JPRS ID: 8454 TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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JPRS L/8454
ii May 1979
.
. ~ .
TRANSLATIQNS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ~
FOUO N~, 634
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NOTC
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JPRS L/8454
1]. May 19 79
TRAI~~LATI OfVS ON SUB~SAHAN~AN AFRI CA
FOUO No. 63~
~ COIITENTS PAGE
INTEIt-AFRICAN AFFAIRS .
Unprecedented African War Annlyzed by Marc Yared
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Apr 7g) 1
CENTRAL AFRICAN Ei~'IRE
Emperor Bokassa I Releases Prisoners
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 Mar 79j........ 4
Bokasea Described as Being Megal4maniac
(E. 21ngo; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16-30 Apr 79) 5
CHAD
Kano Agreement Has Not 5ettled Chadiai: Problem -
(Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Apr 79) 7
CONGO
Nation's Orientstion To Be More Radical Following Congress
~(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE~ 16-30 Apr 79) 10
.
LIBERIA
BrieFs
Saudi Petroleum Supply Agreement 15
FIDA Loan 15
REUNI~N
Cantonal Elections Analyzed by Yvon Mace
(AFRIC~uE-ASIE, Y6-29 Apr 79) 16 -
- ~ - (III - NE & A - 122 FOUOj
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CONTENTS (Con~inued) Page
S~NEGAL
Premier's Official V3s~t to ~rance Conaol3dates CooperaCion
(MARCHES T1tOPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Apr 79)......... 19
TANZANIA
1978-1981 P1an for Zanzibar
(MARCHES TRO~'TCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Mar 79)......... 22
UPpER VULTA
Movement Towards Unity Go~�ernment Examined by Siradiou Diallo
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Apr 79) 23
ZAIRE
Mobutu's Efforts at Rehabilitation Viewed With DisCruet
(Jack Bourderie; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16-29 Apr 79)............ 28
Arms Trafficker, Mercenaries Arreated
. (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Feb 79)........ 31
Mobutu Visits Europe Seeking Aid
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Mar 19)........ 33 ~
' Briefs
Budget Deficit 35
PRC Aid for Drought 35
-b-
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, INTER~FRICAN AFFAIRS
UNPR~CED~NTED AFRICAN WAR ANALYZED BY MARC YARED
Paris J~UNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Apr 79 pp 12-13
' (Texe] In several weeks time, the n~ture of the conflicC between Uganda
~iid TnnzAnia has changed and becomp an unprecedented African war. Origi-
nally (in October-November of 1978), iC was a duel between two heads of
state which everything opposed to each other: their social origin, religion,
,education, aharacter, type of government, regional alliancea (of JEUNE
AFRIQUE no. 948).
A Moslem born into a humble family, the Kampala dictaCor acquired a rudi-
meneary education. He is a cynical actor moved solely by ambition. In
_ order to safeguard his power, he chose a bloody internal represaion and
alliance with Arab states which made it possible for him to receive
important financial, petroleum and military backing.
The "Mwalimu" ("professor" in Swahili) of Dar ea-Salam is, for his part, a
"progressive" intellectual profoundly marked by his Catholic convictiona
and by Anglo-Saxon culture. His dream is to transform hia country into
a federation~of communal villages, or "u~amaas." Contrary to Idi Amin, �
Julius Nyerere incarnates in Black Africa a tradition which ia disCrustful
of the Arab world.
Today, however, the bilateral character of the Ugandan-Tanzanian dispute
is becoming more and more blurred. An internationalization of the conflict,
fraught with danger for the entire dark continent, hovers in the air.
Africa is threatened threefold.
. --Tlie invasion, since January, of Uganda by the Tanzanian army is a serious
precedent. For the first time in Africa, we are witnessing armed inter-
vention of a state openly intended to bring down the regime of another state.
Tt~e Ogaden war (July 1977-March 1978) was intended to aettle a territorial
disp~te. .Furthermore, the $omali never admitted that their army took part
in combat. Libya has never admitted that some of its Croops were supporting
Chadian revolutionaries against the legal authorities of that country. Even
Egypt mad~ it clear in July 1977, when they launched a mini-war against
Libya, th~t th~y intended to "teach Colonel Qadhdhafi a leason," but not
overthrow him...
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CerC~~.n delegaCes of ehe United NaCions Security Council and of the Council
of� Ministera of the OAU (Organization of African Uniey), which met in Ngirobi
(frnm 23 Februnry eo 4 Marc}~), did not hesirate to con~ure up the apectre
of. nn "Ugandan Cambodia" with Tanzania playing VieCnam's role. In 5ouCh-
e~st Aaia ae in EasCern Africa, the army of a"progresaive" country has
launched an aesaulC against anoCher "progresaive" country accused of tyranny
and serious human rights violationa. What country of the dark continent
could feel iCself eafe today from an identical undertaki.ng?
More serious sCill: the Tanzanian army ia accompanied by Ugandan opponents
who are aupporters of Dr Milton Obote, the predecessor of Marehal Amin.
What African top man can henceforth not fear the r~rurn of his predecesaor
in the ammunition wagons of an enemy army?
--The aCeitude of Preaident Nyerere, who oppoae~ to the "syndicaCe of
African heads of etate concerned with perpetuating their power," the interests
of Che people atruggling against tyranny, riaks widening the gulf between
the con~inent's moderares and progressives. A near-unity of militant
African supporCs Dar es-Salam: national liberation movements (the Rhodesian
Patriotic Front, Namibia!s SWAPO, the Saharan Polisario Front), "frontline"
seates oppoaing the raciat regimea of SouChern Africa (Botswana. Zambia,
Mozambique, Angola) and revolutionary co:~ntries (EChiopia, Madagascur, Benin,
the Congo...). On the other aide, the "moderates" (Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya,
2aire, Rwai~cla) fear the contagion of the Tanzanian example and a calling
into question of the status quo.
--Finally, and above.all, the conflict between Dar es-Salam and Kampala
risks causing the old demons Qf pre-colonial Africa to rise again: the
antagonism between Arab Mr~~lems and Black animists or Christians. For the
duel beCween Idi Amin and ?Jyerere has become a confrontation between
Tanzanians and Libyans on Ugandan soil.
' For the Eirst time, the Jamahiriya troops intervene officially beyond their
frontiers. Champion of panfslamism and of panarabism, Colonel Qadhdhafi
is combatting in Kampals the "Mwalimu," who incarates~anti-arab Black
Africa. For once united, the overwhelming ma~ority of Che Arab-Islamic
"Oumma" (community) (with the exception of Algeria and Sbuth Yemen) approves
Libya's ~ttitude: allocation on 15 March to Kampala of four million dollars
in aid by the Islamic World Bank; appeal fron+ the Islami~ C>>nference for
withdrawal of Tanzenian troops; multiform aid furn:~shed Idi Amin by the `
Palestinians, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arabic Emirates,
the Sudan and Egypt. The Ugandan opposition has threatend to execute in
reprisal every captured Arab combattant.
This evolution is all the more fraught with implications for the future in
that tension is perceptible today in the ma~ority of the continent's zones �
wher~ there is a junction between the Arab world and Black Africa: Mauritania,
where a Front of the Negro-African Peoples' Armed Str.uggle was created on 29
Marcl~; Chad, where Moslems on one side, and Christians and animists on the
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orher indulge in random alaughter; EriCrea, where Ethiopian forcea are _
~ ~ightfng againsC naCionalist maquisarda supporCed by Arab stACes; South
Sud~n, where a smAll ~roup is trying Co renew guerrilla warfare agninat
thc: Arub-Moslem North.
~ 7'he war beCween Ug~ndci and Tanzania ia a fuae which can blow to bits not
only a solidarity already rudely Caxed among t~~e continent's states, but
even their terriCorial integriey. The OAU and hfrican public opinion muse
be awar~ of this.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9330
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CL'~ITRAL AP'RICAN EMPIRE
EMPEROR BOKASSA I REIEASES PRISONERS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 698
~ext7 During a ceremony arranged in 8erengo on 22 February by atudents of
~ Bokassa Foundation on the occasion of its 59th anniversary~ the head of the
Central African state gave a speech and released certain prisoners. Hoxever~
this act of clemency daes not apply to all prisoners= the exceptions arer
--persons prosecuted or cor~emned for political reasons (the emperor places
this number at about 20)i
--persons proaecuted or condemned for attacking the internal or external se-
_ curity of the state~
--persons prosecuted ~r condemned for misappropriation of public fundsi
--prisoners attempting to eacape= and
--persons apprehended after 1800 hours on 22 February. -
During the same speech~ E mperor Bokassa I again referred to the events of
~ January and denounced both ideolo~ical and religious subversion threatening
the CAE ~entral Afrtcan Empire~ and other African countries. The head of
state particularly asserted that one should respect the ideology of each
country and addeds "We are socialiats= Ke are remaining xith our type of
socialism." In regard to religion~ the.emperor stated that religion should
not be impoaed by force and that he xould oppose the CAE's becoming a Moslem
country.
The head of state discussed the ~ame sub3ects on 24 February i'n satisfying the
wishes of President Dacko and Prime Minister.H. Maidou, but he also made some
remarks on reapect for human rights and the role of nexspaper people.
He also "identified," xithout naming them~ txo countries whict~, are enemies of
the CAE and xhich Kere behind the disturbances of the previous month, undoubt-
edly alluding to Libya and the USSR (all relations xere severed with Libya on
23 February) .
COPYRICHT t Rene M oreux e t C ie Paris ~ ~979
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CENTI2AL AFRICAN EMPIR~
a
BOKASSA DESCRIBED AS BEING MEGALOMANIAC
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-30 Apr 79 p 26 ~
[ArCicle by E. Zingo: "The Emperor's Youngest Victim"]
[Text] "Starting at 0000 hours my decision is that the disorder which has
been disrupting Che capiCal for Che past 48 hours should come to an end. I
formnlly prohibit all assemblies and all demonstrations." These were the
words of Emperor Bokassa I speaki.ng on Bangui radio on 20 January 1979.
In facC, his personal militia, sCaCioned at Berengo and supported by a com-
pany of the Zairian army (Bokassa no longer trusCs the Central African army
since the aborted coup of Colonel Obrou in 1976), did not waiC for this of-
ficial declaration to take action against the dem~nstrators: Children from
primary schools and public and private secondary schools whose only crime is
that they ob3ect to wearing an expensive uniform which the Emperor has or-
dered to distinguish them "from other children not enrolled in schools who
are often thieves."
. The results of the violence of repression were especially heavy: 400 fatal-
ities recorded by the various public healCh centers of Bangui, a French
physician who was present at the NaCional Hospital Center (the largest
Central African hospital) noted.
More than 1,000 fatalities, Central African citizens who have reached Paris
~ since these events reported.
Only the wounded who did not die immediately in the streets were taken to
care centers. Among the survivors was Nadege Longo, a baby girl 6 months
old.
Nadege is now at the Necker Children's Hqspital under the care of Dr Polliot
(ophChalmology) after undergoing a serious operation during which a bullet
was removed from her'brain.
This bullet first struck the child's mother, piercing the muscles of her up-
per left arm which was holding an umbrella, then it went and lodged in the
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infanC's brain~ Mrs Longo waa carry~~ng Che chi].d fastened.~o her back tts
do mil~.iona o~ African mothers, 5he was geCting~ready eo leave her home and
go to the market when her h.usband mot~oned to her thaC she should wait, She
ttien recalls sQei~ng many~ sold3ers alight from trucks and hearing the initial
shors. �
A martyr in this Tnternational Year of Che Child, Nadege Longo had Co be
hidden. No government could be proud of what happened to her. Wil1 the
French conCinue Co accept much longer without reacting that their President,
who likes safaries, should continue to supply arms of all kinds of an emperor
~ because Che latter controls enormous hunting grounds and uranium? Muzzled,
hunted, young Central African citizens are now expatriat~.ng themselves in.
large ,numbers in order to survive and escape fr.om this megalomaniac who has
been rul3ng Che Central African Empire [RepublicJ in a bloodbaCh for Che
pasr 13 years. ,
COPYRICHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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CHAD
KANO AGREEMENT HAS NOT SETTLED CHADIAN PROI3L~i
Paris JCUNE AFRIQUE i.n French 4 Apr 79 pp 21-22
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima, "Goukouni, Giscard, Kaddafi, and The Others"]
[Texr] It is true that since 23 March the main protagonists resumed part-
nership within a provisional Council of State of the Republic of Chad. But
the caution with which the Kano agreement was greeted does not fail Co
cause worry. A provisional institution--like the government--Che Council
of SCate includes, on the individual level, elements whose points of viaw
are irreconcilable from the start.
Appointed president of the Council of State, Mr Goukout.i Oueddei is going,
d uring a period still difficult to determine, to direct the country be-
s ide representatives of the other factions: the Movement for the Livera- =
tion of Chad with its leader, Aboubakar Mahamat Abderhamane; the Armed
Forces of the North with Mahamat Nouri and Mahamat Saleh Ahmat, two
a ssociates of Hissein Habre; and the Chadian Armed Forces, represented .
by thp head of the gendarmerte, Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue. Theo-
retically, all the signatories of the Kano agreement will have their say
in the establishment of the future institutions of Chad. It remains to
. be seen to what extent the 8 men of this provisional executive are really
masters of the situation.
More than ever, actually, the future of Chad seems to depend largely on
foreign countries. The game of France is particularly revealing with re-
spect to the international appetites which recent events have only sharp-
ened. In announcing the withdrawal of iCs troops, the French Government
in reality is obeying une canstant factor of its policy: not to be absent
a t the moment of great turning points. Announced on 27 February, when the
~Kano meeting was being held, the decision was not inspired, as they had
led one to believe, by the fact that the conditions of a settlement of the
Chadian problem were therceforth met.
It is true that those who had been battling with well known vigor agreed
to sit down at the same table. But it was prpcisely because of the new
turn atiich events were takiclg that the French Government decided to change
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t~cllc~ ~y trying ~o iinticipute them. I.ts ~Critude wns decided by Che
confrontations of N'D~amena, during which it is s~id ro have taken a
posiC3on in favor of Mr Hissein Habre'.
Members of the entourage of former President Malloum do noC hesihate to
speak of laxity today. According to certain in�ormation, France had
been persuaded thaC tlie forces of Hissein Habre would control ehe capital
in 48 hours of fighting. Everything has happenec? as though by counseling
moderation to Fe1ix Malloum from the beginning~c,f the test of strength
undereaken by Hissein Habre in September 1978--~nly one month after the
formarion of the g~vernment of national union--, France had wanCed to
weaken the �ormer president. This charge aeems all the more surprising
since it was at the inssitence of Felix Malloum thaC Valery Giscard
d'Estaing had ended by endorsing the appointm~nt o� Hissein Habr~ as head
of the Chadian Government. But politics has rules, one of the most con-
stant of which is that of opportunity. .
Confusion
With or withouC the complicity of France, the troops'of the prime minister
succeeded in getting those of the presidant of the'republic into difficulty.
There ensued'a vacuum of power.enhanced by a climate of conf usion which
made possible the entry of the FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front]
into the capital in force. After that everything was jeopardized. This
was the moment France chose to come out of the muck so as to arrange the
future. The mass departure of it~ citizens who had little desire to return
to Chad had moreover facilitated this decision. The presence of its troops
was thus no longer justified. In addition the latCer would have had to
fighC eventual partners in the talks. So they had to avoid mortgaging
the future.
France therefore suggested the idea of a federation by proposing the meet-
ing, under its auspices, of a round table at N'Djamena. Considering him-
self betrayed, General Malloum rejected the French proposal. The inter-
vention of the Sudan. actually requested by France, did not necessarily
change tiis position. He preferred to entrust his fate to Nigeria, the
entry of which on the scene considerably changed the basics of ~he sit- ~
uation. France was no longer the only one in the lists.
What emerges from the Kano agreement is perhaps nor yet the.fc+rmalization
of the partition of Chad-thus this famous federation urged by France.
On the other hand all the countries which were pulling with :.trings from
behind the curtains through the intermediaries of the various factions now
have their representatives within the provisional executive. With
Hissein Habre'it is the Sudan, and, in the background, Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, The MPLT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad] is
ofticially support~d by Nigeria. The only poor parent in this business is
finally the faction represented by the Chadian Armed Forces, carongly
described as southerners.
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~ SU~tip TACC~Cg
~dr, rv~n it Jiv~rgenrt~ hnve appe~r~d b~rw~pn Goukouni nnd Libya, ie mu~t ~
r�t b~ f~rgdtten thnt ch~ l~tr~r helped him eu nuge HigsEin Hgbr~ h~nd
of ttih ~[tOtINAT. Tndny A~yl Ahm~e, th~ nf fieial proe~g~ of 'rripnli, dc~~s
nnt poss~os rh~ gnm~ trump e~rde gg ~h~ gnn nf rhe ~erdei. ~nd it would
nne be gurprisin~ if I.ib~e di~ not ~,rpsg him Coward reconcil~.ation wiCh ~
t~ie "~n~my broth~r", leaWin~ en cool down the problem of the Aouzou band -
which wc~g at thp 'origin of thc di~pue~ bctween Gnukount ~nd Tripoli. Th~
Li.~ynn Covernmene cannnt permie itgelf Cn be ~b~enr froa~ the ecene at g
tiine when the futurc of Chad ig going to be decided. It will have to have ~
it~ own man there, which would puah ie to conce~eiong townrd its old proCege,
Couknuni, wh~, wiChout Libyan euppceC, would ri~k ~peing hie po~icion
we~kcn~d in th~ f~c~ o~ Hispein Habre nnd Abderhamane.
_ cMc c~n ~ee thae the co~atal .1r~b et~~eg enjay th~ mgin rnle in Chis
afCair~ Thie explging th~ ~rench game: tn keep its Crnops in Chad .~nd
gupport Malloum woul~ be rn nlienate itself frdm the friendship of counCri~~ �
witl~ wliicti, for varioug re~gons, the governmenC at paris insiats on having
th~ begt relations.
Thp.F'r,nnch tactics nevertheless do not l~ck subtl~ty. �nrig nctually
chose the stronger sid~ at an earlier time. Ite choice was facilitared r
by the Arab countries, which osteneibly supported their proteges. Which
wa~ not the case with the French-speaking countries of the region, friendly
to ~rance but disinclined to interfere in the internal affairs of Chad.
By subsequently propusing the formation of a federation, the French in-
tended not to ~bandon totally the southern part of Chad, which has a
frontier with other countries in its zone of influence~
Torn Apart
The K~~no agreement h~s not finnlly settled the Chadian problem. :t has
only clarified the sit~iatinn: caught between ita more ~r less p~werfu.l
ncigt~bors and its former colonizer, Chad remaina tragically torn apart. _
The Eacr Chat the abrupt ~ecision to wic}~draw French troops was regretted
first of all by the Chadians themselves proves at the very least that~ 20
years aftar its independence, Chad i.s still very f~r from having cantrnl
over its own destiny. And, by taking this decision, ~rance was doubtless
aiming to calm passions and demonstrate its good will. In order better -
to prepare its return.
C0l'YRICfi'f: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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CONGO
NA~ION' S ORI~NTP,TION TO gF. MOFt~ 12ADICAL FOLLOWING CONG1t~S5
~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASI~ in ~rench 16-30 Apr 79 pp 21-23
[Articl~ by ep~cial cnrregpondent Gineete Cor: "The Wind of the Three
Glo~ious Ones"]
[Texe] The events which have ~ust taken place in th~ People's Republic of
Congo lead right away to an initial determination: The existence in that
counCry of a powerful, genuinely revolutionary movemene and Che deep root-
ing of the ideals of gocialism among the popular masses.
The rebound which the situation has ~ust witnessed finally confirme this
tend~ncy verified on numerous occasions in history, namely, that nothing--
neither p1oCS and political intrigues, nor economic strangulation and
threats of all kinds, nor even failur~s and setbacks experienced by the
revolutionary process, nor even less the assasaination of a prestigious
leader or Che usurpatinn of power by elements guided by the sole concern
of their egoistic and short-term ambitions--can bend a people determined
and inured by long years of struggle--quite the opposite.
'That is how the assassination on 18 March 1977 of PresidenC Marien 2igouabi
and the 600 days of rule by the one who has been dubbed "Shah of Mpils" in
the Congo finally led to the explosion of a trulv revolutionary situation
where anything (~espite the serious handicaps which still have to be over-
come) is again possible.
For that is indeed whnt is involved. The fact that the Speciul Third Con-
gress of the PCT [Congolese Labor Party]--whose convening, announced pub-
licly 500 days before his death by the assassinated Congolese president as
_ echeduled for April 1977, could appear, after these 2 tragic years, as a
stake--should have become a reality, the fact too and especially that
these meetings, occurring from 26 to 31 March 1979 in Brazzaville, should
have broad~y fulfilled their promises, these two events a~e already suffi-
cient to have convinced one of it. '
In truth, the Third Special Congress of the PCT will unquestionably have
been--and no one has made a mistake about it--the congress of Marien Ngouabi.
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~ His priority goal (the eaegb~.iehment of e aolid and coherent pol~.tic~l
execut~.ve) soughC by Che movement of rad~cal~.za~ion launched in Sepeember
1975 by ehe l~te Congolege pre~~denti and fdr a~h~:~h the ibttier finally paid
with h~s life wae achieved. ~he March meeeings indeed concluded with the
elecCion of a central comm~ttee, very largely renovated and reinforced,
whose 60 membera chosen by Che rank and fiLe liave proved themselvea, very
particularly 3n ~he lategt period during the d~cisive struggle engaged
a~ainge tihose following Che right~sC and liquidationisC l~ne in Che party.
Three Basic Documente
A~cordingly~ 20 of the 45 members of the former PCT~s centrnl committee held
over from the Second Ordinary Congress of December 197G were s~ruck from the
slare while 3~ new aceivists, originating from the rank and file of the
parry, from the CSC (Congoleae Trade Union Confederation~, the UJSC (Uni~n
of Congolese SocialisC YouCh], and ~:he APN (National People's A~rmy] have
made their appearance in Ch~ PCT's executive organ.
Similarly, the 10-meinber PCT politburo whoae members were elected by~the new
central commitCee for their proven competence in the face of the needs of
Che hour includes officials who have played a deCermining role in Che ini-
tiation and waging of the struggle against the dicCatorial power which Gen
Joachim Yhomby-Opango had arrogated upon h~mself.
~inally, the Third 5pecial Congreas of the PCT brought out in broad daylight
al1 the qualitiea of a leader whom the people and all the progressive and
revolutionary activists had already chosen on the very narrow of S February
1979 to preside over the destinies of the party and the government. Greet~d
wtth enthusiasni everywhere during the meetinga which preceded the congress,
Col Denis Sassr~u-Nguesao had been proposed by all the regional and communal
congresses of the PCT as well as by all the mass organizations as the only
candidate to assume this heavy responsibility. IC is then raiChout surprise
but in an atmosphere of warm brotherhood and regained confider?ce that the
500 delegates to Che congress elecCed by acclamation the one who was the
comrade-in-arms from the outset of Marien Ngouabi and about whom everybody
in Che Congo agree~ that he is the closest spiritual heir of the founder of
the PCT to the office of chairman of the party's central commitCee.
At the same time as is known, Colonel 5assou-Nguesso was slated from that
time to assume, too, the burdena of the Congolese presidency, of head of
state as well as chairman of the Council of Minisr.ers [prime miniater].
Preceded by preparatory work effectpd in record time but in depth all the
sr~me, first in commiCtees and then in base organizations across Che coun-
try, through re~ional ond communal congresses as well as meetings of coun-
cils or central committees of the mass organizations, the idarch meetings
were characterized by a spirit of unprecedented competition and frankneas.
Reflecting the discussions held in districts, regions, "arrondissements"
, [adminisCrative districts], and communes, the congress was dominated by
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i
the firm reoolve of pue~ing gn end once and �or all tio lackadais~:ca~.nese, ~
compromt~e, complacency, hes~.taeion, and a11 the other ills which for tioo. ~
long have undermined if not paralyze' the Congolese revo].uCionary movement.
Three documente providing a criCical exh~ustive and seriou~ analyeis of the
country'~ political, econom~:c and socioculCura]. situaGion, apecifying the
orienrae~.ons o� the PCT and proposing soluCions to emerge fr~m the cr3.sig,
as we11 as a reporC of the central comm~.Ctee had been made parC o� the
recard nf ehe congress. ~nriched by the recommendatione and commenta made
by ehe reg~onal and communal congrea~es, ~11 these documents reactivar~d
and exCended in some way in Che lighC of the experience of these past 2
years the declaration of 12 December 1975 which had had, 3t wi11 be re-
ca11Qd, the effect of a boomerang, as we11 as the work of Che party's
national conference held in November 1976 aC Che ir.itiative of Preeident
Marien Ngouabi 3n the conCext of a proceas of radicalizaCion and prepara-
tion of the Third Special Congreas. ~
ImmediaCely with the opening of Che March aesaion, in a speech which inc~-
dentally wae to be approved ae an orientation documenC of Che congress and
Co wh~ch we shall have occasion to return, Colonel Sassou-Ngues~o, who
chaired Che meetings, had set Che keynote. He said thar people should
know "that the leadership role of the party does not flow and cannot flow
from any special authority, for example, from a decree We must know
_ that our party will noC be credib~e, consequently, will be unable to ef-
fectively lead the revolution if our alogan is: To Cake advantage of one's
membership in the party in order to enjoy privileged social status. We
must know that it is thanks to the correctness of our position, the pres-
tige acquired in the concrete struggles of the masses, the example given in
the acceptance of the sacrifices imposed by the struggle, our unbounded de-
votion to the cause of the people, and our exemplary discipline that we
shall be able to play our role as avant garde activists In the past
we did not pay sufficient attention to a11 this but too t'requently uaed
� our status as party members not only to promote the atruggle but also to
try Co improve our personal position. We must henceforth act in auch a way
Chat each of our words, each of our actions may reflect the interests and
aspirations of the people: Each one must know thaC if he commits errors no ,
one will protect him. If he is honest, the people will appreciate him
while if he resorts to betrayal the people and the party wi11 stri.ke him
Today the country is experiencing a particularly severe economic and finan-
cial crisis and waste inherited from General Yhomby-Opango. :~ixteen years
after the Three Glorious Ones it is also found that the establishment of
public enterprises in sectors of economic and social life, while it reflects
the popular will for national liberation, far from having initiated a aplit
with the strategy of neocolonial improvement has, contrariwise, strengthened
the outward-looking development model, that is, turned to the outside repre- ~
sented by France.
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Ie.~.s ~iso nored ehae ehe eound ~.nie~aCivea (,such as, ~or example, thp plan
for a peop~,e~s school, in abeyance eince 197~) were for ehe most part
hlocked or reactivaeed by, the buregucraric liourgeoiaie ae we11 as by the
parasitic bourgeoiaie of governmenC agreementis, a bourgeoisie which grew
like muahrooms 3n the rain through tihe impl~menta~ion of the F3rst Economic
and Social Deve~opment Plan (1976) whose princ~pal goals were thereby
scuttled.
~ Thua ehough~ will inevieably lead to the abaolute need of waging twi.ce as
hard and eignificanr a class struggle against these underminera of Che
people, ob~~ctive alliea of ~mperiallam, ~nd an unceasing struggle against
all those practices which favor and tend to perpetuate the exiating eitua-
tion. That, in fact, ia a 11fe-or-death queation for the Congoleae revo-
lutionary procese. To emerge from the crisis and the neocolonialiaC mire
demanda, ~,ti goea wiChout sgying, considerable efforts and e+acrifices. This
also and esp~~:ia11y mgndates unprecedented popular mobilization which can
not be cor.::retized effecCively unlesa the parey leaderg and activiats first
s~t an example and do not give evidence of particularly severe demanda first
vis-a-vis themselves:
~ We mus~ consider ourselves--President Sassou-Nguesso declared in esaence in
his opening apeech--as a generaCion do~med Co live auseerely Coday so that
our children may live better tomorrow. To remove frc~n the bureaucratic and
parasiCic bourgeoisie iCs meana of exi.stence (gratuitiea, corruption, com-
mercial and financial shenanigans, embezzlement of public funds, and so on),
to act in such a way ChaC the elements of these minority groups may no
, longer infiltrate themse~ves into positions of reaponsibility in Che party
and the government, to prevent the self-corruption of the PCT cadres--such
are the concerns which underlie the numerous resolutions and motions appro~~ad
by the Third Special Congress as is the resolve to undertAke a decisive
struggle against the domestic allies af imperialism. This was expressed in -
the measures soughC by Che eongress-holders (who thereby acted as apokesmen
for the wishes of the rank and file ar~d the popular :nasses). Regarding the
"Shah of Mpila" (leader of Che burea;,cratic bourgeoisie), the resolution ap-
proved in this regard calls, as is known, for the immediate arrest of
' General Yhomby-Opango, the seizure cf his assets, and his tri~l before a
people's court for the crime of high treason.
A New Direction
T~ wage the struggle for naCional liberation and the construction of social-
ism to its conclusion.implies today more than Pver, under existing circum-
stances, the rally of all revolutionary forces within the PCT. That is why
the Third Special Congress will also have marked this resolve concretely
with the full and compleCe rehabilitation of former participants in the move-
ment of 22�February 1972 as well a~ in the aborted strike of March 1976, in-
dividuals who had sought to be reintegrated in the party during Che latest
period.
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In addiC~.on, the PCT ~hould be ab~.e to manage Co overcume one o~ ~.ta w~ak-
neese~ c~nnernin~ iCs po].icy wiCh regard to cnmpaigne wiCh the decision of
tlie c:ongresa to atrivp ~or the conatruction o� a mass peasanr~' organiza-
rion. LeC ue note fin~lly~that a nea conatieuC~.on as we11 as new methode
fnr Ch~ ~1pnC~.on of oPficials and the P~op1e''s Natiional Assembly were ep-
prov~d ~.n order to ~reinforce the lendership and dynam~.c role of Che parey
and to prevent enemy elemenes from managing, as ~n the past, to use tihe~e
democratic inatituCions to their own ends. But as President 5assou-Nguesso
underscored at Che closing of the congress, eo approve reaolutions is one
thing while to implemene Chem 3s a completely different thing.
However, while no one is expecting m~.racles or promis~ng abundance for
tomorrow (iC is evidenC that the nexr 4 or 5 yeara will be d~fficule), the ~
revolutionary siCuation which was created through the eoppling of the
Yhomby-Opango clique should make ie possible for the Congolese revolutionary
movement to take a new direcCion and move aC the doubLe. On the~r pare, the
people are ready, and popular demonsCrations, which in Brazzav~lle and
Pointe Noire marked the close of the congress, are evidence of it. Bue the �
activists in Brazzaville say tt1aC ehe people will not always have the -
patience to bear disappointments and procrastination.
ror the Cime being the new leaders have adopCed a work tempo which tends to
confirm Chat things have indeed changed. On the very next day after the ~
congress one could thus witness the formation of the new government which
immediately got to work while the political commissioners were appointed to -
go inCo the regions in view of the election of officials for which the daCe
was already set for 8 July 1979.
The.wind of the Three Glorious Ones, blowing strong once again over the
People's Republic of the Congo, seems at any rate to be really bringing
hope.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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~o~ or~zcrEw crs~ ornY
~ Lr$~ain
BRIEFS
SAUDI PETROLEUM SUPPLY AGREEML'NT--A Liberian delegation led by Mr James Phil-
lips~ mini$ter of finance~ signed an agreeMent in Riyadh at the 'beginning of
March xhere the Saudi company~ PETROMIN ~eneral Organization for Petroleum
and Mineral~~ agrees to furnish 4.1 mi111on barrels of oil annual.ly to the
Liberian Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC). It xas atressed in Monrovia that
this agreement r+ould thus end the uncertainty of supply and very Wide price
fluctuation to ahich the Liberian company has baen sub~ected during the last
few montha~ particularly in viex of the interruption in the supply of Irsnian
oil. Text] ~aris MARC~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Mar 79
. p 74,~ 8578
FIDA LOAN--The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA) ia pre-
paring to ~rant Liberia a loan of $10 million to be used apecifically for a
rine-groxing development program. A delegation from that organization arrived
in Monrovia on 14 March precisely for the purpoae of arranging that loan.
[T68t] ~aris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French 23 Mar 79 p 7~+~7
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REUNION
+ .
CANTONAL ELECTIONS ANALYZEU BY YVON MAC~
Paris AFR'IQUE-ASIE in ~rench 16-29 Apr 79 pp 25-26 .
[TexC~ France ia behind the timea. On the eve of the year 2000 it'retains
the deaCh penalCy in its panoply of represaion and the sole power in iCa
case, which remaina resolutely colonialist.
The death petialty is a French internal matter and I will not dwe11 upon it
here; on the other hand the fact of colonialism is an international
problem wh3ch concerns directly the countries of the Third World, those
which have recently gained independence first of all.
A glance at the map of the Indian Ocean is illuminating on this aub~ect: all
the coastal states, including the smallest islanda of this area of the
world, are independent and can make themselvea heard in international
bodies, make their own decisions, and possibly try to block the advance of
imperialism in their immediate vicinity. The only exceptiona are Mayotte
and Reunion, French overseas territories and "departments." The anachronism
is obvious.
The inhabitanCs of these islands are supposed to be entirely French. Under
th'~s headtng their destiny is clear, they have outl.ined a vocation for them
from which they cannot escape. If they have a brown skin they can only
solicit underling ~obs in the meCropole: postal workers, RATP [Independent
Parisian Transport System] agents, menial ~obs in the hospitals or with
private peraons. Only a handful of privileged people escape this fate.
The others, those who remain in the country, the great ma~ority, hundreds
of thousands of inen, women and children, remain prey to undercmploymenC,
poverty, and illiteracy. The billions of francs in~ected by France will
change nothing Chere. On ttie contrary, they are designed to perpetuate a
state of affairs of which a tiny minority of privileged local people and
metropolitans (the "zoreils") are the sole beneficiaries. A colonial
situation if there ever was one!
The "colonial policy of integration" intends to make monkeys of the mass of
these island people. On certain occasiona one guesses that they were
created to lend their support to the power in charge in the metropole. When ;
the French vote, the inhabitants of Reunion also vote. And as much as '
;
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posaible they ehould vote "righr." No holds are barred fnr Chat. Everyone
kn~we thnt fraud, Chrent~, and violence are everyday occurxencea ~t? ~he
"overgn~N depar~ment~."
Toward AuConomy?
Thus the inhabitants of Reunion voted 3n cantonal elections on 18 and 25
March. There were 19 general councillors to elect. As one might have
expected, the candidated aponaored by the central power won: 13 reelected
or elected, againat only 6 for the opposit~on.
The analyais of the results nevertheless showa a aerious aetback for the
RPR [Rally of the Reunion People] to the advantage of the 'UDF [Union Pour
la Defenae de la Republique) which will cause gnashing of teeeh among Che
~riends of Mr Michel Debre. Yeaterday sCill a Gaullist stronghold, the
Reunidn of Che musclebound departmentaliets is tast becoming Giscard ~ �
,territory. But the ant3-autonomist tide anCicipated by the powera that be
did not take place to the same extent. The sole socialist councillor
- candidate was reelected on the firat round; as for the Comraunista (who did
not en~oy the carryover of the eocialist votes, at least offiaially, only
the MRG [left radical movement] having aolemnly called for votea for Che
, Communiat candidate in favorable balloting), they loet only one seat,
that of Saint-Louis 2. Paul Verges, who was the candidate at Saint-Pierre,
was beaten.
If the metropolitan press and televiaion made a big thing of the defeat of
the secretary-gen~ral of the Reunion Communist Party (PCR), it ia worth
pointing out Paul Verges lacked only 200 votes to be elected in that district,
the private preserve of the UDF and of election fraud.
On the o.ther~hand Lucet Langenier was elected at Sainte-Suzanne, a former
R2'F d3strict, which was not easy. Finally, and most significantly despite
its low score in seats, the PCR received and it alone, 48.8 percent of the
votes in this election. One can therefore conclude that almost half of the
inhabitanta of Reunion are not hoatile to the sutonomisC policy preached
by the Reunion Communiata.
All things coneidered, one can estimaCe, along with TEMOIGNAGES, the organ
of the party, that without fraud, without violence, and without metropolitan
assistance (300,000 receiving "assistance" out of 500,000 inhabitat:tsl),
and with accesa to the television (which has been prohibited to the
Communists up to now), the autonomists would have been in the ma~ority.
The election of Paul Verges to the parliament in Europe, which is asaured,
can only emphasize this trend.
Autonomy, according to the PCR, would be only administrative, and to a
certain extent economic and political. Close links would be preserved with
France, and the inhabitants of Reunion would keep French c3.tizenship.
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~s ~ederaeion?
The d~~~arCmental~.eta are neverChelesa making a case of the intentione of
Che autc~:;omie~s: auronomy, they say, will quickly result ~.n independence
and to th,.~. cutting of 11nks wiCh Frgnce. It is perhapa conceivable. This
is all ":ihe more eo since the fratiernal parties and progreaeive governments
of ehe area deaire that the 3sland gain independence. In Cheir eyes an
independent Reun3on Island would not only make possible Lhe binding of
regional alliances, but o� even closer links~ ~ven befare the independence
of Mauritius, the Seychellea, and Che Comoros, the idea n~ a federation of
the Grand Mascerenas in which F,eunion wou~.d have been sn integral part, had
been launched.
But thaC point has noC yeC been reached, and it is not at all worth dramatizing
it. Autonomy in the union w~th France, such as that auggesCed by the PCR ~
and ita alliea, does noC mean an obligation to independence tomorrow. The
choice would remain, whatever one may say, in the hands of the inhabitants
of Reunion, finally free for self-determination. If they deaire to remain
French, no one would prevent them. Unless they aucceeded again in deceiving
Chem with electoral fraud and violence~
For the preaent, Reunion remaina an asaiated colony.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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S~N~GAL
PREMIER'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO FRANCE CONSOLIDATES CUOPERATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET t~DITERRANEENS in French 6 Apr 79 P 87~
~ex~ Mr Abdou Diouf~ prime minister of Senegal~ made his first official
v3sit to France ~"rom 27 to 30 M arch. In his press conference of 29 March~ he
stated that his vieit has achieved its essential ob~ectives: "a deepening of
Franco-Senegalese friendship and a consolidation of their cooperative ties."
The results of his visit were termed excellent by the Senegalese prime minis-
ter. "We rrere favorably received," he said~ "and we shall try to be xorthy of
Franco-Senegalese cooperation by exercising a good and strict adrainistration."
In fact~ the 3oint communique signed at the end of the visit, after having em-
phasized that the txo countries Kill ~oin forces to achieve a"great Euro-
Arab-African axis of solidarity~" states that~ on the bilateral level~ the
Senegalese prime miniater obtained additional financial aid from France in the
amount of 30 million francs to be added to the 30 million already grr.,nted ~or
the construction of the University of Saint-Louis-du-Senegal~ aimed at accom-
~ modating 4,000 students in 1982. Mr Robert Galley~ French minister of coopera-
, tion, xho received Mr Diouf at lunch~ is said to have plans to visit Senegal
xithin the next ferr months to establieh a schedule of payments of the French
sid for this university pro~ect.
France also confirmed that it xas granting Senegal exceptional etd in the
amount of 20 million francs xithin the t~amexork of the 5ahel~Plan to implement
a program simed at combating the drought xithin the next fex months. Moreover,
the French Government xill release 20 million of the 80 million francs already
foreseen in par~ticipating in the construction of the Diama Dam. In addition,
Mr Barre stated that he Was pre pared to examine favorably the possibilities of
supporting the development pro~ects of Senegalese radio and television and an
expansion of the Ziguinchor hospital.
In reference to radio and television~ it xas agreed that French Television
System (TDF) xill collaborate xith the Ministry of Cooperation in making a
"preliminary study" aimed at asBisting Senegal in the choices it has relative
to the reatoration and expansion of equipment. In an interview xith Radio-
France International Mr Diouf indicated that Senegal was hesitating betrteen the
construction of an ORTS (Senegaleae Radio and Television Service) House and a
more modeat pro3ect calling for the installation of television in neK localities
' separate from those it nox shares xith the radio service. The TDF stuc~y Will
take from 3 to 6 months.
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As for fishing~ the SenegaleE~e and French prime minis~ers ~te~ted that they
w3ro prep$red to pursue the' 11ne of eooperation contained in the proviei~ns
of the agreement noK being concluded betxeen Senegal and the EEC. This con-
firmation 1.s of particular interest ~to Frenoh fighing fleets operating along
the Senegalese coast~
In the technical assistance sector the French G overnment offered to devote
its efforte more to higher education and the sending of technicians rather
than to seconda.ry education. One wi11 further deduce from the final communi-
que that the Senegalese and Frerich prime ministera "expressed tt~eir pleas;:~na ~
at the progress achieved betWeen the Africa~ Caribbean and Pacific Cotnmon Mar-
ket states and the EEC in arriving at a nex agreement" replacing that of Lome.
MS$cellaneous Questions
In addition to the above economic questions and questions on bilateral rela-
tions, Mr Diouf was asloed to speak ~in his press conference of certain politi-
cal or specific problema~
--The Israeli-E~yrptian Peace Treaty: Senegal xanta to aee the problem of the
national rights of the Palestinian people settled~
--Western Sahara~ Senegal hapes that ths OAU's conuaission of sages xill pro-
pose definite solutions during the Monrovia summit meeting in July.
--Rel.ations Kith Guinea-Bissaur This is a friendly country Kith xhich Senegal
has trustful relations. The problem of maritime borders is being handled dis-
passionatelyi but~ if it xere necessary~ and upon mutual agreeme~t, the two
countries would appeal to the International Court of Justice of The Hague.
--Mauritiniae Mr Diouf used the term "xorrisome situation" in speaking of the
announcement of the establishment of an armed-conflict front for self-determi-
nation of the blacks of Mauritania.
--011: Asked to give his opinion on offshore petroleum exploration, the Sene-
galese prime ministe r stated emphatically that there xas no difference of opin-
ion Nith Guinea-Bissau in this regard and that negotiations xere going on xith
various countries, particularly Venezuela, to achieve a profitable exploratory
method.
Meetings With the Private 5ector
On 28 March the Senegalese prime minister had a long meeting xith a delegation ;
of about 30 French industrialists led by Mr Jean Dromer~ chairman of the ACP I
(Africa,~ Caribbean~ Pacific) Commisaion c~f the N ational Council of French Pro- ~
tection (CNPF~. ~
Mr Diouf xas surrounded by several of his ministers~ particularly Messrs Ous- '
mane Seck (finance and economic affairs), Oumar Ba (urbanism, housing and ,
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env~.ronment)~ and Louis Alexandrenne (plan and cooperation). The Frenah in-
~ dustrialiats represented a varSety of sectors suoh as chemistry~ banks, the
automobile induetry~ engineering~ the cement industry~ food and the ~Ske.
Three ma~or pro~ects were brought up during this meeting~ They concern the
creation 'of 100 ~obs in various industrSal sectors in the free zone of Dakar
with a credit of 100 million French francs, the installation of a cement plant
in which the Creusot-Loire company ~aight participate~ and aohieveaenta in the
chemical domain xith the collaboration of Mining and Chemical Enterpn.�1e~e. -
The principle of CNPF's or~anizing Ser}egalese days in Dakar at the beginning
~ of next year xas also adopted. This type of event~ alreac'~y arrang~ed in other
countries by the CNPF~ makes it possible for industrialists to meet Kith local
economic leaders and thus obtain information on the industrial aspecta~ grob-
lems and plans of the country in queation.
Mr Raymond Barre, French prime minister, agreed to pay an official visit to
Se negal at a date to be de termined later. Mr Barre conferred the insignia of
the Grand Cross of the National Order of Merit on Mr Abdou Diouf.
' COPYRIGHTs Rene~Moreux et ~ie., Paris~ 1979
8568
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_ T~4NZANIA~
19~8-1981 PLhN FOR ZANZIBAR
Paris MARCH~'~ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN3 in French 9 Mar 79 p 6~+2
~~xt7 The Tliird Tanzanian 5-Year Development Plan (1978-1981) foreaees an
annual growth rate of 5.6 percent for the xhole of Zanzibar's economy, with
5�5 percent being anticSpated for agricultt:re= 4.,5 percent for industry=
10 percent for public worksi and 7.5 percent for transportation. At curreni:
prices the island's GDP will be 887 million shillings in 1981 on the assump-
tion of a real rate of inflation of 10 percent. These ob~ectives imply a to-
tal investment of 1.14 billion shillings~ divided as follor+ss
Sectors M illions of 5hillings Percentag~a
A~riculture 273�6 23.9 ~
Industry 107.8 9.4
W~ter~ energy~ mines � 215.4 18.8
Natural reaources s~,8 ~ t~.7
Transportation and public works 152.2 13�3
Trade 15�5 ~ 1,4
Education 69�3 6,1
Health . 47,1 4.1
Housing 1~7�4 12.0
tnformation 13�5 : '1.2
administration 5~�3 5.1
Total 1~143�9 loo.o
A total of 420 million xill be invested in 1978-1.~~79: 412 million in 1979-
1980= and 321 million in 1980-1981. The financing is to be assured by
546 million of local funds~ 160 million of foreign gifts and 4;7 million of .
foreign loans. It is to be noted that among the foreign contributions Zan-
. zibar is counting on assistance from the Tanzariian Treasury Department for
the continontal part of the country. Among the principal industrial pro3ects
we must cite:
--alcoholic beverages~ gasoline and perf~ames (29.7 million shillings)s
--central coconut-oil xorks (1$ million)i
--expansion of cigarette manufacture (9 million = and
--expansion of Mahonda sugar mill (22.8 million~.
COPYRICHT: Rene MorBUx et Cie., Paris~ 1979
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UPf~tt VOLTA
MOVI,7~i~Nm '1'dWAttDS UNIT't CO ~ ~~NT FJ~AI~NLD I3Y 5IRADIOU DIALLO
Pari~ JL'UN~ AFRIQtJ~ in ~'r~nah 11 Apr 79 pP 6~-71
~Artiale by gpec3al anvoy Siradiou niallo]
[Text] Th~ oppo~itSon demandn it, Preaiden~ Lami2ar?a
is waitin~ for parliament~s epring seeaion to propose
national reconciliation,
7'hQ politica~l truce in effoat since the forn~tion of the mhird Republia
Govarnment (July 19?8) will be short-lived. Thia cruaial event in the
country'~ political life ended a long and diffieult period of eon�rontationa
punctu~ted by the 27 November 1977 referendum, the March 1978 paxliamentary
electiono and the May 1978 presidential eleetione. In fact, fcllowing the
appointment of RDA (African Democratic Rally) veteran Dr Joseph ~onombo ae
head of the grovernmen~, protag~onigts of the Upper Voltar~ politiaal scene
pretended to check t}~eir weapons at the door and retrench. But this was
nothing but a fa18e start, not to eay a simple military ruse,
Six monthg later, recovered from their aounds, full of faith in thei~
luclrf star and more than ever bucked up by a well-deserved, although a bit
forced, res~ cure, the ~lr~dfators once again entered the arena. The ltick-off ~
for the firat okirmishen was delivered by the uniona on 3 February. On that
day, a big meetin~ was organized at the Ouagadougou Labor Exchang+e. On r~n
appeal ~y the CNTV (National Confederation of Upper Voltan Workers), the
CS'V (Upper Voltan Labor Union Aasociation) and the OVSL (Upper Voltan Free
Labor Union Orf~anizatian), aeveral thousand aorkers in an overrrhelmingly
ent}iuai~.~tic atmosphere raiaed their hands in favor of a"call for general
?~obilization."
In a short, incisive document, the unions declare open rrar on Mr Conombo's
g~overnment, deacribed as a~~patched-up peace," if not a"regrouping of tired
politicians," They reproach him for his blindnesa in the face of the grow-
ing poverty of the masges while, according to them, membere of the government
bcncfit from "fabulous" salaries and advantages. ISkeafse, (ma~ority a:~
wcll as oppoaition) deputies are reproacheo for having increased their com-
pen3ation and privfleg~ea in a"flabbergasting and shamelesa way," If we are
to believe union members, the government does not hesitate to create new
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po~~t~ wi~h an ey~ ~o t~wasd3ng i~te pa1i~3Qa1 ~llies, a~ ~he ri~k of ~bi-
tr~rilY ~war~~ing oon~rao~e for g+ov~t~nmen~ de~ls ~o bugin~~emen who m~de
"th~ ri~hh~ ahoiae~~ ~,n ~th~ ~lea~ion~~ And tn ord~r ~o divide ~he workerA,
regim~ detraatore aagert~ ~~~hey arreeten the pot for ~ome ahile ~hrowing a
bon~~~ to ~he othere.
In ~h~ Qy~a of union m~mb~rs, ~h1a ~or~ of ~quandexing proves ~hat ~hc~ g~rr~rn-
m~nt t~s the m~ana buti delib~r~t~ly ~~fu~es to meet th~ir ~u~~ demand~~ And
what c~r~ thay d~manding? An '~~dequate~~ inar~ase in workere~ purchaaing
pow~r ahi~h~ they ~lai~n, hae dropped consid~rably. 'IR� ~a~~t ra3e~~ in
Upp~r Vo1ta prior ~o ~he 6-peraent sal~ry inerea~g dear~ed a~ ~he s~a~ct of
~thi~ year ~o baek to Apri1 1976~ The pro~ea~ere in addition advoaate ~n ~d-
~uatm~nt in aaholarahip~ for pupil8 and s~tudents and a faSr organ3,z~~ion of
~torgn ~nd grain distribution ag aell aa a hou~ing poliay bold enough to
~liminate ~peculation on property at~d rente~
~ut union memberg do not atop at purely corporate or crassly materi~l demands.
~hey denounae geizureg of neaepapera~ arbitraryr as~i~menta of officiale,
n~potiam and favoritiam, Th~y aonelude With a vfbrant appeal for general
mobilization, calling on Worker~ to hold:themselve~ ~~ready to ett~a~+e in thoge
aations neaeeeary to ~atisfy th~ir oan intereets and thoge of the Upper
Voltan people.~'
A vi~,~oroug Warrting whieh the g+overn~nent ir?terpret~ as ~ v~~itable ehalleng~.
Then too, Dr Conombo has pi~ked up ~he gauntlet. ~lfthout ar~y delay either.
F'our hourg aft~r the 3 F~ebruary meeting at the Labor Exehange came to an end,
thQ head of the gnvernment presided over a big rally not far from ~here on
the Place du 3 Janvier. Officially to tharilc voters from the capitt~], who
supported the RtiA during the l~t fow election campaigr~st In reality~ thi~
waa in reaponae to th~ arrorrs releaeed that m~rning by union members~ And
through them by the opposition. The languag~e employed by t~he prime minieter
on that occasion is aa~ple proof of thie~
In Pact, for Dr Conombo union members are nothing but partisan minds, They
defend a"xorkers~ oh~are," Nhile the g+overnment, Whiah "defenda t,he intareat$
of 7 raillion Upper Voltari~, n io the ~'real union~ Eut the president doeg
_ not stop at castigatin~ th~ uniona. He actively attacks the oppositinn
partiea Hhich he feeln are the oneu rrho are really pulling the gtrings. Thus
ho de~cribea ex-YrenidQnL Dfa.uria~ Yaa~eo~a' ~ UNDD ~National Union for the
Dcfen~e of DQmocracy) and Joneph Ouedraogo~a Refusal Front as a~'renegade
rnlly," Ag for Prof Joseph Ki-Zerbo'g UPV (Upper Yoltan Progres~ive Unfon),
hc callo it "bourg~eoin" and "opportunist.~~ And Dr Conombo concludes his
violent diatribe With a strong Warning to troublemakers arid all thoee Who
mi~ht bc tempted to de3tabi23ze the Third Republicl With these aggressive
and at tha vQry leagt uaaccustomed statements by this experfenced and ~ne-
rally ~oft-spoken politician, the president touched off the powder keg and
in so doing ligt~.tened the task of the oppoeition parties.
) The latter could hardly miss catching the ball on the rebound to ahout their
challQng~e and provocation. And that is rrhat they did. Better yet, they
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~ook udv~~r?tag~ og th~ ~i~ua~ion ~o ona~ ag~in ~.n mot3on ~ha uni~y of
~a~ion ~hey }~d givQn up ninae ~he end of ~h~ May 1976 pr~eiden~3c.1 ~1ac-
~l.onn anmp~ign. Ir~ nhort, ~ ve~i~ble windf~l~ .
I~ n~verthel~~~ ~ook 3 w~eks of ne~o~ia~ion~ ~o g~~ ~he UPV, ~h~ UNDD and
tha ItQf'u~al Fron~ to work aide by r~ide~ The ~h~Qe organiza~tion~ oal~,ed ~n
importar?t mee~ing whiah wa~ held on 24 ~ebruary a~ ~the Place du 3 Janvier
in Ou~.dougou~ 0~ aduj:ge~ ~he ntmo~ph~re w~s nnt the game as during the
~leot~ion oampaign. I,~s~ pa~aion, por~raits o� 1ead~re at~?d pennar~t~. But
in ~the bpring sunligh~~ a Qrowd that wa~ ~u~~ aa big danaed to the rhythm
of th8 orahe~~ras~ Group~ of athl~te~ rivaled one ano~her in Fea~e of
e~r~ng~h and adroitne~~, S~ r~a,a in thi~ relaxed and childl~,ke atmosphere
~hn~ Mr Ntacair~ Ouedraog~o for ~he tJN~, Profeseor Ki-Zerbo for ~he UP~I and
Mr Jo,~eph Ouedroao~o (Itefueal Front) ~uaoeseively took the floor~
~'h~ np~akera unanimously aondeamed the repraesive methods the g~overnmen~ haa
ue~d ~in~e it~ inception. If we are to believe them, for 6 mon~he now the
~rev~rnm~nt h~s been r~sortin~ to intimidating maneuvers~ vendet~ae and
~~~~tlin~ ~eoreg with oppo9ition par~yr members~ To illustrate these aacuga-
~ions, they pell-mell oi~ed eaeeg of officialg arbitrarily ailene~d, bullied
vi~l~.g+~rs and tribal chief~ rQVOked or imprlsonod on ord~re From the minis-
terc of interior ond ~ustice. But the nevereat ~eausation~ are more par~i-
cularly based on what the oppoei~ion eonsiders to be a"flagrant violation~~
of ~he Congtitutions th~ decrees ~ha~ deal aith the appoiritment of apeeial
delegations aharged with the administration of the commurtee, departmente
and subprefecturea.
In fact, Article 104 of the Conatitution providea for eleeted aseembliee to
Qnsure the adminiatration nf all local aollectives. Under the eircumstanaeg,
ProfNSeor Ki-Zerbo would probably aay, in his typically garcagtio tone, that
Upper Voltari demoeraay is a"one-eyed man Whose.good eye looke abroad to make
uo beliQVe that Everything is beautiful under the skies of IIpper Volta While
the bad eye ie turned inward to frighten Upper Voltans." As fox Mr Joseph
Ouedraog+o, the fiery leader of the Ref'ueal Front, he rrould poir?t his fore-
finger accueingly at President Iemizana~e residence, rrhich looke out on the
squarc3, to threaten it aith the thunderbolt oF the people.
~ In any event, at the close of the meeting it seemed clear that oppoaition
leaders Were appealing rather for concerted eFFort than for confrontation,
trying rather to reaci: a~eement with the gov~rnment than to overthrnw it.
Yrofe~aor Ki-Zerbo summed up this aspiration by ~aying that the prime minis-
ter ought to "uee tha flute rather than the staff to g+et the Upper Voltan
flock to~,rother." Zb ~,rive tho whole story~ the opposition would like to have
a national unity government fora~ed, founded on a minimum political program,.
ahich, aithout renouncing the e~cigtence of the parties and their apecific
characters, xould allow for the appeasement of e.rtific3al confrontations,
the elimination of peraonal quarrels and other superfluous maneuvera in order
to bend all our energieu toward the struggle f~r development.
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Ar~ P~eo~,den~ Lan~izar~ and h3~ governmen~ prepa~~d ~o mov~ ~~hi~ dir~ation,
~o f~vor ~he bloa~oro~,r~ of' ~htr~ ur~i~arian ourre~?~ ~h~ oppos3tion ~,a appeal~,ng
for wi~h i~a wieh~~~ Th~re 3~ every reason ~o beZiev~ ~o. As ~~pre~iden~
o~� al1 Upper Vo1~an~, I am at~ove ~he partiee~ he oont~,d~d ~o ue 3n his offl,ae~
ado~nnd by a por~ra3~ of Ouozz3n Caulibaly, the ~carid o1d man of ~he FtDA~
unrxnimouc~ly renpoatod anc~ aon~id@rod ~o be ~ho truo fc~~hax o~ Uppor Voltan ~
indapandanaa. nr~nond gil in bluu fcom gasr~,non cap ~o ~ooke inoluding
thc~ indi~ boubou, the oh3.~f of ~ta~e~ his ~y~ ~W~.nk1,~.nng ir~ ~ pl~a3.d mask
lin~d wi~h ritual gcars~ wen~ on= ~~Wh~n ~he ~im~ aom~s~ 1 wi11 oall on all
th@ part3ea ~o get tog~~h~r and form a g+overnment o� na~tional uni~yr. IF
~h~y r~al,lyr wari~ ~o work in the in~er~~ts of ~he na~ion, they will 13s~en
to n~y appeal.
Actually, Preaiden~ iam~,zc~na han already choaen eides. He is only waiting
for ~he ~pring se~eion oF the Nat3onal Aaeembly~ whiah opens in mid-April,
to announoe whioh on~. W3th a vfew to thia reoonc3liation looming on the
horizon~ the ahief of atate seema ~o have ~takon all step~ likely to appeaee
the opposition. Thue the apple of d3saord aonatituted by the epea3al dele-
~ti~ng charggd with admSnis~ering the local ~olleativ~a will be ~liminated,
Ag t1~~ oppoeition partiee demand, the government wiYl undertalte to organize
muniaipal and departmental eleotione by the end o� 1~7q or~ at the lategt,
the beginnit~g of 1980. "Searaely a few months ago, we oonoluded a long
election campaig~n,~' the preeident told ua by way of 3us~ifying t.he po~tpon~-
mQnt of this eleati~n and explained that xe had to ~~give the people a breather
befor~ calling them to the po11e again,~~
A1so, ~~neral Lamizar~ aeema reac~y to apply those provi~ions of the Coneti-
tution relating to the limitation of political parties~ ThQ Constitution
adopted by referendum on 27 Novamber 19?7 in Saet only permits three poli-
tical parties in Upper Volta. Also, since the March 19?8 parliamQntaryr
electionn~ it was expected tha~t the three par~ties reeeiving the large$t
popular votet the RDA, the UI~IDD and the UPV, aould be the only ones autho-
rized to function~ Now since then, no decree applyfng the laW in th~t direc-
tion haa been promulgated~ Deapite thQ fact it has been queationed several
times, thQ g+overnment maintains absolute silence~ And �or g+ood reasan~
Certain rai,nisters and not th? littl~ :i~: - th.,ti u,akd up the ernment
team turn out to be leaders of the PRA (Africat~ Regroupment Party~arid the
Independ~nta, that f s, two parties rrhich, beaten in the elections~ ought to
legally disappear.
Aa of nowe how can General Lnmizana satiafy the oppogition without breaking
with the Constitution~s re3eated g+ooda? Th~ chiQf of atate in satisfied
with an~woring this queotion aith a rnther eniginatic amile, But then he
at once oays that "everything is ~oing to be all right. "L~ ar~y event,"
h~ note~, the "law is .ready; it t~+ill be submitted to the National AssQmbly
au soon a~ the next se~sion begins.'~
Then there is the mortgag~e constituted by the case of Maurice Yameogo~
Thirtc:en yearu after hi3 fall, the ex-prQ3ident in fact continues to exert
by no meana ne~liEi.ble pressure on Upper Voltan political lffe~ In order
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of importanoa, ~h~ UNDll~ whioh 3p hio orea~ion~ oaoupien eeaond po~i~ion on
tha poJ.3~iaa1 laddE~. 'i'~en ~oo, ~he ~overnmen~ aanno~ indeS~.ni.~ely ignora
~he Koudougou roe].u~~~~ d~mand for rei.n~ta~emen~. Any na~ional reooncil~.a-
' tion munt of naoQOOi~y na~iefy Mr Maurioe~ ~~Ni~ (Mauriao Yameogro) r~ins~a~e-
mon~ depondn sololy on himnolf,~~ Primo Min~.s~er Conombo oonfidad to ue~ Then
he wont on to sayt "L~~ h3m ~ake 3~ Qa~y beaau~e we will yie].d ~o nei~her
blaQlana~.l nor preasu~a,
~ Adtu~lly, ~h~ di~ i~ now ca~t. Seor~t aonversatione go3ng on for monthe now
bo~ween oertain ItDA l~aders and Mr Yameogo seem to have reaohed an ~~inte-
reo~ing poin~.'~ Fur~ho~more, Preoident Houphouet-Boi~yr hae probably played
an aa~ive role 3n ~hi~ rapproahement~ Aa ADA chairman and founder, ~he
Ivorian leader has roceived ~he ~top men from ths different fao~iona ~ha~
claim ~o belong ~o ~he family in h3a native v311ag~e of Yamousaoulaco. At
prenen~, ~here is every reaaon to believe that the ~'o1d man" hae aahieved
suaaeas in his delioate miasion~ And in Ouagadougou the enen~r bro~here will
no cioub~ ooon buryr the hatahQ~. Thie does not mean that the3r oonfron~a-
~ion~ will not be puraued in other way~. But even if they were to aoma to
a mcre nomblanae of an arr~ng+ement, that would be eomething. Somethi~g we
have been wait3ng �or for 14 yeare and which would chang~e a lot of thinga
in Upper Volta.
CO~ftIGHms Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
11,q66
cso: 4400
. ~
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zAIRC
~
MOBUTU'S ~F~ORTS AT 1t~HABILITATION~VIEW~D WITH DI5TRU5'T
Pnris AFRIQUE-ASI~ in French 16-29 Apr 79 p 24
[Artiele by Jack $ourderie: "Mobutu Under SurveilJ.ance"~
[Textj "We have another Iran on our handa," said SCephen Solarz, chairman
of the Foreign Affairs Commiteee of Che American House of itepresentatives,
concerning Zaire. He added.that given "Mobutu's inclination toward a vio-
lent solution" and the "rapacioue horde" conetituting hie Zairian Army,
Con~reas should be very cautious about aid suggestions presented by the
~dminiatration so that the United States does not become "too closely iden-
tified wieh Che unpopular government of Zaire," as it was at the time of
the Shnh's overthrow in Teheran.
This distrust is shared by French business circles, despite their growing
interest in Zairian resources and the reassuring words which the "Guioe"
~oured forth in the courae of a long, 5-hour meeting with represenCatives
of the National Council of French Employers (CI3PF). "Outside of a few
speciEically'Zairian factors such as thoae having to do with poor management
and the ill effects of certain zairianization measures, it is essentially
external reasons that are the cause of our difficulties. Are we responsi-
ble for the dollar crisis, the energy crisis, world inflation, the spec-
tacular drop in the price of raw materials, unemployment? ThaC is the
poinC of view I clearly put before the representstives of French employers
whose guest I was on 19 March." With this solid convicCion that once more
he had succeeded in bluffing and becked by the vague assurances of French
employera and the firm promise made by Sicard concerning Paris' resolute
support for requests for financial assistance made again to the Croup of
the Ten, Che Zairian president believes that he was able to ward off the
threat congisting of the fact that the precondition for any ne~r finnncial
assistance might be purely and simply the overthrow of his regime.
The fact is that the record of his administration is not a shining one.
In addi[ion to debts totaling over $3 billion and colossnl squandering -
which, ranging from the Inga II pro~ect to the Kisnngani pro~ect and includ-
ing the Voice of Zaire (national radio and television office), the Maluku
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~.rhn r~nd ~reel complex, ehe epace Celecommunicaeion~ ey~~em, ~he K~.sangani
sCeam gen~rating ~Caeion, and so on, amountg tio Che mose ~neredible figure
in rh~ billion~, eher~ ~re now the counelees exampl~s of ~mbezzlement
~prinkled through ehe pagea of the astound~.n~ r~pores n� Erwin Blumentihal,
the German expere from ehe InCernaCional Monetary ~'und in charge of
puCring the aituaCion in order" and named asaieCant to Che governor oF
rhe nank nf Zaire in order tn do eo.
Coba.le and Buaea
Hnwever, Chere is no end in ~ighC to rhis rehabilieation Chat muse precede
the r~lea~e of some $200 million by the IMF and ChaC led IMF experCs Co
draw up black liats of zairian companies and bueineasmen up to their necka
in cnrruption and mieappropriation of funds, all wirh Che blesaing of
the Guide, whoae family and tribal customera they are. Scarcely had Che
IMF noeed Ch&C Che drop in the production of copper And cobalt in Che
course of 1978 and ae the beginning of 1979 had, despiCe the spectacular
rise in prices, brn~ght abour a loas of $L6 million (ov~r 65 million new
francs) in January and $30 million (130 million new francs) in February
when the sordid cobalC mess surfaced.
In order to fool the ittCernational tutelage nuChorities, the Zairian
leaders rhoughC up the idea of creating from scratch a"Swiss company" in
charge of selling 2d0 tons of cobalt for cash (annUal production is abouC
12,000 tons). The difference between the cash price: $46 per pound, and
the official term price: $25, thus enabled this pseudo Swisa company to
make a net profit of $8.4 million (some 35 million new ~rance or 3.5 bil-
linn old francs), which quite obviou8ly disappeared wiCnout ever touching
Zairian soil. Caught red-handed, the officials claimea that half of the
sum obtained in this fashion was reporCedly used to pay for an order fnr
buges mnde with the French coropany SAVI~M (Industrial Vehicles and Mechani-
cal Equipment CompanyJ. As for the reaC, nearly 2 billion old francs,
it disappeared in the welcoming, diacreet depths of the numbered Swisa
coffers. Can one believe that the master of Kinshasa was not in on the
deal when it was.he who only recently traded French helicopters for copper?
~veryone everywhere doubts everything Mobutu says. For example, no one
took seriously Che statement made by thc Zairian preaident according to
which Hince .the production of his mines had resumed, 2airian copper salea
were gning to increase. The continuing riae in copper pricea in London
is there as evidence.
Likewise, knowing smiles greeted his statement thnt "there is now total
security" throughout the country and that "the replacement of the Moroccan,
Senegalese and Gabonese soldiers by the inter-African force is now neariy
certain."
~ut while Mobutu may have lost all personal credibility, Western business
circles nre s[ill clinging to Zaire because as the 20 March issue of the
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FINANCIAL TIMES emphaeized, "Chie counery, wh~.ch i~ reduced Co begg~,ng for
inrernaCional aid, is one of the moet produce~.va nae~.on~ i.n B1ack Afr~.ca."
PoeenC3a11y, naeurally! If only one could get rid'of Mobutu.... ~ut how
is one Co do so w~.thout risking overturned alllancee and ehe hostilliCy of ehe
new ru,lera toward rhese We~terners who have always held him at ~rm's lengrh
and continue Co do so. And a11 the while, uneil hie fa~e i~ decided, $
clnae watch ~.e being kept on him by two watchdogs: a wnunded naC~.onn1
capita~.ism 'and a greedy inrernational capit~liem, which apy on one anoCher
and, like new Diogenes, both go ~doking for 8 man.
COPYItIGHT.: 1979 Afrique-Aeie
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ZAI~~
AitMS TItAFF'ICKER, MERC~NARI~S AFtR~ST~U
parig MARCN~S TitOPICAUX ~T M~DI'C~RRANE~NS in ~rench 23 Feb 79 p 520
(Text] On 14 February, the 2AIRIAN PRESS AGENCY (AZAP) revealed Chat an
~rms trafflcker of Italian-Belgtan netionality and hia accomplices, two
zairian upper-1eve1 employees, had been arrested the previoue evening in
Z~irc by the Security Servicee, while 19 merc~narie~, "hlred to create die-
turb~nces in the eastern region of the country," had been duly "identified
and booked,"
According to AZAP, Che ar~ns trafficker and the Cwo 2airinn cadrea were ar-
rested in Lufu (Lower Zaire), near Che Angolan border, while carrying
"compromising" documents confirming instructions dictated from Bruesels by
self-styled opponent~ of the Zairian regime and proving th~t...the Italian-
Belgian ind~ividual had previo~sly succeeded in amuggling weapone and muni-
tions ineo Zaire."
A little later, attention turned, not to the 19 mercenaries, but to 48 othere.
These mercenaries, mainly of Belgian nationality, but aleo from Weat Germany,
the Netherlands and France, were reportedly in Rwanda at the border statinn
of Gisenyi. According to AZAP, the recruitment of these mercenaries was
allegedly carried out in Belgium in Liege. The same agency believes that
the brains behind the operation sent a member of the opposition to the
Zairinn regime as un emissary to the United States in order to try to rally
Washington.to their cause.
'Chi~ mnttcr of the mercenaries remains a rather confusing issue. At any
rate, nuthorities in Kinshagn are an the alert. Elements from the 311th
parutroopers Battalion have been sent to the Coma region. This battalion,
made ~p of French instructors, performed brilliantly at the time of the
events in Kolwezi in Mny, tAking the airport of the mining city that had
been invaded by the former Katangan gendarmes.
~
According to Zairian authorities, there is an actual plan aimed aC "de-
stabilizing the country a few weeks aWay from the scheduled meeting of
Zaire's p.zrtners in Washington concerning the economic recovery'plan."
In Brusaels, observers note that Kinshasa's announcement of the arreat of
several "lost soldiers" corresponds to the sending, as early as 12 February,
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uf Nnmc! 'l5U AQ1~lnn pnrn~rnopere tn 2aire. Ofticie~.ly~ ehe ~.atter nr~ C~
help Crain Zairi~n armed f~rces at rhe Kitona bae~, 300 kilomeCer~ w~~e
of the zairi,an cap~.ta1, Some Belgian new~papers belleve thae the di.scovery
of a p~at aga3nst rhe regime o� President Moburu Se~e S~ko ie at the root
of rhie sending of t~�oops by 9elgium. The Zairian preaidency has formally
denied rhis version of the �ac~e.
WhAt i.g rerta~,n ia Chat the eoc~al ~ieuation in Zaire is ac~si very tenee~
The Zairian oppog3eion Qvan etates thae rel~tively ~erioae di~tiurbane~s
took p1ACe ~n Kinehaga ar ~he beginning o� February, which wa~ ~lso nffi-
cially and formally denied.
IC should be ~dded that in addition to the 250 paratroopers, the laet of
whlch left Bruasels on 19 F'ebruery, Belgium has decided to eend a navy
ahip equipped with a crane to the estuary of the ~aire River, near the
Kitona military base. This ship, the "2enia," wi11 not be armed an,d wi11
carry food and medicines. "Thie wi11 facilltate th3.ngs from a iog~er~.~ai
senndp~ine," Che Belgian prime minister said.
COPYttIGHT: Iteae Moreux eC Cie., Parie, 1979
11,464
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ZAIRC
MOgUTU VISITS ~UROPE S~EKING AID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Mar 79 p 820
(TextJ Before going to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he was re-
ceived on 22 March by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, President Mobutu Sese Seko
wenC to Parie, whexe on 21 March he was the gueat of the Diplomatic Presa
Association and gtated that the aituation in hie country was being remedied.
AdmiCting "without hesiCation" the exietence of certain administrative
deficiencies, President Mobutu attributed the deterioration in hie country's
monetary and economic aituation to the world economic crisis, the drop in
the price of copper and circumsCantial difficultiea.
"Nowever, Zaire's situaCion is being remedied," said the Zairian chief of
atate, who announced that documenta concerning agreements made between hie
country and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been initialed and
thut he would soon sign them.
These documente are part of the Mobutu Plan for rehabilitating the Zairian
economy, for which credits amounting to $457 million are being sought.
The program extends over 3 years and involves the reorganization of
management, economic and financial stabilization through control and regu-
lation of demand and a reaumption of production.
President Mobutu also categorically denied that there had been any drop in
copper production in Zaire. He said that production, put at 450,000 tons
(sixth place in the world), should total 600,000 tons and that 150 foreign
technicians were working in Zaire.
Referring to the reorganization of the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), Presi-
dent Mobutu recalled that France was in charge of the training of 3~000
paratroopers who will make up an airborne squad, thaL Belgium was training
3,000 infantrymen and that China was completing che training of 3,000
commandos.
In Bonn, president Mobutu Sese Seko ~oined with Chancellor Schmidt in a
discussion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the economic,
financial and development policy domaina. Chancellor Schmidt said that
.
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h~.~ Cnun~ry's governmenC is willing, w3th~.n rhe fr~mework of tihe Mobueu plgn,
~o conrinue ire financial and rechnical aid to Zaire and eo p~rticipate in
multingtinnal effnrts in order to enable ~.e ro carry our ehe plan. '
In addition, iC has been announced that the next meeting of the German-
zairian Gr~tnd Commission will Cake place in Kinshasa in the fa11 of 1979~
- Aft~r his vieit tn Bottn, the Zairian president retiurned eo Paris, where he
once again meC wiCh PresidenC Giscard d'Estaing on 26 March. Upon leaving
Ch~ Elysee Palace, he announc~d Chde ~rance was gning Co supply, emergency
aid to the victima o� rhe drou~ht in Lower~Zaire, particularly in the
capital of Kinshasa. This aid wi11 include 1,500 Cone of wheae, 1,000 tons
of sugar and 4 tons of inedicines. The emergency aid wi11 be delivered next
month.
President Mobutu Seae Seko was then Co proceed on Cn Rome in order Co
meet wiCh Italian finannial attd economic officialg. He was also to go to
the Vatican, where he wou].d be received by Pope John Paul II.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux eC Cie., Paria 1979
11,464
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ZAIR~
BFtIEFS
~
I3UDGCT DEFICIT--On 21 March, the Zairian Legislative Council approved the
prop~sedbudgetfor 1979. The approved budget wi11 be promulgated by Presi-
dent Mobueu Sese Seko. It provi.des the following for 1979 (round figures):
2,662,000,000 zaires in overall expenditurea (operating expenaea and invest-
menes); 2.43 billion zairea in receipCs. This me