JPRS ID: 8421 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS BASIC MILITARY TRAINING

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TRANSLATIQ~IS ON USSR MI LITAR~( AFFAI RS
(FOUO l1/7'9)
BASYC MILITARY TRAIMING
~
U. S. ;OINT PU~LICATIONIS RESEARCH SERVICE
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_ ' JPRS L/8421 ~
_ x5 Apri1. 1979 -
TRANSLATIONS 0(d USSR MI LrTARY AFFAI R5
(FOUO l1/79?
BASIC MILITARY TRAINING
- Moscow NACHAY~'NAYA ~VOY'E~1!IA'YA PODGOTOVKA (~A~ia Mi.~.itary Training)
= in Rugsian 1978 signed ta prees 16 Jun 78 pp 2, 3-4, 5-41,
_ 61-62, 87, 137, 1558 217, 24Z-299, 300-303 -
[Annotation, tabJ.e ot oont~ntg, introduvtion, excerpts of chap-
ters 1-6 and t~xt of Chapter 7 from the textbook adited by
- Lt Gen A.M. PopoV, azdatel'stvo DOS~AF SSSR, 1,300,000 copies,
_ 303 pages]
Author~collective [page 2) -
' (Text] P. I. Bykov, M. A. Belikov, I. F. Vydrin, N. I. Demin, N. K.
Yendovitskiy, A. M. Kostrov, V. M. Konoplyanik, Ye. A. Lukanin, V. I.
: Mironov, V. K. Novik, V. P. Nesterov, A. M. Popov, M. U. Sibilev, M. P.
Slobodchikov, and N. A. Yasinskiy. ~
Annotation [page 303~ -
[Text] The textbook contains basic information on the Soviet Armed Forces, `
their nature and particular features, on the regulations of the Armed Forces, .
_ on tactical training, weapon training, drilling, military topography and
civil defense.
The textbook is designed for the stuc~y of military affairs by students in
secondary general educational schools, specialized secondary schools,
vocatienal-technical schools and for youth employed at enterprises, insti-
- tutions, sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
Contents
~ Page
[pages 300-302]
- Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1 [IIY - USSR - 4 FOUO)
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Chapter 1: The ~oviet Armed Forces on (3uard for the Motherland. 5
~1. The Defense of the Fatherland and Service in
the Soviet Armed Forces--A High and Honorable _
Duty of the Soviet Citizen. . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -
~2. The USSR Armed Forces Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
~3. The CPBU on the Taske of the Soviet Armed Forces
During the Period of Building Communism 25 ~
~4. The Command, Political and Engineer-Technical
. Personnel. The Political Bodies, Party and
Komsomol Organizationa uf the Soviet Armed Forces 32 -
~5� The Military Oath--The Oath of the Soldier for
Loyalty to the Motherland. The Colors of a Unit -
( The Flag of a Ship ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
~6. Soviet Militsry Legislation on Service in the
Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Chapter 2: General Military Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces 61
�l. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR
Aru�ed For~^es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
�2. Disciplin~,ry Regulations of the USSR Armed Forcea 72 ~
~3� Garrison and Guard Service Regulat3.ona of the
_ USSR Armed Force3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Chapter 3: Tactical Traindng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
- �1. The Bases of the Combat and Organization of a
Motorized R{fle Squad, Platoon and Compat~y 87 _
~2. The Actions of a Soldier in Combat . . . . . . . . . 99
_ �3. A Squad on the Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
S4. A Squad on the Defensive. . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . 121
~5. Reconnaissance. A Platoon in a Reconnaissance _
Patrol. ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12~+
~6. A March and March Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
_ �7. Bivouacki;ng and Outposts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Chapter 4: Weapon Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
~1. Principles of Shooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
�2. The Small Caliber Rifle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 ~
- �3. The Procedures and Rules for Firing a Small Caliber
Rifle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 -
�4. The Kalashnikov Automatic (The Ka.lashnikov�Suh-
machinegun ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
�5. Caring for Weapons, Their Storage and Safekeeping 173
�6. Procedures and Rules of Firing and Firing at Fixed
Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
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, . Page
_ ~7~ Fragmentation Hand Cirenades . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Chapter 5: DRILL TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 '
~l. General Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 -
~2. Dri1.1 Movements and Marching With and Without -
' Weapon9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
�3� Saluting, Breaking Ranka and Approaching a Super3or . 207
~4. Squad Formattons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
�5. Actions of the Personnel by Vehicles and on Vehiclea. 214
Chapter 6: Mil.itary TopograpY~y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 _
~1. Positioning Finding Without a Map . . . . . . . . . . 217 .
52. Movement by Azimuths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
� �3. The Concept of a Topographic Map. Using a Map 224 ~
Chapter 7. Civil Def~nse,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
51. Civil Defense at a National Economic Inatallation
- ( School ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
�2. Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction i2;
the Armies of the Imperialist States. 244
_ ~3. Uefense Againat Weapons of Mass Destruction 255
�4. Radiation and Chemical Reconne~.issance Instruments 277
~5� Reconnaissance of Strike (Contaminated) Areas 290
�6. Rescue and Immedinte Emergency Reconstruction in
Strike Areas and Disaster Regions . . . . . . . . . . 296
- INTRODUCTION [pe,ges 3-4]
[Tex~] The defense of t~ie soci~list motherland against encroachments by
its enemies has elways been and presently is a sacr~d duty of the Soviet ~ -
people. The history of the Soviet state is rich in examples of the heroic
struggle against the imperialist aggressors.
During the years of the foreign intpr-.*ention and the Civil War, the young
- Soviet republic and its valorous Rsd Ar~r under the leadership of V. I. -
Lenin and the Communist Party were victorious over the sizable armies of
the imperialists e.nd White Guexds, and defended the first worker and peasant
state born by October.
During the Great Patriotic War against German feacism and Japanese militar-
ism,.the Soviet people and +.heir Armed Forces led by the Comanunist Party
~?~feated the shock forces oi' world imperielism, they defended the honor,
_ liberty and independence of their motherland, and made a decisive contribu-
tion to saving the peoples of the world from fascist slavery.
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~ ~ FnR OFFICIAL U5E ONI~Y
The Communist Party and the Soviet governm~nt, in carrying out Lenin's
legacy, have consiatently conducted a peace-loving policy aimed at a less- _
ening of internstional tension and the prevention of war. At the same
time they have ahown constant concern for atrengthening the defensea of
the Sovi~t state, for increasing ~he combat might of itr~ Armed Forc~s and
for~ strengthening snd develop3ng the fraternal friendship and military co-
operation among the peoples and e,rmies of the socialist countxies.
The Soviet state proceeds from the view i;hat as long as imperialism exists,
the danger of aggressive wars remains. The po7.icy of imperialism in recent
' years has provided new proof of the permanency of its reactionary and preda-
tory nature. The imperialists are continu3ng to prepare to $tart a new
world war, and above a11 against the USSR and the other socialist countries.
For this reason the Soviet people and their Armed Forces should be constantly
- ready for a decisive and complete defeat of ar~y aggressor.
This is why the party has posed the valid demands of increasing the vigil-
_ ance of the Soviet people, ensuring the security of the Soviet state, and
preparing the population, particularly the youth, for the armed defense of
the socialist f.atherland. ~
Military service, states the USSR Constitution,is an honorable duty of the -
Soviet citizens. The defense of the socialist fatherland is a sacred duty
nf each Soviet eitizen.
A future war, if the aggressive forces start it, will place exceptionally
- high demands upon the Soviet military. In modern combat victory wi11 come
- to only that soldier who is tatally loyal to the motherland, the Communis�~
Party and his geople, who possesses high political, moral-combat and psy-
- chological qualities, who is discfplined, profoundly convinced of the ,~ust-
ness of his cause and in victory over the ene~, who has mastered the dif- -
ficult weapons and military equipment, and who is pY~ysically strong.
It is a very complicated thing to master modern weapons and military equip-
- ment in a short period of time and to become a trained defender of the -
motherland. For this reason each young man, on the basis of the USSR Law
Governing Universal Military Service, even before induction into the Arnied
Forces, must prepare himself for military service. In schooi during exer- -
cises for basic military training, the students gain high ideological,
political and moral-psychological qualities and discipline, they acquire
military an3 technical knowledge and skills and are physically strengthPned
- in order in the crucial hour to come to the 3efense of their fathexland with
*,~reapons in hand.
= The textbook worked out in accord with the requirements of the USSR Law -
Governing Universal Military Service and the prograui for basic military
training provides an opportunity for the students to firmly assimilate the
purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces, their nature and particular features, -
and the requirements of the USSR Law on Universal Military Service, the _
- military oath and the general military regulations.
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'!'he textbook exEUnines the principles oi^ military service, it gives basic ~
d~ta on tactical ~nd weapons training, drilling, military typography and
= civi~. de�ense. The book helps to realize that military service ie an -
honorabl~ duty of each 8oviet cttizen and that ~ach peraon is,pers~nally -
responsible for defending hie motherland. , -
- The textbook wi11 help to indoctrinate in our yduth Soviet patrioti~m and
proletarian internationalism, a love for the~motherland, for the Commun3st
_ Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, hate for the enemies of
_ socialism and a readiness to defend their fatherland with weapons in hand.
CHAPTER 1: THE SOVIET ARMID FORCES ON GUARD FOR THE MOTHERLAND [pp.5-41] -
' �1. The Defense of the Fatherland and Service in the Soviet Armeld Forces--
A High and Honorable Duty of the Soviet Citizen
= V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherlut:d
(~xcerpt] We, the Soviet people, live in a socialist country. Our Soviet
motherland is the world's first socialist state of a11 the people, and a
country of true democracy. We are proud of the fact that the Soviet Union
� is called the fatherland of the xorkers by a11 oppressed pe~ples who see
their bright future in the homeland of October.
~
~ With a special feeling we have read in the CPSU Program and the US;R Con-
; stitution that the defense of the socialist fatherland is among the most
important functions of the Soviet state, and is a concern for all the people
and a sacred duty for each citiz~n of the USSR.
What is the fatherland? A correct answer to this question was first given
~ by the founders of scientific communism Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
In examining this concept from a historical t~nd class viewpoint, they re-
- pudiated +he assertion of the bourgeoisie of a single fatherland ~F th~
suppres:~or:, and the suppressed. In the "Communist Manifesto," they pro-
~ claimed ~,hat under capitalism the Working class has no fatherland, and
proved that only by overthrowing the exploiters could the proletarians F
and all the workers echieve a real fatherland.
The founder. and leader ~f our party and the Soviet state, Vladimir I1'iah
Lenin, in developing Marxist ideus, profoundly analyzed the concept of the
- "fatherland" and its role in the life of society. "The fatherland, that
is, the given political, cultural and social milieu," he tirrote "is the -
- mightiest factor in the class struggle of the proletariat...."i
The social and political milieu includes the population of.the given coun- -
try, the economic relations existing in it, the class structure and the _
state system of society.
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In a capitalist society, the class atructure is Uased on the proletariat
ar?d the bourgeoisie, that is, the oppreased and ruling classes. The bour-
~ geois atate is ~ weapon of the exploiting elasses for suppressing the work-
ing massea, for seizing foreign nationa and ensJ.aving other peoples.
A socialist society consista of t'ri~ndly c].asses, the workers and peasanta,
and the intelligentsia which hae developed out of the people. A soaialist ~
state serves as an implement for liberatin~ the workers, for building a
soc9.alist and communist society and for defending i~ against external
enemies.
The concept of a"fatherland" elso includes the language of the people, _
the territory of the nation, its nature and all the riches createkd by the
labor of the people.
Our great motherland, the US3R, is the true fatherland of the workers. It
arose as a result of the victory of the Great Patriotic Socialist Revolu- -
tion which freed the peoples of Russia from capitalist slavery, and opened
the way to a free and happy 1ife.
V. I. Lenin, in work~ng out the program foi~ implementing the proletarian
revolution and building socialiem, conaidered the orgariization of the
armed defense of the socialist fatherland !!s an inseparable component part -
of this program. He said: "Any revolutioti will be worth something only
when it can defend itself...."2 '
.
With the victory of the working class initially in one country, Russis,
- the overthrown exploiting classes, Lenin taught, with the aid of the im- � _
perialists from other states will do everything to suppress the revolu-
tion and to restore the rule of the capitalists~and landowners. Under
these conditions, the working class and the working masses will be forced -
to resort to arms in order to defend their revolutionary victories. _
After the victo'ry of Great October, Lenin's teachings on the defense of
the socialist fatherland were further developed and practically worked out. �
- Lenin defined the most important conditions essential for organizing the
repelling of the enemies of the revolution and for their defea+,. The
main condition and immediate concern ~ere the creation of a strong-armed
force of a new type, an ara~r of workers and peasants. ~
I
Lenin and the Communist Party pointed out that this should be a completely !
new army which differs fundamentally from the bourgeois armies. It is ' ~
called upon to protect the vital interests of the workers, and is created _
_ along strict class lines from representatives of the workers, peasants and
other strata of the w~rkers. Leadership by the Communist Party is the
basic core in the organizational development of a socialist ar~y. The ~
immutable prittciples in the creation and development of the new arn~r are
� its inseparable tie with the people and its internatione,l nature. The
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- party and the homeland 3nvolve ~he workers of a11 the peoples and national3-
ties of the nat3on in the armed struggle aga~nst tY~e enemies of the revolu-
tion. The new arn~y is to be set up with a permanent, professional organiza-
tion, centralized leadereh3p, unity of command and strictest conscious dis-
cipline. -
These were th~ basic princ3plea elaborated by Lenin and the party for aet-
ting up the new army and organizing the defense of the socialist fatherland.
The Communist Party Headed by V. I. .Lenin--The Organizer of the ~
~ Soviet Armed Forces
As V. I� Lenin predicted, immediately after the victory of the Great Octo-
ber Socialist Revolution, the internal counterrevolution and international
imperialism ~oined forces against the Soviet republic. Kaiser Germar~y and -
~ later England, France, Japan and the United States committed their troops ~
to suppress Soviet power in Russia. They armed and fully supplied the
_ armies of the White Guard generals Kolchak, Denikin, Drasnov, Yudenich,
and others. The Soviet repub~ic was in an exceptionally complex and dif- '
" ficult situation.
During the first days of Soviet power, the sole arm~d force of the revolu-
tion was the Red Guard, the armed detachments of workers Which had been
- organized by the party upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin in 1917 and who
_ had participated in the October armed insurrection. But they were few `
in number and weak. Under these conditions, it was particularly urgent to
organize a strong, large, regular, strictly centralized and disciplined
ar~y. ,
Upon the appeal of V. I. Lenin and the party, the Workers of our nation
rose to fight for the liberty and independence of their motherland.
~ The beginning of the organizational development of our Armed Forces was
the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars [Sovnarkom) on organiz-
ing the Worker-Peasant Red Arn~}r (28 January 1918) and the Worker-Peasant -
Red Navy (11 February 1918).
In January 1918, the German imperialists, having treacherously violated
the truce conditions, began an offensive along the entire Russo-German
Front. And the soldiers of the old Russian ara~}r, wearied by the imperial-
ist uar, threw doKn their weapons and headed for home. The front virtually
ceased to exiat. A mortal danger had developed for the young Soviet repub- -
lic, and above sll for revolutionary Eetrograd. The Communist Party and
the Soviet government urged thc~ workers to repel the enea~r advance with
weapons in hand and to defend the cradle of the proletarian revolution,
_ Petrograd. On 21 January 1918, the appeal-decree "The Socialist Father-
land in Dangerl" which had been worked out by V. I. Lenin was published.
Lenin's appeal resounded throughout the nation, it united the people, and
raised them to the defense of the Soviet republic. In a number of cities,
and above all in Petrograd and Moscow, mass volunteering of the workers
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for the ranke of the Red Arn~y commenced. The communists were the unifying
- f~rce of ~he young regiments. The formed utiits 3mmed3ately set oi'f for the
~~'ront and fought une~intingly against the (3erman arcr~y.
- By 23 February 1918, the advance of the German troops against Petrograd had
been stopped. The interventionists had sustained a crushing rebuff. In
commemoration of the patriotic upsurge and the mass mob3li~ation of the _
workers to defend the socialiat fatherlc~d and the first victoriea in the
armed struggle against the enemies of the revolution, 23 February is cele- . _
_ brated as a national holiday, Soviet Arn~y and Navy Day.
In Russia the Civil War was starting up and the imperialists commenced out-
right interventfon. Under theae conditions, V. I. Lenin and the Communist
Party took the most decisive measures to organize the Red Arn~r and defeat -
the eneiqy. In April 1918, universal compulsory military instruction c,f -
the workers (Vsevobuch) was introduced in the nation, and on 29 May, a
_ decree on universal military service was approved. Intense organization
and training of the troopa for the front were underway. While in the
spring of 1918 there were 300,000 men in the ranks of the Red Army, by the
- spring of 1919, its size was 1.8 million, by the end of the same year,
- 3 million, and by the end of 1920 had reached 5.5 million men.
The infantry was the basic branch of troops in the Red Ar~y. At that time ~
_ the cavalry ~lso played an important role. Artillery battalions and air -
detachments were also formed. The armored forces had armored trains, .
armored vehicles and later tanks. The revolutionary Baltic Fleet comprised
the core of the Republic Navy.
The party Centrel Committee directed all the work of organizing the Red '
Arrr~y and tY!e defense of the nation. Vladimir I1'ich Lenin carried out
titanic work. He headed the party Central Committee, the Sovnarkom and
the Defense Council, combining party, state and military leadership of the
nation. Vladimir I1'ich worked out and signed hundreds of decrees, direc-
tives, letters and telegrams on the questions of organizing the defeat of
, the White Guards and interventionists.
In this period the central and local military organization was set up, a
clear structure was defined, a unified organization of the troops was in-
. troduced, regulations and manuals were worked out, and the task of train-
ing command personnel was successfully 3mplemented. Important measures
for strengthening the ranks of the Red Armpr were the introduction of the
institution3 of military commissars, and the creating of a broad network ~
of party and Komsomol organizations in the Ar~r and Navy. The party made
a colossal effort so �chat industry, agriculture and transport were sub-
- ordinate to the needs of ~?efending the nation and supplied the front with
weapons and food.
,
The Soviet Armed Forces which had been organized by the party and V. I.
Lenin, in the fierce struggle, defended the victories of the revolution
- and defeated the hordes of interventionists and White Guards.
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The Fundamental Dietinction of the 3oviet Armed Forces from the
Armies nf Imperialiat States
~he Red Arn~y is e, new type of ar~y, an arm~y of the workers and an arz?~y of ~
the social.3st ravulution. Tt differs fundamentally from the arm3es of the -
capitalist nationa. The h3storic Decree on the Organizat3on of the Worker-
_ Peasant Red Armdr signed by V. I. Lenin stated: "The old ar~r served as
an implement of class suppresaion of the workers by the bourgeoisie. With
the coming to power of the workers and the exploited classes, the need has
_ arisen of creating a new ariqy...." The decree empliasized that the Red
Arn~y is to be crpatQd from the most consc3ous and organized elements of
- the working massea, and it wi11 "recruit every person who is reac~y to
_ dedicate his forces and life for defending the v3ctories of the October
Revolution, the power of the soviets and socialism."4
In contrast to the bourgeois armies which are used by the exploiters for
oppressing the.workers, the Soviet Arn~r ie an ar~r of the workers and
peasants, a truly people's arm~y. From the moment of its organization,
~ it expresaed and defended tlhe interests of the absolute ma~ ority of the
people. With the complete victory of socialism in the USSR and the con-
� struction of a developed socialist society, our arnpr has become an ara~y
_ of all the Soviet people. One of ~he most important sources of the might
- of our Armed Forces is the ~nseparable tie with the people. As was
pointed Qut by V. I. Lenin, "This force is not divorced from the people
like the force of the old standing aru~r, but is most close]y linked to
it; in m~litary terms this force is incomparably stronger than before; in
revolutionary terms it is unique."5
Antagonistic c1+~ss contradictions are inherent to a bourgeois arapr, like
all capitalist society. Its command personnel'is recruited predominant~jr
from the exFlriti.ng classes and the interests of the comma,nd differ from -
those of the soldiers and sailors who are eompelled to serve goals that
_ are slien to them. The ruling circles endeavor to conceal their revolu- -
_ tionary class goals from the soldiers, and to persuade them that service
in an imperialist arrr~y and the aggressive wars waged by it are merely
- business or a profitable undertaking. National and racial contradictions
axe also inherent to the armed forces of imperialism. In a bourgeois arn~}r,
_ the lack of rights of dark-skinned soldiers is particularly~apparent.
- The Soviet Armed Forces, on the contrary, are united by a strong class
unity a.nd an unshakable friendship of the peoples and nationalitie~ of
the USSR. Our coa~?anders, soldi~ers and sailors serve the coimnon in~terests
- and goals of defending the Soviet motherland and the cause of socialism
and communism. The Soviet Ara~r and Navy are characterized by an atmosphere
of true equality of rights, fraternal unity, friendship and comrade~hip.
The Soviet military is indoctrinated in a spirit of international solidar-
- ity, fraternal friendship and cooperation with the peoples and armies of
the countries in the socialiat coammonwealth. _
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_ , A fundamental dist3nction of the Soviet Armed Forces from bourgeohs armies
i~s nlao thr~t the,y aerve to defend their snotherland againet ag~r~ssion, and
t~c~~rl;h~r wi bh thr. nrrnir..m oP tht~ frnt~rnnl nnt,ionn, d~fa~d thp nar.urity ~f
Lhe aocl~,ll~b commnnw~alth and the cauee of universal peac~.
. 2'he Sovfet ArTqy is a liberator arm~y. V. I. Lenin re~~atedly stressed the
l3.berating and international nature of our arn~y st~:mming from its very revo-
lutionary essence and the missions which it was ~-ailed upon to carry out.
"Our arrtpr," said Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is in-
doctrinated in a spirit of prol'ound loyal+,~r to the socialist motherland,
to the 3.deas of peacs and internationalism, to the ideas of friendship
among peoples. In precisel,y this ~he Soviet r~rmy differs from the bourgeois
axm3es. For precisely ~his rea~on the Soviet people love their ar~y and are
proud of it."8
~
� The Purpose and Nature of the USSR Armed Forces -
Marxism-Leninism teaches that the ar~y is an fmplement of the ruling classes,
and its nature and purpose are deter.mined by the political organization of
s~ciety and by the class essence of the stQte.
In a bourgeo3s saciety, the army serves as an i.mplement in the ru].e of the
- exploiting imperialists. Its purpo~e is to defend the boi:z~geois system,
to sup~�~ess the masses ~f people and their liberation struggle, to seize
forei~n territoriea and to enslave ather peogles.
The hist~ric missioti of the Soviet :.~zqy created by the socialist system, in
+re definition of V. I. Lenin, is: "...To defend the victories of the revo-
lution ar~d our pec~ple's power.
During the years of the Civil Wax, the Red Arn~y was called upon to defend -
the victories of the October revolution and the young Soviet state against
foreign,~intervention and domestic counterrevolution. In the battles against .
the enemies, the young Red Ar~y won unc~ying glory.. In overcoming unbeliev-
abie difficulties and under conditions of hunger and chaos, it de~eated the
- hordes of interventionists and White Guards and defended the motherland and
the victories of October.
After the Civil War, the party directed the efforts of the Soviet people at
= rebuilding the deatroyed national econo.~}r, creating the foundation of a
socialist econon~y, and strengthening the military might of the Aric~r and
Navy. ~
- During this period the Armed Forces were confronted with ~he mis~ion of -
being reac~y to repel a possible att~.ck by the i:~erialist aggressors and
to ensure conditions for the building of socialism. The Red Art?~? vigilantly
- guarded the Soviet frontiers. It dealt a crushing defeat to the attempts
of the imperialists to disrupt the peaceful labor of the Soviet people in
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, tt~e l~'ar ~ant ana dn the approaches to Leningrad, and it helped the p~ople
of the western oblagts nf Beloru~di~, ttnd the Ukraine ~nd the Baltic repub-
- lics to ,~oin the fr~ternal fcunily of Soviet peoples. -
~ mhe c3reat patriotic WQr of 1941-1945, in ahich our people defended the 1ib-
erty und independence of their eocie~.iet motherl~d, We~s the bloodiest ~nd
_ fs~v~re~t War in hietiory, The materi~l, politica]. ~nd tnilitary forced of the
Sovi`t s~at~ underwent e c:-uci~l testin~. In th:s x~r, the i'ate of the
Wor.ld's firgt socialiat fatherland and all Wor1d civilization was determined. _
7'he severe hardghips could ndt break the tighting ~pirit of our people and
their r~rm,y, and could not ahglce the unlimited faith of ~he Soviet people in
the triumph of communigt ideals. During thoge days the song "A holy War"
resounded as a voW to the motherland and as ~ tocsin calling the people to
_ fi~ht the eneu~:
- Rise up, oh vast 1and,
Rise up to mortal b~ttle -
- Against the dark fgacist force,
_ Against the accursed hordel
The Leninist Communist Party aas the inapirer and organizer of the atruggle
of the Soviet geople for the frepdom and independence of the motherland.
Under its leadership the nation ~as turned into a single military camp.
In th~ Battle of MoscoW in December ].941, the Red Arrt~}r dePeated the crack
units of Nazi troopa and thKarted 'nitler's plan for a"blitzkrieg," and
shattered the a~rth of the invincibility of the ltazi arnp?. This rres the
first ma~or defeat of th~ Idazis in the courae of the entire World War II.
The heroic defense of Leningrad, Kiev, Sevastopol', Odessa, Tu1a, the
: Caucasus and the Soviet Arctic also played a ma~or role in the achieving ~
of victory over the enen~r. The great Battle of Stalingrad continued Por -
more than 200 days, and this ended vith the encirclement and complete de-
feat af an ar~r of more than 330,000 enemar troops. The victory at Stalin-
grad marked the beginning to a fundamental change in the course of the Wsr,,
and ~~s the start ot the general defeat of the C~rman invaders and the ex-
pulsi~n of th~m Prom Soviet land.
The bettles at Kursk, Leningrad, Novoroasiysk, oa the Dnepr and in Belo-
russia, on the Vistula and Oder, in East Prussis in the Balkans and the
other ma~or engQgementa Were the most important stages on the path of the
Sovfet people toXard victory in the Great Patriotic ~ar. On 8 May 1945,
Hitler Germar~y surrendered unconditionally. In Auguet 1945, the arnpr of
militarist Japan aras defeated by Allied troops.
During the Great Patriotic War, as during the period of the Civil War, the
truly popular nature of our Arr~ed.Forces xas ful~y apparent as well as the
ardent patriotism of the Soviet mi7~itary, their total loyalty to the
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Communi~t Party and th~ mu~herland, and unpreceflented cournge and mRen
lirrr~inm. ~t~~n~l'ftrmr.~1 wr.ru bl~e fervent wordu aC Vlncllmlr YL'ich Lenin 1;t?nt
~ in th~ ~tru~gle for. freedom nnd Por Soviet power "Ruagia is capable of
providin~ not on].y isol.ated heroes...and that Rus~ia c~n produce thege
t~eroe~ in hundreds and thousande."~ -
7.'he book "Malq}ra Zemlya" (The Sma11 Earth] descr3bes with clarity ~nd he~rt=
f~~t warmth the masa heroig% of the 3ov3et eoldier. In ~he courae of b~ttle
- "the e~rth Was set on fire, stoneg smoked, mei;~.1. melted, concrete collap~ed,
but the people, 1oya1 to their oath, flid not retreat from this 1and."9
F'or military feats in the t~rest Patriotic War, more than 11,000 men rE~~e{.ved
the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them were the sons and daughters
of a1]. the peo~lea of our motherland. Some 104 soldiera became twice Heroea
of the Soviet Unic+n, while G. K. Zhukov, I. N. Kozhedub and A. I. Pokryahkin
rec~ived thia high title thrice. Among the Heroea of the Soviet Union, 74
percent were communists and 11 percent Komsomol members. For military feata
for the sake of the motherlanQ, more than 2,000 persona vrere awarded the
Order of Glory oP the three degreea. -
- The Creat Patriotic War clearl,y manifeated the international nature and the
_ liberation mieaion of' our arined forcea. In the unstinting atruggle against
Cerman fascism and Ja~anese militarism, they not only defended the honor,
freedom and independence of our motherland, but also saved mat~y peoplea
from fascist enslavement. Mare than a million Soviet soldiers gave up their
lives in battlea for the liberation of peoplee in foreign countries. The
Soviet Arcr~y liberated partly or complete].;f the territories of 10 E~ropee~n
nations and two Asian countries with a total area af 2.5 million km~ and a
population of over 180 million persons.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War contributed to -
the Formation of the world socialist system and to the grosrth of the revolu-
_ tionary movemen: and the national liberation struggle throughout the world.
The sources of the world historical victory of our Armed Forces were the
leadership of thE Communist Party, the firm alliance of the korking class
and the kolkhoz peasantry, and the unshalc~ble friendship of all the Soviet
nationalities and peoplea.
In the postwar period, our Armed Forces, under tne leadership of the Com-
muniat Party,, have continued their successful development and strengthening,
aud have hon