JPRS ID: 8390 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040026-8
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i0 APRIL 197~ CFOUO 2i179) . i OF i
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JPRS L/839Q
10 April 1979
TRAP~SLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
CFOU(l 21/79) � ~ �
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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JP1tS L/8390
10 April 1.979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 21/79) ~
CONTENTS � PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
INT~RNA.TIONAL AF~AIRS
Cmergency Measur~s for European Steel Indtistry
(Eugenio Occorsio; IL SOI,E-24 OItE, 7, 11, 14, 15 Feb 79). 1
FEDERAL RI:PUBLIC OF Ci:RMANY
Feder~l Office for Protection of Constitution Criticized
(STERN, various dates) 9
Poatal, Electronic Surveillance -
Use of Informants
Lack of Security
FRANCE
'New Opposition' Within PCF Described, Discussed
(Bernard Guetta; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12 Mar 79) 27
Lsibor Minister Boulin Interviewed, Defends Policy
(Robert Boulin Interview; PARIS MATCH, 16 Mar 79) 30
CFDT's Maire Interviewed on National Labor Picture
(Comond Meire Interview; PARIS Mr1TCti, 16 Mar 79) 37
Pertinent Official Interviewed on Research Policy
(Pierre Aigrain Intervi.ew; PARIS MATCH, 16 Mar 79) 43
Briefs
- ~ PCF Membership Requirement 45
SPAIN
Brief a
International Labor Meeting 46
- a- [ III - WE - 150 FOUOj
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~OR O~FICIAL U5L (1NLY ~
(.OUNTRY SCCTION IN'Cf:KN~TIONAL A~FAIRS
EMERGENCY MEASURES EOR EUROPEAN STEEL INDUSTRY ~
Milan IL SOLE-'lq ORE in Italian 11, 14, 15 Feb 79
[Article by Eugenio Occorsio~
C7 Feb ~9, P 5~
[TextJ Paris: The French government 3~esterday accepted the
union proposal to lower the retirernent a~e to for workers
in the Nord and Lorraine steel industry. The move announ-
ced at the close of a meeting between Labor Minister Robert
Boulin and union representativea of the sector is obvious-
ly aim~ed at easing some of the pain inevitably connected with
implementation of the plan to restructure the ateel industry
drafted by the government, which will involve laying off 25,000
steelworkers over a 2-year period. -
The measure, however, does not appear to be sufficient, of it-
self, to quell agitation among the steelworkers, who have al-
ready staged massive demonstrations in the last few days at
Longwy in Lorraine and at Denain in the Nord. The urii.ons, which
called out all 120,000 of France~s steelworkere on a natioalal
strike on 16 February, are demanding that the government ~go
bac,k to the drawing board with the entire plan to restructure
the steel industry.
Metz: There has not been a break in the mass demonatrations
protesting against the job cutbacks which are the most conspicu-?.~
ous aspect of the industrial and financial restructuring plan
the French government is proposing as a final solution to the
crisis in the steel industry, t~hose effec~s have been felt even
more keenly in France than in Italy. In 197g, according to
early estia?ates, steel production dropped to 23 rnillion tons
as against 2~ million in the pre-crisis year 1974�
When you say "steel" in France, you are talkir~g mainly about
Lorraine. In the 10 kilometers between Metz and Thionville,
with offshoots reaching into Ger~any and Luxembourg, lies one
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of the heaviest concen~rations oF gteeim~iis in Europe. The
- redimens3on3ng operation wi11 be drastic: mos~ of the existir?g
plants ~re obsolate, and no longer prof3~able to opor~te.
The results of this aituation and o� other faotors (first among
them the worldw3de crisis 3n the steel markets): in Lorraino
there were 52~416 people working in the stee1mi11s in 1966, and
now ~here are 3S~8a2; in another 2 years, there will be only
26,300. Nationw3de~ the overall job losaes from shutdowns
and layoffs have amountecf to something on the order of $0,000
in just, 6 years.
First, though, let~s take a careful look at the latest overall
~~.an, which was announced by~ the government on 10 Qctober after
getting ti~?e assent only of the most "moderate" of the national
union officea, and hence over the open opposition of the left.
The starting point is the 3~~00 billion lire loss piled up from
1975 to 1978. The greatest change called for has to do with
the capital stock of the three major conglomerates: Usinor~
Chiers-Chatillon, and Sacilor, whose output accounts for 90 per-
cent of the national total and is concentrated mainly in Lor-
_ raine. Control would pass to the State through the eatablish-
ment of several holding companies: a number of reductions and
increases of capital~ and consolidation of some of the debt.
The whole package seems indispensable primarily to halt the spi-
ralling interest charges which constitute an abnormal burden on
revenues, as is the case with our own Italsider, in which the
intere~t factor is over 11 percent. In France, that bite will
be pared down f rom 13 to 5 percent .
' The indebtedness of French steel compani.es now runs around 9,400
million francs, the equivalent of 1,900 billion lire. These are
the steps the banks will be taking for the financial part of
the treatment: 1. conversion of 600 million f rancs in credits
into capital, so as to achieve subscription for 30 percent of
the capital for each of the two holding companies; 2. wr~iting
off 400 million francs in interest due (that is 80 million francs
per year for 5 years on that portion of their credits not con-
verted into capital); 3. a commitment to maintain a line of
credit on behalf of the companiea at least equal in volume to
~heir current lines.
,
The measures envisioned for the plan will expire at the end of the
- 5 years provided for implementation, at which point a public
issue of s~curities will be undertaken, with formulas still under-
going scrutin~. As of now, the two holding companies will issue
p:eferrea stock, any ~iividends from which for the first $ years
will be reinvested, and whose quotation (the value loss tu share-
holders will be ?0 percent, but even before the treatment plan
. 2
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~UEt OF'FICIAL US~ UNLY
t:hc~ir shares had dropped to a thi.rd oi' their naminul value) will
be permitted on the E3our~se begiiin:i.ng wiLt~ ttie G~h your.
A:a for plant upgrading, titie restructur3ng pl~n t-,ends bo eancc~n-
tratie tihe French steel industry around thrae m~jor hubs:
I)unkirk (where on of Europe ~ s moat modern stcel plants wus l~u~.lt
in i~~63), Fos-sur-Mer (near M~rseillo), And Metz, where the~re
wi11 b~ ~he greatest ntunber of shutdowns, partly in order to
1es~en tho 3mpact of this development hub on t}~e whole induatry.
Produc~ion capucity will be cut b~ck �rom 3~. to 27 millioii tons
per y~ar, and act~ual production by 1983 will be 2$ m311iun tons.
Stcel~s future in France and elaewhere lies mainly wi~h oxygen-
furnace plantg, arid this is the direction i:i which it i~ moving.
The Air Liquide Company has built the biggest distribution pipe-
lina system in tha world here in Lorraine and in the westorn part
of Belgium~ with bri?nches running ~o Luxembourg, Germar~y, Ilolland,
and the reg3on around Dunkirk.
Once thi5 colossa7. troatment, certaic~ly tl~e mo~r daring ever Lu~-
dertakeii in France, tias been completiod and t}te sLeel sector lias
been restored to industrial and financial healtti, the government
is convinced that not only the financial and technolog3cal gaps
can be closed, but the productivity gap as well, with 1$0 million
tons of steel as against Germany'S 190 million and Japaii's 32~ -
million tona. Worki.ng on it will be men free of the taint of
ministerial bureaucracy. The government and the major national. -
banks, called upon to appoint the men who will implement the
whole package of m~asures called for, they are insisting
that will not ac~ept the term "nationalization," and vow that
all decisions are and will continue to be taken from the market
economy approach.
[11 Feb 79,p 11~ ~
[Text] F3russels: In Belgium~ as in France, massive government
steps are about to be taken to rescue a steel industry plagued
by a crisis to which there appear to be no viable market solu-
tions. The problems are the same ones we f ace at home; an in-
terest load so big as to swallow any nrofits, a debt burden out
of all proportion to assets~ and 3ndustrial structures sorely
in need of repair. And this is the way Belgium, with ita fine
tradition in the industry, even though the sector has been ail-
ing for a number of years because of the steady depletion of
caal and iron ore resources, is planning to deal with them.
The impact of the crisis on the Belgian steel industry has been
pairitully evident, as shown by these data:
1. The decline in production: 12.6 million tons in 1978, which
was 11.5 porcent better than in 1977, but 22 percent below the
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~~cruci~l~' year 1974 (16 million tons). ~
'l. The operating loeses auffered bv 1~he b~.g threo cor~porations:
in 1977 (much the eame situation provailed in 197~), Cockerill
los~ Z00 billion lire, Hainnult-Sambre 73 billic~n, and Sidmar
30 billion.
3. Product3vity per worker has been declining steadlily, and it
now staiids at 212 tons per year, as against Italy~s 240 (al-
though the French situation is markadly worse).
4. Labor costs here are the highest in the FEC: 430 francs per
_ hour~, or 12, 000 l~re, as compared with th~e Italian ~zverage of
4,200 and G~ermany's 1,960. ~
The broad outlines of the restructuring plan, with pdrticular -
reference to ec~~nomic restoration, were approved by the cabinet
~n 23 November 1978, after 2 years oP negotiations among thQ
government, the steel companies, and the unions. We got the
~vhole story from Chris~ian Oury, gregident of the I3elgi~n B1ast
Furnace and Steel Plant Group, which is the local equivalent
of Italy ~ s As~ider. Here, br~.ef~.y, are the tiigh:.ights.
a. Conversion of inedium- and long-term financial indebtedness
to convertible bonds, issued by the corporations and underwrit-
ten by the State, with maturity in $ years. This measure is
less radical than the one adopted in France, where the bonda
will be immediatel~ converted int~ stocks by public bank con-
sortia. In exchange for this pledge, here again the State will
pick up a port~.on of the ca~ital c~qual to 60 percent of shares
held by major stockholders (40 percent);
b. a$-year extension on payments to suppliers;
c. further payr~ll cutbacks (employment has declined already
from 74,000 at the end ~f 1974 to 50,000 today) totaling 6,000
more jobs ov~er the next 'l yearg through early retirement at 55
on ~0 percent of base pay, full pension to be paid beginning at
age 6$. The adjuatments over past ye~rs have been achieved
primarily through f~eezing turnover, except for 1,$00 workers
affected by a plant closing, who were guaranteed full base pa,y
for the first year, 90 percent base pay for the second, and
. 80 percent base pay for the third;
do State participation ~n re~inancing some of the companies.
As of now~ the government has picked up 35 percent of Cockerill
stock and 22 percent af Sidmar's. Boards of directors will have
equal numbers of government ar:d private-sector members;
e. Th~ State will guarantee cash-fluw requirements in exchange
for convertible bonds.
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i'OR OI~'FICIAi. USL ONI~Y
Clearly, t}ier~c~ wi11 be a 1ot ot' ~ovornment activ:L~y involvad,
aiid put~ing it A11 together will be anything bui; simple. The
spocifi.c procedures will bo ~jstabliahed on a case by case ba-
sis direcbly by the companies. Ttie ~ob cutbucks already in
tlie works wi.ll, in any case, raise~ considerablQ dif~iculty in
i rebmployment, wh3ch ie particularly aensitive in the two vitnl
zones of Liege and Charleroi, whictl were hard hit in the 5ix-
ties even before the coal crisis struck, and bnttered again
by ttie slump in haavy construction. The government has sought
to get through the 3nitial problems by making available half
a million Belgian franca (around 14 millian lire) for every
job lost~ and ~hrough plans to create new ones to replace thom
as ~ reault of new 3nvestments start3n~ as of January 1976�
Additionally, for unemployment compensation alone, 154 billion
tire t?ave already been paid out. Private sharoholders have
come up with 'L80 billion in working capital for new investments
in areas other than steel.
[14 l~eb 79, p 13J
[Text] Luxembourg: We must nat overlook the steel industry in
the tiny Grand Duchy: snuggled into the vary heart of L�he great
basin that includes the German plants in the Snar, the French
mills iri Lorraine, and Belgium's Charleroi installations, Luxem-
bourg is anything but a minor factor, for more reasons than one.
~he historical basis lies in t}ie fact that rigtit here, in the
Dudelange area~ 18 March 1886 saw the first batch of Thomas type
steel (which today is the most in demand and wi~iely used) ever
made on the continent of Europe, thus openir.g ~ip th~ future Por
the highly phosphated ore fr~m the Lorraine mines, as well as
for Belgian and German coal.
The economic importance of Luxembourg's stepl industry atems
frorn the world-wide reach of the Arbed corporation, which has
a monopoly on Luxembourg steel. Arbed xs one of the biggest
corporatione in the world steel ma:�i:et, with extenaive holdings
abroad: French and Brazilian iron mines, coalfields in the Ruhr,
an intorest in Belgiwn~s Sidcnar corporation and in other steel
companies in Germany, Austria, Brazil, and Argentina.
In Luxembourg, Arbed and its subsidiaries provide jobs for some
2$~000 people (,out ef 350,000 who make up the total population)~
but employment levels are steadi].y dwindling at an alarmingly
high percentage, again because of the crisis. Production rose
' a little in 1978: 4.7 million tons of stpel, a 10.,5-percent `
increase over 1974, the last "good" year before the cutoff o~
the international markets toward which practically all produc-
tion was directed. Further, all raw materials (iron ore and
coke) must be imported from Sweden, America~ and Fra~ice (Lorraine~.
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~ Expo~sed as no other to the ups and downs oi the icitern~tiona~
Aitu~tion~ the Luxembourg atoel industry h~?~ been los3.n~ money
for ye~rs~ to tho point of triggerin~ the reatructurin6 str,ns~
ali~eady under way~ ~~hich wi11 certainly h~ve drastic impac~ on
emplayment. By way ~f example, the hourly cost of labor in
1977 was 9~~61 13re, as compared with 6,535 3n Italy, 7,569 in
France, 1.0,120 in Germany, and 11,200 3n Delgium. _
Part of the governmenb-run plan is a st~e1 cooperation agreement
betwoen the governmeii~s of Belgium an~ ~1~E Grand Duchy (where
steel~s share of the econ~my is by far the largest of the few
sectors to be found there). The agreement cal?s for a concerted -
, effort at streamlining and updating plnnts, preserving the bal-
ance between the two countries~ ateel iridustries, and making al-
lowances for European interrelations.
Worth noting is the fact that the Rodange-At~hus Mining and Metal '
Company, an Arbed subsidiary~ owns a rolling mill in Belgium at
Athus, in addition to ibs home plazit a~ Rodange.
. ~
[15 l~cl~ 79, p 17]
~Text] Brussels: This lengthy journey ~liroubh the crisis beset- -
ting the Community~s steel industry and the emergency measures
the various governments concerned are contemplating comes to
its logical end in a series of ineetings at Berlaymont Palace,
called for the purpose of getting a gloaal picture of the situ-
ation as it affects the Nine. An initial datum to emerge from
the information provided by the experts gathered there is not
heartening: even though in 19~8 there was a slight upturn in
world produ~tion, here in the EEC we are still woefully belaw .
the pre-crisis level (production prior to 1974), and th+e out-
look for the medium term is anything but hopeful.
To grasp the discrepancy between optimum and actual production ,
capacity, cite need only recall that the mosf: reliable forecasts
of market conditions over +he next few years cite 1~4 million
tons as the optimal output for the EEC in 1983, whereas today
it st,ands at 201, with output of 148 million and hence with a
mean rate of utilization well below the 8$ percent cutoff point
for economic viability for plant.
The European steel industry (see chart on output and producti-
vii;y) will therefore have to pay a very high price to tailor
its structures to fit t~he new requirements of the world market:
the general decline in consumption, combined with the growing
influence of production by non-Community countries. From such
countries contes a never-ending flow of exports to the EEC, which
' consequently and paradoxically finds itselt in the position of
importing a lat more steel than it ought, at ever-lower prices
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_ FUR 0~'FtCIAi, 115C UNI.Y
and in a sy~tem of' competition wliatc}i in maiiy ca5o~ is uriyth3.ng
but proper, ~ven thou~li i.n very recont years a~;�reemonts hAVe
boon r~actied witti t-hree tourttis oi' thesc: countr~ieg.
STCEL PRODt1CZ'ION
Produtlone ~ ~ ~~r millions of ~ons
�Id~rurpica ~
MILIONI 01 TONN '74 '791~um.? Shaded bars : 1974
' So1id bary: Est. 197~
i"',~ a~,~ ~ '
~
~~~4 ~0 ~1e ~'6 ~1~~ ~iZ 79 �1Z/O ~7 /O
Prod~ttlvlt~ t~~ oic,~a~~ ~ PRODUCT:LVITY -
16NM ANNU~ s t~l,~ !M ~
Il ADD~TTO ~N ~YIIlUal tOI1S ~P.T' worker
11 � 1~~~
~~e,4 [RFT = i'RG]
~ Source : OECD and Ctiambers of
Os Fr B�N~L RFT J~p USA or~anized labor. _
- RONT! ~ OCD[ � o~n~a� �IMaeNI
r
- `~This is cer~tainly no new problem, but it is one which nobody so
~ Far has managed to solve, despite the setti.ng oF minimum prices
arid guidelines for markets within tho Community, and of refe- -
rence pricas for imports from abroad (theae prices are the es-
timate world average prices made public as a basis for datermin-
ing whether a given price is fair, or constitutes dumping). Now
� they are tryin~ tlie planning and quantity control approach, with �
all the predictable unknowns surrounding it.
Declining consumption, dropping net margins of exports, and ex-
cess capacity: because of these threee chronic ailments the
whole of Europe~s stee]. industry, but most particularly that in ~
the weaker EEC countries, stands in absolute need of drastic and
urgent measures to restore its industrial and financial health.
The subject iiiQVitably- leads ~xs home to Italy, and to Italsider
in particular, where the deficits are still piling up beco~.use of
thc impossibility of recovering the tremendous sums laid out on
pre-crisi5 investments (in 19'73 and 19~4 a7one the peak effort was
made, in view of rising trends on the m~rket). Debt service
costs alone reached $00 billion per year, and only the planned
increase in capital from 1,1~9 to 1,800 billion will make it pos-
sible to make at least a partial improvement of L-he amount of
ready capital in relation to investments and indeptedness (4,000
bila.ion) .
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Even so, from the point of view of plan~,, the ~insidar~ 6roup nced ~
envy nobody. The substanl;ially up-to-date ~tructure o� its plant
makes Fins3.der stronger than would appear ~rom its balance-sheet:
the complete-cycle planta (Bagnoli, Turanto, Genoa, and Piombino)
are al1 on the sea, and this cuts down on their supply shipment
costa, and the solid charge planta (Terni, Dalmine, LovQre, and
_ Campi) are alao close to the raw materials (scr~ap) collec~ion
centers and to their markets.
One "st ructural" exception is the sagcioli plant. The EEC Commis- -
sion knows full well that this is one of the very few "plague-spot~" _
- in Italian ~teelmaking on the technical eFficiency score. That
would re~u3re very coatly restructuring investment,s, called for
both under the final program for the steel industry within the
provisions of the Italian industrial reconversion act, and under
- the proposed regulations for aid to t~he sector filed some time .
ago with the Rrusaels Cauncil (but as ye~ not acted upon).
Goiiig back to the whole gruup of Italsider a.~nd Finsider companies, '
it is worth remembering, as we learned in detail in earlier in-
sta~ments of this article, that the situatian is every bit as
serious~ particularly in Belgium~ France~ and Luexmbuur6, coun-
tries in which massive govex~nment intervention has already begun
to lighten the load of intereat costs and to a~sure capacity to �
m~~ve ahe~~d with reconversion investments , without bankr~uptcy
breathing down their necks, by means of adequate recapitaliza-
tion.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l. -
6182
CSO: 3104
~
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COUIJ'I'RY SI;C'rTON FT:~CRAL EtEPU~3LIC OF GERMMIY
rCDERAI, OFFICE FOR PROTEC'rION OF CONSTITUTION CRITICIZED
Hamburg STERN in G~rman 8 Feb 79 pp 68-7G -
Postal, Clectronic Surveillance
['i'ext] Section VII in the Federal Office for the Protection
of the Constitution ie actually supposed to find terroristy.
But inatead of solid facte~ it is providing solid scandals,
bureaucratic idling and e~nbarrassing disappointments.
DER STERN reveals how the "lazy bones" work.
~
Letters for the Munich attorney Juergen Arnold, 35, were suddenly delivered
to the wrong addressea. Some of his pri~~ate mail went to his office, and
_ sometimes bu~iness letters arrived at his home. Arnold wrote to the
_ responsible district post offl.ce 40 and asked for an ~xplanation. The
' post office knew nothing: "Unfortunately, in spite of all efforts, we have
not succeeded in discovering the conditions that led to the fact that some
letters addressed to your home were sent to your office."
The information was false. For at that time--it was August, 1975--the
lawyer's telephone was being tapped by order of the Federal Office for
ProCection of the Conetitution (BfV), and his mail was being opened. And
in the process, some postal official had often thrown all the letters
that had been returned from being opened into a bundle and shipped them
off in the basket for only one delivery district.
- 'Pt~e re~lson for the investigation was that Arnold is a leftist. He defended
a member of the terrorisr "Ser_ond of June Movement," represented the Trikont
Publishing House after the ~,pectacular confiscation of the Bommi Baumann
book, "Wie alles anfing" [How It All Began], and was the lawyer for a
femanle bank robber from the M~lnich anarchist milieu. Arnold's "mistake"
was that he took the eide of his clients. "I did not identify with them--
but I am of the opiaion that they must also be treated ~ustly."
Since the constitutior,~~ protection authorities, in spite of wire taps,
mail openings and cotitinu~l observation, could not find any proof for their
- suspicion that "Arnold was a central figure in anarchical terrorism (con-
stitutional protection dossier) in the Munich area and in part beyond it,"
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the federal office in Cologne puahed for sharper measures. BfV President
Richard Meier wanted conversations in the lawyer's officE Co be monitored
with a bug as we11. His colleagues in the "Bavarian Stnte Office for
- Protection of the Constitution" (BLfV) received under the official symool -
L VIII 086 - S- 182 588 ("Operat.ton Fork" [Gabel~) permission to spy on
Arnold.
This was not at all easy BLfV President Dr Hans Ziegler wrote to Meier
~oncernicig this maCCer: "Here we have always proceeded from the ideA
that, fur a listening effort possibly to be effective, we would have to
succeed in obtaining neighboring rooms in the house. After we rried to
do this but failed, we considered the operation to be impossible. 'ihe ~
considerably greater risks of An operation from outside are unanimously
recognized and have been discussed by everyone."
Ziegler was right. Arnold's room located In a communal ofEice on the
Hohenzollern-Strasse in Schwabing, on the ground flaor, witt~ the cellar
below, yard behind, colleagues right and left, and a young team of designers
above. A break-in (Ziegler politely: "Operation from outside") was something
Ziegler did not want to risk: "Th~ v.lue of such an action here as iti
simil~r situations is nnt considered to be worth the risk."
Meter reacted furiously: "I cannot express my agreement with this answer
from the BLfV. While our ~udgment contains several indications of ineetings ~
in A's office, the letter only repeats unfo~mded views of the P(resident)
of the BLfV." -
Meier was in a mood to bug. After all, he had ~ust given the green light
for "Operation Winzer" [Operation Winegrower] in which the lawyers Haag,
Becker and Croissant were to be bugged--and approved the break-in into the ~
house of nuclear physicist Klaus Traube ("Operation Muell") [Operation
Rubbish]. To soothe him, Ziegler offered: "The BLfV will soon suggest
an ob~ect with a less problematic li.stening operation which can be executed
as a test. Preparations for tt~is are underway." "
There is no evidence against Arnold that could ~ustify the planned listening
operation and tricks which are still being played today. The lawyer attracted
a:tention becauae he was embarrassing; he was tricked, for example with
house searches ("We are looking for explosives"), and learned years ago
about an investigation procedur.e against him. Even today he does not know -
why it was tnade or continues. When larger terrorist acts occur, he is
always visited by two officials of the Land Criminal Department who demand
an ali~i from him for the time in question. He is on the list for the
observational search "Befe 7" and is often detained for hours at the botder `
when he travela ~broad. He bears it with composure and believPs: "If it
were not a constitutional government, I could not be a lawyer here. In
the GDR or in Chile I would certainly not be one." ~
The bug has become the heraldic animal of the Second German Republic: ~
. begging is done during break-ins, even "as a test" (could anyone have been
1C
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i~bk hh'i'[C1AL USI: (1NI,Y
r~luglit in thi~a mc~nnr.r'?) ,.~i~~1 wa11N r~r~c~ buy,ge~l tf:x-Mini.~+tcr of the I~itc~rior
Wcr~ier Mr~ihoEer. : "We do ttot ~io thnt! .
S'Tf,RN (Nc~ 12J1~~71: "Con:~t.itutional I'rotector X") knowH ol' cupe~ in H~7mburE;
tn wh{~~h thE~ Con~tituti~nc~l Yroterti~~~i UfEice h~~3 rectted liotel roomH tiext
to suypiclouy nrr~on:3 ,tnd ptit bugg into IIUtE'9 bored i.iito the w,~ll~. At~d
it~ ~~ow and then in tl~iy 9ervice a bugging i~ refu~ed, the reservntiottb nre
~ertatn.ty not of a.lep,al n.~tur.e. An example: in the early summer of 1976,
Senior Polir_e qfPicer Wilhelm Knueck, 4~3, from the I3fV decideJ, in r~se
which he wr~y hr~ndling, to bug a plnce. He mndr. ~i written rr_qucst, but hi~
superiur, Governmental ~dvisor Aet, refu~ed for "technicc~l" rengons: it
was known from the "Muell" c~se (listening operucion againqk the nuctear
phys ic ist i)r Kl~nu:i 9'rnt~be) thc~t Che npparFitu~ did not work. Kueck w~ca mnd.
'['his proceys ig typical for bepnrtment VII, in which Kueck work~. Nowhrre
else is this seemingly "extreme me~nv" (Maihofer) used so frivolc~usly ne
there, 'Che legcnd~~ry statcmen~ of one-Cime Mintster c~f the Interior Hermr~nti
ll~~~cherl th.~t hi~ constitution~l protectors "cnuld not continually run around
with the constitution nnder their nrms~" hf~~ now tr~ken on quite a new inter-
pretatton; 'The "Soldierv of DepArtment 5even," so lt qeems, du noC know
the con9titution at all. It it~ not surprising that iti ~1 federr~l bure~rrncy
so full of affeirs, Deparcment VII iF already the w+.th the most nffnirs.
It was Eounded in 1973 by the then president of the BfV, Guenther Noll~u,
because there w~s no group cnpable of keeping w~hrch over terrorist r.ells.
F'ighcinK terroris[s wns something new. The beginninps of the bombinga tiad
~imply been ignored by bepartment II (leftist extreniiym) whi.ch wn~ responsihle
at the [ime. The usual methods which were used~ for example, ngninst n party
such ay the Germnn Communist Fnrty, were almost usele:~s against terrorists
group5: acquirinp, nnd inserting spies who worked sometimes for n lot of
muney.
Por reasons of secrecy, the new department was not placed in the large head
officc~ on [~arthelstrasse in Cologne~ but in en office building on Widders-
d~rft~r Strasse in Cologne. Ln a building in which they had rented two floors
for 35~000 marks a month. "Pro~ect Duke (itcrzogJ" as it wag called intern~lly,
was disgui�ed ea a"Peder~l Accouncing Office." Orip,inally, Department ViI
was t~ have been houeed in the fiederal Automobile Inspection (TUeV] highrise
{r~ (:ol~gnc-Muelhetm. In 1976, the whole dcpartmenC had to retreat to
t~.~rt}~elscrasqe. Uut this move coet eome[hing more than half a million marka.
'I'he reason given by a cormnission of [he federal ministry was that "Project
Duke" had been placed on a much too active ~:treet. The rer~l reason: A bar
fight t~ad become public in which four officials ~f Department VI2, among
them a senior o:'Hci~l vtth karute training, had been bea[en up by a bully.
F~r che first chieE of the terrorist fighters, No1J~au go[ Opera[ions Chief
ii:~ns-.iuer~en Wiehe from [he Sta[e Office for C~~nsit~utional Protec[ion in
Hznov~r. Wiche, a former journalist. was considered to be one of the
clevere~at r~nd most cap~~bte "operators" who had aorked his way up ~without
univcrsicy study to becom~ the leadinR governmencal director. But the
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~ok c~~F�rr.tnr, us~~, ~)NLY
capnble Wir.he ~oon losr his nppc~iee for thc~ new ~job nnd went b~ck to
H~hnover. ~iraC of all~ the promise way not kept of promc~etn~ him to
"nirector in Conetitutional ProCection" (senior civil c~ervant). In the
~~cond pluce, the buildup of the dcp~~rtm~nt wn~ not workink ~is well ag
hnd been prdmieed, but was rc~ther beinK chnked in the hure~7ucrnr_y. The
necegsary financi~l and pereonnel decisions took months to come from ll~e
Ministry of the InCerior.
'There w~g a loC of elbowing. Mnny of those who h~~d vol~nr.eered were
eager for rapid careers and intere~tin~; ta~ks ~ibout which the people
in the Interior Ministry could only dream ~it their desk~. in the operntionhl.
~rea Chere were business trips, telephnne