JPRS ID: 8389 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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iA , I CFOUO i3179~ i OF i
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JI'I25 L/8389
- io Apr,il i9~9
. ~
.
TRAPJSLATIONS 0~! NEAR EAST AND NORTN AFRICa
(FOUO 13/79)
� '
. ~ .
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NOTC
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JPR~ L/8389
10 Anril 1979
~ TkANSLATIONS ON NEAR F.AST AND iVORTH AFRICA
' (FOUO 13/79) ~
COMTENTS PAGE
zrrr~-~s ~naRS ~
' PLO W111 Seek U.S. Recognition as Sign of '(3ood Will'
(Mohe,med Selhami; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2F~ Mar ?9) 1
IRAN ~ -
Women Who Believed in I4iomeyni �
(Kenize Mourad; LE NOWEL OBSII~VATE(kt, 19 Ma~' 79~ 2
Briefe
On Khomeyni's Blacklis~ 6
ISRAEL
Article ~xamines How War Haa Transformed Zionism
(Axyeh Ya'ari; 7
SUDAN �
Opposl~tLon Leader Describes Unrest in 3udan
~ (Shaxif Iiusuy~ al-Iiindi Interview; A.~-WATAN AL-'ARABI~ -
11-17 Jan 79) 12
TUNISIA -
Ma~or Invest~ente Slated for Mining, 'trrigation
( MAFtCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Feb 79 18
Destourian Party Prepares Congress, Woos Youth -
(MARCIIES TROPICAUX ET MED~S, 9 Mar 79) 23
Briefs
Bou Aouane ;~Iineral Deposits 29
- a- [ I I I - NE F~ A- 121 FOUO )
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' CON~'ENi'6 (Con~inued) p~,ge -
WESTIItN SAHARA '
_ Pol.issirf.o's N1Qin Aim To Win Img!ortant Mi.litary Victories
(CAI~IDIO 16, 18 Mar 79) 30
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INTEB-ARAB AFFAIRS -
PLO WILL S~EK U.S. RECOGNITION AS SIGN OF 'GOOD WILL'
� Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 p 24 LD
[Report by Mohamed Selhami: "The PLO Will Continue the S'.Cruggle"]
E~
[Excerptj "The signing by al-Sadat of the American-Israeli-Egyptian agree-
ments iH meanin~;leae to the PLO since the Arab world has uaanin~~usly con-
demned it," Ibrahim Sus, PLO permanent repreaentative in Paris, told us.
"If atich u signing had immediately followed the visit to Jerusalem (19 Nov-
ember 1977), it would certainly have been difficulC for the Araba to counter
it. Dut now, particularly since the Iranian revolution, the balance of power
' in the area has changed. Egypt ia ieolated and so ie Israel, economically
and politicully."
The PLO's position has been strengthend by Jordan's. Following the Husayn-
'Arafat meeting in Amman un Saturday ]7 March, the Hashemite sovereign,
- who was to receive Zbigniew Brzezinekiy the next day, condemned the Israeli- -
Egyptian treaty and declared in favor of a Palestinian 3tate.
The PLO has called for an Arab summit, at which it intends to demand impl~-
mentation of all the secret -~esolutions passed at the Baghdad aw~anit (2-5
November 1978}_particularly those which stipulate a aeries of political,
economic, social and cultural sanctions against Egypt. In this reapect, how-
ever, the PLO's demands are likely to come up against the reluctance of
Saudi Arabia which, although condemning the treaty, ia opposed to an eco-
nomtc boycott.
The moderate countries display roughly the same attitude as Riyadh. But
the PLO intends to concentrate the main thruat of its offensive 3n the
United Nariona. According to Ibrahim Sus, it is going to demand implementa-
tion of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the Paleatinian people's -
rights: "In this way we will be able to ~udge U.S. good will when it comes -
to seeking a~ust peace in the region. However, this good will should s:iow
% itself first through recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimgte represent-
' ative of Che Palestinian people."
Parallel to tt~is diplomatic campaign "on a large 3cale, the PLO will con-
tinue the armed struggle both inside and outside the occupied territories." `
_ COPYRICHT: Jeune Af.rique GRUPJIA 1979
CSO: 4800 1
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~oK or~zcr~ us~ otv~,x
X~
WOM~N WHO BELIEVED IN KHOMEYNI
7
' Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 19 Mar 79 pp 44-45
[Report on conversations wiCh Iranian women by Kenize Mourad] -
(Text] You laughed in my face, Nuarat, as you dld, Soleyla, and as you did
too, Nassrin, when I was in Iran a month ago ~xpressing my concern about
the place of women in an Islamic republic. That was the day after the ~
victory. The people, led "by f~:dayin and mu~~aeddin groupa, had conquered
the barracks, emptied Che arsenal and were no~~? ainging in the streeta. You
had participated in everything, L~ndpr your long black chadors, in the great ~
demonatrations,,in the diatributions of tracts, in the inspection of the arr~s
and sometimes in the combata them~elves. You were happy, proud, aure of
~ yourselves, and the details of the Sharia, the Koranic law which specifically
permits repudiation and polygamy, preacribes that the "honest woman" hide
her hair and her form, and ordere atoning for adultery, did not worry you
very :~uch. "Those are ancient cuatoms," you would remark, "they will be
adapted as a function of present conditions, as is the custom in Shiite
Islam where the i~Cihad, the interpretation of a great ayatollah is pre-
_ scribed. In any event," you added, "in the Koran it is written that men and
women are equal because they are created from the same es~ence."
Today you are uneasy. Thousands of Iranian women have demonstrated ~gainst
wearing the chador and to demand equality ~f political, economic and social
:ights with men. And you too, under your biack veil, you have demonstrated
so that the choice may be left to each one whether she will veil herself or
unveil herself. And you have been attack.ad, some women have even been
wounded with daggers. Provocateurs? SAVAK agents who want to lessen the
prestige o� tt~e npw regi.mP? Perhaps. But you are only half convinced of
it: you know very well that there are ~anatics and reactionary Mullahs
- who wouid be willing to profir from circumstances ~n order to find the
place once again where 50 years ago they replaced "monarchy with mullarchy"
nnd rest their authority on that half of the population which used to be easy F
to control: the women. You have won a preliminary battle: the Ayatollah
Khomeini, who had asked ~~u to cover "your heads, your necks, your arma and
yu~r legs," has conceded that this was "not an obligation but only... a duty." ~
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~oK or�ricini. us~ ocvLY
The nlack Kexchie� _
' Wearing that vei.l! Xou are ar~noyed that Westernexa and a cerra~.n number o~
- your compatriota gi.ve eo much importance to it and thaC it ahou~.d 6e can-
sidered as the symbol, Che barometer of the ~volution or of the 1lberty of ~
Iranian women. "The French or American feministe were not as worried when
under the Shah's dictatorahip we were imprisoned and tortured. And, for that
matter, what righte did we ha~~e? They tried to force us to accept valuea
which were not our own, they interdicted accesa to the univereities and to
the schoola to those women who wore the chador or even the he~ab (a amall
kerchie� for hiding the hair). With a great deal of publicity they tried
_ to tranaform us into dolls, into aexual ob~ects which would not be dangeroue
for the regime."
Dolle, sexual ob~ecte, the k.ey worda are spoken. Between 1966 and 1976 the
consumption of beauty producta in Teheran increased 500-fold. Is that the
standard by which the progresa of Iranian women is meaeured.
But the veil ia not in itself a factox of progreas anymore.... On that, you -
have argued among yourselvea, you are not in agreement. "First of all,
= what veil? The chador is not a Moslem costume but an Iranian one. It
existed among ua long before Islam, Mohammed simply re~~ommended that women ,
should cover their hair and should not carry themselves in 3uch a way as to �
excite men." "For me," Nuarat, a law student, declareg, "to wear the chador
. was a political act, a sign of rallying againat the regime of the Shah who
~ forbade it. Now, like many Iranian women, I no longer wear either the chador
_ or the he,jab." As for Soleyla, she is a physical engineer. During the
struggle, she also wore the chador, but today, in order to go to the factory -
where she works, the only female enginec,. among the workers, she finds the
black fichu which hides her beautiful blond hair to be more comfortable.
All of you women speak to me of Ali Shariati, that Iranian philosopher who
died in London three years ago. Some people claim that he was assassinated
by the Shah's agenta. Among you, hi.s portraits cover the walls. "He wss
, the real instigator of the Iranian Revolution. He turned the young people
upside down by making them find once again the real sense of. Islam, beyond
the dusty traditiona which blurred i.'te image. He re~ected the idea of the _
submissive Moslem woman which our families presented to us as a model.
Between that trad~tional woman and the 'modern' woman wh4 lives according to
pattern3 imported ~rom the West, we want to freely find our own identity."
Repudiation, Stoning
And the equality with men, for which you are struggling, :Ls that according
to the Karan? Repudiation, for example? "Tn Tslam, woman always has had
the right of divorce, while you Westerners have not received that right until
_ recently and it is still forbidden by the Catholic Church. Under Islam, it
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_ ie suCficient that it be apecified in the marriage contract. IIut many people
among ~is d~.d not e~en know it; Khomei,ni remin~ded us of i~_ i,n a xecent speech."
And polygamy? Tt's apPlled out in Pu11 in the Koran. What do you think,
Nnasrin, you who are married, o~ ~he opinions of the great Ayatollah of Machad,
who declarea thaC "as a rooater needa sev~ral hens, a m4n needa aeveral womeu?"
_ The Koran stipulatea that a r~an ma;? have Pour wives ouly if he loves all of -
them equally and if he treate them equally. That ia impossible."
"If that were possible, if it is poasible, would you nccept?"
"No, unless I were very sick, so that I could not have sexual relations or i�
I could not have children."
"However, in epite of those xeasons, it is in the Koran and you must accept
it." Poor Nassrin, you b;:~Qh, you nervously bite your fingers, you are
- torn beCween your loyalty to I,~lam and the reality of being a young woman in
love. I have stopped my questi~~ning because you w~re on the point of
bursting into soba.
And Lhat couple who several days ago were flogged iti the public square for
an act of love outaide the contract. A light penalty if it is compared to
_ the stoning of the adulturous woman prescribed by the Koran. Soleyla rebelled:
"They always apeak of the atoning of the woman, but according to the law the
man also is etoned."
"But things are not set up that way."
"No," you recognized, "but in fact Islam has put such conditions on stoning
that it turns out to be almost impossible. It is necessa�ry for four trust-
worthy witnesses to have seen the act khile it wast-~~i~ig� ~onsummated." -
~"However, Soleyla, don't you believe that if the Koranic law is re-established
- many ~ealous husbands or husbands who might just be tired of their wives
might buy such witnesses?"
' "Yes, of course," you sighed. "That is why, as Moslems, we do not wiah only
a change in the relationship between men and women, as we know very well that
they are based on social relations of inendaci.ty and exploitation. We want
change in all of aociety."
Lf Khomeini is Mistaken
And suddenly, to my gxeat stupefaction, I saw all three of you clad in your -
blthrn. %i~m- istic l:c: i.;irn~is~r~ a~i~ountti to a tactical quar-~. -
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- ror~ orrzczAL us~ ortLY
�
rel about tl~e Ucat way to acliicvc thc same Icnce to~,.~rd the ncighboring pcopic:' _
results. , "Visions oE Zionist political policy lacking
fullest conccrn tor Arab rigl~ts not only indicatc
Self-Determinatlon for Both Peoples un abaencc oE scnsibility nnd intcgrity - but
Iiow far away in timc we (ind oursclves chat o[ polieicai realism as a~ell."
today from tl~e enrly '/..ionist lcaders' decla� A comparison between tl~is conception
ratians ;?bout rigl~ts to tlic land, wt~ich wete which inspired a noble humanistic tradi!ion
- to be cquaily bcstowcd upon both Jews and - and tl~e prescnt opposition to the Pales-
Arabs! In thc thirtics, Bcn ~3urion declarcd tinian's riglit to sclf-dctcrmination cqually
be[orc a British Itoyal CCom,nissiot~ t~~at our sharcd by Jabotinsky's and Iicn Gurion's suc- '
_ ~im was tl~c crc~tion of a bi-national stltc: ccssor~ indicates l~ow low the mcrals oE
"If wc werc o[fercd a Jcwish Stnte we wouYd the 'Lionist movemcnt ha~�e fallen, somc~vhcre
rc[usc it", ~c s~id. And it was llso tl~e young along the road betwecn its aspir: tions and
Ben Curion who wonder[ully dcfin~;d the its achicvc~nents. (The debates arni tl~c re-
~ positioci oz Soci~list-'l.ionisli~ in terms of the solutions adoptcd during tl~e )ast Zionist
acutc problc;n of tl~c Palestinian pcoplc's Conbress - which wcrc ratificd by a strong
rigl~ts : � majority, in spitc of t}~c laudable efforts of
"I am wholc-lieartedly for tlu ri8ht of ~cit� tl~c le[t-wing minority - are a sad illustra-
- dctennination for cvcry pcoplc." tioR of thcse statements.~
"'1'his riglit cannot be lin+:,ed ur conditioned
~ bcclu~a ot ita c(fect upun us or our nf(ain, The Problem ~
7'hcrc i~ no doubt but tliat t~ie Arab pcoplc~ ~~'h1t :s the real problem? ls it an un-
o[ thr. Land o[ Isracl posscss the right to scl(� 1voidablC et~olutionary proCess that charac- _
detennin~tion. 7'F~is riglit cannot be restricted teel~CS the rold that many a nationist mo~�e-
out of tcar ehac ;t mighc encumbcr our cn- ment has travelled? I.loyd Gcorge cricd out:
~ clcavor~. 7'lic moral casc of 7.ionist thougtit "I zm in dcsrair as I scc stnall nations wl~icli
implics that a pcoplc evcry pcoplc - eort� hlvc scarccly c~ught a glimpsc of light and
stitutc an cnd in itxclL It is not an instru� Cannot wait to oppress othcC nltions."
meniality tor tl~e attainiuent ot oUject;ve~ of Collcctive ethics, e~�en m~re than indi~�i-
oth~r pcoplcs." dual etl~ics, arc both a product and a funa ,
"Wc ~cek th:?c d~c Jcwish prople be a sove� tion of interests. But tl~c fcar and mistrust
reign mastcr c,t h~ d~stiny in liistory H~ithout th~t hatred, ldversity, and aggression hat�e
bcing dc~~enelc~~t or ~he wilt - yes, tt~c good g~ncratcd, all cloud tlic ability to make a
will of oil~cr ~,copl~~s. I.ikewise, wc secL� cl~e clear distinction between genuine and spe-
~ame tor tt~c Arabs. I:ven if tlic m~?cccr wcre cious interests. The stupelying ri3e oE ultra- -
entirely wittun our jurisdiction and subject to ortliodox obscurantism whicli has joined for- "
our ~vill, wc can?~ot ~�icw tl~c Arabs ot thc I.and ccs with fanatic chau~�anism, is an obviot~s -
~ of l.rael aa a~neaus (~r our e~nda, We cannoe sy~inpto~n of the inauspicious process ��hich
- dctcri~~inc thc L~tc ut thcir rights." the %ionist mo~�ernent, oncc liberal and en-
"It ie pussiblc that tlic cunsummation oE lishtc�ncd, has gone through. ~
A�a!~ aims (or sclf-drte�nninatiou might impuse
fenuidnlalc diffii~~~lti~s u~mn us. IIo~~�c~�cr, tl~at ThP Impact of Wa~
- tlnnot ~cr~�c us n principlc t~ rctrnct that right Tl~c only [�~ctor which cxplains this mutz-
tro~n tl~c Ar:~bs." tion is - wac which in die coursc of ~
"A lurcc lacking a moral [oundatinr~ is tran- time bccamc thc fundamcntal condition �~nd
~icnt. 1(islory has nut establithcd th,t P~~Y~~~1~ tl~e pcrmanent context of thc relations bc-
might alonc iv suf(icicnt tu sustain rulc for ttvc:cn thc Jct~�s and thc Arabs. Thc Arabs'
g~�n~�r:1U0119, WC~ in ;,ny r.?se, c:~nnnt depend iniplacable re(usal to recognize the legitimacy
on n policy uf phy,ic:,l miSl~c - cvcn if we of thc n:~tional AS~Ir;itions o[ thc Jcws,
~o desired. ~Vor1J public opinion - upon cr~ded any belief in i~eaceful coexistence, _
wh~~sc recugnitiun and sy~n~~atliy ~~�c dcpcnd - ;tncl undcrniincd i,s crcclibility. ~1nd not only
will insist that we crhibie thr. fullest bene~�o� ~~�as che possibility of coexistence denied, but `
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evcn ~hc vcry cxistr.ncc of both n~tions w1~ clmc to dc�y that samc right to the Palcs-
rhnllrni;cd. Sooncr or latcr, most lcadcrs tini7ns. Thc nrgumcnt which is presentcd
~ ~IICCUtt1I)clI t~ thc idca that cunflic:t was - thc I'LO's crimin~l and insanc bchaviur
un~~�oidablc, nnd that the issuc could only - c~nn~t justify such a rcfusal, Shouldn't
be defined in teniis of victoty I~ere venus ~ve recall tlic I~istory o[ many new atatea
tlefeat there whir.l~ Icd to cert7in ~~olitical, wl~ose independrnce wa~ won with tl~e aid
military, and idc~~~logiral conclusions. Ilcn of sa~~agc terrorist ilCltvitics? And imaginc
Curion's m^mora~lc confrssinn in 1~~~4 about what would havc bccn thc situation if Begin,
his ~~artitian I?lan ('Chc Tialtimorc I'Iht~) w;u anJ not Ben Gurion, hacl bcen thc Icadcr of
a hc~r~bnnkin~ rrvision of his prcvious ap� tnc Jcwish Yilhuu in 194U. Begin, the lcadcr
proach, whicli had suftered many blows in of the irgun, like the Palestinians today,
thc past. 'I'hosc likc iiubcc, Magnc~, ~rnst stubbornly rejcctc~! thc U.N. rrsalutions, and
~ 5imon, Knh~arisky, Al~aron Cnhcn, ai~d Den- ~iid not rcfrain (rom u~ing tccmrist mcthods
- t~v, whn continuccl tc> bclic~�c thnt only rc� uqainst F:ngl'ssh soldicrs and Arab civilian~
cipror.al rccn~�nitirni r~ulcl guarantcc thc r+a- (Dir Yassin). If thcsc mcthods had hccn _
tion7l riqht~ of hotl~ thc Ar~bs ~nd thc Jcws, dominant, pcrhaps thc Stntc oE Isracl would
wrrr itolalyd ~ml "y~iarantincd". 7'hcy wctc not havr_ bccn cstablishcd. But, if aucli a hi~-
cond~~m~~cd a~ ~it~~~ian dre~mrn by~ somc, torical catasrmphc had occurrcd, ~voald it
~nd a~ trouhlc-makin~ dc[catiets by othcrs. havc inval~datcd nr rcduccd thc Jcwish peo- -
7'hcir voicc ~~~as s~mn drowncd out by thc plc's right to sclf�detcrmination and n~tional
~ roar n[ thc cannonx. I~ut drspitc ha~~ing to indcpcndcncc? 'I'hc obviou~ answcr i~ no.
go tl?rou~h th~~sc tii~~rcil~,s� ~ncl I~.it~�ful w~rs, it is w~ll known that rxtrcmc ntitinn~lisnt is
n?mt o( thc ,jeHi~h ~x~~iulati~n of Palcstinc ch~ractcriud by a rcfusa) to rccognizc cqual
(thc Yi~hun) lon~~�c) f~?r pc~rc ancl was gc- ri~hG~ :?nd rcciproca) dutics. Thus, t}~c rise
miin~�ly cag~�r for n'Cf111i1~i7Uf11L ~,nnfmnta� of rc~�isionist nco�Zionism to ~wcr haa re-
tio~i ~~~as dcclarcd to I�� an un~~�oiilal,le, en� sultcd in a~ad symmetry betwecn t~vo equally
~lurablc, }'ct dc~~l~,r:ihlr :incl disa~tr~m~~~ cr~l. absurd and sclf�dcsttvcti~�c rejcctionist np-
'I'hc victory in thr~ 1)ay ~V~r Icd tn tlic ~~roachcs~ which coulcl Icad tltc tragic con-
�tr~n~f~~rmatiori ~~f ~lis:~~t~�r inio ~�iiiuc" (t~? (lict to a dcad end. Just thc Palcstinians,
qu~tc thc Gcnn:~n ~x~n,�.sion). ~1 c~m~~lctc 3U y~~rs ~go, sacrificd thcir chancc to indc-
rcv~r~cil of thc ~~rinci~?I~s, ~�alurs ~ncl aim~ pcnJcncc bccausc of thcir strong animousiry -
of %ionism waa cf(ccti�el. Paradn~cic�ally, the towarda the treation of a Jewish atatc, so
most ~landcrrnis a~cu.:~tions of Arab propa� tl~c Prescnt lsracli go~�crnment may miss tlu -
ganrla l~ccamc "sclt�fulfillii~g ~im~~hccics". In historic opportunity for an immediatc rccon-
1~J.''ifi, lsracl actccl to~cthcr ~vitl~ dcrlining ciliatinn with thc lcadin~ Arab statc (I:gypt),
im~rri.~list ~rnintrics clurin~ th~� Sinai ~1'ar. f1~f.:1li~C of ita anti-Yalcscinian nbscssion,
in I~1G7, "f~r:icli cxpan~ionism", at thc cx- poscd as an untouchablc national taboo.
(~cnsc of thc tlu~�c hcllircr~nt Arab >t~tcs,
I~CC:ttitC a~:u~t. ~~r~ ~I:ili� i. c~�rr r;i~ct' t~ ~iti� Z1011?st R~iuvenation
up ~~m~~u~~ir~l trrti~riri~�s; ancl l~i.l~rric ri~;lits, 11';~o thc idr~listic iiha~c oniy thc initial
s:icn~c) alt.~rliiiu�nl tn ancrstra) larnl~ SCf11r1IY Grnctamt of the Jcwi~h national lihcration
pn~l~lc~ne, ;uul lict hnt not lc:i~t, stul~l,otn ~~~~~~ci?u�nt' ~~nd aftrc thc mo~�cmcnt's aim
Ar~h n~j,�r~iui~i.~n (thr il~rc~ "nn~" of l~I~ar- h~s h~cn r~~ch~~d, has it in~xorably aRed to
trnim), ;ir~�~~t~i~r,~~~ic~l I~y l,lin~l f alrstinian lcr- thc hnint o~ dcnying it~ r~st and of bartcting
rnrisrn, :ill f:u~ilit~~r~c1 I.racl's ~ni�nt~) a~lart~i� ~hstr:i~t ~�alucs f~r m~t~rial ~oocls? ~Ia~�c the
ti~n to its nrw c~~~uliti~n. An oj?~~resscd ~~co- t'itil x�risc of justicr and cquity oE thc movc- .
~~I~ Inr~mc an ~~?~rrc~u~r j~co~il~. mrnt bcc;~;nc a hcivy ind unwantc~l burdcn
for a~tatc ~~hich relics on strcnSth for its
A Sad Symmetry sun�i~~al? Por Isracl, thcsc ~olitit~ ~vould
'1'h~~ ir hmv ~hr. %i~~nist \1rnc~ncnt thc signify nnt only a crimc, thcy a�euld bc an
I,c.t rx:~rn~~l~ nf ci srlf-cl~tcrrnination which crror of ~;igantic pro~~onions. iia~�c wc (ur-
7~I~i~�~rJ in tritc c?( many obshiclcs - ~;~~u~~n that thc cstahli~hmcnt of the statc d~c~
n
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not im~~ly thr full .hchic~r.rncnt of 7.ioni~m? i~ (ound in Arab lands, dcspitc th~it revolu�
Arcn't wc aw;irc that OQ^jr, of tlic Jcwish tion~."
pc~plc atil) is in tlic niaspor~, thrcatcni~d by
two tr~artal dangr~; by rapid assimilation, Unlvetsal Foundtttione
and by tl~c vicisituclcs of tf~c prcrarious li~~cs 'fl~c uncomrnon attraction o( tl~r Flalutzic
of minoritie~. 'fliat is wl~y, witl~out Zionism, (pionccrin~;) idcals f~r tl~e gc:~cration which
and without its rejuvenation, ncither thc rer- built the kibbutz mo~ -+ncnt would be ~n
mnnencc of tlic statc nor thc survival of tl~c cnigma, wcrc it not for its univcrsalistic "
pcoplc ~rc Ruarantccd. ,Just as war was tlic (oundation. Ac~~ond thc ~vishes for tl~c rc-
main instrwnent of its dcgcncration, so pcacc dcmption of thc Jewish pe~plc and for thc
- ahpcars to bc thc candition, sinc qua non, u~~building of its country, thcrc was a pro- -
for thc regcneration of 'Lionism. Only thc dig:ous ambition to give birth to a new sa
reconciliation bet~veen ,jews .~nd AraUs cir.ty, ~ new man, a new prototype for the
which will follow thc indespcnsablc mutual (uturc of humanity.
rccognition of Isr,hclis and Palcstinians 1(, ~mong tlic many achicvcments of Is�
may inaugur:?tc n ncw I~istorical cra; thc era racl, only tl~c kibbutz attracts uni~~crsal ad-
of pc,~cc, miration, this is not sl~ccr coincidencc. 1Vitl~-
out sucl~ a sxial mcssagc - which of(crs an
Conatruetlve Energy nnd Moral answer to problcros and vital nceds of all
Radiance ~~coplrs in thc arca, and tf~rougl~out thc
lsracli im�~~Ivement in the re~ion, in addi- ~voricl, "statist st~nd~rdization" would den~~
ti~n to ~~roducin~; incoinn~cnsurahlc political "l,ionism its "soul" at~d ~vould reducc it to _
~nd cconomical ,~ch~antaurs f~r thc statc, (or thc Ic~~cl of ordinary nationalism. Such a
all of tiic statrs in tiic nrca, c~uld i?i~bu^ mrn�cmcnt rmsrnts no intcrest to otl~cr j~eo-
'l.ioni~m with a nc~v citaliry. At a timc of plcs, it is not cvcn cndrnved with the I~o~vcr
scrirnis ~~roblc~iie in tlic 'I'hird World, aid of ~tvaction to~~�ards thc scattcrcd ,jc~~�ish
froin ~ nciRhbnrinr; statc (nr thc d~~~clopmcnt peopl~, as thc currcnt acutc crisis of thc 'Lion-
ot tlicsr countrics ~v~uld cnha~~r.c lsracl's ist mo~~cmcnt indicatcs. If thc prcscnt staws
pmsti~;c ~nd its attracti~cncss in thc c~~rs of quo will continuc, thc crisis wiU bc aggra-
thc lx�.t of tl~c ,1cwish ~�outh throug~~out thc ratcd.
world. lf Israc) t~da~� i~i~rircs fcar, anxicty Only pcace can cnablc Israc) and thc Zion�
ancl c~mmis~ration - tomorrow it could ist mo~�ement to break the infernal circle of
~ ~nc~ ~~~in bccc~inc an ol~jcct of admiration s~litudc and hatrcd. Only pcacc can enablc
no longc~r for it~ militar~~ ~~irtucs and Isracl to changc its imagc of harshness and
achie~~emrnts - but rather for its c~nstruc- intran~igence. Only peace may create new
tive cncrqy and itc nioral 1'A(J11fICC. NOt IOllg conditions for a'l.ianist rc~�olution; a renewal
aqo, 1'aul Juhn~cm, thc ~ditor of thc British and a rcwrn to sourccs, an uphcaw~l of
"Nrw Statcsman", coulcl still tvritc alx~ut norms, c~itcria, and rrioritics.
i~rac) : Such a tc~�olutinn i~ n~t just ai~ abstract
"fhc pr~~�f�r:~~l .y,~y~.,ihics c~~rrcnt an~onq anil pious conccpt. it is an utmost rcquirc�
Soci~l I)cmrurah .tcm frnm I.racl's Jeniocratic tncnt (or a t~alistic ~Mlitica) a~tpmach. Thc
StKi:~~isnl ralhrr th.v~ ~h~tn its %inni.tn. ~VC ~tc ~U~t ~)~18tC O~ flt~tll~ltl ~Y:13 l~lZ iCIU~t1 Of l~ll'
~~~t ntta~h~J ~o I~ra~l b~~~.~u,~ it i. a Jc~.~ish .(r~visli ~?rn~~lr t~ i~c hnm~land. '1'hc nr~t his� -
- st~l~, liut ~.~I~~~f hi�~.~n.r il s~Mi.~~islic. ~tf ~t??Il' ~1h:1~1' O~ ~ur n:ttintl:l~ Il'~Ifl~l N~~11C~1
~nfClt~rlr.l N~~~t1iqI11P ~~x~i~�. .~tr Iq ~~n~i~iC hanJ~. ~~c;i~c ~vould Ix'f~lll --'1:15 ~O fK isracl's union
'fhcir tn~n.ut~�mont i. nnl Jrri~r~l ~rom t~rr N'IIII OlI1C~ i1:ItIOflS.
wcal~hy cL~..~. ~~r (rmn tli~~ tirc.titii.ni. sch~,ols, 1( ~~-c t.~ill it it tvill bc no IPgcnd. _
but (mtu thr kil~hnv r~~innnu~iti~�.. 'I hcir public
m~nrnhi~~ i. ~�~frctrd ~~ithr~ut di~InrLinq drmo� Postscript
~ralic ~onir~d. 'Ihi~ i~ a nni~~~i~ c~mh;n.,ti~n 'll~c at~rnc lin~�. ~~�ctc t~nttcn b~f~tr thr
Nhi~h a C~N;.,li~t L~~I. ~o li~~~l el�~..hrrr ~n (:ani~~ 1)~~id ('~nf~~r~~?uc. '1~hc apmcnicnt
~hi. Kl~bc 16~~ i. m~~,nu.,d�i~n~~~~n io ..hat ~li.i~ ~~:ic rc':1fI1C(I fN'(\Yrrn. t~racl anJ I~.r,~rt
10
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ror~ orrzcr~w us~; otv~Y
rrove. tl~nt pr:u�c i~ not rn~ly ~li~sir~bic ancl fusic,n, but onc which is no Icss damanging:
~vnrth~~�hilr, it is polsihlc, ~Ics~~itc tl~c doubtx tl~r iiossibilit~~ ~f rr~ching a scpar.~tc pcace
ancl o~?~?u~ition ~d t~iatry ~~u b~~th sid~s of thc witli i;gypt, ~~~hirh will allow f~r thc con- -
l~rder. 14ut wr. sliould still cm~?hagizc tliat tinuntinn of Isracli tulc itt thr. Wcst Ilank
pcacc i9 still only ~~~oa~ibility. I~tany, botl~ nnd on tl~c Col;in ~icights. Tf~is illusion will
ot homc and abroad, nrc waiting (or it to not last for lonr;, ncitlicr for tcn morc ycars,
(~il, nnd even i[ as wc iiopc a pc~ce or even for thc 5 ycars proposr.d [or by thc
treary will be signed betwecn Isrnel nnd the autonomy rlan. 'I'hc d~�namics of the peacc
largest s~nd most i�i~~ortant Arab state pmcess wil) be accelerated by some powerful
it will not y~et bc a stablc ~nd lasting pcar.c. f:~ctors: Amcric~n prcssurc will incrc~sc and
1'he st;ibility of pcace will only l~c gu~~at~tecd ~rotv. 7'hc r.onsolid~tion of Ainerican inter-
: if it stands on two fcct. " csts in thc rcgion tvill rcquirc thc prc~�cntion
of }~:gy~~t's isolation, by inducing Jordan to
- IsrBelis and Pnlestiniana }oin thc pcacc process, and by gaining thc
7'hc t~iain conflict is bctwcrn tlic Israr.li b~cssings and support of 5audi Arabia, and
peoplc nnd tl~c f'alcstini;in pco~~lr, and .~s pcrhpps ccr.n by induciiip Syria to join tl~c
IonK a~ it will ti~~t b~� rrsr~lvc~, no genuinc nroccss toH�ards a cotn~~rchcn5i~�c scttlctncnt.
~~cac~� will ~�oni~� t~~ I~c in ~,ur rc~ion. (n ordcr 13iit a n~ccs~�ary condition for achicving nll
to narh this ~;~:~1, wc tiuist o~~rrcomc two theSC g07~3 IA 8 SOIUtIhII ~vhich ~~�ill satisfy
main ohstaclcs. '1'lic firs~ is thr. stul~born tl~c national aspiratioiis o( thc P~Icstinians.
refuc;~l c,f thc Pc?Ir~tinian Iradcrs to (ulfill a 'I'hus, thc circlc is clos~d, ~nd chc a~~p?uc
conditirni, withc~ut wlii~~h ~~~~cn I;~;~~~it ~~~ouW rct~~rns tu its historical starting point: thc
not ha~r siu�c~�cdrd in r~v rn�crin; hcr con- cristcncc o( two nations which arc (atcd to
qucrcd t~�rrit~ri~. frcnn Isr~rl; a ~~uni~~lct.r. ~nd 1~~'c sidc by sidc. E11ood�fillcd i~istorical c~c-
~mconditi*~nal rcro~nition ~,f thr ii~h4~ of thr. pcricncc, ~nd considcratirnis of ~~~isd~m, cmo-
lcr~cli n:~lion lo its I~o~ncland, whilc ~icin:; tion, and juslicc, rcquirc us to concludc that
~~p thc falsr and hnllc,w ~I~Kan of a"drmo� ~~c must basc nur rci~tions upvn mutual rc-
cratic, xccuL�~r, i'alrstin~;~n ~tatc". '1'hc s~rond cognition, pcacc, nnd coopcration.
obstaclc ig thc poli~y o( tlic Crn�ernmcnt of 'I'hc stniggle (or pcacc - a complete and
Tsracl. Aftcr th~ illu~ion a tcrritorial ~taws stablc pc~cc must contim~c, and thc pos-
qiw on all fro�~5 was shattcrcd, thc Rcgin sibiliti~~ o( succcss arc tnday much greatcr
Crn~crnmcnt is culti~~a~in~ a morc IitnitcJ il� tlrin tncy et�cr wcre bcforc.
COFYRIGHT: 1979 by New Outlook
CSO: 4t~0
11
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SUDAN
- OPI'(15ImI0N LI:AbLlt D~SCEtIifC5 UNItLST IN 5UDAN
t'c~ riy AI! WA'PAN AL-' ARAI3I in Arnbic 11-17 .Jan 79 pp 28-29
[Intcrview with Opposition Leader Shnrif Husr~yn al-Hindi; "Numayri -
Vi.ol,7ted Concili~ltion Aqreement"; in Paris~ dnte of interview not givenj
[Textl Durin~ his visit to AL-WATAN AL-'ARAUI's office in Paris, Sudanese
le~der Sharif Husayn al-Hindi disclosed the hidden phenomcn~ which mude the
national pe~ce in Sudan mere ink on paper. Sharif al--Hindi directly accused
tl~e Sudanese regime of failing to carry out any of the conditiona of the
ngreemenC.
Sharif al-Ilindi related in detail the conditions nnd circumstancea which
made nl-Sadiq al-Mahdi lenve Sudan in embarrassment. He also drew a blenk
~~icture of the internal situation, assuring us of the opposition's ability
to bring down the regime Without bearing arms against it. Finally, he
liE[ed the veil from thc presence of naval, air and ground forces in Sudan
to support the Numayri regime and protect it from popular tremora.
Pcrhaps it is worth noting that the waves of popular discontent in Sudan -
:ire crystallizing in widespread strikes. The latest of these was the open
~[rike thi~c week bcgun by 40,000 elementary achool teachers demanding im-
p rnvement in their ~i~in~; conditions.
At tl~e same time, report5 ~re circulating about movementa and rebellioLa
~tsc~rd~rs in Southern Sudan, to place the Sudanese situation open to many
po;~~ibilLtles.
~'erhap:~ tl~e followinR conversation with Sharif Husayn al-Nindi completea
~ome linkg in the picture of the Sudanese situntion. �
(Questinnj /1s a member of the National Front, you accused President Ja'far
, Numnyrl'� re~;ime of fniling to fulfill any of the cnnditions of the national
rcconcili:~tion. Wtia[ will tt~e Front's position be in confronting the regime?
1?
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[An~wer) In the pnaC, Che Nutionnl Front particip~ted in several armed
civilian und milit~ry confrontntions and l~d populnr confrontr?tiona, demon-
strntione, ~trikQe, civil disobedience, and vc~rious riots. liowever, according '
to the information I now have about Che detcriorating situation in Sudan,
the gaChering of a11 individuals of the 5udAnese people in the opposition,
and the acute incompaCibility between the leudership of the regime and Che .
reet of Che groupe of the Sudanese people--including the armed forces--I now
believe thaC all of this collective formation of blocs which constiCutes
complete and total opposition ia a substitute for the need to bear arma
against th~ Numayri regime.
lsgyptian F'orccs I'resent
[Questionj Ilow much truth is there to what is i~einp, said about Cgyptian
f.orces b~ing preser~t in 5udan?
[Answer) I am certnin that there are Egypti.tn forces in Sudan. There are -
nnva3. Inrces in Port Sudan, air forces at the Wadi al-Sayyidnah and Khartoum
atr ba~ey, nnd ground Eorces in Khartoum and in the e~st, souCh and rvest of
5udan.
We have Information that the number of these forces is coneinually increasing,
e~pecially recently. That is in nddition to their penetration of other
sensitive apparatuses. such as the security agencies and others.
[:gypti.~ns Have Incre~sed Tension
[Questionj What is your position concerning these Egyptian forces in case
ttiey mcve to protect the Numayri regime?
~
(Answerj in my opinion, the presence of Egyptian forces in Sudan, eapecially -
ut this time, and their takinR over protection of the regime has increased
ti~e intensity of the tension between the Numayri regime~ the people and
their armed forceg, especially since these forces were withdrawn from con-
Crontation with the Israeli enemy in order to confront conquered, starving, -
I~elpless pcople.
The deep-rc~oted historical links between the Egyptian and Sudanese people .
and armies make ugin~ the L�:gyptian army to sub~jugate the Sudanese people a
m.ltter ~f c;~lling for ~rief and sorrow. However, as a conquered and wronged
pcnplc~ fi~;htin~ for our freedom and our ri~hts, we cannot be blamed if we
dc~fend c~ur I.~nd ~1nd our riKhts a~ain5t im~orted drmies. These armies which
w~~:ik r~�F;imc~~ bring In to oppose their peuple c:annot figf~t and win in an un-
frtendly cllmate and