JPRS ID: 8489 TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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- JPRS L/8489
31 May ].9 79
~ ~ ~
- 1'RAhISlATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRI CA
FOUO No, 637
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIQNS RESEARCH SERVICE ~
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r0~~
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- Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or eransliterated are
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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J~PRS L/8489
- ?11 May 19 79 -
TRAN~LATIONS ON SUB-SANARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 637
CONTENTS PAGE ~
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Line of Black Resistance to Islamic Influence Noted
_ (Jean Grandmougin; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 16 Apr 79)..���� 1
CAP~ VERDE
Briefs
Badea r:shing Pro~ect Financing 4 -
' CQNGO ~
Economic Situation Described 3s Being Far From Aesperat~e
(Jacques Latremotiere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET -
MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Apr 79) 5
~ GABON
Public Opinion Poll Hi~hlights Main Cor.cQrns
(MARCHES TROP.iCAUX ET ~fEDITERRANEENS, 6 Apr 79)....... 13
GHANA
Briefs
B~ntanga Dam Completion Threatened 15
Sugar Factory Closing Envisaged 15 _
GUINEA
Briefs
Budget Increased for 1979 16
Adherence in Principle to OMVG 16 _
French Equipment Financing 1~
_ a - (III - NE & A- 122 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (ConCinued) Page
GUINEA-BISSAU
Brief s
Fiahing Cooperation With France 18
MALI
Political Climate Returi~s, Concerns Expressed
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Apr 79)..... 19
Review of UDPM Congress Procedures, Resolutions
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Apr 79)..... 22
SAO T01~ AND PRINCIPE ~
Changes in Government Posirions, Daio's Rising Influence '
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 Apr 79)..... 25
TOGO ~
Briefs -
Budget for 1979 Published 27
ZAIRE
Zaire Terminates Rocket Launch Site Contract
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Apr 79)......... 28
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- LINE OF BLACK RESISTANCE TO ISLAMIC INFLUENCE NOTED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 16 Apr 79 p 33-34 -
[Article by Jean Grandmougin: "Blacks AgaineC Che Greena"] '
[TextJ Libyan retreat in Kampapa--Armed attack in Nouakchott--unatable _
balance in N'd~amena--a line of Black resistance ia forming against Islamic
influence.
The thrust of Isl,am in Africa has run up against ~ growing resi~tance on
the part of Blacks: from Nouakchott to Khartoum.
In Mauritani, on 6 April, a new Committee of National Safety" brought to
power as head of government Colonel Bouceif, while Colonel Saleck will
- remain as honorary president: that has led to the removal from his poat -
as m!.nister of the Interior of Commandant Jiddou, an advocate of aevere
= reprassion against the Black community and to his replacement by one of the
rare Blacka in the preceding government, Commandant Thiam el-Had,j.
ctauri.ania is made up 80 percent of Berbers, nomads living mostly in the
- desert~ of the north and of 20 percent of Toucouleur Blacks, who form a _
- permanent population of farmers and fishermen in the south on the shorea of -
the Senegal River. At the end of the colonial period, the Blacks, who had
_ been practically the only people to attend French schools, found Chemaelves
- holding almost a monopoly on ~obs in the public aector.
As the first president after independence, Ould Daddah made Arabic the -
- official second language, on the same basis as French. His successors have
worked at eliminating French from the civil service and from the schools,
substituting for it Arabic, which has led to barring Blacks, who epeak French
and ~o not know Arabic, from access to the modern sectors of national life.
The Blacks have reacted to this militant Arabism. The new National Consultative �
Commit:ee, which is supposed ta advise the chief of 3tate, since it is com- .
_ prised of only 17 Mauritians of Black African origin, as ~pposed to~80
representatives from the Maure community, the Blacks, in a letter to Colonel
Saleck, protested against "the unfairness of the etanic distribution" within
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that assembly, from which they resigned. They feared that their Maure
compaCriota would call a halt to the improvemenC pro~ects in the Senegal
= V~lley, which would benefit the Black farmers.
- While the army includes a large proportion of Blacka, many officers have
relatives in the opposite camp and the Blacks did not see what advantage _
= there was in "recovering" a part, a desert part, of the Spanish Sahara,
= populated by 25,000 5ahraouis, who are more or less Arabized. An armed front
= to fight for self-determinazation of the populations of Walo, of Fouta and -
of Guidimaca--which explains its name, the "Walfougui Front"--was aet up
under Che leadership of a former officer of the Mauritian gendarmerie, by
the name of Alloume Diaw. His ob~ective: to liberate the "native popula-
- tions sub~ugated by the Arab-Berber Mauritians."
~ Mr Leopold Sedar Senghor, the president of Senagal, who was to go to Nouakchott
informed Colonel Saleck that, if Mauritania became part of a confederation
with a"Sahraoui Republic," Senegal would support autonomy for Black Mauritiana.
A comparable split between northerners and southerners exists in Chad. In
Che north: Moslems. In the south: Blacks. Since the south had a literacy
rate of 60 percent and the north a rate of 3 percent, the power, with the
coming of independence, had been given to the people of the south, the only
ones capable of filling key positions. But while the Blacks had become
accommodated to colonizatien, the Whites in the north, who are strict Moslems,
had opposed it. That is the source of the personal quarrels, of guerrilla
_ war and civil war, Moselems, Mr Goukouni Oueddei and Mr Hiscene Habre
supported first by the Libyans of Colonel Qadhdhafi and then by the Sudanese,
called upon their fellow Moslems. During the recent fighting, which has
been bloody in N'djamcna, before the ceasefire, Moslems were massacred in
the south.
Another battleground; the Suda..i. For 17 years the southern populations of
the Nile Valley, who are animists or Christians, have been fighting against
the Nubians, who are northerners and who are trying to convert them to Islam.
An agreement was reached in 1972, at the instigation of President Nemeiry,
between the forces of KharCoum and the Anya Nya guerrill~s of the south.
_ Southern Sudan has obtained legal internal autonomy.
3ut the southerners, to whom the elections of 1978 have not been favorable,
have all the more the impression of paying the cost of the national
reconciliation sought by Mr Nemeiry now that Sudan has strengthened its ties
with Egypt, to the point that the popular assemblies of the two nations held,
+ in January, a~oint session in Khartoum. The "separatists" do not diamiss
the possibility of new hostilities. Having taken refuge in Ethiopia, many
Anya Nya �orccs hRVe had military training there. _
And in Uganda, the Moslem Libyans had called for Islamic solidarity to aid
President Amin Dad, who is supported by the Nubian guard, which was
originally from northern Sudan. The Libyans have also tried to stir up
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the Tanzanian Moslema against the regime of Preaident Uyerere, aince the
Tanzanians are giving military support to the opponenta of the regime of
Amin Dada. But Che rout of Che battalion of Colonel Qadhdhafi was auch
that it is strengthening from east to weat in Africa, all the Blacka opposed
to Gren Islam. '
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs Actuelles"
8956
CSO: 4400
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CAPE V~RDE
BRIEFS
BADEA FISHING PROJECT FINANCING--The board of directors of the Arab Bank for
Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), at a regular meeting in Khartoum on
7 and 8 March, approved the financing for a fishing development pro~ect in
Cape Verde. The Abu Dhabi Fund, the Saudi Fund, and the Cape Vprde government
are also participating in the financing of the pro,~ect. The investment
should contribute to revival of one of the most important activities of the -
Cape Verde islands arid to supporting the economic expansion oF the archipelago
as a whole. It is estimated that one year after its st artup, this pro~ect, .
which will have provided for modernization of a key sector, will furnish the
- country with export receipts of neaxly 2 million dollars per year--the equi-
valent of one-seventh of the GNP, and double the export income realized in
1976. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEPRANEENS in Fr~nch 6 Apr 79
p 873] 11267
CSO: 4k00
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- CO NCO -
- ECGNGMIC SITUATION DESCRIBED AS BE7NG FAR FRUM DF~PERATE
_ Paris M/lRCHES TRCPICAIAC ET MPAIT:'�RRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 PP ~52'85~+
[Article by Jacquea Latremoliere: "A Difficult Turning ~oint for the Nqw
Co~?ernment of the Peopla's Republic of the Congo"] _
_ CESccerpt] The Third F~ctraordinary Congreas ~f the Congo-
leae Le~bor Party [PCT] closed ita aeasion on 31 t~i~rch
xith the deaignation of Co? Denis Saseou Ngueaso as i,aad
of the party~ chief of etate and head of grovernsent. In
the economic sphere the party decided to b~eak definitively
xith the "international capitalist divieion of labor~"
xhich has been ad3udged responsible for a failura of the
economy that the psrty spokeseian describes as "extroveraion
, accomganied by hypertraphy of the tertiary sector, an
industry of substitution and an archaic saall-sca.le agri-
culture." The resolutions adopted are accordingly intended
to reinvigorate the national economy xith the aim of
"achieving a socialist society in the Cong~o" by basing
that society on a"revolutionary, autodynamic and self-
conta.ined revolutionary strategy." The article xhich
- folloxs emphasizes the difficulties of such a pro3ect.
In his closing address Col Denis Sassou Nguesso reaffirmed
his country's intention to carry out "a policy of diplo-
matic openings~ g+ood neighborliness and internatioral
cooperation based on mutual interests arxi strict equality~
xithout haggling and xi#,hout relinquiahing our optiona or
aba.ndoning our principles."
Subsequently~ under the heading "Congo," the reader xill
find details concerning the decisions reached at the
extraordinary congress of the PCT.
The replacea~ent--as head of the People's Republic of the Congo--of Ceneral
_ Yhomby-Gpango~ former student of Coetquidan, by Col Denis Sassou-Nguesso,
who received a Marxist education in the USSR and Cuba, xaa reportedly
motivated by ethnic rivalries arxi differences of opinion among men of
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divsrse bac(cgrounda in respect to education and ~training. It is c~nceiv-
able that the country's economic problems also played a role, aven though
offiaial gnvernmental deci.alons hr~ve varied little (except fur a few changes
in rrording) since the eli~aination uf Father Fulbert Youlou in 1963� -
This persiatence is rema.rkable, not so ~nuch because it has been consolidated
in the midst of chan es in regime (this latest change did not involve a
~ "settling of gcores"~ as becauae it has eventuated in a aystem ~rherein st,ate
socialiata requires the support of foreign ca.pital ~,nd in fact "get~ alor?~"
_ qui~e trell ~ith the latter. ~his formula�-xhich has been made necessary by
_ the absence of inechanisms for capital formation and by the necessity of
- technological assistance--fa common to all of tropical Africa and does not
differ f~om one country to another except as regards planning, xhich can be
more or less authoritarian in character. Moreover, it rarely go~s so far
as to re~ect modifications suggested by the investors, xhenever the latter
have suff'icient influence. The phraseo logy also differs, in that it is
inherently do~natic in those states that are under military leaderahip.
Despite the efforts made ta codify it, this system romains a far cry from
that of the people's democracies of E~xope. Saturnin Ukabe, xho served as
minister of the interi.or in the Yhomby-Opango adminiatration, expressed the -
opinion in 197~ that enterpr~.~ses capitalized at less than 25 million CFA
francs shauld be reserved to the domestic private sector and those capital.-
ized at betKeen 25 mi111on ~.nd 50 million should be reserved to partnershipe
betxeen the domestic private sector and foreign im~estors. ~ter~rises -
capitalized at from $0 million to 1 billion CFA francs~ he belie~ied~ ahould
be ~the domain of mixed enterpriaes~ rrith the capital contributed by the atate _
(as distin~ct f~om that contributed by foreign investors) being apportioned
in such a way as to give the state a cleax majority of the atock in enter-
prises capitalized at more than 100 million CFA francs. In the case of
enterprises of from 1 billion to 2 billion the state could be content xith
a c~ntrolling interest. Its participation in enterprises capitalized at
mcre than 2 billion, hoxever, xould be "purely formal" 1n character.
- Whether it reflects the Marxist dialectic or mere disillusionment, Okabe's -
economic stratigraphy expres~es the simple concept that in tropical Africa ~
the socialist xay of development is in reality open only to the xealthy -
countries, that is to say, those countries xhose underground resaurces
constitute an initial capital large enough so that the rev~nue it produces ~
wilY enable the sta,te to buy up--in a relatively short period--the foreign-
oxned shares and thereby begin exploitation of those resources. The
industries established by the former colonizers axe able to perform this
- functiun adequately only tc the extent that they remain integrated into the _
overall commercial framework on xhich their viability formerly depended.
This is not the case Nith the Congr~, however, xhere these industries xere
conceived in the context of a Federal structure and a comaaunications netWOrk
that has since been dismantled. The 37 percent share of the 1970 GNP that
these industries represent should not deceive anyone, for the costs entailed
by the na.tionalizations (and further aggravated by poor managem$nt) have
since that time substantially exceeded their pr~fits.
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It has unfortunately been demonstr~tscl in �the Congo that nationalizatic~n
of industr:tes ~inder these conditions has been, for the nati~n, more of a
, "snare and a delusion" than an advantage. A total of 60 national companies
= currently owe to the national treasury--in the form of customs duties,
taxes and various advancea--a tota.l of 11 billion CFA francs, or one-sixth
of the national budget. The psychological balance sheet for the operation
is equally unfortunate: despite their basically low profitabillty~ theae
enterprises have in effect attracted the lower-level loca,l cadres xho were
_ made available by the disappearance of the federal activities and xhose
appetites exceeded their technical skills. This has resulted in a shaacp
decline in production (that of SIA-O~NGU [Congolese Agro-Tndustrial
Compa,r~y] dxopped fror~ 50~000 tons to 13,000 tons) and in a host of dismis-
~ sals, suspensions ard arrests that decimated the managerial ranks of the
public enterpri.ses and agencies, including the BNDC [National Development
Ba,nk of the Congo]; National Social Welfare F~~nd; Trans-Congolese Coramuni-
cations Agency; the Former Mory Industries; SOCOMA.B [expa,nsion unknoxn];
_ and National Hydro carbons Compa,ny. The petty bourgeoisie xere accordingly
1ed astray into a hopeless struggle; but most iraportant of all, their
attention was diverted from the real problems by encouraging them to �
- believe that socialism would allox them to continue to caxxy out (albeit in
another form) the functions of a"staff"--a rale that their training at
Brazzaville and Fb inte-Noire had basically prepared them to play. ~
This interpretatio n continues (more or less extensively~ to xreak havoc~ _
and is likexise reflected in th~e dfsproportionate burden of aocial xelfare~
in the hyoertrophy of the civil service, and in the increased rate of
ur.banization. It also ex~lains, to a certain extent, the eagerness of
government officials to commit in advance the revenue derived f~om petraleum
production.
Fetroleum Pr~~duction _
, The People's Republic ~f the Cong~ xas on the verge of achieving the status ~
of.a country that passesses substantial mineral resources--a position that
would have enabled it to justify, a posteriori~ its choice of the socialist
xay. With a vieN ta preventing the declines in agricultural production
which in Africa--be it in Nigeria or in Guinea--have generally accompa.nied
the development of mineral exploitation, and foreseeing that petrolewn
revenue will not continue forever, the 1975-1977 development plan quite
wisely oriented the Congo toxasd truck farming~ the growing of industrial
crops~ and the development of a food grocessing industry, In such a atruc-
ture petruleum xas merely a means to a.n end, and the alreac~y e~acisting
, industry xas a"determining factor." The projected ?5 billion CFA francs
in investments~ however~ xas based on an anticipa,ted p.;trolewn production
of 14 million tons for the 3-year period--a figure which in practice xas
reduced to a mere ;.4 million tons.
The Emeraude Ma.rine deposit, exploited by ELF-CoNGO [Gasoline and Lubrica.nts
= Company of the Congo], xhich in 19?4 ha.d produced 2.5 million tons of crude~
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~ p~c~duced only 1�4 million tans in 1~)7F and is schedul.ed to be aUa ndon~d
around 19`~1. ~cploitation of the Likc~ala de~c~sit will begtn in i~~f~0, btit
~ i ts rrc~d�ctic~n wi 1.1 come t~ no more than 600,000 tona ~~or yea.r~ The
1,~ango Mar~.ne deposit--an AG~P [ltalian I~etroleum Enter~rise] conceselon--
produced approxima,tely 980~U00 tons in 1)7�3. The txo companies, to bo sure,
- are continuing their exglorations, and a suucessful result is ;x~ssible,
es~ecially in the R~inte Noire-Crand Fond region. C n the basis of current
data, hoxever, thc: prcduction goal of 5 million tons per year (which was
considered re~~sonable in t974) should be ruled out, and it is even doubtful
whether the total tonnade of 1978 can be ma,intained beyond 1980.
Were the government's expectations based on overly optimistic estimatos by `
the exploiting companies? The fact is that the error did not relate to the -
cubic content of the reaerves but rather to the difficulties of exploiting
_ them, with production having to be limited--for technical reasons, a~d
especially because of the density uf the crude--to approximately 15 Percent
of the reserves.
It would have been surprising if these circumstances had not given rise to
distrust and protests on the part of Congolese politicians. At that time
Jean-Pierre Thystere Tchicaya had in fact apoken of "the vast plan of
imperialist sabotage designed to stifle the production of petroleum." The -
authorities~ however, soon recognized that these vicissitudes had nothing -
to do with imperialist maneuv~rs. The permits were at first denounced but
= then renegotiated xith the aforementioned two cnmpanies. In Sy76 the
latter Kere ,joir.ed by th~ Getty Oil Company, xhich was specifica.lly chaxged
- xith deep-sea exploration north of the ELF-CONGU an3 AGIP concessions.
Misfortune never comes singly, and so when the pxoduction of sylvinite by `
the Congo Potassiwn ~ompan --whose capital stock is held jointly by SGGEPAR
_ [expansion unknown], BRGM ~Geological and ~Iining Exploration Uffice],
ELF-COIv~GO, and the Congolese State--was unable to attain the profitability
- threshold of ~30U~000 tons it declined rapidly. Exports of potassium in ~
1971 represented 13.6 percent (1.4~F39 billion CFA francs) of all export
sales; 10.4 percent (3.998 billion CFA francs) in 1975~ 9�2 Percent
~3�29~ billion CFA francs) in 1976; and lastly~ 9.4 percent (3.066 billion
CFA francs) in 19?7. There have been no exports of potassium since 1978�
Gveral.l, from 197~ t~'ough 1978 ~neral products represented, on the
average, 85 percent of all exports from the Congo, of xhich 45 percant `
represented crude oil alone. Gne can appreciate the serious consequences
of this decline in mineral groduction. The 33 percent limitation on invest-
ments stipulated in the 3-yeas plan is less important in this respect than
the exceptional increase in public exnenditures based on anticipated
revenue f~om petroleum. The nationa.l buciget accordingly rose from 20
- billion CFA francs in 1973 to 40 billion in 1975 ancl 60 billion in 1979~ -
while at the saane time no substitute resource--nor any genuine effort to
reduce expenditures--was discernible. F~cpenditures for the civil service
_ increased by 20 percent in 1979, and since 1975 the minimwa wage has been -
increased by 75 percent. Thanks to hydrocarbons~ exports attained their
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culminating paint in 1976: 42.,5 billion CFA francs. F~cporta began to
~ d~cline in 1977 (to 36 bil~ion CF'A franes) wherQa~ i~aporte--which had
increas~d conetantly t`rem 1975 to 1977--prdduced the first defioit in the
balance nf trade ~hat had been recnrded ~ince 1y73~
_ Reflecting these flgures~ service of the foreign debt in 1!?7 reached 7.4 -
_ billion CFA francs, ar 20 percent of the tota.l o~ foreign resnurces.
~ Wlth the "red l~ne" having been attained~ the Republic of the Congo xas faced
xith the problem of reatructuring its economy. Did this neec'1 motivate the
~ recent trlp to 'rhris by Minister of F'inance Lopes for the purpoee of deliv-
erin~ a message from I'resident Sassou-Nguea$o tn Valery Giscard d'~rbt,aing?
- htoreover, can ar~+one say posltively that the departure of Yhombo-Opango-- -
xh~ had already been forced to resort to the unofficial f~iendship oP a
- neighboring government in order to meet pr~asing due dates-~was unrelated
_ tc this need?
- The Contribution Made by Fbreign Cooperation
:t might be expected that the ideology grofeased by the Republic of the
Congo would entitle it, in these difficult circwnstacces, to the suppoxt of
the soc~alist countries. There, hoxever--as in other African countriea--
d~liveries of arms on credit extended by Moscox are not accompanied by any
econemic participation that even remotely resembles our cooperation. The
vo?ume of trade xith the USSR is smail, being less than that of the Congo
xith F`rance, the other EEC countries, the United States~ Spain or Japan.
An agreement signed last 26 Decesber xith the Sov~et Covernaent providod
fer the openin~ of a Russian trade office in ~razzaville~ and this xill
perhaps ameliorate the situatSon. Sihat xe knoK of Soviet nethods in
tropi~ral Africa, hoxever, leads us to doubt xhether the USSR desires any-
thing more than reequtl:bration of the balance of trade, xhich currently _
shous a surplus in favor of the Conga. As for the Cuban interventions -
(xhich legend has, incidentally, greatly e~gerated)~ they are devoid of
economic significance. Little is knoxn coneerning Cuban personnel xho are
providing technical assistance in the military and medical fields, but they
~rcba.bly total no more than 20.
Under theye conditions, and deapite its ideological proferences, the Congo
xas in fact obliged (in order to dev~lop its 1978-19?9 plan of action
foiloxing on the heels of the 197$-1977 plan, xhich xa.s not completely
f~alfilled) to solicit the ~upport of Western enterprises and the na3or -
international deveio~nent orgar?izations. Nore than ever, this plan gives ~
privrity to the rural sector (food production, industrial crops and foreat
~ducts) assnciated with agrcir,dustry. c.ther than the pro~jects relating
te co:fee~ cacao arid cil palms, and a fruit-growing operation eurrently
- under study by the IP.FA (Zn;,titute for Research on Citrus and Other FScuits),
the plan centers on a revival of the ~duction of sugar and edible oil in
the i:iari and Sangha River Valleys.
9
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FUIi U6"~'~CI/~L I1S~ Oi~1~Y
'The p]~n w~s obli~ed to limit it~elf to evok.~n~ th~ pronpect~ for explv9-
= tation of ~,h~ depos~ts of ircn nre (~~tiroated at ~00 milli~n tong vf ore
xith a g0 pez~cent iron content), phosphate~ arui marble. The chapter on
infra.~tructur~, on the oth~r hand, ig impnrtant. The principal item i~ the
C~ngo-~ce~.n r~ilway re~lip;nment pro~ect~ for which multipartite financin~
in the amount c~f 41 billidn CFA francs has been arranged. it ua~ arranged~
to be sur~~ at a time xhen proapect~ for the Congc~ appeered to be mnre
favorable. One cann~t help noticing a certain di~crepancy b~tween the
finanrial scope of the operation and the now reduced prosp~cts of the
naticn--a discr.epancy all the more obvi~~us in that various factorg euch as
the nature nf the L~rrain traversed~ t1-.e increasing frequer~cy of price "
revi~iona, the devaluation of the dolla: and the reevaluation of the
d~utsche maric threaten to increase th~ final cost by approximately 20
percent, anr~ the coparticipants will have to take cognizance of this fact
at the meeting that xill be held next May in Br~issels. Az~ things atand,
however, the prn~ect shauld enable the Congo--by maintaining an adequate
level of ma.rketa and ,~,obs--to achieve an economic tempo more in keeping
with its resources. The pro~ject also has the advantage of updating~ and
maintaining, a te~hnica~ achievement xhich in ita day xa.s especial].y note-
xorthy.
htoreever, the situation of the Congo--be it in the area of public Works or
- a.~;riculture--is (if you disre~ard the adininistrative shortcamings) far from
being desper.ate. There is a highxay system of 10,000 i;ilometers~ c~f Which
1,000 kilometers are surfaced. There is a rail system of 800 kilometers
(including the Q;MIIAG [Ogooue Mining Company~ line, which hauls the
= manganese from Moanda, Gabc~n) xhose overall traffic totals 2 million tons
per year. There are 4~500 kilometers af navigable xatenrays. Traffic at
the river por.t of BrazzavillQ totals 550~00o tons per year, While traffic
at Pointe roire~ xith its 1~200 meters of xhazves, totals 3 million tcns.
Air traffic at Brazzaville and P~inte t'oire combined exceeds 6~,000 pa.ssen- -
ger~ ~er year. Lastly~ although the coasumptior~ of electric poxer (130
mil:.ion ~cxh) is limited by the extent of the installations, the projects
- prcvidin~ for exrans:cn of the Djoue fac:lity and for better utilization _
of the Bouenza Dam--Khich rep~-esent investments totaling approximately
- 13 hiilion CFA francs--could easily increase this figure sevenfold. A
sma11-ycale producticn of natural ~as is also added to the enezgy potential
of the Congo.
Zn the area of a.~cicultural a:~d agroir,dustrial activities, the decline in
sugar productien in the Niari River valley is certainly to be deplored. A
revival cf cc~ffee production has been noted, hoxever: it had dropped to
1,200 tc:~s in 1�73 but ha.s nox regained its 1968 level of 2,000 tons,
re~resenting total receipts of 1.9 bfllion CFA francs. in the case of
ca.cao, the very substa.ntial revival of productiar. that began in 1977 could
nat, un:ortunately, be saaintai:~ed in iy~~. The fcrest products crisis
im~acted the Congc just as it has the other groducing countries, and caused
exports in 1975 to decliae tc a tota~ af 1,294~3~0 to;~s. Here, too, a
substantial :ecovery xas recorded in 1977 xith export receipts doubling,
leadir.~ to the hcpe that the 1974 levels xould be regained not only for
timber but for saxn ?umber and veneers as xell.
1~~
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~
~Ft U~~'ICIAL U~~ ~NLY
A L~ok at the Future ,
Th~ Cc~n~ hae today rejdined the group of countriea di txopica~ Africa
- ~hat suft'er from chxonic underdevelopment a~d from xhich it xas at one time
thdu~ht to be detaching itaelf. Ne have already pointed out the ar.tificial
Charactar of a CN~ Khich at recently as 1977 xe~ still 187 bill~on CFA
f~rancs, xhen in actual ~'act thi~ figure included 36 billinn for mining and
31 billinn for manufacturing and el.ectriC poxer generation (not tn mention
19 billion for governmental activities)~ a11 df xhich are componenta whose
precarinus nature--and xhose decline--are obvinus to a11. It is a disap-
~x; intment for th~ Cot~go to be constantly faced xith these diff iculties
conn~cted xith revita~ization of the econotqy--difficultiea xhich it on txo
different occagiang thought had been resolved.
~:ne might xell have expected that a~ethod of development based on the
existence of an initial capital xhichexperience has shoxn to be either
insufficient ar unrealistic would officially ~,~ndergo some revision on the
part of those xho had developed it. Fbr a lnng time nothing hxppened~
save for various decisiana of a negative character that xere intended, for
example~ to reserve to Congc~lese nationals a sectar of retail trade that
had been invaded by forei~n natinnal~ tYom Benin~ the ivory Coast~ Upper
Vclta~ Mali~ Nigeria and Senegal, of xhom 5,OU0 xere expelled xithout
compensation in ly?? and nnt xithout atrong reaction on the part of the
affected states~ notably Senegal. It should be recalled, hnxever, that
shrrtly before his replacement by Colonel Sassou-hguesao, Ceneral Yhon~by- '
Cpango told a journalisti "The hist~ry--and the reality--of the contea?porary
xorld make coexistence xith the private aector unavoidable. we are axare of =
thic fact and are benefiting from it." Th3s statement should be compared
xith other coaunents ma,de by the forn~er head of government concerning the
shortcamings of tripartite management (enterprise~ trade union and party)-- -
shortcomir.,s xhich he said "lead to irresponsibillty" xithin the state
enterprises.
tiot t~~ be able to advance--along the road to development--xithout financial
support frcm foreign capitalist enterprises or international lending organi-
zaLions is a3suredly an uncomfortable position for a government that pur-
ports to be yocialist. It is also understandable that potential irnestors
are uneasy about the fate of their irvestment capital--and about conditiona ~
for operating--in the G~ongo. The re~ults of the mission sent in 197~ to
a~azzaville by the Group ef Seven (headed by Afrika Yerein) are quite
eloquent in this regard. The mission--in xhich great hopes had been
placed--reached positive conclusions rrith respect to the possibilities for
cer~~,ain types ~f participation: expanded plantings, technical assistance
tc the i+ationa.l 'ra.La Croxin~ Administration and SIAOONCA and SOTEX~
[Textile G~mpany of the Oongo], the industrial processing of certain prod-
ucts, the establishment of units for the treatment of alkaloids~ imrestaent
in the forest products industry~ and e~+en the sxploitation ~f �ineral
xaters. The mission~ hQxever, made this participation conditional on the
a.doption--xithin the structuze of management--of certain criteria of
, profitabilit~r and competition and on the rationalization of marketing. Did
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~U~ U~E`ICJ~IL US~ dNLY
th~ge conditions appear to be redhibitory" Th~ �~ct ig th~t there xa~
ap~arently no foll~tt-up to the~~ rec~~mmend~tior~s ~nd ronsequ~ntly none to
the ~~3ects themeelvea.
~'~.,rtunately for the Republic ~f the ~:on~;e~ howev~r~ bilateral~ multilateral
and international public agsiatanc~ is less demandin~. Th~ ~'AC [Aid and
Co~~peratic,n F1and~ in particular has invested, in the Cc~ngo for the yeare 1975
through ly7g (in the form af nonreim'bursable granta and not including techni-
- c~l as~istance) ~ total cf ~.5 billi~n C~'A francg~ or ~pproxim~tely 1.39
billicn C~'A francs per ye-3r. Of this t~tal oum ~5 million xas devoted to
general aurveys~ 63~ million to rural d~velapment, 1.25 bi111an to a mining
survey, 3.27 billidn tv infrastructure, 180 millidn to health and 205
million to education. ED~' [European l~v~lopment ~nd~ aid--centered
primarily on the alignment of the CF'NW [Congoles~ Railydad]--~s in a sub-
stantially equivalent amount~ If one th~n adds to the above pe~rticipationt~
those cf the UND~ [United :~ations Development Progra~c~ and various agencies
_ of the United P;ationat the lvans from the AD9 [African Development Bank]i
the loans from the Central Banks and lastly~ the loan of 4 million dnllars
recently negotiated by the ~ongolese Hydrocarbons Coc?pany frnm 0 PEC~ it is
clear that in this reapect the government en~oys broad poasibilitiea.
These types of assistance are invaluable fo: the infrastructure and for -
rural development~ but are poorly adapted to the creation of an econo~aic
fabric of enter?zises~ of xhich they cannot be caore than the subatratwa.
- This :s the main problem~ and it is posed to the Cor~go on txo different
levels.
:t is ur~erstandable, moreover, that certa.in kinds of verbal radicaliam are
not calculated to attract investors. This is no~ the most serious aspect
of the problem~ hoxever, for many of these investors ncx regard African
socialism (xhich is uniform in tempo if not in melody; as a basic fact to
xhich ene must adjust or otherxise xithdrax nne's participation.
The other problem resides in the influe:~ce exerted by a public xhose atate
~f mir.d, after years of indoctrination, is much less pliable than that c~f
the cadres of party members xho have been conditioned by the subtleties of
Marxist self-criticism. The ma3or peorle's organizations of the regime--
the Revolutionary Uni~~n of Congolese Youth, Union of Congolese 3ocialist
Youth, and Congolese TYade-Union Confederation--have spread the official
mystique to such an extent among the general population that it appears
im~ossible to modify their orientation in the absence ef a certain ritual.
Did Ger.era? Yh~mby-Cpar,~o trar.s~ess th;s "rule o: the game" by expsessing--
thou~h xith considerable ~rudence--a sonexhat revisionist position? The
declaration by his successcr tc the effect that the extraordinary congress
of the Oongolese Labor ca~rty should "immortalize forever Comrade 1~1a~rien
~ Kgouabi by achievin~ ideological clarification and unity xithin the party
_ and by accelerating the process of econoraic and scciocultural liberation"
undoubtedly had no other purpose than that. The internal logic of the
systen, hoxever~ requires that the orthcdoxy of the vocabulary be in con- _
~'ermity xiLh the s~~pe of the change in policy to be ado pted.
OOPYR~G?iT: Rene Moreux et Cle., raris~ 1y79 _
10'y~2 12 -
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~Ott O~~ICIAL U5~ nNLY
GAgON
- F~LIC OF'INIOtJ POLL HIGHLIGHTS MAIN CONC~FtN5
parie A'(AF2CH~5 '~I30PICAUX ~T M~IT~tRetn'~NS in French 6 Apr 79 p 88~
[Text] Last 12-15 February, a public opinion poll Was Laken at Libreville~
ban~d on ~~uppoeedly repregentative gampling of 513 individuala of both
s~xe~ of the adult population~
The resultg of $hi~ po11, ahich particularly highlight day-to-day concerne
in r~orker sectians of th~ Cabonege aapital, xere p~abliahed in the 19-22
M~rch editions of the daily L'UNIOtt.
A first poll aas ta~:en in December 197? ,qt Libreville. Judging i'rom the
rc~ults of thi~ 1979 poll, the essential problems~ of th~ people ha~ve ht~rdly
b~en ~olved in the intervening period of over a year.
T'he "biggegt personal problems" in fact are still: the coat of living
(37 percent of thoge sampled versus 41 per.ient in 1977)~ housing (21 per-
cent the sa~e percenta.ge as in 1q7?), unec~ployment (7 versus 2 percent in
~977~ and health (6 percent, as in 19?7).
~ More than ever, '~neighborhood problemg" are centered about the "shortage of
rrater ~nd publio fountainn" (28 versus 22 percent in DeceAber 1977) and
electricity and li~ting (15 versu~ 14 pcrcent in 1977), The state of re-
pair of the roads is, hox~ver, a cancern that seems ta be less ehared (17
ver~us 26 percent in 19?7)~
Thu~ the general evolution of "Libr~ville problems" is ~g folloxgt the
condition of the roada was the primary concern in 197'] (19 percent). It is
today t~erely a secondary one (13 percent) as oppoyed to the cost of living
(18 versus 1j percent in 1977) and health proble~ (16 versus 8 percent in
~977).
On the other hand~ the people of Libreville who xere polled fcel that
Cabon's twe aast inport,~nt probleu~s arn ~till improvement of the road network
(20 percent, as in 1977) and the cost of livin~ (19 versus 19 percent in
1977).
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I~'Olt UN'H'IC IAL U5~ nNLY
Kaeent national eventu that huve a~fected then? mo:~t are the Cnbona~~ Dcmd-
cratic ~~rty (~DG~ Speci~l Congren~~ cited ~t the tdp of the 11st by
- p~r~~nt ot' thd~~ polled ~nd ~7 percent nf the n~fiCic~l~ qu~~tion~d~ and
thc in~u~,~~.tton of the 7'r~s-C~bones~ c3ailro~d (~4 perr,ent of tho~r pollhd
anci 2ti p~rcont of the officinl~).
Whj ic a large pcrr.c~c~tu~e oi' tlie :~ample fe~1s that ttt~ expl~?n~tion~ provSded
by the aongr~g~ h~ve "~laays be~n cle~r," jq p~rcent do n~t shase this -
- o~inion, especial7y women and people with little means.
mhe ~~b M~~ry ~979 po1~ wa~ adndu~ted in duch a way that the individu~ln
qtte~tihn~d had to exprens their opinion~ on the import~nee nf cert~in ~e-
soluti~m ~ adopted durin~ the ~C con~re~~~
7'hu~ they view ac impdrtarit tho~N having ta do withs "gr~nting agriculture
the rieCpSJa.i~y means of ~ssurin~ the natinn a fond supply" (q9 p~rcent)~
with percent of ther~ of the opinion th~t th~ nea~ureu advo~ated will be
- eff~ctive (~5 percent think not); reforn~ing technic~l education ~q3 percent);
"providin~ cff~ctive aid for the creation of sm~ll and mediu~-cized Gabona~~e
enterprige~" (93 percent); ~nd co:~batting banditry (qq perCent) and cnrrup-
tion (91 percent~. GRi~y 33 percent of thosF polled are convinced th~t the
mea~ure~ ado~ted a~ainst corruption are effectiv`, Whereas the sc?me peraent-
~r;e i:: per~uaded of their uselesune~~s. "Declaring w~r on ur~bridled capital-
f::,~." ~eehs to be an important resol~:tion for 35 per~ent o� thn:~e questioned~
- Lu only 59 percent feel tr~t "pursuin~; an unfalterina polic;~ af au~terity
ii~ order to Cle~n up , r~d consnlid~te the Ctibone~e econon~y" is an "importazit
is:~ue."
COi'YiIGiiT: iiene ~;oreux et Cie Pari~ 197U
~1,466
C~Os ~~,30
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~
t-~,
f
~o~ o~~icra~. us~ oxt.Y .
(}W1NA
~
~t~
BRI~'S ~ _
~
~ON'rA,~iGA nAM COMPL~.fiION '~HREAmF:NED--According to the official reaponsible for ~
th~ upp~r region of the Irrigatior? Dev~lopment Authority, the con~truction
xork on the Bontenga dam, near Tamal.e, xhose coat is estimated at 18 million ~
cedis, is threxter.ed with interruption for lack of raw materials--dynemite
- ~nd cement in particular--but Also for lack of machinery and qualified person- ~
nel. The aork, vrhich aas begun nearly 4 years ago and on Which military per-
gonnel and experts assigned to the Tono dem construction work hsve helped, ~i
has not even been able to have the benefit of the credits allocated for it ~
in the 1977-1978 budget, not being able to use them for purcha$e of Lhe nec-
_ essary roaterigls. The dam is to have a holding c~?pe?city of 20 million cubic ~
meters of Water, intended for supp],ying the city of Tamale and for irrigating
1,000 hectares of land. Compl~tion of it is thu~ of the first importance, `
gnd Hr Osei has asked the government ta take urgent meesures on its behalf.
(Text~ (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX EP MEDITERRANEFI~IS in French 23 Feb 79 p,514], ~
11267
5UGAR F'ACTORY CLOSING ENI/ISAGED--The ge:tergl. manager of the sugar factory of -
Komenda, G.L. Okine, receiving the cvmmissioner for the Central region, Dr
K.G. Erbynn, hes empt~asized to him the dit'ficulties With xhich his enterprise ~
is faced, eapecislly in procuring spare parts, and he did not hide the fact '
that the factory could be forced to halt operations complete~}? before the end
of the year if no measures are taken in higher circles on its behalf. Accord- :
ing to Mr Okine, the sugar factory, several of Whose machines are in poor op- y_
erating condition, needs about 7 million cedia worth of import licenses for s
squip~ent. Dr Erbynn noted Mr Okine's request carefl,tlly--and all the more ~
so, he said, inasmuch as this sugar factory, together xith that of Aeutausre,
is capable o: supplying ell of the country's needs and even of exporting. `
~Text ](~aris 1~SARC'c~r5 'i'ROPZCAUX ET MIDITERRAN~tS in French 23 Feb 75 p 514 j t' -
1~267 s;
CSO: ~400 ~
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~OR O~~ICYAL US~ ONLY '
;
~
i
- 4UINEA
BRI~~`S
~UDaF."C INCR~ASED ~'OR 1g7g--Guinea's budget fbr 1g79 hga been decreed, in in- -
- come and expenditurea, at 11.26 billion sylis (or about 2.475 billion French
francs, or 123.75 b~.llion CFA franca). This budget is up 11.09 perc~nt over
- the preceding one. The operating budget provided for is 6,792 million sylie ~
(as against 5,715 million in 1978), and the equipment budget totals 4,460
million sylis (as against 4,430 million). The nevrspaper HOROYA notea that
the income expected from mining products and their derivativea comes to 1,500
. million sylis. This sum Will be paid into a res~rve fund of the general bud-
get created especially for this purpose in 1978. The tot ~1 in thia fund at
present is said to be 2,7~+1.7 million sylis. (Text~ (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 874~ 11267
ADHERENCE IN PRINCIPLE TO 0?4VG--Guinea has given its agreement in principle
to ,~oining the Organization for Development of the Gambia River (OMVG), Which
groups Senegal er.d Gembia. This indication ~+as given on 30 March by Radio
Conakry, uhich read a communique published at the conclusion of the 24-hour
visit xhich Sir DaWda JaWara, president of the Republic of the Qambia, made
to Guineg. This communique specifies that Sekou Toure, president of the
Republic of Guinea, after receiving a letter from the Qambian chief of atate,
Who is the current president of the OMVG, inviting hfm to ~oin this organiza-
tion, "gave his agreement and specified that the membership procedures would
be completed after study of the dossiers relating to the nrganization."
Guinea's ,~oining the Q~f1/G is necessary in order for the organization to be
able to carry out its program for construction of two dams--one at Kekreti,
for regularizing the kat~rcourse and irrigation, and the other at 3embengoulou,
for electric po~?er. Construction of this latter dem must entail the creation
of an artfficial lake in Guinea end thus necessitates Conakry's agreement.
[Text] ~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX E.T MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 p 87kJ
11267
t
1
~
i
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~
_ ~
- ~OFt O~F'YCIAL U5E ONLY
~ ~'~2~NCft ~QUIPMN.'~1T FINANCING-~-Credit Chimique h~s ,~ust signed wi,th the Fr3.gui~
company a purchase credit a13reement for fin~ncing th~ equipment xequixed for
proce~ging the alumintun pro~iuced by the Kimbo plant in (~uines, as reactive
aluminum, using the proc'ess developed by Aluminium Pechi.ney (cf MARCHES
. TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS of 23 March, p 744). Credit Chimique is acting
_ as 1e$der of a group of four French banks. [Text] [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX
E"I' M~DITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 P 87~+J ii267
- CsO; 4400
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~012 OFrICIAL U5~ ONLY
GUINEA-I3ISSAU
BRI~F'S
~ISHING COOPERATION WITH F~tANC~--Luis Cabral, chief of state of '
Guinea-Bissau, who has ,~ust made a 2-day trip to France, spent the d~y of
28 March in the port city of La Rochelle, on a private visit. President
_ Cabral, who wa3 accompanied b,y his minister of plenning, as we11 as by the
French minister of cooperation, Robert Gnllev, was received by deputy mayor
~ Michel Crepeau, by the prefect of Charente-Maritime and by the administrator
of maritime affairs. The purpose of this side-trip was to visit the instal-
_ lations of the Dubois Express Maree group, a La Rochelle specialist in fishing
and processing of sea products, which 3 years ago created, with the government
of Guinea-Bissau, a mixed company foz~ outfitting and fishing which will run
almost all the fishing activity in this country. This company began its op-
erations on 2 April. It comprises a fleet of five boats for semi-industrial
fishing as well as a plant which will process, freer.e, and store the fishing
products, essentially shrimp and sole. In a second phase of equipment acqui-
sition, 8 new boats of about 100 tons each are to be ordered for 1981. This
is the first time that a socialist state of Africa is making such an agreement
with ~ private company. [Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in ~'rench 6 4pr 29 p 873] 11267
CSO: 1t400
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MALI _
POT,ITICAL CLIMATE RETURNS, CONCF~NS EXPRLSSID
Paris JEUDTE A~RIQUF; ~.n French No 954, 18 Apr 7Q pp 34, 35
[Article by special envoy Sennen Andriamirado: "First Incident of 'I'rip"]
[Excerpts~ Arrest of former regime big wigs following
party congress distorts politica~ debate~ r
- riali is rediscovering political life with its maneuvering and, of course,
its politicians, Beneath a white-hot sky, gathered at~out neighborhood
stoves on which dibi (grilled meat) is smoking and that national drug, tea,
is brewi.ng, people comment on the founding of the UDPM, the Malian People's
Democratic Union (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 9;3). And then, the first incident of
our trip: the arrest on the ni~t of Mu:~da.y-'I'uesday, 2-3 April, of certain
important persons of the former regim~. The reason: the distribution of
a pamphlet considered to be subversive~ Actually, distribution of this
notorious pamphlet has only just begun and even in Bamako the underground
opposition has not been apprised of it. L'~reryone is talki.ng about it but
no one has read it. We must admit that the police were particulaxly fast.
The first (and only copies were distributed on Monday, 2 April, to a -
limited readership~ Tha.t very evening, presumed suspects were picked up
at their homes: Ma,madou Golog^o, who was deceased President Modibo Keita's
_ (overthrown in ~968) minister of informa.tion, ex-Minister of National Edu-
cation Abdoulaye Sin~are, former leader of the Malian Students IInion Victor
5y, ~rnown here for his violent stands against the military regime, and
others. _
Victor Sy wa~ released on Tuesday, 3 April, Mamadou Gologo and Abdoulaye
Singare remaa.ned under a warrant of comomitment.
This first incident that has arisen in Ma,li's new ~,ulitical life has not
been very we].1 received. A hi~ official, a former member of the US-RDA
(African Demacratic Rally Section of the Sudanese Union~, says: "Sing~are
and Gologo no longer agreed on ma.tters. The former was lumped together with
the partisans of an ivorian-style liberal econor~c policy and the latter
was lflnown for his radical and progressive sta.tements. I do not at all be-
lieve that they could ha,ve agreed on a given text for even a second.
19
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The cnndemned pamphlet is ~uppo3edly not only hostile to the militnry rQgime
~.nd the party cnnst3~tu~cd nn 31 M~.rch. According to o~rtain sourcQe, it in
~upposed ~o contai.n virulent at~acka against UD~'M poli~tical ~ocretary Sory
Coulibaly, accused of having turned hiy ba~?: on the Mod3.b~~ Keita Regim~ -
whose ambaseador to the United Nations he was.
. Be that as it may, while the suspeo~s have the premature benefit of the
doubt as regards Bamako public opinion, their gesture (if it wa.s a gesture)
is deemed to be untimely.
_ At least for th~ time being, the political debatQ has in fact been distorted
- by ~his incide~~~;, With a unanimous vote by the delegates~ the congreas has
dem~.nc~c~d abrogatioi; ~f Article 76 vf the Constitution, which prohibits former
US-RDA officials who held. responsible p~sitions between 1966 and 1968 from
en~TMaging in any political activity. Comforted by this initiativa, sever~,l
factions of the new party feel the time has come to endow the UDPM with _
sor~e political substance, since the congress scarcely offers it any epeci-
fic political orientation. Among the resolutions adopted, particular em-
phasis was laid on the fact that the UDPM is '~a democratic, anticoloniali~~,
anti-imperialist, antiapartheid, anti~Zionist party..." In short, anti _
a~nany thing~ but pro few. A high party official admitted to us that the
UDPM was pro-Ma,lian and nothing but that.
Now, like its statutes, the UDPM program makes use of worda borrowed from
' the usual lexicon of socialist-inclined partie3: democratic socialism and -
~oc~.al justice, among others~ President Moussa Traore assures us that it
is not out of feax that the TTDPM has not used the word socialist itself.
Political secretary Sory Coulibaly (a civilian) and Col Filifing Sissoko
have each independently informed us: "The experiences we have g+one throu~
~ have traumatized Malians~ They no longer wish to have anything to do with _
~ the US-RDA infernal machine: daily meetings that last the whole day long,
collective projects, harassment by the People's Militia."
Pxesident Traore even told me ;,~ha.t iil 1973, during his official visit to
China, Chinese Prime Iti.nister Chou F~-lai had advised him to establish a -
na.tional democracy before thinking of setting up a people's democracy. And
I~~ioussa Traoz~e went on to say: "The Soviets said the same thing to Modib~ -
Keita when he was in power,"
This strate~ic caution in political matters has not been sufficiently under-
stood by all Malian railitary leaders. The crudest antisocialist images have
been revived by the governors of Certain regions: atheism, depraved morali-
ty and collectivization of property, meals, even women. All these are con-
cerns that nave nothing to do with either President Moussa Traore or �
SOC1311SII1,
UDPrI l~aders are, of course, aware of these distortions, "We must constantly
educate part~,~ officials," we were told~ E`ven the young members of the UNJM
[expansion unlaZOwn] assur~: us that "we anzst not challenge the party. With �
20
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th~ Ulil~M we have achieved lawfulnes3; it is up to u~ to f3.nd logitimacy.~' -
Snry Coulibaly himself mA.~.ntains: ~~Better a poor 3.ns~itution than none at
� ~,11.'~ Zn plain l~.n~ua~e, up to nnw Atali httd no law, but nnw it ha,o. ~
, 1:t i~ up to u~ ~o rc:3pect it. 7'he prin~ry condition for tlxi~ ig that thu
u~i.litary and civiliatis should be capable of sharing power~ But that is -
another matter. The former have to get used to no longer bein~ the only
ones 3n the limel~.ght and in possesafon of absolute power, while the latter
have to get used to not being sQCOnd. fiddle leaders. For, as Col Youasouf -
Traor~, iTD~i :~ecretary ~or information and culture, says: "A na.tional life
without a pasty and a national life with a party are two gituations that
' c~inot be compared~'~
COF'YFtICHT: Jeune Afrique GHUPJ.t~ 1979
1~,466
cso: 44no
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MALI _
HEVIEW OF UDPM CONGRF55 PROCEDURFS ~ RF50LUTIOIVS '
Paris MARCHFS TROPICAU7( Ei MEDITFRRANEENS in F:~ench 6 Apr 79 P 873
_ ~ex~ Mali i~ returning to political life after 10 yeaxs of a milltary _
regime~ It has at its command a political party which should lead it to a _
normal constitutional life with a national assembly and establishment of a
new government.
The new party, the I~emocratic Union of the N~a.lian People ~UDP~~ was started '
at ~he end of the constitutive congress held at Bamako from 28 to 31 March.
.T.t also elected Gen. Moussa Traore secretary general. Since the 1968 coup
d'Etat, of which he was the principal author and which put an end to the
regime of former President Modibo Keita, General Traore has exercised the
functions of president of the Milita.ry National Liberation Committee ~MNL]~
chief of staff ar~d president of the government.
1
The election of ~resident Traore took place in the National Council of the
UDPM, an organ cf 137 men~bers (104- civilian, 27 militaxy and 6 representatives
_ of wc?men's, wc;rkers' and yuu+,h organizations) which proceeded to elect a Cen-
tral ~cecutive Bureau of 18 members (who will ultimately be joined by the _
presi.dent o:~ tre future National Assembly). The Central Executive Bureau -
- comprises civ;~ian and 6 militasy members, counting President Traore.
Four of these milita.ry men are f~rmer members of the MNLC who cax~:cied out the
coup d'Etat in 1968. In add3.cion to General Traore, they are Cc~. Amadou
Baba Diarra, vice ~resider~~ of the MNLC and minister of finance and commerce,
who will become the deputy secretary general of the UD~'M; Col. Filifing Cissoko~
the permanent secretaxy of the MNLC and president of the Fr.eparatory Commission
of the congress, who will become the treasurer general of the UDPM, and Col. -
- Youssouf Traore, the axbiter of MNLC disputes and ministe~r of education~ wh~
will become the UDPM secreta.ry of informa.tion and culture . '
Two me;nbers of the MNLC did not figure in the list of the new bureau. They
are Cols. Ma.ma.dou Sanogo and Missa Kone, the ministers of justice and health,
who are, however, members of the National Council.
22
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~
~OR Ot~'~IGIAL U5~ nNLY
mhQ two milltary xho ~re n~t mem~r~ di the MNIx but whd h~ve t~cnm~ m~mber~
of the ~xecutiv~ $u~~u ~e Lt. Cdl. af the Arn~? S~rvic~ Corpg S~kou Doumbia~
thc administrative officer of the arn~y and Cav~lry Ma~or Mah~ned Keita,
chiaf of st.~.ff of the milit,~ry police.
The best known of the civilians in th~ bure~u i~ 5~ry Couibaly, the form~r
minister from i968 tn iq~8~ Nho pr~viougly u~ the only eivilian tc~ att~nd
_ MNLC meetings a~ ~n MNLC d~puty mini~ater~
A Solemn O~th
In the coursQ of hig speech at :he close nf' the aonstitutive congresg~ pre-
s~dent Tr~ore todk a golemn oath to "serv~ his people" ahil~ making the eSx
: folloxing points respectQd~
1, To leave no st,one unturnec~ in m~king th~ party ~ffectiv~ly th~ p~rty of
"all the people".
2. To eliminate all pre,judice betNeen the military and "tnilitants in
uniform" so that th~y merge togeth~r to serve the ob~ectiues set by th~
congress.
3. To establish total collaboration betxe~n the authoritles of the party and
Zhose of the administration~
4. To comb~t absenteeism~ sloth and negligence, as xell as incompetence.
5. To see to it that demxracy does not bscome merely ~ pious xish.
6. To do everything possible for the liberation of Zimbabxe~ Namibia~
South Africa and Palestine.
For "Positive Non-Alignment"
In add3 tion, the constitutive congress of the UDPM adopted a general policy
, motion in favor of "positive non-alignment". The UDPM is gupporting OUA
~rganization of African Unity~ for "peaceful settlement of di~'ferences"~ be
between the African states. I t favors developing and deepening relations
betxeen Mali and other African st,ates, more particularly neighbors, espe-
cially in t~.e regional and subregional organizations.
The UDPM economic pla.n favors a. "neK~ indeper:d~lnt and planned econot0.Y"
xhich xould includes a publi~ se~ctor to he cleaned up and developed~ a mixed
sector to be encouraged and a rrivate s~ctor to be guided.
2he resolution, the AFP notes finally~ establishes "demxratic centralism"
and makes the party "the supreme authority for guidance and control,"
adding that this primacy by no means signifies that the party authorities
should take the place of other institutions of the state as to the preroga-
tives xhich have devolved on it under the constl tution, the laxs and the
regulations of the public administration."
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~dtt O~~tCIAL U5~ ONLY
President Ci~~~rd d'~~#,~ing ~ant ~ lett~x nf
~nngr~atul~tiona to G~n. Mdu~~a
~`ranre on the o~cagidn of thig appointment a~ ~Qcret~ry g~ne~~l nf the
Demo~r~tic Uni~n of th~ M~lian P~op1Q~
(:oPYkICtiT: Ctene Moreux et Cie p~ri~ 1~7g
9~80
C5U: 440n ~
24
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~
~dlt O~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
SAb TOM~ Ah'U pRINCI~~
CHANC~S IN GOVERNM~N'r POSITIONS, DAtU'S ~tI5ING IN~'LU~NC~
parie MARCNE5 TROpICAUX ET MEDITERItANEEN5 in Fr~nch 27 Apr 79 p 1074
('Texej A Sao Tome national redio broadc~~t ~nnoune~d on 9 April thge the
pogt of prime minister Wgg ~boligh~d and that Dr Federico Jog~ Sequeir~,
minister of health~ agg ougted from the govern~aent.
~ormer Prim~ Minigter Miguel Trovaada hgg now became minister df ind~~try,
coam~erce and fi~h~rie~, a poeition entniling con~idergb~y reduced r~spon~i-
_ bilities~ given Sao Tome ~nd Prineipp'g pr~~~nt ~cnnomic deveYopment.
Trovoada was the founder in 1961 af the CL5TP libergtioniet movement (Com-
- mitt~e for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Princip~), Which wag r~cogniz~d
by thc OAU in 1962 and gubsequently became thp MLST1' (Movement for the
Liber~tion of 5ao Tome and ~rincipej, the ruling party in 5ao ~ome whose
secretary generel is President Pinto da Costa.
The minidterial reshuffle follows the verdict issued agAinst the accused
in the "Cobra 17" plot in Which certain historical ML5TP leaders aere in-
volved. Another reshuffle had taken place last September. Celeatino Costa,
formerly minister of justice and education, had lost at the time hia second
post. Leonel Dalva, formerly minister of foreign affairs (and the old
prime minister in the transitional government before independence) had be-
come minister of education. A parallel can noW be drawn between the aboli-
tion nf the post af prime minister in 5ao Tome and the fate of I.opo do
_ Nascimento in Angala last December.
Angola wields considerable influence in 5ao Tome. Pregident Pinto da Costa
_ made an official visit to Angola in February. A military group of approxi-
mately 1,000 men from Angola and Cuinea-Bissau led by Cubans has been ata-
tioned in Sao Tome since 1978 in the Wake of alleged invasion attempts by
_ a foreign power. ~
In another development, the increasingly important role played by Com-
mandant Daniel Daio, minister of interior, in the political life of the
two islands has been evident for some time. The former Portuguese mili-
tary man, little known abroad, has successfully eliminated a number of
zs
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~dtt b~~tCtAL U5~ ONLY
riv~1,~, ~mt~ag them Cdn~nd~nt Alb~rtind N~to, wh~ h~~ ~u~t b~~t~ ~~ntpnced
to 21 y~~.rg imprigonm~nt b~c~u~~ of th~ pgrt he ~ii~g~diy pl~y~d in th~
"Cobr~ 77" pl~t.
COPYItiGHT: R~ne Mar~ux et Ci~ pari~ 1~7g.
CSO: 4400
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~Oft U~~tCIAL U5~ dNLY
Tdf30
B~t I ~F'S
~UbG~'C ~~R 1979 F'UI3LI51I~D--~he ordin~n~~ af ~q becember 1978, en~eting the
finnnce act fc~r 19'T9, ha$ e~tablighed the mog~l~~e budget for ~i~c~l 1g7g, in
_ income and expenditures, ~t ~i~.6 billion CPA--an ~aount c~os~ tc~ ~h~ 1978 bud-
get, srhich rr�~$ 60.6 billian, th~ increase thug being 3.3 p~r~ent. 7'he 1979
investment anc~ equipment budget (1~.8 billian C~'A) includes 12.1~ billion for
_ pri~r commitments: the Togol~se ghnre in pro~ects finnnced by forAign ~ic~,
interest and ~.??nuiti~s, ar~.ortizaLion of lo~ns, etc. 'I'he investment credite
total 3.4 billion CFA (rurrent program and sub~ic~y for aupplying of fertil-
izer~). 'I'he subsidi~ry budget for the rgilWays in Toga has been decreed at -
921 nillion C~A in incotae and expenditures. (~xcerpts~ (P~ris MARCHES TR~-
PICAU?~ E'I' 1dEDIT~RttA;t~NS in F'rench 6 Apr 79 pp 876-8T7J 11267
- C~O: 1~400
21
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Fl~~t nt~~~CtAt, U~~ ONt,Y
- 7AICt~ -
~AIRE TEttMtNA`TES ROCitET LAUNCH 3~1'~ ~ON`~ttACT
P~rig J~UNE A~RIQU~ in Fr~n~h 25 Apr 79 pp 28-29
(Artiele by ~r~ncoig Soud~n: "b'TRAC t~ L~~ving"~
['~exrJ Th~ v~~t Manona Plgt~gu li~g in th~ n~rthe~gt~rn eorn~er df Z~ir~'s
Sh~b~ ~rovince. Some 40~000 pergans 1iv~ in thig r~gidn b~taeen ehe Lualaba
Rivpr and th~ villag~ of K~melie on th~ ~hor~ of i.~k~ 'f~ngenyik~. For th~m,
th~ cess~ti~n of OTRAG'g gctiviti~~ and the dep~rture af n handful of Whit~
techniri~ng Will probably hav~ littl~ ~ff~ct dn the fix~d tPnar of their Waya.
OTRAG ig legving. So what'?
Orbit~l Transporr ~nd Rak~ten AG, OTRAG, is g rather sma11 G~rman firm Whose
pre$id~nt~ Lutz Knyser, a specic~ligt in aeronautical engineering, is not
lacking in aa~bition. His goal is to make money by uging his ingenuity and
resnurrefullneeg. His gpecial "nich~" ig space. He ie engaged in building,
- launching, and placing in orbit small observation satellites ~+hose launch
vehicles Will burn liquid propellantB, che fuel used by the famous V-1
and V-2 rockets built by the Germans late in World War II. Ne ie develop-
ing ~ snrt of "poor man's" sntellite one that Third World countries, or~an-
ized int~ consortiu~, Will be able eo obtain for peaceful applicationg.
This satellite markee also interestg both NASA and the Eu~ropenn 5pace Agency.
Like Kurt Debus, che chairman of OTRAC's board of directors, and OTRAC's
projects m~nager ttichard Gompertz, Lutz Kayaer is a veteran of Peenemunde, the
German V-1 and V-2 rocket research and development center. All three men
W~re ~ubseq~ently "rehabilitated" by NASA. All three formerly Worked at
rhe Kennedy Space Center. Nhen NASA began to feel the pinch of tight budgets
in the early 1960's~ these men no doubt felt they had better things to do than ~
"coast along" at PIASA. So they decided to form their own business. Four
banks, actracted by the prospects and also sWay~d by Kayser's persuasive
glibness, lent them the money. But they still had to find a range for their
launcher tests. They set their sights on Zaire, on its vast nearly unin-
habited expanses, and thought of the severe economic problems plaguing that
country. On 26 March 19i6, they concluded an agreement vith the Zairian
authnrities. They Were granted a 24-year lease, extending to the year 2000~
on 160,000 square kilometers of bushland bordered on the south by the Zambian
28
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~dF; C~~~IGIAL U5~ UNi,Y
frnntier, the e~~t by Lake i~ng~nyika, th~ narth by the bdund~ri~~ df Kiv~
prdvinCe, ~nd th~ wegt by eh~ Lua1~b~ Itiver. In ~xchang~ f~r thi~ inm~ng~
firing rang~ tlTttAG dgre~d td p~y the z~irien Gdv~rnment 37.5 million dnll~rg
p~r y~~r plug a perc~ne~~~ af eh~ revet~u~ ~~rn~d by Che anmpany on ~~ch l~uneh
vehi~lp ~~ld ~nd ~ 20 per~~ne digedunt nn th~ fir~e "Z~irign" ~nt~llit~. ~
~ Thingg uent ~moothly f~r C~TttAG in 197b. Ir p~t~blished g gub~idi~ry, d'~RA~ ~
5~ A. (LimiC~d~, ~t V~dux in ehe Princip~liey af Li~~h~~n~t~in, g e~x pgrgdig~
for h Eirm that ig gee~ingly nnt entir~ly ~bdv~ sugpi~ian in ~u~h m~eter~~
A1.1 fund~ d~gtin~d fdr x~tre a~r~ funn~led ehrdugh OTttAG S~A. whic,h alan
handled ~nd routed ~11 equipm~nt attd technician~ ~~nt tn the Kapgcti-Tokn pl~-
teau. `The partent ~ompnny also ingt~lled ~ ghort-lived br~nch n�fiCe, 0'~itAG-
~r~nr,~, on Avenue F~Ch in Parig. ~t~ mangger w~g ~ r~eh~r ~trange individu~l
hiding under the ~li~~ of Gporg~~ d~ Biprre. Np ig gll~~~d to hgvp b~en cnn-
nected wieh fh~ dA5 (S~eret Army nrganix~tidnJ d~ring th~ A1g~ri~n War. The
�irst rdrket, ehrigtened ~illigr~kee~, wa~ launchpd nn 17 May 1977 in thp
presen~e of N. D. G~nsch~r (~ttG'g far~igfl mittige~rj. It was a p~rtial
gucces~: the vehicle re~ched ~n gltirud~ of 10 kilometerg bpfore it gt~rt~ed
t~tnbling. 5~me gtdry for the s~cond te~t. In early June, aith Pr~~ident
~ Hobutu gnd g Gern~n televisian ~r~a pres~nt, it wgg ~heer diggsCer: ~ f~w
secdnds after launCh, the rocket crashed along the ghore~ of th~ Luvun Riv~r.
- OTCUIG executivps th~n decided td postpon~ regular production some 2 yegr~,
in oeher word$, not befor~ 19g1.
goth the CIA and the German BNU aere .;ware of OTRAG's dealings as early ag _
late 1975. But a third "partner" also had Wind of the OTRAG-Zaire ronCr~ct,
n~mely the 5oviet KGB. 'The 5oviet le~dership ig kndWn to be very ~eneitive
to ~nything cingely or remotely relev~nt to the pogsible rearmament of th~ -
~eder~l Etepublic of Germany, sensitive [o such a point that in e~rly 1977
the hremlin decided to place two "spy" satellites--Cosmos 922 and Co~moa 932--
in orbit over southern Africa. These satellites made four passes over the
~tanono Plateati~--4, 23, 24 and 25 July 1977--and carefully photogruphed OTRAG
- installations. Uuring their flights, they also photographed 5outh Africa's
nuclenr test site in the Kalahari Dryland. Did the Soviets really believe
OTEtAG aas a front for ehe nuclearization of the FRG7 Or did they want to
deliberately magnify an isgue the ins and outs of Which were fully known
tn them? Wh~tever the reaosn, in late July they "leaked" the details of the
contract.
7'he ~ast Germans are obviously the most offensive in their criticism. The
CDit charges that OTRAG enables the FRC to circumvent the post-World War II
Potsdam Agreemen~ and the Treaties of Paris and Brussels that prohibit the
FItG from producing long-range rockets. During preparations in March 1978 -
for the second Shaba War, Angolan authorities were patently alarmed by the -
OTRAG rockets they believed vere targ~~ted on Luanda. Hence they insisted
that one of the priority objec[ives oE the "Katanganese gendarmes" had to be
the OTRAG installations. This plan fsiled~ however, and OTRAG resumed its
inconclusivc teat launches.
29
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. . > ~ _
in gdnn, gg we11 ag in hin~h~~~ .;uthoritieN ~e~med ea h~v~ de~id~d to
tetmin~~.e OTRAG'~ ~CCivieieg b~C&lfg~ Cheg~ wer~ beCOming mdr~ gnd mor~
_ df a nuignnC~. z~ire, who thdughe ie h~d m~de n godd bu~in~a~ de~l, fnund -
it~e1~ the ~ent~r of a~ontrov~rgy it ~euld h~ve d~finit~ely don~ wiChaue.
Moredv~r, one di th~e indi~peng~bl~ ~nnditions aE r~~on~.ilintion with Mgala
w~g ch~ digmantlin~ dit~~~i~h t,robl~mtona~~~nd~fotr~n111ber~uge~~t~w~~
w~nt~d td ~~~tl~ ehis I~
p~rdizin~ ieg r~1~~inn~ wieh the L~gt.
The Z~iri~n tegts were ~u~pended itt Augu~t 1978~ 'Ch~n in bec~mb~~,th~pim~n~ng~
yinn w~~ made: z~ir~ w~s unil~e~rglly ~~n~eling the ConCr~Ct.
s~tisf~~t,ion of ehe ~'ItG gnd tihe GU~t (wirh whom Kingh~ga r~~sCabligh~d rele-
tions i~~ J~nuery 1979) ~
A~ fdr d'CRAG, i~ ig now pr~cti~ally bgnkrupt. Itg la~t hop~ W~s thge
~r~~il aauld authorize it to egtgblish it~ 1~unch ~nd t~gt facilitieg in
th~t cauntry� Ihmidt'~evi~it eo BrggiliariGenerglV~igueiredonhadpdeCid~d
of Chance11dr 5c
nnt to favorably consid~r n'rttAC'~ propos~l~.
~.~~i.u?~~~~r
/ ~
~rM
M~
~`D ~ _ / ~
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~w wuM The Manono Plateau in the
northe~stern part of
Zaire's Shaba Province. -
An imanense firing range.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8041 gND
- CSO: 4400 30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050060-9