JPRS ID: 8403 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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JP~tS L/8403
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_ 1~ April 1979
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTN AFRICA
CFOUO 15/79)
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JPRS L/8903
17 Apri1 ].979
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 15/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
_ NORTH AFRTCAN AFFAIRS
_ , Moroccan-Algerian Relatione Examined
(Hamid Barrada; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Mar 79) 1
IRAN ~
Khomeyni's Life, Revolution's Background Reviewed `
(Nawal Azhari; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Mar 79)......... 8 ~
- MOROCCO
Moroccan S6cialist Leader Discusses Sahara Problem � -
(Abdexrahim Bouabid In[erview; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
28 Mar 79) 23
TUNISIA
Opposition Leader on Potential Post-Bourguiba Situation
(Ibrahim Tobal Interview; AFRIQUE-ASI~, 2-15 Apr 79)... 26
- a- [III - NE F A- 121 FOUO]
L~r1D l1L~DT/~TTT itCT? /'1*iT V
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NORTH AFRICAN AF~'AIR5
MO1tOCCAN-ALGERIAI3 RELATIONS EXAMINED
. Paris JEUNE AFRIQU~ in French 21 Mar 7~ pp 21-24 .
[Article by Hamid Barrada. Ina~rt ~y M.Z,]
(Text] The measage aent to Parliament by King Hasaan II an 8 March is part
of that category o� commuaications which cannot be debated that the Moroccan
Constitution very claeaica~.ly unticipatea. For ~hat reaeon no apeech has
ever been so debated. The Perliament, sitting in a special sesaion in order -
to listen to the royal message, was convoked once again on the next day in
_ order to anawer it. Cert-ain cppoaition deputiea were heard to observe that
- the procedure utilized in t~iie regard did not at a11 respect the stipulations
of the Constitution, But they did ~ot hesitate over those juridical niceties. -
As soon as it ia a queetion of the Sahara, national unanimity is at stake.
Everyone agrees in ~udging with the hing that the moment has come to revise
the policy that has been followed up to now with regard to Algeria. The
= debates, which take place outside of the Parliamentary Chamber, revolve around _
the same queaCions. To wllat degree has the King decided to adbpt a new policy? -
How will Algeria react? In one word, are we on the brink of a general war
between Algeria and Morocco?
Hassan II has multiplied his gestures to create a belief in the existence -
of a"new direction" i~ the Sahara. He has requested his closest collab-
orator, Mr Ahmed Rada Guedira, to read the measage to Parliament although it
ordinarily is the duty of Mr Bahnini, the atate minister in charge of culture,
_ whose style is entirely dif~erent~ to take charge of thia taek. The un-
changeable rules of protocol are de rigueur of courae but the text is of an _
unaccustomed clearness: "The action that we have undertaken and the one
- which we are called on to undertake are so broad and at this point so deter-
- mining for the future and the destiny of our country, that we have ~udged
it necessary to associate the entire nation in the persons of ita represen-
tatives to make the decisions that that action demands. From this point of
view, we have decided to create beaide us, in parallel with our government,
_ a council gro~iping the repreaentativea of a11 organized political tendencies, -
which will have the ~ob of asaisting us in the determination and conduct of
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policy in the matter of safeguarding our r,ational Cerritory and the security _
= of the sCate."
- Hassan II &dmire that the policy of "wisdom" a~nd of "patience" that he has ,
carried on up to now has noC borne fruit. He sees htmself obllged to re-
consider the aituati.on which has been imposed on our country and which�is
that of neither war nor peace, how~ver with a1.1 the inconveniences and
consequencea of a aituation of war.
The King abstains from using the word "war" when he speaka of Che new policy.
However, the paraphrasing that he uses to sketch out tne anCicipated decisions
do not mean anything else. The prudence of his vocabulary seems to reflect
- rather the determination in his attitude. Would war Chen be imminenC? How-
ever, the royal message has not totally~~dissipated the scepticism which can
be observed in Moroccan opinion. More exactly, an approximation can be _
observed between the reactiona of the political class and the reactions of _
what we may call less specialized opinion.
~
A certain young industrial oiorker does not believe it is necessary to listen
- to the royal speech. This carpenter displays the same indifference. That
writer has of course read the apeech but has faund nothing new in it. The -
solemn warnings aeveral times addressed ta Alg~~ria and which have had no ~
aftermath explained that state of mind. It ha:: not be~n forgotten that the
King had announced in 1978 that Morocco would ~~xercise the ri~ht of pursuit
_ Not only did that threat remain a dead letter, but the attacks of the Polisario
from Algerin became bolder. After the Tata op~~ration in August 1978 there
- was the Tan Tan operation last February. So tliat the warnings sent from
Rabat to Algiers came to resemble the warnir~gs that the Chinese formerly -
addressed to the Americans while taking care to number them....
- The context in which the royal message was senC is no longer foreign to the
- general scepticism. The King announced his r.ew policy in the Sahara on the
day after the Tan 1an attack, but also after a movement of deep social dis-
- content.
On the very day before the speech, on 7 March, the health services went on
strike all over the country and demanded a pay increase. That was the fir~t
time that that sector had ever "moved." Even ~luring the general strike by
government employees in 1975, the hospitals hacl functioned normally. One
week earlier, the Khouribga (phoaphate) miners had stopped work. The high-
way workers had gone on strike. The education.~l establishment can also be
mentioned, which underwent two three and ~our-~lay general strike~ in the
month of February and then again on 13 and 14 liarch. The movement, relayed _
~ by the strikes called by the secondary student:;, according to Prime Miniater -
~hmed Osman, raises fears that the academic ye:ir may be a"year in blank."
` Ttie a~;itation in the schools also makes the go~~ernment uneasy because it is
assuming a frankly political character and thrt~atens to become worse.
- N~~merous incidents are observed. Slogans ho~tilp to the regime recall those
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wt~ich haci flourished at the time of the Maxch 1965 riots and the~ are
- proceeding to the point whexe they suggest that what happened ~.r. Tehex~n
could regemble what i,s happeni,ng ~n Rabat. ,A western d~.pl.omat axruck
~ "by that obseseion with Iran" which he ob~erves boCh in the behavior of -
the government and in the behavior of ~Ce opposition.
The phenomenon is even stranger since the Moroccan kingdom in certain respects -
(democratic liberCiea and the deep presence of Talam in instituCione gnd
public life) seems like an anti-Iran. To te11 the truth, by warmly defending
the Sliah, by consigning Khomei.ni to he11, above all by sheltering the deposed
emperor, Hassan II has done a great deal to encourage an unflattering analogy
between Morocco and Iran in public opinion.
- People are not ceasing to be astoaished that a atatesman whose polirical -
' skill needa no further demonstration ehould have committed what really must
be called a blunder. He must have adopCed that attitude againat the advice -
of the ma~ority of his ministera, which is at least what they proclaim _
- today....
= It is atill neceseary in this extremely dangerous climate for the government
_ in other words the King to do something. The speech from the throne
on 3 March would, it is thought, aupply him with an occasion to get the
situation in hand again. He prefexred to skiF over the problems and leave
the country expecting more in order to ensure in some way greater aCtention
to his message of 8 March. There were two valuable indications in the
speech from the throne, however. First, it was the majority which supports
him that the King most heatedly toc,k to task.
Those who governed and were elected before were called "cowardly." The .
- opposition was alsA mentioned but everyone knows that they are irrespon~ible -
- by definition and they have only 16 representatives in Parliament. Then the
King clearly declared that he did not have any intentian of stopping the
_ democratic experiment. If the opposition d?d not exist, he said in substance,
he would have invented it. After 27 k'ebruary the peraon who appeared as the
King's closeet collaborator, Mr Ahmed Reda Guedira, on his own initiative
- I~ad met Mr Abderrahim Bouabid, the leader o~ the opposition. The conversation -
}~ad t~ do with social tenaion. The ~~.rst aecretar,y o� the USFP [Socialist
Union of People's Furces~ denuunced the inE�~ectiveness of the government:
- "We tiave no one to argue with." Is it neceasary to believe that the accus- -
ations were not un~ustified in the eyes of the King who on the following day ~
_ ordered the government to begin a dialogue on the side o~ the unions?
Devoted to Conf~ict
The research into social pacification had as its ob~ect to keep the chief of
_ state's initiative in the Sahara from being af:similated into an operation of
- domestic politics, according to sources in thE� King's official family. For
that reason,.the message was exclusively devoted to the confllct with Algeria.
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_ i'or thcir nArC~ the oppoaition leadera mainta~n Chat their participaCion in
ti~e N~tionul SecuriCy Council, whoae creation F{aasan zZ announced on 8 March,
is not ried to any counterpart on the social p~.ane, as far ae ~hey ax'e con- -
c~:rned. Tt is sti11 no J.ess cerCain that some over~apping was and sti17. i.s
inevitable between the Sahara affair and domesx~.c problems, and tha~ a new -
policy with regard to Algeria wi1~. inevitably have repercuss:tone on the =
social situaCion. '
- A high official, a member of rhe USFP, recognifes Chat if h~.s party were in
' power it would de�end the austerity policy and would demand sacrifices from -
the workers in the name of the war effort. "At most we could make taxaCion
moral."
A close collaborator of the King finally expresses himself :in similar language: -
- "The situation in the Saha;.a r~quires the government and `~e opposition to -
assume a new attitude." Lengthy apeculation m~iy be devoted to the relation-
ships between Hassan TI's initiative in the Sahara and the deterioration of
- the social situation. One thing ia certain, hc>wever: the speech put a
- brake on the peychological deterioration.
_ When tiassan II declArea in his message to Parli.ament that "Morocco is facing -
in the south of its territory a more and morA difficult situation which can- _
not continue without making the country run sertous riska," he expresses
accurately a general feeling. He then adds: "We know that for many, if not
for all, the situation ie~ reaching the threshold of the intolerable."
.
_ The acrack on Tan T~n marked a tu.rning point. An officer in the Royal Arn~y,
who unhe;itatin~!;? recognizes the combativeness of the Polisario, declares =
that on the strictly military level the operati.on had limited effects, not =
- related to its psychological effects.
"The enemy sprinkled the Peopl~'s Bank with mac.hine-gun fire and fired a shell
- that hit an electrical transformer which nevertheless continued to function. ~
They had in mind to carry off 80 women whose ht~sbands are at Tindouf, but =
- they could only carry away 13." "Of course," the officer continues, "if
the enemy was able to operate inside the town, that was because of a failure
in the defense system. That is a fault that calls for sanctions."
New Situation =
For our informant, the strategy of the Royal Army in the Sahara, even if it -
- makes tt~e Royal Army vulnerable to stril;es from the Polisario is perfectly
- adapted to the real enemy: the A1.gerian Army. "We are not weak. We have .
_ not used our force up to now. Which is not the same thing." In h~.s Qyes,
ther_e is no doubt at all that the message from the King creates a*~ew situ- -
- ation on the military level by freeing "the initative" of the Moroccan Arcny.
Many facts recorded since 8 March corroborate those an3lyses. Parliament -
unanimously voted in favor of a resolution recommending exercise of the right
of pursuit. For the moment, Hassan II seems to have made up his mind to use
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= tiis rlght of pursuit....A,a ~ar as ideas are concexned. Four days afCez his
- mess~ge to Paxli.ament, he named I,t Co7, Moha*imled ,Abrouk, whow he had ,just -
- promoCed to that gxade, and who has Che zeputation of being a~ baroudeur
[tr,~nelr~tion unknown] chief o� the advanced ata~f in the Sahara. -
On the next day tihe firat meeting of the National Security ~ounci.l was sup- _
poaed Co be held. The principal politica~ formations, Istiqlal, U5FP, Popular
- Movement and Independenta, are to aend two repreaentatives each. Mr Ali
Yata will also take hia seat in the name of the PPS [Party of Progress and
Socialiam], which is communiet. -
Riska and Trump Cards
- The presence on the SecuriCy Council o� men like Mr Bouabid, who had suggeated
the conetiCution of euch a body in 1.975 and who has not ce~sed tc publicly
defend a policy of intransigence in regard to Algeria, or like Boucetta
(Istiqlal) and Ahardan (Popular Movement) who, in spite of their participation
in the government, share the eame conviction at bottom, allow it to be =
thought that Morocco is in the same situation as it was at the moment of the -
_ Green March. With the same riske and the same trump cards.
As Ln 1975, facing the Spanish Army, the risk of a conflagration is real. _
'fhe chances of a peaceful solution are ~lso sa�eguarded. The message of
8 March is very clear on that sub~ect: "The ob~ect of our present message
- is first to associate the entire nation in the various efforts that we are -
_ employing and to ehow the nation once again more clearly the ob~ectives of =
- peace that we are pursuing." A close collaborator of the sovereign insi.sts
_ on this aspect: "We shall continue to give special treatment to peaceful -
- means because war is a riak." It could be thought that this is nothing but
= a bluff on the part of Hassan TI. That is not the case. For the good reason _
that he has deliberately closed that door. You do not tell an army which �
dreams of combat ~hat they are immediately going tn attack; you do not
- mobilize parties that are in favor of it or a public opinion that wants to -
get it over with and then sit with your hands Eolddd. That would not be
= serious. Now everyone agreea, even hie adversaries, that Hassan II is
- 5erious.
Is it wur, then? The ball is in the Algerian court. "In its conflict with
- us," a responaible official explained to n~e in Rabat, "Algeria has up to now -
tiad the best part. They clai,m to be defending a principle, that of self-
~ determination for the Saharan people. Now no one, if he is speaking honestly,
can admit that a state hae mobilized ~ts military and dip].omatic appaxatus
_ with the single purpose of defendi.ng a pr~,nciple which concerns a third
party. The position of the AZgerian leaders cannot be upheld ~ust as the
position of France could not be supported if it armed, refereed and aided =
a Basque liberation movement which would carry on guerrilla operations ~n
Spain." -
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Peaceful Solution -
� Our informant conCinued: "We xecognise ttiat A~.gexia may have a~ty positi.on
_ it wants to on the decol,onization af the Sahaxa. But we deny it the xight -
to help the people who come ro attack u$ ~.n, our counCry." My in~ormant is
nevertheless chiefly preoccupied in seeking out a peaceful arrangement. He
even disputea thaC the 8 March epeech marked a hardening. When T asked him:
- "WhaC has changed then?" he anewered: "Nothing, except t~?at up Co now
- Algeria was engineering causes of war which we did not consider as such. -
_ From now on, a cauae of war ia a cause of war."
Insert: Algerian Attitude
Will President Chadli reapond to the warning addreased to Algeria by Hassan II? -
Whether it be toward a worsening or toward an easing, the conflict in the
- Sahara can rt~pidly assume a new direction. Not only because of the King's
_ message, but also because for the first time since the illness of President
Boumedie:�:.a, the actors are in place on the Algerian side. The same day that
Hassan addresaed the Moroccan Parliament, a government was finally formed in
Algiers. _
- More Engaged
_ What will be the attitude of Algeria on the sub~ect of the Sahara? Do
- Col Mohammed Iien Ahmed Abdelghani, the prime minister and his team, represent
the assumption of power by "hard-liners"? Without any doubt it is too early
_ to answer that queation, but the departure of Abdelaziz Bouteflika from
foreign affairs was noted. He had been at the head of Algerian diplomacy
- for nearly 15 years. Must we see in this an indication of a policy of greater
engagement alongside the Polisario Front? The former chief of Algerian -
~ diplomacy, in apite of his repeated statements about "decolonization" of
- the western Sahara was, it is true, in private a partisan of a negotiated
solution with the Moroccans and the Mauritanians. An intimate friend and -
~ counsellor of the deceased pre~tdent, he might even have progressively won
- Boumedienne over to his line of argument.
If the meeting between Hassan II and Boumedienne, after long preparation,
_ could not take place because o~ Boumedienne's ilJ.ness, Rabat had a right to _
- expect after the appointment o� Chadli that contacts would be taken up again. -
� However, when the F~ench aecretary o� state in Foreign Affairs, Mr Olivier _
Stirn, announ~ed a meeting between Chadli and Hassan, ttiis was immediately -
denied by Algiers. Too early? Or rather was it comp~.etely out of the
que3tion?
If the Algerian leaders sti11 choose a position of firmness, it is not sure
that the new government is looking for a~lash in the conflict which has been
opposing the two neighbours since 1975. The Sahara affair seems to have had
lfttle weight in the final balance in the changes that have taken place in
the seat of power in Algiers.
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_ v,nriona], De�ense -
WiCli two m~.lltar.y nten at thc head of rhe countr.y, who al.locate Co Chemse~.ves
~~11 o~f the pxerogak~vea o� Preaidenr Boumedi.enr~e, ~t is being con�~'Jrmed that =
the partisana of Mr Yahiaou~, a presumed (and im~.ucky) cand3.date to the chief
magistracy, are accusing them of a retreat.
In the new distribution of por[folios, National Defenae has not been officially
- assigned. Thie puta the preaident of the republ~,c ~n position as a candidate
- Eor office in that post.
Competent Walis
In rhe same wAy, Colon~l Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, who is assuming the dut~es of
- prime miniater, has not conaidered it a good idea, in the absence of any
preeise definition of his new dutiea, to aband~n the Interior MinisCry which
he has led since the death of its holder, Ahmed Medeghri, in 1974. As a
direct consequence of the promotion of Mr Abdelghani, many walis (prefects)
have proved their competence on the ground and they have replaced some
- ministers (Health, Public 4iurka, National Educ~tion, Juatice). Mr Abdelghani
had directed an important re-ahuffling of walis in 1978, as he has a certain
influence over them. The choice of these men wae dictated by the double =
- concern of broa@ly renewing the peraonnel of the ~ld cabinet and of putting
an end to the mandarinate exercised by certain of lBoumedienne's ministers.
_ The question of the primacy of the single party in the state has not been
brought up. The presence of two leaders both an ihe state level (Chadli,
Abdelghani) and on the party level (Chadli is the titular secretary general -
while Tahiaoui has ~ust been named "coordinator." of the FLN) bears this out.
' However, it is quite apparent that the balance is not weighed in favor of the
_ "militants," who are desirous of reinvigoratin~; the party. -
Delicate Mission
= The designation of the firat government since Iioumedienne puts Che final
period to a long interregnum. Mr Abdelghani's cabinet has the delicate mission -
- of giving a satisfactory and urgent respcrose to the worries of Lhe
Algerian population (uuemployment, houaing cr~His, supplies) which have been
- relegated to the second for too long by the "imperatives of devel,opment."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afr~.que GRUPJTA 1979
- 12,116
_ cso: 44~0 -
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IRAN _
~ KI#OMEYNI'S LIFE, REV OLUTION'S IIACKGROUND REVIEWID `
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABT in Arabic 2-8 Mar 79 pp 36-39
[Article by Nawal Azhari: "Secreta in Khomeyni's Life; Costume Party Led to -
_ Religious-Political Revolution and to ileclaration of 1906 Constitution; Assas-
sination of Khomeyni's Father, Foreign Occupation and Mosadaq's Fall Behind
Ca11 for Islamic Republic; A1liance of Religious Establishment With Bazaar
People Guaranteed Current Movement's Successrr~ ~
[TextJ Aeginn:ing this week, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will begin publishing a
series of prea:3 reports on Iran dealing with the various aspects and with the
background of the current pvents. ~he paper will start this series with a
report on the Shi'ite religious institution, on Ayatollah Khomeyni, ita u;sin
leader, and on its struggle since the beginning of ttiis century and until
= the victory it achieved by toppling the regime of Shah Mohamad Reza Pahlavi.
- When he boarded the special French Boeing aircraft that took him from Paris
to Tehran at the beginning of last February, he apread a small carpet,~per-
formed his prayers, returned quietly to his seat and surrendered his head
= to a deep sleep after the plane took off for its hiatoric trip, whereas
tension prevailed among all his companions who were worrying about what evil
might f ace them at the airport at the hands of the pro-shah forces. -
This venerable old man has been able throughout his stormy life to maintain '
= an inner calm which nobody, except a few ascetir.s and Sufis, could parallel.
- He is also an aecetic hermit. But hiz~ distinction is that he has not shun-
ned people and that he has ahared in tlieir affaira and the proble~s of their -
~ daily life. He has even endured from th~m and f.or their sake more than
strong men can endure.
_ Ayatollah Ruhollah Muatafa al-Musawi al-Hus ayni Khomeyni changed none of his
tiabits, neither during his 15-year exile, nor since his return to the home-
- l.and~ He waked up at an early hour to re~oice rind worship in a apiritual
conversation with his creator for hours. He thE~n spends most of h3s day
dealing with hie family's and with the people's affafrs and then retires to
_ bed at 2300.
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tlis food is Chat of c~seetica: Cheese~ bread, yogurt, grapes and cootced or
b oiled vegetAbles. Perhaps this strir.C routine of worship and food is what -
- tias enabled him to maintain his vigor and energy :tn this advan ~ed age, and
what lias enabled him to endure a11 the hardships, twists, shocks and sur�-
prises in his 11fe. -
Ayatollah Khomeyni came into this world at the beginning of this century . ~
His childhood was apent in a small and modest Iranian ,?~.11~~e, Khomeyn,
~is Eather wns also a Shi'ite clergyman.
1
ltao 1~lstor:Lc Events in Khomeyni's Zife
There are twn histaric events which the memory of his early childhood could -
n~t compreliend: The 1906 revolution and decl~ration of the constitution, and
_ ~he ass~ssination of his father by government men. 'The father was firm and
never stopped attacking the oppression and tyranny of the shahs and of the
].andowners and feudalists who cooperated with them,
- Let us leave the child C~~ go to L-t~e holy city of Qom in the south, where his _
religious studies began, ana let us pause a little to examine that thunder-
_ ous revolution.
The incidents start with the clergymen's si.t-in strike in the mosques to
dem~tid ex~ulsion of the Belgian Mr (Nuis), the ct~.stoms inspector who insulted .
the clergymen by attending a boisterous costure party dressed in the apparel
_ and turban of a clergyman. The sit-in strike developed quickly to become a -
- demand for the people's right and for a constiLUtion that would put a limit
_ to the powers o; Muzaffar-al-Din Shah. -
- The Ottoman Empire mediated between the sh ah and the clergyman, and a shahan- -
shah decree was issued declaring a cons titution providing for the creation _
of a consultative council and ~udiciary courts. However, the shah procras-
- tinated in its implementation, and the demonstr~ztions were renewed. Tehran
_ clergymen staged a sit-�ln strik~ in one of the mosques, and a prolonged
blockade was set up ar~~und them by the governme~lt forces. 1fie matter er?ded
wjth a permit allowing them to emigrate to the i~oly city of Qom,
_ The truth is that the events were not generated by the rashness of a young
~ and irnpudent foreigner, such as Mr (Nuis) . There were deeper and more impor- -
tant social and religious causes,
_ Oppression reached a peak under the (Fajar) dyn,isty: A profligaCe and op-
- pressive shah, a corrupt government, provincial governors harsh in collect-
- ing taxes, harsher tax collectors, prevalent igri~rance, no schools and no -
t~ospitals. -
= T1~e clergymen were more capable than others of ~mderstanding the public de-
sires by virtue of their direct contact with thE~ people and by virtue of the
relative organization of the Shi'ite religious c~stablishment itself in a
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m:tnn~r thttt permitted its extetteive network to spread throughout the rural
- cmd urbAn arene. 11~e Cler~}?t~.en'e anger. .~t ehe shah wae an extenaion of rhe
peo~~lc~'~ wrntili nPnin~t hi.m.
_ Isritieh Expl.oit Situation =
Tt~e cler~;ymen'e emigration to Qom touched off the people's feelinge and
made them head singty and in group~ to the gritish Embasay in Tehran. 7he
. }iritieh and the Rueeit~ng were the two main partiee involved in the interna-
tional game in thie poor Islgmic country. -
~
- With their cunninP, the British encouraged the people Co protest. The Bri-
tish were annoyed by the fact th~t the Russians had the tr;~per hrmd in tt~e
Persian court, and they exploited Che opportunity Co regain their lnfluence.
'~t~ey ~pened the doorR oF Che embasay to the ett~aesy Co the demon~trators, who
- staged their sit-in strike in it for days, during whict~ the people ate~ -
_ drank and slept in euch a very orderly manner, thnt the most organized
present-day popular organizatior~s would envy them.
Muzaffar-al-Din Shah backed down and iasued on 5 August 1906 anottier shahan-
shah decree declaring the conetitution proponed by the clergycoen: Conatitu-
= tional government~ electe.d national council, the Ja'fari Shi'ite creed as the
atate's official religian~ approval of the principle of the separation of
powers. and affirmation of public and pprsonal liberties. More important
tha.i all this was article two wh i d~ granted clergymen the veto right ov~r any -
officinl l~c,r which the clergymen found incompatible with the Shari'a. -
' The religious establishment in Iran attachea great importance to the 190E
constitution~ becauae this conatitution recognizes the establishment's poli-
tical and social role. Clergy:nen are the ones who control and keep record
- of the vital statistics, auch as marriages, divorces, births and deuths.
They are also the ones who supervise daily transactions such as purchase and
sale c~ntracts and leases, and who play the role of banks. 'It~e rich deposit
w2tt~ them whatever surplus money they have and pay to them the ta~tes and -
fees required by t~^ Shari'a.
'Ihese taxes and fees~ in addition to donations and in}~eritance, enabled the
S}~i'ite establishment to own vast properties and lands. Tt~e revenuea of
thesc holdings enabled the clergymen to rally the pe~ple beh ind them with ~
the aid and grante that the clergymen advanced to the orphans~ the sick~ the
unemployed and the disabled~ and with the sympathy these clergymen gave the -
- people when expoaed to the tyranny of the rulery.
T1~e fact 1s that t}~is conatant contact between the Shi'ite religioua eatab-
lishment and the common people in Zran always qualified, in the absence of
rulers with a sense of national responsibility taward the people, the
_ Shi'ite clergymen to perform their ma)or role and provided them with un-
paralleled moral and nsaterial support in their tong atruggle with the
government .
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Muzaffar-al-Uin 5h~h attended the opening of the parliament ~the Council)
carried on a litter, and died ill and defegted in the year following the _
declnration of the Conetitution,
_ Piugnificent Democr~tic tixper.ience
y Ttie democratic exr~erience was magnificent and dar.zling. The Council was an
exact replica of a teaching session at a mosque. The presi~lent s at in the
middle and the deputies gurrounded him, sitting on mats spread on the floor.
They di,ycuaeed ~nd deb ated whntever uffairs they wanCed to discusa. Thoae -
pre~ent tnok pnrt in the dier.ussion. F:vr_n the common people Cook their amall
problems to the Council to preeent the:� t~ the deputies or to the discuasion .
se~aione.
Mohamnd Ali Shah could not seand this unique experience~ and so he sent his
imperial ~uard~ who consisted aL the time of Cossack cavalrymen, under the
command of u Ruseian offi~er called (Liyakhov) to besiege the Council, expel
the people's representatives, suspend the constitution and impose a curfew
in Tehran.
- How similar is today tu yesterday? The people rebelled against the shah and
defeated his forces, and the shah had no alternative but to resort to the
- Tzarirt Russian Delegation. The clergymen dethroneci Mohamad Ali Shrsh and
instated his son Sultan Ahmrid as the new shah. Zhe constitution was reacti-
vated and the former ahah was banished to Russia. Ztie United States had not
yet extended its fingers to t}~is part of the world. Iran thus became one
of few countries that could be counted on the fingers who knew a constitu~
tional democratic rule early in this century.
- In 1921, an ambitioue and almost illiterate soldier leaps suddenly into the
heart of the events in Iran. In 1925, he dethrones the last of the (Fa;~ar)
dynasty shahs and imp~ses himself as the new shah. Reza Shah Pahlavi, the
father of the present shah, was no less oppressive and tyrannical than the
depased dynasty.
Under the slogan of modcrn reforms, Reza Pahlavt, a product of the military
establishment, begins his conflict against f!:C clergymen. In the 1930's,
he strips them of their constitution?:iy guaranteed privileges and of the
veto over civil legislation.
With t}ie rising star of Reze Pahlavi in power, the star of Ruhollah Khomeyni, -
the young mulla [low-rank clerKymanj, bep,ins to rise in the religious estab-
liehment. The young man's maturity, awareness and studies were completed
and he began to look at [he tyranny, transformation and development with a
stern face~ knitted brcws. penetrating :~~ks and two dark and thick eyebra~rs
comFeting with his thick and dark beard. 2tothing has changed in this
Khomeyni rit present exc~pt his beard, which has been invaded by the ~rhiteness
of old agc.
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~i ~meyttl H ~cing Reza Yr~hlnvi
riie youug trnchEr did not confine hie interest to tenrhine ,jurieprudence ~
alone. l~e proceeded to attack Rez~ P~hlavi and the imperial regime eloquently
, and fluently. Ne inatigaCed the people tn dieobey the shah'~3 orders and told
them that such orders would be of no value if the people re~~~cted them un--
animously.
Then com~s World War II and Iran suffers widespread harm, 13y virtue nf his
~enuine f;~sci~sm~ the shah h~d i~azi imClin~tione. With the advances of the ~
~+ern~nn forcee in tl~e Piiddle Eest~ the 311ies were sfraid that: the ahati would '
4tab them in the b,~ck, ~nd eo the I3ritieh and the Sovi~ts hafitened to march
int~ nnd occupy Iran to get control of the oil fields. 'Ihey banished the
�~}iah in 19~i1 and appointed his son Mohamad Reza, the present ahuh, in his
~~lace.
'[he Iranian people's tragedy was thus compounded because they~ had to endure
- the burden of occupation and tt~e exl~~ustlon of their country's resources.
Y,homeyni was one of the clergymen most strongly a~~aare of the enormity of the
r_ragedy und most strongly pained by it. His reaction was cry~stallized in a
- three-pnrt slog~n that he raiaed: Freedom, independence and fighting foreign
domination.
I'he war enCed and under pressure from the peopZe, the ~ritisri withdrew after
long maneuvers and after msking sure of putting the oil under. the control of
~heir moncpolist compunies. 111e Sovieta also withdrew, but anly after leAV-
_ inR Azerbaydzhan Province under the control of one of their ~?ge~~ts. The
Iranians regained the province after long suffering. _
Dr Mosadnq's Experience
5uddenly~ the Iranians were able to regain t}~eir oil in the E~arly 1950's,
tiianks to Dr Mohamad Mosadaq, that old and shrewd poli;ician who was good at
- rnaneuvers. Mosadaq would not have succeeded had it not been for the influ-
~nce of a prominent religious leader named Ayatollah Kashani� Khomeyni was
~~ne of the prominent supporters and advisers of Kashani,
}lowever, the people's joy with their national victory did not: last long.
I1~e Americans toppled Mosadaq's government, brought Shah MohFimad Reza Pahlavi
h:~ck from exile and replaced the British with their own influence and their
own e;cploitation of Iran's oil resou~tces.
~~e rule of Shah Mehamad Reza Pahlavi starts actually in 1953. Thanks to -
~l~e support and backing of t}~e CIA on the one hand and the dtvision in the
:}ational ranks on ~he other hand, the shah was able to impose his sadist and
teel rule on Iran.
"i~e sh:~h persecuted the nati.onal politicians and the clergymen allied With
- ti~~m, imprisoning their elders. He also liquidated physically the cream of
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, Mosadnq's aupportera, youths who received Cheir higher education abroad~
throUgh aesassination or Corture in tt~e dnrk prisons. He did noC hesiCate
- to imprigdn a venerable old man auch ~s Dr Moeaduq, who was more than 75
- yenrq dla. The shah released Mosadaq only after he became cerCain that
= cancer had eaten away hie tongue und that he could no longer utCer a eingle =
word of criticism agzinst him.
The end of the nationnl experience in the spring of its life was a aevere
- shock for I~ omeyni~ and its failure was harder on him than hia imprisonment _
- in [he sh ah's cells and ~ails.
~ 'The clergyman r~treated to stud,y, discuss und analyze the causes of the
failurc, and ended up with a conclusion thnt became more deeply entrenched
in his mind with time, namely that there could be no salvaCion for Iran--
rather, there could be no salvation for all the Moslems--coiChout the estab-
liehment of an Islamic state, to be specific, an Islamic republic totally '
- divorced :rom all the forms of Is].amic government established throughout the
ages--g state in which rule is not inherited by the caliphs of a ruling dy-
n~~sty~ as wns the case in the Ommiad and Abbaside caliphates, and which does -
not use religion as a curtain for its igiiorance, backwardness, auppresaion
and terrc~r, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire. _
The clergyman proceeded to use his eloquence and his magical influence over
worshippers and over the faithful to call for his "vitruous" republic and to
compare what the situation would be in a state that maintains its revolu- -
tionary and religioua purity, as was the case in the time of Prophet Muhammad, -
may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and the time of his fourth succeasor
'Ali ibn Abi Talib, with the situation of the Moslems and of Islan in Iran -
undzr the rul~ of. Mohamad Reza Pahlavi, the shahanshah and emperor of em-
perors.
_ ~
Tlie shah became annoyed with Khomeyni and tried first t~ buy him with gene-
rous gifts, as he had done with others. But Khomeyni refused. He was con-
tent with his ascetic life with his big family, a wife and 5 children, in
t~is modest home in Qom.
'Il~e shah prrested Khomeyni ut the beginning of 1963. After a period of time
- ~nd when the shah thought that prison had undermined [~?omeyni's morale, he
sent emissarier~ to express his willingness to neRotiate with him and to
release tiim from prison in return for Khomeyni's abandonment of his ca11. _
Hut Kl~omeyni told the shah's emissaries: So, what is left for us to nego-
tiate over? The shah brought Khomeyni t~ trial and recor,unended th at a ~
de~th sentence be issued against~him. But ~'he prominent uelma hastened to
_ hold a meeting and to qive Khomeyni the title of ayatollah. 'It~is meant that
the shah had to stop his trial and to rei~ase him in accordance with the :906
cons tit:ution.
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Kt~omeyni in l:xile
'Ctie ~hrali was forced Co release him~ but only on the condition Chat he gu
1nCo exile. Khomeyni and his family left for exile in Turkey end tnen pro- -
r.eecled to Irnq to s tay clos~ to Che holy places in al-Na~af anci Karbala' .
In exile, Khomeyni devoted hia efforts to de~~eloping his new theor,y ott Islnmic
rule, guided by the ~rn of al--Rnshidun caliphs [the four caliphs who fol- -
lowed Ciie prophet immediately). He has writCen extensively on the iseue~
mostly in rh~: form of lecCures that he delivered to the students of religious
insticutes.
N~r}~:~p~ tt?c most importnnt of his wrttings are "The Rule of The Shari'a" and
"The Islamic State." In both~ Khomeyni says thaC rule in islam ia not abso-
lute, but constitutional. But it is not conatitutional in the conventional
Western aenae of democratic constitutionality. Rulers in the Ialamic state
.~re bound to a number of principl~s and conditions revealed in the noble
Koran nnd explnined in the Hadith and interpreCation of Prophet Muhammad,
mny God'~ pence und prayere be upon him.
' Thus, the Islamic state relies on holy laws, and its legislator is God, may
He be praised, in accordance with His Koranic teachinga and His prophet's -
interpretation, whereas the role of legislator in the Western constitutional
state is performed by the people's elected representatives, Nob ody has the
right to legislate or to rule without depending on t}~ese divine principles. -
Khomeyni gives the ulema and the ~ariaprudents the rigtit to interpretation
_ within the framework of the Koran's provisions and of the prophet's interpre-
tation without any deviation. In this, }ie is in hermony with the flexibi-
- lity of the historical Shi'ir~ religious establishments and with its imams
in regard to interpretation to meet the requirements of the conditions and
of thc age. .
K}i~mcyni defends warmly the penalties stipulated in the Koran to punish cri- -
minals, and denies that they a~re derived from the "harshness of the Arabe," `
~s tlie orientalists claim. He asserts that these penalties seek ultimately
to stop crime, to impose the authority of law and order and to establieh
security, safety and peace in the state.
= Opinion of IQ~omeyni's Critics -
HcnaEVer, m~ny of Khomeyni's critics beliPve that a lot of ambiguity engulfs
the principles on wh ich his Islamic republic is established. They are gene-
ral ~rinciples that intimate that Islam is middle-of-the-road between capital- -
Lsm and communism. that it permits personal liberties and curtails extensive
.iomination by capital and thst, at the same time, it is against state capi-
..alism because it p~~~nits merchr::its to engage in their trade and to earn a
I.egitimate profit. "Capitalism explcits the people through its materialism, -
�ommunism enslaves the people through political oppression, whereas the
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,
~
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Islamic etate will wipe ouC corrupCion and guarantee poliCical and economic
equality among all under the canopy of t}~e Koran." ,
A11 tlii.e remains general principles. As far the acCual implementntion of
rheae principles in ehe people's daily life and under condiCions that are
toCally different from those existiing more than 1,300 years ngo, Khomeyni has
not provid~d m~ny detailg. Even the bordera of this state ~re nat cl~:nr to -
him. Is it confined to Iran nr does it include all ehe Mos lems?
The man calls for aboliehing the monarchy and aums up h is go~ls in releasing ~
ehe deCuineea, arresting ~he corrupr., cnncelling all. the contracts and deals
that nre not in Irar,'s interest, producin~; little oil, paying grenCer atten-
r
tion to agriculeure and reducing the number of the armed forcea. ~
- K}iomeyni says: "This is the first step. Our etruggle will continue after we
deport the main criminal~ namely Che shah. Our ultimate success will be
- racliieved when all the foreigners leave us and stop controlling our army." -
All this is good in the view of Khomeyni's critics. But the detailed lines
continue to be ambiguous~ confused and unclear, especially in regard to legis- _
lation and interpretation on matCers connected directly with the Shari'a
rules .
- h;ven tt~e vast numbers of his supporters don't know any notewortny thing about
- his Islamic stste, whereas his main aides range from those demnnding implemen-
tation of the Shari'a laws and eatablishment of Lhe Islamic state to those
who n~pire to a Weatern-style democratic system, even though relying generally
on Islam and ita dictates. -
- Khomeyni's main aides have exerted tangible efforts in an attempt to explain
the executive principles of the Islamic theory. Zhese aides include Mehdi
Bazargan, the present prime minister who has asserted in his numerous writ-
ings that Islam is not in conflict with science and technology. Meanwhile,
Ali Shariati, the departed poet and thinker, trted to mix the Islamic prin-
ciples with socialism. _
Aut these attempts have been conflicting and varying between the thinking of
a liberal like Bazargan and another radical Islamic thinker deeply imbued
_ with the socialist principles, such as Shariati, .
K}~omeyni's Foreign Policy
~h e utter clarity in Khomeyni's positions and tliinking appears in matters
pertaining to his foreign policy. He wants to restrict foreign influence in
- Iran, including the secret role played by foreign businessmen i.n carrupting
the government and the l~ureaucratic agency.
He i:s fully aware of Israel's dsnger to the area, to the Arabs and to Islam.
Iarael !s "the product of the collusion and understanding of the Western and
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I:fiytern imperi~J.igt countries.,, Zts roota muat be pulled out with the ef- -
^orty of the mighty Isl~mic counCries and Cheir great peopl~s." _
~ In tliiA regard, IChnmeynl i~ very detuiled and preciae. The Isl~mir. counCries
"muqe unite and muat exert all their efforts and employ all rheir reeourcea
to uproot the uaurping nggreasor~ Th ey must stop aiding Iarael~ those who
proceed in its bandwagon and thoae who support it. The Islamic countriea
,nuat cut off all forme of m~terial and moral aid for them, ~ey must deny
them uil and must refr~in from using an,y Isrc~eli producta."
In his books, Khomeyni draws r~ dark picture o� Israel's and zionism's role in -
the Ir~n of the ehnt~anahat~. ~'On Che }~ands of the malicious Irunian govern-
- ment, Isruel infiltrated inCo a11 of the country's economic~ military r~nd
- poliCical affairs, and Iran became a militar.y base for Tarael, or rather for
ehe United Statea. Now, Ierael controls our cauntry'e ~ff aira, runs Iran's
- economy and manages the affairs of. numerous Irunian far,tories and inatalla-
ti.ons
'I'he prominent Iranian leader is ~onvinced that Zionism is plotting against
Iran and Islam. He points out in this regard ite distortion of the Koran.
He is also fully com?inced thar its ~ltimute goal is to control the world.
He even chargea Zionism of plot~ing to kill him.
U. S. Responsibil.ity
EQ~omeyni holds the United States li3rgely respons3ble for what has afflicted
Iran and what ia afflicting ther Daleme. "Had the Islamic counCries relied
on Islam inatPad of relying on the Eastern and Western camps, they would not
have fallen prey to the Zionist aggreasion, they would not have been terror-
ized by the Phantom planes and would not have submitted to the Soviet Union's
policy of bargaining."
~omeyni adds: "Let the world know that all our problems emanate from America.
All oiir problems emanate from Israel. Israel is also a part of America."
_ Khomeyni then wonders: "Isn't i: our :ight to protest the supply of Iranian
oil. to a country which is in a state of war with the Moslems and to protest
- c;ivinq the Israelis a free hand to tamper with our Islamic country? Israel
ls c~~rrently in a state of war with the Mosler~ and is planning to invade
and occupy the Islamic countries." Despite all this, Khomeyni is aware, as
a true Mosiem, of the principles of religious freedom. Ne stresses that -
Jew;; and C}irie[ians in Iran must be given freedom of worstiip and of prac-
ticing thcir religious rituals. But he is not at all tolerant toward here-
- ~:ies, suct~ as the Bahu'i movement~ which has aided the shahanahah's regim~.
~rom his exile, Khomeyni instigated the Iranian Arnry to mutiny and rebel:
71~e Iranian Army officers must exert aerious efforts to purge the homeland's
;oil of t}~e deAecration and i.nfluence of Israel's agents. You are Moslems.
~~e~l your crushing blows to these agents and cut off the evil Israeli hands
' n your dear homeland."
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- K}iomeyni is aware n� khe nature of the relaCionship ehae has bound the shahan- -
~ sh~h's regime Co nll of Irgn'e enemies: "The Pahlavi family ~ssumed power by
- force~ The present ahah has desrroyed the economy And our natural resources,
~ has reduced agricultural production ao as to secure a market for U.S. pro- -
ducts, hae aub~ugated the armed forcea to foreign conCrol and hae abolished
_ freedom of expreseion and of the press, and hie police forces have massacred
thousands of citizens."
_ Todny and after t~e vicCory of Khomeyni's revolution, Khomeyni has put into -
practic:e whuC he advocated in hia exile and in his atruggle. He has severed
all of Irnn's relaCione with Ierael, hae expelled Che Iarneli and U.S. experts -
_ and t~r~s declared r~ tialt to the dellvery o� oil to Che Zionist stuCe a.~d to
_ 5outh Africa~ To reaesure the ArAba, he has declured an end to Iran's role
ag Che patrol policemnn in the Arab Gulf, He wanta thus to ahow that Chere -
is no conflict in the ultimaCe goals between Iran And its neighbors by virtue ,
" of the relations of hie tory, relig3on and blood. -
No Bargaining in Revolution
One of the mnin characCeristics of Khomeyni's personality and of his revolu- _
_ tionnry conduct ia his ability to adopt decisive decisions. Those who have
followed in detail his latesC battle with the regime can attribute his vic-
tories to his refuaal to bargain at the expense of his positions and prin-
' ciplea.
He did not bargain with the ghah and did not permit his allies (the National -
~'ront) or hie supporters to coaperate with the regime in ita final days or to -
accept the regime's superficisl concessions. He defined his phased ob~ec-
tive: The shah muat be overthrown. When the shah fled the country, I~?omeyni
- decided to return home. Even Bazargan, his top adviser, advised him not to -
return. But the revolutionary old man refused to back down and refuaed to -
bargain with Shapur Bakhtiar, who eplit away from the national movement and
_ who accepted the shah's inducements. Khomeyni returned, knowing well that _
his return constituted a danger to his life and the life of his companions.
A revolution does not accept bargaining. It is some kind of a wager and it
may win or it may lose, but wher. it bargains, it starts to lose.
Khomeyni returned and toppled Bakhtiar's government in days. He even ended
the myth of rhe "bogy" with whom the shah and the Americans long threatened
- the people, namely the army. With the magic of his leadership and with his
influence, Khomeyni attracted the troops and wrenched them away from the grip
of their officers. Within a few hours of their armed confrontation with
I~ omeyni, the commanders themselves found that they were alone in the arena. _
In their position, their forcea, their equipment, the instigation of the
shah and the advice of the Americans were of no help. They fell into
Khomeyni's hnnds one nfter the other to face the fate deserved by whoever
places himself in conflict with the people's interests and aspirations.
t~uwever, Khomeyni wae not quick and decisive in adopting the individual deci- -
_ sions concerning fateful isauea, such as dethroning the shah~ abolishing the
monarchy, declaring the Islamic state and nationalizing the oil. Perhaps he =
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pref.~rred Lo refer Co the people'i3 opinion on these matters~ coneidering that
he hnd nlwnys n~fi�rmed that the people hold ~hc fingl decision.
Cotif'lice WiCh Left
Perhapa Khomeyni is in dieagr~ement here with Choae allies who waged the
batCle of liquidatin~ the regime with him. What is mesnC here are the radica~
- communisC rind leftiat org~nizatione, aome of which adopt the principle of vio-
lence in their political action. ~ly virtue of the3r thinking and their ideo-
logical poaitions, these organization3 do not consider that the battle in Iran
has ended. The~? demand that the hand of the revoluL�iom extend to political
- and military groups, and perhapa to social clasaes, to liquidate and pura~ie
tliem. These organizatione even find themaelves in an :inevitable confronta- -
- t�Ion wiCh Khomeyni and with his call for an "Islamic state." What makes the
confrontution even more serious is that theae groups a~re well-armed, espe-
_ cially afCer acquiring large quantitiea of weapone from the army barracks and
s tores .
IC is doubtful thut Khomeyni and *_he Shi'ite religious establishment will be -
- able to persuade these radical factions to agree to giye up the arms and to
coexist peacefully under the canopy of an Islamic ataC~~ whose opponents are
permitted a degree of freedom of criticism and of expreaeion.
In confronting his opponents at home, Khomeyni depends on the ovezwhelming -
1 ma~ority of a people who have deep-rooted Islamic Crad:iCions and on a willing-
- ness for sacrifice and giving that reaches Che degree of martyrdom and re- -
demption for which Che Shi'ites have been known througlicut their hiatory.
This has been proven correct by the unequal confrontat:Lon in the-atreet be-
tween these masees and a well-trained and fully-equipped army. Theae masaea
naw put th~ir leader in the poeition of holiness. In ~heir view~ he repre-
sents the symbol of struggle, of political purity and nf religious selfless - -
nesa.
.
_ Despite this, the ability of Khomeyni's revolution to maneuver is curtailed
by several factors and circumstancea. His old age doeg not permit him to
exert too much effort to adopt daily decieions. He haa not actU~ally asaumed
power and has left it in the hands of a group of hia loyal followera. He -
may adopt a deciaion to withdraw gradually from the arena and return to live
in Qom~ being content with the role of the theoreCical leader and the
spiritual father.
Ttie other thing that may limit the effectiveness of his role is the dieagree-
ment among hie supporters and allies over a certain political line and a
definite ideological position. Moreover, the leaders of the Shi'ite reli-
- gious establishment itaelf view Khomeyni with some envy. He is nowhere near
- them insofar as their clerical and religious poaition i8 concerned, even ~
though he excels over all of them with~his overwhelming popularity and his ~
~ clear, unheaitant and uncompromiaing positions, eapecially toward the pre-
vious regime.
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~o~ orrrcinL usr~ orrLY
a.~0,o0U Mu~.1~~e '
_ Tliere nre nenrly 180~000 mu~.lns conetiCuting Che backbone of the religious
esCabllehmenC ChaC has ~n almasr. unique organizaeion in the Islamic world.
Thia establiahment pervades the core of Tranian life and exerCs its religious
and poliricAl influence through these firm re~.ations Chat it has establiahed
- with the popular classes.
The middle class, represent~d by the bazaar merchanCs, has been the natural � -
ally of rhe religious establishment in its long struggle with the regime Chat
depended on the military eetablishment. The bazaar merchanta often played a
atrong, even Chough noC apparent, role in tipping the scales in favor of the _
clergym~n over the shahs.
. In Khomeyni's revolution, there was a meeting of the interests of two victims
' in opposing and defeating the regime: The clergymen and Che b azaar merchanta.
- The shah's mietake was that tie launched in Che early 1960's a battle on two -
fronts. He committed what no political leader in a country with atrong reli-
gious sentimente would commit when he tried to confront the religious eotab-
]ishment through a police establiehment (the SAVAK). Through his poliCical -
deciaions and the slogans of modernization and reform, thp shah tried to curb -
the clergymen's social influence und powera. He confiscated the Shi'ite '
_ religious truste, reduced the government allocalions for the clergymen, per-
secuted their leadera and insulted the religious sentiments by appointing to
the positiona of power and control individuals belonging to auspecC sects,
such as Baha'ism, and people whose ability and in~egrity were doubtful.
Matters went too far when the shah adopted in the late 1960's the course of -
"Persianization," trying to wipe out the religious feelings by reviving
nationalist feelings reminding the Iranians of the glories of the ancient
Persian state. But his call was received lukewarmly~ and even left a nega-
tive impact. This call confirmed to the religious establishment and to the
overwhelming religious ma~ority of the people the soundness of their suspi-
cions concerning the shah and the throne. -
Bazaar's Role
= The bnzaar marketa with their narraw alleys, their closely lined up shopa
and tiieir luw roofa are the heart of every Iranian city. For example, there
are in Tehran 60,000 shops and buainesaes extending over an area of 10 square
kilometera. These shops, which attract the tourists with the traditional
- Iranian and oriental goods that they disnlay, constitute, deapite their =
modesty, the third force in Iran's political and economic life after the
shahanshah authority and the religioua establisllment.
In recent years, the bazaar merchants were exposed to an organized campaign
- by the Authority which overburdened them with its taxes, and with its disre-
gard for the merchanta' interesta. The authority inflicted grave harm on
them through ita attempt to fix prices and to hold them responsible for
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l~OR OrFICLAI, 1?SL' ONLY
~nmperin~; with Chese pxices ~ wtiereas Che authority itself was actunlly respon-
slble for Che i,n�].ation ~nd .for the rising cost of living through ita corrup- -
' ~ion. iCs wasting of the country's enor~nous resources~ and ita alliance with
the b3g merchants and businessmen, moet of whom are Jews and foreigners.
- Tl~e bazaar merchanta fele in~ustice afflicted on Chem wben they saw the poli- ~
eical authoriry entrusting foreign businessmen and their Jewieh Bahn'i ~epre-
senCatives with most of the contrncts ~:~u ~eals. Under the slogan of re-
_ building Tehran~ the nuthority even ~repared a plan to demolish the bazaar
. murketa and to ahatter thia enormoua claea of inerchanto. In 1977 nlone, the
_ uuttiority referred 250,000 bazaar merchants fram the various cities to triAl.
A total of 8,000 of thoge merchants were aent to ~ail an the charge of tam-
pering with prices, whereas bribee Co the tune of hundrede of millions of -
dollary were fi111ng the pockets of opporCuniste and foreignera cloae to Che -
government . _
'1'he bazaar merchants thus found in the religioua establlahment ~ natural nlly
to fight the political authority. In 1977, the ehah reduced the allocations
of tl~e rpligious estahlishment from 80 million dollars to 30 million do].lars. -
BuC th e bazaar merchants offered the establishment 320 million dollars to
enable ir Co advance the necessary aid to the poor classes.
Wl~en the troubles starCed at the end of 1977, the bazaar merchants and their
employees and workers were the first to proceed Co the confrontation arena.
One of the bazaar lenders in Irar. has said in Chis regard: "If the Islamic -
_ struggle in Iran is the body, then the bazaar is iCs eyea and the oil industry
its heart."
The b azaar merchanta financed Khomeyni's movement. Despite the atrike and
the economic and commercial difficulties, they paid the religious establish-
ment millions ~f dollars in 1978 to enable it to meet its commitments toward
the destitute classes that were harmed by the troubles and to help the fami-
lies ttiat loat their supporters through martyrdom or imprisonment.
Tlius , on re tiirning to Iran, Khomeyni was eager to cut the s trike period -
short. He and his government issued strong calls for return to work and for
reopen ing the shops, He did ao out of consideration for the merchants who
suffered and for their role and sacrifices in supporting his movement. _
Aut i~a ve Iran's problems and difficulties ended with the crust~ing victory
- scored by h7iomeyni's revolution ar.d with the great gain accomplished by the
_ religious earablishment? -
~Che rapid collapse of the shah's regime has caused tens of previously s~~p-
- presse d conflicta to rise to the surface. Perhaps some of these problems~
+.cd hy the problem of. the minorities lying in wai. on the remote bordera, .
~~rc enougi~ to create a number of big obstacles :tn the face of the stability