JPRS ID: 8459 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050030-2
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• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS ~/sas9
is M~y L9~9
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 20/79)
, ~ .
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JPRS L/8959
1
~5 MaY ~9 ~9
~ TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOVO 20/79)
~ CONTENTS PAGE
.i.l\iC~CI~liLV~p t~(~t?,j,(~~
' Arab Nations Carefully Providin Aid to Nle,uritania
Mmnr~ FasT, Arn 79~ i
rro~rx ~xYCarr a~a~s
Mewri~ania, Nbrocco Trying To Protect Fiehing Lndustry
('I'~ I~IIDDLE EAST, AP~' 79 ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
,
_ Moroccan ~Terrorism~ ~ga,inst Ellgerir.. ;~n~unced
(a~rqvE-asz~, i6-29 a~ 'T~) 6 ,
'AFA14UE-A3IE' Expose8 ~Secret~ Israeli-Egyptiaa
Underatandings, Collaboration
' (Sion Me~ll.ey; AFRIQUE-A3IE, 16-29 Ap~' 79) 7
IIiAN ~
Japaneae Officialg Analyze Irdnian Crisis .
. (3higeo Anori; AS~AHI EVENIIV~ NF~JS, 27 Al~ 79~ 11
MAUFtITANl'A
Uncertaluty Whether Nationallsm i+ill Win Over Racial Issue
(T~ ~lIDDLE EAST, APr 79~ l~+
- MOROCCO
~ RPport e on Aborteci Coup, Social, Economic, I~bor Problems
~H. Abeu Feriel; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16-29 Ap~ ?9) 16
- a - [III - NE $ A - ~.21 FOUO]
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CONTENTa (Continued) page
PERSZAN (}ULF AREA ~
Problem of ?~ni.grant Zabor Discusaed by Minieters
(Salih ~ay~un; AL-WATAN AL-~ARA'BI, 2-8 M~,r 79) 20
SUIlrANATE OF OMAN
Qabus 8een Moving Closer to United StQtes
(At,-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Feb 79) 2~+
Tur~csrA
Destourian Campe~ign Against Oppositionists Denounced
(Ade1 Wahid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16-29 Ap~ 79) 27
~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARAB NA'fIONS CAREFULLY PROVIDING AIb TO MAURITANIA
London THE MIDUL~ EAST in ~nglish Apr 79 pp 104-106
(Text~
'I'he ~t~uin'h~r+au~ Minister of European Economic dit~icultiee ca~? be rerti8ed,
Pinnnrc & C~~mmerce, Sidi Cc~mmunity for developing� others are proving extremely
l~t~~hiunm~~d Ould Anrijera, told cnuntry eignatoriea to the Lom~ ~{if'Acult to overoomp. F'ur ~me
7'lir ,lfiddJ~ F.'oat nn taking convention. In Mauri.anie'e thing Meuritnnia hnh I~~h~n I~it
u~�er hiy ~�i~l~inet {xx~t of~er after caae these funde were to com� by the lethel Snh~~linn ~In~util~t.
Ihr iyn~p d Mat in Nnunkchott prnsete for the ahortfall in ~t year was the fir~l y~~ur nf
la~t .luly thet the ec~~nomic ~ulput of iron ore. Finally - and ~e.4oneble rainfell Hinre~ 1!N;~J,
.i~unti~nt inh~~rited from the ma+t im~rtant - it has seen a end it will tnkke muny mom nuch
' p r 1 fl ll R r e g i m e w e s tentet~ve end to the three yeara yeara to overcome thc lun~�I~~rm
"cntaintn~~~hic". ~~f war agninat the Polisario eoeio�economic chanKew r~uncd
F'~~n~i~;n nwcrves, he said, were frunt, fight ing the jaint by eight years of dn?u~;ht,
d~~~~r t~i ~?Omn, ~ufficient fot Morurcan�1~lauritaninn annex- Added to the cffeclK ~?f ih~
unl~~ une m~?rth's ~mports, and eti~?n nf the 1~'estem Sehare. dnn~ght, of ax~r.~e, the M~errilla
there ~~�na nl~xolutety no money On the other hand, it wes war hes brought cc~?n~~mic n~in.
in the '11Y~asury, which wes clear :hat meclium�term end Iron�ore productinn, S~it by
am~~ay ninning a 350mn ~~,ng�term meesures were sabc~tsge, feU durinR the lin~t
~?~~~~rdraR with the Central needed In rectify the "errors of three �nontha of 1978 to :~0'',�
Annk. Thr former govemment thc pnat". Acrnrding to Ould below normel. O~~tput fnr Ihe
hed brrn ~~I~liged to take 160mc? ~i~Cijare, lung�term irnprove� whole of last year nlum~x~cl t~?
ou~,vi~�n~ uut of the state in� ment wuuld require chengea not aome 6mn tons, which i~ 2mn
surxncc r~nnpany, SMAR, to only in ecbnamic ewctures but tons below the fitirore al which
pay em~~l~ryee~ end the money in the people's mentslity. In lhe production begine t.o be ~~mfi�
hnd ta he ropeid. shurt term, he said, e complete table. Thia ie ~rticulnrly
There ~~~na little doubt et the :~rvey c?!'the economy wes being crucial for a rountry wheer
time thnt the situatiun wes ae cnrried out and investment (according to the Inlent N'~~rld
hnd ii. Ould Bneijere pairled it. ~eKislatian was being revised to Benk Atlaa) avera~e inn~me e
The yu~wtinn ie now bring ~~~Kraliqe the econom~?. head atood at only 5270 in 19i i
n~k~~d, huwever: whet ~tepe ie 'T'he intemational economic and where i~on ex~?rIa ncanint
tl~e new Cuvernment tsking to n,~nmunity endorses these plaru~ loravet 80~ of forci~,m revenue.
rever.~e thr ~lide into bankrup- for economic recovery in general ~mmedietely a(ler laet ~rer'~
lcy? terma, edvising the Govemment coup funda pnured into
On the plus nide, the new ~ roncentrate on streamlining Mauritt+nia from Areb rntmtric~
lr~+dervhip hn.~ ~ereived aub� the flow of foreign funds into the which were previcwaly lolh to
,inntinl nid, rr~ninly from fricnd� ~numy nnd on fixal reforms. pump money into w~hAt
ly Arnb,tnles in the furm of Mfta Mnny expert~s think the ecid test appeued tobe a bottomless pit.
end Pnti I~~nne. For the ftrat time, ;g Whether the Gnvemment can 'Ibe Saudia, for instana, hed
' ~oo, i~ hm nurcreded in obtein� put life into the steggeringly in� inac~~ed to find a consign.
Eng Gmd+ fn?m the STAFiF:X rfficient ndmini~tretion. ment af ~.enpons bound for
schemt ~?pereted by the p~~},~i~Rh ~c?me ernnomic 1~,,;~chott still sitting on a
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Margeillee wharf �our Morocco will releaee the Precisely becaus~ of the
monChe lgtex'. Funds r~mainderofitapromtsedfunde, paucity of natural resources,
~ent Co pay f ar them One fector ceuefng m~or great streas is pleced on cnntinu�
hnd simply baen chan- donora Co monitar eid to Ing ir~n�ore productton es the
n~11ed lnto current Meuritenie very cloeely ie lhat back~bone of the economy. The
even though the eume tnvolved biggest Acheme the country hse
expenditure. Indeed nre not greet, they nevrrthele~ ever undertaken, the (3uelb pro�
iC was subeequenC repn~rnt e very high per caput ject, is des~gned to prolong pro�
Saudi refueal to re- inveatment, ae Mnurilania'a duction until well into the ne:t
F~opuletion numhere ~nly, century by opentng new minee
lease �unde which 1,bmn, Another pr~blem is that, when the depoeita near Zouerete
dealt the coup de ape~: from imn�orr end under� are exhauated, Untortunetety,
grace to Che old ~~xplaited flsheries, Mauritenia this scheme, although vital for
regime. hea few nacurel resourcea, ex� Mauritsnia's future, hee had
Reassured by Che {~~ially since its IivC~tock herdb getbecke.
heve Ptill not recovered from the Under ,\Rohktar Ould
chattge, however, Che dmught. This fector hnlds down Daddah, the Societe I~aticntle
Saudis promised $100 ~cnnumic growth to e slow l,b'lo lndu~trielle et Miniere (SNIM1
mn to the GovernmenC n ycar, leg~ing behind a pop� WRA ~h~~?~K~ from a atate
of Ould Salek almoat ulnt'sc~n gmwth rate of 2.2"o rnmpany to a mixed venlure,
immedia tely. Some (~th e`,~0�~~ infant mnrtality). larKel~~ et the rcyuest of Arab
it iA hoped, neverthelese, that ~tnles who wcre tn cantribute
$30mn was deaCined the private sector mey take off money to the Krheme, Thie
for budgetary aup- iet~r thia year and force the PnM~ hns crn~tinued under
port ~nd $70tnn as a growth rate up. Meuritania has Ould Snlck, nnd four Arab
long-term developmenC aleo mede etrenuoua efforte d~mi~M hm~e now ~iven firm pro�
loan. Moroceo also H~nce th~ coup to rescheciule mi~ea to aul~w~ribe to the
fornign debts of eome $760mn, t~�>~~ I~rojeM.
gave $15mn as a gift ~e World Bnnk's report for But e fir~t upvet came wilh
f or the budget ~ f otm- 1978 put the country's debt� the n~~j~,7~nti~m un 3 January of
' ing Che f ixet al ice servicang retio for 1976 at 37�'0 of i~mnil Ould Amnr, SNIM's
of a promised $60mn. exports of goods and aervices - Secreten~ General, on the
Lib a(alle edl v the hiqhest ratio in the bank's m~~steri~~us gmunda thet he
Y 8 Y Y- list. cc~uld "no l~,nger fu181 his job .
ing with Saudi Arabis) ~~g 8~~ of effaira was His {x?ct hns tx~en tnken by Ely
provided $1Qmn cau5ed in part by a 37;"o increase Ould Allaf.
end leunched e number of co� in budget expenditure between refu al~berboth Kuweit and the
u{xrntion projecta and KuwAit 197b nnd 1976 and en increase of ~
27~~ between 1976-1977 putting ~Ab 111ining Company to
pmvidecl $15mn as e loan at ' eccept !~tnuritxnia a e~aluation
3.6",r', interest. The IMF and a heavy atrain on the belance of ~f S~111'4 e~~ets as ~,360mn. At
Frnnce have eleo ellocated pnYmente. L�est year the the end of Jenuary they 8nelly
funds, emounting to S4mn and bnlance�of�paymente deficit ~ttled cm S290mn. Since then,
g2.2mn respectively. widened even further with Ku~~~ait, the Arab Im~eatment
Theac donora were reaas+ured ~mporta expected to reech
by the ~litical etability which 5388.2mn, caqting about twice Company, 4torocco and the
fnlluwed the coup, end the as much ~ exporte, projected at islemic Development B~r?k
influx of aid Ateved off 5180.2mn. It ia hoped now thet have egreed to subscribe a total
immediate economic prablema. the heavy toll of defence of 59Smn for the capitsl of the
Since then, huwever, there haq gpending (accounting for new� S~iVI. Lib.�e end lraq are
been e noticeable pc~litical ehiR roughly 60"m of Meuritnnie'e al~o expected to tnke part but
tnwerds I.ibya end Algerie, meegre budget) can et leat be detail~ ere not yet knovm.
rnmbined wilh increasingly ~duced, elthough this cannot Thi~ is only hel[ the bettle,
overt tenaion be~ween blacica happen on a siKnificant acale how�e~�er. Economic experta
end Berbet~, end it ie not until the de facto ceesefire egree thet this project is vital for
~ k n o w n~ u n d e r t h e observed by the Polisario is :W auritania, but they wam that
circumatancee~ whether tranaleted into a long�term it ai11 not break even unless
aarnement. efficientl~� admini.atered. They
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etres~ thaC the capital cost is hug~ and tihat burgeoning administratiion
in Nouakchott threatens Co eat up pro�ita, which are ~lready decl.~.ning
- bec~use of the unfavourable world situatioa~
Hopes for the long Cerm are pinned an fishing, which is poCentially an
even bigger earner than iron-ore and contributed $14mn last year. _
The British White Fiah Authority recently eatimated that 3mn tona of fiah
ia caught in Mauritanian watere every year, at least 2mn of which is ,
caught illegally. They warn that immense difficulties are involved in
~ making this sector profitable �or the country aC large. MauriCaniane are
also anxious to improve agricultural output, held up by delayed irrigation
schemes. But agriculCural self-sufficiency wi11 take at least 20 years
to attain, even without a recurrence of drought.
COPYRIGIiT: Apr 1979 IC Magazinea Ltd.
CSO: 4420
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NORTH AFR~CAN AFFAZRS
MAURI'TANIA, MOROCCO TRYING TO PROTECT FISHING INDUSTRY ~
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Apr 79 p 106 -
(TextJ
I~~~rdly a wetk gues by without made repeated proteat~, buti The glate�~wned Offlce
y~m~e incident between petrot mc~et of the ownere of these Nationel dea Pechee fe gotng
!x?ets fmm Morocco end Aciating fectoriea tend to ignore ehead with a echeme to _
MnuritAnie and foreign (iqhing them, modemise the Moroccan fleet, Yf
ve~sels wc~rking the ric ? Atlentic Over recent yeare both budgetery n:etrictione do not ~
r~n?~tnl wnters, which run from Morocoo and Meuritania have aftect ita prc~gremme,l2 sardine
Tengicre in the north to beyond been attempting So develop and nine tune boete ee well as 18 -
Nc~uHdhibc~u in the eouth. their own fiehing and csr?ning trawle~s worth 34bmn, ere to be
M~~st recently, a neriee of induatriee, but their boate are bought in the next twoyeat~. `
nttecks toy Polisario guemllas smatl and out of date end The Moroccan Minieter of In� _
ngninst South Africen and cennot compete with the better� duatry & Commerce, Abdel-
Spenish ves.qels, which the eq~~ppec3 veseele from the Kemel Reghaye, ei~ed e
litkretion movement elteges are developed atetes. fiehing caoperation agreFment
" fishing illegelly in the Westem At the eame time, Morocoo with the Soviet Union lest year. _
Sahara's terri~oriel wete~s, hes 1ua been especi8~ly hard hit by e Tn exchange for Soviet aid in
led tn a significant reduction of E u r o p e e n E c o n o m i c training Moroccan crewe~
fishing ectivitiee along thie Communiry deciaion giving finencing feasibility etudies tor
Kt retch of the aeeboard. preference to Portugueee~ canning fecilitiee en~d the
- Thie 3,OOOkm�long constel Spahieh end Greek ~ardine.~. poeeibility of forming jotnt ven-
zone conteina eome of the Tinned eardinen re~~reaent e}xiut tura, Saviet ehipe were ~entec~
w~irld's richeat 8shing gmunds, A0~'~ nf M~~mccen fiah exporie npeciel fi,hing ri~ht� in
with Westem Seharen watere end more then helf of the.e are Moroccen weters.
elc?ne pcn.we~+.qing an estimeted nbsurbed by the European 'I~ie egreement, huw~~~~~~r,
2hn. t~?nnes of fi~h. The annual mnrket. Merocco'e over� touched off e minur di~~i~~mntic
ratrh in thia xrea ie conrer� N~?erinlisetiun in thiq domnin ia a incident beceuee Algerin n~~d
vntively rKtimated At upwerde ~u~ri~~us wcnkne~e. the Poliaario thuught lhnl KinR
of'2mn. tunnen. Momccnn fishermen heve Nuexn was u~ing it tn nrhieve
With thr gn~ing world need IK~en com~~leining thet over� de fecto recognition from
for pn?lein, the+e fi4hing fi~hing by G~reign boeta hes Maecow of Mrm~ccan amlrol
Krc?unda hava attrncted e tended to naiuce their cetch, a over the Westem Snhnn.
vrriteble Armeda fmm the ~criou~ mnttpr since the local Polienrio Secretary�Crneral
Suviet Unicm, South Africa, cnnning indu~try cfepend~ cm e Mohemmed Abdel�Axi: lpter
,lapnn, S~~ain and Portugal, x~eady supply of fi~h. Studiee told The Middle Eait that hi~
R~~nt~ frorn theee rnuntriee wc~rk ere ~nder wey w see whether movement hsd received
with ultrn�mc~dem refrigereted m~xlem fishinq boata can be e~eurences from the Soviet
fish�pnwcw.ying and cenning chNrtered, end expan~+ion of leadenhip thet the egreement
rhi~xa. Hnth the ~vemments nn.ahnre refrigeration facilities ie ~~ernl cmly Moroccnn waten
c~cmc~crne~1 nnd Poliearie heve AL.o be{ng con+idered, end did not involve th~ dipntled
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' Seheran zone. In 1978, for example, onl~~
Maurit.ania'e Mini~ter of 8p,000 tonnes of fleh ceme
~inence & Commerce, Sidi a~hore out of e total cntch
- Mnhnmmed Ould Bneijnre, hae eatimeted at between 80U,000
elen etresaed thet hie cow~ty le and Imn tonnee, Whet Ee more,
to put e great emphenia on the the Mauritanian Got~emmcnt
Anhing induetry in its ecuncnnic received a mere ~12mn tn
recnvery pian (ae� prcuinua royaltiee and fees from finhinR
article), To reach thle ganl compenies for e cntch ~~nlued et
_ Nouekchott hes decided t~ farm sround ~lbn,
_ joint venturee with both Arnb Put!{ng the new fiahing pra
and European etatee, Sn far gremme into ectian, the
euch ventures have Alarted w~th Meurit.anian MiniAter of Fl'~?~iryt
Libya and Ueq, nnd an n~ree & Merine Eoonomy, Ahmnd
ment with Egypt ehnuld be Ould Bouceif, negotintcd the
aigned eoon, baeic principlee of a thmr�~rRt
Previously Mxuritnnie hnd draPt egreement an fi`hiiyt ca
established a eyntem of licena operation with the EEC. Und~r
egreemente with the principel this echeme, which ahc+utd cc~me
flehing netione, but thie into effect in 1980, thc ~F.C
arrangement proved unnetiafea countries will teke pnrt in ,~~int
tory ee foreign ve:+sela [niled W venturea end provide I~chnic~l
eupply the Nnuedhibc~u�l~ehed ekille. In the meanume thry w~ill
canning industry with M ~~8~?1,~ 8p!'C~B~ TIRI1fr. O
aeeured flow of fleh.
COPYRIGHT: Apr 1979 IC Magazines Ltd.
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NORTH AFRSCAN AFFA]RS
MOROCCAN ~TERRORISM~ AGAINST ALGERIA DFNOUNCED ,
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-29 Apr 79 p 17
~ [Tex~] The Moroccan intelligence aervices are presently recruiting
terroriat candidates from among the vaet number of unemployed flooding
the kingdrna as we11 as former convf.cta who are urged to "reform"; the
idea is to train them and organize them in the form of urban eabotage
groups intended to sp~ead death and destruction in Algeria.
Several a~tempts hav~ already been mad~e in the border region at MBghnia,
where a bumb, placed by a Moroccan agent, exploded in a big cafe in the
city, in~uring about a acore of peraons. Haesan II~s advisore on ter- ,
rorism are currently puahing him into apreading this experiment to the
entire border strip.
Theae acts of eabotage wi.ll be pictured as counterguerrilla operationa
aimed against the fighting men of the Polieario Front. Theoretically,
the terrorist gxoups will be under the authority of the "National De-
fense Council" created recently with the participation of palitical
opposition partiea, especially the USFP [expansion unkaown] of Maeter
Abderrahim Bouabid and the PPS [Farty of Progress and Socialism] of
Mr Ali Yata who, for a month now, has been calling for "more energetic `
acti'on" by Morocco againet the Saharan fighters. That would aeem to
be the thruet of the "new etrategy" promiaed by the king to his feudal
followers.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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EGYPT
'AFRIQUE-ASIE' EXPOSES 'SECRET' ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDINGS, COLLABORATION
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-29 Apr 79 pp 8,9 LD
(Article by Sion Malley: "The Secret al-Sadati-Begin-Carter Agreements"]
(TextJ Since Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jer�salem on 19 November 1977
there has been a constanC stream of official and secret meetings between
Israelis, Egyptians and Americans. In Rabat, Washington, Paris, London,
Vienna, Rome, New York and Geneva, top officials and experts from the
three counCries had hundreds of hours of talks to establiah what kind of
relations Egypt and Israel would have after the signing of the separate
peace treaty,
The fact is that, from the day the Iaraeli secret services conveyed to
al-Sadat, through Morocco's King Hassan II, allegedly authentic documents
revealing that Libya had organized a plot to overthrow his [al-Sadat's]
regime (dacuments which his own secret services con�irmed as
genuine), the Egyptian head of state decided once and for all that he
could trust Tel Aviv and collaba:ate with its leaders. And firsC on
26 March in Washington, and later on 2 and 3 April, during Begin's visit
to Cairo, the two men reached agreement on implementing a whole series of
secret understandings, which had already been nego~iated at lengCh
between the Egyptian and Israeli secret services. ~
In actual fact, it all started in a Europesn capital (probably Vienna).
There, al-Sadat met with Ezer Weizman and asked him for a"special"
favor: to organize for him a personal audience with the all-p~werful
chief of Moaead (the Israeli secret service). The latter, Mr Yitzhaq
Hoffi, whose name is never published in the Israeli press, obtained per-
mission from Begin to accept Ct~e invitation. He arrived in Che Europesn
cnpital barely 12 hours after al-Sadat had made his request aiid was
closeCed with hi,m for several hours. Even Weizman himself was not allowed
to attend Che talks6 _
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Few people know what the two men said to each other. The only thing which
has �iltered Chrough from their conversaeion Chat day is that tihe rais
requesCed the "active and permanent cooperation" of Che Israeli aecret
servlce~ to "protect" his regime against ite "Arab and communiat" enemies,
and thaC Hoffi gave his conaent.
From tl~ae d~ay fortih collaboration began between the two countriea and 3.t
has indeed grown more active since the signing of the separate peace
treaty. In Cairo and Jerusalem, and a].so in aeveral weatern and nonalined
capitals, regul~r meetings are held between Egyptian and Israe~.i. agenrs
to exchange information of pareicular intereaC to Che two countries. This
exchange means thaC al-Sadat has now become Tsrael's informer not only on
Arab problema but also on international eventR of all kinds.
Today we are in a position to reveal some of the sECret understandings
concluded between Israelis and Egyptians, wiCh, of course, the approval
- and close cooperation of the United States.
Here are some of them.
1--Measures To Be Taken To DesCroy the T7nity of the Arab P'ronC HosCile
To the Peace Treaty
Provoke permanent troubles on Che Libyan borders to destabilize the
Tripoli regime. At some time in the future this could enable the
Egyptian troops to use the right of pursuit t~s ~ustification for entering fC"
Libya and trying to overthrow al-Gadhdhafi. A1-Sadat assures the Israelis
' and Americana that he has a Libyan political team all ready to form a new
regime which wou].d ~oin forces with Egypt.
Incite certain Kurdish mercenary elements to foment hotbeds of rebellion
in northern Iraq to disCract the Ba'th gavernment from the Arab-Israeli -
problem and persuade it to reverse its decision to merge with the Syrian
government.
Provoke community and religious troubles in Iraq and Syria. At the same
time, submit to the latter countr3~ a proposal for the gradual withdrawal
of Israeli troops from the Golan Heights provided that it 3oins in the
peace process initiated by al-Sadat and abandons the idea of inerging
with Iraq.
" If Syria proves "obstinate," provoke incidents on the Syrian-Israeli
borders which would give Tel Aviv the opportunity to attack Syrian terri-
tory and claim subsequently that the aggression was committed by Damascus.
Arouse mutual suspicion between Syrians and Iraqis regarding their respec-
tive intentiuna toward the Soviet Union and the United States.
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~or~ u~ricr~L vs~ oNC,Y
Pr~v~ne ~ rapproch~m~ne b~tw~~n Irsn and Iraq by playing on the Sunnite-
3hi'it~ faetor ~o as to m~intain permanene frict3on.
~xac:~rbc~ce di~putpc~ among the membere ~f the ~~udi royai fam~tiy reggrding
the ~ep~rgee p~~c~ tr~gry. tf t?e~e~~~ry~ "actively" hei~ eh~ F~hd-Sult~n-
al-~dysal wing, which i~ mor~ amenabl~ to an agre~ment with I~Yae1. (In
ehi~ ccnnection, we may recall the role p1ayE~d by cereain 3+audi pxincee
in Ch~ g~eaeeination of King ai-Fayea'1 who~E ant3~American feelinge w~re
~~ourc~ of seriou~ eoncern to the CIA and Etenr~? K3~~inger.)
Keep Aiger3a "occupied" by urging Morocco to maintain con~tant ten~ian
on the bordere. ~or thi~ purpose take advantage of the Sah~ran affair
ond offer aubetential aid to Mauritania ro prevent it from r~aching
a~grEen?~nt with Algier8 and Ch~ Po~ieario.
in~urp that th~ pr~liminary sgr~ert?ent~ between th~ two Y an~n~ come to
nothing. ThiR ie to prevent Aden from resumtng it~ aesietanc~ to th~
Dhofar combattants againeC Oman, which along with Sudan i~ thR only Ar~b
country to eupport C.hp leYaeli-Egyptian treaty, and to rekindle the con-
flict between the two Yesn~ne.
2. Actions Ta Be Undertaken To Paralyze the PLO gnd Enable Ceiro To P,Lay
~ ~"E~rntection" Role in the Arab World and che African Continent
~
'Creck down the moet hardline Palestinian elementg, vho coneider that ~he
grenting of internal autonomy to the West Bank and Gaaa i~ totelly
unaccepteble. Trecking them doan means phyeically liquidating them.
Persuade the nonalined African countries (or at least som~ of them) to
renew relationa wich Israel. A dozen countries have already given theix
conaent in principle, the israelis and Egyptians claim, notably ZairQt
Sene~al, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Central Africa, Upper Volta and G~bon~ -
Aggruv~te diecord emong the different groupe of the Pal~stinien resist-
nnce--i~ necessary by fabricating "documente" Which Would set the~ up
in arms againat each other.
Cc~vince llusayn of Jordan by various means (agents provocateurs~ assaesina-
tion att~mpta, end eo forch) that Syria and che PLO are plotting againat
I~te reqime. If necessary, threaten to overthra+ hiw in favor of another
manber of the royal family or by proclaiming a republic.
Triple or quadruple the number of Egyptian troopa stationed in Sudae to
prevent any popular revolt or coup d'etat against Nymayri. The latter~
moreover, hae allegedly agreed to the presence of Israeli secret service
"adv~~ers" in Khartoum.
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L~t cert~in Afric~n ~nd Ar~b countri~~ kn~w rhae Egyp~ pr@par~d eo
~uppor~ eh~m, if n~c~~~~ry, by ~~ndi.ng i:t~ tiroop~ Sn ~h~ ~v~ng o� ~a
~.n~urrection "~g~inat eh~ir ~nticommun~~t r~g3me~" or by r~eruiCin~
mercenari~~~
~ Indirecely encourag~ South Africa to maintain it~ pree~ure againeC Mozam-
bique, Angola, Madaga~car, 2ambia, Tanzania and so forth, to p+:~vent
the~~ countriee from actively aupporting ehe advereari~e of Cha aeparate
peace~
3~ Piedges Made By the United Sea~e~
D~~piee fr~aqu~ntiy ambigueue wordin~, t~~ Igr~eli-U.S~ memorandum accom-
pgnying the e~parate peace treaCy clearly eEipulatee the piedgee made by
We~hington.
IE ai-Sada~ did t~ot reque8t that ~ aimiigr documene iinking hie country
to the Unit~d Statee b~ draf~ed, it wa~ becauee the Igraeii-U.S. memoran-
dum corrQ~ponde perfectly t~ hie Wiehee. According to we~l-tnformed
American ~ourcae, the mPmorandum eigned by President Carter containe the
following:
Waehing~on promiees ~o ineure ~hat th~ eeparate peece tr~~t�y is respected
at a11 costa. It in~orme all Areb powere and organizations that if thie
"historic experiment" were threa~tened, its armed forcee Wou1d inearvene
imm~diat~ly. America would be all the more capable of doing [hie gince
it Will have at its diepo8al in ~he aree (chiefly in ~gypt and Iarael,
oE course~ naval, land aed air baees ag well aa all poseible military
facllitiee.
WasMington has decided Chgt any hostile action againgt th~ oil aealth of
the r~gion aould ronatitutc a blo~? eo ehe security and interests not only
of thc United Stat~s but also of the entire Western indu~trial world. The
blockmail could not be c.learer. uashington thua informs ali the Baghdad
summit participants, and also che socialist poWera, that ite armed forces
Will intervene to insure that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is reapected,
in r~ther Worde to protect "its" Arab oi1 and ite strategic interests.
'Chese are some of the secret agreements made among al-Sadat, Begin and
Cartpr. They are clearl.y an act of defiance against the Arab peoples~
an attack on their dignity and their sovereignty. It is up ta them to
meet the challenge by making eure they do no: fall inta the dangerous _
trupe l~id for them by the signing of the traitora' peace in Washington,
r~nd algo by remembering that the 1 million U.S. soldiers aent to Vietnam
could not prevent their oven~rhelming defeat, any more than the : million
French snldiera aent to Alge~ia gucceedpd in c~u~hing Chp Algerian nation.
CAPYRtGNT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
CSO: 4802
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IRAN
JAPAN~3E 0~'FICIALS ANAt,YZE IRANIAN CRISiS
Tokyo ASAlii EVENiNC NEWS in Englieh 27 Apr 79 p 2 OW
[ArtiCln bq Shigeo Omori, head of ASAHI SH2NBUN Analyeie end Research
Canter, from the "Weather Van" column entit],ed: "Political SiCuation in
Iran"j
[Textj It is difficult to make ou~ precisely what has been heppening in
Iran ~ince the revolution. The impreseion one gete from reading preas
reporte ie definitely ore of confuaion and instability. But the stebility
of the n~w goveYnment ie diractly connect~ad wieh 2ran's capacity to produce
and export oil, and thie is a aaatter of great concern.
I recently had the opportunity eo liaten to the vieas of two govprnmenC
oEEicials who are concerned aith iran~ On~ ie Nadhiro Amaya, the director-
general of the Natural Resourceg and Energy Agency; the other is Tsutomu Nada,
Japan's ambaesador to Iran, aho had rer,urned briefly to Tokyo. The vieas
of the two diverge considerably.
Amaya, in the course uf an addr~ss on the critical oii gituation, sgid that
the government of Prime Minister Medhi Bazargan reated on precarious
found~tions. it was being obetructed by the left and aas under preesure
Erom the right. The principal factor in the overthrow of the shah, he
dectared~ were the etrikes of the oil Workere which brought production to a
i~lt. Left-wing el~nents whi~h had penetrated ehe labor unions vere atrong
enaugh to organize 8trikes at will and bring do~+n the government. The
preasure Erom the right com0s from the religious forces~ in ahich
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni is the moet poWerful figure.
RclAtions between Khomeyni and Bazargan are touchy, alternating between
~lashes and cooperation, :~nd Khomeyni can atop oil production Whenever he
pleases. Ir. his analysis of tHe situation in Iran, Amaya indicates that
Japan rannot afford to be optimistic ~rith regard to the oil eupply.
Ambassador Wada took up his poet in Teheran last December. Earlier, he had
gained some attention for predicting--correctly, as it turned out---the fall
of the Pahlavi dynaety. In describing developtaents in iran to me, Wada
l.]. '
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1~'OR 01~'FiCiAL U9~ ONGY
be~an by ~ayin~, "I ws~ ~~eo~nished a~ eh~ 1arg~ numb~r o~ peopl~ ~n Tokyo
who b~iiev~ tha ~oi~ric~1 situae~on in Zran ~s ~xtremely un~eab],~ and thae
gr~~t upheavals ~t?�s eomin~ in eH~ not fioo d~sea~t fueur~."
Wade ha~ baen obeerving carafui].y at f~re~hand ~eveiopmenta ~n iran and the
1at~er h~lf of ehi~ artiele i~ be~ed on hia analy~i~ of 3e.
A Se~t~ of Ca1m
Aceord3ng to Weda, rhe ten~ion ahich had bu31C up throughout Iran di~appeared
at once with the departur@ of the shah, and rhe country quickly returned eo a
~tt~t~ of ca1m. Vieitore from Japan are all eUrprised at wHaC they eee,
~eying, "Ir'~ inconcaivebia thaC thie ie tha counery about which rhere'e
be~n aii that clamor in ehe new8 media."
Th~ number of rifles which the revalutioneries took from the armoriee is
eaid tn b~ about 300,000. But the greaC ma~~ri~y of ~ho~e riflee which
have noe yet been recovared have bean registered wi~h the loc~l revolu-
tinnary committeee by thoee who ara ~till carrying them, and these young
men ere being organized inCo a r~volutionary force. The authoritiee are
by no means disreggrding Che problem of weapone in the handa of the populace.
Thage youeg men~ under the control of the revolutionary committees, have been
maintaining law and order since the dismiseal of the military forcee and the
roii~e. The eituati~n ie in hand and not a single Japenese hae been hurt
@ither before or after the r~volution. NeW York City is a much more
dangerous place.
Bazargan, although an engineer by profeas3on, ie also an Islamic scholar
~rith a notable record of resistiance to the shah's rule. Khomeyni, in naming
Bazargan as prime minieter, praised him lavishly~ eayieg that ~o oCher man
could serve as aell in the post. Hia character and reputation are such
tl~at thc~doctrinairp zealots around Khomeyni cannot point accusing fingers
et him behind his back. Although he thinks 11ke a Western liberal and his
Way of thinking may differ froca Khaneyni'e, he is not in opposition to
~ran's religious forcee, but eeeks to aork aith them. Noa that his position
ha~ become aLronger, he can apeak out more fraely to Khomeyni.
'fhere mny be clashes of opinion between the two but these are merely disputee
WiChin the family. N~aither can afford to allow the other to step do~rn and
thnt i~ ahy I think there Wi~l be compromiae and gccommodation bett~?een them.
In the unlikely even~ of Bazargan quitting, h;s eucceesor ~,rould be a man from
the religious forces.
Islrun, aith its more than a thousand year tredition~ pervades all aspecta
of Iranien aociety. The revolution in Iran has fram first to last proceeded
under the direction of the raligious forces. The left did undertake a
vanguArd role but it did eo only under Khomayni's leadership, riding on the
great aave of rgligiaua fervor. ;fhe left is not strong enough to challenge
the religious forcea and take power in its o~m right. Again. the oil
~rorkere' e~rike aas part of the general stYike ordered by Khomeyni.
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Th~ aorid'~ peeroleum oxpartia e~eumed, ~um~~diateiy Qftar the revolution
in Februery, Chat ~ran would noti ba abl0 eo raeume oii exporee until
December becauea of the oppoeieior of tihe laft to exporte. However,
oii exporta began agai,n 3 Weeka after the eazargan cabieet took offic~.
The naw goveti~nnene's polici~e give priority to reswa?ing oil exports,
putting public financee back on a eound baaia and raeroring normai
condit~.one in ehe aconomy.
Ov~rwheim~ng Support
The overwheiming ma~ority of ths paopie gupport the Khomeyni-Sazargan
regime, and the government is coping wieh iee probieme in an efficiant,
cepebia manner ehat ~xcaede expect8tioee. Iran'e difficuleias ara formid-
abie but i believe the gcverronant wiil eomehow or other be abie to overcoma
them.
Cei1y oil productioe in March was about 2 million barrela, but the government
plane to etep up exporte during the courea of thie year tc beeween
_ 2~7 millioa and 3 million barrale a clay. if tha governmene hae an annual
revenue of $20 billion, ~here need be no concern about Iran'e etabiliey
in the long run.
Iren is exeremely grataful for Japen'A acticn in promptly extanding recog~i-
tion to ehe ravolutionary government. Japan en~oye a favorabla raputaCioe
throughout rhe country~ and Zran hae grea[ hopee in cooperaeiva ralatio~e
With Japan~ in coneection ~ritt~ tha Mitsui group'e petrochemical plant projact
and other pro~ecte.
co~xmffr: asagr sx~xsvrr Taxyro Hoxsga ly?9
CSO: 4920
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MAUtt~TANYA
UNC~RTAtNTY WMETHER NATIONALI3M WZLL WIN ~VER RACIAL ISSUE
London THE MIDDL~ EA3T in ~nglieh Apr 79 p 14
[Text~ Mauritani~'s ~eogrephical poeition, linking the Arab MAghreb with
sub-~ahar~n Africa, i~ continuing to play cruel trick~~ as the new regime
of Coionei Muetafa Ouid-Salek cautiouely triee eo disengage the country
from th@ Saharan conf~ict. The ceaeefire in territory controlled by Mau-
ritenia p~roclaimed by the Algerian-backQd Polieerio front af~ar laet Ju~y's
coup d'etat in Nouakchott has removed the direct military menace from the
~ north. But the ruling M1litary Committee for National Recovury (ChIIW)
has now had to turn its at~ention to rhe south, where a different problem
i~ threatening the fragile national unity.
Di,eaati~Eacelon on the part of the blaok population a~ong the SQnegal
Va11ey hne made iteelf felt increaeingly in recent weeke. initially the
black population had supported the new regime in the hope o~ ending What
th~y considered to be a var "between Arabe." In the nev cabinet, black
officers hold several posts, but none of them are key positions, and this
fact has given rise to complainte of diecrimination. -
This racial probiem is not particular to Mauritaria; to a greater or less
extent ell the Arab statas of North Africa face it. Sudan euffered 10
yeara of fraericidal war before the Arab and blgck populatione found a
modus vivend~. Chad is noo? experiencing atrife betW�en the Arabic-speak-
ing nomade of the north and the black Chriatian population of the south.
llnuritAnia hae n long hiatory of racist tension. In 1966 there aere ma~or
riots Wti~n former Preaident Mukhtar Ould-Dadda tried ta make Arabic the
ntEiclal language. The black population also ob~ected to Mauritania's
,~oining the Arab League in 1973, and to the introduction of an indepen-
dent currecy, the ouguiya, which they say as cutting them aff from their
"brothcrs" in black Africa Who use the CFA franc.
LnnKuage proble~s are not limited to Mauritania. Morocco, Tunisia and
Algcria have all had to come to grips aith them. Whether prefexence ia
given to French or Arabic tends to determine which sector of the ruling
elite is privileged.
14
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Over tihe paet few monehe Cha CMRN'e attiempte to haeten Ar~bi~ation have
exacerbated fr~c~ion, and formar b~ack Min3~ter of Educet3on Seck Ma~ne
~ ~iqck di~evowed Government policy by publicly supporting eh~ contiinuarion
af a bilingual educa~ionel sys~em. Th3~ provoked ~ych an ~proar that the
radical Minieter of the Intarior, Jiddou Ould-8alek, felt obyiged
to "reaffirm ehe country'~ artachment, ~n ite toeeli~y, to Arabo-Islamic
cu~.ture." '
When aeked if th~ demands of eha black population were ~ueti�~ed, one
genior MauriCania diplomet told TNE MIDDLE EA3T that whenever the country
hae political problem~ the racial ~seue comes to the fore. -
Un1~ke Sudan aed Chad, Mauriean~a hae only one reiigion end culture, al-
though there aYe ethnic differences. The diplomaC added thae tha differ-
encee were being ~mphe~ieed by forcee intent on preveeting the CMRN from
con~inuing iCe dynamic for peace. Even befora tl~e nra Governm~nt took over
. ehe Senegaleee Preeident Senphor threatened to demand "eelf-determinatioe"
for MauriCania's black population if a regime he dieapproved of was in-
stalled in Nouakchott. Senghor is a etaunch elly of King KASean of
Morocco, and ia thought~to reeQnt the rapprochemen~ taking place witfi
AlgBrie. Moreov~ar, Morocco ie not wiehout alliee ineide the preeent
regime. THE MIDDLE EAST has learnt that some other Arab cepitals are
aiso exarting preasure to get Colonei Ou1d-Sa1ek to elrn,r down the peace
proces~.
tt is not ~uet pan-Arab sentiment which ie behird the C1~tN'e attempts to
align Mauritania ~ith the Arab Worid. Any strategy for putting the ehaky
economy back on its feet ig contingent on the inflo~r of petrodollars. The
opening of near iron mines north of Zouerate, for example, depends on the
goodWill of several Culf atates.
It remaina to lse geen Whether the nationalist sentiment ahich animatea
both the Arab and black populations can provide the necessary cohesion
againet strife.
COPYRI~ItT: Apr 1979 IC Magazines, Ltd.
CSO: 4420
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MOROCCO
REPORTA(iE ON ABORTED COUP, SOCIAL, SCONOMIC, LABOR PROBY.EM3
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-?9 Apr 79 pp 16, 17
~Articie by H. Abou Feriel: "The Aborte~ Ccup d'Etat"]
~Taxt~ For three yeare noW, tihe Moroc~can army hae
bean liviag in a contradictory eituation: Doubi~
pay but mora aad more stagnatioa. Ovarehroaing
Haoean II ie the only ~tay out.
But where, than, are the 19 Moroccan officere Who "dieappeared" fYOm their
uaits more ehaa.a moaeh ago? Thay aert simply exeeuted eummarily on ordere
from Kiag Haeean It ic? pereon, folloaiag aa attempt at a coup d'Btat Which
t~tae extremaly hare-brained. Tha ne~te aas coufirmed for ehe familiee of
the executad iadividuais iadiractly.
The mutineera had a tW~i ob~ective: To overL~row ehe Alaouite monarchq
at Rabat and to turn the ehah of Iran, who at that time aae a refugee in
Morocco, over to the Irc.nian revolution.
Onc~ agaia, ia les~ than 10 years, "baraka" (luck~ aa8 aith Haee~.~ II but,
even more eurely~ eo wae the vigila~uce of the cnuntry'a s~cret eervices
for Wh~~;h, folloxing the fall of the shah, it wae neither de~,irable nor
opportu,Re to lose aaother pillar of imperialiam ia the Medl.cerranean aad
Africa.
The feW pereone cloae to the king's entourage. who `rere briefed oa the
affair, ~till tremble with fright before that pereeverance of the military
. eiace 1972. For them, the varniag ie quite ciear: In epite of--or because
of--t3?e humiliationa vhich it euffered in the `+e8tern 3ahara, in spite of--
or becauee of--the humiliatione to ahich th~ king eub~ecta it regularly in
order to divide it aad contaia it, the army for the time beiag hss not given
up ite idea of gettiag rid of its "commander-in-chief" 8aseaa ii.
It ie in thie context, pregnaat aith threats eo the throne, that the king
hae ~~t addreseed hie iaetructions to his court, hia government, and his
adminietration: Do "eomethiag neW," do "the unexpected," in order at
leaet to give the illueioct of movemeat.
16
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Officially, there ie at leaet a Cr~ple ob~ac~ive invo~ved here againeti tha
background of thie crieies Rag~in ~redibility on Cha intiernatiional scena,
' r~~~ore ~h~ mili~ary ei~uatiion ~~ha weeeern Sahgra even eti tihe price of
extend~ng ehe war, and finally reatore "e~ocial peace" a~ home without how-
~ ever heving to pay the price For tihat, or at least at the lowest poesible
coet.
The crea~ion of a"netionel defense couecil" and the repi8cement of Mr
Ahmed Oeman by Mr Maati Bouabid at tihe head o� the government moreo~rer
reveai the limitatione impoeed by the broad range of ehe economic, social,
military, and diplomaCic crisis engulfing the kingdom. They look more
like an aepirin given to a dying individual. Tha appeal to "eacred uaion"
at home~ the warlike accents along the bordere, aad the pYeee campa~gn
nnieaehed abroad eo explain the "big change"--thaee in effect ara part
of the ueual est af inetruments empioyed by r~agimes that are in deep
trouble but are incapabia of achieving real change.
But thie redietribution of rolee within the moaarchic machinery is inter-
esting becauee of th~ numbar and importance of avowal8 which it containst
Recognition, at la~t, of the war in the ~restern 3ahara for what it is;
fear is~ the face of a hardening of eociai etruggiee leading to labor
union rene~al~-ofeen agaiast the deaire of ehe established bureaucraciea;
anxiety in the face of the dip~omatic deadlonk which King Ha~Ban II's
~ adviaors are trying to exorciae by hanceforeh re~ectiag ~hat theq oddiy
enough call "aay interference ia Merocco's iaternal affairs," in relation
to a problam ahich for n~ora than 3 yeare nov has been taken up by ietar-
naei~onaL inetancee,
\ How to avoid war or hoa to fight it? A cruel dilemmg indeed.
How to a~+oid it, aith the leadere of the political parties aithin the
"National Defenee Council"--aad the king himeelf--involved in their o~m
game of trqiag to outdo each other ahich leavee them no way out other
than milixary adventure?
.
t~oat to do thie amid diplomatic ieolation aad even aithout th~ suppore of
"friendly" poWere--Praace and the United Statea--for Whom the kiag's
politicai and militarq ctedibility is at ite lowest ebb and aho refuee
eo coaimit thameelvee on hie aord alone?
How to do thie a18o aith aa army of ahich nobody todey knoaa vt?ether it
is reliable aad Which hae beea piling up fruetraeions and raacor since
~971.
The king has done everything to el3minate the cadres of qesteryear, thoee
of Ahermow~oa tradition, from the mountains of the Rif aad tha Niddla
Atlea, and he repiaced them ~rith "aew men," more cloeely tied to the
eocial etrata from ahich the regime dr~,We ite eupport. And has he
managed to makre it more reliable? Aftar Iraa, can anqbodq be sure that
thie ~rill aver come about?
~ 17
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Th~ Moroccan army ae a mattier o~ fe~t has been ~.iv3ng an exietance ~ull
of contradiction for thYe~ year~: Double pay, buC it a18o got eeuck in
the sand. A uselase and unueable force~ i~ look~ deg~aeed by Che Polie~
ario Front. xt pa~,d haavily fox r~aeponeibiliey of the Saharan raid on
Tan-Tan, ae witineseed by the axacu~iona during the days theraagter and
the appo~,ntimenti of a"naw man~' Colonel Abroq, to "fight against anybody
who breaka the un3ty of the rank~ and Yebe18 age~net the order of the
commander of the believere." On~ thing is eure in any caee: R~agardieea
of what order Hasean II gives hi~ army in the end (advance, etay in piace,
' or withdraw), it will turn ag8ineti him in tha end.
Crying 3ocial Di~parit~es
Along with ehe deterioration of the militaYy ~ituaeion--~hich, no matter
how one looks ~qt it, proves to be ratheY uneertain ae far ae tha king ie
concarned--the thruet coming from tha eocial sCrugglee adda a new element
to the politicai crieie which the counCry eank ieto since the and of the
euphorie of the "grAan march." It wae day-to-day real3~y which brought
out the contradiction betwean ehe unanimieC aad myatifying argument of
the monarchy, in tha name of zhe "unity of the nation" againet "foreign
perils," and the concrute and vital naeds of the popular maseee~ illus-
trated by the alogane at recane demonstrationa ia Ou~das "Sread--no
Warl"--in other Worde, very cloae to the demande of the Mauritaaian
peopie on the eve of the downfall of MokhCar Ouid Daddah, "iiater and
peace!"
The dec~ine in the etandgrd of living ia at the c:,re of the popular de-
mand: The purchasing power of the interoccupational guaranteed miniamum
Wage--s~hoee nominal value presently at the official rate does not exeeed
1.40 dirham--dropped bet~reen 15 aad 20 percent, at leaet, 8fnce 1972.
Moreover, the principal local food products, which constitute a source
of iacome for the Moroccan geaeante, are running ineo etiff competition
from importad faod producte vhosa pricee (etraagaly enough) are going up
at a leeear raee. ~Ie mLSt ~aalize that a Moroccan aorkeY muat trork more
chan one hour for a loaf of bread~ more than 1 hour and .30 minutee for
one kilogram of sugar, 1 hour and 1.5 minutes for oae kilogrem of beana,
and close to 11 houre for one kilogram of beef.
Noa, ae fa~r ae the unemployed are concerned, their number keepe growing
all the time. More aad more qoung people are ~oining the labor market
and the ~ltipie coneequencee of the aorldvide economic crisis (closing
of subcontract textile mille and return, in ehort-range or medium-range
term~, of a large portian of the irork,era Who had migrated to Burope,
and reduced returas from public--do~+n one-third--aad private iavestments,
do~+n 20 percent, etc.)--theae eake employment prospects look darker than
ever before. On top of r,hat ve have the crqing eocial di8parities vhich
only make for a vider gep betvean the poor and the veaithy of the kiegdom.
This ie true to auch a poi~t that, several yeara goo~ the government aa8
forced to eetabliah an inquiry commission whose first expiatory victims,
l~ `
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according to good established tradieion, covid even be ehe former caur-
t~~re or leading agen~e of Haesen II.
in this expioeive polie~,ca1 and social contex~, ~he king hae ~s11an back
on hie usuai tac~icet He addresses tihe agency manhinery over ~ha head of
the mili~ane xank aed file and trieA tio turn ehe o1d into ~omething new
by negotia~ing the neceeeary compromisea i.n the palace. In the final
analy,~ie~ what ~'change" is thare i.n appoineing a former min~.ater of ~ustice
--who ie particulariy diecraee about rhe "dirty tricka" of the king's se-
cret agenta--eg prima minister? Or i~t elevating a former director-
genarai of eecurity, who repreeent~ the very faca of represeion tio the
Moroccan militants, tn ehs poet of minister of the intarior? Or aonfir-
ming Mr M~hammad Saucetta in his poet as minieter of foreign affaire?
Or eimoet compiately r8ehuffiis~g ail og the minietare in tha pYeceding
. govarnment and finally puteing the outgoing prin~ minieter on the "Nat-
ionai Defenee Council?"
"Labori~e'~ Solutiion?
A~s far ae the compromises are concerned which muat be entered into 3n
order poeeibiy Ca reduce sociai tansion, if the leaderahip of Mr Abderra-
him Bouadid~e USFP [expanaion unknown] were ever to dream aboue Chis, ~t
is certain that the partisan8 of Mr Mohammed Basri would opposs that
~rith all of the force they etill have inside the party, pracieely at tha
momsnt When the Yecrudeecence of social atruggles enablee them to achieve
ehe conseruet~on of the ne~r laboY union organi~ation, that ie, the ~DT
(D~nocratic Confederation of Labor).
Aa far ae ehe old political fYiends o~ Mr Maati Bouabid are concerned,
they continue to remain silent; Abdallah Ibrahim has been completely
absent from the political eceae since 1974 and Mah~oub Benseddik, UMT
~Moroccan Labor Pederation) secretary geaeral aince 1955, has ~uat been
quietly realacted by the Sixth Congrese at Casablanca. There is little
likelihood thet he is thinkiag of a social truce ia the immediate future,
at ehe praciea momant ahen ths new rival labor union (the CD2) will force
the old apparatue of tha UMT to aaica up or to vanieh. Are both of them
thinking of the "laborite" solution which they have beea recommending
aince the beginuing of the seventiea? W'hat links did they maintain with
their formar fighting companion ia the atruggle for independeace--whom
they euepended but did not kick out of rhe UNFP when he aas appointed
minierer of ~uetice in the last 08man cabinet?
The fact ie that oae of the btggeet uakao~ma in the neW criaie staged
bq the king remaiae the role that vas asaigned to t~ir Magei Bouabid and
what meaas he aill have available in order to launch a"laborite solu-
tion" that ti?ili eerve the monarchy.
COPYRICE~T: 1979 Afrique-ABie
5058
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PERSIAN GULF AREA
PROBLEM 0~ II~IIrIIGRANT LABOR DISCUSSED BY MINISTERS
Par3~ AI.-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2-S Mgr 79 pp 20-21
(Article by Salih 2aytun: "Foreign Labor: Time Bomb Appointed To Euplode"]
(Text~ The dgngere of the population imbalance in the
Gulf arpa due to the p resence of foreign labore ra wae
the main topic at the first conference of minis ters
of labor and social affairs of the Peraian Gulf statee.
The ministers met in Doha to inaugurate the cooperation
of area etatea in the fielde of labor and social ser-
vices based on the great eimilarity of conditions in
the v~rious Gulf states.
One of the moet important outcomes achieved by the ministers was an agree-
ment on the basic organization of their conference. However, it behooves
us to stop aad consider the remarke made by s ane of the ministers during
the sessions--remarka which sum up the problen~ and the di.stinctive charac-
ter of the area.
Saudi Arabia expresaed intereat in cooperation 1~y area states in manpawer
d~velopment, training and social research by utilizing the area's abundant
resources. When the conference proposed that new regional centera be
establiRhed--a move which would lead tQ duplication and Yeduadancy beyond
tha t which already exietg--the SaudiB offered Che other Gulf states the
opportunity to utilize thefr apecial training organizations.
Bnhrain streased the importance of e~tabliehing regional Culf centera to
develop human resources in the labor and aocial fields in response to the
needs dictat~d by the procesa of growth in Gulf eociety.
The United Arab Emirates called for control over the inflwc of maapower
into the Culf etates in order to guarantee the attraction of Arab manpawer.
The UA~ miniate r of labor revealed the recognized and disturbing fact that
80 perccnt of the manpower in the Culf states comes from foreign countriea,
and perhapa thia is the reason for his eagerneas to control the influx.
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Ir~q can~~.dare that by s~Cting up the b aeic structure of the conference
Cheir work wil]. be puehed forward and the Offor~e being made in ehe field
of socinl and a conomic development wi11 be channeled. Lraq also praiaed
th~ UAE's commente on the control of manpawer. Like Kuwait, Iraq glso
considere ~abor the main instrumenti in the productiion procesa.
It can be aaid that the results o� the Doha meeCing are the firet practical
atep toward desling with the problem of foreign immigraeion which tlireatens
Co ch~..~.ge the compoaition of Che population in favor of the unanticipated
imm~.granta. In this regard, perhapa the UAE will become ehe moat importan~t
setCing for tihe cryatallization of ehis problem.
UA~'s Problema: Demographic Shortage
Onc of the arudiea on thia problem atated: To ehow ~ust how large a
phenomenon the proceas of importing manpower and experte frocn abroad is,
we provide the following figures: In 1964, the total population of the UAE
was no more Chan 84,000, moat of whora were emFloyed in raisiisg cattle,
fishing and collecting pearls. Then the popula~ion ~rew to 180,000
by 1968 as oil operatione began Co expand and manpor:~r was drgwn from neigh-
borin~ or nearby countries. fly 1975, the population had multiplied more
than three Cimes, bringing the total to about 656,000! This population
was diatributed among the emiraCes as follows:
Emirat~ Population
Abu Dhabi 240,000
Dubai 21Q,000
Sharj ah 88,000
Ra's al-Khaymah 57,000
Umm al-Qaywayn 16,000
Fu~ ay rah 2 4, 000
' A~ man 21, 000
Total 656,000
The latesC statistics prepared in 1977 indicate that the population has
reached 862,OOU distribc:ted among the following age groups:
Population Groups in the UAE
Age Group Number Percent
4 yeara and under 98,400 11.4
5-14 128,700 14.9
15-24 183,600 21.2
25-34 245,600 28.5
35-44 120,900 14.0
2~
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45-54 51,100 5.9
55-64 20,200 Z.3
65-74 9,900 1.2
75-84 3,200 0.4
85 and older 400 0.1
Total a62,oo0 loo
The country's lab or force ia no more than 35 percent of the total popula-
tion.
These figurea make it clear that the critical problem is that foreign
workers who have come to the UAE com~rise no less than 75 percent of the
total population, and the ma~ority of them do not knaw Arabic. Estab lished
srafiistics show that SO percent of thoae who entered tice UAE in 1976
did nat epeak .'!rabi~:. xn the oil industry, 2,130 workers are Aratts as
opposed to 3,164 ioreig~ere.
Studies by security experts eum up the dangers which could reau].t frcm
the population imbalance caused by an increased importation of f!oreiEn
lab or, singling out first of all the strategic factor. Accord~ng to the
� experts:
The atrategic factor is one of the main cauaes of the immigration of for-
eign workers and techniciana into the UAE due to its oil and ita location
on the shores of the Persian Gulf, controlling 400 miles of ahoreline
in a vital area.
It is now clear that the increase in the number of immigrants to the
Gulf states, including the UAE, coincided with a longrange Iranian plaa
to gain control gradually and without a war over the oCher coast of the
Persian Gulf by sending groups of immigrants as workers and technicians
and eventually establishing an Iranian ma~oriCy there. This is considered
the most serious effect of foreign immigration into the Gulf.
In recent years, the strategic motives for imanigration have becon~
stronger. The United StaCes has overseen a process in which thousands
of South Koreans and Taiwanese of armsbearing ages have been sent to th e
Persian Gulf states.
Strategic Goals of Immigration
The strategic goals and dangers can be clearly su~nmed as follows:
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~oR oF~ic~nt. us~ orr~Y
1~ Zmmigr~tion �rnm ~everal nofl-A~ah couneriee t~ th~ P~r~ien Cuif gre~
i~ nothing bue ~n aCC~mpC to ~iiminat~ the nati*~n~l id~neiey of the
Arab population by maic~ng them a minority i.ncapable of deterenining eh~
faee of the area, after the foreigner~ hav~ beco~ an ev~rwh~lmi,ng ma~ori~y.
Th~ pr~e~nca of for~ign innnigrant~ in large percQntagee providea a
pr~text for ehe immigranta' nativ~ etaees eo ineerfere in a hoee counery
on th~ basie of prot~cting ehem in aa emergancy. Thus, the hoet country
bpeomes the targaC of foreign interference which could bacome very
s~riou~.
3. Coloniee of immigrant~ owe loyalty to eheir nativ~a country regardleae
of t~� nature of its poiitical eyatem. Becauae of this loyaity, they can
b~ uaed ag a fifth colwmi for their country's propagnnda purposgs or
for sab otage and ~spionage. Moreover, if tha. need erieeg, they can be
us~d eo aesiat in any military action ahich th~ir etate directe againet
ehe ho~t country.
4. The individuala who belong to immigrant colonies eteempt to weaken~the
t~E3 which bind the Arab citizens in the hoat country with the Arab na-
tion as a whole h^cause foreign colonies aee the tiea be n+een the Arab
population in the host country and the Arab nation as a threat to their
welfare.
S. There is ac~, increase in eocial fragroentation, culturgl conflict,
moral disintegration, outbreaks uf crime and a hoet of varioue imparted
morol and behavioral defects vhich car? be attributed to the contrasting
origing of Che values and mannera.
~K
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARASI ~
8S91
CSO: 4~02
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9ULTANAT~ OF ~AN
QABtJ3 3EEN MOVINC CLOSER TO UNITED STATES
Paris At-WATAN At-'AMHI in Arabic 2-8 Feb 79 p 26
~Arrici~ by Pereiaa Cuif af#ai~re editor: "Suitan Qabue' Niglttmare imp8le
Him to Military Rapprochement Wieh WgsHington"j
(Textj There is a a~ea~ure of agreemene among obaervgrs that the Suleanate
of Oman ai11 be the firet place ahere the changee in Iran wi11 be reflecred
in the PerBian Cu1f are8. The Yeason for ehie i~ the d~parture o.f the shah
~+hich nullifiee the validity di the eecret agreemente which had exiatfd be-
t~reen ~he shah and Sultan Qabue on a personal baeie since the Dhofar Re-
volution. These agreemente made the Sultanate of Oman practically a center
of Irnnian influence and point of departure in the ehah'8 plac~ to control
th~ Strait of Normuz and to uee the Sultanate to exert preeeure on n~ighbor-
ing ,~tates~ ineuring that the vill of traa could be imposed in various vays~
including direct and indirect in~erveetion in local disputes and disagree-
~uents.
The Sultanate Af te r Changes in iran
The fact ia that the change� in Iran. based on the etatement by Iran's
nea prime minister, Dr Bakhtiar (representing the opinion of the opposi-
tion), that Iran does not intend to continue to piay the role of police-
man in the Culf area, has caused ne~+ aaxiety in the Sultanate of Oman. The
sultan and his advisere have been intently atudying the effect of these
developmente on the sultan's poeitions and policies in the area.
To help hi~? vith this matter, Sultan Qabus has called on a n~aober of
British and American experte to eva~uate the poesibilities and deduce the
outcomea.
Observers and analysics believe that if the ne~+ regime in Iraa continuea
it~ course of reducing Iran's role from a state endeavo:ing to gain open
c~ntrol over the Cu~f area~ the SNltanate aill be forced in the fina~
an~lysie to move toWard improving its relations with Saudi Arabi aad the
UAE in order to fill the vacuum left by Iran--a vacuum ~+hich the Omaai
Cov~rnment feara may provoke the government of Aden te resudme its encourage-
ment of revolutionary activity in the Sultanate.
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Coneacta With the tla3eed Stae~s
Ae we aaair rh~ re8ulee of th� new evel,ugeion~, it appear8 elaer thae eh~
~ulean hae ent~red into imm~ diate ~ontacte aieh ~he Un~ted 3eates 8o ehee
it cen take Itian'~ place 3n eh~ 3uir~n~ee. rhi~ i~ b~8ed on the expan~ion
of th~ miiieary facilieiee for al,r and neva~ forcee vh~ch the eult8n pre-
viou~ly granted ehe U.B~ 7th Fieet.
Mor,eov~r, A1-WATAN AL-'ARASi ha~ i~arned thgt Sultan Qabue hAe decided to
pay ont of his own treaeury the Iranian forcee who are etationed in Omat~
and Musca~ 88 a resarve force against e ree~eion of the Dhofar RQVOiu-
eion and in accordance arith the ~oint communique ~esuad by ehe euitan aad
the shah in December 1977. This comm~miqu~ etated ehat iran end the Sulte-
nat~ of Oman coneid~r8d the~aeivea reeponeibie for guaranteeiag the se-
curiry o~F the 3~rait of Hot~auz.
Th~~ decieion Wae made as a reeuit of reporte that the nea Iranian reg3me
, decided to withdrar~r iran'e forcee from the Suitana~e of Oman in order eo
reduce expenditures and to give.an indication of the radical change in
~ts :oreign policy.
~ In apiCe of the concerna of Sakhtiar's government, Sultan Qabus eent a
meseage to the commander of ehe Iranien Army anfl ehe mi,nie~er of dQfenee
informing them that his government aee ready to explore the poaeibil~ity
of paying part of the payroll expeneee go that the Iranian forces could
remain in Oman.
AL-WATM1 AL-'ARABI has 1earn~d that the prime miaiater of Iran iesued in-
structione that this meesage be ignored and that it not be ans~aered.
Recent reporte from Muscat state that confusion reigns in tihe offices of
the royal palace because of the Iranian developments, and Sultan Qabus
feels that aith the shah's departure he has lost a atrong ally aho had
backed hYm in his ailent struggle aith his neighbora, especially the UAE,
inasmuch ae the shah supported hie demand that the Sultanate's bordere
With Ra's al-1Q~aymah be changed right after oil aae discovered in the
di~puted area.
Tt~ree monthe hefore,the eultaa had ordered mi~itary move and concentrationa
� in order to exert psychological preeaure; however, responsible authoriCiea
~ in the UAE ignoted these actions, although they had already taken the pre-
cautionary measures dictated by probab~e developments.
Informed gources revealed that the shah had played an important role in
Sultan Qabus' move aWay from Saudi Arabia~ despite the large amout?ta of
Saudi aid he had received for a road construction program, to etrengthen
the army and to develop and~invest in copper mines.
;
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The eha.'~ wae bQhind 9ultan Qahug' ~re~eceion of ~ pro~~ct to ~ay an oi1
pipeline from Dhahran to Rayeue on the Omani coaeti~ a pro~nce ahic~h wouid
have heip~d to div~reify ouelee poinee for Saudi oil.
Ar that time the shah coeeidet~d t~a pragect +~~n "act of agg~ta~ai,on."
The 3h8h, A1-SadaC 8nd Q~uB
The eh8h aiao p~ayed an importan~ role in steering 8ulean Qabue eoo?ard
abso~uee snpporC #or 3adae'e poi~cy, and he obte~ned apec.~g~ facil~,ties
from ~he eultan uhich permitead iranian piaaes to make reconnaiaeance flighte
over n~aighboring areas.
The ~hah ~ae p~anning eo halp Suiten Qabus Qstabiieh n co~iega for PQrsian
Culf yourh attachnd ~o the Uaiversi~y of 9hiraz. It vouid have providad
the kind of capriva~ing pro~agenda ahtch Mweolini reeorted to durinR tha
Fe~ciat ragime in Ita1y prior to Norid War II in an attempt to antice Arab
youth and impt~ese upon tham rhe greatnaes of Italy.
Trilaterai Axi� of Pressura
Th~ iar,g range goal of che tranian policy of stmul~aneouA rapprochemant
aith the S uitanate of Oman and 8gypt wa8 to Qetablieh a trilateral axie
of presaure compoaed of Iran, the Sultanate of Muecet aad Sadat's Sgypt
in order to control the petroleum linee in rhe Peraian Gulf area and the
Red See and to dominate the aetare of the Norn of Africa, with tha eerata-
gic cooparation of the Unitad 3tatea.
In orde r to accomplieh this, the shals began aecret negotiation8 vith Pre-
aident Sadat 6 months prior to his do~mfall. In these negotiations, he
agreed to stop using Israel's Elat-Ashqelon oil pipeline to pu~ Iraniaa
oil ~o the ehoree of the Mediterranean providQd that he could use Bgypt's
Sumad oil pipeline for that purpoee inatead...hoaever~ in exchange fer
obtaining nav~l aad air rorce fac.~tic~es in bnth Port Said and Suei.
COPYRICHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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CSO: 4802
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.
TUNI3IA
DESTOUAIAN CAMPAIGN AGAIN3T OPPOSITIONISTS DBNOUNCSD
Par~e APRZQUB-AStE in Prench 16-29 Apr 79 pp 18, 19 ~
~ ~Areiais by Adei Wah~,dt "The Mutiny Againet th~ Milieanra"~
(Text~ Unable to come up With ~ny solutione to tha
Tu~isian crieie, the Destourian governmear hag ~ust
launched a va~e oparaeioe againee oppositioniete.
"I wiii have their haade bafore thay~have mine," shouted Mohamad 3ayah
in a epeenh delivered eeveral weeke before the 26 Jeauary 1978 ma8sacre~
thus directiy tackiing the UGTT (Tuniaian Generai Federation of Labor].
Than the chairman of the Deatourian party, tha iaader of the "havks" in
Che PSD (Deetourian 8ocialiat ~arty~ aad oae of the chief iastigators of
ali the kiiling on "81ack Thuraday," acted oa his threat and ehared what
he ie capabia of in the maeter of represeion. One must not take hie
aorde lightiqi he tmotis vhat he wante and he doee noe care `?hat meaas he
has to uee to ,attain hie goais at the moment ahen the preparationa for
the coming congreee of the P3D, acheduled for nexe September~ once again
"laceratee" tha Deatourian family.
In the dull rivalry betveen the various factions of the PSD today, any-
thing goes in an attempt to control a maximum of Destourian cells and
thua gaiaing a poeition of etrength.
The etalces aYe indaed high: The side t~hat can gain control over the con-
greee a?ill have all chaacee on its side in the race for po~er vhich today
enters its decieive phase.
NoW that Mohamed Sayah prides himeelf on having gotten scores of thou-
eands of citizene to ~oin the party recently--a figure Which has been
tremendously inflated and ~,rhich includes phony memberehips, we muat
poiat out hcre--Premier Hedi Nouira ie more ekeptical. Without of courae
going eo far ae to admittiag that the PSD has become a aclerotic orgaai-
zation, devoid of an,y subatance and content, he coneiders this suddea
influ~c to involve a L�unch of opportuniets, mostly, and he does not re-
frain from ecolding them roundly by declaring: "Some people are ~oiniug
the party for peraonal reaeons."
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Ned~, Nouira oppose~ Mohamed 8ayah'~ m~n3pula~ion~ wi~h "opann~~~" and
"dia~.ogu~," although ha aurroundg thag~ ew~ ~de~~ With ~ueh e 1~rge number
o~ reetrintione thae thay wied up m~aning nothin~ in th~ end. Thie a
atrange policy of "opening" which righe awgy excludae a11 ~eprnsantgCive
poli~~n81 ~urrante, thue danying eh~m eha right Co a l~g~l axieeence,
which keape politicai militants aad labor unionie~e in prieon and Qner-
gatinally re~~QC~ eh~ muleipa~ey ~yet~m ~"pradun~ ~f th~ W~~e" wh3eh
ie noe ~n 13n~ with Tunieian reality. The premiar ~e lacking a cartai,n
degree of apiomb when ie comeg to piilorying Wee~arn "model8~" whaYaaa
h8 wa� ~he liret, ever e~,nce his appoinrn?ent in 1971, to open Tuniaia~s
orlde gaeaways to Weetern civilizatiot? ~.n terme of tha wc~rst ~,r hae ~o o�fer,
euch ae the icaporti o! luxury coneumer goods, ~epeated appeal8 to foreign
bueines~men eo inv~et in Tunisia through exorbitanr tax exemptions (the
law of Aprii 1972), and the eetsbiiehment of offshora banks. Tha aconomic
groath giguree are cerefully calculaeed according to methode aad models
copiad from ehoee of the Waett Afrar all, wae not the famoue and ephemerai
- "progreee contract" ieeelf patternad after the "aociai contract" of Chab~c?-
Deimaa?
Th~ premier ie gearing hie "opening" particularly tos~ard tha young peopiel
Reprassed aC the uni.vereity~ coneigned to eo-cailed "pubiic aervica" camps
Wlten thay could noC get a~ob~ victims of unemployment spreading to all
eectora, eub~ected Co all kinds of vexatione- Tunisian young paople are in
a good poaieion eo irrterpret thie "opening" for what ie i8.
By atrtking the terrible bioa of 26 January 1978 ag~inst the popular move-
taent and by reeponding ~i.th a massacre to the demande of the young peApie
and the workare~ the eetabliehmeat believed t~at it had�for a long tia~
finiehed off aay oppoeition and in ehe illueory calm of recent montha eaat
proof that it had eucceeded. Bu~ it failed to reckon with the deC~ermina-
tion of the couatry's active forces to pursue the atruggle. Labor union
re8lstance, loyal to the UGTT leadership atill in ~ail, is being reorganized
and, compar~d to the puppet directorate headed by Ti~ani Abid, it looka
like the autheatic apokesman of the workers. The atudents a~e once again
challenging eelective policies in the matter of education and recently
conducted a etrike.
Diecontent is even ~preading to the farthest corners of the land. Thus~
the s~mll village of Dahmani, 28 kilometers from Kef, on 10 and il February
witnessed unueual aggitation. Interior miniater Dhaoui Hamtablia, aho
was holding a public meeting, reaponded with insults and crude remarke to
the proteeCe of the iahabitanta Who ~ere victims of unemployment and deplor-
able road and heaith conditione. The miniater'e staCements were receivesl with
an outburet of epontaneoue hatred; aeverai huadred persona garhered in
the village �quare and remained Chere, lined up for 48 hours, shouting
elogans hostile to the government; they kidnapped the coiomander of the
National Guard, who had ueed his weapan and Wounded a demonatrator in.the
hend. Police end gendas~erie reinforcements, hastily summoned from Kef,
aeverely repreesed the demonstrators. Out of 200 peraons arreated, 28 are
atill in ~ail.
2$
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Dividad tihough ~hey ,.he group~ wieh~n ehe P9D er~ 3n agreement a~
laaee on oc~o pointis 8~praAa eha voice of the oppoeiCion ae any priaa and
preeent tha imaga o~ e calm and harmoniouB Tun3oia t~ dom~eCic and ~ntier-
nationai public opinion, ~uee a~ew monrhe be~ore tha opening of tihe con-
graaa. Tha gact ia that thn campaign of inttrnatir~:ai aolidarity r~ith tha
labor un~on militiante and tha uneiring acriviey af th4 TuniOian oppos3Cion
abroad aso upsatting and wo~zying eh8 eBeabli~l~mene mor~ than ie o~ieh~e eo
admie in pabiia.
. (~ood Job ~
The recent ~x~,p by Mr Ahmad Ban ~alah~ the bxaine behind eha Mt1P (Movamene
~ for Popular Unity)~ to the United StateB and Wast Oarmany and~ ganeraily~
eha good ~ob dona by tha lef.t-aing opposition "are tarniehing ehe imaga
of Hourguibisn ZLnieia and a~ra ieolatieg ~the regime on the intarnatianai ~
e~ene" according to reeponeibi~ Tunieian ~ndividuale taikieg in pYivata.
To p~iliate thie etate of effaiYS and to kill any oppoeition movement~ the
Tunieian ragime hae launched a vaee campaign of threatg and intimidation
against Tunieian militants abroad and mora particulariy againet thoae of
the MUP. Severai ecoras of piainclothee police officers aad informante
of ehe P8D in recent waeke ~re diepaeched to Paris wi~h the mieeion of
infii~rating the ranke of is~.tgrant Workers who are becaming more and more
attantive to the euggeatione of the oppoeition, in order to eseablish PSD
ceila thare and counter the exile oppoeitioniste by all meaus available.
Shadowing, aaonymous phone calis with death threats~ aad aearchee of homeg
have increaeed considerc?bly.
While it is difficuit Co say ~uet how far the ~unieian government intenda
to go along thie road~ muat it wait for the irremediable to happen? Muet
it waie for Tunieian militaata to become victima of phyeical aggreasion
by a regime Which today more than ever before realizea the point to which
it has become ieolated and discYedited both at home and abroad?
,i
COPYRIGFiT: 1979 Afrique-Aeie
� 5058
CSO: 4400 ~
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