JPRS ID: 8470 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050041-0
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• Document Page Count: 50
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• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8470
22 May 1979
N
TKANSLATIONS ON USSR MILItARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO l3/79)
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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JpR~ L/8470
22 May 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
(F'OUO 13/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
Comments on Alcoholism and Drug Addiction in U.S. Navy
(M. Pan~.l; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Dec 7@) 1
Comments on NATO Defense Against Airborne Attacks
_ (I. Khramov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENSYE, DeC 78) 7
- Comments on Western SAM Systems
(V. Almazov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZREr1IYE, Dec 78) 15
Corranents on Antiaircraft Defense of U.S. and Canad~
= (Yu. Omel~chenko; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Dec "j8) 21
Comments on NATO Joint Armed Forces in E~.~rope
(I. GoloTmin; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE~ Jan 79) 27
~ Corranents on U.S. Bivision-Level Contro]. and Corrnnunications
J (I. Loshchilov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNUYE OBOZREIJIYE, Jan 79) 37
Connnents on NATO Combat Helicopters
(Yu. Kolesnikov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jan 79) 41
_ Corimients on NATO Doctrine on F~nploying Tactical Aviation
(L. Andreyev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Jan 79) L~2
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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COA4IENTS ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ADDICTION IN U.S. NAVY
Moacow ZARUBEZ~IOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Rueaian No 12, Dec 78 signed to
presa 6 Dec 78 pp 13-17
[Arti.cle by Col M. Panin: "Drug Addiction and Alcoholism in U.S. Naval
Aviation"] _
[Text] According to the American preas, the U.S. military leadership ia
aeriously diaturbed by the eCate of military diacipline and by the increase
in drug addiction, drunkennesa`and the crime rate among Armed Forces
peraonnel.
All theae "ailments" are related dirsctly tc the profound sociopolitical
crisis which has gripped broad layers of the American public at the present
time. Meanwhile, the U.S. military leadership atill continues to aeaert
that the growth in the crime rate, alcoholism and drug uae in the American
Army is a result of the U.S. defeat in the war against the people of
Vietnam. As a matter of fact, in Vietnam American service pereonnel showed
the whole world their ideological lack of principle and the depth of their
moral and ethical decay. But the main reason lies in the very essence of
American bourgeois society with ita ideals of personal enrichment and
profit at an~ cost; of a society where a power cult, extreme iudividualism~
egotiem and cruelty flourish. All base feelings and the mflet diaguating
manifestation of bourgeois morality are stimulated and developed in every
poasible way during combat training and ideological conditioning of the
personnel.
Drug addiction in the U.S. Armed Forces, and especially in the Navy and
naval aviation, has acquired such scope that the command element has taken
a nianber of stepa aimed at preventing the use of drugs and at identifying _
persons who abuae or trade in drugs among the peraonnel.
Judging from foreign presa reports, the secretary of the Navy was forced to
set ~up a special group under the Chief of Naval Operations l�o fight drug
- addiction and he had to develop an obligatory program for familiarizing all
personnel with the destructive effects of drugs on the bady. A directive
from the secretary to naval officials ordered the elimination of drug
addiction. The military chaplaine service additionally was included in the
etruggle against drug addictian.
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BuC the elimination of drug addiction in ti?~ Navy, including in naval avia-
tion, ia atil~. uneuccesaful. Moreover, the number of drug addicts is grow-
� ing. Whi1e 30 peraona were released from the Navy for drug abuse 3n 1963
and 3,808 in 1969~ their number already had riaen to 4,000 in 1972. Groupe
- were aet up to fight the unidentified drug addicta~ The groups consiat of
- noncommisaioned officera, medical aervice officers and chaplaina who work
in the aquadrona and aboard shipa to explain Che pernicious eff ect of ;
various druge on the body.
j
The essence of these explanationa reduces to the fact that a pereon who has
given himself up to using heroin, mari~uana, LSD, barbiturates and other ,
compounda gradually loaes the ability to control his acCione intelligently.
He lives in a world of morbid hallucinations and proceeds in his ~udg~mente
and acta not from reality, but from his own fantastic impr~esiona which i
appea~ under the effect of a drug. Tt is impossible to predict the
behavior or reaction of the drug addict. ','hey are not sub~ect to loAic. ~
When an order is given to a military drug addict, one cannot be sure that i
everything will be executed in that way and not vice versa, or whether it j
will be executed at a11. Psychological disorders and serio~ie mental ill- '
nesses are a common phenomenon among drug addicts.
- Some drugs are distinguished by heightened toxicity. According to American ,
press data, more people die each year in the United Statea from barbiturate i
poisoning than from all other poisons together, except carbon monoxide..
The hallucinogen LSD is one of the most dangeroua drugs ueed by U.S. naval
personnel. This strong aubstance drives a peraon mad and keepa him in that
state for an indeterminate time. The effect of LSD showa up even 2 years
after use. No one can predict when a relapae will occur. It ie believed ;
the chromosomes damaged by LSD can be pasaed from generation to generation.
A negligible doae of this compound is sufficient to cause deep paycho- ~
logical disorder in a person. According to official estimates by American i
apecialists, the contents of an ordinary suitcase with a falae Uottom would !
be quite sufficient to place the entire populace of North and South America ;
in a schizophrenic atate. ~
According to the foreign military presa, a special danger of drugs is that
they not only destroy the physical health and psychology of persone '
addicted to drugs, but also do enormous harm to society as a whole, with
the material and moral damage not being sub~ect to precise determination. ~
As it is generally known, there is a rigid selection of pilots and landing
cont~ollers in naval aviation. All flight training programs categorically
re~ect candidates who have used drugs at any time. The naval aviation
command complains, however, that around 60 percent of all drug addicts
begin to use drugs even before service in the military and conceal this
fact from recruiters and acceptance commisaions when enlisting for service.
,
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_ Americana believe that the "average" drug addict in naval aviation uaually
is among the rank-and-file or a ~unior officer 20 yeare o1d as a rule. But
the age group variea from 18 to 23 yeara. According Co a aCatement by
military authorities, "society ie experiencing ~ crisis with Che youth and
the drug problem."
U.S. ~udicial entitiea addi:ionally aee a direct link between drug abuse
and a growth in the crime rate among military personnel. U.S. law viewa
the disaemination and storage of drugs as a crime. Naval personnel are
sub~ect to court martial and a bad conduct discharge for drug abuse.
Groups for fighting drug addiction in the Navy and naval aviation work
closely with narcotica divisiona tn police departmenta of large citiea and
counties. As a result of their activitiea, 3,949 drug usera were identi-
fied in the Navy in 1976, 7,771 (an increase of 98 percent) in 1968 [aic],
and already around 11,700 in 1970 [sicJ.
Meanwhile, as the American military press notes, some air subunit command- -
ers aC times connive with seamen and officers whom they view as "reliable,"
cloaing their eyee to the drug trade and drug uae by service personnel. A
situation in which the moet sophiaticated weapona systems, including
thermonuclaar weapons, are in the hands of people stupefied by druga causes
serious unrest among honeat Americana. It is easy to imagine how a drug
addict controlling an aircraft with a deadly cargo aboard might, und~r the
influence of a morbid imagination, commit actions "on his own initiative"
with consequences which are difficult to foresee.
While drug addiction, in the estimate of foreign military specialists,
basically touches the youngeat portion of naval aviation personnel, drunk-
enness is the lot of military personnel of all ages and ranks. "We drink
from the moment we enlist for service until we retire, from youth to old
age." Such are the admissions of some military personnel which have
appeared in the American military press. According to data of the Navy's
chief inedical directorate, hawever, the "average" alcohollc uaually is an
officer 30 years old.
Alcohol--the "grandfather" of all drugs--has been declared national
problem n~unber on= in America. There are over 9 million alcoholica in the
United States. Zhirty-eight percent of all officers and men of the Navy
are confirmed drunkards, while 40 Fercent of the drunkards usu:~lly become
chronic alcoholics. It has been estimated that each alcoholic in the Navy
has a direct inarmful ef~ect on the lives of four other coworkers, that
victims in 50 percent of accidents were in a state of intoxication at the
moment of death, while ?.0 percent of all hospital admissions in the Navy
involve alcoholism.
I:~ this instance aviation natusally was not left out. An analysis
performed by the neuropsychiatric department of the Bethesda Maryland Naval
Hospital ahowed that in the period 1960-1970 22 percent of naval pilots
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were diagnosed as chronic alcoholics and 54 percent were confirmed drunk-
ards with varioua formo of psychological disor~era. The number o� chronic
_ alcoholica in naval aviat3on ie growing with each passing year. The naval
aviation command admits that at least one out of every Cen aviation peraon-
ne1 is an alcoholic, and officers compriae the baeis. Ma~or crimes
including murder, rape, robbery and armed assault are committed in a state
- of drunkenness.
The basic causea for masa alcoholism in U.S. naval aviation are well known.
- In addition to them, there are a multitude of traditiona and cuetome
facilitating an intensification of drunkenneas among peraonnel.
American pilots admiC: "In naval aviation we drink during off-duty hours; '
we drink after a flight well performed, after a bad flight, and after a
near collision in the air (to calm Che nerves). By tradition, we present
our inatructor a bottle of his favorite beverage to celebrate our firat
solo flight. And if we e~ect safely from a falling sircraft, we give ~
thanks to our 'savior'--the parachute packer--with a bottle of alcohol,
which he himself prefera to select. We drink when we receive the 'Golden
Wings' emblem; when we 'wash down' a promotion; we drink when we are
'passed over' in promotion (to ease the depression), aC official dinnera
and at change of comm~nd ceremonies and appoinCmente of the chief. A nighC
' landing with the arresting gear on a carrier is evaluated with a'medicinal'
portion of cognac allocated to the pilot from the 'good aviation doctor's'
stocks."
During the dirty war in Indochina the aviation command would iasue flight
personnel a bottle of whiskey, cognac or vodka as an incentive for a
successful combat sortie. Instances were cited in the American press where ~
naval pilota would fly combat sortiea in aircraft and helicopters during
combat operations against the DRV while they were in a state of druakenness. ,
;
College students who dream of naval service and who train in educational
programa for subsequent service with the Navy are obligated to undergo two
months of practice aboard naval ships and at air bases during sum!'~cr vaca-
tion. While cruising aboard ahips, cadeta visit "interesting" bars and
taverns in the FRG, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. The young
people like to get drunk together with the officer instructors. According
to the U.S. military press, the opinion has become f ii-mly entrenched among
ca~'ates for flight school that the life of a real naval pilot consists
of constant drinking bouts. As a result, after 4 years of "practice," the
, students arrive at aviation schools already prepared for much unreatrained
drunkenness in the officer environment. ~
Arunkenness leads to frequent f ights with the Marines (to "defend the
honor" of naval aviation) and leads to sutomobile accidents and wrecka. The
police have to intervene in scandals and brawls begun by drunken pilota
both in the United States and abroad.
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There also are a large number of alcoholics among phyaiciaizs, chaplains. _
frogmen, engineers, technic3ana and mechanice in nnval aviatian. In 1974
the ~ournal NAVAL AVIATION NEWS published the reaulte of obaervatione of _
239 naval aviation officers (there were eight women among them). The
obaervatione were conducted for aix months. It was determined ae a result
that almast every third person drank ao often Chat in fact they could be
conaidered alcoholice. It was noted in the U.S. mil.itary preas that a
unique "protective ~nvelope"is created around alcoholics in some naval air
units. IC exists unCil the pilot ia in a condition to �ly and the mechanic
can aervice aviation equipment. Despite the presence of obvioua eymptoms
of chronic alcoholism, preference ia given to a11 kinds c~f "sparing" -
diagnoses, with flight personnel aent to hoepitals for treatment of
secondary ailments. And the higher the rank of the alcoholic or the higher
his preatige, the lesa obvious it is that he is given the correct diagnosis
and will receive the appropriate treatment.
A naval staff directive was issued in May 1973 and an instruction of the
main naval medical directorate was issued in December 1973. These docu-
ments contain statements concerning the abuse of alcoholic beverages and
stepa to be taken to prevent and treat alcoholism. ~
The Navy now has f ive special alcoholic treatment centers, 14 departmenta
in naval hospitals and four dispensaries, i.e., 23 specialized establieh-
ments. They are attempti:~g to treat alcoholics of the U.S. Navy using
medical, psychological and psychiatric methods for thia purpose. The _
"rehabilitation" of an alcoholic lasts 6-8 weeks. If the patient was from .
among flight personnel, then in conformity with the instruction of the main
naval medical directorate, the physician can suthorize him to flyr if the
result was favorable.
In addition to therapeutic establishments, there also exist v8rious public
organizatione which fight alcoholism. They arrange lectures and talka and
show films about the harm of alcohol. Convalescing alcoholics are brought
in to work in such organizations. Along with their basic official duti~es,
they perform the role of "advisers" to the command element on problema of
combating alcoholism.
In spite of all these measures, the number of alcoholics in the Navy _
continues to rise. The foreign press has reported that from the moment
special alcohol treatment centers were set up until 1974, 4,350 peraons -
were present in them. Seventy percent of the patients returned to official
duties. Former alcoholics still remain chronically ill, however, and great
hopes are not placed on them. For this reason they usually are considered
second-class persons and are assigned to positions which do not involve
heightened responsibility. Many of the convalescing alcoholics
end up in treatment centers for a second and a third time. Out of the
70 percent of patients who returned to service after treatment, only eight
naval aviators were suthorized to fly as copilots.
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The naval aviation command lately has been disturbed by the fact that the
"average" alcoholic is becoming younger with each pasaing year. Thase who
became chronic alcoholi~cs at age 30 began to geC drunk at age 18-20.
" The American military press has emphasized that it ia difficulC to prevent
alcoholiam in naval aviation and, in the opinion of experienced phyaicians -
and specialists, it is very dif�icult to treat it. Such illnesaea as drug
addiction and alcoholism can hardly be eradicated without curing the well-
known social diseasea of the entire American society. Neverthelesa, U.S. ,
military authoritiea have taken steps ro "improve the health" of Armed .
Forces peraonnel, including those of naval aviation. The check and aelc~c-
tion of new recruits is being conducted more thoroughly. Moral and psycho- _
logical influence on service personnel and their ideological conditioning
are being intensified to ensure that naval aviation continues to be one of ~
the reliable strike detachments of American imperialism.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978 ,
6 904
CSO: 1801
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COMMENTS ON NATO DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE ATTACKS
:
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 78 signed to
~ress 6 Dec 78 pp 25-31
[Article by Col I. Khramov, Candidate of Militaty Sciences, Docent: "Ground
Forces: Combating Airborne,Landings (According to Views of the NATO
Command)"]
[Text] Despite certain positive changes for the better in the relaxation -
of international tension, NATO countries are conducting intensive prepara- -
tions for a new aggressive war. A considerable plar.e is set aside in the
- course of theae preparations forproblems of combating enemy airborne
assaults. ~
The NATO command takes the organization of the struggle against airborne
assaults as a complex of ineasures conducted by commanders in chief
(commanders, chiefs) and staffs aimed at the security and defense of _
important areas (installations) tn the rear of friendly forces and deatruc-
tion of an eneury who is being landed or has landed. The primary measures
are considered to be the preparation of local security and defense of areas
(installations); planning anti-airborne operations; the organization of
coordination; the assignment and training of personnel and weapons employed
in combating them (including the creation of mobile groups); reconnaiasance
and warning; the organization of air defense, patrol service, couater-
_ intelligence and so on. ~
The primary ob~ective of the aforementioned measures is to detect sirborne
assaults in time and prevent their landing, but iftt~ey still take place, to
prevent the performance of their asaigned missions.
, To achieve this ob~ective troops have to accomplish a number of important
missions of both tactical ~nd operational importance. They usually include
� the timely revelation of enemy intentions on making airborne assaults;
notif ication of all military and civil echelons (command elements of formationa,
combined units, other units, chiefs of military installations and civil
defense entities) xbout the threat of their employment; destruction of the
airborne assault forces during their marshaling for boarding aircraft and
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helicoptera, during the flight ro the landing zone or immediately after the
landing. -
This arCicle examines the organization of the struggle against enemy air-
borne assaults in the Central European theater of military operationa
according to views of the NAxO command elemenC. As the foreign presa
emphasizes, responsibility for its organization is placed on the commander
in chief of the ~oint armed forces, who exer.cises control through ~
commanders of army groupa and air force formationa as well as through
commanders of territorial command elemente of the FRG and the Netherlanda
and of Belgium's internal forces.
It is generally known that the Central European Cheater of military opera-
tions is divided into a zone of combat operations and a communications zone.
The boundaries of the Northern and Central army groups lie within khe
limits of the zone of combat operations. Here Che responsibility for
defense of rear areas in the army group zones belongs, in addition to the
army group commanders, to the commanders of FRG territorial commands "North"
and "South" respectively. By requir.ement of the NATO leadership, they muat
provide troops ~f the alliance freedom of operational maneuver by blocking ~
enemy military actions in the rear area of Che zone of combat operations
and, in exceptional situations, in rear areas of army corps as well.
~ The zone of comb at operations within an army group zone includes forward
and rear areae. The forward area in turn is divided into corps and divi-
sion areas in which the appropriate commanders bear responsibility for
combating airborne assaults.
In order to improve the control of units, their logistical support and _
_ organization of the most effective defense, combined unit commanders can
break large-sized rear areas into subareas, and subareas into sectors,which
uniCe within their boundaries important installations and the troops ,
defending them. Persons responsible for these aubareas (sectors) usually
are the commander (chiefs) of combined units, units or subunits (insCalla-
Cions) located within them.
The communications zone takes in a territory beyond the limits of the zone '
of combat operations. The main rear services entities and estab lishments
as well as lines of communication are located in it. In the Central
European theater it includes the territory of the Netherlands, Belgium and _
Luxembourg. Commanders of these countries' territorial commands are
responsible for the communications zone.
The communications zone may be divided into sectors: one or more base
sectors and a forward sector. Each of these sectors in turn is divided
into areas and the areas into subareas. The commanders (chiefs) of these
sectors, areas and subareas are responsible for combating airborne assaults.
_ ~
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- As a ru1e, the staff located in a given area plans rhe measures tor
combaCing enemy airborne nssaults. Special entities usually are not set up
in army groups and combined un:Cts to conduct measures o� combating landings,
and the entire responsibility rests on Che commanders in chief (commandery)
and their staffs. The foreign press point~ out, however, that at times
special groups (centers) for planning measures of combating airborne -
assaults are organized on combined unit staffs.
For exampl~, it is recommended that a group be set up in a division made up
of the chief of the operations sectinn, two assiseants, Che reconnaissance
battalion and air dzfense battalion commanders and an air force repres~nta-
tive; and that a center be set up in a corps made up of a staff detachment
and three sections (planning, combat operations and control of mob ile
operations groups). Trooos temporarily located in a given area carry ouC -
measures only for immediate security of their own units (subunits) and may
rake part in combating airborne assaults in conformity with instructions of
superior headquarters.
The formation (combined unit) plan for combating airborne assaults gives
thorough consideration to intelligence on the enemy (political, economic
and military aspects) and problems of rear area support. Ir usually
contains data on iroop locations; missions and areas or zones of their
operations; proba'ole defended installations; measures for co~rdination of
the operations ~t combined units and other units, and other problems. It
determines which installations are to oe defended above ~11, as well as the
composition and procedure for employment of troops assigned for security
and defense of the i;~stallations (including procedures for training and -
employing local police forces, volunteer detachments and other formations). -
Measures for combating airborne assaults usually aretied in closely with the
following plans: air defense, system uf ob stacles, f ire support, combating
sabotage groups, intelligence and communications, electronic warfare,
conducting counterattacks and delivering counterblows.
An important place also is given to coordination, especially among FRG
territorial troops and NATO forces. The NATO High Commanu in the Central
European theater works in c^ordination with the Biindeswehr command element,
the army group works with the territorial command ("North" or "South"), the
army corps works with the Heimatschutz forc es command element, and the
, division works with the local staff of territorial forces respectively.
_ The composition of personnel and weapons used for combatin~ airborne
assaults usually depend~ on the expected character and scale of the enemy's
attack from the air, the importance of the defended area (installation) and
the availability of personnel and weapons as part of the arnry group and
combined units at the given moment. In all instances, however, it is
determined by the commanders in chief of formations and comranders of
combined units, who can employ regular comb ined units and other units which -
are in the reserve, territorial troops and civil defense formations of the
FRG, air defense and air force subunits, as well as security entities for
these purposes.
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~dr example, up to one-third of the personnel nf rear service~ unita gnd
~ubunieg brought Cogeth~r intn C~cti.c~1 groupg (brigades) of 4,000-5,000
pergons can be u~ed in Che corps rear aren, figuring g plaConn or comp~ny
per ingC~llgCion~ Th~ ~orp~ cnnunander cg?i have a divis~.on, brigade or
regim~nt gn we11 as Bpecigl-purpoge ~ubunits and local military and ~ea?i- o
military form~Ciong ~ mnbile reeerve (mobi~.e nperatinng group). The
- arnry group may not assign such a grnup, usuglly~ because nf ~ lack oz
Combined uniCs and oCh~r unies as p~rC of itie reaerve. It~ Chi~ inetance _
iCs miasion i~ gCCOmplished by F'RG territorigl ~nrces and ci.vil defense
~ formgtions. In addiCion, newly grrived and mnbilized combined unita ~nd
troops er~ining to conduct special acti.vitiev (airborne and amphibioua
as~aults) m~y be located in the arnry group'g zone. The army group
_ commander may employ a portion of them temporgrily.
In the opinion of foreign specialista, Co prevent a surprise enemy attack ~
it {s neceasary Co ~rganize reconnaiasance and notification a?~out the
th~eat of employmenC of at+borne assaults. Intelligence muaC w~cover the
enemy's preparations for landing airborne assaulCa in good time and
determine their landing locations, fnrces, cnmposition and the poasible
character of operationa. Considering that preparation of airborne forcee
for a landing in the enemry rear usually is accomplished at a considerable ~
distance from the front line, it is recommended that reco~maiaeance
missions be aeaigned to personnel and facilities of the higher command
el~ment.
Notification ia accompliehed with the help of long-range and cloae-range
_ detection and warning systems organized at the theater level. The long-
range detection and warning system provides the command element of troope,
sectors, areas and subareas with timely information on the threat of an
_ airborne assault landing. It includes airccaft control entitiee, radio-
technical units and subunite of air defrnse, reconnaiasance satellites and
so on. ~
The clo~e-range dete~tion and warning system is aet up within th~ limits of
a rear area, subarea and sector, in the communicationa zone, in fronc
of the FEBA and in the combat operations zoiie. It is organized for
providing troops and installationa with Cimely info~mation on areas and
directions of operation by enemy landing forces. This system includes
" ground and air surveillance stations, radars of AAA units and aubuniCs,
instruments mounted at installations and in areas of unit (subunit) loca-
tions for transmitting signals, radio intercept stationa and patrols
equipped with radiotechnical equipment. This system works closely with the
long-range detection system, especially with the nearby air force or air
defense control entity. Each rear area or installation must have communi-
cations with the person responsible for its security, as well as with the
poli_ce, security forces and civil entities of this area.
Servfce subunits and the military police provide local security for rear
area installations. Defense against enemy attack from any direction ia
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I_
ro~ o~rrcint, vs~ ~t~nY
org~niz~d, ~ncluding ggginsC nn girbnrne lgnding. Bgrbpd wire ~ntgngl~- -
menC~~ minefl~lds, explosive~ end prepgr~d firing po~ieinna r~pre~ent Che
minimum which foreign militgry ~peCialigCe believp eo be neces~ary for
providing thi~ d~fen~~. -
According to for~ign prese dgCa, Chp gecuriCy ~nc~ defen~e eystem of
Am~ri.~~n inaC~~laeiong in th~ eheaeer pre~ently includee Chree zonea:
limieed acce~e, limiC~d mov~m~ne gnd prohib~.e~d. P~netration inCo them i~
1imiC~d or compl�t~1y excluded. The g~cured insC~llgeiong ar~ equipped
with variou~ ~en~dr~ gnd ~utdmaCic gignalling gyeeemg providing vieual and _
aural not3ficgtion when aecur~d doorg gr~ open or even ge the appeargnce of
foreign ob~ecta (p~ople or vehicles).
'The gecurity of regr ar~a ingtallatione usu~lly coneieeg of a miliCary
police platoon or company (60-300 persong) nr p~r~nnnel of the inetalla-
tion'g subunits. Security gnd defenap of the rear area are reinforced at
the beginning of combat oper~tione. ~xch ingtgllation ie Cransformed into
a center of resi~tance and ita entire ground and air space is covei~d by
fire.
Ta giv~ assiatance to the gubunits aseigned for inatallation security~ it
ie recommended that mnbile operations groups be set up. Their composiCion
is determined by commandera in chief, conmoanderg and chiefs reaponsible for
combating airborne assnults. They must be located at a place from which
they can quickly rench the ar~as of most probable landing by enemy airborne
forcea.
When a significant number of personnel and weapona are assigned for defenae
of a corps rear area, an anti-landing re.serve may be sat up from combat
units and combined unita located in this area, in addition to the mobile
group.
The NATO theater comwand plans to make wide uae of fire support helicoptera _
and air defenae weapona. It is believed that the air defenae system eet up
with the employment of fighter aviation, SAM's, antiaircraft tube artillery
and small arms should provide for the destruction of enemy transporta and
helicopters during their flight to the landing zones and eapecially when
landing the assault force, in addition to performing miesiona of repulsing
enemy air strikes.
~ patrol service is set up in rear areas of army? groups and combined units~
a system of various obgtaclea is created, and dummy installationa and
structures are set up. Special ateps also are taken along the line of
security entities.
Strikes usually are made agdinst bases of airborne troops, airfields and
other important enemy installations during the period of �reparation for
an assault landing. Tactical aviation is used for strikes to a depth up to
1~000 km, and the Per3hing missiles are used to a depth up to 600 km. In
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Cr~ npinion oE Ameri~gn mi~.itary specinligCg, it: is gdvi~gble to deliver
gurfgee aucl~~r burses prim~rily with hi~h yield we~pons. Chemical gnd
conventional muniCions can be ueed in addition.
On reC~ipr of a w~rning ag eo a poegible airborn~ aesault landing~
~onunanders in nhie� o� army group~, ~'RG terrieorigl fnrceg gnd combinc~d ~
unit commander~ estimgte the probabl~ ~tCack ob~~c~iv~ ~nd Che poesible
degree to which tY~e landing forc~'s ~cCions wi].1 affect~ rhe aucceea of an
operation (battl~). A11 troops locatied in the given area ~r~ placed in ~
full combaC readineae. F'ersonnel occupy defensive positions ~nd poate
according Co the alloaation of batrle Caska. Military police aubuniCs are
a~gigned in addition to reinforce gecurity posts and interior guards and
for pgtrollin~. Mobil~ operaCions groupa are regdi~d for mavemenC to
thre~tened xreas.
Fire of gll available weapons ia opened against the assault transporta as
soon as they appear and the enemy landing begins. Artillery and mortare
concenCraee fire against the landing zone, and aircraft and air defenea
weapons comb$t the air cover.
If the force is landed in areas inaccessible to the defenders' weapone,
aeparate unita muat proceed in short periods of time to where they can
conduct effective fire. It is believed necessary to make wide uae of
_ helicoptera (including fire support helicopters) for this purpoae.
After the airborne force has landed, it is recommended that it be deatroyed
by conducting defensive and offensive operationa. The former are conducted
to deliver maximum losses to the landing forr_e and limit ita freedom of
action, whi.le the latter purs~e a more decisive ob~ective of deatroying the
landed force in cumbination with fire and maneuver. Based on thie, units
and aubunita asaigned for local cover of inatallations usually conduct
defensive operations, while mobile operations groups conduct offensive
~perationa (with the support of aircraft and artillery).
Western military specialista auggeat the use uf masa deatruction weapona
~or rapid elimination of an airborne assault force, with obaervance of
measures ensuring the safety of friendly troops. Nuclear atrikes should be
delivered with low-yield weapona using the moat accurate means of delivery
to the target. In all instances the enemy assault force either is immedi-
ately attacked after landing or steps are taken to contain his actions and
then to destroy him with the help of the mobile group and reaervea.
It is recommended that forwa�rd subunits and units of the airborne force
dropped to capture landing zones be attacked immediately by any forces in
the vicinfty, taking advantage of its initial lack of organization. If
theae forces are in no cflndition to defeat the enemy, they must strive to
create favorable conditions for mobile group to deliver attacks (Fig. 1).
4
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F'OFt n~~ICTAL U5~; nNLY
5~~:~:rity
~ b;~t t~~] inn 0~~1~ i re nur~pnrc
e,
~ tielir~~~ter4
i i. ~ ~
/i
rnr
~i" n~ts1; ~ ~0 ~
a m
d ~ ~
~ o ~ a tik, l c; i n k ,.~vr +Meo~ nas '
~ ~ ~ ~r~u~ ~
, ~
. ~ ~,~nd ir.ra
' zone ~ nJo~
. ~
Mrh,t 'l e ~an ~ -
oi~~rar'~.cm:3 ~...~.s~ T.fne 1 ~
orni~r, deplovment
~ s ~
Fig. 1. Organization of combat formation of forces assigned
to desCroy a landing force far from an installation (variant)
KEY: 1. ~1irt~orr.E~ re~;iment 2. Airborne battAlion
With the beginning of a drop of airborne force, the mobile operaCions group
usually moves out immediately and attacks it from the move. It is believed
- that attacks even by insignificant forces, especially tanks supported by -
artillery and aircraft, and conducted at the moment of the drop, assembly
and while the landing force subunits are being made combat ready may result
in the enemy giving up further landing in this area.
If an airborne assault for~e manages to land and assemble, selection of the
method of troop actions designed to defeat it is determined by the composi-
tion and character of actions of the landing force, the status of friendly
troops, weaCher conditions, Cerrain relief and other factors.
An attack is organized when the enemy assumes the defensive. A penetration
of the defenses is made by the mobile operations group supported by artil-
lery and aircraft on one or more axes in order to split the landing force
and destroy it piecemeal.
If the attack fails to destroy the enemy troops which have landed, the
mobile group contains the airborne assault force, thus supporting the
- advance of the senior chief's reserve (Fig. 2).
When the enemy makes a major landing in the rear area of an army group or
in a communications zone, troops are brough[ in to destroy him: above all
the personnel and weapons of the air force, mobile tactical groups and air-
mobile uniCs and subunits. When a large sirborne force which has landed
begins to move toward installations in [he rear of an army group, the
troops assigned for its des[ruction usuallv are subdivided into a holding
group and an attack group. The former moves to the primary movement routes
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~ox or~ici~ vs~ oNLY
ttnbil~
' ~�u~
~s.s ~r
' Ll ~
? r' ~
Jj~ ~ ~ ~ w+3'? n~ ln3n ~
~rr ; o ~t
Etear ; ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ I ~
/ ~ � ~nsi 4
~+etallati L c~ _
~ 'i^`
~ ~
~ oO~ ~ ~ "1J rv~
~
�O,I~e~ ~ ~ Tf'~ ~ ~ ,
Secur~.ty Li.ne ~
b~etttli~n , ~,,e s ~'of ~c, ~u ~
~ ~s s ~.e~ a~~ ~ .
1 ~ ~deploymen~~ ;
,vn8~�"~~ 5ecur~.ty I
fP�~�P~) ~ battalion
Le end ~ ~
8 ~
~ ~;uclear c~tril:es
' dd Air strikes I
Fig. 2. Diagram of mobile group operatiana in containing a ~
landing force (variant) ;
KEY: 1. Motorized infantry division (reserve)
2. Airborne regiment i
of the airborne force and tries by means of defensive operations to delay
its advancp, while the latter delivers attacks against the flanks and rear
of the force. Sometimes a frontal attack is even used, when the aseault
force is advancing across a broad front or when the aituation does not i
permit an enveloping maneuver to be made.
In case of a aimultaneous enemy attack from the front and operations of a
large airborne force in the rear, and in the abaence of a aufficient
reserve at the diaposal of the army group commander, the misaion of troope
assigned to destroy the landing force is to contain its actions and prevent
it from being reinforced by new movements. This wi11 allow time to be
gained to prepare for defeat of the landing force by troops moved up f rom -
the depth of the theater.
The experien~ce of exercises and maneuvers of the NATO ~oint armed forcea
conducted in recent times in the Central European theater ahowe that the
alliance command is working out a large number of different measurea aimed
at timely identification of thc preparation of airborne operationa, at
their diaruption, at reliable security and defense of the most important
rear installations, and at the defeat of landing forces during their
landing.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1918
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COI~Il~fENTS ON WESTERN SAM SYSTEMS
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Ruesian No 12, Dec 78 signed to
press 6 Dec 78 pp 39-46
(Article by Engr-Lt Col V. Almazov: "SAM Systema of the Ground Forces of
Capitaliat Statea"]
[Text] The aggressive schemea nurtured by the military-political leaders
of wesCern powers againsC countriea of the socialist community attach great
significance to sir defense as a meane which to some extenC can weaken the
might of a retaliatory attack. In the opinion of foreign miliCary epecial-
ists, the experience of combat operations in Vietnam and the Near East
vividly ehow the growing role of air defense systema, and particularly of
surface-to-air missile [SAM] aystema. The improvement of SAM syatema in
capitaliat countriea ia being conducted along the line of modernizing -
systems in the inventory and developing new ones.
The western press notes that the United States has achieved greaCeat
success among NATO countries creating new /long and medium range SAM
_ systems/ [in boldface]. The Americans already are testing the "Patriot"
system (previous designation of "SAM-D") at the White Sanda Range. It
differs from all existing syetems primarily in the fact that it can f ire
simultaneously against eight targets flying at different altitudea. The
combat capabilities of this SAM system have been increased by uae of a
phased-array radar and high-apeed electronic computer, which permita all
necessary operations to be accomplished considerably faster with a large
dat~ flow and to coordinate air defense misaions with combat operations of
friendly aircraft. The system's high mobility is achieved by reducing the
overall dimensions of the gear and installing it on semitrailera.
In the eatimate of foreign apecialists, the "Patriot" SAM system surp~sses
existing long and medium-range systems fourfoid in its fire capabilities.
It is also believed that its electronic countercounter measures [ECCM] ate
ten times better and the effectiveness af destroying maneuvering targeta is
twice as great. The gear being used for system monitoring allows the
system to be operated by operators with less training.
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The SAM sysCem includes a control staCion, phased-array rgdar, launchere
(four missiles each), four gas-turb~ne power ~ources (60 kilowaeee each),
communication~ gear and auxiliary maintenance equipment (F'ig. 1) ~PhoCo not
reproduced]. Five is cnnsidered to be the ope3.mum number of launchers ~n a
system. Judging from American press reporea, the "Patriot" system wi11
replace the "Hawk" and "Nike-Hercu~.es" SAM syateme and wi11 remain wi~h U.S.
Croops even in the nineties.
At the present time refitting of the U.S. Arnry with the improved "Hawk" SAM
system has been completed. It differa from the base system in modernized
radar equipment, more eophisticated computer facilitiea and a aurface-Co-
air miasile which has increased reliability, a new engine and a more power- `
ful warhead. All this permiCted an increase in the syatem's xange, an
incre~se in the probability of destroying air targets and a reduction of
reaction time in firing againsC high-speed maneuvering targete in the -
presence of electronic countermeasures [ECM). A self-propelled version of
the improved "H~wk" has been created in which the launchera and command
poat are installed on the M727 tracked chassis. The self-propelled chassia
also is used to tow the rest of the syetem's equipment.
European partners of the United States in the aggreasi~~e NATO bloc are
planning to rearm their Croops with the improved "Hawk", organizing produc-
tion of all necessary equipmenC at their own plants under a license. In -
the opinion of western apecialists, it will meet requirementa placed on
thia type of weapon up to the end of the eighties. ~
Primary attention abroad in the last decade, howevers has been given to
creation of mobile /short-range/ SAM systems and /portable syatems/ (in
boldface]. This is explained by the fact that combat tactica of air attack
weapons have undergone certain changes. For example, aircraft have
mastered low and extremely low altitudes (15-150 m) while operating at high
speeda (Mach 1.2) using ECM, which led to a aharp reduction in the range of
detection of air attack taeapons and a reduction in time to prepare data and
open fire.
Foreign specialists believe that ahort-range SAM syatems have to meet the
following specifications: Destroy air targets flying at a speed of Mach 2
and with an effective reflecting aurface of 0.1 m2 or more at altitudes
from extremely low up to 6 km and at ranges of 7-10 km; have conatant
, readiness to evaluate the air situation and detect air targets even when
the system is moving; and have a short reaction time and high probability
of hitting targets under various conditions of visibility day or night. In
addition, the syatem has to have identification friend or foe [IFF]
_ gear, a large number of missiles ready for launching, automatic reloading
of the launcher, hi.gh mobility and low cost, and it must be sir-
transportable and simple to handle.
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The shorC-range systema developed in European etares which meet the
designated requiremenCa Co a eufficienC extent include ehe "Roland" (FRG,
France)~ "Crotale" (France)~ "Rxpier" (GreaC Britain)~ "Sp!ada" and
"Yndigo" (ICa1y) and the "Skyguard-M" (Switzerland~ eee tia'h1e ftable not
reproduced]). According to a foreign prese report~ Chey compriee the
baeig of air defenae weapone for combating an air enemy at low altitudes in
the eightiea.
Sma11 ~amproof pulaed Doppler radara are employed in shart-range syatema
for timely detection of low-flying targets nnd for providing eelf-contained
operationa. They also provide Carget identification and a determination of
their coordinates. The radare are equipped with plan poaition indicators
reflecting the air situation within a radius of 15-18 km and are inatalled
either together with the launcher ("Roland," "Rapier" and "Skyguard-M") or
on a separate vehicle or trailer ("Crotale" and "Indigo"). In the defenae
of fixed inatallationa, these radars also can isaue acquieition data to AAA
batteries.
An important feature of short-range SAM ayateme is the use of all-weather
fire control systems in them. For example, Che "Skyguard-M" syatem (Fig. 2)
[photo not reproduced] wae developed as an all-wearher syetem, while the
"Roland" SAM syatem was developed in two veraions ("Roland"-1 as a fair-
weather system and the "Roland"-2 as an all-weather eyatem). The "Rapier"
SAM system was created as a fair-weather system, but subeequently a target
tracking and guidance radar for the "Blindfire" misailea was included in it.
Radara included in the fire control system uaually have one receiver and
three tracking channels (one for the target and two for the missile). A
transponder is installed aboard the missile for tracking it. The narrow
radiation pattern of the antennas and short pulae duration uaed in tracking
and miasile guidance radars permita obtaining a precise display of target
and misaile on the acope. Automatic infraxed devices are uaed in the
initial leg of flight to place the miesile on the line of sight of the
target. A great deal of importance wae attached to probleme of protecting
systems againat ECM capabilities in creating ehort-range SAM systems.
The foreign press notea that operation of SAM ayatems under ECM conditiona
is ensured by simultaneous use of 3amproof radars and optical target track-
ing capabilities. For this reason the "Roland," "Crotale," "Indigo" and
"~kyguard-M" syatems are equipped with radar and optical target tracking
systems which permit the oper~tor to use a particular tracking ayatem
depending on the situation. The operation of ahifting from one sy8[em to
another in the "Crotale" system can be accompliahed even while guiding the ~
miasile.
The "Roland"-1 and "Chaparral" have only optical target tracking syateme.
Target tracking is done by the operator with the help of SX end lOX optical
sights. The priu?ary feature of the latter is that they are not aub~ect to
the effects of ~a~ing and they have a rather high tracking accuracy. In
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addition, the absence of targee i1J.uminaeion in the mi~~i].e guidance
proceas pro~~ides concealmenC of Che mo~~ene rhe mieail~ is launched.
According ro foreign preas data, teste nf an all-weseh~r v~raion of Che
"Chaparral.", in which the "Blindfire1� rndar used in ehe British "Rapier"
system has been included, have been underway aince mid-1978 aC the White
Sands miseile range. According to American speaialista, however, thie SAM
gystem is not for the long term and iC wi11 be replaced in the mid-eightiea
by a version of the "Roland"-2 presently being created in the United States
under license.
It is believed th~t giving short-range sysCeme equal or greaCer mobility
than the Croopa Chey are covering is one of the primary requirements in
developing them. Combat vehiclee with good crosscountry capability are
being used as the basis for making the system. For example, the French
veraion of the "Roland" is mounted on the AHIX-30 tank chassis, the West
German veraion on the "Marder" infantry combat vehicle (ICV] ch~aeis, and
the American veraion on the tracked chaseis of the M109 155-mm self-
propelled howitzer.
_ Firing from the move is an imporCanC characteristic of short--range SAM ~
systems to provide cover to troops on the march and on the battlefield. The
following deaign solutions have been worked out abroad for this purpose.
For example, Che chassis of the "HoCchkiss-BrandC" armored vehicle on which
the "Crotale" is mounted has a soft, shock-abaorbing engine mounting, '
_ electric transmisaion and hydropneumatic wheel suspension. Vibratione
affecting the operation of the acquisition radar were eliminated b~cause of
this and its operation during movement was asaured. The "Roland" syatem
has a radar and launcher stabilization system. The miasile launch of
_ short-range syatems, however, is done only with the launchers at a halt.
Launchers with several rails and automatic reloading are uaed in ahort-
range SAM systems to increase their firepower. For example, the "Roland"-2
has two missiles on rails and eight in two revolver-type magazines.
Reloading is done automatically within 10 seconde. The "Roland"-2C has ~
four missiles on rails and eight in magazinea. Automatic reloading cen be
done only onto two rails. The "Rapier" and "Crotale" have four misailes
each on rails, but reloading is don~ manually.
Computer facilities for evaluating the air situation and tracking air
targets have been employed widely in the systems. One "Crotale" syatem~
which includes a vehicle with an acquisition radar and three launchers, ie
capable of detecting around 30 air targets simultaneously at ranges up to
18 km, determining the degree of their threat and combating 12 aircraft.
One of the directione of development of the SAM systems is the creation of
systems adaptea for different regions. For example, the "Shachine" ahort-
range SAM sysr,em is being created in France on the basis of the "Crotale"
(for Saudi Arabia). The target acquisition radar and launcher with miasile
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tracking and guidance rnd~r in this sytem are mounted on Cwo AMX-30 tracked
tank chassis. Th~ gcquisiti.on radar wil~. be able eo supporC 3-4 launchera.
It wi11 have a h3,gher resolution, since iCe antenna radiation pattern wi11
be reduced from 3~5 to l~k� in b@aring. IC ie planned to equip the
Y lsuncher chaesis wiCh navigational gexr which wi11 automatically procese .
data ~n the launcher's location. Coneideratioti o� these data wi11 permit
opening f ire immediately af ter movemetit is haltecl. Six SAM' a lnstead of
four are accommodated on the launcher. The system's maximum range of f ire
roae tn 10.5 km thanke to inatalling a new, more powerful engina in the
misaile as a result of increasing its length by 11 cm. Judging from
foreign presa reports, Egypt is ahowing great intereet in acquiring such a
SAM sysCem with a modernized misaile.
A modified version of tt?e "Roland"-2C eystem intended primarily for defenae
of fixed insCallations in a theater of military operations has been
developed in France on an order from the Belgian defense miniatty. In
contrasr to the "Roland"-2, the new syatem (Fig. 3) [Photo not reproduced]
consists of a coa~and poat (CP) and launcher mounted on trailera or the
"Berlier" vehicle chassie with high crosscountry capability. The French
~amproof pulaed Doppler radar used in the "Crotale" is being used ae the
target acquisition radar to be inetalled in the CP. The CP's can be
equipped with detection radars of other types as well, however, if the need
arises to increase the number of launchers controlled from one CP. For
example, in case the "Siemens" radar (FRG) is used, their number can be
increased to eight. Misaile guidance is accompliahed with the help of a
radar on each launcher.
In the opinion of foreign specialists, portable SAM systems are an effec-
tive means of sir defense for small subunita on the battlefield and on the
march. Becauae of their small size and light weight, they can be used
under conditions where employment of another air defense weapon ie diffi-
cult (forest, mountains, swamps). Weatern experta regard the American
"Red Eye," the British "Blowpipe" and the Swedish RB-70 as the moet
sophisticated portable SAM syatems. As the foreign presa states, their
combat employment has a number of features.
The "Red Eye" and "Blowpipe" SAM's can be launched from the operator'a
shoulder or from moving means of transportation (APC's, vehicles). The
detection, identification and selection of target is done by the operator
of the portable "Red Eye" SAM system viaually. The "Red Eye" SAM can hit
targets only f rom the rear hemisphere, since it employs an infrared homing
head. The "Blowpipe" SAM system has a command guidance system and "IFF"
gear. It is capable of hitting both approaching and departing targete. A
missile with a laser guidance system was uaed for the first time in the
RB-70 (Fig. 4) [Photo not reproduced]. The shortcomings of the above
syatema include the capability of :'~eir use only under conditione of good
visibility.
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Ae ehe prea~nt time ehe "Stinger" portiable SAM system has been developed in
_ the UniCed Statea eo replace rhe "Red Eye" syatem. It uaes a miasile with
higher apeed and range because o~ the use of ~ more powerfu~. RllPT [solid
fuel rockee engine]. A new infrared homing head permita intercepting
targeea in an aCtack from any direcCion. The aystem is equipped with an
IFF device not only �or U.S. aircrafC, but a1~o for thase of all~lea in the ~
aggresaive NATO bloc. Foreign specialiats believe thaC the "Stinger" can _
, be usecl for firing against air targeta at night as well.
The following primary reguirements for ensuring combat readiness are
presented in the developm~nt of SAM syatems of all typea: a high 1eve1 of
reliability of elements and systema; a maximum reduction in the number of
checka when in the handa of Croopa; and convenience in servicing and
repair. To this end auch SAM syatems ae the "Patriot," "Crotale,"
_ "Roland" and "Rapier" are equipped wiCh built-in suComatic manitora and
their primary components consist of a number of diacrete units (modulea)
which can be easily replaced under field conditions in case of malfunction.
As the foreign press notes, thanks to this approach to the problem of -
developing electronic hardware, there has been a signi�icant reduction in
the overall number of apare parCs needed in operating the systema. For
example, while there were 30,000 items in the "Nike-Hercules," there are no
more than 3,000 in the "Patriot" system. Operating costs dropped threefold
and the number of servicing personnel was cut fivefold in the proceas.
SAM systems pass through a technical maintenance cycle conaiating of
periodic technical aervicing at several levels to enaure their aervice-
ability when being operated. Their scope and complexity rise with an
increase in the syatem's service life. For example, permanent automated
monitoring of the status of elements and circuits is carried out from the
time the "Crotale" system is placed in operation. A apecial computer ,
detects a melfunction and the module or element which muat be replaced is
depicted on its illuminated display. Because of this monitoring the task
of servicing and eliminating malfunctions at the tactical aubunit level is
simplified considerably.
As the foreign press notes, the high lev~l of automation of new SAM syatems
means that their operation and servicing requires a minimum number of
personnel, whose training and preparation have been simplified significantly.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
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COMMENTS ON ANTIAIRCRA~T DEFENSE OF U.5. ANU CANADA
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 78 si~;ncd to
press 6 Dec 78 pp 51-56 =
[Article by Col Yu. Omel'chenko, Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent:
"Air Forces: Automated Antiaircraft Defense Control Systems of the United
5tates and Canada"j
[Text] In conducting an aggressive foreign political course and constantly -
building up the might of its sCrategic offensive forces, the military
- leadership of the United States and Canada continues to improve itti
countries' defense against air attacks. The widespread system of air
defense managed by the ,joint North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)1,
which was set up in 1957, serves these purposes. Ir includes the Aerospace
Defense Couunand (ADC) of the U.S. Air Force (its units and subunits
comprise around 70 percent of all NORAD forces) and the Canadian Air Force
air defense command group. At the present time air defense of the North
American continent includes antimissile, antispace and antiaircraft
defense.
As reported by the foreign press, the NORAD commatid perfqrms its functions
on the basis of broad use of automated control systems [ACS].
Three basic ACS are used to control personnel and weapons of antiaircraft
- defense of the North American continent: the 425L (deployed at the NORAD
CP), the 416L SAGE (Semiautomatic Ground Environment) and the 416M BUIC
(Back-Up Interceptor Control).
The NORAD CP (Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs, Colorado) is a structure
with an overall area of over 18,000 m2 deep within the rocks. Th~ 425L ACS
provides for collection, processing, storage and display of air situation
data, and it generates control commands f~~rappropriar~ subunits. As the
foreign press reports, the NORAD CP has 17 independent electronic computers,
primarily the Philco 2000-212. It is noted that all data for tl~e
1. For more details on NORAD see ZARUBEZ~VOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2,
1976, pp 51-59 (Ed.).
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intercept of air targeta can be proceased in ll, aeconds (with the diaplay
o� results of the processing on display devicea for collective use).
The 416L and 416M AC5 are connected dlrectly with the central 42!iL ACS. In .
addition Che NORAD CP interworka with a number of other syetemay �rom which
it receives varioua data. These ACS include the 465L, which providea -
control of the U.S. Air Force SAC forcea; the 466L, for collection and ~
procesaing of electronic intelligence [ELINT] data; the G33L, for meteoro-
logical observation and weather'forecasting; and the 431L, for air traffic -
control.
The 416L SAGE ACS provides control of weapona of individual sir defenae -
regiona. There is a total of eight ~uch regions (Fig. 1) (Photo not
reproduced].
U.S. Air Force specialiats believe that the SAGE ACS allows the exchange of
data of an equal level among ad~acent centers of control and warning
regions, and its transmission over commun ications channela to aubordinate
radar acquiaition and control posts as well as to active means for destruc-
tion of air targets in sufficient time for timely decisionmaking for their
employment. The system is aemiautomatic, inasmuch as such functions as
aearch, detection, identification and surveillance of targets are performed
by the personnel of control cenCers, while tracing of their flight routes
and display of other data is automatic. Control and warning center person-
nel have the responsibility for designating and activaCing weapons. Display
of results of calculations involving the commitment of active weapons is
done with the help of a computer.
~ao computers, the AN/FSQ-7 and AN/FSQ-8, are installed in each regional
control and warning center. One of them operates while the other ia kept
as a"warmed-up" reserve and placed in operation with the appearance of -
malfunctions in the first one. ;
The AN/FSQ-7 computer is a high-speed,universal,digital, single-addrese,
parallel computer (with a 32-bit word length). The requirement for
providing for real-time operation of the computer made it neceasary for a
high rate of apeed in performing complex computational and chiefly logic
operations, a large external and immediate access store, the presence of _
devices operating in parallel and so on.
The immediate access memory of the AN/FSQ-7 is based on ferrite cores. The
- store cycle time is 6 microseconds, and the average time of command exe~:u- .
tion is near 10 microseconds.
The external memory includes 12 magnetic drums (each contains 12,288 32-bit
- words) used for storing the operational program, system status data and
other data.
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The AN/FSQ-8 is identical to the AN/FSQ-7.
Each control and warning center equipped with the SAGE ACS has a large
number of operator positions, approximately half of which are engaged in
selecting the type of weapon and conCrolling Chem, around a fourth are _
engaged in target tracking, while the rem~inder are process3ng the data
received.
` The 416M BUIC ACS was developed as a back-up to the SAGE ACS and is
intended for performing the very same functions (in case the SAGE system
malfunctions). The B-825 computer is the foundation of the IiUIC ACS
equipmenC. BUIC ACS centers have been mothballed since the end of 1973
(except for one located aCTyndall Air Base, used chiefly for rraining).
A special "Missile-*iaster" ACS and its mobile version, the "Missile-
Monitor,"2 as well as the new "Missile-Mentor," are used for directly
controlling the fire of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's). The "Missile-
Minder" ACS is in the development and testing stage. These systems are
coupled with the SAGE ACS, but also can operate independently. The
following missions are accomplished with their assistance: detection,
identification and tracking of air targets in the zone of responsib ility;
continuous determination of their coordinates; automatic display of the
air situation; allocation of targets among SAM systems and fighter air-
craft.
The distant line f or detection of air targets is supported by 31 radar
stations of the DEW line, located on the territory of Alaska, Canada and
Greenland (along the 70th parallel of north latitude), and the near line of
23 stations of the "Fine Tree" line (installed along the border of the
United States and Canada). A network of supplementary antiaircraft defense
radar stations is deployed in border areas of the United States. They work
- closely with radars of the air traffic control system for civil aircraft.
An overall tot,al of over 120 radar stations are deployed on the North
American continent. In addition, the EC-121 early warning radar aircraft
are used to monitor the air space.
In implementing the concept of a constant build-up of military potential,
U.S. ruling circles decided to conduct a number of ineasures in the next few
years to improve the antiaircraft defense control system. The primary
neasures are as follows: creation of a new JSS (Joint Surveillance Systems)
ACS; construction and activation of new regional control centers; accept-
ance into the inventory of the E-3A radar early warning and control air-
- craft of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) to supplement
ground-based detection and control facilities; development of a special
"Seek Skyhook" system for detecting low-flying targets; activation of an
improved 427M ACS at the NORAD CP which, as American specialists believe,
wi~l not require modernization during the eighties; and use of new tech-
nical solutions in weapons control systems.
2. For more details on "Missile-Monitor" ACS, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
OBOZRENIYE, No 8, 1975, pp 52-56 (Ed.).
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~ Ag Che fnreign preg~ repdrti~~ rtie ide~ df crenting ehe J55 bel,ong~ to the
Air ~orce, but ehe ~eder~l AvigCiott Administr~tidn (~AA] ig Cn pgrCicipge+~
~xeengively in implempneing it. It is pl~nn~d thgt the Air ~orn~ gnd th~
~'AA will m~ke ~oinC use of ie~ radar statiang. Itt peacetime it is ~uppo~~d
to provide gurvei~.lance of rhe gir gpgce of the cnnein~ntgl United Statee,
Alaska and Canada~
Baeed nn th~ exp~rience which has bet~n g~ined, Americgn sp~CialisC~ believe
that 3oint us~ of Contrnl statinns ~nd radgrg nf milie~ru ~nd civil gvi~-
tion will expand ehe posgibiliey fc~r monitoring Che gir spgce ~nd inCrea~e
the level of radar support to botih departmetttg. The foreign prees hae
reported thaC intereat h~s risen in the United Statea in this regard
concerning an improvement in techniCal ouCfiCting nf ~AA cotttrol pointg~ In
particular, the firm of Texgg Instruments has developed a microwav~ con?Crol
atgCion radar for civil ~viation wieh el~ctronic beam scentting (Fig. 2)
(Photo not reproduced~.
New regtonal conCrol centers are to compriae the bagis for control of anti-
aircraft defense force~ and weapons with activation of Che JS5 syetem~ It
is pl~nned to build a total of seven such centers, of which five wi11 be on
the territory of Che United States (one in Alaska and the othera in the
northeastern, northwE~~tern, southeastern and southweatern aectore of ~the
continenCal United StaLES) and two in Canada. r
Foreign specialists note that the JSS syatem being created will replace the
SACE ACS. When new air defenae regional control centers begin operating~
then the BUIC ACS training center at Tyndall Air Base also will cease
functioning in addition to cessaCion of operation of the SAGE ACS.
A.ccording to foreign specialists' estimates, the new system will have a
higher level of automation in comparison with existing systems. Data are
quoted that while from 75 to 200 persons are ~equired to service the SACE
ACS center, 20 will be sufficient for the new syatem's automated center.
The AWACS is viewed by the foreign press as a part of the JSS ACS. The
E-3A aircraft with a set of the necessary electronic gear compriae the basis
of the AWACS.
The ~-3A aircraft will be based at airfields near air defense regional
control centers, which in peacetime must monitor the air space with the
help of ground-based equipment. In case the intetnational situation becomea
aggravated and the appropriate command is received, aircraft will lift off,
fly predetermined routes, provide ground control entities with supplementary
information with the help of their own on-board systems and, ~hould the
latter malfunction, perform their functions. A long-range radar~ identifi-
cation system and nine multifunction consoles with scopes displaying the
situation and with means of control over all operations are instulled
aboard the E-3A aircraft for this purpose. The aircraft's crew ie up to ~
17 persons (according to data published in the foreign press, it is planned �
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r~ub~equ~ntly td in~t~11 16 ~nn,~oleg for ~per~tnr~ ~nd gdditi~n~1 cdmmunie~-
tinn~ ~nd dgtg pro~e~~ing ~quipment, which wi].~, r~quire the inclu~idn nf
ground gnother e~n per~on~ in th~ Cr~w).
D~t~ from the ~ir~r~ft'~ n~vigg~iarial gear er~fed into the centxal on-board
~nmpuC~r di th~ Ai~AC~ in guppdrt ~f ~nntrdl functi~n~. Thi~ g11~?e g
d~tprmin~eion ~f th~ lac~eion of ~ir t~rg~eg and nutput o� the data
r~c~iv~d to AC3 op~rat~r~ in ~~~~raphi~ ~d~rdinnt~g.3 ~h~ w~~t~rn pre~~
nne~~ eh~t eh~ AWACS i~ not ehe nnly meang for incr~n~ing ~nCiaircrgft
defen~e effpctivene~~ in long-r~nge target d~t~ctidrt. In p~rti~ul~r, g
grpat degi of ~~t~ntion ie givett Cn g etudy of rh~ pos~ibilitie~ for u~ing
gn nvpr-Che-horizon radgr with incl3ned-r~ciprocgl ~ounding, which ie
guppo~ed ro deteet Carget~ at a11 altitud~e and ~t very l~ng rgng~e.
Ampricgn gpecialiat~ believe that if th~ir technical forecaets are borne
out, four auch radare oriented tioa~rd th~ four egrdin~al pdintg w111 provid~
aurv~illgnce of the ~ntir~ p~rim~ter of ehe continentnl United States.
In conformity with plgng for d~veloping gnCiaircraft def~ns~~, it is also
planned eo include spaee facilities in the new ACS~ In particulac, under
thp "Blu~ Spike" program, U.S. Air Fnrc~ epecialiet~ gre studying the
poegibility for d~tecting bombers from aboard ~pgcecraft �rom the infrared
emi~gion of their ~er ~ngineg in a certnin aector of the epectrum.
The conduct of a syeCem of ineaeur~s within the framework of the "Se~k Sky-
hook" progr~m ig provided for in thp intereats of improving capabilities of
control eyatema to intercept low-flying targete. It includea pro~ecte for
creating teth~ered balloone for the inatallation o~ radare. In the opinion
of American specialietg, rhis should increase the range for detecting air
targets With the uee of rel~tively inexpensive gear. From their vieapoint,
the accommodation of radars on a tethered balloon ie advantageous, eince
this reduces to a minimum interference signals reflected from the earth's
surface, which inevitably arise with the operation of a station aboard a
flying aircraft, and the cost of such a balloon additionally is no greater
than 10 percent of the cost of an aircraft.
The foreign press reports that teats of the "Seek Skyhook" ayetem have
succeeded in detecting targeta flying at altitudea of 15-150 m at a range
up to 230 km, which considerably aurpasaes their range of detection with
the help of ground-based radara.
The U.S. military leadership's plans to modernize antiaircraft defenae
control systems have been met with approval of influential circle8 of the
military-induatrial complex. A number uf large American and Canadian firms
have begun developing var{aus pieces of equipment for the new ACS. Accord-
ing to foreign press data, ov~~rall expenditures for creating a new control
system for antiaircraft defense of the North American continent will be
over $300 million. Of this amount, ~ouadian firms figure to receive ordera
of approximately S45 million, while the lion's ahare of $255 million will go
to American companies. "
3. Concerning AWACS. see ZARUBEZNNOYF. V~XENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 6, 1975~
pp 58-62; and No 7, pp 55-56 (Ed.).
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1 _
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~d~t O~~ICIAt, US~ ONLY
Among the m~~~ur~g ~im~d ge incr~~sin~ th~ Cgpgbi~.ieie~ nf ~~.r d~f~ng~
~onCrdl gy~e~m~, it i~ impc~g~ible td igndre ~CeempC~ by militari~Cin
~irCl~~ of ~h~ UniCpd SC~C~g and Cgn~d~ to coneinue tn build up eh~ir
militgry potenCigl through tihe u~~ of eh~ 1~Ce~C gChiev~mpnCg of ecienc~
~nd t~chn~logy.
COPY1tIGHT: "Z~rub~zhnnye vuy~ennoy~ dboxr~niy~", 19~8
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a v?~ Nl ~ J,VJf1L uuu ui~L~
COMM~YTS ON NATO JOINT ARMEU FORCES IN EUitOPE
Moscow 7.AttUBLZHIdOY~ VOYENNOYE OB02RENIYE in Ruesian No 1~ Jan 79 eigned to
pres~ 8 Jan 79 pp 7-16
(Arei~le by Col I. Gdlovnin: "Gen~r~l Milieary Prnblems: NATO Joint Armed
~orcee in Europe"~ -
(TexC] The coneistent peeceloving policy nf the Soviet Union and countries
of the socialieC community, aimed at atrengthening compreheneive cooperA-
tion among nations end achieving detente and disgrmament, has led to
prc~found changes in international relationa and a new alignment of forcea
in favor of peace and socialism.
On the other hand~ the enemies of detente, chiefly in the United Statea,
have begun vast military preparationa, Caking advantage of the myth of the
so-called "Soviet threat." The White Houae administration lately has taken
a course openly toward a revival of the "power" policy in the "cold war"
spirit and has stated directly that the chief role belonga to the NATO bloc
in achieving U.S. global interests. The United States was the initiator in
forcing the arm~ race and further increasing military expendituree. For
example, military appropriationa of NATO countries in 197') comprieed
$174.6 billion and, according to eAtimatee bv American specialists~ they
will riae at least 6U percent in the period 1978-1982.
Decisiona by the supreme military-political entities of this aggresaive
bloc made in May 1978 attest to a further build~up in its military might.
The "ahort-term" and "lott~-term" programs for developing the armed forcea
approved at the NATO Council session in Washington pursue the chief ob~ec-
tive of achieving complete military auperiority over Wareaw Pact etates.
Relying on war as the primary means for achieving their goals, the imperial-
iat forces of the United States and other NATO countriea have c~eated armed
forces of five million persons already in peacetime. The largest and most
combat effective troop grouping of the NATO countriea has been created in
Europe. As noted by the foreign preas, it presently has over 7~000 American
tactical nuclear weapons, more than 3,000 means of delivering them to the
targets, up to 70 equivalent divisions, at least 11,000 tanks and 3,000
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a V~� Y~ a r~rN~~ r.a+ r~~rc. I
I
CgCr~.CFll gircrafe. rt;~npnwer exceedy two mil~.ion, nf which ground 10 percent
grp under the immediaee operaCion~l control of ehe eupreme commander of -
NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe.
The area of responsibility of the aupreme (sergeegin) command includes the
enCire ~urop~an theater of war with the exception of Che territoriea of
- Gregt Britain, France and Portugal. 5ubordinate eo i.e are Chree high
command~ of NATO Joint Armed Forcea in theatere of military operation
(Northern Europe, with headquarters in Kolsos, Norway; CenCral Europe in
Brung~um, Che Neeherland~; gnd Southern Europe in Naples, Italy)~ a BriCish
Air Force command in the parent counery (l~eadquartera aC tiigh Wycombe, _
Great BriCain), NATO mobile forces and a~oint air defenae ayatem. Command
elementa have been created in each high command in theatera of miliCary
operaCion, Co which corresponding groupinga of ;loint ground forcea, air
forcea and naval forcea are subordinate.
/The Northern Europe Theater of MiliCary Operatione/ (in boldface] is given
a apecial role in NATO plana deapiCe the fact thaC in aize and combaC
might, the troop grouping located within its limita is conaiderably emaller
than in the other European Cheaters of military operation. As the foreign
press reporta, however, primary attention in numeroua exercises by the NATO
Armed Forcea is given Co ita reinforcement by moving combined units and _
other unita from the United Statea, Great Britain~ Canada and other coun-
Criea. It is believed thaC a rather strong grouping can be creaCed in
short periods of time within thf limita of this theater of military opera-
tion.
As reported in the foreign preas, the Northern Europe Theater includes the �
territories and coastal watera of Norway, Denmark, the West Gerr.~an 9tate
of Schleswig-Holatein and the strait area of the Baltic. It is a unique
link between NATO's strategic commands in Europe and the Atlantic. It
provides an opportunity to monitor t'he watere of the Baltic straits and _
linea of comcnunication leading from porta and naval bases of the Arctic
into the Atlantic, and so it is viewed as an advanCageous area for deploy-
ing ma~or air force and naval groupinga and for stationing air defense
early warning capabilities.
Subordinate to the NATO Commander in Chief in thia theater (Fig. 1) (Not
reproduced] are Joint Armed Forces commands in Northern and Southern Norway
(headquarters at Bodo and Oslo respectively) and in the Baltic straita area
(Karup, Denmark). The first two are at the same time Norwegian national
commands which, in the estimate of the NATO military leaders, ehould
provide flexibility of command and control in peacetime and their effective
troop employment during combat operations.
At the present time these co~ands chiefly exercise control over general
organizational development of the armed forces and operational and combat
training of the combined units and other unita subordinated to theffi. They
assume direct control of these forces with an aggravation of the situation
or when exercises of the Joint Armed Forces are held.
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ru~t urr.~~.~tiL u~~, uiv~,.c
According Co foreign press d~en, tihe overall eize of Che grouping of NATO _
Joint Armed Forceg in the Northern Europa Theater may be ground 100,000
persona,
The ground farcea have the FRG 6th Motorized Infantry Divieion, six
motorized infanCry brigadea (five Danish and one N~~rwagian)~ several ~
separate infantry battalions and a separaCe "Lance" misaile battallon.
In the estimate of NATO legdera, the FRG diviaion ia the moat combaC- .
effective combined uniC of the 3oinr v,round f.orces. Organizaeionally it
conatets of two motorized infant,;y brigadee and one tank brigade, an
artillery regiment, an "Honest John" missile battalion es we11 as combat
_ support and rear aervices unite and subunits.
In addition Co theae regular combined unite and other units, which are in
conatant combat readinesa, reaerve forcea and irregular formatione which
are the basis for activating new combat unita may be asaigned Co the NATO
. JoinC Ground Forces in the theater. For example, as the foreign press
reporta, several motorized infanCry brigades may be activated in addition
in Demark when mobilization meaeures are conducted nnd over ten infantry
brigadee may be activated in Norway's Ground Forces. Headquartera of the
reserve brlgades already are functioning in peacetime.
It is planned to accomplish Che mobilization deployment of Weat German
forces on the basis of the "Schleswig-Holstein" territorial command. As
noted in the western military press, this allows the activation of an
infantry diviaion in a period of a few hours and its tranafer to the
command of the Joint Armed Forces in Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland and
Fuenen Island.
Weapons and combat equipment of ground forces of NATO countriea in the
theaCer primarily conaist of models of American, British, Weat German and
some Swedish production.
The Air Force is represented by Norwegian, Daniah and Weat German unita
and subunita, with the primary miasiona being aupport of combat operations
~ of ground forces and organization of air defense.
NATO's Joint Air Forces in Northetn and Southern Norway consiat only of
Norwegian Air Force subunits in peacetime. According to foreign press
data, the Norwegian Air Force has three fighter-bomber aquadrons, a
reconnaissance aquadron, sir defenae fighter squadron, two transport
squadrons, a"Nike-Hercules" missile battalion (36 launchers) and aeparate
helicopter aquadrons. The greater part of these personnel and weapons is
assigned to NATO. Thus at the present time they have over 90 warplanes.
In the next few years it is planned to replace the obsolete F-104G aircraft
with the lateat F-16 fighters of American production.
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~
- r utt ur r yu~.NL U~~ UNLY I
The b~nish Air ~orce in eh~ B~1CiC ~tr~iC ~reg hg~ thre~ fighe~r-bdmber
squadrnns, a reconnei~sance squgdron, Cwo air defenee fighCer aquadrong~ a
Cr~nsport ~quadron and one batt~lidn each nf "Nike-Hercul~~" and "t~awk"
iU~88~1g8. The D~nieh A~.r Forc~, which ia inrended for trenefer Co NATO~
ha~ ~ totgl of sround 100 warplanes, 36 "Nike-Hercules" launchers and 2G
"Hgwk" ~.aunchere.
The F'RG Air ~orc~ in thi~ gr~g include~ two fighC~r-bomb~r aquadron~, Cwa
reconnaigeance and ewo "Hawk" battaliong. The overall eot~l o� warplanes
is over 70.
There ia a total of arnund 26U warplanes and over 140 SAM launcherg in the
NATO JoinC A ir ~'orcee in the Northern European Theater.
Naval forces are repreaenred primarily by light forcee (up to and including
destroyera), n~val aviation and coastgl artillery. They are intended '
chiefly to blackgde rhe Baleic etraits, to provide beach defenaea and
protecC sea 11nes of communication.
The navies of Nnrway gnd Denmark have an overall total of 21 dieeel
aubmarines~ aeveral guided misaile frigates and over 100 ahipe of other
clasaes including around 40 guided missile crafC.
As reported in the foreign preas, the Weat German Navy is the moat up-to-
date in technical outfitting. It has over 180 warshipa and amall combatante~
including over 20 diesel submarinea, aeveral deatroyere, up to 60 mine-
sweepers and around 40 guided missile and Corpedo boats. Naval aviation
conaists of the following squadrons: tactical fightera and reconnaiseance
aircraft (four), coastal patrol aircraft (three), communications aircraft
and helicopters, transport aircraft and ao on.
The /Central European Theater/ [in boldfaceJ (Fig. 2) (Not reproduced] ie
one of the primary theaters in Europe. A powerful strike force of NATO
Armed Forces has been created within its limita already in peacetime~
numbering over 700,000 personnel, 23 divisione, 7 separate brigades and
regiments, over 6,000 tanks, up to 2,000 field artillery piecea and over
1,700 warplanes, of which around half are nuclear weapons platforma.
In the estimate of foreign cr~ilitary specialista, this grouping is the most
combat-effective and is maintained in conatant readineas for combat opera-
tions. If one considers that there are around 80 percent of American
tactical nuclear weapons ar.~ ~ust as many delivery platforms within the
limits of this theater, it is obvious what role is given the hi~h command
of NATO Joint Armed Forces in this theater in fulfilling the aggressive
schemes of imperialism.
As reported in the foreign press, the Joint Ground Forces organizationally
are placed inCo two large groupings: Northern and Cen[ral army groups
(NORTHAG and CENTAG).
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NO1t~NAG (h~gdqugrt~rs gt Mu~n~hen-G1~dbach, ~1tG) hgg 12 divi~idn~ ~
(fiv~ C~nk gnd g~v~m m~e~riz~d infanCry), including four WegC Germgn~
four Briti~h~ two gelgian ~nd twd UuCch~ Iea primary strik~ force ie mad~
up of We~t Germgn divieion~, which nr~ ~up~rior to eh~ ~ombined units of
other countri~e tr~neferr~d eo NORTHAG in six~ and geturation with ~rm~red
equipm~nt~ ertill~ry end antitank weapone. _
CENTAG (hegdqu~rt~rg ge S~ck~nheim, p1tC) ha~ 11 divisinn~ (of which five
grp C~nk divi~ion~) and four s~par~Ce briggd~g, including four Am~ricgn
divisinn~ and thr~e Americ~n brigad~e, eev~n W~gt Germatt divisione and ~
Cgnadian briggd~. Two armnred end two m~chanized Americ~n divigione and
thre~ W~et German Cgnk diviaione cnmpri~e th~ basis of CFxiTAG's atrike
Corce.
In the estim~Ce nf for~ign military ep~cigli~C~, the l~rgp grouping of
NATO Ground ~orc~g ar~ated ~nd in congtgnt combat readin~e~ in Che Centrgl
European Theater wi11 be reinforced eignificantly at th~ momene the eitug-
ti~n becomeg eggravated by the m~v~ment of combined unite nnd unite from
other areas~ primarily the UniCed St~tes. A greaC deal of gtCention i~
given to w~rking out problems of rapid troop movement frdm the American
'continent to ~urope (chiefly Cn the FRG) in annual ~xerci~es such ae
"Reforger" and other~.
. The combin~d units and units have the "Perehing" lA~ "Lance" and "Nonest
John" operational-tactical and tactical miesiles; self-propelled 203.2-mm
and 155-nnn howitzers capable of employing nuclear munitiong; contemporary
- medi~n tanks of varioue modificationa (M60, "Leopard~" "Chieftain"); light
tanka, infanCry combat vehicle~ and armored personnel carriers; the "Tos~,"
"Milan" and "Hot" antitank guided missiles [ATGM'qJ and otherg.
The armored and mechanized combined ~ita of the U.S. Ground Forcea are
saturated with tanka. artillery, antitank weapons and APC's to the greatest
extent. For example, the armored di.viaion has 351 tanks, 66 atomic
artillery pieces, 225 "Tow" and "Dragon" ATGM launchers and around 700
APC's. In addition, each diviaion has 42 helicopters equipped with ATGM's.
As reported in the foreign press, NATO's military leaders intend to achieve
_ a further increase in firepower and striking power in the nex~ feW years.
as well ae in capabilities of ground forcea to combat enemy tanke and air-
borne assault forces. Deliveries of the lateat miasile and artillery
systems, tanks, ATGM's and other weapons are planned to the combined uaita
and unite for this purpoae.
The NATO Joint Air Forces (headquarters of the command element is a[ -
Ramstein, FRG) have the 2d and 4th Joint Air Strike Command (JASC],
intended for operational coordination with NORTHAG and CII~ITAG reepectively.
According to foreign press data, the 2d JASC includes the Britiah Air Force
command in the FRG, the tactical air commands of Belgium and the Netherlanda,
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I
the 3d Air ~uppnrt niviaion gnd 4th Air ~ef~nge Divi~idn fram Ch~ FIt~ Air
~dre~ Air Serik~ Comm~nd ~nd th~ 3Zd 'T~ctic~l ~igheer Squadron (United
5egt~~)~ Th~ 2d JASC h~~ ~ eatal af ~rdund 600 w~rpl~neg, including up ec~
200 n~~L~~r w~apan~ p1~tf~rm~, 36 "Per~hing" lA i~unch~r9 (~1tG Air ~'orc~)
~nd ~pproxi~natiely 500 "Nike-H~rcule~," "H~wk," "Binodhound" and "Repier"
~AM launcheY~, ~t i~ planned to repl~~e the obsolete ~-104G, G~91 ~nd
cerCain dther typeg nf aircraft with the new "T~r~ngdn" ~ircrgft (F'~tG gnd ~
U.K. air forCeg)~nd tihe ~-16 (~~lgian ~nd the NeCherlgnd~ fiir force~), which
cgn be ~rmed not ~nly with conventi~ngl aegpong, but with nucl~gr w~~p~n~
~s well.
A~Cdrding ro fnreign press data, the 4eh JA5C inCludeg the 3d ~nd 17Ch ~ir
fdre~g df ehe U.S. Air ~~rce, tihe lgt Air Support nivigi~n gnd 2d Air
- Def~n~~ Divi~ion of th~ ~tt~ Air ~orce Air Serik~ Comm~nd as well as the
C~n~di~n l~t Air Group. Th~re ig ~ tne~1 n� dver 750 w~rplgn~~ in th~
~ircrgfe invenCory, of which grouttd hglf are nuclear wegpone platformg. In
gddi.tion, Ch~ 4th JA5C hag 36 "Perghing" lA operari~nal-tgcticgl migeile
launchers gnd over 140 SAM launchers. Air unitg gnd eubunirs have
eonCpmporary ~-111E, F-I5, ~-4~, ~-4C end ~-4D warplaneg, which make up
over 70 percent of the command'~ tdeal aircrafe inventory.
A~ f~r~i~ milit~ry speci~li~tg b~elieve, NATO's Jc~ine Air ~orc~~ in th~
thegCer wi11 work clogely with the British Air F'orce command in the home
country in p~rforming the mis~ions ~ssigtted them. With an aggravation in
the gituation, the Britigh Air ~orce command i~ made operationally
subordinate to rhe supr~me commander of NATO's Joint Armed ~nrcee in
~urope. Ae with the Joint Cround ~orces~ NATO'e air grouping in the
theater will be reinforced primarily by movements of combat aircraft from
the United Statea and Canada and also several units fram Gregt Br~tain.
Western military epecialista believe that the /Southetn Europe Theater/
(in boldface] aleo is of great atrategic importance. It ie the southern
flank of the North Atlantic Alliance and ita link with other aggresaive
blocs, primarily CENTO. Therefore, in the overall chain of militariat-c
preparations~ the NATO command even in peacetime keeps ma~or groupinge of
ground, air and naval forcea in this theater ahich hade the purpose not
only of thregtening the southern flank of Wera~w Pact countrieg and
controlling the Black Sea gtraitg, but aleo exer[ing preagure on countrieg
of the Near East and Af rica.
The Sourhern Europe Theater includee the territoriea of Italy, Creece
and Turkey; water areas of the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmara; the
Black Sea straits area and the southern part of the Black Sea. The
theater's ground area is over 1.2 million km2 and the population of NATO
countries located here is around 100 IDillion persons.
According to foreign prese reports, the national armed forces deployed in
thig zone number around one million per~ons, the largest of Which are
ground forces, comprising over 70 percent of military personnel. A large
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number di the combin~d units ~re intended for trangfer td vgriou~ comm~nd~
of th~ bld~ ~~ig. 3) (Ndt reproduCedj.
Jaint grdund, air gnd n~v~l ~orceq ~~~igned frnm the United Stgte~, Great
_ Brie~~ln, It~ly ~nd 'Curkey ~s well :~q n~v~l ~erike force~ ~r~e nperntinn~lly
gubo,rdin~ep tn fhe Cnmm~nder in Chief af NATO'~ Jdint Arm~d ~drees in ehe
Sdufh~rn Europe `~heater (headquarters at Naples, Ita1y). Greece has held
~~p~ci~1 plg~e in NATO's milit~ry structure frdm tiagust 1g74 dn. tt
d~~l~red it w~g le~ving the bloc'g milit~ry drg~nizatidn, but gt thc~ pre~ent
ttme it has annnutteed re~dineg~ to return td active work within the
fr~arewnrk di the military org~ttization dn the Condition th~t itg Armed
~or~~e~ mug~ hgve indep~ndent cnrom~nds (ground, n~vral ~nd gir forces) with
their dire~t guburdin~tion tn the Commnnder in Chi~f nf NATO Joint Armed
~dree~ in the 5outhprn ~urope 'The~ter.
Ag ttot~d in rhe fdr~ign pregg, the Joint Ground ~~rceg have grnund 30
divigions, up td 40 brig~deg ~nd gever~l ~ep~r~te regimentg gssign~d by
- It~ly~ Gree~e, Turkey gnd the United 5t~teg. TheBe forCeg gre brnught
tngether intn twn ground force co!nmanda: in the southern p~rt of the
theater (Cerritnry of It~1y, with headquarterg at Veronn) end in the
southeastern part di the theater (territory of Greece and ~'urk~y, with
headqu~rterg ~t Ixmir, `~urkey).'~
The Joint Ground ~drees in the southern part of the theater have four
It~li~n divisions (thr~e mechanized gnd one ~rmdred), over ten Itnlign
briggdeg ~ttd a U.5. Southern ~urope tactical grnup. This grouping hag
12 "Lgnce" missile lnunchers.
The Join~ Cround Forceg in che southeagt~rn p~rt di the the~ter nominally
include dne Greek ~ield Army and three Turkish f ield armies, which have 28
Creek and Turkish divisions, as well as up to 25 separate brigades and
over ten "Hnnest John" and atomic artillery battalions. Until decision of
the questian about creation of independent NATO coeumands (the 7th JASC and
the Joint Ground Forceg command in the cencral part of the 5outhern
~urop~ Theater) on the territory of Greece, the Creek Armed Forre~ ure
under national subordinatinn. They are directly subordinate tn the
Coamander in Chief in the thenter during the period in Which joint exer-
cise~ are conducted aithin the framework of the bloc.
Creece's Cround ~orces number 11 divisiong (including one armored division)
and tao seperace armared brigades. All of chem are brought together organ-
izationally inco four army corps, which make up the ist ~ield Army (head-
quarters at Larisa). These combined units primarily have American combat
. equipment and Weapons, including nuclear weapons delivery means ("Nonest
m_
~Until [he question is decided concerning the creation of independent NATO
~ commands on the territory of Greece, its representativeg are not partici-
pating in the Work of headquarters of this command or the 6ch JASC, Which
are headed by Turkish generalg. and Cre~k forces have been removed from
gubordination to these milicary control encities.
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~d~ OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY ~
Jdhn" misgil~~ rand ~03~~-mm hnwitzerg). The 17 diviaiong gnd up en 20
aep~r~te brig~d~g (regimentg) of the ~urkish Arm~d ~'nrCe~ gre parC o� fnur
field grmieg, ehree of whinh hav~ b~en ergngf~rr~d tn eh~ NATO Joint Ground
~~rc~e. All nf Chem gleo ~re ouefiteed with American cdmb~t equipment gnd
we~ponry~
The NATO Air ~orce~ (h~adqu~rCerg of the cdmm~nd element ge Naplee, ~t~1y)
nrggniz~tionglly are br~oughr togeth~r in th~ SCh gnd 6th JASC~ which
inelud~ Americ~n, It~lian, Greek and Turkish air gqugdrons treneferred t~
NATO. Th~ overgll number of wgrplaneg ie around 1,000, of which over 180
gr~ nuclegr w~~pon~ platformg.
'~he Sth JASC (headquartere ~C ViCenz~, Italy) ie itttendpd fnr ~oint npera-
tions with J~nint Ground ~orres in eh~ ~durh~rn pare of th~ theater and for
~creening Che t~rriCory of ICg1y. It includes Che Itglian Air Force gt
fu11 g~rength, th~ U.S. Air ~orce 40th Taceical Air Group and three "Nike-
Herculeg" bgtt~lion~. There is ~ eot~1 df aver 300 wnrpl~ne~ end up to
110 SAM l~ur?cherg itt the Sth JASC.
The 6Ch JA5C (headquarters at Ixmir, Turkey) presently include~ only the
Turkigh Air Forc~ end the U.S. Air ~orce 39th Tactic~l Air Group. mhe
Turkish Air Forc~, con~isting of the lst and 2d eactical air armies,
numbere around 350 warplanea (chiefly nf Americgn production). In addi-
tion, it has two air def~nse divisions (72 SAM launch~re).
The Greek Air ~orce temporarily is a aeparate air formation (28th Air
Strike Command) and numbere around 300 warplanea, the basie of which are
Am~rican tactical fighters ~nd reconneissance aircraft. Several aquadrong
ar~ equipped with the ~rench "Mirage" F.1 f ighters. ~
The NATO Joint Naval Forces (command element headquarters at Naples~ Italy).
In peacetime the command of the Joint Naval Forces doea not have its own
personnel and weapons, except for functioning control entitiea. The shipa
and aubunits of the naval forces of Italy, Greece, Turkey ae well as of
Great Britain and the Uniced States intended for transfer to it continue to
remain at the disposal of the national commanda (a total of up to 2$0 ahips
of primgry classes and around 100 aircraft). It is planned to make them
operationally aubordinate to the bloc command With the appearance of a
crisia situation or at the outbreak of War, as vell as for the period of
conducting exerciees and maneuvera of the NATO Joint Armed Force~ and Joint
Naval Forces.
According to foreign press reports, the Joint Naval Forcea are intended for
aupporting combat operations of naval s[rike forces of NATO in the
Mediterranean, for supporting Kround forces on maritime axes, and also for
defending sea lines of communication and blockading the Dardanellea~
Bosporus and Cibralt~r straits.
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A cotnmgnd ~1~menC o~ Ch~ b~.ae'~ Jnint Co~sCa~. AvigCion in ehe MediC~rranean
wga gee up in the 5nuehern ~urope The~t~r in 1~6$~ intended chiefJ.y for
~urveillgnc~ of ghipg of W~r~aw Pacti enunerie~. It ha~ up eo 50 aiccraft
of vgrioue types esgigned by air forceg of Che United SCaee~, Greut Britein~
Ita1y and Turkey.
A decisinn w~~ mad~ in 1970 to set up gn operneinnal combined uniC of NATO
Nava1 ~'nrcee in the Mediterrane~n for "on c~ll" op~ra~ions. It includes fourtn
six ghipg fram th~ United StaCeg, ~r~ae Britain, ICa1y and Turkey (ae the
prea~ne time Greece does not aseign any). It ie intended for conducting
combgt oper~t3ong 1n ehose parte of the M~diterranean where there ia no
nepd for interference by the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
NATO's naval gCrike Eorces are formed on the basie of combined uniCa of the
U.S. Sixth Fleet, which in peaceCime ie under national subordination and is
Cran~ferrpd to the Joint Naval Forces in case of an aggrgvation of the
internaCional aiCuation gnd the appearance of a crisis. As noted in the
foreign presa, the Sixth Fleet conetantly hea up to 50 ahips and auxiliary
veseels, including two carriers (bgeing 160-180 warplanee, of which up to
SO percent can be nuclear weapons platforms)~ -
_ Thie f leet elso includea Marine aubtinits (around 2,000 persona) located on
amphibioue warfar,e ahips. As reported in the foreign press, ita overall
aize approachea 25,OU0 persons. In addition, it ia planned to include
aeparate guided missile ahipa of the Italian and Britiah navies in the
naval qtrike forcea.
Aa the foreign preas reports, forces of the American Sixth Fleet~ including
carrier task forcea, submarine forcea and amphibious warfare forces with
Marines, ueually head for the area of the eastern Mediterranean~ i.e.~
nearer the bordere of Warsaw Pact countriea and the Near East, in a period
of an abrupt aggravation in the international aituation.
/The British Air Force command in the home country/ (in boldfaceJ wae aet
up in April 1915 on the basis of an air atrike command. It received the
atatute as a high command in the theater and was made operationally
aubordinate to the Supreme Commander of NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe.
It has over 300 warplanes and around 60 "Bloodhound" and "Rapier" SAM
launchers.
The /NATO mobile forces/ (in boldfacej play a role of no small importance
in the structure of NATO's Joint Armed Forcea in Europe. They include
aubunita of Ground Forces and tactical aviation which even in peacetime are
operationally subordinate to the Suprefle Command of the bloc'e Joint Armed
Forces in Europe. They are intended primarily for reinforcing troop group-
ings on the northern and aouthern flanka of the bloc in case the threat of
a limited armed conflict breaking out in the Northern or Southern Europe
Theaters appeara or when it begins.
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_ A~ r~pdrCed in Che foreign press, rhe mobile grnund forces include seven
bgtealions (American, BriCish, WesC German, Canadian~ a~i$~8n, Italian and
Luxembourg) as well combat aupport and service aupport eubunita. Their
overall size ~e around 8,000 persons~ The mobile ground f.orcea have their
own headquarters (Seck~nheim, FRG) and are headed by a commander in the -
r~nk of ma~or general.
The mobile nir Eorces include seven tacCical air squadrons from the air ~
_ fnrces of Che Unieed Seates, Great Britain, FRG, Canada, Italy, Belgium and ~
Che NeCherlanda~ The aircraft inventory numbera over 120 warplanes, of ,
which several tactical fighters can be nuclear weapons platforms. In
contrast to the mobile ground forces, they do not have their own headquar- '
Cers end, in conformity with instructiona o� the Supreme Commander, are
moved in a crisis situation ro the area of combat opera~iona and become -
gubordinate to the commander of the bloc's Joint Air Forcee in thia area.
/NATO's Joint Air Defense System in Europe/ [in boldface] is a uniform ,
complex of national air defense systems of bl~c member countries, inter-
connecCed by the performance of common missiona in peace and war under the
direction of the Supreme Commander. It includea varioua types of radara,
units and subunits of fighter aviation and SAM's, as well as control
enCities, Che ma~ority of which are equipped with Che "Nadge" automated
sysCem. Air defenae peraonnel and weapons are kept constantly in a high
degree of combat readineas even in peacetime. A continuous watch by
radars, conCrol entities, fighter-interceptors and SAM complexes has been
organized in all European theaters.
Organizationally this system conaists of sir defense zones, regions and
sectors, which encompass Cerritories of bloc member countries in all
European theatera. A total of four zor.es have been set up: NorChern
(opErationa center in Kolsos, Norway), Central (Brunsaom, the Netherlande),
Southern (Naplea, Italy) and Atlantic (Stanmore, U.K.). The boundaries of '
Che first three zones coincide with those of the Northern Europe, Central ~
Europe and Southern Europe theaters respectively.
According to foreign press reports, this system has a total of 84 radar
poats, over 550 fighters and around 1,600 SAM launchera. ,
To keep the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe in high combat readinesa, the
- bloc command element constantly and ~urposefully works on problems of
training stgffs and troops, which bears a clearly expressed aggressive
direction. Each year there are over 180 different ma~or exercises of '
branches of the Armed Forcea and ~oint exercises. The largest of them are
the "Autumn Forge" Eall maneuvers, which asaociate over 30 different exer-
cises in all European theaters.
All this indicates that the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe, a powerful
strike force of U.S. imperialism and other bloc countries, is preparing to
unleash aggression against countries of the socialist community and
represents a constant threat to peace and security onthe European continent. _
,
COPYRIGNT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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rux ur~r~.~~.~L u~~ ~ivLx
COMMENTS ON U.S. llIVISION-LEVEL CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION5
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 1, Jan 79 eigned to
press 8 Jan 79 pp 29-34
[Article by Engr-Col I. Loshchilov, candidate of technical aciencea:
"Ground Forces: Organization of Control and Co~nunications in the U.S.
D ivis ion" ]
[Excerpts] By increasing the mobility, firepower and atriking power of the
modern division, American military leaders are attempCing to convert it
into a highly mobile combined unit capable of conducting prolonged combat
operations in any parts of the world where U.S. imperialiatic intereata are
concerned. Succesr~ful operatione of the combined units are made directly
dependent on a precisely organized system of control which, in the op inion
of American strategists, must possesa rapid adaptability to a specific
composition of forces, a capability for operational deployment in poorly
prepared areas, and high survivability. The nomenclature, make-up and
working procedures of command posts are being clari�ied and the syatem of
communications is being improved in the U.S. Armed Forces to satiafy these
requirements.
' The concept of the division's /control system/ [in boldface] includes the
commander and staff, communications system, the authorized organizational
structure of control entities, their operating procedures and decision-
making processes. Its chief purpose is to provide smooth operation of all ~
combat arms and services in performing their combat missions.
The primary elements of the control system are the main, forward and rear
division command posts.* Functions are rather precisely divided among
them: The forward CP exercises immediate control of troops in the primary
zone, the forward CP engages in planning and coordinating combat operatione
at the division level, and the rear CP provides control in the rear area.
*Previously the U.S. Army command planned to set up four command posts: two
forward (tactical), an aux~liary and a rear command poet. For more detail
about Chis aee ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1977, pp 31-37--
Ed.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050041-0

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050041-0
_
~'dit 0~~'~CZAL USE dNLY
Judgin~ frdm eli~ 1nC~~C repore~ of ehe for~ign pr~gg, ~n g~.ternge~ Cp i~
_ noC ~ee up in the Ameri~~n divi~ion gs ~n ind.~p~ndent ~ontrnl ~ntiey. By -
decision of the ~ombined unit comm~nder, its role wi11 be perform~d by ane
of the subordinate CP'g o� the hendqugreerg of greillery or briggdeg.
According to views of Americen military specialiets, the organization of a
reliable /communication~ syseeml Cin boldfacej i~ given muCh attention in
mod~rn warfare. IC coneieCg of two componenC~: ~ nommand componene,
providing direce communicationg among conCrnl entieie~; ~nd en grea
componene, nrggnizpd on ~ territorinl principle.
The cnmtn~nd communiCarions sysCem hgs higher mobiliCy gnd so ig Che primgry
system for the division. Ite elements include commnnd communicationa
ceneers, direct multichannel lin~s connecting these centera, radio nets fnr
vgrious purposes and a messenger gervice. Thege elements are deployed by
resourcea of the divigion's signal batealion and by organic signal subuniCe
of units and subunits,
Command Communicationa centers are nrganized near division control poinCe~
near the artillery staff and in Che primary and rear areas. A aCandard -
center has a communications center, messenger service, code aecCion, radiv
transmission center, control center and separate Communications facilities.
All elements of the communications center are connected through a term3nal
room, which usually also exercises technicgl monitoring functions.
A communicatione center consisting of a cez~tral telegraph atation and
terminal gear ~ermits switching around 30 subscriber lines of printer
communications'and provides for an exchange of information over 11 duplex
telegraph chattnels. It also includes a measage processing center where
messages are enciphered and delivery to addresaees arranged.
The radio transmission center includes conventional short-wave and
tropospheric scatter radios and, if terr~in conditions permit, radio-relay
stations as well, which are the primary means for organizing the divtaion's
multichannel cocmnunications. As a rule, it is remoCed at least 1 km from
the communicationa center.
The control center monitors the operation of both individual equipment and
the entire communications system as a whole. In conformity with exiating
instructions, a communicati~ns check is made periodically every 30 minutes
or immediately after a fire (nuclear) strike.
A central telephone station also is set up at the communicationa center,
permitting the switching of 100 local and 20 main lines: a radio-wire
station providing for entry of remote subscribers with VHF radios into the
local telephone network and means of wire communications for intra-
communications center connection. All communications gear is installed
insi.de 1'~ to 2~ ton vehicles. The overall amour.t of transport equipment
at a division communications center reaches 20 and, countin~ tt~e tactic~l
~~~er