that KhomeScni presides over that council when he wishes and that
it specifically includes Haesan Baniasader, Khomeyni'e right-hand man, Ibrahim
Yadzi, the vice minist~r in charge of revolutionary affairs in the government
and Savek Ghotbzader, who makes an unprecedented fanaticism rule over radio
= and television. It is the Revolutionary Council which cleima to rule the
country. Its the Council whicl? receives the pro~ects of the government,
odopts some of them, and submits the moet important to Khomeyni.
As for the government, it has only to apply the sovereign decisions of the
Council. -
This government is presided over by Mehdi Bazargan who was, let us recall, ~
president of the League for the Defense of Human Rights in the time of the
- shah.
Bazargan, however, probably arranged the escape of Shapur Bakhtiar, who had
agreed tc+ form a transition government several houre before the flight of the
shah. For the members of the Revolutionary Council, that canatitutes without
any doubt a supplementary reason for lancing attack on top of attack againat
the current prime minister to make him pay the penalty.
Does Bazargan proteat againat the expedited trials and the summary executions?
The Council pretends to declare that he is right and ordera the arrest of any-
one it chooses. However, it im~ed~ately draws up an "Islamic penal code"
which permits trying and executing ev~~n more rapidly. And, in order to ahow ~
very clearly that it is all-powerful, it orders the executioa of Amir Abbas
Koveyda, the former prime miniater, "the shah's secretary gnd friend of the _
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W~et." Thie time Bazargan d~es nothing; what ie even worse, he d~clarea
- ehat he does not dieapprove.
Another example: when laet March the Kurda demanded the autonomy of their
region, Bazargan went to vieit them end proclaimed rhat their aepiratione
were compaCible with revolutionary logic~ Kowever, hardly had the prime
minister returned to Tehran when the Council ordered the repreaeion of the
Kurdg: elements of the Army and the Khomeyni militin caueed hundrede of
deaChg there. Bazargan, ouce again, did not dieapprove.
Even more, Karim Sand~abi, his minieCer of foreign affaire, resigned. Now
Sand~abi was a diaciple of Mo~sadegh and the charismatic leader of the
National Front. To a cerCain degree he was a progreaeive brake on the govern-
mpnC.
However, in Irgn things are going so fast Chat the reaignation of Sandjabi
comes without any doubt a little too lete for the additional reason that
Darius Forhouar, the number two man of the Front, expresaea surprise publicly.
There is nothing that the poliCicised and intellectual class can do now except
Curn toward a new party the National Democratic Front started by Matine
Dastari, one of the most influential lawyers in Tehran. Daetari ia a friend
of BakhCiar's, and it is murwured in the well-informed circles of the capi.tal
ChBC he could some day try to bring Che latter back to the country and back
into affairs....
The Red Ayatollah
At the same time, the threat which weighs the heaviest over the Khome~ni �
regime does not come from the lay intellectuals but from the religious
progressives grouped around the apiritual leader of Tehran, the ayatollah
Taleqani.
Taleqani has always been an enemy of the ahah, but differently from Khomey.ni,
he never left Iran. This earned him more than ten years of prison and savage
tortures from the SAVAK.
This great resister, freed last fall, would however prepare the triumphal
return of Khome.yni. Taleqani was a progressive, however, and the man who was
called "the red ayatollah" in the West would rapidly rebel against the brutal
dictatorship of the Khomeini committees. Taleqani and his moud~ahideen would
take the part of the women, the students, the unemployed, the Kurds. He
reminds his hearers that the Isl~nic religion demands mercy for the vanquiehed.
He demands ~ust trials even for his former torturers.
When his daughter-in-law and his two sons were arrest~ed by the Khome.yni militia,
about 10 days ago, the population of Tehran rose in anger. This time it no
longer chanted "let us be happy, Khome~ini is returning" but "Taleqani, you
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are the hope of the peo~l.e~" The eieuation became so exploeive that
Taleqani decided to go to Qom in oYder to meet wiCh the eyatollah Khomeini
there.
The laCter had been warned of the dangers which were in hie path; he there-
fore accepted the aubm~.saion of his "committees" to certain contYOls and
agreed to impose a certain discipllne on Chem. Thus rhey will no longer
have any blank arrest warranta and they may no longer directly exercise
Islamic "iuatice~~, , , , .
, -
For the immediaCe future, Khomeyni has therefore found a means to geC himself
out of an ~mbarrassing situation. However, Che nrresC of the Taleqanis .
followed by the brief disappearance of the ayatollah (who wae in fact on the
road to Qom) permitted milliona of Iranians to demonstratie in favor of the
"red ayaeollah." The ayatollah knows his prestige is inCact while Khomeini's
is ceaselessly melring away.
, Some day history could well retain Che name of Taleqani before that of
Khomeni. Thia is all the more true aince the lay progresaivea are disposed
to accept his arbitration, if not his authority.
The Iranian Revolution is only beginning.
COPYRIGHT: L'Expresa et Special
12,116
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~
,
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~ IRAN
BRIEF'S
KHOM~YNI QUESTION5 LEBANESE SHI'ITE--Imam Musg al-Sadr, spiriCual leader
of rhe L~baneae Shi'ites, who disappeared following a viait to Tripoti
(Libya) h3 months ago, was one of the main organizers of the Iranian
Islamic ~revolutionary movement. Thia is why the Shah's auccessors are
now calling Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's regime to account. "We demand that
this mystery be cleared up," Ayatollah Khomeyni atated on 26 March, while
thousands of demonatratora marched past the hotel where Ma~or Jallud,
Libya's No. 2, was ataying during a viait Co Tehran. [Text~ [Paria
JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 May 79 p 26 LD]
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ZRAQ
'AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI' REPORTS OFFICIALS VISIT TO FRANCE, PRESS CONFERENCE
Parie AL-WA~AN AL-'ARABr in Arabic 11-17 May 79 pp 22, 23 LD
- [Unsigned article: "Iraqi InCereat in French Arms and in Nuclear Reacf:ora
SaboCage Incidenti"]
[~xcerpta] The Iraqi week in Paris was eventful. Iraqi Defense Minister ~
'Adnan Khayrallah held important talka wiCh French Premier Raymond Barre
and Defense Miniaeer Yvon Bourges. Meanwhile Iraqi Information Minister
'Qasim Hammudi explained Che Iraqi stand and the Arab iasuea Co the French
preas and media. The French sourcea said that Iraq was interested in fol-
lowing up the outcome of investigation into the sabotaging of the two Iraqi ~
nuclear reactore that were being asaembled in a French plant and develop-
ments in m~dern French weaponry.
It ia no secret that the Iraqi-French relatione in recent yeara have made
great progress on varioue levels and in many fields.
Despite the fact that the atrong relations between Iraq and France were brief-
ly clouded, the deep understanding on both sides soon diapersed the clouds,
aince the relations between the two countries are baeed on firm psinciples
and on growing common interests.
The sabotaging of the two nuclear reactora, which were being assembled at a
French nuclear equipmenC plant on the MediCerranean coast, was probably aimed
~ at sabotaging these growing relationa.
Iraqi Defense Minister 'Adnan IQiayrallah'a visit to Paris last week at the
head of an official delegation and the talka he held with senior French of-
ficials, foremost of whom were Premier Barre and Defense Miaister Bourges,
have confirmed that the two countries are always capable of thwarting all
the plots against the relationahip binding Chem.
On the occasion of this visit well-informed French sources eaid ~hat Iraq
is ahowing considerable interest in French production of sophisticated weap-
ons, particularly the Mirage F-10 and Mirage 2000 planes within the frame-
- work of strengthening and boosting ita defense and military capabilities.
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_ Iraq ie algo ehowing s~milgr interesC in prov~,d3ng ite navy witih armed vessel8
and coae~~l de�ense weapone. Iraq is also hoping tio p~rovide iee land army
with tanke and various weapons.
Tha Frencii aources eaid that last year France aupplied Iraq with 40 Allouette
IZZ helicopters armed with 20 mm canone, 10 heavy super Frelon helicoptere
- ae we11 ae MX30 tanks, 120 Panhard armor~d vehiclea, a large quane3ty of
- ane~.eank miseiles.
The course said thaC negotiations are currently underway on an arme deal
whose value ie estimated at 10 billion French francs.
Thc Iraqi military delegation's visit occurred alongeide a civilian vieit.
Iraqi Informat3on Minister Qasim Hammudi stopped in the French capital en
routie from Togo to Baghdad afeer having attended the third ~easion of the
Council of Governmental Coordination of Informstion Affairs of Che Nonallned
States. _
On ehe occaeion of the inauguration of the Iraqi Cultural Center in Paria
Minister Hnmmudi held a press conference in which he discussed various is�
aues of interest to the Arab world.
Hammudi expresaed Iraq's conetant readinesa to contribute to any effort aimed
at solving the Lebanese problem. He reiterated Iraq's belief in the integ-
rity of the Lebanese people and Cerritories and its re~ection of any parti-
tioning or ~nternationalization of any part of that Arab country and readi-
ness to coordinate with Arab brothera in order to eliminate the vestiges
of the civil war.
He explained that the new poeitive situat~fon represented in the Iraqi-Syrian
~oint aciCon charter will enable Iraq to exert a better effort and to have a
greaCer influence toward solving the Lebaneee problem. He said that solving
the problem so as to guarantee Lebaneae unity and sovereignty, Co enable
Lebanon to meet ita Arab commitmente, and to facilitate the Palestinian
resiatance's atruggle against the uaurping enemy would further etreagthen
the Arab effort.
Speaking about the Iraqi and Syrian ateps toward unity between them, the in-
formation miniater said that the commanda in both countries are now atudying
a plan for conatitutional unity and another plan for the unity of the [Ba'th]
party. Continuoue contacta are taking place in order to reach a common view
on unity. The next meeting of the ~oint higher political command will dis-
cuss and study the progreas that has been made to achieve thia unity.
The information minister also apoke about the links between the al-Sadat
and Numayri regimes. He said that this rapprochement between the two regimes
is the result of the betrayal committed through the peace treaty which the
SuJanese regime has supported. Numayri refused to take part in the Baghdad
su~mni.t and in the Arab foreign and economic affairs ministerial conference
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or to boycoCC al-Sadati's regime. Therefore, he added, the s~nctiona adopted
against al-Sadat muet also be applied againdt Numayri and any regime that -
refuses to be committed to the Baghdad summit resoluCions and the foreign
and economic af�aire m3nieterial conference reaolutions.
Speaking about�ithe situation in the Arab Gul� region, he said that the re-
cent U.S. threat of milieary intervention or any nther form of terror3st
intervention w311 be me~ by a unified atand~ The adventuriets who imagine
that intervention in thie area would be a kind of picnic will burn their
fingere, he said.
Referring to Iraqi-Iranian rel~tiona, the minister said thaC Iraq has adopCed
an attitude of noninterference in the internal a�fairs of the neighboring
- countriea and shown respect for the Iranian people's decieiona regarding
their fate and Euture. He said thaC the downfall of the shah was in the
, intereat not only of the Iranian people alone but also of the Arab nation.
He said thaC Iraq welcomes the standpoints of the new Iranian Government
toward the Palestinian problem and ita deaire to ~oin the nonalined move-
menC and Co give up the role of gendarme in the Gulf.
Speaking abouC~:the sabotaging of the two nuclear reacCora destined for Iraq,
he said that inveatigat3on into thia matter is continuing. We have confi-
dence in the current French measures in this regard. He added: We are
anxious to see that French commitmente Co Iraq in thia field will be ful-
fi].led within the scheduled program. Those who have perpetrated this act
aimed at harming not only Iraq but also Franc~e.
Minister Ha~nudi then spoke about the Iraqi progreasive national and nation-
alist front and the communists' attitude toward it. Iie said that the front
still exists because it stems from the belief of the Sociali~t Arab Ba'th
Party and of the other nationalist forces in the need for alliance in
shouldering the tasks of socialist building and other national reaponaibili-
ties .
He added: WhaC actually happened was that the Communist Party violated the
rules provided of the front when it tried to set up an organization within
the armed forces contrary to the lawa and to the rules of the front itaelf.
He said that the decision prohibiting political activities within the armed
forces applies to all political forcea with the exception of the Ba'th Party.
However, political action ts permissible in civilian society where there is
ideological and organizaCionKal freedom.
He said that contacta had taken place between the leaderships of the two parties
with the aim of settling problems on a clear basis and on the basis of com-
mitment to the front's charter.
19
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tie added: We hava re~ecCed any attempe to uae rhe fronC as a etepping srone
to power, because the 1968 revolution was a revolution for all the Iraqis
and a11 the Arabs. The Socialiet Arab Ba'tih I'arty which led the revolution
~ims at implementing iCs ideological and pol~.tical program and will noC
gllow anybody Co conspire againet the revolution or tiry to striece at the
- revo~.urion in gny way.
C(DPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
CSO: 4802 ,
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20 ~
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. ~~Q
KURDS FZGHT INTERNAL DTSSENTION, EXTERNAL ENEMIES
London THE MIDDLE EAST ~n Enslish May 79 pp 47, 50-51
- [Text]
6G~n gnvenu~mnt in irnn fru?n ~ceme to hn~~r Ihe wideat following of all
A iT11I1~N1')' (~ICLAIf~f5I11~) 11f p at prt~sent, nnd Ihe Iranian Kurdish
multi�perty demcx:r~cy hnN ~~ver Demcx~retic Pnrt~~ (}~1)P) ofAbder�Rahman
heen willing t,o grnnt the Kur~a Ghn~aemlou. '1'he lrnqi Patriotic Union of
a iiiinimum of autui~umy ur Kurdistmi (1'UK) cif .Inlel Talnbnni has also
d~~crntrnliantion. Once the been nctive in lrnn n.v well es a number of
pre~ent go~~ernment is o1nmR, Smnllleft�win~grou~~s,
there will he nnother verics of Ghna4cmlou H~nq dcacribed by one Kurd
unfulfilled prumises and com� ns "en inlrileMunl but not a lender". His
pn~mises leading to nmre cnn� ~~olicies hi~ve ch~+n~;i~d no msny times over
frantation," a well�informrd the yenrs that he hnq lcwt the confidence of
Kurdish y