JPRS ID: 8446 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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JPRS L/8446
8 May 1.979
~
TRANSLATI~iS ON USSR POLITICAL
AHD SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
- (FOUO 5/19)
~
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�
. JPRS L/8446
8 May 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POI,ITICAL
ANA SOC~OLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
INrERNATICI~TA,L
Article F~caminea Background of S~lP-II Talks
(Roatielav C~orgiyevich Tumkovakiy; VOPROSY ISTORYT, _
1\ 0 J ) ~9~ / � ~ ~ ~ ~ � ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ � � ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ � � ~ ~ � � ~ � � ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ � � ~ � ~
NATIONAL
Kurdish Populgtion oP USSR Described
(B. A. Gerdanova; ftARODY KAYKA7~A II, 1962) 2~
~
- a - [IIT. - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTF~N~TIONAL
ARTICI.E EXAMINES BACKGRW ND OF SALT-II TALKS
~ Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 3, 1979 signed Co pres:~ 5 Mar 79 pp 70-86
[Article by Rostislav Georgiyevich Tumkovskiy, senior rese,3i~cher, Institute
of the UniCed StaCes and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences, ~~pecialist in the
field of U.S. military policy= 'Soviet-American Talks on tr~e Limitation of
Strategic Arms." Passages in slantlines printed in italics]~
[Text] The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) became passible only thanks
to the quarter-century sCruggle of the Soviet Union to strengthen its secur-
ity and that of its allies, during the strategic nuclear a~ims race unleaseu
against it by US ruling circles. The main trend in this struggle was overcomin g
the stubborn US desire to achieve decisive nuclear superiority in order to by
force solve to its advantage the fundamental contradiction af the contemporary
epoch--the contradiction betWeen socialism and capitalism.
Multilateral talks on disarmataent Within UN frameworks precede;; ~ilateral .
Soviet-Atnerican talks. On 19 June 1946 at the UN Atomic CommissYOn ~'~Q USSR
put forth a draft international convention on cc~ plete and unconditiana< pi~o-
hibition of the production and em ployment of atomic weapons. The draft cc~~~.ven- '
tion had as its foundation recognition of the principle of equality and eq~ial
security of all signatories. However, during discussion of the Soviet proposal
in the Atomic Comnission, the US succeeded in diverting it and instea~~, proposed
_ the so-called Baruch Plan, which was directed towards strengthening the American
nuclear monopoly. It did not envision any specific nuclear disarmament measures.
Its authors consider~d disarmament as a matter for the distant future. Naturally,
the "Baruch Plan" was rejected by the S~viet Union. Thus Were noted two opposing
apprnaches to the problem of nuclear disarmaments the Soviet approach directed
towards achievement of equality and equal security for all states, and Lhe Ameri-
can approach designed to insure US military superiority. During further disarm-
ament talks the United States repeatedly put f~rth "initiatives," Which hoWever
invariably contained attempts to acr,ieve ~nilateral military superiority to the
detriment of the USSR.
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This problem atCracted the close attenCion o~ Sovie~ scholars.1 Examined in
Chis arCicle is the contemporary stage of Soviet-America~i Lalks on the limiCa-
~ion of strategic arms.
/1. American propaganda and the realiCies of the arms race./ In response -
Co questions from the German S~cial Democrat ParCy weekly VO~tWAER'fS, CPSU
General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR SupremE Soviet Presidium
L. I. Brezhnev underscored thaC "the arms race developed on the principle of
'action-reaction'= the West put forth ~he challenge, the SovieC Union had to
accept it. So it was during the enCire period from the firsC atomic bomb to
the present day. And, the beginning of each new spiral in the arms race is
invariably accompanied by a new wave of wailing about the 'Soviet threat'."Z
The U.S.A. was invariably Che initiator in this race. F~rced C.o consider world
public opinion, U.S. leaders in order to justify their regular militaristic steps
invariably Curned to the false Chesis of the "Soviet Chreat," striving to shift '
the responsibility for the arms race to the Soviet Union. F'irst the USSR is
said to have "Chreatening" intentions, and then the necessiCy is expressed Co
develop arms for their "neutralization."
Each successive round in the arms race was justified in Chis manner. In the
mid-1950's, to provide a"basis" for a spurt in nuclear-capable aircraft, the
U.S.A. announced that the Americans supposedly lagged behirid the USSR in strategic
aviation ("the bomber gap"). For the purpose of overcoming this lag first the
H. Truman admini.;~tration and then the D. Eisenhower administration began unprec-
edented programs to build strategic bombers and accumulate nuclear and thermo-
nuclear bombs. The U.S.A. simultaneously began a broad program of construction
of air bases for strategic bombers on the territories of allied states near USSR
borders.3 The role of main striking force fell to strategic aviation. Masked
by the thesis of the "bombe~ gap," in the 1950's the U.S.A. brought the number
of bombers to almost 2,000.
~ In the late 1950's and early 1960's Pentagon leaders, greparing a new round in
the arms race--the nuclear missile round--again put forth assertions about the
"Soviet threat." This time they linked it with a so-called "missile gap" with
the USSA. U.S. Secretary of Defense N. McElroy announced in 1959 that the
Soviet Union was capable in a short time of creating large inCercontinential
] ballistic missile forces ~up Co 1,500 units in 1963) and of significantly over-
taking the United States. McElroy's successor R. McNamara by 1962 had already
called the thesis of the "missile gap" a myth. Nontheless, under its cover, the
J. Kennedy administration deployed the nuclear missile ^_:~mponent of its strategic
forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) a,nd ballistic missiles on
missile-equipped submarines (SLBM).
~ Nor is the modern stage in the arms race an exception. Placing a"base" beneath
the program of deploying missiles with multiple independently targetab~e reentry
vehiclES (R(:c:h) [MIRV], Washington began to assert that the Soviet Union pos-
sessed the capability of conducting limited nuclear war against the U.S.A.6
Because of this the task was assigned so that the U.S.A. would rpssess the same
capab~lity. This, in par.ticular, also served as a pretext for a new stage in
- the arms race. L. I. Brezhnev in a conversation with leading American political
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figure A. Harriman expressed the 5oviet position on limiL-ed nuclear war. In-
formation on this conversation presented Che Americaii leader's words "ChaC
L~ I~ 6rezhnev caCegorically disagreed with the theories being developed by
someone in ~he U.S~A~ of so-called 'limited' nuclear war~ The Soviet leader
emphasized 4~arriman, thinks Chat it is a big mis take to Calk about the per-
missibility of 'limited' nuclear war. ~ne must add to Chis the exclusion
of any type of nuclear war whatsoever."
The main goal which the U.5.A. pursued in initiaCing new spirals of the arms ~
- race was the desire by American ruling circles to achieve miliCary-technical
and strategic superiority over the USSR. -
_ The SovieC Union's imperative acCions in the area of creating and deploying
new strategic weapon systems undoubtedly had a reciprocal naCure. L. I. Brezhnev
- specially underscored this aspecC of the problem= "Those circles in the U.S.A.
and in the countries allied with it, which are against detente, strive Co spur
on the arms race, and are now trying to shift the responsibility for this race
on the Soviet Union~ This is a clear distortion of reality. ..Generally-known =
facts show that the arms race and competition in creaCion of Che most ~angerous I
types of mass destruction weapons were forced upon us. We did not �;nitia~e
creation of atomic bombs, submarines with strategic missiles, clusCer warheads,
and many others."a
J. F. Dulles once wrote~ "Such rapid assimilation by the Soviets of atomic
bomb production is truly a gigantic success for the Soviet Union and the end
of the U.S. nuclear monopoly will exert such a far-reaching influence on the _
world situ;tion that it is now diff icult to imagine. Ending our monopoly,
the Soviet Union in so doing radically changed the strategic situaCion in its
favor. The capability of the United States to drop nuclear bombs on Russia
has been neutralized to a significant degree by the latter's capability to drop
nuclear bombs on the United States and Western Euro pe.i9 Having lost nuclear
weapon monopoly, the U.S.A. relied upon thermonuclear weapons. However, the
Soviet Union solved this problem ahead of the U.S.A. i'he USSR tested the world's
first tr~ermonuclear charge on 12 August 1953. Evaluating the military and polit-
ical consequences of this fact for the U.S.A., the then American Secretary of
the Air Force T. Finletter wrote~ "The hydrogen bomb has changed the entire
situation." "In this instance," he continued, "the security of our nation has
been affected in a different way than was the case with the appearance of the
atomic bomb. The atomic bomb in 1945-1954 was not a mortal threat for the
United States. For four years cf these nize we alone possessed the atomic bomb.
During the remaining five years the Russians did not have a sufficient quantity
of these bombs to destroy the TJnited States. Now in a short time the Russians
will have a sufficient number of hydrogen bombs so that a small portion will be
capable of destroying the United StaCes."10
In the 1950's the USSR built its intercontinental bombers in response to the
sharp growth in the number of U.S. strategic bombers. Evaluating the consequences
of the Soviet response, H. Kissinger wrote in 1957s "Creation in the Soviet
Union of intercontinental bombers capable of flying enormous distances and
returning to their bases, along with the increase in the Soviet reserves of
nuclear weapons, was the cause of the fundamental ~'iange in the strategic
~ balance of forces in the postwar period."11
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The USSR responded to the nuclear missile round of the arms race iniGiated
in the 1960's by the U.S.A. by strengtt~ening of its own ~iuclear missile
potenCi~l. In early 1963 U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara was forced to .
admit that the Soviet Union's reciprocal measures to increase its defense
, capability dn not give the U.S.A. Che ca,pabiliCy through a preemptive ~
nuclear missile strike to destroy Soviet straCegic forces and escape the .
corresponding response from the USSR.12 This conclusion has not lost its ~
significance even today. Is it possible to overestimaCe its military-political
~ significance= the strategic mighti of the USSR deCers im perialist nuclear
aggression. "We have created straCegic forcea, whi~h are a reliable means
of deterring any aggressor," L. I~ B~ezhnev pointed ~uC. "And, we will respond
with the requisite increase in military power which guaranCees our defense to
any new atCempts from any quarCer to insure military su~~riority over the USSR.
We can take no other course."13
It is evident from the American evaluations prt~e~ited above thaC, thanks to ,
the timely and decisive reciprocal measures of Lhe So~ieC Union, the U.S.A.
practically speaking has been unable to achieve nuclear superiority over
,the USSR that would give it the capability of unleashing nuclear war without
catasCrophic consequences for itself. The temporary lead in elaboration and
deployment of new strategic weapon systems only gave visibility Co that superiority
which the U.S.A. has on eveLy ocassion strived to use for the purposes of con-
_ ducting a"from a position of strength" policy.
~
This very failure in attempts to achieve nuclear missile su periority forced
American military and political leaders to formally recognize the already long
established strategic nuclear parity of the USSR and U.S.A. President R. Nixon
in 1971 was forced to note that the Soviet U ninn had changed from a position of
lagging behind in the f ield of strategic weapons "to a position analogous tio
that of the U.S.A."14 The parity was characterized by the following indicators~
boCh the USSR and U.S.A. have a strategic triad (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic
bombers), while the balance of these components within the strategic forces
of the two sides does not coincide quantitat~vely. Recognition by the American ~
side of the state of Soviet-lymerican nuclear parity was the necessary politic~l
prerequisite for Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation.
/2. Soviet-American agreements on srrategic arms limitation./ Soviet-American
strategic arms lim itation talks began in Helsinki on 17 November 1969. Two and
a half years later,~on 26 May 1972, L. I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon in Moscow signed
the first Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements~ tr.a Treaty on
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and the Inter~}n Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Stra~egic Of.fensive Arms.
It is known that creation of nuclear missiles directed attention to development
of ABM. Research and development (NIOKR) in the ABM area began in the U.S.A. in
the mid-1950's practically simultaneously with the beginning of work on ICBMs.
In September 1967 McNamara announced the decision by President L. Johnson to
build a limited territorial ABM system named Sentinel. Its first elements were
to protect the 25 most important cities in the U.S.A. and the second to protect
u p to 52 cities. The U.S.A. ABM buildup created new prerequisites for a strategic _
offensive arms race. The Nixon Administration which replaced the Johnson
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gnverruneriC r~:~xamined Che decisic~n abouC building the 5entinel sysCem due Co
iCs low combaC effectiven~ss and strategic inadvisability.l5
The agreement between the USSR and the U.S.A. with respecC to a mutual limita-
tion on ABM systems was reflecCed in the Treaty on the Limitation of,AnCi-Ballistic
Misaile SysCems in paragraph 2, Art. I, which sCaCes that "each ParCy undertakes
not to de ploy ABM sysCems for a defense of Che territory of iCs counCry and noC -
- to pravide a base for such a defense." As an exception Che Parties were allowed
only to have two regions each protecCed by an ABM sysCem, each with a radius of
150 km= one with Che n tion's capital as Che center and one in the area where
ICBM silos are located.~6 The Parties also pledged not to modernize ABM laun-
chers for the purpose of increasing Cheir combat effectiveness and simultaneously
underCook not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or compc~nenCs which
were sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based, i.e., those differing
in design from the already existing sysCem. A very important element of the
Treaty was the agreement on national technical means of verification.l~ It
provided assurance of compliance withd the provisions of the Interim Agreement. ~
Pledges were made not to interfere with the national technical means of veri-
fication and not to conceal verification targets (Art. XII). The ABM TreaCy ~
does not have a time limit. A consultative commission consisting of representa-
tives of the Parties, which must examine progress in its i,nplementation every
five years, was created to monitor implementation. Having signed this Treaty,
the USSR and U.S.A. ruled out an arms race in the area of strategic defensive
weapons systems, and in so doing eliminated one of the incentives for an arms
race in the area of stra~egic offensive weapons systems.
_ The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms was signed for a five-year period. It placed limitations
on the missile components of the strategic forces. The Par~ies undertook not to
start construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after 1 July 1972.
In addition, they undertook not to converC land-based launchers for light ICBMs
or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers
for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time~ As to the underwater strategic
force component, an agreement was reached to limit SLBM launchers and n~odern
ballistic submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the
date of signature of the Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and
submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties
as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed
prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines (Art. III). In other words,
the Parties agreed to allow each to build new ballistic missile ~ubmarines
in a specific manner for each Party, but given the condition that an equal num-
ber of old submarine or ICBM launchers which becazne operational prior to 1964
is dismantled. This was a freeze of the quantitative level of ICBM launchers
- and ballistic missiles on ballistic missile submarines. National technical
means of verification monitor compliance with the Interim Agreement as well as
with the Treaty on the Li.mitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (Art. V).18
In essence, sigr~ing of the Interim Agreement signified the recognition by the
American side of the defeat of the basic policy of the U.S.A. in the arms race
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unleashed by it againsC the Soviet Union calculaCed to achieve a decisive
quanCiCati.ve superiority over the USSR in the sphere of strategic delivery
vehicles. In addiCion, it affirmed the effectiver..ass of the USSR's reciprocal
- measures Co str~ngthen its defense and deCer imperialisC nuclear aggression~
The political significance of this victory of the SovieC U nion in Che arms
race unleashed against it can hardly be overevaluated.
As opposed to Che Treaty on the Limitation of AnCi-Ballistic Missile Systems,
the Interim Agreemznt will not contain provisions prohibiting modernizaCion
of straCegic offensive weapon systems. This circumstance is a direct result
of Che desire by the American side to "combine" diametrically-opposed political
policies--continuation of the qualitative strategic arms race with negoCiations
about Cheir limitation. Soon after the start of the strategic arms limitation
Calks, in March 1970, the Nixon Administration announced the decision to reequip
a large portion of Che ICAM and SLBM force with new missile systems-�-Minuteman-3
and Poseidon (respectively) with multiple independen~ly Cargetable reenCry vehicles
(MIRV)19 vice those with sin~le warheads.. Testing of Che new missiles w~s com- -
pleted in 1969. This decision was the first act in a new qualitative round of
the arms race. On its heels was Che ann~uncement concerning stepping up develop-
ment of new strategic weapon systems= the Trident SLBMZ~, the B-1 heavy super-
sonic strategic bomber, and cruise missiles~
The American military and political leadership, besides the usual references
to the "Soviet threat," cited that the development and deploymenC of the new
strategic weapons systems would supposedly serve the interests of "limiting"
the arms race. Responding to questions from members of Congress relative to
the Moscow agreements of 1972, Kissinger stated~ "In our opinion, we must con-
Cinue accomplishment of those strategic programs which are permitted under the
agreement, and scientific research and develo pnent in spheres which are encompassed
by the agreement. ..(having in mind the Interim Agreement--R.T.). Our experience
sho~s that the program being accomplished will not serve as an obstacle for the
agreement but, on the contrary, might ~peed up its achievement." And further~
"it is considered that our power, if you will, will give them (the USSR--R.T.)
an additional incentive to conduct the talks.i21 This approach to the talks
received a special name in the U.S.A.--"bargaining chips~" It is not difficult
to see that this concept contradicts the principle of equality and equal security.
A11 initiatives by the U.S.A. in developing new models of sCrategic weapons were
calculated to provide specif ic military and political advantages. It is natural
that the Soviet Union was forced to take the requisite reciprocal measures to _
strengthen its owr. defense potential. The example of the deployment of
missile systems gives convincing evidence of this. The Nixon Administration's
decision in 1970 on this question was another attempt by Che American side to
achieve unil:teral military advantages. But, this only impeded preparation of
a new strategic arms limitation agreement. Soviet responses led to the fact that -
the U.S.A. was forced in 1974 to make an agreement in Vladivostok with the USSR
on establishment of identical numerical levels for this type of system.22
Senator G. McGovern, evaluating the results of their deployment, announced at
the Senate Armed Services Committee~ "In 1969 we were ahead in MIRV technology.
During that period there were proposals to delay testing and deployment of
missiles with warheads of this type until conclusion of a comprehensive agree-
ment on the limitation of strategic arms. But the Pentagon did not want to
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hear this~ We tested and deployed MIRV'd missil~s and achicved a tem porary
advanta~e relaCive to thc 5oviet Union. At L-he presEnC Cinie Che Sovi.et Union
is deploying iCs M IRV'rl missiles and apparently in a short time we w ill find
, ourselves in a worse position as compared to thaC in which we would have found
ourselves if deployment of MIRV'd missile sysCems had been avoided by both
sides. The identical people who insisted Chat we unilaterally deploy MIRV'd
missile systems are now complaining that the Soviet l~nion has a Chrow weight
- advanCage and that Soviet MIRV's are more dangerous to us than ours are to
them."23
In 1972 Moscow agreements, like the Vladivostok agreemen~s of 1974, noted the
defeat of the American strategic arms race policy~ The reciprocal actions of
the USSR destroyed a13 attempts by the U.S.A. to achieve nuclear superiority
and to employ it in the interests of its imperialistic policy. However, due
~ to the fact thaC the miliCary and political leadership of the U.S.A. has moved
the arms race to the qualitative sphere, these agreements had not stopped the -
~ latter.
/3. Soviet-1lmerican talks on development of a second agreement on the limita-
tion af strategic offensive arms (SALT-2)./ In accordance with Art. VII of the
InCerim Agreement, Che USSR and the U.S.A. undertook "L�o continue active negotia-
tions for limitations on strategic offensive arms." Experience in talks at the
, first stage and the evident contradiction in the approach by the American side to
the strategic arms limitation problem caused the necessity for preliminary develop- -
ment of a coordinated decision concerning the basic principles of the talks. In
1973 during tl~e visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the U.S.A. the Basic Principles of
Negotiations on Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons were signed.
The U.S.A. and USSR undertook to make "serious efforts to work out the provisions
of the permanent agreement on more complete measures of limitation of strategic
offensive arms wiCh the objective of signing it in 1974." Here "the Parties
will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and
by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or
. indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations
between the USSR and the U.S.A." It was also pointed out that "limitations
placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative
aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement," that Chese limitations
"must be su bject to adequate verification by national technical means," and
the question of modernization and replacement of strategic offensive weapons
must be solved in compliance wiCh the conditions to be formulated in agreements
to be concluded.24 Thus, the agreement on basic principles of negotiations was
directed a~ainst possible future attempts to insure unilateral military advantages
in skirting a future strategic arms limitation agreement.
A working visit between CC CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President
G. Ford was held near Vladivostok on 23-24 November 1974. During the meeting an
agreement on the main content of the SALT-2 agreement was achieved. A joint
Soviet-American announcement stated~ '"The new agreement, being based upon t~~e
principles of equality and equal security, will include the following limitations~
a) both Parties will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number
of strategic delivery vehiclesi b) both Parties will be entitled to have a
certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple
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independently Cargetahle reentry vehicles."25 ~r~cisaly, Che agree~nent included
Che following restri.ctions= a) each Party ~+ill have Che right Co have in toCal _
w ithin its sCraCegic forces no more than 2,400 nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
Included in this total are ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, i.e., envisioned
' is a restriction on all three strategic force com ponenCsf b) wi~hin the staCed
limits each ParCy received tha right Co have 1 320 ballistic missiles with MIRVs.
ICBMs and SLBMs can be included in this limit.~6
L. I. ~rezhnev and G. Ford came to Che conclusion that Chere were favorable
prospects Co conclude the development of the new agreement in 1975.27 This
decision, as is known, was noC fulfilled. The American administraCion violated
its pledges. Here it empl~yed an approach analogous to that used during deploy-
menr., of missile systems with MIRVs. The U.S. Defense DepartmenC annou nced an `
intention to complete the developsnent and then to deploy a new weapons system--
strategic cruise missiles.28
Guided by the Vladivostok agreement on limiting nuclear weapons delivery vehicles,
the 5oviet Union at the SALT talks put forCh a completely logical proposal--
Co include strategic cruise missiles in this limit which would make it possible
even given the avaiiability of U.S. cruise missiles to conclude a new agreement
o n strategic arms limitat ion. But, it was this very circumstance that d id not
suit the American side~ ICs representatives began to assert that the limit
established in Vladivos~ok for nuclear weapons delivery vehicles included only
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy strategic bombers, but not cruise missiles. This
approach opened a channel for a completely unrestricted arms race in a new area.29
And, this contradicted both th~ very idea of limiting strategic arms, as well as
the principle of equalitiy ~nd equal security. Therefore, it was rejected by the
U SSR as being unacceptable.
It became clear to the broad international society that the U.S.A. had violated
the Vladivostok agraement and it was their fault that develupenent of a new agree-
ment was being delayed. In order to ameliorate the unpleasant impression, the
Ford Administration "modified" its position. The U.S.A. expressed the willingness
to conclude an agreement with the USSR on limitation of its cruise missiles in
exchange for a limitation on the deployment of the Soviet bomber referred to as
B ackfire in the West. Bu t, this American proposal compared non-equivalent
we apons systems. The fac t of the matter is that the point of the strategic
arms limitation talks is the li.mitation of strategic weapons systems. The Backfire
is not such a system (the Backfire has a flight radius of 2,200 km and therefore
cannot reach the territory of the U.S.A.).30 As concerns cruise missiles, it is
an entirely different matter% their flight range is 2,500 km; these missiles,
accordin~ to plans published in the U.S.A., are to be placed aboard B-52 heavy
strategic bombers, on submarines, and on the territory of U.S. allies. These
, aircraft and submarines are capable of taking the cruise missiles to a launch
area from which they can destroy targets on the territory of the USSR. The same
thing will take place when cruise missiles are deployed on the territories of the
a llies of the U.S.A. in NATO and other aggressive blocs.
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L. 1, l~rezhnev repeaCedly explained Co ~ord, ;.n parLic~il.ar durin~ L�h~ meeting ,
i~ Helsinki, and Chen to 1'resident J~ CarCer Chat the I3ackEire case involves
a medium range bomber, not a strategic bomber.31 Nonethe7.ess, the American sidc
continued to insisC on iCs propo~al. A loud ~ropaganda ca~npaign, Che tone set by
members of the Congress, was unleashed in Che U.S . A. in supporC o� this pos iCior~.
Congressmen demanded thaC Backfire be i.ncluded in the nuclear w~apons delivery
vehicle limiC a reed Co in Vladivostok, buC thati cruise missi~.es not be included
in this limit~3~ As a result, the Ford Aciministration broke the Vladivostok
- agreemenC about concluding a second SALT agreement by 1975, sacrificing it to
the supporters of the ~ontinuation of the anns race. After defeat in the 1976
elections Ford expressed regret tha;, he had noC signed this agreemen~. The
~ame Cime he in ~�acC recognized thaC the obstacles created by his adminisCration
had an arCificial, premeditated nature.
U.S. Uefense Secretary N: Brown and Presidential Assistant Eor National SecuriCy
- Affairs Z. Brzezinski, with the participation of Senator H. Jackson, led the
development of ~he Carter Administration's position rt ~he SALT Calks. Proposals
which they developed were Caken by Secretary of State C. Vance Co Moscow at the
end of March 1977. During his talks with L. I. B.r.ezhiiev and A. A. Gromyko,
he put forth two proposals Co limit strategic ar;ns~ a"comprehensive," and an
alternative "limited" proposal. At first glance the "comprehensive" proposal
went even "farther" than the Vladivostok agreemen*_. it proposed a reduction
- in the total levels of nuclear weapon delivery systems established in Vladivostok
from 2,400 to 2,000-1,800 units, as well as a reduction in the level of MIRV'd -
- ciiissiles fr~om 1,320 to 1,200-1,100 units. Buty a requirement was put forth here
that realizaCion of the new conditions must be accompanied in the i1SSR by a
reduction by a factor of two in the number of missiles wt~ich in the U.S.A. are -
called "too heavy" or "much too effective.'~33
The attention paid by the American side to the specific type of Soviet missiles
~ is far from accidental. These are the very ones that were the responsP r:, Che
American initiative to begin a qualitative arms race. This circumsta.nce was
emphasized in the report aC rhe Conference of the Socialist International on
llisarn?ament (Helsinki, April 1978) by B. N. Ponomarev, CC CPSU Secretary and CC
CPSU Politburo candidate rr,ember. "In the early 1970's," he stated, "Washington
made the decision to build MIRV'd missiles, which incrpased
by several Cimes the number of American nuclear warheads. And Chese Soviet
missiles which are now causing a racket in the West a~ain were the response to
_ the next spiral in the arms race caused by the U.S.A.~~s4
Consequently, beneath the externally-respectable pretext of a general reduction
in the levels of strategic forces, the new United States [~ropo5al hid an attempt
by the American side to im pede the reciprocal measures by the Soviet Union to
strengthen iCs security and preserve for the U.S.A. the advantage in the number
of nuclear warheads guaranteed delivery to targets.
It was proposed in the "comprehensive" proposal to include in the draft agreement
,
prohibition against development of new weapons systems. However, actually it
_ e~visioned prohibition against development of new weapons systems which, according
~ to American data, are supposedly being developed in the t?SSR and did not envision
any restrictions on such weapons systems being developed in the U.S,A. (strategic
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CT'U~5p missiles, Che Trident 5LBM, and others). AcCVrdin~ Co ~v~lu~tions by
ss~veral wcsC~rn speci~lists, the Carter proposals 1ed to an almosti complete
h~lt in Che 5dviet pro~r;~ns of strate~ic force mod~arnization, le~ving the
correapunding Americ~?n prngr~ns untouched. Thus, Che "comprehensive" prnpds~l
cantrsdicCed ~,he principle o~ equality and equ~l seCUriCy of' the P~rties~
~ F'otmulaCed in the "1~miCed"' propos~l uas the ide~ of signir~g ~n ~greement nn
li~~.iting the number of balli~tic missiles ~nd straCe~iC t~mba_rs, but the questiion
of cruise mie~il~s and the $ack~ire bomb~r w~s put ~?side~~' ~'his proposal,
firsCly, repeated Che ~'ard AdministraCion'~ position which refused to include
cruise mi.ssiles in the Vladivastok agreementf secondly, it admittcd ttie arCificial `
ndture o4 the connection propaunded by the American side between American cruise
missiles and the Soviet $ackfit~ bomber: Chirdly, it gave visibility to a con-
cession by the American side, which was ready not Co ex~mine this connection if
Che USS~i agreed to unlimitied deployment of crui~e missiles in tihe U.~.A~ Cnn-
sequenCly, the "limit~d" proposal insured that Che United States had a free hand
in the arn~s race due to the cruisc missiles.
The unacceptability of both American proposals was evident~ Therefore, they
were rejected by the Soviet side.
Onp s~verall trait shaws through the activities of the Ford ar~d Carter adminisCra-
tions--in a unilateral manner they revised previously-achieved agre~nents ~n
strategic arms limitation. The Ford Adm inistraCion revised its pledges at the
Vladivostok agxeement, and, in essence, backed away from the basic principles
~ of negotiations on further limitation of strategic offensive xeapons. The
Carter Administration completely conducted itself as if these agre~nenCs did
- not exist. All these activities introduced insCability in 5oviet-American
relations and in no aay facilitated trust and respect for Amer ican pledges and
~ confidence in the viability of agreements signed by the U.S.A.
Opposite Che American policy was the Soviet policy directed toward firm com-
pliance with pledges previously made. During the talks wixh Vance, it was pointed
out from the Soviet side that a new agreement on strategic arms limitation must
be developed on the foundation already laid at Vladivostok. A. A. Gromyko
underscorpd this at a 31 March 1977 press cQnference after the talks began%
- "We want the edifice built in Vladivostok with such difficulty and on ~hich
so many intellectual and other resources Were spent to not only be retained,
but that the matter be brought to a close and that a new agreement be concluded
betaeen the USS R and U.S.A. on strategic arms limitation."36
Intense efforts on the part of the USSR Were required in order to move the
strategic arms limitation talks off dead center. A shift was noted only after
_ A. A. Gromyko met President Carter in Washington on 22 September 1977. In talks
ahich followed thanks to the constructive approach by the Soviet delegation
a.greement aas reached on a number of que~tions, pritaarily concerning strategic
cruise missiles. The Parties agreed that cruise missiles uith a flight range
of 600-2,SOU km aould ae subjected to lim itation along with other strategic
weapon systems such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. Here the Parties
undertook that only B-52 heavy strategic bombers could be equipped in the U.S.A.
uith air-grou nd cruise missiles. It was simultaneously apreed to equate than
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Cn etr~tegir missiles Nith multiple independently~Lar~,~_t~~c~ rc~entry vehicles
~nd Cd include thetn in the luniC estat~lished for such delivF~r.y vehicles. -
Air-~round cruise missiles with ~ fliPht ran~e in exc.ess uf 2,5UU km were
complet~ly prohibiCed. As concerns cruise missiles witt, a i~li~ht range in
excess nf 600 meters intended ~or deployment on land and abo~rd maritime v�s~~ls
- and subm~rines, it was agreed to prnhibit their tesein~ a~~c1 d~ploync~nt iniCi~lly
for a three-ye~r period. 'The deferment W~s intended to give the pareies ~ddi-
tion~l titn~ to wurk dut a fin~l soluCion.~~ These agreeme~~ts opened up pros-
pecCs for sigtting a new strategic arms limitation a~I~eetnet~t.
Houever, when there w~s 5UCCE55 aC the talks, criticis~r~ wa, ~,nleashed by
Che rulin~ Circles in Che United SCates about progress ir? tt~e talks and the -
positions of the parties on several prablems and overall. 1't,e "inf~rmation
leak" about Che Calks be~inning in October 1977 becatn~, the source for such
critic: ism.
In conne~ticn with th~ strate~ic arm~ limitation Calks th~ ~,arter AdministraCion
had much greater cooperation wiCh Che Congress than had pretiious ~dminist,~atiuns.
The Senate F'orei~n Affairs CoruniCtee headed by Senatur J. SUarlvnan and the Artns
Control S~~bcommittee headed by Senator H. Jackson systeinatically and in detail
were kept informed about progress in the talks. ~'he ~_onsidc~ration t~ere uas that
- the Congress would have to ratify the new agreement.j~ Acc:ordin~ to American
press information, the subcortmitiCee headed hy Jacksor~, as ~:~~11 as responsible
- guverruneat figures, were the sdurce of the "infortnatior~ l~~ak."
Among the many "critical" speeches connected with the str.atep,ic arms limiCation
talks, Lwo main trends can be discerned% supporters ~~f ~1~~~ first tiope "to adjust"
the agreemenC in order to provide the United States unilateral military advantages~
and the supporters of the second speculate abw t the "Soviet threat." The fotmer
especially stubbornly speak out against limitations on cruise missiles, asserting
that this is an unjustified "concession" to the Soviet ~:nion. They add for the
United States the right to place these missiles not only on the number of heavy
bombers agreed to by the participants in the talks, but also on any other air-
rraft, including heavy transports.~9 Such an approa~:h would open the way to
~ an unl;mited and practically uncontrollable increase i.u~ the number of cruise
rnissiles. At the same time, it is proposed not to extend lunitations on land-
based and sea-based cruise missiles. The idea here i.s to have the prospect of
deployin~ tt~e former on submarines in marititne areas adjacNnt to the territory
of the USSR and the latter o~ the territory of counCri~s allied with the United
States, primarily the NATU countries, also close to the Sovir,t borders. Also
~ envisioned is the capability when the ;.hree-year protocol n~ns out of trans-
ferring cruise missiles to third countries in circumver,tion of the strategic
arms limitation agreement.40 All of these "corrections" in the final analysis
have the goal of undermining the principles of equality and eyual security of
the Parties and simultaneously complir.dtin~ and de~tro~inN preparations for a
new agreement or~ limitation of strategic atms.
Those uho support the concept of the "Soviet threat" assert that, durin~; the talks,
the Unit~~c1 S[ates made too many concessions to tt~e 1'SSR. Tt~ey also put forth
the thesis that the Soviet Union had violated earlier agreements on the lunitation
of strategic artns. In a report at the IX sessioa of th~~ 1;SaN. Supreme Soviet
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A. A. Cromykn noted with regpect Co simil~r st~tements= "8oth in th~ 5oviet
Union and in Che UniCpd 5C~tes iC is recognized that boCh p~rties ~re Complying
utth a11 provigions of the agreement on the limit~tion d~ both de~ensive and
offensive strategiC arms~ The sCanding cnnsultaCiv~ commissi~n mude up of
represenCativee of Ch~ USSEi and the United States, ~onvening sp~cially Co mon-
itor x?rogr~ss in compriance by both parties of pledges made, four~d ttnt ~ singlp
fact of viol~tion of these agreements. .~Only unsCru[~ulous ard irresponsible
cry babi~s could permit thems~lves Co accuse the USStt o~ nonfulfillment of
pledges in the agreement wiCh Che U niCed States referred to ~bnve~ And, this
is being done uith a clear goal--to hinder the talks, especially on furCher '
measutes aith respect to limit3tion on strategic arms and to in~lict harm on
Soviet:-American relations."41
The problem of sCrategic arms modernization also attracted the close attention
of SALT critics. As is knot+n, Che Soviet Union, basing itself on the principle
of equality and equal securiCy and taking into consideraeion the .American posi-
tion, proposed s~hile the three-year proCocol was in force the Parties undertake
Co prohibit new ICBMs and S LBMs with MIRVs. The Amexican delegation proposed
during the life of the protocol to prohibit only all types of land-based ICBMs,
both with M1RVs as well as without them.42 The goal of this U.S. proposal is=
to halt accomplishment of the Soviet programs to modernize strategic forces and
to retain a free hand in realization of American modernization progr~tns sUCh as
the nea Trident SLB~f system with Trider,C-1 missiles, cruise missiles, a^d mobile
ICBMs. It is not difficult to see tha.t Lefore us is a renovated version of the
"comprehensive" variant rejected ~y Che Soviet Union. The broad propaganda cam-
paign "of criCicism" of the strategic arms limitation agreement being developed,
in the opinion of those who are spurring t~^ ~ampaign on, was designed to create
an atmosphere of mistxv st toxards it and coWards the USSR in American public
opinion, and in the Congress and, in the final analysis, to hinder or Wreck
its ratification by the Senate. Supporters of "corrections" to the agreement
a~re attempting to use this threat to pressure the Soviet U nion.
Supporters of the agreement in the United States express an entirely different
point o,f vieW. Thus, the following appeared in the NEW YORK TIM~S on 17 November
, 1977 in an article by military observer R. Burt= The main argument in support
of the new agreement is that, although it may not be ideal, it is much better
than no agreement aC all. In Burt's opinion "a fear of uncontrolled compe~ition
in the field of arms and the danger of a serious breakdown in American-SoviPt
- relations can exert a decisive effect and tip the scales t4 the advantage of the
government, having insured ratification of the agreement. H. Scoville, arms
control specialist and former scientific consultant to the ~.5. Defense Department,
C IA, and the Arms ~ontrol and Disatmament Agency, speaking in support of the
a~re~nent, stateds "I submit that if it is not ratified then this Will be the
~reatest catastrophe for our security, as Well as for ~~~r pocketbook. "43 The
propagandistic campaign of criticizing SALT and the agreement uorked out during `
the talks could not but complicate achievement of an agreement between tt~e United
States and ;.he USSR. Concerning information leares about progress in tne talks
and about the positions of the Parties organized by opponents of detente in .*.he
(;ongress, the then head of the American delegation at the talks P. Warnke said
that such a leak plays into the hands of the opponents of the new agreemen',,44
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A~reemenC oppcnents are trying "to link" Che talks and th~~ 4~ussibiliCy of
Cheir ~i~ning wiCh other ~~olitical proble?ns th~t havc~ ~~o r~~laCion uh~tsoever
Co Chetn and Go use this "link~ge" as ~ me~ns of ~~rESSUri ng ttie 5oviet Union
(in p~rCicul~r, Z~ $rzezinski uses Chis t~ck)~ Hut those ii? the UniCed 5taCe~
aho rp~l~gtirally look aC Chin~s undersCand Che potenti~lly dangerous conse-
quences of such an approach ~'or SALT~ ~or example, ~n 8 March 1978 a N~W YOEtI~
'C1ML�'5 ediCorial sCaC~ds "'This eactic does noC provide resulCs, but could destroy
Che fragile fr~tr?euork nf cdntrol over arms~" '~he policy of "linkage" undoubtedly
impedps improvement in 5oviet-American rel~Cions and conclusion of ~ new stra-
CE~,~C arms l~mitatinn agreemenC.
The broad and t~alicious propaganda campaign surroundii~~ SAI.'I' is a neW phenomenor.
in UnfL�ed SCa~es political life in comp~rison eo deb~tes surrounding the 1972
Moscoa agre~ments. Its purpose is to exert pressure c~n the t)55R position by
threatening to areck ratification of the agreement, as aell as t. justify the
~ delay in the talks Chemselves. The organized ~ssociati.on of oppoi~ents of the
policy of peaceful coexisCence, and in particular sCrategic arms limitaCion
agreemer~ts as ae11, is anoCher new phenornenon in United States political life.
The Committee on Che Present danger, made up of a number uf reactionary anti-
Soviet leani.ng U.S. poliCical, military, and public fig~~res, uas set up in 1976.
The Committee unleashed a broad campaign oc criti:isrn af tt~e sCraCegic arms
limitatiun a~reements bein~ prep~red. The ~:o~lition ior Yeace uith Strer?gth
appeared iri 1978. It consisted of congressmen known for thc~ir conservative
vieus. This coalition also included such reactionaries as Senators B. Goldwater
and K. Nelms, as Well as R. Reag~n. R. Dole, and others. The American military -
elite is Widely representated in the "coalition"~ secretaries of Che N~vy and
Air Force W. Mitteldorf and T. Reed, former JC5 chainnen Adrn T, Moorer and
Gen L. Lemnitzer, former DIA director Gen Cranam, forrnf~r ~~t~ief of USA~ Intelli-
gence Gen Keegan, and others. Collective members making up the "coalition"
included such reactionary grou ps as the Amecican Conservative Union, the American
Security Council, Association of ~ormer Intelligence Officers, Council fot the
- Struggle Against Communist Aggression, and "Organizations" of outcasts and
traitors set up by the CIA. J. Fisher, one of Che co-r_hairmen of the "coalition,"
described the political platform of his organizatiun at a press conference in
the Congress~ rejection of the principle of equaliCy in relations With Che
Soviet Union and insuring overall military and technical su ~riority over the
USSR, intensification of subversive activities by American special services,
- rejection of any agreements on arms control if they E~lace in jeopardy~ U.S.
"national security" (it goes without saying hou "coalition" members define the
latter), and the struggle against communism throughout the~ c:orld.45
Yarticipatin~ in i~niting the anti-Soviet propa~anda ~arnpaign also are leaders
of tr~e present U.S. administration. In his speech at hake f'orest University
on 17 March 1978 Carter accused the Soviet Union of s~lpposedly "demonstrating
an evil inclination to Qmploy its military might and to interfere in local
conflicts." The President spoke of a"important reevaluation" of United States
military strategy. It folloWed from his speech that the prNsent administration
intends to shift the center of gravity in foreign policy from the previously-
anno�nced course of insuring national security through ne~otiations, limiting
the arms race, and intensification of detente to a policy ~~f threats and applying
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pr~ssure. The president underscored thaC he will noC deviate ~'rnm taking
measur~s towards full-scale develo pnent and deployfient of new str~tegic weapotts
sysCems.46
The 5ovipt Union ConCinups Co carry on Che sCeadfasC sCru~gle for deCerring
the arms race and signing with the United SCates mutu~lly-acceptable agreements
on the limitation of strategic offen~ive arms. Thp final monChs of 1978 were
marked by a number of high-level Soviet-Am~rican m~etings= on 30 SepC~mber 1978
A. A. Gromyko discussed Che problem of preparing Che 5ALT-2 agrpement in
Washington wiCh J. CarCer and L. I. Brezhnev received C. Vance in the Kremlin
on 23 October 1918. During this meeting Che main attention was devoted to
questions concerning the signing of the SALT-2 agreement between the USS~t
and the U nited SCates. The Parties noted the consCructive and positive nature
of the talks which occurred in Moscow and announced thpir determination to
exert all efforts and bring this important matter to a close. Talks beCween
A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance took place in Geneva on 22-23 December 197$. Main
attenCion in Chese talks was devot~d to an examination of questions concerning
~ the limiCation of sCraCegic offensive arms on the plane of completing pre para-
tions for the new agreement in Che shortest possible time. Achieved here was
agree~nent or a rapprochement in Che positions of the Parties on a number of
basic q~estions where disagreements remained. Deten~inaCion was expressed _
by boCh ParCies to come to an agreement on the remaining que~,Cions through nor-
mal channels between Moscow and Washington.
The positive results of the meeting were noted in the announcement made by Vance
u pon returning to Washington. "We recognize that agteement on sCrategic arms
limitation without delay has important significance 9Eor peace. We however-- _
the U.S. Secretary of State underscored-- are r.ot tied into any kind of dead-
line."47 During a number of press conferences and television interviews con-
ducted by Carter in January 1919, he repeatedly expressed the convicti~n that
a SALT-2 agreement wou?d soon be corccluded. The Euxopean participants in the
conference held in early January 197') in Guadalupe b~etween U.S. President Carter,
French President V. Gis~ard d'Estaing, British Prime Minister J. Callaghan,
and FRC Chancellor H. Schmidt emphasized the importance of Che policy of detente
and the necessity to sign a new SALT agre~ment. FRG Chancellor Schmidt and
Britisli f'rime Minister J. Callaghan made. a direct appeal to Che U.S. Senate
to ratify as rapidly as possible the Soviet-American SALT-2 agreement as soon
as it is signed. Public opinion polls in the United States show that 75-80
percent of Americans support signing the SALT-2 agreement.
Hoaever, the Carter AdministraCion's policy continues to be contradictory~
it attempts to combine two opposite processes--the limitation of strategic
offensive arms arid continuance of the arms race. This was clearly demonstrated
during the U.S. President's Sta~,:e of the Union speech at a joint session of the
U.S. Senate and House of Representat:.ves. Carter announced that aLnost all
problems at the Soviet-American Stategic Arms Limitation Talks had alre ady been
solved, but, at the same time, Witihc+ut foundation he asserted that achievement
of an a~reement "reliable and deserving of confidence" somehow depends upon
~he USSR position.48 The President With this announcement cast a shadoW on
the policy of the Soviet Union at SALT and, in essPnce, supported those opponents
of the agreement Who asserC that the USSR supposedly hardened its position
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aC the Galks and seeks att excus~ for posCponing signing of ~he agreement.
The falsity of such asserCions was sn eviden~ Chat literally Chree days later
at a press cnr~ference in Washingtion Carter w~s fnrced Co annot~nce Chat "ehe
Soviet Union is conducting the talks conscientiously. .,The Sovipt Union
- has nnt hardened iCs position in Che las~ month or two. Its ~x~sition, just
like ours, is sufficiently rigid. We are conducting very di~ficulC talks
and are ac~hieving conCinued progress.i49
In the SCaCe of Che Union speech mentioned above Carter called upon ~he
Congress to approve Che draft federal budgeC he presented for fiscal year 1980
which calls for unheard of military expenditures--138.2 billinn dollars.
It is evident from the President's speech that Che Uni~ed 5taees as usual
gives priority to the arms race in comparison to measures to limit it. This
~ is reflected in Che stepped-up developnenC of new strategic w~apons systems
" such as Che MX ICBM, Che Trident SLBM system, cruise missiles, and so on.
In addiCion, Che Pentagon levied the requirement Co deploy American MRBMs
_ on the territories of Che NATO counCries in WesCern Europe. Thus, whaC we
have is an atCempt by the U nited States to "supplement" the race in Che sphere
of intercontinental sCrategic weapons systems with a race in the sphere of
sCrategic regional nuclear missile systems.
The possibility of completing SovieC-American talks to develop Che SALT-2
agreement elicited a sharp escalation in the activities of treaty opponents
in the United States. They created approximaCely 70 "public" organizations
possessing large financial asa~ets. These "societies" began a broad
campaign against the new agreement, srriving to "change the minds" of those
Americans (and they are the majority) supporting the agreement. The selection
of "arguments" of the SALT-2 opponents does not sparkle with originality. The
first of these is the false myth concerning Che "Soviet threat" rt:aliciously
pro pagandized at all political levels in the United States. The second no
less false argument was put forth by a special gzou p in the House Armed Services
Committee. It affirms without furnishing proof in its report that a new agree-
ment "might provide the Soviet Union with strategic superiority."50 The third
argument is continuing atCempts to "link" the SALT-2 agreement with other
questions that do not pertain to it. Speaking before journalists Senator
R. SchWeiker announced that "linkage" of the agreement on limitation of stra-
tegic offensive arms wiCh other questions of USSR foreign and domestic policy
is "a key problem."51 A group of senators at a ~.onference of inembers of the
Republican Party holding elected office held at the end of January 1979 pro posed
"to link" the SALT-2 agreement with the condition of the United States Armed
- Forces With achievement of an agreement at the Vienna talks on mutual
force reductions in central Europe, with "compliance" by the Soviet Union with
the Helsinki Act, and with new guarantees of verifying compliance with the
SALT-2 agreement. Only tWO of the 26 senators at the conference voted against
the "linkage" policy. It follows from American press reports that a difficult
situation characterized by the intention of certain circles to torpedo the
SALT-2 agreement existed in the Senate of the United States. This presages
a difficult battle in the Senate on the question of ratifica~ion of the SAL'f
agreement.
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The desire by American reactionary circles Co play the "Chiria card" againsti
the SovieC Union can also be used by them Co build addiCional obst~cles in
the paCh of concluding Che SALT-2 agreement. BriCish E'oreign Minister
U. Owen pointed Chis ouC at a press conferenc~ afCer conclusion of talks
wi~h U.S. Secretary of Stiate C. Vance in early February 1979~ Owen call~d
upon the United States noC Co build its relations with China to the deCri-
ment of Che SovieC Union. Ne noCed Chat this could lead to a breakdown in
Che SALT talks. "In my opinion," Owen sCated, "Chis would be absolute
stupidity."52
Speeches by Che opponents of the SALT-2 agreemenC forced its supporCers
in the United States Co apply a more organized character to their activiCies.
In early 1979 Chey created an organization called Americans for SALT. It
included inflUential representatives from U.S. poliCical, religious, business, -
scientific, and cultural circles. Its co-chairmen are former U.S. Defense
Secretary Clifford, former Senator and permanent U.S. Representative to
the UN H. C. Lodge, former permanent U.S. RepresentaCive to Che UN C. Yost,
and others. The organization supports strategic arms luniCation. It considers
one of its main tasks to be exposing the falsehood concerning the "Soviet threat~"
concerning Che facC that a future SALT agreement would somehow give advantages
Co the USSR and so forth. In the announcement on seCting up the Americans for
SALT, its leaders laid down its position relative Co ratification of the agree-
ment bein~; prepared= "RaCification cf the SALT-2 agreement is of primary sig-
nificance for the securiCy and interests of the American people. It will
establish limits on the develo pnent of new weapons systems. Signing and
ratification of this agreemenC are a decisive step forward towards more com-
plete c~ntrol of nuclear weapons."53
Thus, a new political phenomenon exists in the United States--organizational
demarcation of strategic arms limitation agreement proponents and opponents.
Famous American scientist and University of California professor F. Neal writes
with alarm about the "Carter Administration's inertia in the f~~e of the offen-
sive by opponenCs of Che straCegic arms limitation agreement. ThQ aciministra-
tion not ~nly does not speak actively in defense of the strategic arms limitation
agreement, but it also simultaneously continues to take a broad circle of
measures to build up arms, including plans to deploy neuCron weapons and MRBMs
in Western Europe and to raise the military budgets of the United States and
its NATO allies.
In a speech at a preelection meeting of the voters in the Bauman Voting District
of Moscow on 2 March 1979, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that the new Soviet-American
Strategic Arms Lin itation Treaty, if it is signed, ratified, and implemented,
"is not in any way detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union--nor by the
way, Co the security of the United States. Overall it. ..will be advantageous
to both countries."55
lt is fully evident that the soonest possible conclusion and ratification by
both I'arties of the SALT-2 agreement would facilitate strengthening the policy
of detente and smoothing of Soviet-American relations. This problem is fully
solvable given that U.S. leaders possess political wisdom and attention to insuring
peace througho~ut the world.
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F'00'I'NOT~. ,
1. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSEt" [Nistory nf USS~ E~or~ign policy].
Vol 2. 1945-1g75, Moscow, 1976f see also V. Khaytsman~ "5SSR i problema
raxnruzheniya" [The USSR and Che Problem of bisarn?~tnene]. 1945-1959.
Moscow, 1970i L. Ya. Cherkasov. "Strategiya mira" [Peace Stirategy].
Moscow, 1972f A. Ye. Yefremov. "Yadernoye razoruzheniye" [Nuclear bis- _
armament]. Moscow, 1976. ~
2. KOMMUNIST~ 1978, No 8, p 11.
3. AC the same Cime, H. Kissinger writes, "We even looked upon our military
alliances mainly from the point of view of Che possibiliCy of acquiring
Che air bases we needed aC their expense." H. Kissinger. "Yadernoye
oruzhiye i vneshnyaya politika" [Nuclear Weapons and ~'oreign Policy.J.
Moscow, 1959.
4. "The Superpowers in Multinuclear World". 'Toronto, 1974, pp 276-279~
S. "U.S. Congress, Senat [sic] CommiCtee on Armed Servi.ces and CommitGee
on Aeronautical and Space Joint Hearings Missile and Space Activities, ~
86th Congress, ls~ Ses.". 1959, pp 25-26.
6. R. Nixon. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's." April 1973, p 182.
7. PRAVDA, 21 Sep 76.
8. L. I. ~rezhnev. "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course]. Vol 5,
Moscow, 1976, p 8Y.
9. J. F. Dulles. "War or Peace?" New York, 1957, p 151.
lU. T. Finletter. "S ila i politika" [Force and Politics]. Moscow, 1956,
pp 312-313.
11. H. Kissinger. Ibid, p 158. ~
12. "Uepartment Defense Appropriat;ones [sic] for 1964. Pt 1. Subcommittee
of Committee on Appropriationes [sic]. House of Represet~tatives". Wash-
ington, 1963, p 341.
13. L. I. Brezhnev. "Leninskim kursom". Vol 2, Moscow, 1973, p 541.
14. R. Nixon. 'U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's" 25 Feb 71.
15. See "ABM"~ NeW York, 1969, p 255.
16. "Sovetskaya programma mira v deystvii" [Soviet Yeace Program in Action].
MoscoW, 1972, p 19. In 1974 during the Nixon visit to the Soviet Union
the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
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5ystems was signed. In accordance with the I'roCocol, Che SovieC U nion
underCook not to deploy A4M systiems or iCs componenC~, wiChin an ICBM
silo area, and the UniCed Staties underCook not ti~ d~ploy an ABM system r
in an area centered on Che cap;.t$1. See "Dokumenti i materialy treC'yey
_ sovetsko-amerikanskoy vstrechi na vysshem urovne" ~DocumenCs and Materials
of Che Third Soviet-American SummiC Meeting]. Moscow, 1974, pp 55-56.
17. They include artificial earth saGelliCes equipped with photo and radxo
Cechnical verification systems, ground-Lased radar stations, and so on.
18. "Sovetskaya programma mirw v deystvii;'pp 25-27. The Interim A~reemenC
placed no limitations whatever on strategic: bombers.
19. According to U.S. DQfense Department official reporGs, 55U previous
Minuteman-1 missiles were replaced by Minuteman-3, and Poseidon missiles
have been installed nn 31 of Che 41 ballisCic missile submarines.
("Annual Defense Department Report," FY 1976 and 197T, pp 11-32).
20. In accordance with data published in the American press, TridenC ballistic
missile submarines will have a displacement of 18,700 tons (greater by a
facCor of two than the contemporary American ballistic missile submarines ~
equipped with 16 Poseidon missiles aach) and will carry 24 Trident-1 -
MIItV'cl ?nisai.le~. ("Annual Defense Department ReporC", FY 1975, pp S1,
52, 57).
21. "Hearing before the Commi~tee on Armed Services. United States Senate,
92 Congress, 2nd Sess," 20 Jun. ..25 Jul 1972, pp 125, 135.
22. "DokumenCy i materialy sovetsko-amerikanskoy vstrechi vo Vladivostoke."
[Documents and Materials of the Soviet-American Meeting in Vladivostok].
Moscow, 1974, p 20. [hereafter "VladivosCok"] ,
23. "The Congressional Record, Senate," 13 Apr 76, pp S5615, 5616. ~
24. "Vizit Leonida I1'icha Brezhneva v Soyedinennyye Shtaty Ameriki."
[Visit of Leonid I1'ich Brezhnev to the United States of America).
Moscow, 1973, pp 68-144.
25. "Vladivostok," p 20.
26. 12VESTIYA, 1 Apr 77.
27. "Vladivostok," p 20.
28. Cruise missile--a pilotless aircraft carrying a nuclear or conventional
warhead and equipped with an automatic control and target guidance system.
_ This system insures that the missiles flies according to its assigned
program, "detects" the target, and strikes it. Based on data published
in the American press, the program for building cruise missiles envisions
devclo pnent of three strategic variants--the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise
missile intended to be placed on multipur~ose nuclear submarines (the
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missile can be launched while submerged via tihe torpedo tubes)1 the
second--an air-launched cruise missile Co be c~rried by B-52 heavy
sCrategic bombersf and the Chird--a land-based cruise missile intended
for launch from mobile launchers. The lau?~ch weighC the sea-launched
variant is 1,300-1,500 kg and that of Che air-launched version is 900-
1,000 kg. ("Annual Defense Department Report." FY 1976 and 197T, pp 11-39).
29. The AmArican press published information concerning the Pentagon's inten- k
tion to deploy many thousands of cruise missiles. (see 'Tt~i~ NEW YOItK TIMES, _
3 October 75).
- 30. PRAVDA, 14 Apr 77.
31. Ibid, 1 A pr 77.
32. "The Congressional Record," 28 OcC 75, p E5630.
33. IZVESTIYA, 1 Apr 77.
34. Ibid, 25 Apr 78.
35. Ibid, 1 Apr 77.
36. Ibid.
~ 37. See "Zadacha ogranicheniya strategicheskikh vooruzheniy= perspektiva i
problemy" [The Task cf Limiting Strategic Arms= Perspective and Problems].
- PRAVDA, 11 Feb 78.
38. Based on a law concerning arms control and disarmament the government under-
took to obtain the concurzence of Congress for adoption of any measures
which would limit the milita~ry potential of the United States.
39. PRAVDA, 11 Feb 78. ~
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid, 7 Aug 78.
42. Ibid, 11 Feb 78.
43. WASHINGTON POST, 11 Nov 77.
44. PRAVDA, 27 Nov 77.
/i5. IZVESTIYA, 10 Aug 78.
46. PRAVUA, 19 Mar 78.
47. Ibid, 26 Dec 78.
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;
48. Ibid, 25 Jan 79. ~
49. Ibid, 28 Jan 79~
50. Ibid, 6 Jan 79.
51. IZVESTIYA, 26 Jan 79. ,
52. Ibid, 5 Feb 79.
53. Ibid, 22 Jan 79. ~
54. ~RAVDA~ 4 Feb 79. '
f
55. 'lbid, 3 Mar 19. '
COPYRIGHT= Izdatel'stvo "Pravda". "Voprosy istorii", 1979. ~
7869
CSO= 18U0
I
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NATZONAL
KURDISH POPULATION OF USSR DESCRIBfiD
Moscow NARODY KAVKAZA II in Russian Vol 2, 1962 pp 602-616
. ~rticle by Gardanova, B.A.: "The Kurds^r/
/Text7General Informatiion
Most Kurds (Kurmandzh is their own name for themselves) live outside the
- USSR, in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. A small number of Kurd.s have settled =
in Afghaniatan and Pakistan. According to approximate data, the total number
of Kurds living in foreign countries amounts to about 8 million persons~.89
In the Soviet Union there are 59,000 Kurds (1959 census). They live in the
Armenian (26,000), Georglan(16,000),and Azerbaijan SSR's, as well as in the
Kazakh; Kirghiz, ltirkmen and Uzbek SSR's. In the Armenian SSR most of the
Kurds live in the Aparanskiy, Talinskiy and Echmiadzinskiy r~yons. In addition,
there are Kurdish settlements in the Idzhevanksiy, Sevanskiy, Basagrecharskiy,
Artikskiy, Abovyanskiy, Ashtarakskiy, Oktemberyanskiy and Vedinskiy rayons.
In the Azerbaijan SSR the Kurds have settled in the Lachinskiy, Kel~badzharskiy,
Kubatlinskiy and Zangelanskiy rayons. In the Georgian SSR the Kurds comprise
a mainly urban population. There are more than 43,000 Kurds living in
the Caucasus.
The Kurdish language belongs to the northwestern group of Iranian languages,
and is divided into a number of dialects. The T`rans-Caucasian Kurds speak
the Kurmandzhf dialectf in Armenia they also speak Armenian, and in Georgia
they also apeak Georgian; in Azerbaijan the young people speak primarily
in the Azerbai3an language, while the older generation is bilingual. Many
Kurds, especially in the cities, kno:t Russian.
The Kurds of the Z~ans-Caucasus belonged either to the Sunni Moslp.ms '
(in Armenia), the Shiite Moslems (in Azerbaijan) or the Yezids (in
Armenia and Georgia). The religious differences were reflected in the
daily life, customs and culture of these groups of the Kurdish people. At
the present time, when most Soviet Kurds have moved away from religion,
the terms Moslem Kurds and Yezid Kurds are used in an ethnographic sense.
l
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The date of the Kurds~ firsC appearance in Che Caucasus has noti been '
preaisely es~abl3.shed. Acco~ding ~o literary s~urees Che existence here
of the Ku~dish Sheddadidov dynasty was well knownf tihe dynastiy ~u1ed
in the Caueasus in the lOth-12th centur~S.es in ttiQ area which ineluded
the territiory between� Kara and' Araks, wi.th ~esidences in Gyandzh
and DvinQ.
A significan~ number of Che Kurds settled in the Trans-Caucasian area
- af~er leaving Kurdistan, the primary area of their habitiation, aftier
the Trans-Caucasian area was annexed to Russia,
Those rayons of Azerbai3an which have ~he larg,est Kurdish populations
bordered on Iranian territory in the begi.nning of the 19~h century, ( the
present-day 2angelanskiy Rayon), and tihe Lachinskiy Raqon, whieh became _
ane of the main centers of Kurdish settlemen t in Azerbaijan in the 1820's.
In 1923 the Kurdistan Upezd was fo~cmed.in Azerbaijan, wi~h its cenCer
in Lachin. Some clan associations o� Moslem Kurds moved from Azerbaijan
to Armenia, specifically into the Basargecharskiy and ArCashatskiy rayons. -
The territory of Eastern Armenia was occupied mostly by Yezid Kurds, who
had moved here mainly from Turkey, where they were subjected to religious
persecutiion. The main wave of Kurdish immigration to Armenia took place during
the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. A
significant number of Kurds moved to Armenia �rom Turkey during the
First World War.
A majority of the Kurds who now live in Georgia are descended from
people who arrived here during the First World War, either directly
from Turkey or from Turkey to Georgia by way of Armenia. They moved ~
from Armenia to Georgia in search of work, settling in cities, primarily
Tbilisi.
Principal Occupations
Before the Great October Socialist Revolution the Trans-Caucasian
Kurds led for the most part a seminomadic or nomadic way of life. As a
rule, every tribe had definite routes for its E~,campments wiCh the herds.
In Che spring they moved up to the mountai.n pastures, and with the coming
of aut~unn the herds were moved down to lower areas. They raised mainly
~mall cattle, cows, draught cattle and horses. In addition t~ their
cattle-raising, land cultivation played an important role in their economic
activities. They raised wheat, barley and other crops. The land was
w~rked with primitive toolss an iron or wooden spade, a wooden plow with an
iron blade and a hoe. The land parcels and the pastures belonged
either to the tsarist government or to private owners. For example, in the
seCtlement of Zilanla in the Zangezurskiy Uyezd, of Yelizavetpol'skaya
Gubernya, the land was the property of Gasan-beg and Ismail-beg, Kurdish
, large landowners.
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Af~er the es~ablishment of Soviet authori~y, tihe Kur~lish people were f~eed !
~From the exploitiaCion of feudal lords. 7'he land was ~iven to ~he working
people for their use. The seminomaclic and nomadic life rapid].y gave~ way
to a settled life.
The artels, or cooperative associations of peasants which were crea~ed
3n ~he twentiies for land use purposes, Che crediti societixes, the mutual
aid commit~ees, groups of poor peasants, eCc. all conCributed to tih~
transition of ~he Kurdish peasa~ltry to a settled way of 7.ife. Th~cough these
agricul~ural organizaCions Che working Kurds acquired se~ds, draugh~ animals,
and agricultural tools.
The collectivization of agricultu~e had enormous significance in the life
of the Kurdish peasantry. At present there are boCh Kurdish kolkh~z's
(for example, the Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin, the ~Curdskiy Pamp Kolkhox,and the
Gonda'.chsaz in ~he Aparar~skiy Ray~on of the Armenian SSR; the Kolkhoz 3meni
Sul eymanov in the Talinskiy Raynn o� the AL^menian SSR)~ as well as mixed
kolkhoz's, where the Kurds work along side xepresentati.ves of other -
peoples from the Trans-Caucasian republics (f~r example, the Kolkhoz
imeni E~'gels in the Kel'badzharskiy Rayon of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Lyusaber _
Kolkhoz in the Echmiadzinskiy Rayon of the Armenian SSR and others).
- Great success has been achieved in the mechanizatiion of most agricultural
w~ork. The tracCor, combine, sower, mower, thresher and other mact,ines
have taken hold in the Kurdish vi].lage. Modern agricultural equipment is
penetrating even into the high mountain areas of Trans-~ausasia. For example,
an area as remote and mountainous as the Lachin skiy Rayon in the Azerbaijan
SSR is using the DT-54 diesel tractor, threshers, etc. Kurds have been
trained as skilled machine. operators. The economy of the Kurds, who
live in the mountain rayons of Armenia and Azerbaijan is dominated by
cattle-rai~ing--both small and large t~pes of catCle are bred. Agriculture ~
plays the primary role in ~he piedmont and lowland areas. These areas include
parts of the Kubatlinskiy and Zangelanskiy rayons of the Azerbai jan SSR,
where cotton- and rice-growing are the economic basis of the kolkhoz's.
The agricultural areas include the Echmiadzinskiy and Oktemberyanskiy
ray+ons of the Armenian SSR, where the Kurdish population is engaged
in viticulture and field-crop eultivation.
In the past, truck gardening was almost unknown to the Kurds. The growing
of vegetables was hampered by religious prohibitions (for the Yezids)
and by the nomadic or seminomadic way of life led by the Kurdish population.
But now gardening p]ays an important role in Kurdish kolkhoz's. In the
piedmont areas of Armeni~ and Azerbaijan, and in certain mountain collectives
of Armenia the Kurds hav~; started to grow poCatoes.
In the pasC~ the Kurds did not fertilize the soil. A good crop was related
to the will of divine forces and spirits. Fertilizers are now commonly
used on the kolkhoz fields and private plots.
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In ~he ~re~ of ~nimal husb~ndry, the Lransitidn to tihe r~isin~ nf inerinos
and p~digree cows h~d ~reaC S~grif~~C~flCe beCAUSe thefr produCCiviey is
higher Chan Chati of loc~1 speci~s. The ~verage annu~l yield from ~ coW
of the local breed is 1,200-2,000 litcr~f a pedigree cou ~ives 2,SU0-
3,(~00 1 of milk per y~ar. Th~ fati con~enti nf Ch~ milk h~s ~18b increaged~
gs has tih~ amounti of ineat produced. Before, Che Trans-Caucasian Kurds
consid~r~d it a sin tn process milk by m~chines. This superstiYS.on has
noc: b~en overcome. Th~ knikhdz~s use separ~torg and other equfpm~r?~ Co
procesg the milk. T'he milk i~ turned nver tia dairy plants, ~r?d in ~xch~n~~,
the kolkhoz's r~ceSv~ cheese and butiC~r, uhich ~re diseribut~d to kolkhoz
members ~ccording to tiheir w~ork-d~ys.
Silage is prepared to 'last Che caCtle over the uinLerj the silage is sCored
in pitis s~hich are dug near the cowsheds. Desp~ti~ the far_t that the Kurds
had ~ai~sed catCle for centurfes, they had no noCion of silage. Sitag~
Was something neW for Che Kurdish village.
The kolkhoz~s also raise be~s, poul try and snm~times pi~s.90 ~c~r some
of Che kolkhoz members bee-keeping is a nea occupaCion. ~or example, the
residents of Che Akko settlement of Che Talinskiy Rayon in the Armeniar~ SSR
have been keeping bees only since 1950.
The best Kurdish kolkhoz members among Chose uho raise animaYs as well as
those Who groW crops have been auarded government prizes for excellent
Frork, Those honored in Chis ~?ay include a si~nificanC number af s~omen,
such as V. Guseynova, Who Was aaarded the Order of Lenin for a high
cotton yield and Ch. Gasanov~, Who aas made a Nero uf Socialist Labor,
and others.
Some of the Trans-Caucasian Kurds .are engaged in indusCry. The percentage
is particularly great among the Kurds of Ceorgia, who live, as was alre~dy
n~ted, for the snost part in ciCies.
Carpet Weaving
Carpet weaving and the production of~~roolen goods are the mosC hi~hly
developed of the crafts practiced by the Kurds. Carpet making has occupied
an important place in the economic life of the Kurds for a long time.
According to ancient Kurdish customs, every young girl had to master
the art of producing carpets and wQOlen goods before her marriage.
Kurdish carpets and carpet goods are divided into pile carpets, non-pile
carpets, felt and uoolen gooAs uith carpet designs (purses, bags, stockings,
~romen's ~+oolen belts, etc.). Depending on the meChod of production, the quality
quality of the s~rool, the size and ornamentation, there are various names
for the carpets ~~f31I13I11~N "dxhardzhem," "zili," eCC.). The designs of
traditional Kurdish carpets have, in ad dition to purely ~eometric elements,
motifs ahich reflect the life of the Kurds, their religious rites and
the elements of nature xhich surro~md them. The depic~iot~ of the sun is -
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particul~rly charactc~rigtic b~ tihe Carpets m.~de by ehe Ye�r.id Kurds, ~nd ~
iC ig prdb~bly r~lxted e~ tihe aurship of the sunf the sp~~'t of lan~
culCivatiion, Malake T'aus, is o~ten portrayed in the form o~ a bird.
1'he portirayal of horne, ahiCh are found on many Kurdish carpetis,
ObV~0U51Y r@~Z~+CtS ~I1~ Gt1CtilE-raising in which they hav~ Cr~diCionglly en~a~~d.
At Che present time the designa o~ lturdiah carpets are beginning Co
- conCafn nea motifs, Which reflect the socialigt Nay ot' li~e, as aell as
motifs borroued from n~ighboring peoples.
Vill~pg and Dw~llings
The external appearance of the Kurdish village is chan~ing from day tio day.
NQw construction based on standard plans for aell~built homes aiCh all the
amenitfes is takittg plac~ in n~arly all Kurdish villa~es of Trans-Caucasia.
The~e inciude many Cuo-sCory buildingg. The nea structures can be s~en in
many villageg of th~ Lachinskiy, Kubaelinskiy, Kel'badzharskiy rayons of the
Axerbafjan SSR (Minkend, Verkhneye Mollu, Karakishish, Agdzhakend, Orudzhlu
and oChers), and in Che Aparanskiy, Talinskiy and Basar~ect~arskiy rayons of
Che Armenfan SS~t (Alagez, Dzhardzharis, Akko, Kgyabash and others), bue
th~ old Kurdish dwellings still r~tnain in some villaees. The old Kurdish
home, taade of clay or stone, consists of seve,.~al areas c the rooms in
srhich bread is baked, and people eat and sleep ("mala Candurekhani")t ~
a sCoreroom for food products ("kilar"); a sheep-fold ("gom")f a stablp
and cosr-shed for cattle ~tavla"). The doors of all tihese areas open onto _
a general corridor, xhich is called a"sevdar:~ In the old Kurdish home
as found in Armenia, one of Che main areas Was a room for ~ale guests,
the "oda," 91 The oda aas usually located next to the sCable. One entire
~+all separated the oda from the living quarters, and another aall, loWer
than hwaan height, adjoined the stable. Along both sides of the oda
earthen p1aNc beds about .S m in hefght aere built, and Chey Were -
covered ufth carpets.
A s~ooden panel door led into the house, and it served as the common
entrance for both people and cattle.
Hhen the location of Che house made it possible, the Yezid Kurds ~rould
have the entrance door facing East, which was clearly a vestige of the _
sun cult. In the homes of Noslem Kurds the entrance door ~+ould face
Southwest, tos~ard Hecca and Medina.
As a rule, Che homes did not have Windows. Instead of windoWS, openings
sr~re made in th~ center of the � dome-shaped roof. This opening served
as both a uindoa and a smoke outlet. The ceiling rested on both the s+alls
and on uooden posts Which srere put up inside the living portion of the
house.
2~
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~
~C7k U~~tCiAL USF: ONLY
The houses had no furniture. Durittg the d~y the beddin~ Nas pil~d inCo g
mound on th~ rrooden pl~nk b~ds, thp "ster,"9z Whi~h aere usually locaC~d
again~t Che uall, oppo~sitie to th~ entrance.
UC~ngils, conaisCing of clay and copp~r ju~s, erays, bowls, morCarg and
hand mill~ made of strnte, uer~ arr~nged on the floor. A xooden butter
churn was att'a~hed to t:he pOSGB Which supported Ch~ ceilingf this was in
the hallWay, and in Che living part of Che house a homemad~ cradle aas
atCachpd to Che posts. The hous~ Nas lighCed by nil l~mps. The family -
atie and slept on th~ fluor.
The int~rior of a present-day Kurd~sh home presents g greatly char~ged
appearance. Even in the remotest villages Kurdish homes h~v~ b~come
urban-typ~ daellingsi store-boughC dishes, beds, chairs, tables, radios
and electric lighCs--are all part of the present-day furnishings of the
Kurdish dxelling. .
When Ch~ Kurds led a mosCly nomadic or seminomadic way of life, the most
cortunon type of dwelling uas the tenC, the "kon" or "chadyr," Several
rows of long i+~ooden poles driven into Che ground served as ~tie foundaCion
_ for the Cent. The upper ends of the poles aere fixed WiCh ropes to the
pegs driven inCo the ground. Nome-spun Moolen material (in black, as
a rule) Was stretched over the poles, covering the enCire skeleton of
the tent, except for the entrance uay and the loWer part, aC approximately
0.5 m from the level of the ground. This spaces~es covered with rush
screens ~+oven s+ith bright s+~olen threads. The size of the tent depended
on the numbez of poles in every roa. Familtes of prosperous Kurds had
several tentst the msster of the family lived in one, his family lived
in another, and the t~~ircl xas used to store food and other products.
, A poor peaeant i+ith many children lived in a small tent, frequently sharing -
f t irith cattle.
At present the Trans-Caucasian Kurds no longer use the tent as a
permanent dwelling. In some very hot areas the Kurds ~+ill pitch a Cent
in the summer as a temporary dwellin~ that is light and cool. In the
hot areas of the Kubatlinskiy and Zange~anskiy rayons of Ar.erbaijan
the Kurds, like the Azerbaijanis, build a temporary summer plaCform,
xhere the family spends the night.
The ancienC types of daellings are gradually disappearing. The old
daellin~, Where it remains, is used for nonresidential purposes--
as a storage ~rea, a hen house, etc.
Previously every Kurd tried to build his house near those of his relatives.
- The weakening of consanguinous ties has led to the disappea rance of this
custom. In the villages the blocks of homes belonging to members of the
same families ha~�e sCarted to ~radually disappear. The kolkhoz members
build their }sc~mes in those parts of the countryside ~+here there are
parcels of land free and suitable for gardens.
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~OIt U~'~ICtAL US~ dNLY
- The nea Kurdish hom~e h~v~ ~~quar~ or ~~~tiangul~r p1~n. Th~ aallg
_ of th~ fwus~s ar~ made primarily of ~Cdn~, and Nh~r~ iC ig s~arce,
adobe ie ue~d. In Arm~nia and Az~rb~i~an the roofg nf Kurdieh sC~ucCures
are similar to tihone used on Arm~nian and Azerbai~ani hom~s. Inside, -
the nea homp, as a ru1~, consist$ of an er?trance hall, b~}rond Which -
Chere are one-three large cont~guous room~.
The Kurdish s~tiel~meneg have electricity and radio service, as aell as
postial and telephone communi~ations. In Che seCtil~m~nCs numerous
buildinga have been ereat~d for adminisCraCive, cultural-eduCatfonal
and economi~ purposess vi.llage sovieCs, ~chool~, clubs, libraries,
poet offices; hospiCals, bath housea el~ceriC power planCs, farms,
~+~nrkshops, gara~es, ptc.
The arehitecture of the fraternal Caucasfan peoplps ex~rts a large
influence on the Kurdish villages of Armenfa arid Azerbai~at~.
Clothing
Women's clothing is Che most stabie Qlement of all aspecCs of the material
culture of the Trans-Caucasian Kurds, and it is also tihe one which has
been retained most fully up to the present time.
The national dress of the ~romen consists of ~+ide trousers ('".chaval'kras"),
shirt ( "kras"), vesC ( "elak"), skirt ('twnari; "navdera"), apron ~'shalek,"
"doshtuk"), oversleev~es ~'davzang" ~ aoolen be1C ("bane peshte"), head-dress
("kofi," "fino" or silk head scarves), ~roolen stockings ("gora").
- The "khaval'kras" are very ~+ide, cotton trouaers, gathered at the
xaist and the ankles onto a knitted ~roolen cord. In accordance xith
religious trad itions, the Yezid Kurds wore only ahite trousers, ~+hile
~ the Moslems ~+~ore colored ones. Noa the trousers are Frorn only by
older ~omen.
The "kras" is an undershirt made of colored cotton or coarse calico,
shaped liked a tunic, very ~ride with long, wide sleeves and a
rnund open collar. It is worn outside the Crouser.s.
The "elak" is a sleeveless jacket made of thick one-color material
(broadcloth, velvet or linen). The shoulders and front of the vest
are edged with sflk braid or ribbon. Previous~y, the elak~s~s decorated
~ xith mother-of-pearl.buttons, cofns and even shells.
The Kurdish ~romen of Armenia uear a velvet or broadcloth jacket ("kotvi")
wi.th long sleeves. The jacket is cut loW at the bustline to shos~
the decorations se~+n on the elak.93 The Kurdish women of Azerbafjan
wear an ordinary cotton blouse, but With long sleeves and a closed coltar.
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~OCt n~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
~ 'Th~ "tumart" is g skire, ahich is sewn from m~tierial (~oeeon, sa~in or
- sflk) ahich is usually mulei-colored or, less frequentily, a eolid colorf
it ig a gathered skirt Which is worn ov~r the Crouse~s. The boCtom
of th~ ekirti is trimm~d With braid or ribbo n uhich is noti aewn onto
th~ very edge of tihe hem, but a litt~.e bit above iti. Moslem Kurdish
taomen wear the Cumazt.
'Che "navdera" skSre is Cypieally worn by the Y~zid xom~n. Ie is made
of the same materials as Che tuman. The navdera consistis of L~~ro separat~
panels Whf~h are gathered into pleatis. Onp pan~l is wnrn in front and
Che other in back. Th~y are fastened togeCher Witih s~ring ~itiher around
Che wafst or on the aides. B~for~, up Co ten of ~hese skirts were worn
- one on Cop of the other. Now only ~ two or three ar~ w~orn.
On tiop of the navdera is worn an apron, Which is called a"shalek"
in Armenia and Georgia or a"doahtuk" in Azerbai3an. Iti consists of
Chr~~ or four strips of saGin or silk, whfeh differ in cdlor buC are
identical in length and aridth. The apron is tied at the WaisC xith a
knf tted t,roolen cord.
An older Kurdish ~roman in Armenia axid Georgia ~aps a Woolen scarf ~`pesht"),
recC~n~ular or triangular in shape~ around her Waisti on top of the skirts
and the apron. The scarves can be either multi-colored or solid color.
They are traditionally ~rorn only by married ~men. The pesht is held
in place by a tightly tied, knitted ~ol be1C, Che "bane peshte," xhich
is 2-2.5 m long. In contrast ~rith the pesht, thi~ belt is a required
parC of the dress for both married women and unmarried girls. Brightly
colored belts ~rfth decorations usually totemic in naCure are preferred.
Today the bane peshte is ~rorn mainly by middle-aged and old ~romen.
Oversleeves made of light colorful material are ~rorn over the sleeves
of the jacket, the kotvi. The oversleeves are fasCened at the ~rrist
irf th braid or lace.
The female head-dresses can be divided into the head-dresses for
young girls and those for women. The first category includes multi-
coYored silk scarves and a felt hat like a fez, ("fino").
Thc scarves are for everyday xear~ and in Azerbaijan they are also
s~rorn on holidays.
The fino ~+as ~orn itt Armenia and Georgia as the head-dress for festive
occasions. A silk scarf aas xrapped around the forehead like a turban.
Various decorat~ons Were s~rorn on the fino. At the present time this
fona of head-dress is rarely encountered.
The "kofi," the head-dress of married uomen is found in Georgia and
Armenia. It consists of a~+ood or ply~rood frame, round in shape, srhich
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~OR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
is deeo~$tied on th~ outigide w3.Ch brightily-colo~ed c1oCh, to which coins ~
are atitaQhed. Scarves Which a~e eiCher whiCe or Color~ct ~r~ tiied
around the head above tihe kofi in such a way ~ha~ only t:h~ part decoraCed
ai.tih ~h~ coins is visible. The Moslem women w~ore .a kafi with a high
crown, while the Yezid w~omen ~aore one wiCh a low ero~+n. A~ the rresent
Cime the kofi is Mnrn only on holidays.
On tiheir legs the w~omen wear handmade kni~Ced stiockings, the "gora,"
Which are made mosely of whiCe xool, and Which are decorated witih black
or multi~colored designs. In the past lea~her shoes (store-bought or
homemade) trithouti heels ("sol") or ~ri,th heels ("kondara;' "dzhzma") were
' ~rorn. But this kind of foot~rear raas accessible only Co well-tio-do Women.
~lomen from poor familiea ~rore homemade leaCher slippers, "charekh."
The ~harekh are hardly ever seen noWf store-bought city shoes are
no~? w~nrn everyFrhere.
The national dress of tihe i,romen generally displays a r~nge of
the tnost vivid colorst red, yellow, green, blue, orange, Ptc. The main
difference bet~?een the clothing ~rorn by the Kurdish Women for everyday
and for dreas occasions is the quality of the material.
Ttie numerous decoratifona are a feature of the naCional dress o~ the
1~ans-Caucasian Kurdish women. They are a required part of
certain elemenCs of the female costwne (for example, Che coins on the '
head-dress). These decorations can be grouped according Co the parts
of Ghe bodyt decorations for the head, ears, nose, neck, chest, waist,
hands and legs,
The decorations for the head include the "bardzhenik".and "kole zera."
The polek and 'kotyfc are Morn only on holidays.
The bardzhen3k is a narro~ ribbon or band of velvet srhich is ~rorn on
the forehead and tied at the nape of the neck. Vertical ros~s of threads
stnsng irith beads hang down to the chin to the right and left of the
ribbon. Every front thread is shorter than a back thread (five to seven
of them are u~ually s,?orn on each side). The brighter Che color of the
ribbon and the beads, the richer and more valuable the decoration is
considered to be. Formerly coins Were sewn onto the ends of Che beaded
threads.
The kole zera is a ribbon or band of dark-colored velvet Which goes
around the entire forehead. Mcient coins are attached to the ribbon
in ti+o or three roWS in fronC. The kole zera is fastened to the head
by pieces of braid ~rhich are sewn to the edges of the ribbon.
The polek has copper, silver or gold goins s~rhich are used to decorate
the kofi. The kotyk is a tassel made of silk threads, and it is
ses+n to the kofi on the right side.
All of these decorations are ~rorn by the Kurdish aomen of Armenia and Georgia.
.
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~OK d~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
~arrings, "goar~" are commonly wo~r? by ~11 Kurdish women.
Previously tihe Kurdish women of tihe 'Trans-Caucasus ~rore a nos~ decoraCion,
'hcara~il," a silver or gold dise, which was puC tihrough ehe nostiril.
;rhis decoratfon has now gone out of use everywhere. -
$p8Q9"-"raori," "karbar," "mrdzhan"--8~@ COIAfiOri decoraCions WOTf~t around
the neck. All beads, regardless of size, color, shape and quality,..
with the exception o~ coral and amber, are called morif ka~bar is only
for amber beads and mrdzhan is only for co~al beads. ~ormerly, silver
or gold disce were puti on a stiring and worn around tihe neckf tihis Was
a very common form of 3ewelry. Now this �orm of decoraeion is
w~rn only on holidays ~,~rmenia and Ceorgia).
Of tihe decorations w~nrn on the chesC the most characteristic are Che
"sadaf" and "fakht." The firsti of these ~onsistis of the mother-of-pearl
buttons ahich are sewn onto Che front of Che vesti. The second consists
of beautifully maCched silver or gold coins and fe is a form of adornment
w~orn by the Kurdish women of Georgia and Armenia on holidays.
The hand decoraCions include store-bought items which are common everywhere,
"gostilyak," a ring and "bazen," a bracelet.
The foot decoration ("khrkhal") is a silver brace?~et, worn around the
ankle. It Was usually Frorn at night as protectio;z against evil spirits.
The khrkhal is not worn noW.
In ~he caCegory of decorations w~rn at Che wais~ on.holidays, there is the =
leather belt ("kambar"), trimmed iri.~h silver or coins; it is especially
common now among the Kurdi.sh ~romen of Azerbaijan.
The national dress for men has almost completely gone outi of use, and
the Kurdish men of Che 1~ans-Caucasus Wear conventional European clothing.
In the past the Kurdish dress for men consisted of a ahite calico shirC,
"kras," ahich came down to the }mees; Wide home-spun wool trousers, "shal,"
a woolen "arkhalekh" and "chokhi." The Kurd w~re around his waist a
belt ("pest," "kambar") from which hung a dagger. On the head they s~re
, either a conventional Caucasian fur cap, or several colored scarves,
~round around a felt cap, a"kolos." On the feet they ~rore ~rool and
handmade socks, "gora," and leather sandals, "charekh,"
Family and Marriage
The transition to socialist life led to the disintegration of the large
family, "mala mazen," Which the Kurds maintained even during the
period immediately preceding the revolution. The large family gave
way to the stnall faznily, "mala bechuk." But there are still familfes
' in which brothers live together With their irives and children; but the
number of such families is gradually decreasing.
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t
,
~ ~Ott nF~ICIAL USl: tlNLY
~
Under snCi~lism a mh~rp tiurnittg poine occurred in ~h~ economic fouttdatiion
of Chr~ Kurdiah family and in tih~ consoiougness and culeural l~vel of iCs
mpmbera. Proc~eding rapidly is Ch~ process o~ elimin~tiion of ~he sur~
vivals of patriarchai customs, religious stiagna~ion and family degpoeism.
QualiCatively nea f~~rures arose in ehe relaeions ~mong adulti members
of ~he Kurdish family, and Chese features hav~ ~x~rtied a benefi~faY
int'1u~nce on the fdrmation of the y~unger gen~ratiion.
The positiion of tihe Kurdish w~man has changpd ~undampn~aYly und~r Soviet
auChority. She has received equal righ~s with men in sooie~y and
in Che family. A young girl now? marries on tihe basis o~ h~r own choice.
Certain practi~es have been eliminated such as poYygamy, marriage
between minors and th~ collectian of "kalan~," L�he bride price, eCc.
Also disappearing is endogamy, which at one ~ime had very stirong rooCs
among ~he Trans-Caucasian Kurds. TheY~e are frequen~ instiances of marriage -
between Kurds and Russian, Armenian and Azerbai~nni women. j
Marri~ge and oCher rites have changed subsCanCially, and ~his is reflected
primarily in tihe dying out of ~ustoms related ~o religious beliefs. There
is still a form of matchmaking 3n use, "arekeren," (literally "to say yes");
formerly, the parents' congent to tihe daughter Nas given in tihe presence
of a member of the clergy (a mullah or a sheikh), whose presence aas
considered essential, 'and this ceremoney sCill Cakes place noW, but
without a member of clergy present. The betrotihal ceremoney, "daznygari, '
nishandanin~ began srith Che sheikh ~oining togeCher the ~humbs of the
t~ro fathers. Addresaing the father of the bride-eo-be, tihe sheikh
uould aski 'bo ynu give consent for your daughCer by the irill of
God to marry this man?" The father of the groom~to-be was then asked ehe
same question of the aheikhf The sheikh xould Chen puC the ring on the girl�s
finger and say "Bembarak pirnzba." ("CongratulaCions. Be happy.")
1'hen the feasting ~u1d begin. The remants of Chis rite can be seen
in some villages even now. An engagement ring is put on the fourth finger
of the girl~s right hand as a sign of 'betrothal, but this is no longer
done by a member of the clergyf it is usually some highly respected
person of the village aho'pronounees the "Bembarak pirozba."
In ac:~~rdan~e With the neW custom,~the parents of the young man give~the
briQe-to-be a gold Watch on the day of betrothal, and then the merry-
making begins. The health of the betrothed and their parents are
toasted, and music is made on the zourng and the drumf there is singing
and dancing. Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian, Russian and other songs
are sung in addition to the Kurdish ones. BeCKeen the day of betrothal
and the sredding, the do~rry is prepared, the "dzhekhez," Which is, as
in the past, the personal property of the bride. Among ~he Kurds the
modern doWry usually consists of bed linens, blanke~s, expensive c1oCh,
knitCed items, and furniCure, in contrast WiCh the dowry of ar?cienC
times, t+hich Was b sed on a set number of domestic animals: sheep,
horses and bulls.9~ In olden times the Wedding was set for five months
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~dCt d~~ICIAL U5L nNLY
a~ti~r tihe betiroC'hal. This ~im~ p~~iod hag now b~en reduc~d. 5om~tihing
new has appea:ed in Sovi~ti tiim~s-~guestis ~r~ invi~ed eo tihe wedding,
. and fvrmal inviCatiinns are sent ouC. Today ~h~ b~ide is d~essed and
adorned �or her Wedding wiChouC any rities. She do~s no~ us~ antiimony tio
pmphasize her eyes~ her hair and naiis are noti dyed wiCh h~nna. In ~he past,
the groom's ehesC aas deoora~ed witih a tiriangular tialisman, "nvishti,"
which was drawn by a mullah or sh~3kh. They beli~ved ~hat the nvisht
posa~ssed magieal power ~o watd off evil spiritis. A r~d silk scarf
was tied around ~he groom's neck. Now tihe groom comes Co Che wedding
in citiy dress. The bride, however, is dressed in ~he anci~nt natiional
cos~ume~ only instead of the five-seven dresses, which wer~ worn one on
top of each other, she wears two or three dresses.
The guests invited Co tihe wedding from otiher villages sCay wiCh relaCives
of the groom. The wedding is held both in Che groom~s home and in
a large building (most frequently Che rural club), to which tihe entiire
community of the village wi11 be invited.
Before the bride is brought to the home of the groom, her ralatives,
according to tradition, show the relatives of the bride and groom and
everyone present her dowry. Tf people like tihe dowry, ehey say' "Mashalla"
(Wonderful, bravo!).
AfCer the community inspection of the dowry, ~hey prepare Che bride to
be led out of her father's home. The groom and his father, moCher, the
sponsor and relatives come for the bride. The bride's parenes, or if
she has none, her closest relatives and witnesses go to ehe registry
office (or Co the village soviet). In some families the bride is taken to
the home of her sponsor, "sardauaCi," after the marriage is registered.
She remains in his home for a few hours and only then is she tiaken to
the groom's home. In other families the bride returns to her oWn home
for a uhile.
Previously, Che bride rode from her sponsor's home to the home of her
nea husband on a horse, accompanied by a group of riders who perform
movements that give the impresaion of dancing on horseback, "dzhridlisten"
(literally "a dance While galloping"). Today the neWly-married bride
is taken to her husband's home by car or a wedding carriage. In aacordance
~+ith this change there has been a change in the expr~ssions used: instead
of "buksiarkeren," (to put the bride on a horse), a neW Kord, ' '
has come into use, "bukberen," (to driv~ ~way with th~ bride). Another
custom Which has disappeared Nas based on the protection Which the bride's
brothers offerQd here against enemies and evil spirits.
On thc Wedding day a melody is played on the zourna and the daf (drum)
in front of the groom~s home. The guests begin Co gather ae the call of
the drua. A round d~ce, "govand" is started to Che accompaniment of the
music or of singing. Taking hold of each other by the little finger, the
e1boW, the Waist or the shoulder, they form a roW or a circle and dance.
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i~'dlt h~~ICiAL II51~. ONLY
Th~ sargovand, or l~ader n~ ~h~ dance, mov~s our itt froni:. H~ waves -
a kerehie� in tihe air in tiime Co ~he musi~ or ~inging~ Th~ brid~ and
groom also ~oin tihe danc~rs. Previously, ~h~ ~~oom W~s supposed Co _
hide som~where for a while, ~v~n tio le~v~ tihe viilage. Th~ Kurdi~h
people explainecl this custom by saying tihat th~ ~rodm w~g suppos~:dly
ashatned to sit in view of the elders during ~he weddin~. Buti noW tih~
groom do~s not leave the nuptiial home. Th~ groom and brid~ ~re seat~d
next to Qa~h otiher at the Weddin~ tiabl e in th~ plgc~ o~ honor.
This is a new phenomenon for tihe Kurdish K~dding. Th~ elders ar~ Ch~
~ first to raise their glasses and drink tio tihe healeh o~ ~he b~id~ and
grooms "Ashka du gola" (To ~he healCh of Cwo floWers). mhose presenC
offer toasCs in honor of Che young people and wi.sh rhem he~l~h, a happy
life and a fruitful union ("garak be bar ba"). 'Then ~hey drink Co Che
healCh of Che parents of Che bride and groom ~t?d thett in eurn ~o all tihose
present in order o~ ag~ and distinction. Witih every tioa~t th~re is
a suggesCion tio sing or dance in honor of those who are being toasCed.
In former times only the zourna and tihe drum w~re pl~yed ~t Ch~ wedding,
as was the custom aith all the Trans~-Caucasian peoples.9h Now the tambourin�
and other Caucasian musical instruments are played.
After the wedding be~ins Che "sachu," the call Co provide the young people
wiCh gifCs, and the announcement of who is giving whati. 'The currenC
custom of the sachu differs from Che former version by virCue of ~hat
is given. Previously, domestic animals, primarily sheep, aere given
during the sachu~ and now it is such things as a sewing machine, a
Watch, lengths of material, footwear and oCher objects. Everything
given during 'che sachu belongs to Che home of the groom and is not
considered ttie property of the bride alone, as Was true in olden times.
Several monChs after the wedding tradition calls for the ceremony of
"zey," the reCurn of the young ~ife Co her father's home. Having spenC
about a month with her parenCs, she returns to her husband ~rith the many
presents given to her at this Cime. They are called "shkart." The
shkarG continues to be considered the personal property of the ~rife.
Previously, the shkart consisted exclusively of domestiic animals, the
offspring of Which Were also considered to be the properCy of the ~rife.
Nosi it is mainly objecCs ahich are given.
Of the prenuptial, nup~:fal and postnupti~l customs, everything Chat Was
related to religious belief is gradually disappearing, and the same is
true of the customs associated aith birth. Despite the vestiges of
some outdated customs, the practices of cradle betrothal, abduction,
escape and a check on a girl's chastity ("markeren"), as Well as many
others, have largely disappeared.
According to customary rights among the T rans-Caucasian Kurds, a
xidos~ did not have the righC to inherit. Her husband's properCy went
to his relatives through the father~s line. Only Che dac~rry s~as considered
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Co b~ her prop~rtiy. Today Ch~ par~nCs, Ch3.lt??`tiri ~r?d ~~~h o~ Ch~ spous~s
in tih~ Kurdieh family h~v~ id~nei~al rightis df in~~wrie~r?ce. Justi as ehildr~n
hav~ ~h~ righti tio i.nh~~iti gfCer tih~ir parenCs~ d~gtih, ~ wi~~ has tih~ righe
Co inherit her husband'g proper~y afCer his d~arh. As a r~gulti of tihis,
a new e~cpr~msion h~s sprung up an:ong tihe Kurds, "xh~na mixa~khor,"
w~nman h~ir~ This expr~ssion sounds very s~range Co o].d Kurdish
m~n, som~ of ahom, wh~n tialking abouC tihe ~ighti n~ ~ woman Co inh~rie,
mutitier soepti~ally, "Shukhule den~yaeya" (6uch are ~h~ affairs o� tihe ~,rorld).
The number of Sovieti Kurdish people who gdh~r~ eo Isl$m or th~ Yezid
~eligion is growing 1~ss and less. Oth~r vestiig~s of religion are also re-
ceding into tihe past~~tihe wnrghip of variou~ forces and phenompna of nature,
the ~ustnm of saorifi~ing a sheep ati holy springs ('hcania zymzymi"), and
at places of wdrehip during pilgrimages ("ziyarati"), ~tc.
Health Care
Bpfor~ the esCablishm~ne of Sovi~ti aurhoritiy in 7`rans-Caucasia, healeh
care anwng the Kurds ~aas in a deplorable sCaCet there vrere no medical
establishmettCs in the areas where Che Kurds lived. Witch doctors, mullahs,
and sheikhs se~ved as doctiors, Who tireaCed peopl~ no~ so much with folk
remedies, as with spells, incantiaCions, prayers and exorcism of ehe evil
spirits from the body of Ghe patient. They resorted to various magical
means. ~or example, afCer a baby was born a rifle was shoe off near
the mother. If a w~oman in childbirth lost consciousness, they brought
a neighing horse to her. A paCien~ lying in a fever would be beaten
wf th "divine" tFrigs�~ All this Was done to drive away th~ evil spirits,
~?hich were considered the cause of the disease.
In Sovieti Cimes, hospitals, maternity homes, pharmacies and firsC aid
staCions have been opened in Kurdish villages. Prophylactic measures
are carried out systematically to combat infectious diseases. Their
os+n medical personnel have been trained.
Culture
The culture of the Kurdish people has f7ourished in Soviee times. A Kurdish
wriCten language aas created on the basis of the Russian alphabet, and
the symbols for those ph memes~Which the xussian alphabet lacks Were
taken from the Latin alphabet. Political, artistic and scientific
literature is published in the Kurdish language. A Kurdish nexspaper,
PIA TAZE (NeW Fath) is published in Yerevan.
One of the first steps on the Way to the creation of Kurdish literature
Was the collection and publication of the oral poetic Work of the
Kurds ("Kur~ish ~olklore," Yerevan, 1936). In 1937, a collection of
verse in Kurdish by Museib Akhundov Was published in Baku. The Kurdish
~rriters Arab Shamilov, AdZhiye�D~hndf, Dzhasme Dzhalil and othera have
played an important role in the creation of Kurdish liCerature. In recent
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year~ ~ numb~r nf new works by Kurdish prnse wriC~ry ~11cI p02C9 h~s bEen
publish~d in th~ Kurdish, nU58~.~t1~ Arm~ni,~r?, Georgiar? and Azerbai~ani
languages, A Kurdish seCCion has been estiablished within the Union of
Writers of Armenia.
Thp SovieC Kurds are developin~ ~he best tirnditions nf Cheir many cen~uries
of ~reativ~ wo~ck by th~ people~ This includes oral popCry nf tihe Kurds,
th~ir songe and dances~ RomanCic tales abouC such Kurdish l~eroes as
Mama 21na, 2ambil'frosh, Siaband and Khadzhezar, et�c. a,:d becoming well
known.
Kurdish folk singers perform botih old and conCemporary sor~gs. Choir
singing is becoming esCablished along witih solo singing aaz part of tihe
modern Kurdish folklore tradition. There is a song, for e;rample, which
they sing abouti the Komsomol, "The May Song," and Chere are~ o~hers.
Kurdish dancing, in contrasC with Kurdish singing, was based mosi~,y on _
round dan~ps or group dances with boCh men and Fromen parCicipating. Solo
dances have now ~oined these .older traditional dance forms. Armenian, `
Azerbai3ani and Georgian dances are also performed. The best folk dancers
are broughC together in amateur groups and ensembles. AL� the initiaCive
of the Kurdieh inCelligentsia a Kurdish song and dance et~semble was
created in Tibilisi in 1956j it went on to receive C1~e diploma, secondary
grade, at the republic festival in Georgia. In 1957 an ensemble to perform
Kurdish songs and dancea Was formed in Yerevan.
Before Che revoluCfon one could count on one's fir~gers the number of
Kurds who were literate, and there Here no literaee Kurdish women at all.
Qnly boys atCended the few schools that did exist, and these were mainly
children of feudal lords and the clergy.
At the present education has become universal. In rayons whi~eh have a
predominantly Kurdish population, the Kurdish language is taught alon~ with
other subjects. The schools employ more than 100 Kurdish teachers who have
higher and secondary education. The school children--under the direction
of their teachers--organize reports and plays for r.he people of their
villages. The Komsomol organizations in the school are con~lucting an active
campaign against outdated customs and againsC the vestiges of superstition.
The local cultural and educational institutions (clubs, libraries, etc.)
are carrying out a greaC deal of ~rork among the Kurdish populaCion.
A Kurdish intelligentsia has been created and is groWing rapidly. Kurdish
yroung people attend WZ's and tekhnikums in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi and other
cities. There are Kurdish agronomisCs, engineers, physicians, scientists,
etc. The Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences has established a Kurdish group
as part of the Sector for Eastern Studies. The Leningrad Department of
the Institute of Asian Peoples,~,Which comes under Che USSR Academy of
Scfencea, has a Kurdish Study Center. Kurdish scholars have achieved serious
auccess in the studq of the ' history, ethnography, culture and language
of their people.
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F'Ok O~FZCIAL USG ONL,Y
I'OOTNOTES
89. For information on foreign Kurds, see tihe volume "Narody Peredney
Azii LPeoples of the Ga~eway tio Asia?, Moscow, 1957.
_ 90. Many Kurda do noti eati pork fo~ reasons of custom. For example, the kol-
lctnz of ~he Malyy Dahamusllci village in the Aparanskiy Rayon of the
Armenian.SSR raises pig~, but ~he peasants do not eat the meatif they
hand iC over as part of their obligatiions to the s~ate.
91. Compare witih the Armen3an "oda." It is typical tihat tihe oda was built
only by tihe Kurds of Armenia. The Kurds of Azerbaijan did not know
about the oda.
92. The Azerbai3ani Kurds call these plank '~ed~ "Penmala."
93. The "elak" is frequently worn on tiop of the "kotvi."
94. A cow was not supposed tio be given as part of the dowry in order Co
. avoid having tw~ females leave tihe home.
95. Compare with Che Armenian "gyond," and "govynd." Z'his tierm serves as Che
name of a Cype of collective folk dances, as well as of the formation
itself and of the entire chain of dancers.
96. The "zurna" and Che "daf" were musical instruments used for
signal and ceremonial purposes.
8543
CSO: 8144~1095 E~
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