JPRS ID: 8466 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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JPRS L/8466
18 May 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
tF0U0 29/79)
. ~ .
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NOTC
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- orher characCerisCics retained.
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JPRS L/8466
~ ~.8 May ~.9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 29/79)
CON7ENTS PAGE _
EUROPEAN PARLI~TT ELEGTIONS r
INTERNATIONAL AFF'ArRS
~ Conflicting National, International Intereats Infl.uence
Elections
(Editorial, Alberto Cavallari; C(~RRIERF DELI,A SERA,
26 APr 79) 1
- COi1NI'RY 3EGTION
FEDEREIL REPUBLIC OF G~MANY =
7~aire Terminates Rock,et I,aunch Site Contract
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Apr 79) 4
F~NCE
Bourges Speech Cites Contribution oP Military P~olicy
(Yvon Bourges; ARMEES D~AUJOIJRD~HUI, Apr 79) 7
Iraq-Bound Reactors~ Sabotage Recounted
(Josette Alia, et al.; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR,
i6 A~ ?9) 10
SPAIN
PSA's Ro~as Interviewed, Personal Attitudes bcplored
(Ale~andro Ro~as Mercos Interview; CANIDIO 16, 22 Ap~ ?9) 17
Military Modernization Effort Discussed
(CAMBIO 16, 1 AP~' 79) 25
Briefs
. New Planes for Iberia 28
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO~
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EUROPEAN PARLYAMENT ELECTIONS ZNTERNATIONAT~ AFFAIRS
CONFLICTING NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS YNFLUENCE ELECTIONS
Mi.lan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 26 Apr 79 p 1
[Ed.itorial~b}~Alber~o ~vallari: "The European Horizon Might ~ti11 Become
Brighter"]
[Text] The European electoral campaign is off to a etart, but it ie not
clear whether optimism or peasimism is in order. The HERALD TRIBUNE pointe
out that Europa is taking a back aeat in Italy, England, and Luxemburg,
where the people are mobilized for a national vote. But in France the
European vote is a matter of internal politics~ an opportunity to create
new relationshipa betw~en the Gaullist and the Giscard forcea, perhape to
prepare for early electiona. In epite of the commitment of big nemee on
the liats, eapecially in Holland, Den~mark, and Germany, and regardlese of
how much the laboritea, themaelves, have tranaformed their traditional
anti-Europeanism into a policy of "criticism and reform of the EEC" [European
Economic Commun3.ty], there are graunds for saying that the pesaimiste are
right when theq lament a loet opportunity, or oue that might be l.oat.
' Of course a high EEC official predicta that "the eecond European elections.~~~,; , ~
will be more interesting because the first will have educated public opinion."
Along with thia prudent attribution of pedagogical values to a vote that
s~hould be "historic," there is a fear of poor par�ticipation, or of g
referendum upset. What will happen if, out of 280 million EEC inhabitanta,
only a minority goes to the polle? Also, the equivocal fight has a negative
effect on the functiona of the parliament, itself. Italy, ~ermaay, and the
Benelux hope that its role will be more active, that it will have greater
power, and that it will serve as the motive force for greater inCegration.
But France (in addition to England) oppoaes the atatements of Schmidt or of
Brandt that are so favorable to evolution. One may legitimately suspect that
the European vote will not serve to cancel the present "pharmaciat's
Europeanism"--that is, "3ust enough" Europeanism.
There are of cour8e internal questions to cause France to change its
English-type poaitions. Preaident Giscard seems to have given up all hope
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of reconcilfation with Chirac, and cannoC afford to J.ost the voCes of the
Ggullists who favor him, or who do not favor hie rival, in an election
that is not Caking place with a ma~ority ayatem. The absence of two coaXi-
tions promises a sort of repititiion of the most recent legielative electiona,
and proportional representation conatitutes a risk for presidential candi-
dates~ Thus, Eu.rope losea in Giecard (who ia obliged not to depaxt too
much from Gaullist poaitions) one of ita moat enthuaiastic propagandieCs.
Aa in Che case of Chancellor Ferrer, he preaches for Europe "but with
prudence." -
' Finally one muati not =urget the low tide reached by the eo--called "Euro-Left."
The break wtCh Che socialists brought French communiam to super-GaullisC
positions. Marchais's speeches contain recurring, continuous appeals
against a Europe that is described as pro-German," and the vote ie ~xploit~ed
as an occasion for a counteroffensive againat the social-democraciea "Chat
are headed by Chancellor Schmidt's Bosches." One Chen wonders what will
happen to the massea thaC are led to the vote as if the European parliament
were a Marne? Nor should the criais of Europeanism se a whole be under-
est3mated, however much the Italian communiats do not share the French
posiCions. The conclusions of the Rome meeting, even though in favor of a
pluri-national powEr, have rekindled neutraliaC noatalgias. And then, many
Spanish communists look upon Wehner's Germany and the "dialectica of
reunification" as a positive factor in a different Europe. Thua one muat
exclude that positfve, unconditional wave from the left, for a Europe that
was believed possible by many at the Madrid swnmit.
One must therefore say that the E!irnpeans have little luck and that condi-
tions regarding the vote are not the best. The least thaC can happen (as
Reston says) is that there will be very "troubled" elections becauae of the
simultaneous vote, and because of a vol:e that is distorted by internal
questiona: with a weak European "signal" in Roa~e and in Paris. But if ;
matters remain thus, there are atill significant reasons to inaiat on the '
value of these elections. After all, it is the firet time that Europeans
can act togeCher in making a political choice with non-national aims; and
also it is the first time that all the people can make a concerted action to
inte~rate in a Europe that until today has been purely "Eurocratic." However
devoid of easy proepects, the Europeanists have an important battle to
fight.
From the point of view of integration, tn fact, the elect~on of parliament
represents a decidedly new fact. One might minimize ita significanee and say
that the parliament will not have much authority and that the array of
"confederalists" is too strong to change things. But the fact remains that
no true integration can begin if (as Duverger says) "interdependencies are~
not established among the members of a society." A people's parliament,;;..;:
elected by direct vote, the source of first real interdependence, is the';only
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road to a discontinuance of ~uropean involution. OCherwise Europe will
continue to be what it has been up Co now: a freetrader Coy.
Decieive also is the role of the renewed parliamen~, fully legitimate, with
respect to aweeping away the mists that have thickened over the future of
Europe. In 1972 the Summit of The Nine in Paris launched the famed
"European Union," to be established by 1980~ But no one knows what thia
"Union" meana. The formula has remained indefinire, as in Che case of the
"Community." The EEC institutions, the council of minieters and a committiee,
were charged with coming up with a study ~f it by 1975, but the reault hae
not been very etriking. One gathers that the union is everything and nothing.
Then it was understood that perhaps i~ is or~e of Montesquieu's parodiea
("Europe is no more than a natiion composed of many nations"). Thus only -
parliament remains the credible institution to tell the truth or to profesa
to do so: at least concerning "what we are not and what we do not want."
Thus there are two valid reasone for insisting on Che pro-European baCtle--
perhaps with pesaimism, knowing that aucceas is not near at hand and Chat
the conditions aurrounding the iight have never been so unfavorable. But
perhaps Ambassador Ducci ia right. In his opinion, the Europeaniats should
do as Wellington's soldiers did at Waterloo. "They were so atupid that they
could not acknowledge defeat; and so they were abl~ to win."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8255
CSO: 3104
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. COUNTRX SECTZON FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (3ERMANY
ZAIRE TER.MINATES ROCI{ET LAUNCi~j SITE CONTRACT .
Paris JEUNE~AFRIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 pp 28-29 .
(Article by Francoie Soudan: "OTRAG Is Leaving"] .
[Text] The vast Manono Plateau lies in the northeastern corner of Zaire's
Shaba Province. Some 40,000 persons live in this region between the Lualaba '
River and the village of Kamelie on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. For them,
the cessati~n of OTRAG's activities and the departure of a handful of white
. technicians will probably have littlF effect on the fixed tenor of their ways.
OTRAG is leaving. So what2
Orbital Transport und Raketen AG, OTRAG, is a rather small Genoan firm whose
president, Lutz Kayser, a specialist in aeronautical engineering, is not .
lacking in ambition. His goal is to make money by using his ingenuity and
resourcefullness. His special "niche" is apac~. He is engaged in building,
launching~ and placing in orbit small observation satellites whose launch
vehicl~s will burn liquid propellants, the fuel used by the famous V-1
and V-2 .rockets built by the Germans late in World War II. He is develop-
ing a sort of "poor man's" satellite one that Third World countries, organ-
ized into consortiums, will be able to obtain for peaceful applications.
Thie satellite market also interests both NASA and the European Space Agency.
Like Kurt Debus, the chairman of OTRAG's board of directors, and OTRAG's
projects manager Richard Gompertz, Lutz Kayser is a veteran of Peenemunde, the
German V-1 and V-2 rocket research and development center. All~three men
were subsequently "rehabilitated" by NASA. All three formerly worked at
the Kennedy Space Center. When NASA began to feel the pinch of tight budgets
in the early 1960's, these men no doubt felt they had better things to do than
"coast along" at NASA. So they decided to form their own business. Four
banks, attracted by the prospects and also swayed by Kayser's persuasive
glibness, lent them the money. But they still had to find a range for their
launcher tests. They get their sights on Zaire, on its vast nearly unin-
habited expanses, and thought of the severe economic problems plaguing that
- country. On 26 March 1976, they concluded an agreement with the�Zairian
authorities. They were granted a 24-year lease, extending to the year 2000,
on 160,000 square kilometers of bushland bordered on the south by the Zambian
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frnntier, the east by Lake Tanganyl.ka, the north by the boundaries of Kivu
Province, and xhe wesC by the Lualeba River~ In exchange for th~s immenae
firing range OTRAG agreed to pay the Zairian Government 3~.5 million dollare
pe~ year plus a percentage of the revenue earned by the companq on each launch
vehicle 8old and a ZO percent discount on the firae "2airian" eate111ta. -
Things went smoothly for OTRAG in 1976. It establiahed a subsidiaryr OTRAG
S. A. [Limited], at Vaduz in Che Principality of Liechtenstein~ a tax paradise
for a firm thaC ia seemingly not entirely above suspicion in such matter~s.
All funds�deatined for Zaire were funneled through OTRAG S.A. which also
handled and routed all equipment and technicians sent to the Kspani~Toko Plg-
- teau. The parent company also installed a short-lived branch office, OTRAC~
F'rance, on Avenue Foch in Paris. Its manager was s rather straage individual
hiding under the alias of Georges de Bierre. He is alleged to have been con-
nected with the OAS [Secret Arony OrganizationJ during the AlgeriAn War. The �
first rocket, christened Billigrakete, was launched on 17 May 1977 in the
presence of H. D. Genscher [FRG's foraign minister]. It was a partial
auccess: the vehicle reached an altitude of 10 kilometers before it atarted _
~ tumbling. Same story for the second test. In early June, with President
Mobutu and a German television crew present, it was sheer disaster: a few '
seconds after launch, the rocket crashed along Che ehores of the Luvua River.
OTRAG executives then decided to postpone regular product:!on some 2 qears,
in other words, not before 1981.
Both the CIA and the German BND were aware of OTRAG's dealings as earZy as
late 1975. But a third "partner" also had wind of the OTRAG-Zaire contract,
namely the Soviet KGB. The Soviet leadership ia known to be vezy aensitive
to anything closely or remotely relevant to the possible rearmament of the
Federal Republic of Germany, sensiCive to such a point that in early 1977
the Kremlin decided to place two "spy" satellitea-Cosmoa 922 and Cosmoe 932--
in orbit over southern Africa. These satellites made four passes o~ver the �
Manono Plateau--4, 23, 24 and 25 July 1977--and carefully photographed OTRAG
installations. During their flights, they also photographed SouCh Africa's
nuclear test site in the Kalahari Dryland. Did the Soviets reallq believe -
OTRAG was a front for the nuclearization of the FRG? Or did they want to
deliberately magnify an issue the ins and outs of which were fully lmatn
to them? Whatever the reaosn, in late July theq "leaked" the details of the _
contract. ' ~ ~
The East Germans are obviously the most offensive in their criticism. The
GDR charges that OTRAG enables the FRG to circumvent the post-World War II
Potsdam Agreement and the Treaties of Paris and Brussels that prohibit the
FRG from producing long-range rockets. Duriag preparations in March 1978
for the second Shaba war, Angolan authorities were patently alarmed by the
OTRAG rockets they believed were targeted on Luanda. Hence they insisted
that one of the priority objectives of the "Katanganese gendarmes" had to be
the OTRAG installations. This plan failed. however, and OTRAG resv~ed its
inconclusive test launches.
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In Bonn, as well as in Kinshasa aut.horitiea aeemed to have decided to
terminate OTRAG's activi~ies becausa these were becami.ng more and more -
. of a nuisance. Zaire, whr~ thought it had made a good buaineas deal, found
itself the center of a controverey it cnuld have definitely done without.
Moreover, one of the indispensable conditions of reconciliation wiCh Ango].~
was the diamantling of OTRAG. Aa for the Federal Republic of Germany, it
- wanted to aettle this ticklish problem once and for all because it wae ~eo-
- pardizing ite relationa with the East.
The Zairian testa were euspended,in Auguat 1978. Then in December~ the deci-
sion was made: Zaire was unilaterally canceling Che contract. To the immen~!
satisfaction of the FRG'and the GDR (with whom Kinahasa reestabliahed rela-
tions in January 1979).
As for OTRAG, it is now practically bankrupt. Ita last hope was that
Brazil would authorize it to establish its launch and test facilities in
that country. It was learned in early April, however~ that in the wake
of Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Brasilia, General Figueiredo had decided ~
not to favorably conaider OTRAG's pra~osals. ,
~ ~ `~nM~4l�IIIVIM~I~N~MV . , .
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'~'�w�~ r t++.~4 ~u~~? ~ ~ wu~wui ~
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lir
~1`he Manono Plateau in the
northeastern part of
. � � Zaire's Shaba Province.
~ An i~ense firing range.
COPYRIGHT: Jeuae Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8041 6
CSO: 4400
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1~W1 VL'~'i~I.l.~~.l V?+L V~larr
CUUNTRY S~:CTxON
}30URG~ 5PF.~ECH CYTF
i CUf~(TRI;3U'1'ION OF I~~LIi I1RY POI,ICY _
- P,1ris ARt�~ES D~AUJOURD'HUT in French Apr 79 pp 7-g
[Speech given by Yvon Bourges, Minister of Defense, to the
Co,-;c;ti.ttee on French 7nfluence, ~ on 15 rlarch 1y79]
[Text] I.~~dies u~?d Gentl.e;nen, at its creation your corr~nittee ~ave itself
tY~e m3.ssion of contributinU to the ex~~~~nsion and sup;~ort of the French
presence in the svor].d acco~�din~ to the possibilities that the intern,~tional
sa.tu,a~tion offered at tha bP~innin� of this century. Circwnstances h~ive
~ chan~ed considerably since then, but the reusons for our country~s ~fluence,
its thou~ht3 and acts, re;nain. � I~~fore than any other countr~~, Franco h~3s a
mtssion, a unique and exemplary role to play in the v,rorld. This is apparont
in the 1�rords of Thamas Jefferson: "Fr:nce is the second country of all
mP,T1. n
'~�fiat i~ the b~sis of a na.tion ~ s influence? Its ori~ins are 1s much
er~otiona], as ration~al. ':ti'e are dealin~ here ~~.th a concea~t that is
be~ond our capacity to measure, beyond our ability to contempl~ite.
Nevertheless, we confr~nt circumstances which cow1pel~'us to 'recognize the
exj.stence of. thi~ opinion and tvhich ~uide us, more or less conaciously,
toti~rard a concept ?vhich betokena one people or another.
Lensthy thou~ht is not required: ~t the mere mention of a n~r?e, ideas
~.nd i.r,t::~es arisa. A na.tion's influence de~,en~s, ~'irst of all, on ~~hat
w}lich its narie evokes, on all ~hat is directly associated with it.
Next comes riit3.ona1. analysis which adds or retracts, corroborates or
rectifies.
rler.~ory influences all human thou;ht. In the idea tha.t v~e m~ke for our-
selves of a nc,tion--or, better st~ted, in the foYmation of that idea--
the pa: t pl~~~s a con~ider~ule n~rt. The influence of a countr�f depends
first of all on its history. It i~s obviou~ th:;.t the lrmy ha~ often been
an instrument of birth, and alUrays an instrument of survi.val, of a nation. _
Anns have raar'r.ed borders and insured independence. The a.nr~y is the
prLvileged guarciian of these memories, not for its o:�xi use, but for
that of the nation.
7
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~
Ha,vever, I hr~ve na ~.ntention of relegati.n~ the influence of our ooun~ry to
to tho past. '~~Jhat ha9 been left 1:o u3 by ~hose tvho hr.ve lived 9.n this land
is part of oui� herita~;o ~and h~~s a ~reat deal to ao tvith the ima~e of ~ur
country.. 't~;a are ros~~or~ib].e tor th3.~ heri~a~.;e. If, ~.ndoed, ~ve h~Ve the
oulit;:~t3.on to preserve it, we also h;.,ve the duty to enrich it, as much as
we cun. T~ eoneider the ,~~�~t only as r~n inherit~~nce ~,,;h~.ch must be ~r~e-
~uarded, is to take the risk of watchi.n;~ it lose its substance and briJ.li.ance,
in our hands ar?d through our o~~nm ~'au].t.
Zn today's world the pre.~~i~e; reNutation and au~;hority of a nation rests -
an re~].ity, on ~vfiat it br3.ngs to the :aorld, on the role which it is aU],e to
play thero. 'PYiis lepends on the qual3.ty of its inf~.uence: the universality
of its culture, the ~;eniu3 of its scholars, the at:ilities of its technicians,
but also on the state's capaoility to act ~rrithin tr.e core oi' the international
cor.gnunity. That is to s.~y rather bro~~d].y, it depends on the possibili.ty ~~f
assertin~ ii:seli', uz ter.:~,s of ~.ts convictions and: interests,, 1~3thout Ueing:
at ai].1 dependent. Td this- etid, a militar,y policy which ~ssurea the nation
of fr~edom of choice and of .~ppropriate security is necessary. As General �
dr: Ga.ul.le wrote, the ,~rrr~ is one of three riech~n3.sn~ of a country's pol~.cy ~
which he explained thus :"Dit:lomacy e:cpl~ins it, the army BUqpOT''t9 it, the
police ;~rotect it." Therefore, it is true that one c~nnot spe: k of the
infl.uence of r'r~uice ~�rithout :~tatin; first tha~t ;tt is a free nation.
This is ~~recisely why our n~tional defense policy is b,~sed on the posaession
of nuclear ar,na~rnents which, by dissuadin~ potential a~,?ressors, is the only
way to o arantee the fac~ oT our independence in today'~ ~�rorld. Comb3ned
1�rith conver~tional ;nilitlr~? forces to su;>>ort it and to ,orotect us aga:inst -
insidious forni~ of chanoe or da.rect confrontations, nuclear annaments give
Fr~~nce the means to play tr~e role it ou;
;ht to and *.vhich is expressed bq
our ~diplomacy. This is visible in recent events :�r.ith resnect to our inte~
n~tional cor:;rnit.~~ents c-nd to the rel~ztions rre ~~untain :~rith those countries ;
closest to us in fri.endship ~nd 3n culture. j
t3~zt our an~~ is not sira_~ly a ~ut~;~ort for our dipl.omatic nolicy, it �^1so '
exrre :s ~s, =.:t;en necess;~r^,~, the f'ellaf~ship of our ,_eo?le ~~rith under~~rivileged ,
or ~uffer~n; reoples. The p^rtici~�tion of our ;:.ilit:.ry doctors ~:md nurses
in tr.e care of :ro:nen, r.~en �nd chil~:;ren of unde~levelo;~ed countries, the
devotion of ~he nen ;:nci e~romen ;~~ho, at the core of our field hospitals, helped -
the victir.~s of cat2stro~hes in Gabon, in Peru, in Jorrl~n, in Ilicara~ua :~nd '
i,n the Co:nor~s, is proof of that fello;~r~hip. Eben the tP.C11I11C2~. c1SS].St.~.l1C8
~iven to cert�:in ~.rnu.e:, fi~htin~ for th=~ r country's fr~ed~ hzs contributed
and i~ contributing to a n~~~�;ork of coo7e:ation t�r:.ich has been created acro~s
centinAnts. These :.re the un;~ucstionlble att~~.in,-~ents :rhich constitu~e, in ;
the he~.rts :.nd spirits of :1ar~;~ r:en, ~a precious testi.:l~ony of France's felloc~r-
ship.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050037-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100054437-5
~ The circurr~t.znce~ ;Jhich brin,r., u~ to~et?:~r, ~ike the convict3.on~ we ~k~are,
m4ke it unnece~sar~~ for tn~ to in~i~t further on thc impoz~ance r~ttachud
to the ini'luenca of Fr:u~ce nor on th~ part our army hus played ~.n this.
The French arn~y i.:~ today worthy of it~ histor~.c~il. 3.m..