JPRS ID: 8438 TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050009-6
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JPRS L/8438
4 May 19 79
~ ~ ~ ~
TRANSLATIONS ON SUB~SAHARpN AFRICA
~ FOUO No, 633
~ U. S. ~OINT PUBLICAI'ICyNS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR US~ '
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JPRS L/8438
4 May 1.9 ?9
,
TRANSLATIOfVS ON. SUB~SANARAN AFRI CA
FOUO No. 633
- LoNT~NTS PAGE
INT~R-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Nigeria's Growing Influence in Chad NoCed .
(Marc Yared; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Mar 79) 1
Reaction to Increased Naval Preaence in Indian Ocean Reported
' (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 2-15 Apr 79) 3
A Fifth Fleet by Elie Ramaro
Seychelles Proteat
Clearing the Decks for the French Navy, by Elie Ramaro -
CCCE Commitments to African, Indian.Ocean Statea Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Feb 79) 7
Ef�orCa To Develop Eurafrican Mining Policy Discussed
(Edi.torial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERkANEENS, 23 Mar 79). 23
Petroleum Activities in Afr.ica 1978-1979 ~
(MARCHES TROPICaUX ET MEDITERRANEENS. ?3 Feb 79) 26
CENTRAL AFRICAN II~YPIRE ~ ~
~ . Brief s
Libyans OusCed, Is2am Scored 3~
CHAD
Kano Decisions `Bear Seeds of Further Conflicta'.
(Mar-Gue; JEUNE AFRIQUEt 2-15 Apr 79)
34
Ne~a Governmen~'s Main ProblEm: Reconcile Population~
(Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Mar 79) 37
_ ' a - (III - NE & A - i22 FOUO) ~
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CONTENTS (ConCinued) pgge
' CONGO
PCT Congresa Seen as VicCory for Radicalizat3on Movement
. (GineCte CoC; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 2-~.5 Apr 79) 40
Left Wing of PCT Said To Have Triumphed
(Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Apr 79) 44
Briefa
� Opango Trial l,7
.
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ZNTER~A~'RICAN A~F~1~.'R'S'
NIGERIA~S GROWING INFLUENCE IN CNAD NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 F ~5
[Ar~ticle by Marc Yared]
[xext] The Kano conference, whioh ended on 16 March, marked ~
the emergence or a newcomer on the Chadian political scene:
Nigeria. Lagos currently holds some high trumps if it wiahes -
- to deploy its power on a regional scale. -
For a little better than a year, no;:, N3.geria has been provid-
~.ng discreet but vital support to one of the components of the
Chadian rebellion: the MLPT, headed by a former army officer,
Mr Aboubakar Abderhamane.
Until just recentlS� 3ismissed as negiligibl~, the MP;,T neverthe-
less controls a zo~ie which is very important, both economically
and strategically: the ap~~roaches to Lake Chad and a slice of
Kanem Prdvince. This is w'iere s~rae major petrolewn finda Hepe
made in the early Si~cties, and where the Araerican-oorned Conoco
company had established its headquartera. This is also tha re-
gion~ lying on�the doorst~~p of the capital at Nd3amena and very
close to Niger, Cameroon, and Niger3a, which constitutes the
heart of the Dark Contine?,~t. It liea equidistant from North
Africa and Equatorial Af~ica, from the Atlantic Ocean and the
Red Sea.
' At Kano,~ for the first time, the hitherto ignored MPLT was z~e-
cognized as a full-fledged party to the negotiations by a11
- delegations. ,
Sr.ore one more for Nigeria: the fact that it was indirectly
involved, alongside the MPLT, in the conflict evoked no comment
~hatever~ even though the Chadian government and aru~ed opposi-
tion forces have for years been lashing out at intervention on
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~ the part o� France~ Sudara~ or Libya. What; 3.s a great deal more~
N3.ger3a emerged at Kano for the �3.rst t9.me as an unchallenged
and effective "�0 arbit~r. The Chadian �act3ons w3.~.~. soon ~
fa11 3n~o the hab3.~ of ca~.l3ng on 3.ts good o�f3.cea~ and of put-
t3.ng the3.r nego~3at3ons eander 3.ts aeg3s~ whereas un~3l now
such talks were held by preferenco in Khartoum or Tripol3.~ not
to ment3on Algiera or Librevi~.le.
Lastly and most importantly~ b~r approv3ng the d3.spatch to Chad
of several hundred Nigerian troops to monitor the cease-�ire~
Lagos has acquired the mea~s~ 3f it should one day choose to
use them~ to exerc3ae a d3rect 3n�luence over the dest3niea of
3ta weak ne3ghbor.
Some observers are a~.ready worr3ed ove.r the poasible develop-
ments from th3s comm3.tment, citing Syria~s mediation, followed ,
by intervention, in the Lebanese ci~ril war (197$-1978) to bring
both the conaervat3ve "Arab-hatin~~~ Chr3stians and the progres-
_ sive ~'Arab-loving" Muslima to heel. R3ght now, though, there
:is no visible grounds for harbor3ng any such suspicions.
The commitment to Chad is, for Nigeria, prim~rily an internal
security operation. '"'~e giant of Africa~ among whose citizens
are almoet as many Mu,:~lima as non-Musl3ms (Christians and ani-
mists)~ may legitimately entertain fears as to the contagion
of fanaticism.
The presence of a Nigerian force in Chad perhaps al~o reflects
a regional ambition: to conta3n the "march ta the aouth" of its
Libyan rival.
Nigeria~ the biggest powar on the Dark Continent economically
.a~ well as demo~*raphtcally, is determined henceforth to be on
the spot wherever the future of Africa is at stake. A~ far
back as 15 years ago, it sent troops into the former ~elgian
Congo. And it still st ands ready to do the same in Angola and
in .Namibia.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 ~
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COCt Ol~l~ ICIAL USE ONI.Y
INTER-A~RI~,AIV AFFATRS
" , R
R~ACTTON TO INCREASED NAVAL rxE;SENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN REPORTED
A Fifrh Fioer
P~ris AF'RYQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Apr 79 pp 2~~_26
[Article by Elie Ramaro~
[Text~ The collepae of the Iranian regame and the conclu-
sion ot a separate peace be[ween Israel and Egypt are ac- '
celerating the imperieliat redeploymenC.
- Aft~r, the "Irenian disaster," the WesC ~elt e need ta review f rom top to bat-
tom the quegtion of the defense of its intereste againat the ~~aorthern threat"
the Soviet Union and the ~~danger~' of Arab progressivism: the conclusion
of a separate pegce betWeen Egypt and Israel bears the mark oP this necessity.
It had already been obvious for several mon~hs that Israel was setting itself
up in this.atormy region as "a foraard position of the West'~ in the Middle
East~ a pillar of the ~'free World" and an "existential" ally of the United -
States in the area While the others could be only circumstantial allies.
(On these grounds~ Iarael has apeciali~ed !n providing weapons for the racist
regimes in Africs and the fascist governments in Latin Aaierica. South A~rica,
Rhodesia~ Argentina~ ~nile~ and Guatemala are among its clients, and ita arms
� industry has never been Ao healthy. The United S~ates~ Which !s perfectly aWare
of these dealings~ prefers to have Israel take charge of supplying these coun-
tries, which are especially compromiaing,)
In fact, behind these so-called ~~peace~' negotiations, we have been Witnesaing
a competition among Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to see who looks like ~
the best candidate to succeed Iran as the reg~onal "policeman.~~
Hourgeois Prosperity
Israel resolutely played the card of a community of interesta with the West,
at the edge ot a~~barbarous~' aorld sub,ject to resurgences of �fanaticism.~'
Presideat Sadat, Who !s ready to pay very dea.ly tor a return to capitalist
"prosperity~~' Which would benefit mainly the Egyptian bourge~isie~ otfered to
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guaranCee Che ~~gecurity~~ oP Sudan~ Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, KuWait~ the Unitied
_ Arab Emlratea~ North Yemen~ and Oman (where he hae already sent eome troops
to replace the Iranian unita).
Ar t:he same tim~, the Ameri cat~ government tried to s i lence the ~~grumbl ing~~
of ~3audi Arabia by prnviding it on ahort aotice, in mid-March~ aith two
AWACS radar obaerva~ion systema on aircraft, ai~h ~he 200 American ~echniciena
neceseary to make them operate. President Carter also atiepped up his arm~
deliveriea to Norrh Yemen~ recogni~cing the ~'secondary r~ght~~ of the Saudf
_ leadera egainst Aden and ~hus authorizing them to uae the American treapons in
their posgesaion to bring the socialist reglme in South Yemen to !ts eenses. -
(The United Stetes ected in the aeme Way With respect to Morocco, vhich ob-
tained the right to u8e Americen weapons outside ite oWn territory.)
Moreover~ the direcC preaence of the Americen fleet has been conaiderably
strengthened in the last few aeeks. The aircraft carrier Constellation
80 airplanea, 4,600 men in the crew wes detached fron: the Seventh Pacific
Fleet with four eacort ships to ~~BhoW rhe United States colors~~ in the Indian
Ocean. It was also decided to increase the number of naval units permanently
based in the Gulf. The military agreement signed in September 1978 pith the
state of Bahrain gives the U. S. Navy Middie East Force ~he perpetuel rlght
to put into the port Af Juffayr,. Facilities have also been oftered to the
AmQrican forces by ~he sultan oi' Oman~ Who has entrusted his defenae to the
UniCed States now that he can no longer count on the shah~s armiea.
Several spy satellites and patrols With the Orion reconnaissance afrcraf~
based in Diego Garcia complete this strengthened arrangement,phich hea made
some commentatora say that the United Statea is getting ready to establish
a premanent naval force the Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean, in order
to defend Western intereats there directly.
' In this theory, the Diego Garcia atoll Would play the full role of pivot and
stationary aircraft carrier, for Which it was initially designed. Thia island~
which is located exactly in the ~middle af the Indian Ocean, has been ~rans-
formed into a modern militery base in the last feW yeers, in spite of the
prvtests of many coastal countries and of all the progressive forcea in the~
area. It has a runWay for heavy aircraft, advanced electronic equipment~ end
sheltered anchoreges for ships and aubmarines.
_ Moreover, the Pentagon relies on its French ally~ which still has the lar-
gest permanent War fleet in the Indian Ocean, and has solid bases in Djibouti -
and Reunion. The public visit made by Rear Admiral ~amuel Packer, co~ander
of the U. S. Navy Middle East Force~ to his counterpart in the Armed Forcea
of the Southern Indiaui Ocean (FAZSOI) last Auguet at Saint Denis~ Reunion,
proves that active cooperation has been eatablished bet~reen the tNO main im-
perialist fleets in the region. (The strategic role of Reunion ia more and
_ more apparent, after the Orgax~i~ation of African llnity recommended ita rise
to independence. At thQ begi:.ning of March~ the French ;overnment assembled
there, for the first time, all the Freach ambassadors to the couatriea of
East Africa and the Indian Ocean~ and encouraged them to defend Paris~s
, official positio~s concerning the island~s status With more conviction.)
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5eychelles Prores~
Pnris AFRIQU~-ASIE !n rrench 1-15 Apr 79 p 25
rText~ Preaident Didier Ratsirdka had denounced the WesCern plans, Which
were of an aggressive nature~ atter propoeing the demilitarizatlon of the
Indian Ucean and the withdraWal of aZl naval forcea from rhe region. In !ts
turn., the Seychelleg government has ~ust condemned ~he Anierican decision
wiChout reservation. Thus the Seychelles president, France Albert-Rene, sent
Preaident Carter a message in which he comes out vlgorously against the cre-
a ation of n military force whose result would be to intensily the struggie
T Por lnfluence in the Indlan Ocean atyd l~indor tl~e efEorts to make this region
- A"real peace zone.~~~~To puraue such a pblicy would only endanger Che good
relations that exist between the United States and rhe peaceful peoples in
this area of the ~orld.~'
For its.part, the Seychelles radio stated: ~'We are reedy to grant our f riend.
ship to all nations. HoWever, as President France Albert-Rene says, We do not
want the great powers to come and wash their dirty linen in our waters. That
is why we are opposed to the pres~znce of any naval force in our region, es-
~ pecially if it is based in our vicinity.~~
Clearing Che Decks for the French Nevy
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Apr 79 p�25
[Article by Elie Ramaroa
[Text~ The French warships that are standing guard in the -
Indian Ocean in the name of Weskern inrerests are on the
alert since the Worsening of the situation in Southern
Af rica, Eritrea, and Iran. '
At the Miaistry of the Navy on the Place de la Concorde in Paris~ senior
officers fo11oW day and night~ on large screens, the progress of the 16 units
~ that noW make up the French squadron in thP Indian Oceans in the chart room,
they make telephone calls and send and receive telex messagea~ and interro-
gate, on a television console, the computer that concentrates the technical
data and performs the calculations.
At any ~iven time~ the central computer provides a choice of possible solu-
tions, based on the aara stored.in its memory.
It also computes the navigation plans for commercial vesaels~ especially the
giant oil tankers that travel from the Gulf to the Cape by passing otf South
Yemen and, through the Mozambique Canal~ betWeen Madagascar and the Comoro
Islands.
Similar infoanation !s available in the operaCions raoms of the various French
naval commands: CECLANT in Hrest (Atlantic squadron), CECMED in Toulon (Med-
iterranean squadron)~ COMAR in Djibouti (Northern India~n Ocean)~ FAZSOI in .
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Saint-Denis~ Reunion (Southern Tndian Ocean)~ and aboard the squadron com-
mand shlp Charante, a 16,000-~on tanker and supply ahip, which has been
ou~fitted to house rhe headquart8ra and connnunication aervices tiirected by
_ Rear Admirai Orosco. (Rear Admirai Oroeco, who succeeded Rear Admiral Derrie~us
in November 1978, was born in Maison Carree, Algeria, in 1924. He !s a
"political~' officer: f rom 1976 to 1978, he was the head of ~he military
cabinet of the French prime minister, ~ho himself Was a native of an Indian -
Ocean country (Reunion).)
The F'rench fleeti which included as many as 23 veasels and a ataPt of 4~500 -
men at the end of 1977, alth the presence of the eircraft carrier Foch and `
its escort in the Indian Ocean noW numbers an average of 16 to 18 veseelm
of all sizes, and crews of 2,500 men. The moaC poWertul shlp in the aquadron ~
ia n~a the ~isaile-launching frigate Duqueanes it hes 375 oPficers end sailore;
Masurca, Exocet, and MalaEon Weapons syetems, tvhich are especially Aimed at
, aubmarines; and a lt8tening system based on 12 radare and sonars~ tihose re?aults
are enalyzed by on-board computers. ~
A Turn-Table
In rnid-Janu ary, the port of D~lbout! aimultaneousiy sheltered the aviso-eacort
ships Commandant Bourdais ~nd Doudart de Lagree, the aquadron escort ahip ~
Kerseint, the ultramodern work ship Jules Verne, and the supply ships Chemplein
and Seintonge, !n addition to the flagship and severel patrol boats, like the
Etoile Polaire~ Which is permanently aesigned to marine surveillance of the
straiC of Bab el Mandeb, betWeen Aden and the Eritrean coast.
The ships of the tleet often visit the many Fr~nch ~ossessiona in the south-
west part of the ocean~ especially the scattered islande around Madagascer
(Juan de Nove, Europa, Tromelin~ Glor~euses) or the southern territories
(Amsterdam~ Crozet, Kerguelen, Seint Paul) and, of courae~ Reunion and Meyotte.
But they alsa make many r,alls at Mombasa (Kenqa) or in the ports of the Gulf
emirates and ~ometimes also in the South African ports. ~
Thus France with its squr~dron haa what Admiral Lannu~el, commander itt chiet
of the navy, has called.~'the largest fleet in the Indian Ocean."
The admir~l, an accomplfshed politician he travels a great deal and, in
particular, met with President Sadat on 16 December is not unaWare of the
fact that the time of "fixed bases" overseas ia gone. HQ sees a chance of
preserving the West's world-wide influence by establishing ultremodern, prac-
- tically autonflmous fleets, which have a long range and are capable oP guaran-
teeing "order~' et the sea and air apprc~aches to the countries that pro-
duce raw materiels or ere big consumers of industrial goods.
COPYRlGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
8429
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~ ' kOR 01'~xCIAL U5L ONL~Y
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CCCE CON~IITMENTS TO AFR:ICArI ~ INDIAN OCEAN STATES RLPORT.~D
Paris MARCHES TROPICA.UX ET MEDITERRANLLN; in ~~rench 23 F'eb '79
Pp 495-49~
Lfiext7 The new co~mitments of the CCC~ ,~ZPentral Fun1 for
Economic ~ooperatio> came close to 1.'" billion French francs
in 1~~8~ an increase of 11.4 percent over the previous fiscal
year . This variation is attributable to loans made on
fav~rable terms (operations called "first counter") which~
with a 19 percent increase in 1 year~ have risen to nearly 1
billion franc~, The long term commitments at "second counter"
terms came to 521 million francs. ~
Since 1974~ commitments have been as follows (listed in millions
of franes).
~974 1975 ~976 ~977 1978
First Counter 375 485 659 R19 972
Second Counter 170 613 521 521
Total 375 655 ~1,?72 1,34C 1~493 _
Corrected for variations in French export prices~ the quad-
. rupling of assistance in the last 4 years is actually a real
doubling of "firs~ counter" operations and a real tripling
of the total commitments.
Index of Real Growth of Com.itments
~974 ~975 ~976 ~977 1978
First Counter 100 122 153 173 196
I'irst and Second 100 165 294 282 300
Counters
1. For the 1977 fiscal year~ see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~
, riEDITERRANEENS of 24 Feb 78 583 �
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Tri:is overall favorable trend corresponds to the intentions of
the government officials to give the CCCE a more important role
_ in the distribution of French sid~ by ~iving it the means to ~
increase all of its resources at the sane time~ including
those w3.th good terms.
~ The growth in commitments has caused~ with some sli~page in -
time~ the growth of deposits~ so that the CCCE's net assets
now form a larger portion of all French public asse~ts in the -
recipient countries.
Trends in Disbursements of the CCCE ;in millions of francs) -
~974 ~975 ~976 ~977 ~978
Deposits 299 359 5$2 793 99~ -
" Repayments . ?38 230 243 241 2312 _
Net Disbursements 61 129 339 552 7602 �
~hare of the Central
Fund in public assets 2.9~ 5�5~ 14.20 18.40 22.0~2
in the area affected
The growth ~f net d3,sbursements sirice 1976 has regularly _
exceeded 200 million francs a year. This should continue. In -
fact~ the growth of operations starting in 1975 should only
affect the level of repayments after 1980~ because of the ~
- "postponements" granted to borrowers~ which are generally for
5 years. Furthsrmore~ a new increase in deposits is expected
in 19?9 because of the increase in commitments remaining to
be executed.
"First and second counter" loans remaining to be paid at the
end of the year:
.4t the end of 19~4 663 million
" 1975 652 million (including
122 for second cour}.ter)
" 1976 1.64~2 billian (including ~
569 million for s~~ond counter)
" 1977 2.196 billion (includin
765 million ~or second counter~ L
1978 2.686 billion (including)
~ $55 million for second counter
2. Provisional figures;~percentage is estimat;ed.
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F'd[t h1~~'ICIAL US~ nN1,Y
mhe Re~~.pien~ Countries
~ In iq78 ~he Can~ral ~'urid w~s au~horized tio resuma i~s operations
- in Guinea~ where ii; ~t:t~.~. had some 3mportian~ commi~men~s. I~s ~
~rca nf activir,y was a1.s~ ~xtended ~0 5omalia. So ~.t now in-
e7.udes a~ota~. of' ~ 7 coun~:ries in Africa ~~he tndian OCean
~nd the Caribbean (Haiti). In 1979, ~h~s~ coun~r:ias had 1~3 -
mi111on inhabi~an~s spread over ~ very vas~t ~.and area. This
~ a~ea tias especia~.ly dif
i'icul~ d~v~_ lopr:~~i,t proble~ns .
~ The Cen~ral k'und ha~ been ab1~ to parti~ipate fu11.y 3n ~.nvest-
ment programs :tn coLUZ~ries wr.ose deve~opment is mos~ aclvanced.
Buti it is also tru~ng ~o favnr the poorar countries and ainee
1g76~ the share of credits allocated to them~ and in particular
to the Sahe1 countries, has b~en growing continuously.
_ Among the more advanced colintries~ the Ivory Coast in 19~j8 ~
temporarily halted the expansion of its commitments. The sam~
was true of Gabon. But 1oan.s 'to Senegal increased and some -
important industrial programs came to maturity in ~978 in
Cameroon~ considerably increasing the volume of loans to that
country.
Mi]lions of franes) ~irst Second Tota1 From 197?
Counter Counter
Cameroon 1 ~.9 272 449�9 191.8
' Ivory Coast 1~7.3 ~ 195�3 410.
, Senegal 70.6 90 160.6 144.~
Gabon 33.4 40 ?3.4 160
Totals 469.2 4~0 879.23 906.7 .
Share of these ~ 48~ 790 59~ 68~
countries in loan
commitments
The share of these countries was xeduced from E?~ percent in
~977 to 59 percent. The.geographic diversit~y cf the loans
has been increased.
In 197P, operations were resumed in Madagascar~ with a
large volume (137.6 million francs).
3. This does not include the share of these countries in
the loan to ASECNA.
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~Ott O~~ICIAL US~: ONLY
mhe Cen~ral Fund has also con~inued ~.t~ effor~s ~.n ~he Sahel~
which is s~i1~. suffering a grea~ deal from droughti damage.
~.'here it is work3ng to finance high priority pro~ects re-
~,a~ed to the development of ~ood resc~~~rces ~ as w~ii as indus-
tr~.a1. and infrastrueture programs ~ wl.thou~ which the peop].e's
stiandard of livin~ can not be raised. j~Jith ~his in mind~ .the `
Centir~l~ ~'ur~d par~icipa~ed in a min~.ng program designed to ~
main~ain t~4auritania's forei~n resources~ and it is also in-
- volved in several pro~eets to diversify ~he Niger and 2~alian
economies.
A~.d to Countries of ~he Sahel* (in mil~ions of francs)
First Second Total
Counter Coun~er
1975 78 78
~976 ~69 110 . 279
~977 ~a5 25 2~0
1978 232 75 307
1978 includes: `
Mauritania 83.9 15a�9
Niger 78.9 ~8.9
Mali 42.3 42.3
*Excluding Senegal. Does not inclu~e loans made to ASECNA
~gency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar,,,7
for the development of airports~ whiah was 10 million "first
coun~er" franes in 197F.
Countiries of the Sahel~ Upper Vo1ta, Mali, Ni.ger, and Chad
are classified with Benin~ Burundi~ the Cape Verde islands~
The Central African Empixe~ the Comoro Islands~ Rwanda~ and
Somalia in the UN's classification of least advanced coun-
tries. The funds allocated by the CCCE to these countries
have been increasin~ greatly over the past 3 years; they have
risen from an average of 43 million francs in 1974-?5 to an
average of 252 million siiice 1976.
Sectors of Intervention
~ During the last 3 years~ the CCC~; has directed three-quarters
of its aid to directly productive operations. This proportion
even reached 82 percent of investments financed ~ointly with
the assistance of other co-financing sources.~
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~dR (1~~ICIAL USl; ONLY
-
Iiowev~r, th~ C~n~ra1 Fund t?~g not neg~.ected pub~.~.c equ~.pmen~ -
of ~n e~~nomic nature~ su~?~. ~s ~ranspor~~ti~n ~nd ~elecommu-
nica~lon~~ wh3eh ~re vi~~~. in bringing remo~e areas ou~ of
isolatiion and in promo~in~ trade.
A) Rural Deve~.opmen~
zn ~978 ~ 1arg~ amount ~f money was a17.ocated ~o food programa:
~976: 4;~ million francs; 1977~ ~~3 mi1.11on francs; 19?8: 156
million franes.
4Jhi7.e programs f3nanced ~.n ~he f3.rst 6 mnn~hs concerned pri~
marily pilot pro~ec~s to cult~.va~e vegetabl.es~ manioc~ and
plantains in the Tvory Coast and ~abon~ ~hose in ~he sscond
ha1.f of the year were mainly for rice cultivation programs~
~asp~cially i.n the Sahe1 area and in Cameroon. The development
of irrigatea fields on ~he Senegal river w311 help thousands
of farmers and is part of an irriga~ion policy which is es-
sential in areas of 1ow or irregular rainfall. These prograos
shou].d be based more than in the past on the participation of
~he farmers themselves in a11 the work and on a light and
decentralized administrative strt~c~ure. In Cameroon~ in the
upper Noun vall6y~ which is bettex irrigated and is heavily
populated~ water control over 2~200 hectares wi11 make it pos-
sible to establish 3~000 rice growe~~ there~ and will bring
rice production areas closer to the areas of consumption.
Distribution by sector of interventions o~' the Central Fund `
during 1978 (millions of francs)
Second half 1978 Percentage
of year
Rural development ~53~~~ ~76.00 11.8
Mines ~ 150.00
Industry - crafts 295.20 301.00 20.1
Electricity 152�495 188.495 12.6
Tourism 26~,~p 36.~0 2.5
Total of productiv~ sect~rs
777�495 1058.9'~5 7~.9
Rai.lroads ~J.Sp 1 ~
Roads - ports - 20�3~ 126.2~ 8~5
airports 5
Telecommunications 121.00 121.pp g~1
Social infrastructure 3.00 0.2
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~ ~Oit O~FICIAL US~ dNLY
Total of publia equipmen~
148.81 377�7~ z5�3
To~a~ of finana~.al opeara~ions
Tota~. 9?9�206 1493.142 100
An ~.ntegrated rura]. devA~opment operation 3n the east of
Upper Volta is another type of experiment based on bringing
underpopulated areas ou~ of isolation.
In a gengral way~ the rural opera~ions selec~ed in 1978 most
often had a promotional aspecti. For example~ in the second
half of the year there were the development of wheat culti- -
vation in Madagascar associated with the eatablishment of
- a grain mi11 a pi1o~ agriculture and 1lvestock program ~n
_ Mauritius~ v~llage plantations of rubber trees associated with
an industrial rubber tree plantation in the Ivory Coast~ a
sheep-breeding pro~ect in the Ivory Coast semi-art3sanal
fishing in Senegal. For a11 these pro~ec~s it seems that the
possibil3ty of enlarging the program in case of sucoess
genera?.1y outweighed the risks inherent in this sort of
, innovation.
In a1l 35? million francs were allocated to rural development
pro~ec~s in 1978~ in 29 operations.
B) Industrial Development
Four ma~or pro~ects were financed in the second half of the
year; these constitute the main aid given during the year.
These operatio~s were covered half by the first and half by
the second counters as follows (listed in nillions of franes).
First Second Total In-
Counter Counter vestments
- Guelb el Rhein iron mines in 75 75 ~943
Mauritania ~
Petroleu~ refinery at
- Victoria, Cameroon . 120 1316
Enlargement of ALUCAM plant in 50 80 52~
Cameroon
= Andekaleka hydroelectric power 80 558
plant in Madagascar
Other industrial~ electrical~ 146 ~6
and tourist investments .
Total for 197~ 351 351
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~bit UN'~']'CIAL US~ (1NLY
The Ti~ur~.t~ni~n prd~ec~ wi~.1 use the iron ore resrves of ~he
(~ue1b mines. Desp~.te thei~~ metal content (30 ~0 40 percent)~
wh3.ch is lower ~han the content of the depos~.ts whiah h~ve
b~en ~.n production unt31 now near Zouera~e~ and ~he corresponding
need for enr~.ehment~ this program w~.].1 enabl.e M~uritiania to
conserve ~.~s primai~y export resource after the present mines
are exhausted ~owards 1990.
The Victor:i.a refinery in Cameroon~ simple in i~s des~.gn~ will
have a capacity of 1~500~000 tons which can be increased to
2~OC0 000 ~ons; it wi11 process the new petrolewn production
from ~he Ko1.e region.
The enlar~ement of the ALUCAM aluminum ~lant in Cameroon from
50~00~ tons to ~0~000 tons capacity wi11 use ~he surplus -
ele~tric power from the Song-Loulou dam~ whi.le improving
costs through the moc?.ernization of the existing facilities.
Production should gradual~y be absorbed primarily by the
African market.
~ ~
The Andekaleka clam in riadagascar~ �~n its first phase~ will ~
be equipped with two turbines; this da~~ is de:~igned for
_ the nation's electricity needs~ and could help with its indus-
trial development~ especia].iy for the produc~ton of fsrro-
chrome.
AII:ong the other pro~ects bei,ng financed~ on a more modest
scale~ we can mention two ex~.~ansions of textile plants in the
Ivory Coast and in Niger~ a paper bag and wrapping paper
plant in Zaire and the enlar~~ement of paper mi11s in ~iadagas-
car. In the f~eld of ele~tricity~ the pro~ects ehosen are
aimed mainly at increasinp~ production ~apacity in Cameroon~
Mali~ Senegal~ and Chad. .
Finally~ the Central Fun~~ which feels that the economic
spinoffs of good business hotels are important~ has �acilitated
an investment of this sort ir.~. Niamey.
C) Public Investments
In 1978, these were oriented primarily towards railroads and
airports and toward telecommunications. In the second half of
the year~ ma~or programs were financed in Cameroon~ the Ivory
Coast~ Madagascar~ and Niger~ as follows (listed in millions
of francs).
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1
, _
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Second ha~f of y~ar 1978
Railroads 7�5 ~24~5
Road transpor~
Porta
Airpor.ts 12.3 84.2
Telecommun3cations 121 121
Social infras~ructure 3
Total 148.8 37?�7
(of which ~Y~ese amounts were
i`rom ~he "second counter" 4~ 80
For the firs~ ~ime~ ~he CCCE took an interest in a national
television network in NigAr; this wi11 enlarge the seope of
activity of educatior~l ~televis3on.
A loan was made to enlarge the port of Cotonou which is now
saturated. This port plays an ossentiial role ~.n the Beninois
economy and also in the economy of Niger~ and more recently~
has become important for t~,he Nigerian eeonomy. Along w3th
~he development of uranium mines~ there is expected a sharp
upturn in traffic on the Cotonou-Niger axis operated by the
OCBN ~enin-Niger Joint Railroad and Transport Organizatio~.
Three programs for studies of airport development show the
CCCE's interest in the possibility of using air freight trans-
port in order to bring tk~ese countries out of isolation.
D) Financial Operations
These included a loan of 50 million francs made with the
backing of the French government to the Senegal National
- Development Bsnk for a government investment program.
Methods of Intervention -
In 1975 the CCCE reinforced its promotional role in the pre-
paration of pro~ects brought increased attention to bear on
management and train~ng programs~ and pursued a policy of co-
financing~ which enabl.ed it to multiply the effects of its
actions. ~
A) Promotion of Pro~ects
After the establishment of a development division in the
headquarters of the CCCE~ the establishment of PROPARCO
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F'UIt r11~ CICIAI. US[; ~NLY
.
~~xp~nsSnn unknowr,~~ an ~c~clustri~~. ao~�~~.opment cdmpany which
shares in the cap~.t~1 inves~men~ ot n~w on~erpr~.ses~the pro-
~ect promo~ion organ3za~ion wa~ compl~,ted by a mechan3sm
established to handle ~~udies.
;
The procedure ~o finance studies oi' pr~~eets es~ablished Sn
1978~ h~s a dual ob~ec~~.ve. First of a1.1~ i~ should help to
solve ~he problems faced by ~he de~nloping coun~ries in ob-
t~ining aid for preparing pro~ec+~:~ whc~:~~: deftni~3on is not
yet complete or whose cl~v~lopment is nrt fu11y ensui�ed. The
aid of the C~CE is ~hus added to ~he aid tradltionally granted
for the same purpose by ~he FAC LAid a~,d Coopertttion Fun),
A1so~ the financing oS' s~ud3es is ~~uarantee for the CCCE
.~ha~ iti wi1.1 receive sufficien~ly we11. prep~red pro~ects
~nd ~.n particu],ar~ pro~ects orien~ed from their star~ toward
meeting essential neads or towars the maximum utilization of
1.oca1 labor and local resources.
Excluding general or sector studies, the procedure implemented '
is aimed a~ identified pro~ects which have been app~oved by
the government involved~ and whose nature fa11s within the realm
of later financing by the CCCE. It is significant that the
firs~ loan made to Guinea was for the study of a dam~ a sort
of pump-priming loan for larger amounts of
financing.
B) Managemen~ and Training Aid
The quality of management ~nd especially the quality of the
maintenance of the facilities financed is an essential con-
dition of their profitability. This problem arises particular-
ly with rural development organizations~ large national elec-
tricity production enterprises~ railroad systems~ and road
transport systems.
7'he CCC~ is now financing the training of appropriate personnel
and specific actiions to organize naintenance services. This
aid most often is one of the elements of the pro~ect receiving
establishment loans. Special funding may also be granted.
During the year ~ust past~ a special training program was set
up for SAED LDe1ta Development and Operation Company] employ-
ees in Senegal. The Central Fund also helped with the crea-
tion~ in Iia~.son with professional groups~ of specialized
institutes using a particular type of teaching methods. In
the Ivory Coast~ the Bouake agricultural institute in 1978
received a second installment of funds; the C2�~+II LIndustrial
Maintenance and Mechanics Cente) of Jacqueville will develop
teachfng methods to be used in seven other vocational schools.
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~Oit d~'~ICIAL US~ dNLY
C) Co-~'~.nancing
The Central Fund most often comb~.nes w3.~h i~s long-term loans
credits from suppl~.ers and medium-term funding~ whose repay-
men~ terms are Qased by generous deferments. The extenaion
~f es~ablishment resources is indlspensable when large pro~ects
are involv~d for because of their volume and the risks in-
volved~ theae of~~n exceed the capacities of the Central Fund
alone. The CCCE then intervenes ~ointl.y with other bilateral
and international aid organizations. The experience it has
aequired in 30 years of activi~y in Africa and i~s strong
io~ai t~~s wi~h its ne.~work of agencies and ~echnical assistance
have some~imes enabled 3t to interest ~ther lenders in vast
programs~ especial.l.y~organiza~ions that were established rela-
tively recen~ly.
Sn 1978, the CCCE in this way participated in a total volume
of investmen~s of 8 billion franes~ an amoun~ 5.5 times higher
than the loans that it made by itself since in 1978 its share
in these co-financed pro~ects was 1.4~37 billion francs. While
the CCCE does appear to be the primary financing source (1$
percent), the share of othe~ bilateral aid (15 percent) and of
mul~ilateral aid (15 percent) is also essential.
,
- Loans Made by the CCCE in 1978 to the Nations of Africa and
the Indian Ocean (in thousands of French francs)
r
I Productive Sectors
1) Rural Development 357~354
a) Food crops 155~860
Cameroon: rice cultivation program in the
upper Noun valley 18~000
Ivory Coast: manioc cultivation expansion
pro~ect in the Toumodi region 20~500
I~rory Coast: vegetable cultivation expan-
sion pro~ect at Marabadiassa 24~000
Gabon: crea~ion of an industrial plantain
- farm at N'Toum 24~000
Upper Volta: integrated rural development
operation in the east ' 13~200
Upper Volta: pro~ect to develop farmers'
garden crops in the center west 1~000
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w....
~-W--..
- ~ l~nn or~r.c;LAL USL ONLY
Madagascar: experiment~al progra~n ~~o develop 5~000
whea~ cul.~ivation in ~he AntsiraUe rE~ion
Ma1.i: rehRbilita~~.on of the agrict~~tura7. 3,~0~
area of Baguineda ~'or vegetable and frui~
crops
. M~auritius: pilot pro~ects in agriculture
and livestock 2~000
Senr ~a].. devel.opment of' ~:he N' Pombo �ind -
~'hiago basins 18 560
Senegal: created of irriga~ed vil~.age ~
areas at Ma~am and conducting of a s~udy
of the possibilities of agricul~ura~.
developmen~ of the entire area 26~500
b) ~xport crops 74~550 ~
Burundi: quinquina plantat3on pro~ec~ 750
Cameroon: tea planting program at D~uttitsa, 10~000
Ivory Coast: establishment of the CEDAR
LArabusta Coffee Research and Aevelopment
Cente) plant at Soubre 3,600
~ Ivory Coast: rubber tree planting pro~ect
- (second phase) at Grand Bereby (southwest) 40 600
Ivory Coast: establishment of village '
rubber tree plantations in the southeast 6,600
Ivory Coast: rubber tree planting program
in the southwest (SAPH [Afr~can R~bber
Plantation Company,7) 12~000
rial.i: equipment for rural blacksmiths in
the cotton-growing area (CMDT) 1~000
c) Livestock ~
Ivory Coast: sheep-breeding pro~ect in the
Toumodi region ~2~840
d) Agricultural industries 77~900
Cameroon: construction of a palm oil plant
by the SAFACAM 14~400
Madagascar: construction of a mill at
Antsirabe 20~000
riali: rehabilitation of the Baguineda
cannery.by the SOCAM 2~500
Senegal. construction of a new peanut
oil plant at Diourbel (second counter) 40~000
Chad: construction of a cotton gin at Bol
by Cotontchad 1~000
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FOfi O~~ICIAL USE ONLY
e) Fishing 24~000
Ivory Coast: purchase of a~una boa~ by 13~000 -
the SIPAR
Ivory Coast: purchase of a tuna boat by
the SMBL 10~000.
Senegal: feasibility studies 1~000
f) Training 12~200
Ivory Coast: second part of Bouake
~gricultural ~~nstitute funding 4~700
Senegal: SAED training program 7~500 _
2) riines ' 176~000
tdauritania: start of production of a
new iron ore mine (Guelb el Rhein)
First counter 75~000
. Second counter 75~000
Togo: establishment of a fifth phosphate
processing unit by the CTMB (second covnter) 26~000
_ 3) Crafts industries 301~000
Cameroon: establishment of a petroleum
refiner at Victoria by the SONORA (second
counter~ 120~000
Cameroon: enlargement of the ALUCAM plant's
aluminum production capacity at Edea
First' counter 50~000
Second counter 80~000
Cameroon: development program for small
and medium-scale businesses 7~500
Ivory Coast: enlargement of the African
Cycle Factory in Abid~an 2~000
Ivory Coast: enlargement of the textile
complex of the SOCITAS 12~000
PAPMADscar: expansion of paper mills of 6 600
~
Mali: expansion of the Mamadou Sada
Diallo plant at Bamako 3~Q00 .
~ Niger: modernization ot the spinning and
weaving facilities of SONITEXTIL 7~100
Senegal: provision of backing funds for
small and medium-scale businesses and for
, crafts workers ~ 2~000
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rorz ot~rr.ci~~,~~ USL ONLY
Chad: modern~.za~ion ~f sp~nntn~; r~nd weaving
shops 800
Laire: deve:lopment of' a kraf~ pap~r
p~.an~ (second enunter) 10~000
4) ~lectricit~y 188~495
Cameroon: instal.lation of a f~urtl~
gtnerating system at tt~e S~~?~; Lc~t:~lou dam
and a socond very high vol~age line
between Song Loulou and Edea (second
counter) 20~00~. -
Ivory Coast: electrica~. power su~pl.y of
Korhogo and Dabou 1b~000
Gabon: construction and equipment of
~~ransformer station at Bissegue (second
counter) 20~000
Guinaas studies of rebuilding th.3 Grandes
Chutes dam ~ ~ ,295
hiadagascar: construction of Andelaleka
~ hydroele ctri c power plant 80 ~ 000 "
Mali: Energie du Ma1i investment -
program 25~200 -
Senegal: increase in electricity produc- -
_ tion of Electr3cite du Senegal 15~000
Chad: purchase of three generators for
Ndjamena and Sahr power plants 10 000
~ Chad: technical study of new Nd~amena ~
power plant 1~000
5) Tourism : . 36~100
Gabon: construction of a tourist-class
ho~el at Port Gentil 9~400
Niger: construction of an international
class hotel at Niamey 25~~00
Togo: construction of a hostel at
Fazao 1~000 , _
Tot al of productive sectors ~,058,9'+5
In cluding:
_ First counter 667,9~+5
Sec ond counter 391~000
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FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ �
_ '
~ TI Pub1~.c Equipment
1) Transportation 253~710
a) Railroads 127~500
Benin: OCBN investment program 20~000
Cameroon: straightening of railway
between Douala and Edea and between
Minka and Maloume 14~000
Cameroon: REGIFERCAM amerconian ~
Railway Administratio~ investment
program
first counter ~ 29~~000
second counter 15~000
, Congo_ purc~iase of passenger cars by
ATC LTrans-Congolese Communications
Agency] 22~000
Congo: ATC investment program 20~000 -
biali: modernization of tracks and equipment ~
oF the RCFM 7~ 500 _
b) Roads
- Niger: SNTN investment program 24~000
c) Ports
Benin: enlargement of the autonomous port
of Cotonou 18~000
d) Airports , 84~210
ASECNA: investment program for several
airports 40~000 _
Gabon: Air Gabon equipment.program (second ~
counter) 20~000
Madagascar: enlargement of airport
facilities at Antananarivo ~ 13~~000 -
Mauriti us: geotechn~cal site study of
area intended for construction of
Plaine des Roches international airport 1~000
Mauritius: general study of~ the island's
aviation infrastructure 11p
Mauritania: enlargement of Nouakchott
airport 8~900
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r~nn oi~~'tCIAI, US~ ONLY
Rwazid~: study of development of K;i.gali-
Kanombe international airpor~ 1~20Q _
2) Telecommunications 121~000
Cameroon: extens~.on of telephone systems
of Yaounde~ Douala~ and Garoua
First c~un ter 00
Second counter 37~000
Ivory Coast: deve1opment of the Iv ~ry
Coast por~ion of the Abid~an-Lagos
underwater cablc by INTELCI
First counter 8~000 -
Second counter 8~000
Ma'dagascar: expansion ?nd modernization of
telephone system at Antan,~narivo 1~~000 ~
N3.ger. pro~ect to develop a national
television network 20~000
3) Social infrastructure 3~000
Seychelles: construction of housing for
French technical assistance 3~000
Total of public equipment 3?7~710
Including:
First counter 297~710
Secon d counter 80~000 -
Total I and II 1,436,655
,
Including:
First counter 965,655
Second counter 4~1~000
III Financial Operations
1) Capital participations 6~48~.4
Burundi: increase in capital of the BNDE
LNational Economic Development Bank,~ 1~000 .
Ivory Coast. increase in capital of the BIDI
LIvorian Bank for Industrial Developmen) 1 500
France: increase in capital. of international ~
SCET LCentral Company for Territorial
, Equipmen) 375
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. -
France: participation in capital of
SOFTNINDEX 1~500
Morocco: addition to 3ncrea~e in capital -
of the BND~ LNa~ional Economic Develop-
ment Bank) ?
Niger: increase in capital of BDN LNiger
Development Bank 2~pg5.6
_ Togo: increase n capital of the BTD
~ogo Development Bank~ 24.g
~
2) Advances 50~0~~0 ~
Senegal: financing of government investment
program by the BNDS ~enegal National
; Development Bank) (second counter) 50~000
Tata1 of financia~ operations 5E~487.4
Grand To~al (I~ II~ III) 1,493,142.4
Including:
First counter 972,142.4
Se cond count~: r 521 ~ 000
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et cie Paris 1979
7679 -
CSO: 4400 -
22 .
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- I~Uk n1~ t~ I:C tAL tJ~l: hNLY
2Nm~It-1~'RiC1W l~'F'AIf25
.
C~'~'UEt7'5 7'b bEV~LbI~ CUI2AF'RICAN l1INING POLICY. bISCU55Ln
paris M1~ItCH~S TRAPiCAUX ~T M~diT~12R~1N~~NS in t'ranch 23 M~r 79 p 7~7
C~ditori~l: "~or a ~ur~frican Mining poli~y")
(T~xt~ In proposing to tihe gov~rnm~nts of inembQr nations
of the ~uropean ~conomic Community in Brua~els on
15 March that they off~r tihe community's guarantee for _
mining investmonts in Africa (see "Mail from grussels"
heading), th~ commissioner for development, Mr Claude
Cheysson, suggested only one possiblQ solution to a
well-known and often deplored problem for which eruly
appropriate measures have neverthelegs not been consid-
ered to date : tihe proL~lem of the low quantity af Euro-
pean mining invQStments, dangerous for thQ future, in
Africa and more generally in developing countiries.
With his usual candor, Mr Cheysson accused the governments of the "Nine"
- of "a conspiracy of silence" in regard to proposals of the European Commis-
sion. No doubt the governments showed keen irritation at the mere idea
that the Brussels Commission could sugqest a real policy for them in any
.zrea. But if Mr Cheysson's accusation is well founded, the negative atti-
tude of the governments woulc? be even more incomprehensible since Europe in
general depends to a large extent (about three-fourths)on foreign sources for
its supplies of essential ores for its industries. This is particularly
the case with France, which has to import about 55 percent of its consump-
tion of ores other than sulfur, potash and fluorine, and must rely on New
~ Caledonia for nickel, whereas its deposits of bauxite will be exhausted in
about 15 years.
The United Nations, Mr Cheysson recalls, has estimated the mining invest-
ment needs of developinq countries at S4 to 5 billion per y~ar. Almost
half of these investments, approximately S2.4 billion, should be invested
by Europe each year for 10 years if it wants to be assured of a reqular
supply of ores, according to estimates of the fozioer chairman of the Aaso-
ciation of Mininq industries of the United Kinqdom, Mr Beville Pain, in a
speech delivered in early 1978 a t the time of his retirement. The amount
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whieh ~h~uld b~ d~v~~~d tic~ A~rica ~ach y~ar can b~ ~gtiima~ed ati ~om~
$6n0 million and p~rhapg ~v~n mor~.
Gommodi~i~g ite~~arch Uniti dir~ctor Ftob~rti Periman warn~d in iatia 1977 tha~
du~ tio lack of maggiv~ inv~~~m~n~g in ~h~ mining indugtiry, i~ po~~ibl~
~ti~~ pric~s of inet~l~ will ris~ con~id~rably in eh~ ~ightii~~. What ha~
~ur~p~e don~ to Cop~ w~~h ehi~ ~i~uatiion7 In 1967, invegtm~n~e of European
bu~in~~~~~ in Afric~ (noti including Sou~h Africa and Rhod~sia and exciuding
uranium) r~pre~~nt~d S3 million. 7'hey w~r~ x~ro in 1976 and barely r~ached
$126 million in 1977. Mr Chey~son d~scrib~fl tihis lack a~ "diea~tirou$."
H~ comp~r~d tih~ poli~y of ~h~ United Stig~p~, which depends on fnreign
gources for only aboati 15 p~rcenti of i~g or~ guppll~g, buti whose mining in-
v~g~en~s in the Third Wor1d are twic~ thog~ o~ the ~uropean Economic Com-
muni~y. If the EFC doeg noti quickly rsctify this eituation, its dependence
will continue to increage in tihe future, wheth~r on or~-producing developed
countirieg ~uch as Canade, the Unit~d Stiatieg and Austiralia or on multina-
einnal companieg coneroll~d by Am~riCan nr J~panes~ capital.
mhere are ~wn reasons for the drop in mining investments in reaent y~arss
tih~ low l~vel of inetal prices, which hag ~nabled investors to reap only
second-rate profits and, on th~ o~her hand, noncommercial riskg, i.e., po-
litical ins~ability ~nd th~ fear of excessive increases in taxes or roy- .
alt;ies, posgibly ~ven leading eventually to actual expropriation.
ThE: European Commission suggests that the governments of the "Nine" take
action in two areas.
With regard to prospecting, the EEC could help to establish and ffnance in
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries] "national funds for mininq
exploration" in which other financinq agencies such as Arab funds, for ex-
ample, could participate. The EEC should also share in financinq prospect-
ing by allocating venture capital for this purpose.
With regard to the pr~motion of production investments, needs are so huqe
and investments require such a long period of amortization (about 40 years)
that Europeans should 3oin forces to make an effort comparable to that of
- the United States. The European Commission therefore suggests that public
financing agencies act as a catalyst for direct investments of European con-
tractors in ACP, that the European Investment Bank increase its participa-
_ tion in mining (and energy) projects and that the EEC offer its own guaran-
tee, in addition to that of national agencies when this is the case, against
noncommercial risks.
According to Mr Cheysson, the "Nine" are still not willing to really tackle
problems of mining cooperation with ACP. On the other hand, ACP have ap-
peared to be rather favorable to the European Cortm?ission's proposals while
still maintaining a certain deqree of reservation concerninq the real in-
tentions of the "Nine"s it would therefore be appropriate to dispel their
doubts by clearly affirming that they have no intention of interveninq in
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t~hk Ut~['IC1AL USL l)NLY
ehe intern~l aff~irs af nCp wtth re~p~~e tin ~~rdtectiing tiheir inve~ttn~n~g
. ~.n ~hdse ~nuntriea.
is it pc~g~ib1~ tih~t ~he prc~~pecti af ~n increa3e in nr~ pric:es in fu~ur~
;~~ars will caug~ d~v~loping cdun~ri~~ with ~i~her six~l~ d~pdsitis dr min-
- eral w~~ltih td limit Cheir salcs ar to r~~~r~ dr r.e~~rict developmen~ of
~heir re~erves while waiting ~~r wdrld ~riCes to rise7
t~~veloping c~untri~g, ~nd A~rican ne~ions itt p~rticular, would m$ke a
s~ridug error ~.n 3udgm~nt i~ ~hey yield~d tn ~h~e temptatiion. mhc~ir popu-
latifong would not und~r~~and why tih~ir gav~r~,~entg wer~ rurning away tiha
f1c~w of mining investmentg while the number ~t job~ ne~sdad was incrQaging
~very day. Mor~over, ~ certiain price level may induce mining compnnies to
sQ~k otiher sources of supply, as they havQ alre~dy done by channeling a
p~rcenti~ge of their inv~gtments to Can~da dnd nugtralia, congidered ~n be
politiically ~~able countries. Conqumerg may �ind it more profitiable to use
alt~rnatiive products. I2egearch on new r~cov~ry techniqu~s can also b~ de-
velnped. ~ranc~ currently recycles about 30 p~rcent nf itig lron and copper
consumption. ~'inally, an increas~ in prices may make iti profitable ta ex-
ploit oc~an noduleg such as thoae of manganese in tihe pacific. mhe failure
of negotiatiions on t;_Q Law of the 5ea and the United Sti~teg' threat to
granti development rights to thair companies c~bviously show that, for the
time being, it is excessive cost price~ which have h~ld back the develop- -
ment of ores deposited in tihe ocean floor~ rather than rzspect for qreat
principles of international solidarity.
For lack nf an agreement betwean Europe and Africa, the latter would con-
tinue to be deprived of the economic and social benefits which tit:e exis-
ter~ce of its m.ineral wealth should provide. mheir common intierest Chere-
fore sugqestq that they should promore, as far as possible, multilateral
negotiations--but their successful conclusion does not depend only on them
--and encouraqe the developnaent of new solutions such as partnerships of
public or private European P.nd African capital and the conclusion of lonq-
term ore supply contracts. This is also wha~ the Brussels Commission is
proposing by setting dependency limits and by restricting Community inter-
ventiion in countries whose mining companies are linked to European pur-
chasers by long-tierm contracts.*
, * Cf. M}1RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEbiTEItRAA1EENS of 16 Mar, p 678: Toward the
es~ablishment of a Stabex II for ores.
COPYRIGHT~; Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
11915
CSO: 4400
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. 1111L' [l"~[' L11C~N C ~d~0
PLTROLf:tiM ACTIVI~'I~S rN AFf3ICA 19?8-1q79
~'aris DtARCI{Lw TROI'ICAIiX CT Mi~'.DiT~RRn~rr,~NS in French 23 Feb ~9 pp 491-9~
~ext7 Data relativ~ to p~troleum activities in Africa durin~ the past year
arE: f.ar from bein~; tetally availablQ. }touever~ tgmporary estimates have been
ma~ie in r~t;ard to pz~oduction and significant developmenta have been ascertained
in roctorr. "doxnstreAm" with the result that it ie possible to strike a balance
an~l point out the trends ahich the petroleum industry in Africa muat surely
follow in the months to comQ.
Africa~ 9.1 Percent of 'rforld Production
petroleum production in Africa in 1978 (excludin~ that of Ep,ypt~ as is ~ener-
ally the case) is 8aid to h~ve been about 277 million tons divided ag folloxs
(temporary fi$ures~ in millions of tons):
1978 197?
Libya 95�5 ~oo.l
Al~eria 59�4 53�5
ifiFeria 95.0 104.28 -
Gabon 11.0 11.2
An~ola 9.5 $.1
= Tunisia ~~.6 4.3 ~ -
ConFa 1.9 1.A4
Zairp 1.2 1.0
Total 27?.7 2R4.32
The tonna~e extracted in 19?8 ranks about the same in aorld production as that
extracted the previous year--namely~ 9.1 percent. Nevertheless, despite the
recent entrance of nea countries in the cycle of petroleum production~ there
is reason to be astonished at this drop of 7 million tons fro~n one year to the
next. The drop is due to a xeakening in Nigeria's exports severely affected
by a sloxdown in demand durinF the first half of the year: thus~ in a sellers'
market Niqc3rian crudo met xith strong competition among its usual b~yers (United
States and countries of northxestern Europe) from crude coming t~om Alaska~
Mexico and the North Sea. The situation ri~;hted itself~ particularly from Sep-
tember on~ xith the pseneral resumption of precautionary purchases made in vieN
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i~'tlit Ui~'~ICtAL USL UNI,Y
ot' th~~ ~x~ct~d pricr~ rin~ Nhich Orf~;c; wa~: t,o deCid~ ~t the r:nd of Uocemb~r,
1. ihvn'r, ~a1 t~aation wec~ ~om~what comp~rable ~~1 ~.hou~h the I,i hyAn Cov~rnment hAA
r,~rm~d to be eatiafied xitli ~tep~d-up pre~duation in accord~nC~ with itg pol-
ir.y of maint~inin~ re~erve~.
On thp et.h~r hand~ one w1..11 note th~ incr~as~ in Al~;eria's production ~8 ~r-
rAn1.~ ~r;-t t!~;:.t, of An~n~ ~er~ent) ~ WI1~.C}~ h~, s.r~ keQpin~; xSth Lhe requirey
mrnta t'or fin~ncitt~ the ar.onomipa of thorf~ tN~, ~OUt1f.*'~E?f;.
Hoxever~ it is fittin~~ to add C~maroon to th~; African countrie~ ~lreac~jr pro-
ducin~;~ Cameroon produced about 60~~000 ton~ from the Kdle offshore dc~posit
o~n~d in February.* Tt ia expected that 1.5 million tona uill be obtain~d i?i
~ 1979, BQtika~ a neN depd~it~ has ,~ust be~n put into productiion~ mhus~ Came-
roon wi11 help maintain the groWth rate of p~troleum production in Africa~ ~nd
a neu producin~ country Kiii ~ add~d--Ghana. In fact, at the end of Drcnmber
the Americ~n Countries khich had discovered the Saltpond deposit 9 miles off
th~ ~hore of Gh~na in 1970 tran~ported a first load of that oi1 to Texas. ~ut
the tonna~es obt~ined tti11 be low~ and it is expected that it xill bo 'nt~eria
that will parttcularly add to the increa4e in African production.
_ As a matter of fact~ except for that country (for tt~e portion of the conttnent
located south of the Sahara)~ the development of production comes up a~gainsL
technical difficulties experienced by most of thc recently discovered depor~its:
where~lA in N~geria the average ~roduction cost per barrel ia about $1~ else-
uhere xp must count on ~~i, and even ~10 as in th~ case of the Con~olese off-
ahoro deposit xhere the reRe~voir is deep and releaseg a rathor viscous oil -
xith some difficulty.
ttev~rthele~s~ the companies involved ar~ not'sparing in their efforts~ despite -
the lar_c;e sums they must invest. For example, in Cabon~ r,LF Critrean Libera-
tion Front7~ aysociated xith Mitsubishi~ is developin~ a depoait discovered
in 197~~ ln the sea at s~ diatance of 75 km south of Cape Lopez= its goal is to
~tart production in June 19E~0 at an annual rate of 400~000 tons.
In Conr;a a third offshore de posit, Li Kouela (after those of ~meraude and
Loanpo~~ aill become productive 2 years from nox. The operating company, EI.F~
is hopin~ foz an annual production of 1.4 million tons from 1980 on, rrhich
aould make it possible almost. to double Congo's production. In Zaire produc-
tion xill decline until a secondary-recovery system is installed (xhich the
World Bank s~ill partially finance). Ghana~ a nex producer in 1979~ could be-
come e~tablished as an important source if Phillips~ Getty and AGIP ~talian
Petroleum Enterpris~ consider commercially xorthxhile their r8cent discovery
of an oil of ,r,ood quality, 32 de~rees, accompanied by gas~ in a deposit knoxn
as "South Tana~" about 20 miles offshore.
~ The opArating company is ELF-SEREPCA Critrean Liberation Front-Petroleum
Research and Exploitation Company of Cameroon7 xith 51 percent.
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On the Who1e~ the depo~aita rec~ntly put into production~ or whi~h Ni11 be~ xi11
com~nAate for any decrea~e tn oil obtatned from older flepositg, Any inc~~s~
in production in Libya will riep~nd on the poli~y of the authcritiea and a1AO on
pro~~n made in equipment pro,jects~ such a~ the layin~ ef the ~+00 km pipelinfr
from A1 ~tamadA to Zawia (Tripoli)~
I t iR ~Rpe~Sally thanks to Ni~ria that Africa'g potential rrill be further de-
veloped in i979~ Di~coveries follow one another rather regularly like the one
made in S~ptember by ACIp-Phi11l.ps in the Ni~r River de1t~ not far from ~'or-
cados where 1'~ productive de posita xere found. 1{aving no caus~ for concern
ov~r the state of their hydrocarbbn resc~rvea, the Pligerian authorities Will be
~bl~ to take advanta~ of the rather tense situation of the World market in
11~ht crude oils in increasin~ their ~nnual production in 19~9 to 120 million
tonR or even mor~.
An~;ola can al~o look forward to a~ood petroleum future. It~ production has
raga~nad the level it had before independence= but, mox~e important, the I,uanda
~;overnment has draun up nex rules on the ~ame of coop~ration With the private
companiea on the basis of the aemifiacal system of " production sharinr~." F'or-
ei~n research companies~ obli~*ed to rrork in association xith the national com-
pany~ know that in case of discoveries they Will be reimburaed for their ex-
p~nses as operator and that they xill share in part of the production. The CE'P
~rench Petroleum Company7 ~roup has ~ust concluded an a~reement of this type
xhich xill enable its s4bsidiary~ Total-CAP ~ngnlr.n Petroleum Compar?y~, to use _
the knorrledp~ acquired previously throuqh several drillin~ campaigns and not
lose the benefit of its previous inveatmenta.
In reference to the location of hydrocarbon reserves in Africa~ emphasis must
be ~iven to offshore deposits. In 19?8~ nearly 60 producing xells xere located
in thP sea~ not to mention those of Nigeria all located in the Routhern part of
the country. This confirms the analysis made by geologists on the formation of
oil in Africa south of the Sahara. The arran~ement is obviously quite different
for North Africa~ even though exploration in Cabes Gulf has revealed several
re^,ervoirs xhose exploitation, in some instances, is delayed by the problem of
the divisian of the continental plateau betxeen Tunisia and Libya. Fo~ this
reason the Libyan Government has opposed the start-up of the offshore deposit,
Isis. discovered in 1974 by a suhgidiary of the CFP ~roup~ xith an annual po-
tential of about l.y million tons (it was not possible to complete the xork es~
tablishing the boundary at the east).
T t is proba.ble that Kith the nex program of aid t~ developing countries for
their ener~r requiremsnts~ decided at the end of January by the Vorld Bank~*
oil and gas production in Africa will progress in future years. The bank has
already pmmised its assistance for production operations xhere the commercial
See MARCNES TROPICAUX FT MtT~~ITEREtANEE1tS of 2 February 1979~ p z33
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pro~itr~bility i~ only modarat~ (sma11 diricdvhriE~g in Chxd, for exampl~) t~ut
nuff'iCtent to decr~ac~e the en~r~y de~nd~nce of' thr-. r.nuntrt~~ in ques~ion~
'Th~A nex orientation by th~ b~nk~ which ~xtQnds from anpi~tance in definin~g
~n~rg,y polici~g to thr. financin~ of
p~dduction and even af ce~t~in exploralory
pro~ie~t~, will be trorth fo1].awin~; o.ttentivel.y ~ in Cact, it mi~ht in time ~1-
ter th~ p~ troleum trad~, dominat~d up to now by the pre ponderance of Middle-
Last production~ and p1acQ ~reat~r ~mphasi~ on t.he flinction of "industrial co~
op~r~tt~r?" of nil ;:a;~paniea (rthich doer. i,t ~lw~,ys ~.~~1 t 1ar~ int~rnational
r~roup:;) ~
Natural Gas: Al~eria in an Awkrrard ~ositSon
We cr~nnot c1oAS a~tudy on Afric~n producti~n srithaut mentioning natural ~a~.
As n matter of fact~ thA situation did. not change in 197P. Libya and especially
A1~ rta are the only remainin~; commercial producer~ of this kind of hydrocar-
bonRt A1~ ria has confirmed its position ag 1ead~r, havin~; increased ite pro-
duction to more than 14 billion cubic metern~ oi� ~0 ~rc~nt more than in 1977.
It aill dovelop its production still more in the future~ e:~peciallv xhen
~ONA~'itACFI ?Zational Compan,y for the Transport and Market~ng of ~'uels~ xi11 have
arranp,ed export facilitie~ (n~:a liquefaction r.quipment and piping. In this
re~;ard~ althou~h th~rn is sti11 tincertainty about the ~?as pipeline leading to
Spain~ the installation of the pipeline 1lnkin~ Al~erin with Italy via Sicil,y
can ~o fortrard in a decisive manner~ since its financ~n~; has been assured b,y a
loan of ~~SO million from an Italian consortium to xhich is added a loan of
~?_10 million from other banks amon~ whSch Credit Lyonnais ranks first.
Hoxever, in Lhe rest of Afrir.a, and especially ln 111�;eria~ the use of natural
~;as is not y~t or~anized. In this domain~ the weaker the induetrial risk the
more probable the ald from the World i3ank. But it is taking a long time for
the tao interested parties to re ach an undexstandi , and the closing of the
hmerican markets to imports of liquid natura.l gas ~NL7 for price reasons is
delayinp, the carrying out of n pro3ect like that currently bein~ discussed
amon~; several Ni~erian producers (LLF, Shell, BP ~British Petroleum7 and ACIP)
for the annual export of 16 billion tons of GNL.
i~'iv~: tteK R~fineries in ~ y^~9
Downstream production operations in Africa's petroleum industry did not shox
an,y definite developments in 1978. The continent is inereasing its dependence
on oll as an ener~r source~ each country adapting to the crlsis in accordance
wlth lts oxn particular situation. Cenerally speaking~ this crisis situation
is servin~ only to strengthen the golicy of the various governments in broaden-
inr; their contro2 or direc~ intervention in the refinin~; sector and in the sup-
plyinF of products.
Five nex refineries xere started up in Africa in 19?Q: in Togo (Lome)~ in
Piauritanta ("ouadhibou)~ in Somalia (1io~Adiscio)~ in Congo (Pointe-Noire) and
in Pri~~erl.a (Warri). They have the cc;~,mon characteristic of being oWned by the
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_ sta~a and mana~d by a natSonal company~ an indication oF the deeire to exclude
privato induetry from the refining sector~
Thoir conatruction~ as elsewhere in Africa~ was motivated by the desire to be
no lon~er dependent on foreigtt sources for the supply of ma~or petroleum prod-
.ucta~ Their capacity ia not always based on the aotual or ~OY'@68@AtiJ1@ needs of
their rospective domostic market. This ig the case with the tdouadhibou~ Lome
and Pointe-Noire installations~ each havin~ an annual capacity of 1 mi111on
ton~= however~ ~their localization has ~iven their promoters reason to believe
that their production would be aufficient for export. The Mogadiscio refinezy~
xith an annual capacity of 500,000 tons, will also need to export. On the
other hand~ Warri's annu~l capacity of 5 million tons wS11 not long auffice to
satisfy an expandin~ domeatic cona~~mptton, even with the aid of the country's
first refinery~ located on the coast~ in Port Harcourt. A nex refinery Ss
bein~ built in Kaduna.
,
Even when the refSneries do not totally belon~ to the state~ there is a tondency
to incroase the public share of the capital~ In ivory Coast~ PETROCI ~vorian
Petroleum Company~~ a state company~ already holds 30 percent of the capital in
Ivorian Refinin~ Company. In Senegal, the government is havin~ a atudy made on
its behalf of a r~ex share arran~ement in African Refinin~ Company, and in Came-
_ roon~ the government has atraightaaay asaured itself of a 66 percent share in
N ational Refinin~ Company (SOPlARA)~ rrhich is undertaking the conatruction of a
refinery in Victoria xith an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons.
These three countries are continuin~ to choose a system involving a 3oint ap- .
propriation of refinin~ resources= they are not alone. This 3uridical status
facilitates industrial cooperation xith foreign companies whose experience is
definitely established and correspondingly decreases the amount of investments
required by the state. I t is partially re aponsible for the success of an in-
dustrial enterpri~e like the Vridi refinery in ivory Coast~ xhich has already
doubl~d its refining capacity (currently 2 million tons) and, xithin a year~
will be equipped aith an ultramodern converting facility, a hydrocracking plant~
for which bids were golicited in December 1978. The same procedure is being
folloued in Cameroon for the construction of the Victoria refinery (Khose en-
,~*ir.eerin~ was contracted to Procofrance) Hith French Petroleum Company~ chosen
a~ the "operating company," assuring the development of the pro~ect~ the con- ~
trol of the xork and the like.
In the sector of product manufacture this cooperative system enabled PETROCI~
in October 197~~ to have no difficulty in starting up 1~lultinational Asphatt
Company's plant (280,000 tons per year) of xhich it is the principal shar.e-
holder and operator.
Strenp,thening of State Control
The le~itimate concern of the African governments to assure the dependability
of oil ~upplies led them in 1978 to take various steps to control the sequence
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of a~r~.tions involved in the manufxctuxc~ at' thclr rroduct~. An oxample ai'
this i~ th~ deci.~ion of the Car~~roonian Cnve,~nmant~ made in 5eptomber 1~7t~, to
limi.t its imports of product~ cotnl.ng from Gabon to 20 percent of its ne~dq
(thr~t iF~ from SOGARA ~abonese Refinin~ Comp~n~7 of Port-Centil). Thi~ ~tep,
whi.ah wi~1 make it necesaary ovor the short term to i~e~ort to a p;reater variety
o� for~i~;n ~ources~ is undoubtedly viewecl at Yaounde as a pxeliminary of the
autarchy which the Victoria rnfinory x111 brin~; i~t~
'I'lic offorts undertalcen l~y v~riou:~ ~overnment:~ to ~t~~~dardir,e the adminiEtration
of their ~,tocks or devolop their c~pacity seem to be more rational, In iJpper
Volta~ the authorities ~rran~~ fbr a study to be made on th~ establishmont of
a commun~.t,y atoekin~ company (Decembor 197~)~ C~m~roon went orie step further
last yenr: followin~; a docrQ~ iE:ged on 23 December 1q77, it si~ned an a~e-
ment establishing the Community Potroleum Stora~;e Company, a 3oint company be-
tween the state~ with 40 pQrcent of the holding~~ and six distxibution com~.~-
nies represented on the market~
r;ven partial Africanization of the distribution companies i3 another indication
of the desire of variouc ~overnments to develop national independQnce in tl~e
petroleum sector= this was be~un several years ago ln a number of c~untriesi
but the methods used differ~ rangin from the nationalixatSon of the networks
for the benefit of a atate company ~for example~ in Congo) to the creation of
a jotnt company (for example~ in U~anda)~ or else to an obligation made to
forei~n companies to offer a part of their capital to private domeatic inter-
ests. This is the direction taken by the Lagos ~;overnment in 1978 which direct-
ed distribution companies operating in Ni~eria to se11 40 percent of their cap-
ital to private interests. But elsewhere~ when one wishes to follox this path~
one i~ apt to run into a lack of available private capital incurring dolays as
in llpper Volta~ where an attempt was made to implement a similar measure.
This policy of 3trengthening administrative control, directly or by eliminatin~ -
f~rei~;n companies~ has its ~ustifications. But it does not necessarily result
in an improvement in the mana~;ement of companios and~ as a result, in their
profitability. From this aspect, the year 1978 wa4 marked by a few dis~ppoint-
ments in various countries. For example, the i~larri refinery, whose construction
was already takin~; lon~Pr than anticipated~ was stopped in December, a few ~
months after its start-up~ due to technical difficulties, An ol~er refinery,
that of ~iombasa~ in Kenya~ experienced a number uf stoppa,r;es~ which forced the
- ~overnment to make an appeal abroad for the import of products xhich the re-
finery could�no lon,~er furnish. In Sudan, serious disturbances in the forward-
in~ oC products from the Port Sudan refinery to the interior caused a shorta~e
of aircraft ~asoline and kerosene. The pipeline connecting Zambia xith Dar es
Salaam is operatin~ badly.
Undo~zbtedly, the distances to be covered in Africa and i.ts natural and climatic
con~lltions make the exploitation of refineries, fleets of ~trucks or pipeline
di^tribution more difficult than elsewhere. But the active presence of foreign
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~
compani~:~--without compromisin~ the normal control of the authorities on tho
~ supply problem--provides for a better echedulSn~ of operat3ons and a atrict
aurveillance of thQ equipment with immediate aseistance through arran~ements
madr, to have spairo part9 immediately availabl~~ uaually imported. Once more~
we should 3tress the mutua~ interest of cooperation between the African coun-
tri~~ and industrialized nations.
F'rance and African Oi1
Sn this appraisal of the Afric~r? petroleum year~ it is fitting to recall the
importance of African oil for the F'rench petroleum industry. First of all~
out of a production of 277 mi111on tons nearly 19 million tons went to the aub-
sidiarie~ of two Fronch qroups partScipating in the exploitation of African
depo~its; this amounts to nearly one-fifth of the oil necessary to satisfy
France'~ oonsumption. hloreovQr, this tonnage represents about 27 percent of
th~: crude oil reverting to I'rench companies as a result of their production
activitie~ in France and elsewhere in the world. Lastly~ sub~ect to precise
information which will be given later by official publications~ petroleum of
African origin imported into I~'rance~ whether or not produced by French compa-
niet~~ wi11 have accounted for nearly 15 percent of the supply going to French
refinerie$.
These fi~ures establish the importance of the African continent in the balance
and expansion of the French petroleum industry. Tyey also indicate a certain
diversification in the provisionin~ in comparisor. with the Middle East. It is
to be hoped that 1979 xill see a confirmation of' these two trends.
South Africa is in a completely different position. With the political changes
which have occurred in Iran~ it finds itself deprived of its principal source
of crude o17.~ but it cannot appeal'to the African producing co~triea to re- '
place that source. Nevertheless, its aituation is not as precarious as it might ,
. seems first of all, oil accounts for only 20 percent of the country's energy
need;;, while it is true that it accounts for SO percent of its transportation
needs. Iiowever~ very sizable strate~ic stocks have been accumulated, and this
will make it pos~ible for the country to await the start-up of the second plant
for the manufacture of petroleum produets on the basis of coal. Moreover, the
South African authorities would obtain crude oil (paying a surcharge) from other
supplier~ Hho will not proc7.aim such purchases from the housetops. The petro-
leum asphyxiation of the South African Republic~ through lack of petroleum prod-
ucts~~will not take place tomorrow despite the vote taken in the UN Ceneral
Assembly on 24 January 19?9 on a resolution asking the Security Council to pre-
pare an obligatory embargo on deliveries of crude oil and petroleum products to
~outh Africa. It is fitting to point out that, although 105 countries voted on
the resolution~ 6 countries rejected it (among which xere France~ the United
States, the United Kinqdom and FRG), 16 abstained rind 24 were "absent."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie.~ Paris~ 1979 ~
856t~
cso: 1~~00
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CUIZ OT'CICIAL t15C nNLY
C~NTItAL ACItICAN CMPI[tT:
BRIEF'S
LIBYANS OUSTED, ISLAM SCOItED--Ch~rging Libya witih having h~d a h~nd in
fomenting the demo;~~tratione that erupCed in Bangui on 20 und 21 January,
Cmpernr AOI(~5gp ha,^. ordered, u Libyan-owned cnrporltion operating in
Centr~l Africn to s!ii5t up shop. He has nlso denounced A11 agreemenCs
si~ned wiCh Libya. AC the sgme time~ Che emperor launched a violenC
verbal uttuck on Isl~m, chgrging it with every known sin of subversian.
rurther, eo save any ~f his "sub~ects" from following its "evil example,"
Dakassa h~s banned any kind of news report concerning Iran from Bangui
itndio's airwaves. ['1'exC) [Paris JEUNE A~RIQUC in French 28 Mar 79 p 13J
6182
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~'(7Et U~'I~'tCIAL U5L ONLY
CFi All
KANO DECISIONS 'BEAIt SEED5 OH' FURTHER CONFL:CCTS'
- Paris JEUNE A~RIQU~ in French 2-1,5 ApI~ J9 pp 'l'1-23
[Article by Man-Gue~
~'i'extJ With the Malloum-Nabre pair out of ~he way and `
~ the establishment of an interim Council of -
State headed by Goukouni Oueddei, the prevail-
ing mond in Ndjamena is sti11 one of skepticism.
Now it seems that we have a Holy A1liance among the men back- _
ing Gen Forest, thc; troops of the former "rebel Toubou" and
those of Goukouni Oueddei, formed to check the armed insurrec-
tion in the central and eastern portion of the country against
the rule of Hissein Habre, which the Elysee did its best to i.m-
pose. ,
And people are wondering about the likelihood of success for
the agreements signed ~t Kano on i6 Mareh 1979�
For the time being, relative calm seems to have replaced the
bloody confrontations which had plunged the nation into a cli-
ma~e of all-out civil war. And bloody confroni:ation seems to
be gradually givin~ way to negotiated agreement. What has
happened is, by all indications, that the various possible com-
binations devised by L. Dallier, the French ambassador to Nja?n
mena, have at last shaken down into a kind of equilibrium among
tt~e warring f actions as the l6 blarch accords would ~eem to
indicate. Those agreements, as we now know, call for a conti-
nued cease-fire throughout the entire territory; neutrality
on the part of t;:e s~ate radio and demilitarization of the ca-
pital; freedom of movement for civilians; establishment of a
conLrol commission made up of two representatives from eacr of
t}~e four neighboriiig countries and from Nigeria, as we11 as one
representa~ive from each of the four Chad factions ~;igning the
Kano accords (Feli.x Malloum, Hissein Nabre, Goukouni Oueddei~ -
an~l Abderhaman Aboubakar).
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Under the ~erms o� thi~ agreemen~, tho new government must im-
plem~n~ ~hn decision on general amnesty (�ree3n~ a11 political
prisoners and pris~~:ers of war); organize the return o� Ch~d-
ian ex3.les; determine the nation~s political fu~ure; carry
ou~ ~ sweep3.n~ reshuffle of a1:L executive positions and disband
~xll standing armies prior to establishment of ~ national army.
Tho Kuno ttccord affirms ~"de~ermination on the part o� one and
- al1 to preserve (:had~a unity and integr3ty and their commitmen~
to ~he rees~tab].ishment o� peace~ security, and con�idence at
a11. levels.
Even so, these new arr~ngements, which aupersede the agreements
reached last August be~ween Hisse3ne Habre and Fe1ix Malloum,
and which involve the dissolution o� the institutions set up a~
~h~~ time (presidency, government, de�ense committee and national
union counc3l) may or may not suffice as a basis �or any real
hope �or the ~Eu~ure. 0~ course~ even now, one point in t he mea-
sures call.ed for has juat made headlines. On 23 March, Pre-
siden~ Felix Malloum and his prime minister, Hissein Habre, re-
signed, and an interim Council o� State made up o� eight members
represen~ing the four signatory fac~ions to the 16 March accords,
and headed by Goukouni Oueddei, has been set up.
Similarly~ we also know that at the close of the Kano conference
all parties to the conflict except for Dr Aba Siddick and Mr
Acyl Ahmat, who did not take part expressed satisfaction and
pledged ~o implement the measures adopted there to the letter.
It would, however, be premature and more than a little naive to
conclude from all this that we are on the way toward a just and
lasting peace in Ndjamena. What ensued upon the Malloum-Habre
accords last August is of itself grounds for pessimism. And
above all, beyond all appearances, we find that the various deals
stemming from the 16 March conference in no way chal.lenge the
current neocolonial system in Chad. It is clear on the face of
the evidence that the primary if not the sole concern of the
leading actors on the stage in the Chadian capital is to carve
out the lion~s share of power, to the detriment of all r~val
factions. And so we see that the solution that has just been
adopted is itself gravid with the seeds of further conflict~
particularly in that, in all of this, the aspirations for which
the peoples of Chad have been fighting for 13 years, at the cost
of untold sacrifice, are completely overlooked.
We are bei.ng offered a truly pathetic performance by the men on
- the political scene in Ndjamena right now. The people of Chad~
whom the politici~ns are trying to divide and set against one
another in the name of ~~badly led ideologies," are once again
the prime victims in this new scenario. That makes the problem
of organizing the people on just and equitable lines~ to ensure
the protection of their most fundamental interests, more than
ever one of pressing urgency.
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~n t;hi5 samo line nf thoughi:, si;:i.11 another abserva~ion must br.
mudc. :Ct has to do with the absence Prom Kano~ on lG March, of
political ~ac~;ions associ,7ted wibh tlie armed insurrec~ion in ttie
cEnl;i^a~, and easi;eriz re~;ions. In view o� ~Gha~ absence~ ib is
hard to put; much credenc~ in ~the proclaimed d~termination of' bhe
I'ari;y to lay the foundations for bro.~d national reconciliat~.iori
ab bhe sam~ ~ime it is doing its utmost, out i.r. the field, to
comp~.ete the military l.iquida~ion oF all combf~tani;s in that zone.
Given that', it 3s pain~ul.ly clear that any '~ethnic balance" sn-
lut:i.on f.'or putting~ a government together which does not allow
roor.~ ~'ur po7 itical e:lemen~s spealc~.ng for tlie central and eastern
rc6ions :is forecioomed to �ailure. T}~i~ is why the announcement
o� the wii:hdrawal of the interventionist Fi~ench troops can be
greeted only with a great many reser~�,;i._i.ons. 1t is very clear
tttat, in ~his situation oF endless:Ly elusive peace~ whcre every-
i;hing may well explode a~ain, Paris will surely not be so rash
. as t~o ~ive up the weapon of the Mirages and the Jaguars without
pr�ior assurance that its interest~ will be protected.
COPYRIGEIT Afrique-Asie, 197q -
618z
cso: 4400
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CNAb
NEW GOVEttNMENT~S MArN PROBL~M: RECONCIL~ POPULATIONS
Par3.~ JEUNE A~RIQU~ ir~ French 28 Mar 79 PP ~.4, 1$~ 16
[Ar~ic7.e by Jos-8laise Al~.ms~
Cmext~ First promulgated in 1978 at ~he close of prolonged hag-
glin~ between tihe armed forces of the Nor~h under Mr H3ssein
Habre and the High M3litary Council wh3.ch had taken over from
President Tombalbaye, the "fundamental charter" seems now to
belong to history. On1y a few hours after the signing of that
"separate agreemenb,'~ those of the protagonists who had refuaed
to have any part of the negotiatione re~ected the chartier out-
right. In other words, the experiment that has ~ust ended was,
in the long run, doomed to fuilure. Even as they shattered the
remnants of the fundamental charter~ the clashes which~ since 12
February, have aet Hissein Habre~s men againat those of Felix
Malloum have cast doubt on the viabil3ty of the existing inati-
tutions. One might even, in hindsight~ call this a good ~hin~~
in that a broader gamut of the forces involved has gathered
around a conference table. The Fact that two of the principal
adversaries, Goukouni~0ueddei, commander of the largest.faction
in FROLINAT, and Abaubakar Abderhamane, leader of the People~s -
Movement for the Liberation of Chad (MPLT), had decided to cast
in their lot with the Malloum-Habre team in an effort to break
the deadlock was even then a major step along the path of recon-
ciliation. Even ~hough the tergiversations of the former Ndjamena
leaders meant that the start of the meeting was delayed by 3 days,
- thus creating a lowering climate of doubt and uncertainty, the
Nigerian authorities~ who had taken Ithe initiative in calling the
conference, had reason for pride in having succeeded where the
OAU itself had failed. The non-stop negotiations that dragged on
for S days in the suburban town of Kano, in northern Nigeria~
however, were particularly trying for the participants~ and the
agreement reached between the belligerents seems, for the moment,
to be a laborious compromise whose soundness will be demonstra-
ble only when it is put to the test of application.
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~
- ~nx o~~rci~, i15~ ONLY
Un13.ke ~he ~undam~nt~~. ch~rti~r, the KUIlO ~CCt~I''C~ C~,~f,iR~g ~o bn
~lnbul it~ sac~pc~. And s~ indned it 3.s ~ to a dn~rne. Iti bindn
�n~ nnly thr ~nur Hi~,mratidri~~~ but ~1s~ L�w~ oL�hcsr ~'ROL~NAT Eac-
~innv whd hun~ I~~ck on ~1� nutskirt:~ o~ t,he cnnf-'~ronco, givin~;
the .~m~~c~~gs:ton th~t tih~y would :Likc~ t;c~ go alon~y wfth 3.~. br ~
Abba 5Ji.dd:tck s~nti un anvc~,y tid Knno, and A~y1 Altm~t ~~em~ to bc~
i~~ ~uvor d~ thc~ conclu~i.nnq re~~h~d bhc~. His one ramaining -
dc:mn~nd is ~h~ w3.thdraw~l df L�he I~'rtnah trnop,s. That po3nt, how~
~v~r~ i~ ~1r~~cly~ won, 4~I1CG Fr~~nCa, whose ro~.e in the cours~Q oC
the r~acen~ Cv~nt~ ticrc l~~� b~c~ri controvers3n~, to s~y t;}ie 1eu~r,
I~f~~ firtrally bnwr.d tn bli~ vcrdict of Kanc~, wli~re~ it was aongpi-
cuou~ by 3ts ~bscncc~ ef'~or h~vinb vainly tric~d tio set up A
i~ound tahle u~ Ndj~m~na.
A~s ~ m~btier of ~~ct, ~h~ great�es~ ~ch3~vement o~ thc~ Kano ua~
cord ~.s ~he d3~solution of ~he insbitu~ions born o~ the �und~-
m~n~~l chartor~ cleurly doom~d bo ext3rictinn aEbar a mere 6
montihs of existence. The first ~hing on ~ho agendtt now is thus
to seti up a governmental structur~ which ~1.1ows for tihe naw ~i-
~uat3on wh3ch has come 3n~o being. In p~.aco of two part3es
maki'ng up this cot~lition govornmetit, thore w3.11 be Four~ or evnn
six. Its format3on will only be rendered moro ditficult by
the degree to which each of the partie~ wi11 make demAnds on
the basis of ~he real estatie it controls. Whi1e the Kano con-
ference succeeded in getiting the principle of r~ cease-fira~ the
accord ot put together says not a word about control of torr3-
tory. The suggegtion oF disarmament of 50 percnn~ of ~he �~or-
ces involved 3n the fighting was not ~dopted. In tho agree-
ment, all armed forces are to withdraw to a distance of at
least 100 kilometers from the capital. This meana that the go-
vernment wi].l be able to seb up its headquartera there in suFety.
Hol.ding Ndjamena, however, does not necessar3ly mean holding
Chad. There is already a dQ facto partition. And it ~s to be
feared that the gov~rnment, in the �inal analysis~ will be no
more than a kind of Pederal executive in that, initially at
le=.ist, e~ch pnrty wi11 be counting on ~he torritorial pos3tion
it has won or on t}~e region of its origin where the populationa
support it. While it is true that texts are only as good as
the men who must apply them, the present deli.cate balance can
be st~at~ered at any momen~ and the temptation to seceasion
following the example of Bangladesh may one day prove too
strong for those who feel themselves short-changed in bhe new
state of affairs.' This, in turn, means that the forn~ation of
the new government and the reshuffling the accord calls for in
the civil service~and in the army would have to be very care-
fully weighed and measured. The man who heads the executive
musL� be strong enough and enough of a nationalist himself to
hold the nat-ion together. It is iri this sense that one can
truly say that Chad is looking for a heaven-sent man. General
Malloum appenrs already to have bowed out. Bat his comrades in
arms, most of them, like him, from this "good-for-something Chad"
- which is the south, are standing by to defend their region.
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~Ott n~~ICIAL US~ ONLX
Gnn~ra~. D~ogo ~nd Co~.onv~.s D~3m~ ~nd K~mougu~ ~r~ r~~dy ~o loclc
~rms ~o no~ ~o b~ overwh~lm~d by ~he no3.sy ~rr3.va1. on ~h~ ~
,~~ene o~ oppos3.tion leaders (whor~e men righb now occupy mor~
~h~?n ha~.� ~he countiry) who mighti b~ bamp~~d ~o d~m~nd conbrol
of the gov~rnm~nt.
On tihe ~v~ d� ~h~ ~ormab~.on o~ th3.s new c~b3.net~ ~her~ w~~ g
1ob o~ ~~~.k ttbouti Goukouni OueddQi ~or pr3.me m3.n3.~~er. Bu~
whetiher he or someone ~lse b~kes over tihati ~ob, tihe governmcc~:
th~ti t~kes off3c~ on 'l3 Mttrch will be, to pu~ 3~ bluntily~ ~n
3nbQrim gov~rnmen~. The. re~1 probl~ms w311 beg3.n when ~he ~im~
comes to rnconc~.l.e tihe p~opu~.ab3.ons, s~ill ~raum~~ized by ~h~
rec~n~ xtroc3b~.es. Wi1]. ~hey fnllow th~ pc~litical men ~long
~he pat}i o~ w3.sdom and ~?3.rtue? Th~ti~ in trubh, fs the questiion
tha~ haun~s moati men~s m3.nds, and the queg~ion whose solub3on
- musti be, for the nQw governmen~ and abovo ~11 �or its head =
� the very top priority.
COPYRIGHT Jeune A�rique GRUPJIA i979
6182
CSO: 4400
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~Oi~ O~i'IC~AL US~ nNLY
CONGO
~
pCm CONGIt~S5 S~~N AS VTCmORY ~OEt RAll~CALIZAmION MOVEME;NT
Pari~ AFRIQUE-ASIE in ~'ronati ~-15 Apr 7~ pp 21~22
C Ar~3.c1o by Ginebte Cot :"The Congross at Laet !"l
j,Text,~ The ~orced resignat3on of prosident Yhombi
Opangn is the dawn o~ ~ tremendous hope.
The Congo Lttbour Party Congress wi11 be a
new kickofF for the radiLal3zation movomont
decided for at the end of 19~5.
Ind~scribable relieF, a renewal of hope ~nd of fighting spirits
these are the prevailing sentiments in the People~s Republic
of Congo, in the wake t~f the events of 5 February 19~9, atid now
as, at long lnst, the $rd Extraordinary Congress oF the Congo
Labour Par~y (PCT), so long awaited, f3.nally begina.
It is ~11 happening as iP the country had just experienced a
new nnd genuine liberation, so incroasingly intolerable had
grown the leaden yoke that weighed on the Congolese people in
the years since the assassination of President Marien N~Gouabi
on 18 March 19~~, and the ~odvent or? 4 April o~ General Yhombi:
Opnngo as hed of the Party~s military commit~ee. ~
Today, a11 the whisporeii rumors which for months had been pump-
ing increased alarm into the "sidewalk radio" bulleting~ all
the wrongs, the mistrust, the ques~~~ns that had been piling
up throughout this dangerous period, are out in the open. And
the long 13st of charges filed against the man who cla~tmed to
be the successor to Marien N~Gouabi, but whom delueions of gran-
deur and a savage lust for power and wealth drove into a bot-
tomless pit of intriguQ and demagoguery, is still growing.
Herc is how the voice of the Congolese Revolution and the daily
MWETI confirmed a few of the more scandalously outrageous and
sigr?ificant criminal acts committed by ex-president Yhombi -
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~OEt O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
Opango t ~he purah~~se 3.n Libr~v~.1~.~ o~ a bed Cor~~ing 17 m311~.on
C~A �rgnam; ~he agr~~m~n~ tio buy, du~ o� ~h~ na~~.on~1 budg~t~
~~ot~1 n~ 500 m3~.].~c~n C~'A �r~nc~~ worth oE veh~.cle~s 33 "p~+~~
' e~b" automob3lo~, 45 ~~~P~, 50 mo~nrcycles~ ~nd ten Land Rovera
~quipped wi~h brdgdc~~b3ng f~cil~.t3e~; th~ ~mbe~xxlem~n~~ for
th~ purpo~e o� aorrup~3.ng po~en~3~1 ~113.e~~ of ~ 400-mi11.3.on-
C~A ~o~n gr~n~ed by A~.g~ri~ ~o bu3.1d a wgb~r supply ~y~tem ~.n
~h~ Plebeaux reg~.on, bhe e~~rt o~ wh3ch prn~ecti h~?s ye~ ~o come
about a~~er 8 months~ ~nd �or good r~ason; tihe con~~rucbion
oP s~veral v3.11as~ for h3s family's use; the maintenance on h3a
es~~~~ ~n Mpila (g sec~3on o~ ~r~?x~~?~~.ii~ from which 'General '
Yhombi Opango drov~ ~h~ ~.nhabib~ntis ao he cou~d expand his re-
,~id~nce) of ~ zoo whose daily ap~r~b3ng cagb~ c~une ~0 200,000
C~'A f r~ncs.
The ousted president 3s~ ~?1~o charg~d w3th ou~r3.ght plunder o~
the ~reagury funds for his person~l u~e. Whereas the appropri-
~?tiion ~or polit3cal funds was 400 mi113.on CFA franc~, Gen Yhombi
Op~ng~ spen~ ~,500 million for his prestige tiravels in i978
alone. In th~t same year, 'l00 million C~A francs had already
been w3~hdrawn ~rom ~he coffers of tt~e Statie even before tho
budget had been ~pproved.
Fed Up
While he was striving to achieve the standing of a Mobutu, g
Bongo, or a Bokassa, Gen Yhombi Opango was leadir,g the nation
over the brink of the abyss. The capital of the land of the
Three Days of Glory was in danger of turning into a Kinshasa
o~~� a Libreville. Corruption was spreading like wildfire~ to the
p~~:nt where people today talk of the "manile envelope virus"
that infected every level of the ruling circles.
While all this was going on, "far from tapping private capital~
as promised, it was the product of the people~s toil that was
being squandered," as MWETI puts it, official rhetoric had
mounted to the heights of paroxysm, and ~peeches and slogans
fl�w like leaves on the wind.
And at lasb the people~ keenly aware of the flagrant contradic-
tior~ between words and deeds, and of the deception practiced on
them in this traveaty of the work and the spirit of President
Marien N~Gouabi, were fed up to the tieeth. For each one of
them life was growing harder with each passing day. To the
anarchy that prevailed in prices and the uncertainty af supply
deliveries was added galloping inflation.
On 24 January, the Congolese daily reportvd the dizzying nose- ~
dive of purehasing power and the astounding rise. in prices.
The price of a Pri.mus beer had risen from 100 to 120 CFA francs;
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~n~ a~~tcrnt, us~ nrtr.Y
tiha pr~ica o~ a 1~.t~i� n~ g~~c~lin~ Crom S~ to 1'l5 C~A; o~ n ~
kt_1e~ o~ gug~r ~rom 175 to 3dn C~A; i;he pr~~r~ o~ u t~x3 r3d~ er
munioc ~1our had clnubled, wh3.1d s~m~ t~~nts h~d gon~ up by 2~ 000
C1~ A i'rana~ ici tihe ~nttrse r~f' ~~in~~,c year.
Loc~l;i.n~ aL� the C~tgurc:.~~ on~ C~n iuid~r~~t~nd why d3.~cont~n~ acid
an~er~ :Lncr~ug~ngly in ~v~.d~ncc: over r~c~n~ mc~nths~ bntih erupted
intn unliridled r~gc 3n bh~ wc~k~ c~~ tl?c ~vc~nts nC 5 F'ebruary~ ~s
~vidCnced 3.n the p~ople~s abtcmpt; to mount ~n atitaak on G~n
Yhdmhi Op~n~d~s re:~idhncp.
mFtc~ pr~~esg ~l~c~t b~~qan on S Apri1, wl~~~? tltiv PCT took ovor fu11
pc~wdr Crom thc~ hands n~ Lh~ ~'~t~ty Diil:i l;nry Cr.~~nmibtne ( CMI' )~u
which it h~d nrigiii~lly ~n~rusb~d b}i~ma and when Co1 S~~gott
Nguas~o sueca~ded Gen Yhombi~ Opengo, 3~+ also L�ho ~58Ub of a long
dr~wn-nu~ strugg~.~, eb onoo semi-clundcst3na $nd ~v~rt~ mounbud
, by the Gongolese rr~volut3.ona~ry ~orcns~ and 3n which ~hc~ m~gs
or~un3.zsti~.ons play~d ~ cruc3.a1 r81~. App~rently tho lofti~ts
on the CMP and ~he Cent:�al Commi~tee o~ the PCT succ~edad very
Cleverly~ tivithout shedd3ng ~ drap ef blood, in out�1ank3ng the
Yhombe clan~s m~neuvers, ~11 the while relying on the massos of
the people. -
mod~y ~ho people of the Three Dnyg of G1ory have onCC~ aga3.n com~
out winners in this severe test. They have bogun to speak out~
~nd tihe regionul and town congr.e~ses~ ag w~11 ns in the mu~s or-
ganization congresses which preceded the Party congross~ gave
rise to sometimes noisy debates over the ~liorniest of issues.
In addition to the re~pening of the trial in connaction with the
ass~ssination of President Marien N~Gouabi (we lcnow t}iat prACti-
c~11y nobody in Brazzav311e was ever completely convinced by the
official view of N~Guabi~s murder. There nre sti11 too m~^ny
points left unclear and contradictory; Ed.)~ the most dynamic
gr�oups such as the People's National Army and the you~}~
are demanding that Gen Yhombi ppango be brought to trittl. -
Gre~t Turning-Point
They are also calling for unity among all th,3 forces of the left
ai~d for "reintegration of the 22 February and 24 March comrades,~~
and, oii the other side, rehabilitation for the PCT and labor
union members who were dropped from the ro11s in tha wake of the
March 1976 movement.
In the revolutionary situation which lias jus~ developed and in
which the trial of strength is taking place in broad daylight,
the 3rd Extraordinury Congress whose or3ginal convocation was
prevented by the assassination oF President Marien N~Gouabi
might well mark a great rutning-point and, in so do3.ng, put an
end to the policy of hesitancy and compromise which for too
long has prevailed in E3razaaville; that is a policy which has
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un~orbun~tie~.y ~.ad u gre~~ m~ny progre~s3ve A�r3c$ns 3nto x mi~-
und~r~~and~.ng of tih~ r~~~.3.~3.ess o� ~x~pr~~~.d~n~ Op~ngo ~ a po1~-
03~~~ in whioh anti-3mper3a~.~.~~ po~3~3.on~s and "revolut3on~ry~~
~st~ndg w~re mersly cloaks �or r~ai po~.~.ti~.C~?i and econom3c de-
s~igns ~?nd oho3.ces.
C0~'YiiIGNT: 1979 Afriqua-As3~
~ 6~.8z ~ ~
CSO: 4400
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~UIt (~~CICIAL U5C ONLY
CONGO
L~~'I' WxNG 0~ PC'I' SAID TO HAVE TRIUMpH~D
Paris JEUNE AF'RYQUE in French 11 Apr 79 p 15
[Article by Jos-Blaiae Alima: "Left Wing Triumphs in Congo. But the more
extr~mist left-winq has not been admitted in political bureau"J
(TextJ The triumvirate which took the power after Gen Joachim Yhombi Opanqo
was evicted last F'ebruary, has now consolidated its position. In this reapect,
the third extraordinary congress of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) which
took place in Brazzaville on 26-31 March did not bring any surprise. Denis
Sassou Nguesso, Jean-Pierre Thyst~re-Tchicaya and Sylvain Goma continue in
the functions they already had: the first one was elected president of the .
party and thus automatically becomes head of the state. The second, the
actual number two of the regime, is in charge of educatior~j the third
retains the post of prime minister which he has occupied since 1976.
This sanctions the triumph of the left-wing of the PCT. However, the situation
should be viewed in perspective. While the party "ltard-liners" are the main
beneficiaries of the operation, the extremists of this tendency have not been
admitted into the "sanctuary" of the revolution, the political bureau. For
the time beinq, the road to por~er is still not open to the ultras. Thus,
Pierre Nze, who had been excluded from the political bureau in 1976 at the
time when the campaign for radicalization was launched, is makinq a stronq
comeback. The reqime's ideoloqical theorist since its formation, the fonaer
head of the party school is emerqinq after a three years' eclipse. "The Conqo,"
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he proclaimed in 1974, "is not yet a socialist country. Y~ is preparing for
socialism." This is evidence ~hat P~.erre Nz~ has always shown realism. ~
Hi~ lucidity contrastied atrongLy with the uncompromising sna ao~,~t~.~ attitude
of revolutionary tiheorietis and intellectuals such as Claude Ernest Ndalla,
Ange biaware or even Ambroige Noumazalaye. E1is cnmeback illuatrates the
de~ire of the Congolese leaders not to get ahead of schedule in their a~~ecnpti
- to return to an orthodox marxist line. This would explain why the road has
not been opened for ex~reme left-winq representatives.
During the past few weeks, Brazzaville has been �looded with hundreds of
� leaflets which are supposed to re�lect the principal demands of the population.
While the masses were demanding a return to civilian power, the third congress of
the PCT has not been able to solve this problem, and civilians and miliCary
men �ind themselves in equal number in the new political bureau. Such an
apportioning is probably necessary at the present stage: the minds are still
overheated and the wounds inflicted during the bloody events which followed
the murder of Marien Ngouabi have not yet healed. By pushing Yhombi Opango
aside, popular demands have, in a way, been half satisfied. The former
president, in fact, has been accused of "high treason through his wastefulness,
his lifestyle, his disregard for marxism." This is not the first time, however,
that the fonner head of state is accused of havinq had ~ lifestyle incompatible
with socialist austerity. In fact, while left-wing representatives have
often proclaimed that in revolutionary Congo the only possible coup d'etat
would be a reactionary one, everybody agrees that "only the manner in which ~
certain citizens practice socialism may be questioned, not socialism itself."
What charges will fo~mer president Yhombi Opango have to answer when he
appears in court ?
The Iack of precision of the accusation remains evident. Nevertheless, some
ambiquities should be removed. For instance, the people have demanded a
new trial for the murderers of Marien Ngouabi. The conclusions of the congress
make no mention of this. However, the admission of Mr Yangouma Bokamba in
the political bureau is noted: he is qeneral secretary of the Conqolese
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~ ro~7 orrrctnL us?; nNLY
mr~de-Union Confed~raCinn, tihe militant m~rnb~r~ of which r~re said to have
accelerat~d th~ fall of Yhombi Op~ngo by th~ir mani~estia~iong. Ts h~ going
tn ti~kQ aclvantage of his present position to d~mand titiati justice~ follow itis
cours~ for the former presic~ent?
'Che coming weeks wi.ll no doubti constieute a vpritable test �or the �uture of
the Congol~se experiment. Since the death nf M~rien Nqouabi in Dtarch 1977,
blood has not stopp~d �lnwing on the banks of the Congo River. Many have
taken the law into tih~ir dwn hands af~~r his murder, although tihe former
president had himself never been a warm propnnent of poli~ical execu~iong.
in March 1972, Major Ngouabi had pardoned a number of i.ndividuals accused
of havinq been the initiators of the fafled putsch of 22 February, among whom
was ~Unbroise Noumazalaye, fnrmer prime minister. mo explain his decision,
Marien Ngouabi had then merely declared: "The initiators of the putsch will
not be physically eliminated, they must live through their mistakes."
Will tt~e r~ew team in power, wha say they intend to "continue Nyouabi's work,"
follow the same reasoninq? It will have to keep in memory the followinq
statement of the Congolese Information Aqency (ACI), written in 1971 after
a conspiracy had almost brouqht down the regime: "Greater difficulties are
awaiting us, and only when confronting them shall we see who is revolutionary
and who is not."
COPYRIGHT: Jeur.~~ Afrique. GRUPJIA 19~9
9294
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CONGO
B1tI~FS
0~'ANtlO TRIAL--In ~ regoluCion gddregsed on 15 March Co Cheir new pregidenC,
Col Uenis Saesou Ngu~sao, Che Congreg~ of Che Army gnd the delegates of the
Brazznville section of the Congo Labour ParCy demgnded that the former head
of state, Gen Yhombi Opango, be arreated and tried for "the crime of high
tregson." They aleo recommended conficcation of all his property and rein- _
tegration into Che PCT of all members ousted or auspended by the former
president. I� Gen Opango goeg to trial, it will mark a victory for the
hardrore faction 1ed by the present head of state. It might coincide with
~ Che reopening of yet another case: the trial o� Che assasains of President
Marien N'Gouabi. (Text] [Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 p 13~
6182
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