JPRS ID: 8363 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY

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30 !lAftCN i979 PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE BUREAU~RACY i OF i
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JPRS L/8363
30 March 19 79
~ ~
TRANSlATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUa 10/79)
PROBLEMS OF ~APANESE BUREAUCRAZY
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
F~R OFFI CIAL USE ONLY
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~ BIBLIO~iRAPHIC DATA 1. Repon No. 2 Recipient'r Atee~~iun No, -
SHEHT JPttS L/ 83G3 "
. c e~u e c e . epon ~ee
TRAN5LATIONS ON JAPAN, (FOUQ 1.0/79) 30 MB~Ch 1979
_ Problems o~ Japanese Bu;:eaucracy b�
7. Author(~) 6� Noctamtne Or`~ois~tion Re~x.
p. Petlormiaa Ocs~oi:~tioo N~me �nd Addee~~ 10. p}ojeet/T~il~/Work Unit No.
Joint Publications Researctt Service
~ 1000 North Glebe Roed 1~. Conenct Gnnt No.
ArlingCon, Virginia 22201 -
1~. 5pon~aio~ Oc~aoisattoa N~me ~od Addre~~ 13, Type of Rapo~t 8c Period
Co~eted
As above
t~.
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16. ADstnct�
The report containa preae and radio coverage on politiCal, economic, military,
sociolop,ical~ scientific and technological developments. '
,
" 7. Key iordi ~cd Dxumenc Aoaly~ii. lla De~eripton
JAPAN
~ Politi~al and Sociological
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17b. Identi(ien/Open-Eoded Tscros
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JPRS L/8363
- 30 March 1975
TRANSLATIQNS ON JAPAN
- ~FOUO 10/79)
PROBLEMS OF ~APANESL BUREAUCRACY
CONTENTS PAGE
Analyses Focus on Problems of Japanese Bureaucracy
- (BUNGEI SHUNJU, Nov 78) 1 -
Foreign Ministry Fhlls to Peking, by Yutaka Kobayashi
~
Defense Agency Discards Kurisu, by Sakae Kashiwagi
- a- [ I I I-~1S IA - 111 FOUO ]
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ANALYSES FOCUS ON PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY
- Foreign Ministry Falls to Peking
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japaneae Nov 78 pp 166-187
(Article by Yutaka Kobayashi: "China Drawa Jgpaa Into 'Anti-USSR Axie'
Through Concluaion of Japan-China Peace and Friendehip Treaty; Option of
- Foreign Servicf Officere Should Be Reviewed"]
[Text) Foreword
"Dissatiafaction on the part of both partiea makea for good negotiatione."
So goea an often quoted comment among diplomata concerning diplametic nego-
tiations. The alluaion describes the theme that independent nationa in-
volved in a negotiation mu~ually recognize that impoesibility of bending
the other party to its own will.
Over the past 6 years, the concluaion of a Japan-China peace and friend-
ship treaty has been a ma~or item on the agenda of Japan's foreign rela-
tians and hae proved to be a real problem child. NoFr that it has been
- eigned, Foreign Minister Sunao Soaoda and the executive office etgff of
the Foreign Miniatry are praising themeelves that the conduct of "the
event was worthy of almoat perfect marke." If that is so, then according
to the wiadom of foreign relationa officera quoted above, one has to suit-
~ pect that the Japan-China treaty negotiation could not have been one fa~~or-
able to Japan.
In reopening the negotiations, Prime Minister Fuke:da made the concluaion
of the treaty "provisional to conditiona satiafactorq to both parties."
In reviewing the long drawn out negotiations between Japan and China,
Japan's diplomacy cannot be said to have really earned the jubilant cries _
of "Oh, well done! Well done!" Aa a matter of fact, we can't aee any regime. Hie attempt to salvage something out of that debacle by fishing
- for a normalization of relations between Japan and China had fallen on
deaf eara. As salt ground into his wounds, he was beaten in his bid to
seize political power as Sato's $uccessor by the forces of Tanaka, Ohira -
and Miki who had become united over the Japan-China issue. When one
realizes how China had ~inxed him, one can see why there were points of
differences between him and Sonoda who was solely motivated by concluding
= a Japan-China treaty.
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Officials in the Foreign Miniatry felt secure wiCh Fukuda because his
track recurd showed him to be one who did not force iaeues. But ae the
prlmc, minieCer put more dietence betwarn himeelf and Sonoda and di.eplayed
an inclination Co take thinge into his own hands, they t,ecame uneaey over
the posaibili~ty that he would d~op hia support of their proposals and
- procedural plana. It may be a little unfair to blame the lack oP unity
of purpoae on the aelf-aerving nature of the Foreign Ministry officials
but they, caught beCween the cautious Fukuda and the eager Sonoda, had
to conducC their business on an ad hoc basis and be completely dependent '
on the whims of the time. This etructure which lacked a basic principle
from which to act but which reacted to whatever event occurred wae the
structure in effect until shortly before the treaty was concluded.
"If I pull, he will follow behind but he will not take th~ initiative and
" lead the way...." Sonods vei~_,; this criticism frequently to his foreign -
' service officials always hinting that Sato in the field was the aub~ect
� of hia ~ ibe.
The first of the discusaions between Sato and Han Nianlong were held on
- 24 February. The crux of thia session was Co determine whether Japan
could be kept from being drawn into an anti-USSR proviaion of "a unified
front againat the USSR," even by conceding to "mnti-hegemony" clauaes. ~
No progreas was made and Sonoda displayed some dissatisfaction with ~ato's I
~ "indecisive petletration."
On 4 March while the National People's Representative Convention was in =
progress, the second Sato-Han discussions took place. No meaningful -
progress was made at this session either. Sato who felt that the prime
minister's residence and the foreign office were somewhat out of step
with each other, turned the baton over to headquarters, saying "Ammunition -
at hand hae been exhausted; it ia now up ~o Tokyo." _
. This snapped Sonoda's tolerance. He showed his irritation not only at
Fukuda but at his rival Chief Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe and his cohort
_ Yoshiro Mori and others connected with the official reaidence for their
viewing the Japan-China event too relaxedly. Referring to the progress nf
the Peking discussions, Sonoda chided: "So brother Sato's a big shot?"
He began to openly push for working level negotiations. The fact that
Ambassador Sato had previously been given the post of vice minister by
Miki and becauae Sonoda was a ringleader of the "get Miki" movement is
thought to be behind the delicate relatipns between Sonoda and Sato. -
In mid-March, to para11e1 the visit of Chief Secretary Yano's group of the _
Koemi Party to China, Sonoda dispatched Takeshi Ta~ima, China Bureau Chief, "
to Peking, ostensibly to keep the field abreast of the atmusphere in Tokyo
to facilitate coordinated action between headquarters and the embassy in -
Peking.
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y, Reggrcilees of the intent of th~ ~dminietrgtive bureau~ 5nnoda vas a~ming
- at ~dmeching el~~. Three months after baving reCurned Co hie poeC :rom -
~ g vi~it to Che home office at year's end~ Seto in Peking eeemed Co be un-
- certgin ae to wh~ther "the home goverament inC~nded to pureue the projecC
~ ~inc~reiy and Wheth~r the diff~r~nc~s beCWeen the prime minieter and
foreign mtnieter aere ~n the zone of concern." 3onoda tebuffed him:
' "Thoee are not your concern; expedite ~rrgngements for digcu~eion by your
= foreign minister on hi~ visit to China evea if such diecueeione include
' the anti-hegemcny is~ue."
= AtCcaCtivenees and bistrust of "Aut-of-Norm" Poreign Minister
From the viewpoic~t of Foreign Mini~try officials, wae Sonoda a completely
uniRVited guegt at Kaeumigaeeki? NoC really. In diecueaione wiCh foreign
minietere of varioue countries he dieplgy~d magterful tactice and rhetorica
learned in coping with parligment and in the elecCion circuite.
He rode into MoeC~w in January and gave a etraightforaard accounting of `
Japan'e poeition at a meeting nf the foreign minieter~ of Japan and the
- USSR. When ~aromyko tabled a"Good Neighbor Cooperation Treaty Propoeal~"
~ Sonoda countered by tabliag Japan'e "Peace Treaty Proposal." In the paet
when Japan'e foreign miniater met with the USSR. he would be eo completely
overahelmed that he waen't given a chance to fully exprees hie intenC. Not _
sa with Sonoda; he fearlessly said what needed to be eaid aad got his points
acrose and all in all wae given good marks for hia efforta. `
Masuro Takaehima~ deputy vice mini~ter for foreign gffgirs vho accompanied
Sonoda, co~ented: "He plays the diplomat's role on atage very aell With
a well prepared ecenario and ~rith correct underatanding of the situation."
, It is reported that Sonoda has brought life and action to the service and
has even given a lift to the slumping art of diplom$cy.
The image of the foreign minister since the time of Iichiro 8atoyama Who
was nicknamed "the Accountant" has not bcen a proud one, having been those
of Foreign Minietry bureaucratic upbringing if they had been nurtured in
the Foreign Minietry or bureaucratic politicians. Thnse aho didn't have
some apecial ekills such aa Kiichi Miyazawa with languages aad keen sense
didn't have chariema or other qualities sought in foreign service officere.
The uncertaintiea and doubte the foreign service officera felt in not
krowing where Sonoda was going or how he intended to get there seemed to
have a complementary effect betWeen him and themselves.
Thouph we have become eomewhat sidetracked~ the fact that Sonoda kept ac-
tive "while leaving the engine idling at high speed" probably lead to
getting the reogening of Japan-China negotiationa back on track.
Did the Foxeign Ministry really Want to conclude a Japan-China peace and
friendship treaty? If the question were put to foreign service officials
who viewed it from the standpoint of foreign relations, the answer ~aas
"no."
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~ox o~~ict~u. crs~ oxi.Y r
Jnpan-C'nina "a Domeetic Prablem"
Why? Priu~rily b~cau~e they cauld find no r~egon for m~king a Jepan-
~hin~ CreeCy g muet. Some were of th~ opinion based on enaly~es made by
- the ~oreign Ministry~ that reletione between Japan end Chinm could be
developed with etability witt~,out a formal peace and friendship treaty; '
~ome had deep down feelinge the*. since China wag primnrily motivated by
promoCing iCs "four modernixatione~" ir was asking too much of Jepan to
get into a feverieh pitch over the signing of the treaty.
~urthermore~ the USSR related diplomacy wae giving them enou~h head~ches
without the addition of the "hegemony" bit. That wae the e~tngle biggest
factor which contributed to the minietry's leck Qf Qnth~siaem. Conse-
quently, until the dir~ction of the politicat flow had become overwhelm-
ingly evident and the adroinietrative bureau of th~ Foreign Ministry had
been shoved into a point of no return, there had been no coordinated and
concerted effort by Vice Miniater Ke4~uke Arita~ Deputy Vice Minister for
~oreign Affairs Masuro Takashima, Director General of the Aaian Affairs
Bureau Yosuke Nakae, and Ambaesador Sho~i Sato in the field to explain
the aituatioa and guide the politicians toward the eatabliehment of a
government policy leading to a sound basis for a treaty. -
r
~ If Japan-China relatione needed to be spotlighted (in ieolationJ, a~oint
- atatement would suffice to bring about closer relations. Thoae who were
for this approach argued that, "Japan-China is, in reality, a Japan-Japan
problem" meaning that poli~ical factions which wer~e extremely pro-Chinese
and thoee which were pro-Taiwan aad/or pro-USSR were ao atrongly at odda
with each other that they canceled each other ~ut.
It had been generally accepted that the great ma~ority supp~rted the view
~ that, "since there's no overriding need for it, no crash diplom~tic action
to conclude� a treaty is required." Here, again, it is evidAnt that those
in charge of foreign affaira involving China ia the Foreign Miniatry did
not have a firiu hand on the reina.
Ae already pointed out, neither the activists nor the conaervatives who
were sandwiched between the prime minister Who is a master political
tactician and the foreiga miniater, could do aaything but aimleasly float
around, their fatee in the hands of time and place.
Watching the lack of direction being given to the Japan-China treaty ,
problem, Director Ceneral Ohira co~cnted bitterly: "What do you expect
when the foreign office fails to make frequent visits to explain matters ~
and advise the prtme minister?"
There is an inclination to believe that concluding the treaty was on the
agenda as a political item even during the days of the Tanaka and Miki
cabinets.
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Be that gs it mayo the Foreigc? Minietry eeeme to have choeen 1978 gt
random and without making any analysie on euch fundament~l iesuee ae how
a Japatt-China treaty would affact our position in the ovarall ralations
with the U.S. and the U3SR~ whether a Japan-China treaty wag eeeeuCial Co
relaCions between Japan and China, nor making any aetempC Co explain Che
iseues to the people. Putting it bluntly, Kaeumigaseki took up the matter .
~ of coming forth with a settlement ae if iC were ~ust enother homework
aseignment in an atmoephere of lgckadaieicgl purpoeelesenees. -
Private Commenta of Foreign Service Officials
At the reopening of the regular eession of the Diet, Prime Miniater Fukuda
eaid as part of hie etatemant on policy: "(The Creaty~ will be concluded
in a manner eatisfactory to both pa~tiee; the time for reopening negotia-
tione ie approaching." These worde were spoken while his heated "nonaense"
etatement hadn't been given a chance to cool off and it departed from the
drafC which had been prepared by the Foreign MinieCry which aae much more
moderate in tone.
' Fukuda who felt that a more vigoroua posture had to be dieplayed for domes-
tic political purposes, was not satiefied with the drafted propoeal and
ordered Chat "a text containing stronger nuances be prepared." Then taking
up a pencil himeelf compnsed the text quoted abave.
"The prime minieter," eaid some foreign service officials earcastical~.y,
"knowe that there's nothing concrete in the mill and ia only trying to -
show that there is." But that was the extent o~ their prot.~at. As on cue~
Sonoda's atatement on foreign relatione pertaining to Japan-China, aee
identical to Fukuda's line.
When the oppoeition party voiced aupport for a"positive posture" Sonada
immediate].y raiaed bis voice by several decibe?s.
Of course, duxing the qaestion period the answere given by the embarraseed
foreign service officere expoaed the fact that the China Bureau had pxe-
- pared answera on the asaumption that the questiona would pertain to What
was to have been the central theme: "After all, concluding a treaty isn'C
an overwhelmingly essential matter." But thla obvioualy embarrassing
impasse failed to atop Sonoda from making his endorsement speech, even
though in private, the confuaed foreign service officera muttered that
"There isn't anything more etupid than for one party in a negotiation to
- try to rueh thinge through."
Thfs kind of spineless fear of expressing one's owa opinion opealy could
be seen in various q~iarters right up to the time of the aigning in Auguat.
Limita of Kasumigaeeki Diplomacy
_ Kasumigaseki does not ha~e ita foreign affairs policq on a conseasus ar-
rived at from discussions brought up from la+er levels. A mechaaism exists
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for th~ re~epective ~gctione of tne verioue bureaus to draft proposala bue
in reality the number of pereons who h~ve ~ny authority to make policy
decieione is limited ro a very fe~r execuC3va offtcials.
Thie eituation does not a11ow for the much needed policy cleci~ion making -
procese in which all of the concerned membere of the m~nagerial eegmenCg
get together and hash out a11 interbureau probleme. 5uch g proceea is
particularly e~eential in thie international society of increaeing inter-
dependence when coping with probleme involving the U.S.~ China~ the US5R, -
dr more broadly~ Aeie, Europe, or tt~e Mid31e ~aet. The regular semi-
weekly chief'~ meetinge ueually consist of perfunctory readin~ of reporta
from ~ech of the diviaione during which even the old prog who have had �
20 or 30 yeare of experience in the foreign affairs field ever vo;iunteered
to exprees hie convictione on any eub~ect. _
Nicholeon in hie famous book "Diplomacy" writea that the characterieCic ~
of a foreign service officer ia one who ia unmoved by th3nge or evente,
who doee noC make decisions lightly~ and who can coolly gee a thing or
event in ieolation. But we feel certain that he did not imply thaC for-
eign affaire people ehould not have ccnvictione ~nd the enthueiaem to act
on them.
In the c:sse of Che Japan-China peace and friendehip treaty only a emall
handful of officials were in any way concerned with the planning phase.
They were beaides Sonoda, Arita ~nd Takashima, Nakae and on occaeions
Deputy Vice Minieter for Adminiatration Toehia Yamazaki (and until January, _
the current ambassador to Mexico~ Nobuo Mataunaga) and to them could be
added Treaties Bureau Chief Seichi Omori. Poeaibly, the prime minieter's
private secretary Ito Kowada who had been asaigned to the prime minist~r's
residence from the Foreign Miniatry could be included in thia group aince
he wae the pipeline to the official residence.
In ceality, this group could be aqueezed dowa to Arita. Takashima and
Nakae, and until a certain time, Mateunaga.
' Vice Minieter Keisuke Arita who was the aenior member of the 3~300 for-
eign service officera at home and abroad, Was nickaamed "Fierc~ Face"
within the miniatry because he aas apt to flush in anger and baWl out
even bureau chiefe when acaething diapleased him. But being a man of
such etrong emotiona, did he have bold imaginative ideas or have the .
courage to confront and persuade Sonoda, Fukuda~ or the leadera of the ;
LDP to move foreign affaire isauea? No, he did not.
Oa the contrary, his image was that of an able official Who concerna him-
aelf With details. He had a solid background: Tokqo Uaiveraixy graduate~ -
fifth soa of the later F'oreign Miniater Hachiro Arita and he had umoothly
eailed through a eunny career ircluding North America Divieion Chief.
Miniatar to the USSR, Europeas. ~nd Oceanic Bureau chief, aad ambaeeador
to Iran. What were his thoughts during the progreea of the current treaty
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negotigtion~ gnd whaC were ht~ deep-aeaCed convictions ~oncerning the
treaty? What did he think ehould be the direction tn which Jgpan-China
ralatione ehould develop? What were Arita'e true thoughte on the xumoxed
differences bAtween the o�ficial reeidence gnd the foreign office or on
the con�us~d policy iseuee or on the matter of mainline revieiane? How
did he try to put across hie convictione in such matters? In Crying to -
pin dawn theae point~ to paint his portrait, ae can com~ up aith only a ~
very v~gu~ icoage of th~ man.
, The Man Who Wae Called "a Legal Criminal"
The man who is given credit for being more influential in a certain con-
text in policy making than AriCa was Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign
Affaire Maeuro Tekashima. He wae chief of the treaties bureau at the time
of Japan-China normalization in 1972. Later he became the chief of the
Aeia bureau and wae involved in euch matters ae the ~irlineg agreement.
it has now become parCly legendary but it ie eaid that the l~te Chou
En-lai called him a"legal bandit" and added~ "we would certainly like td
have ~uet one official like him on our aidel" As a foreign aervice offi-
- cial~ he is excepcional and has gained the reepect and faith of both the
ina and oute and ~ithin th~ LDP, of the liberals and conservatives alike.
It is related as a true story that once when Vice Miniater Arita vas re-
porting on the Japan-China treaty to Fukuda at the official residence~
Arita was aeked~ "Incidentally~ ahat's Takashima's ~udgment on this?"
Sonoda was well aWare of fihe high pointa given Takashima in the party
and in early epring, even before the foreign minieter's China visit had
been acheduled, publicly announced that~ "~1hen I go to Peking I'm taking
Takashima with me."
In the conduct of diplomatic relationa With China, Takashima strongly
advocated that a bold protest be made againet China's habit of ignoring
normal diplomatic channels and resorting to actions and words aimed at
Japaa's internal affa~ra. He inaiated that euch a step be takea to force
some rethinking on the part of China but the vice minister designete was
at that time in between floors With respect to responsibility over polit-
ical matterg so we don't kao~r whether thp advice bore any fruit or not.
VieWing the negotiations in isolation, we suapect that Takashima's aima
aere only half fulfilled. He is a man who wae graduated from Tokyo Uni-
versity end was detained by the USSR for 2 yeara after the War ended.
Aaia Bureau Chief Yosuke Nakae~ unlike Arita and Takashima aho Were of
the faction Which entered the ministry during the war, did not come into
it until after the War. He is a Kyoto Univeraity graduate and Within the
ministry wae active in the theater. Even noa, he is an intellectual Who
Writes scenarioe under the peaname of Tamoteu Kasumi. At the time of
_ Jepaa-China aormalization~ hs was councillor uader Aaia Bureau Chief
Takashima and accompanied Vice President Shiina o~ the LDP on a visit
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to Tgi.w~n. ~'or over 6 yeare after thgt he held respongible poeCg in Aeian
affaira, first ag depuCy chief~ then a~ chief of the Aeia Bureau. During
that period he participated in euch ma~or ieaue~ ae the Japan-South Korea
continenti~l ehelf and conclue~.on of the Japan-China treaty. He will
probably be aesigned an overeeae ambaeeadorship eomeC3me during Che y~ar.
- Taking care of adminiatrative mattere and fielding parllamenC'e queeti~n~
are claseed as being amnng the moet difficult of taek~. But Nakge ia Che
model of efficiency ae a bureaucratic officer, always keepic~g his conl and
even during the Japan-China treaty hasele, managed to never get caught out
on the limb. At the expense of sounding repetitioug~ even these officials
- never took iaeuee involved in the Japan-China negoCiatione into their own
handa; they drifCed with the conetantly changing direction of the current,
never initiating action and reacti~na ~nly when forced to do go. At one
time after it had become clear that the Japan-China treaty was to be con-
cluded~ it eeemed like the foreign office wes duty bound to perauade Fukuda
to accept the fait accompli and send Sonoda Co China to make an egrly seC-
tlement. But it wae not in such as Arita and Nakae to m~ke a move.
_ The Turnabout of Prime Minister Fukuda
Prime Minieter Fukuda who had continued to haraes the foreign aervice of- ~
ficera by asking, "Where lies the Cruth and aincere intent?" ahowed the
firet signa of raiaing his heavy poeterior in favor of reopening negotia-
- Ciona during the latter half of March. Paradoxically, it was chortly
after the vieit to China by the Yano group, facetiously referred t~ as
the Fareign Ministry "uaing the opposition to give the Chineae a first
class shake down." The Yano group forwarded to the government the uaual
~ Teng Xiaoping explanation of China'e four modernizationa and "nothing ~
more than anti-hegemony; it is illogical ta assume that that is aimed at
any given entity." The foreign aervice officers chorused that there was
"nothing neW" and that the whole thing Wag "within the realm of amateuriah
diplom~cy." '
Fukuda, however~ began to ahoW signs of moving toward reopening the nego-
tiatione and meeting between Fukuda and the leadere of the Foreign Minis-
try--Sonoda, Abe, Arita~ and othera--was set for 22 March.
With good humor restored and spiritedly declaring that "I'm going to get
some clear inetructions~" Sonoda rode into the Foreign Ministry's official
hall in Iigura aith a proposed text of the treaty drafted by the adminis-
trative bureau.
The focal point of the discuasioa Was the handling of "hegemany" and
"third country" and Fukuda acting "juat like an accountant," asked for
details to be aeaured that the Wording would not point to anti-Sovietism.
Ne kept streseing the fact that "I'm not going do~m unconditioaally" and
in his cautiousneea, he failed to give direct inatructions to reopen nego-
tiatione.
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That evening, Directnr~ G~neral Ohira eai.d: "Thia vould be a good time for
tha foreign minister to vieit China." Hut the ealvo f~.red i~a eupport of
Sonoda failed eo obtain any reaulte.
In epite of these negative d~velopmenta~ ~ukuda made a nav~. On 25 M~rch,
~ h~ invited the conaervative--with ra~pect to J~pan-China--elements of the
LDP including the leader Kokichi Nadao and Dietmen Kingo Machimura~ Ke~uro
remaoki, Maeaquki Fu~io to hie private reeidence for an informal discus-
- eion. "If ve leave the Japan-Chine treaty m~tter~" ~ukud~ told them~ "~uet
hanging in mid-~ir~ w~'ll be wlnerable to being puehed ~?round bq both
_ China and the USSR. Md domestically, we'l1 be giving emm~mition to Che
oppoaitioa parties." He followed up by persueding tham to concur in re-
opening eegotiatione.
Nadao and companq were privately well aware that Fukuda would come out for
reopening the negotigtione since the Japan-China iesue ~?g~ one vhich had
politicgl impllcaCione. They requeated~ however, that the matter be con-
eidered carefully in view of the fect th~t on 5 April it would be 3 yeara
aince the death of the laCe Preaident Chiang Kai-ghek gnd TaiWan would be -
coming out of mournin~g on that day; that it was easential that the USSR .
- be kept from becoming antagonietic, coneiderat~one for the ieeue of terri-
torial claims over the Senkaku Islande, and the exi~t~ace of the Chiea-
~ U5SR alliance agreement.
The conaervatives led by Hiro Kichi Nadao based their criticiem on "a
lack of historical comprehenaion of the thing called Japan-China norm~liza-
tion." At the bottom of this criticism Wae the charge that at the time of
the normglization~ the foreign office had no pipeline into Taiwan and no
fina intelligence or eatimatea on TaiWan or how it would react; that the
Foreign Miniatry'a intelligence and analyses concerning Japan-U.S. and
Japan-USSR relatione aere tutally unreliable. Moreover, they auepected
that~ "If Sonoda were to visit Chin~-, he would s~rallo~r China's propoai-
tion in toto." The last point Wae alao a atatement of "no confidence" in
the foreign service officera' ability to prevent Sonoda from operating
singlehandedlq.
About this tisne~ a paper entitled, "Progresa of the Japan-China Peace
and Friendehip Treaty Ieaue" wae produced by the administratfve bureau of
the Foreign Minietry at the requeet of Nasayuki Fu~io and othere and it
tended to further the controveray.
Ripple Effecta from Tajima Papers
The paper ~rhose authorehip Was attributed to China Section Chief Takashi
Ta~ima analyzed the situation should the treaty be pig~on-holed, unsigned,
in the following manner: 1) The credibility gap by China for Japan would
. be Widened; 2) The USSR Would uae it to applq further presaure on Japan;
3) Stability of Japan'e foreign aervice vould be shaken to the point of
unbalancing it; as a conaequence of the reduced scope of Japan'e fereign
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relgtioc~~ (compared to the eitugtion in which J~pgn conclude~ the treaty),
~ th8 atab3lity of Japan-Taiwan relations would be, "paradoxically~ main- _
tained and ~ven ~nhanced aa a apie-off e~fect." The peper's conclusion
is to the effect that, "the eoneensug of the argumante pro and con ie to .
the effect that (non-conclueion of the trpgty] would give tha impreesion
thaC Japan dances to tihe tune playad by Che USSR."
'The pro-Taiwatt and pro-US5it factioa~ critici~ed the paper on Ch~ grounda
that the conclugions were baaed on fautty or eh~ky pr~mises and these pro-
teste lead Co forcing Che paper being made public. Although some empathy
for Tg~ima ~rae expreseed within the minietry--"it wag used by the oppoei- _
tion merely for the sake of oppogS~tion"--it wae criticized for having
"inadequare aupporting ~vidence."
The incident aucceeded in expoging the We~kness of the ~oreign Miniatry
as an instrument which ie supposed Co be founded on the doctrine that
"diplomacy ia the exteneion of domestic politice." The consequencee of
isgui~g the paper which wae supposed to be a philosophical diacueaion~
pointed up the fact that the Foreign Miniatsry wee directionleee and that
there lacked a mutual confidence between tha ministry end the politicians
and that the mi.nistry'e capability to m~ke an eat~mate of the politiaal i
atmoaphere wae inadequat~. I
On 2~ March, With the LDP's intraparty reorganiz~Cinn well on ite way to _
completion, a government party in power conference was convened. At the I
meeting a paper entiCled, "A ttequeet Regarding the Five Dutiee of the
Party" outlining the basic posture of the government wag submitted by
Fukuda and Sonoda. The paper advised that: "To give Japan-China rela- ~
tions a firm and steble faundation would be in conaonance With the cur- '
rent status of the international society and would solidify Japan's
diplomatic standing in it," and urged that "an unbiased vieW be taken of
guardiag our national intereata."
About this time~ the often heard rumor aas to the effect that "Fukuda
has solidified his decieion to reopen negotiations but is not thinking of '
concluding a treaty as yet." At thie government-party conference, Yaeuhiro
Nakaeone, chaircmn of the LDP executive council, aeaumtng the role of
repreeentai:ive of those advocating the separation of reopening negotig-
tions from concluding the treaty, said: "To reopen negotiationa ia a good
= thing. But the matter of the foreign minister vieiting China ie somethfng
else. At the time that such a atep ia contemplated We desire that the
- party's approval be sought." Because the statement Wag made by Nakasone~
the only man who had constaatly eapreseed coolnese toWard the 18aue of
reopening negotiations, Sonoda flared up and retorted sharply: "Hoi+ to
proceed with the negotiations is the Poreign Miniatry's business ien't it?
Diplomacy caa't be conducted if ve have to etop at every turn to coneult
With the party. I'm eure you aould feel that eame Way if you Were the ~
foreign minietert"
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To th~ phyeically bi,g statured 5onoda, Fukuda said soothi.ngly~ "Weli~ i
guess you have a point," and Wi.th reservatione, it wae agreed thsti the
pgrty would proceed with pr.eperationg on the baeie of a"reopening."
Sonoda and Nakason~ both eerved their apprenticeahtp under Ichiro Kono
- and had competed with egah ocher for favorable poeitions. On the death
of Koc?o~ the unreconc~lable two gglit the faction in half. The cleavage
' wa~ deep and until tha treaty wg~ ~igned, they vere conetnnrly at each
other's throata. ~
Subsequently, Fukuda who was seen as the man who would put order back into
the party~ atepped back to a vantage point from Which he could watch Ohira
handle the taek. At a~oint meeting of the foreign gervice overeight com-
_ mittee and the foreign service committee, 5onoda made an appearance and
became the one target. of a rain of arrows, auch ae:
- "Forego concluding the treaty until the China-USSR friendly alliance pact
which ie antagonietic to Japan ia abrogated"; "Don'C get drawn into beconr =
ing the firet line for an anti-USSR front by the anti-hegemony provieion";
- "Clarify the territorial righta over the Senkaku Ielande."
- Confronted with these ~ibes, Sonoda had to give up his plan to vieit Peking
before the Japae-U.S. summit (3 May). And complainta epilled over to ifl-
clude Fukuda.
The Foreign Ministry should have bec~~e a combat arena but one could not
say that the conaervative elements or the libera~s of the party were over- ~
burdened aith requeata for vigoroua support from the foreign service offi-
cera. The atmosphere in the miniatry w~s one of quiet isolation. Ae far
as the politicians were concerned, aince the matter was a foreign rela-
tions ieaue "Which doe8n't produce votes," no preparationa ~aere made to do
battle nor did they lob5y very hard in either direction to influence polit-
ical clane.
The Senkaku Islanda Incident Shock
During a time when the Foreign Ministry was laying low in the hopes that
it wouldn't be overly affected by the confueion cau8ed bq the LDP's intra-
party reorganization, a Chinese fiahing fleet caused an incident on 12 April
by violating the territarial waters of the Senkaku Ielanda. Needless to
say this put a crimp in the aentiment for reopening [negotiationa] ahich
had heen on the riae ~ince the latter part of March. Was it a deliberate
incursion? Accidental? If it Was a planned incursion, Was it tied in With
the peace aad friendahip treatyZ Or wae it limited to a claim of terri-
toscial rights? There Was a dearth of intelligence and analytic findinga
Wer~ totally lacking.
There was, hos~~ver. an abundance of guesses and rumors: "The Chinese have
doWagraded the Fukuda cabinet's credibility and have decided to take a
tough stance"; "The Chinese are reaponding by applying presaure againat
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the hard line taken by the Seirankgi and other conservatives who arR in- -
~iaCing that the iesue of rerxitori~l righCe over thQ Senkakus be clgri-
fied"i "It ie a demonetrgtion by some tougQ? elements in the outly3ng die-
tricts against the central government's weak-kneed aCtitude tioward Japan." ~
On-site inveetigatione indicaCed Chat the ehipe of the offending fiehing 1
f1eeC were regisCe~ed in v~rious parts af China which tended to eliminate
the "accidentgl incureion" theory. Almost eimultaneously, Vice Minieter
Keng Biao who wae meeting with Representative Hideo Den of the Shaminren
(Social Democratic League] announced on the lSth that the incident wae
"compleCely accidet~tal" and had no connection with the peace and friend-
~ ehip treaCy negotiationa. On the issue of reopening negotiations, he took
the oppoxtunity to etate: "We are not making any new conditions gnd the
anti-hegemony provieion ie not pointed at sny apecific entity." Since -
_ reopening the negotiaCione with Satn and Han as the central figures was
imminent, the starement wae undoubtedly made to give aseurance ChaC the
anti-hegemony provieion wae not aimed aC a specific country, namely the _
USSR, ae a~n inducement to Japan which had been expreaeing conaiderable
concern over that iseue.
_ While China wae uaing euch meane to accelerate the proceedingsr Japaneae
opinion was etill divided. Sonoda~ of course, was ruahing xround trying
to get the negotiaCiona geing while Arita, Takashima, Nakae and othera in
_ the Foreign Miniatry inaieted on a calmer approach. '~Since there can't
be an easy eettlement of the territory isaue~" they argued, "it would be
wiser not to get ahead of ouraelves by charging into the reopening of
negotiationa thinga." Therefore~ when on 21 April Deputy Chief of the
Aaia Bureau Wan Xiaoyun told Minieter (at the time) Donowaki in Peking -
that, "The incident was unintended and will be treated when discussing
the broad question of Japan-China relationa," the opportunity was seized
to attempt to make a"diplomatic eettlement" of the incident.
But Fukuda and Abe reeisted ringing do~n the curtain too ~.;ecipitously.
In an atmoaphere where the domeatic reaction Was bound to be: "That would
be a real hegemony principle actionl" Fukuda could not be blamed for being
reluctant to aettle the matter on the diplomatic fiction that the incident
was an "accidental occurrence," without going through normal diplomatic
' procedurea. ~inally, a temporary aettlement was reached on 10 May, after
the Japan-U.S. aummit~ betweea Sgto and Han who agreed to reaffirm the
~oint agreement reached in 1972 that neither party would touch on the eub-
~ect of territorial rights over Senkaku. ;
Inadequate Intelligence Pipelinea
This incident clearly poiated up the inadequacy of intelligence available
to the Foreiga Mini~try through foreign eervice chaanels and the lack of
pipeline8 ahich frequently play deciaive rolea.
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The undercovar atruggle of Deng and Che oppoe~,t3,on faction when some `
_ fragmentary ~,nformation was mada available Co so~e Dietmen in the form
of Taiwan intelligenca~ Hong Kong intelligence, and even 3outh Korea
inCelligence.
On 21 April~ the e~me day ehaC thg Minister ponowaki-Weng diecussione were
being conduc~ed, a paeeenger liner of Korea Air Lines which was cgrrying
msny Japgneee paeseng~re, etrayed into USSR territorial air space. Our
military intelligence did learn of the incident buC we could not but be
envious of the wealth of U.S. sourcee of intelligence which not only found
out where the liner had landed but wag able to get the incident which in-
volved the USSR~ South Korea and Japan, eettled expeditiously.
Sonoda did not completely depend on the Foreign Minietry for intelligence.
- He had hie own pipeline: For Japan-China related matCere, he ueed people
involved with the 1Cokubosoku [Japan International Trade Promotion Aeaocia-
tion] (Aiichiro Fu~iyama, chairman) to make contact with Liao Chengzhi and
oChere who aupplied him with information. Several legislatore whoae inter-
eats were not confined to domestic mattere had established their own sourcea
of information since the foreign office's intelligence was inadequate a~nd
belated. Recently, several LDP Dietmen initiated a move to eetablieh Japan-
U.S. and Japan-Europe intelligence pipelines at the legielature level ae
a reault of their being criticized for being unable Co accompliah no more
than a rubber-necking Couriat could on their trips abroad. The incident
points up the lack of confidence in intelligence collection activities ~f
our official inetallations overaeas.
- The foreign office conaieta of a staff of. 1,500 at headquartera and 1,800
in overseas offices numbering 158. Theae figures are comparable to Italy
_ and Belgium which have much smaller populations and economic and financial -
- interests. In view af vastly increased administrative requirements in the
diplomatiic eatablishment~ ad~ustments in pereonnel and budgetary require-
menta are ~uatified. Proteste to the effect that Sonoda "ia making no ef-
fort to recruit well qualified people and to increaee effectivenesa in the
field," pointa up the need for better quality rather than greater quantity. _
Of the 40 staff officere in the embassy in Peking which is at the very
front line of negotiatione with China, it is surprising to learn that only
a very few are Chinese linguiata. The uaual excuae ie that their couater-
parts in the Japanese aection of the Chineae for~ign office with which the
bulk of businese ie conducted~ are knowledgeab le in Japanese. That seema
like a very lame excuse.
Backstage During Negotiatf:~n Proceedinga
The Senkaku Islanda incident blocked an opportunfty to reopen negotiations
but the atmoephere improved after the 3 May aumnit between U.S. and Japan
dve, pri.marily~ to a notable change in Fukuda's attitude. On the 20th,
1~~arita International Airport was opened and on the following day, in apite
_ of its being a Sunday, Fukuda invited Sonoda and Abe to hia private reai-
dencs. He was in high spirits and said: "The op~ening of Narita sirport
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is a great event wh~ch hae taken 10 years ~o accomplieh; tihe Japan-South
Korea conCinental ehelf agraement iwe been 6 yeare ~.n Che mak3ng; the Japan-
China treaty could not be accompliahed in the timee of etther Tanaka or
Miki." He talked ae if the matter was already ~an accompliehed fact,
taking Sonoda by compleC~ surpriee.
ThaC was the turning point and tho+agh a delay occurred due to Han Nianlong's
illness and eubeequent period of recuperat3on, the negoCiaCione at an admin-
ietrative level were reopened on 21 July. ~ut the question is what lead
Fukuda to make the decieion? Fukuda had been saying that the Japan-U.S. -
coaference was the most 3mportanC aingle item on the ageada for Che fireC ~
half of 1978 ~nd the coaservative element around him had beer~ ineisting .
that Japan-China came "only after Japan-U.S. had been taken care of." It
could be that having under~aken the Japan-U.S. 3tem eucceasfully, he was
enconraged to take on this pro~ect. Coincidentally, the opening of Narita
airport fell on the same day ae the inaugural ceremonies for Taiwan's new ~
president Chiang Ching-kuo. In Mar~r., Chiang had been elecCed preaidenC; i
5 April wae the third anniveraary of Chiang Kai-shek's passing. Agricul- I
- ture Minieter Nakagawa end Che pro-Taiwan members of the diet had been
eaying that~ "The prime miniater won't annouace any deciaions until all
the ceremonial events in Taiwan have been carried out." That may t!ave had
something to do with the timing, too. I
In retrospect, the whole pro~edure could be termed as being typ:cally (
Fuktitda but up to the point where he actually made a move, the Foreign Min- I
iatry ha~l not been aware of hia real intent.
_ There were some foreign aervice officers like Yoauke Nakae who weren't
taken by surpriae: "From the time he asaumed the post of prime miniater,"
�,he said, "Mr Fukuda had hie mind made up to conclude the treaty. The only
' f~old-up had been to prepare the domestic political atmoephere so that the
event could take place in an orderly manner. There wasn't much point in
~iaking turmoil by ru8hing into it." That may be ao but a prime minister
who is the final suthority in decisiona involving foreign countriea, can-
not be excuaed for failiag to divulge his predetermined intent to at least
his foreign minieter.
- IC ehould ~a noted~ however, that Fukuda's keeping hie innermost convic-
tiona to himeelf, prevented Sonoda from making e cheap visit to China and
credited him with a dieplay of leaderahip-=in reverse. For Japan which '
lacked useful etrategic intelligence~ one could be lead to believe that (
hie tactice tuscned out to be a weapon in the isaue involving China even I
if it wae only a maaifeetation of Fukuda's nature to diapoae of adaninis- i
- trative matters at hand one by one in an orderly manner. -
"Deng, Ching, Kang" Negotiationa
~ Converaely~ [the route taken by Fukuda] pointed up the lack of any diplo-
- matic etrategy at Kasumigaseki and of any program leading to reading China's '
haad. For example, over 7 months elapaed from the time Sonoda began talking
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about visiting China until he actually flew into Peking. During the
interim~ Sonoda's wishful thinking wae reflected in his countless announce-
mente auch ae "China visit during latter part of January"; "February viait -
to China"; "Over the head vieit Co China in March"; "China viait: ~l0 to
15 April"; 1�China visit prior to summit conference of developed countries." -
A1Chough this keeping Che auxillary engine (himeelf) running until Che
msin engine (Fukuda) caCchea was a prime Sonoda strategy, it can't be
given many pointa in diplomatic negotiationa. Not only the timing but
the purpoee of Che foreign ai.nieter's visit to China changed constanCly =
according Co the explanatione given by Sonoda and the adminiatrative of-
fice of the Foreign MiniaCry. ~
_ Then there wae the matter of erroneously eatimating Han Nianlong, Sonoda's
counterpart in his propoaed China discusaiona. The Foreign Minietry had _
been viewing him ae merely a protocol officer; the Chineae counterpart, _
thought tha Foreign Ministry, had to be one who could discuss matters at
a high polltical level or no important iseues could be aettled. Kasumi-
gaeeki's eatimate of Han Nianlong was that he was an inflexible and tough
foreign aervice officer."
Vice Miniater Han's illness forced a change in the scheduling giving some
of Japan's more capable foreign service officera to ad~uet their estimate
of him. A review of hia role in isaues pertaining to Japan made it clear
_ that he was indeed a very competent foreign aervice officer. With thie
revised estimate, it was decided that the administrative level diecussiona _
be expedited by curtailing them to one or two meetinga and to schedule
the foreign minieter's viait to China for about the 26th or 27th. A Japan _
Airlines plane was quietly chartered to carry out this program.
But when confronted with reality, the scenario had to be completely re-
written. Around 1974 when the initial steps in the Japan-China peace and
friendship treaty were taken by Vice Minister Tngo and Chineae Ambassador
Chin, Han's name was tied in with the other two and the proceedings were
derisively dubbed the "Ton (Togo)-Chin (Ambasasdor Chin)-Kan (Han) Nego-
tiations." [Pun refers to a state confusion] Han now made no secret of
the fact that he himself wanted to complete the treaty. As an opening
, gambit, he bluntly tabled China's basic position on "anti-hegemony" and
"third party."
Japan's position had been, "Firet, the problem iseuea have to be put in
order," and with regard to the hegemony problem, "if we carelesaly get
drawn into this iasue too deeply, we will find ourselves on a submerged
reef even before the foreign minister arrives."
Since Han had to commute to the neetings from his hoepital bed! they were
uaually convened at 3:00 or 3:30 pm (China time) and each meeting with a
long rest period included, laeted only at moet 2 hours or so. The atmo-
sphere under such circumatances, wae not conducive to smoothly bringing
up political iasuea. Finally, even the foreign office had to revise its
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eatimate of Han's influence, realizing thai: he had direct ~.insa Co l.iao
Chengzhi nnd evPn to D~eng Xiaoping and could apeak with authority equal
to even Huang's. Under this revieed estimate of the man, the foreign
office had to put ite thinking on an enCirely new track.
' Sonoda ~nd Arita had been thinking in terme of having Nakae return home
_ temporarily when the adminiatrative level discuseiona had borne enough -
- resulta for the foreign miniater to make his China visit as a meana of
persuading Fukuda to make a decision. But much as the early introdt~~ction
of politicail iseuea was desired, it was estimated Chat if they were intro-
- duced premb?turely, unfavorabl~ results would be obtained. Sonoda, of
course, wae champi.ng at the biC and Sato and Nakae in Peking �elt at a
_ losa ae to what Co do.
On 27 July, when the 5th meeting was to take place, Ambassador Sato re-
queated guictance as to whether Nakae should return to Japan but Sonoda
wouldn't affirm the trip. He reasoned: "In the heat of a battle, a com-
manding offi~:er can't be recalled; he comea 'home only after he has spent
his arrowa arid broken hie aword or has aettled the iasue to the point -
where the eituation can be turned over to headquarters for final resolu-
tion. The ~udgment as to which category your eituation fits must be made
in the field."
~i
While the headquarters complained that "insufficient aggressiveness" was
being displayed in the negotiations, July came to an end and the 8th meet-
ing took place on 1 August. The summer heat in Peking caas exceptional but
to Sonoda and Arita and other foreign aervice officera who had to burn
the midnight oil night after night awaiting official co~nuniquea during
Tokyo's unuaual heatwave, thie was indeed a"long hot sua~er."
Fruatrated by the lack of any cue for him to go on atage, Sonoda expressed
hie impatience: I am getting a feeling that the demarkation line between _
administrative and political discuasions ie fading." Knowing how Sonoda
was prone to ahow hia emotions, Arita and Takashima tried to make an open-
ing wedge for the "Minister to go on stage." They began to think in terms
of breaking off the administrative discussions at a suitable point and to ~
make preparations for him to ga to China during the first part of August.
Signs for 8 August Good -
For the Japaneae conferees, the timing of the changeover to political ~
discuasions without antagonizing or hurting the feelings of Han who had t
professed his desire to see the whole thing through, was the source of
headaches. When during a diacussion aession Sato touched on the poten-
tials of convening "political talks" Han snapped back that "after all I
am also a politician and "I si+1 prepared to participate in them" which
made matters even more difficult.
On the Sth, Chief of Asia Bureau Nakae fi~nally made the trip home. The
Foreign Ministry had had a meeting of the minds on "foreign minister visits
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China on the 8th." Although tt wge a cae~ of Che earli~r thg baCCer, the
calendar eigne were noC good for the 7th ~nd wer~ for "Gr~at peace" for
Che 8th.
Uuring the evenin~ of the 6th, the legderehip consieting of Sonnda~ Arita~
Takaehim~ and Nakae from the ~oreign Minietry and Ab~ and Mori of the
official residence etaff m~r aith Prtme Minieter Fukuda at ~ hotel in
N~kone wher~ h~ wg~ takir~g a rest. The Forpign Minietry gtroup~ particu-
larly Sonoda~ �aae uneasy becau~e they knew that ~ukuda h~dn't been very
' f~vorable to N~kge'e coming home.
But Fukuda's firet move was to a~k Sonoda tn me~C with him alone ~~ad
opened Ch~ meeting with~ "When gre you leaving?" Thie one quesCion took
all the wind out of 5onodg's aail; he hgd been all set Co dramatically
announce Chat~ "I am willing to ~acrifice my poet to carry ouC plenipoCen-
tiary responeibilitiee."
At the meeting of th~e entire group, ~ft~r Nakae had made hi~ report~ Arit~
explained that the 8th wae chosen becauee "8-8-78 wae 'suehirogari,' g
harbinger of good thinga." (In Japaneee character~ 8 is ehaped like
'suehiro~' a fan~j The group had a good l~ugh over thie. Sonoda was
overcome with gratitude to Arita who wae firet of all a diplomnt~ for his
affectionate reference to "harbinger of good things." The party then
returned to Tokyo and by the time it had arrived at the Foreigu t~iinistry~
n meseage from the Chineae~ "Welcome to China," had already arrived.
Sonoda's eyea were filled with tears of ~oy.
Thua the fulfillment of his great wieh--Sonoda vieit to China; eigaing of
- the treaty. Ae icing on the cake, it was reported by the Japanese that,
- "The Chin~se made great concesaiona." The Foreign Ministry coneensue in-
cluded in ahich were the opinions of Arita, Takashima, Nakae~ and even
, Ta~ima, was that China's basic position on "aati-hegemony" vae pushed
aside and wordinge most deaired by the Japanese in the treaty'e Article II
on anti-hegemony and Article IV on the third party ieaue had been adopted.
Although it had been preordained that the negotiattons had to culminate
in "both partiea being satisfied," Sonoda proudly announced that (the
treatyj "cleared up the whole thing in~luding the trunk, the ehape of the
branches, even to the fullnesa of the foliage." But Was the state of
- conclueion all it wae puroorted to be and could we allow ouraelvea to be
so optimistic?
It is true that during the final stages of the n~gotiations, Vice Chairman
Deng Xiaoping, Poreign Minister Huang Hua and other Chineee leadere failed
to show much vigor. But couldn't thnt have been becauae the Chinese had
already fully achieved ita goal? In the final accouating of the Japan-
China negotiatione, won't we find that we had beea entrapped? `
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Fingl Accou:tting of Treaey'e Debite ~nd Credite
Right off the top, iti mueC be pointad out eh~e eh~ overaii ~ecnuneing hg~
noC b~~n correcCly portrayed. 7'hese negotiaCione got etarted with pre-
1lminary telke betwe~an the two Vic~ f~oreign Miaintare I~u~ .iko Togo and
t~en Nian].ong who had come to Japan to eiga th~ maritime agreea?ent. I~our
years elapeed since then.
In the baginniag~ Jep~n uever dreamed that th~ couree of navigation aould
be ~uch a hezardoun one~ Japan'~ only purpoee for it wae +che promotion of
peace in general~ never once thinking th~t the th~u~ of th~ n~gatiation~
would draw u~ 3nto Che whirl~,~ool of Sino-US51t confrontationg. Thp Chinese
had no intent3on of entering into ~ window-dreeeing type of treaty whia~
wge neither toxic or m~dici:~al~ they Were in pureuit of forming a"Unif~ed
Anti-US5R Frant" and aith th~C Ror~moeC ie ite mind, it wanted to includ~ _
the anti-hegemony lenguage into the treaty.
Admittedly~ there vere variancee in peripheral circumst~nceg but th~ dif-
fer~nce ags between a country whose Concept coneidered the ~ffectg on world
politics and a"country of political midg~Ca." During the apring of 1975
when the hegemony ieeue eurfaced, the Kremlin became agitated and initiated
artacka againet the Japan-China treaty. With China reacCing strongly Co
this, the cl~avage within Japan anang the pro-Chinese~ prn-3ovieta~ treaty
hawks and treaty doves d~epened markedly.
In April of that year draft propoeals of the peace and friendahip treaty
Were exchanged bet~?een Japac~ and China. There Were eome decieive differ-
ences in tha baaic poeitiona eince the Jepaneee proposal made no referenc~
to the h~gemony iesue.
The then foreign mini~ter, Miyaze~+a, and the administrative bureau of the
Foreign Minietry explained: "41e had no ob~ection to tie in an anti-
hegemony atand into a~oint atatemeut which clarified the recogaition of
the thea exieting world situation and our political poature. But We could
not agree to commit the aignatory natione to a poaition Which could become
untenable in a changed aorld eituation."
Even during Diet hearinga, there aas no eign of retreating a single step
from thia etand in thie ieeue. But vhea the treaty negotiatione became
etalled. th~ ieaue at atake Was eofteaed from the original adamaacy to �
argumente over ahether aati-hegemony 1) was a general principle; aad, 2)
aould be acceptable as long as it did not commit either party to act '
~ointly. The inconclusive argu~ment over these provieiona forced the nego-
tiatione to be broken off.
Japan's "Big Conceasion"
1976 vas a year of violent changes for China: Premier Zhou's paseing;
the Tian M Hen incident; Chairman Nao'e death; the baniahment of "the -
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g~ng of four~" Jn th~ other ~id~~ Japan wae in ~ etormy rurmoil nver tihe
tockh~ed incident and th~a "(tet Miki" movamane. NaiCh~r party w~~ in any
po~iCion to Cake up treaty negotietione. gut then the Fukudg g~vernm~nC
took hold and the Hua Guofeng regime beg~n to take ehape and the at~nosphere
b~cgme conducive to thinking about reopening eegnei~tionu. From China'e
viewpoint~ the domeetic po~tur~ had to be re-e~tabliehad and the world's
ra~pact it h~d during the Mao-2hou er~ h~d tn be ragained to pravent gn =
op~aning through which the tl5~lt could elip in. '1"he conclusion of a Japan-
Chine treaty could be eeen ag ~~t8p in that direction.
At thie point the prime miniet~r m~de public hi~ etand with hi~ "Clarifi-
cation of Che text of Che anti-heg~mony article" (Genpral e~esion of th~
- loaer house on 3 Febru~ry 1977). 7'hie knocked out the aegumption th~t
the etarting point of the negotigtione would be a hot debate on t+hether
to include the anti-hege~.~ony iesue or not and dignified a giant conceseion
on th~ part of Japgn.
Regardleee of the ob~ective viewpoint on th~ matter, eub~ectively, the
pendulum had ewung from "~q+iidigtant from the US5R ~nd China" to etr~ngth-
ened political tie~ with Ch.tna. Having made that baeic docieion, the
problem of how to express tfie anti-hegemony iesue and how to handle the
_ third party matte: became mere eubsidiary probleme.
A certain Foreign Minigtrj+ le~der said at a meeting thig epr~ng: "There
wae no need for Japan to have opposed the inclueion of the anti-hegemony
iseue even at the time of the Miki cabinet; convereely. every effort ahould
hava been made for ita inclvaion." The etatement made the lietener wond~r
if hi~ earg had heard the worda correctly. By abandoning the line irhich
it had been following and by contradicting itself to euit the situation,
the Foreign Ministry loat all cl~ims for credibility and for having had
any basic policy or plan.
Sonoda's action at the reopened negotiations ataged in Peking Were very
flamboyant. He lived up to hia reputation for being "a killer at the ini-
tial meeting" (a maeterful epeakerj. "A good treaty," he eaid, "muet b~
brought to fruition becauee I cannot return to Japan With my tail i:etween
my lega; the only elternative for me Would be to disembo~+el myaelf in
Pek:ing." He spoke in a voice drenched in emotion. This aae the scene
that got rave notices in the papera which reported that Sonoda had the
Chinese female interpreter in teare with aympathy.
It ia probably true that 5onoda expounded Japan's etand "very boldly,
frankly, and Without mincing Words" (Takashima's quote). In the final
ana~yaie, however~ waen't hie act put on in fulfillment of a etage set
up by r.he Chinese? Whether so or not, Sonoda on hie return to Japaa
braggingly deecribed hia meetinge with Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng
vherever he happened to go. He even deacribed ho~r he--to overcome a
feeling of restraint While meeting with Deng--stood up aad apat into the
spittoon located near the chairman'e feet When he met with Hua. Naybe
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thi~ wa~ typically Sonodg'~ gggr~~~ive dramaCice~ 8ut frum the viewpnint
of Hue and D~ng who ware looking ae Jap~n-China rel~tiong gnd pgrticui~rly
th~ ~ff~~ti of the paace and fr~eadehip treaty on the big rtratiagy involving
the confrontation viCh the US3R and ie~ own modarni~ation pl~n~ rhe dramat-
' ice ~;ould very we11 hava aeaaaed lske a child pl~ying gameg.
In any event~ which was the eide that madp pointe by concluaing tha tr~~ty?
And whaC aere the dem~ritg?
Puttiag a~ide a critique of the proce~diag~, ie uouid be impo~~ible to di~-
cu~e all of the proe and coae, tha g~i~ts and loeee~ her~. Wh~t can b~ ~aid;
however~ ie th~t "Thi~ firmr the relat~on b~taeer? J~pan and China" type of
congratulatory addrees~e ~ra premature. IC ie tru~ that euch aim~ of the
treaty ae mutual aquality are on the poeitive rid~ and ~hould be made to
bear an abundance of fruit but whether the goale are k~pt alive or ar~
killed depands on hoa the tWO couutriee proceed from thie etarting point.
For ingta~r?ce~ ~hat about the China-US5tt priend~hip A1liance and MuCu~1
Aasistance Treaty vhich muet affect the Japan-China treaty? Thgt treaty
in ahich Jgpan fe "vie~red ge an an~my country" wae concluded by th~ Pen-
p1e'e Republic of China under the leaderehip of Mao Z~dong in 1950, or in
the year after the ~~ople's Republic aae formed. The existence of that
inetrument Wae one of the re~soAS fnr the formatian of the Japan-U.5. 5ecu-
- rity Treaty (the former "8ecurity") during the folloaing year while in the
cnld aar environment.
It Was not eo long ago that both China and the USSR denotmced the Japan-
U.S. aecurity pact a~ being aa "incureion of U.S. imperialiem i~So Aeia,"
aud wag the firet etep in "the ravival of Japanees militariam." But ae th~
Chin~-USSA confrontation d~epened the cleavage bataeen the tao~ the U.S.
and China begen to cloee the gap between themeelves and followit~g the
norm~lizatf.on of Japan-China relatione, China began to preach not only
the importance but the easPntiality of the "Japan-U.S. axis" for the main-
tenance of aecurity. Simultaneously. Chinege leaders began to proclaim
that the Sino-Soviet A~liance Treaty, "~xisted in name but wae dead in sub-
~ stance. Next April~ China aill face the fork in the road and a decision
Will have to be made ~+hethnr to extend or reacind it. Reecinding it hae -
~ bean made public as a condition for coacluding the J~pan-ChiAa Peace and
Friendship Treaty. So "eternity" now has a hiatory of uader 30 yeare ~r~-
cauge of changee wroughtl
It serves ae a reminder that international relations are living things aad
treaties i+hich are aigned in a flurry of happq celebrationa can eometimes
become a mere scrap of paper in a graveyard. Maqbe thie is a good time
to remi*�~! :,~reelves that the~only tWO friendahip treatiea signed by Japan
prior to the Japau-China treaty--"Jap$n-Ethiopia Friendship Treaty" and
"Japan-Cambodia Friendship Treaty"--have long eince become defunct and
that the participating couatriea hardly remember that they had ever
existed 8ad also that both of the other parties have undergone revolu-
tiona Which have left them in a muddied, conf~eed etate.
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The qu~~tion as eo ahi~h party a~~ more daeiroue of concluding eha ere~ty
ir gr~dually bacomt~~~ ciear; the on~ thae naeded it vae China and it ~ta~
Chin~ which wcpadie~d it. ~xternally, Chin~'~ top pr~ority pro~ecr ie~
"unification of gn ~nti-USSR fr~nt" a~d dome~tic~ll~r it i~ the "four
naderniaatioes." We get th~ impra~~ion thgt beag i~ manauvering toaard
achiaving ~heee goalr vithout cara ae to hoa hi~ ~ction~ r~ay uppenr to
th~ out~ida.
'rhp main thruat ha~ ~hift~d from "Survival through eeif effort" to "lparn
from the experiencea of the ~dvanc~d ngtion~" ~nd und~r those terme and
_ vith pyee focu~~d on 20 or 30 y~ere in the futur~a~ China i~ ~eekieg ~ccr
nomic deve~opment vith tha eupport of Japan~ U.5., ~nd ~urope. It ie
natural that Japgn shouid beco~n~ the c~ntr~i pil~ar in thi~ program be-
cguee not only ie it c1o~e~t geographicglly but hae shaWn miraculoue eco-
nomic and technologic~l groo?th in the 30 ye~r~ ~ince the end of the aar.
'Phe conclueion of a long term Japan-China erade arrangee~nt r?hich v~11
fdrm the backbone of Japan-Ching rel~tinng, ai11 b~com~ g r~ul~tq n~xt
apring. Prepgratinn~ to impl~mene the program under ahich Chinpge crude
oi1 will be imported for Japgn~ee exporte of manufactured goode and t~ch-
nology i~ being put on trgck.
The Chin~ee aim to epeed up the tempo of its economic build-up nieshee
ideally aith Japan'e effoxts to find a aay for economic stability vhile
changing over to a loy? growth era. In mid-September, during hie visit to
China, Minieter of Internatio~al Trgde gnd ~nduatrq [NITI~ Komoto egreed
on ~ framework for doubling the trade volum~ and eyctended the time limit
by S yeara~ to 1990 from 1985. There i~ report to the effect that Deng,
during hi~ m~eting aith Sonoda on 15 Augu~r~ eurprie~d the lett~r by eCat-
ing: "In behalf of muderniz~tion and development, China vill not re~ect
the po~gibility of altering ite conceptual aCructure."
Even without the peace and friendship treatq, the relatianehip between the
tWO countries undoubtedly aeuld have developed in an effective manner. Un-
like the relationehip among Japan, U.S., and Burope, ahere fricCions are
notable~ beh+een Japan and China there should be a mutually complementary
ecanomy for the foreaeeable future. Oa this basis alone, it is probable
that there aould be a naturaily intermingled economic flos+ bettireea the
t~ro neighboring countries.
China aas obviously chasing two rabbite: Stabilizatioa of Japan-China
relatione and the expaaeion of the anti-USSR front. The truth of the
matter aeeme to be that the Chineae can be smug !a the kaa?ledge that eheq
_ no~r have both rabbits in the bag.
Deng~ With referenc~ to the Soviet'e opposi[ion to the peace and friend-
ship, denouaced the USSR: "That's because they fear the aati-hegemony
- principle. The treaty puts a crimp in its expaasion policy aad puta them
in an unfawrable poeition to launch a audden aggreaeive war. In thia
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~oR o~icint. us~ oi~nY
1i,ght, eh~ tra~ty (Japan-China) !.s eot mer~ly g two-cowntry i,~au~ but h~~
im~or world~rid~ r~mi~ic~tion~."
'~he Jgpan treaty !e th~ fir~t treaty eign~d by China in 13 ye~re and under
thp "'Phraa World Concept" it i~ the ftrrt to be eigned aith the ~~acond
aorld in ite 49-year hi~tory ~ad i~ s~~m~ permi~~ab~~ to thiek thet ~ddt-
t3onal importance can be aetached to it ie that it i~ th~ fir~t tre~ty
which contain� referenc~ eo anti-hegemony.
Tt?~ National P~oples itepreeentative ConvenCion h~ld in i~t~rch dr~.wr up ~
"New Congtitut~on~ 1978." it~ corner~eon~ i,e th~ concept of anti-USSIt~
In impl~mantation of that doctrine, vigorou~ ~ctivity hae been direcC~d
~t Africa, gurope, and Aeig. Th~re ection~ egn be saen part of an pf-
fort to roll back ehe US3R's teking gdvantege of China's break with Albania
- and eeparation from Vietnam. In May~ pr~eidential adviser Brzegin~ki Who
i~ kno~m for hie tough attitud~ toaard the USSR, ahil~ an g eo~r of ~`hie~
a~id et the welcom~ banquet given by Foreign Mini~ter Huang Hu~, that he
~ympathized a~th nnd approved "Chiaa'~ decigion an gnti-h~gpaany." Md =
he added: "A etrong and etable China benefite the U.S. gnd China can
b~n~fit from a mighty aad eelf-confident U.S. which has aorldwide concern~."
In respon~e, ~oreign Minieter Huang vigorougly denounced "sociel imperi-
nliam (USSR)." Alth~ugh there wae no definitive progrees tovard normaliza-
tion, the mutuality of b~nefitg and loeee~ of the tvo countriea' etrategy '
. involving the USSR aere bluntly expregeed.
Sonoda querried Brzezineki vho etopped off in Japan on hi~ return trip I
from China~ of the U.S. policy pertaining to the US5R and Brzezineki'e
peraonal via~?e of the USSR. To ~uetify hi~ inquieitiveneea, Sonoda ex-
plaieed: "There ie a differ~nce betveen U.S.' USSR pollcy which has world-
aide implicationg and Japan'e i+hich revolve arouad local iseues but unle~e
We are familiar with the U.S. point of view~ Japan's poliaq with reference
to the USSR caanot be made firm."
Brzezinski'e trip co the Far East revealed, like it or not~ that the _
Japan-China treaty had an effect even within the frameaork of the dynamic
U.S.-China aorld atxategy. Was it just a di~tortion of fact that Japa-
nese diplomacy which lacke any firm etrategy appeared Co ba a flover of
the poppy? Japan doean't have the etrength to intervene in or interfere
with any po~+er plays of the U.S., China~ ar the USSR and needlees to say,
it could not even attempt to hold the reine of China-Soviet relation~.
But leaving ob~ective inteutions aeide~ ehouldn't Japan's Foreign Ninis-
try proceed with a foreign relatione program ~+ithout blinders to block ~
out the sight of turbulent seae awirling arowad the peripherq of the Japan-
China treaty~
Without dragging in a country such as Vietnam ~+hich expreseee concern over
the formation of a"Japan-U.S.-China alliance~" the mejority vhich has
evaluated the aide effecte of the peace and friendship treatq aad who feel
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that Japan QoC moet of ah+~C ie a~k~d fdr--aven ~uch ehinking piopl~ see _
in i~ "J~pan-U~9.-China tr~d~ cooparteion" as ~he ulrima:a nae ra~uit.
~tn day~ alter Ch~ Japan-China tr~aty Wa~ eignad, Chair~mn Kua Ouofang
dep~rted on ~ tour of thr8+~ of tha USSR'~ naighborit~g countrito, Romgaig,
Yugogievie~ and Iran. tt aa~ obviou~ tt~et it va~ a poeitive approdch Eo
U53R neighbcr~ affi~r th~ p~tabliahment of firm fooeing g~inad through the
pe~e~ ~rid f~iendehip treaty. Instead of insieting that the treaty "af-
fact~ only t~?o countries, Japea aad Chi~na~" can't the poreign Atiniatry
~traigheforf?ardiy stat~a that "it ha~ ine~rnation~~ remificatione"?
The CttRISTYAN SCiBNC~ MONITOR ~f Ch~ U.~. etatee that the Japan-Chin~
tre~ty ie the inetrumant uhich pu~hed Jgpar? intn an "anti-USStt axie"; the
French paper ~Y(iAItO eaye that the conclunion of thae ereatq ie "aithout
queetion a great aucc~se story for Chine~e diplomacy"; the TIMBS of the
_ U.K. h~ard, "ehoute of delight in Chiea." Cloeing o~ae'~ aarg and eyae
to auch truthe and trying to get by with r~tionalizatione cannot but re-
,~uit in d~ceiving our people.
Ig There a Future for Foreign Service Officare?
Poegibly We have ~udged th~ curr~nt treaty conclueion proceedings too
harehly. But the fact th~t in th~ ~ntire course of negotiations, it
ia difficult to find even ~~ingl~ imprint of s far~ign e~rvice officer's
handivork. Under the parliamentary syetem of governmeat~ the rioreign
Minietry ia the ~pecified organ Which ia charged with the reeponsibility
for cerrytng out foreign policiea as determined by the political party
cabinet. The U.S. Denartm~nt of State hn~ for eome tima, branded Japan'e
as "a do nothing diplomacy" and in fact, that criticiam ehould be applied
not only to the foreign eervice officere but to the political figuree
abov~ them euch ae the prime minieter and the foreign minieter.
To be able to maintain continuity through changeg in political leader-
ships and reorganizations~ the bYOadeat poesible source of intelligence
aed a facility to aelect the best poesible intelligence ehould be made =
available to the Poreign Miniatry eo that credibility ebroad can be eus-
tained. That ie the function of the Foreign Miniatry and only the foreign
service officera can fulfill the role. For that purpose~ theq must not
only have the capability to satiafactorily explain Japan's poeition ebroad
but be given the mechinery and poaer to clarify ita intentions to the p~o-
ple to merit their confidence.
Laet aumomer Prime Minieter Fukuda toured ASEAN and proclaimed "The Three
Southeast Aeia Principles." (Manila proclamation) Cammenting on this.
the U.S. Ambaeeador to Japan, Mansfield said: "This is the firet diplo-
matic iAitietive aeaumed by Japan since the aar's end." He aent on to
eay, "1978 will mark the year that Japan made preparations to etep oato
the etage of aorld politica."
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Uudoubt~dly th~ar~ ~r~ ru1e~ of protocni ~nd ~~ountry which i~ anviau~ly
in eh~a bi~ck ~conomic~ily ig buYden~d ~Kth fe~re of reprieai~= but J~pan'~
dipiomacy c~n t?o i~riger ~uet drift along aith the eid~ gnd aemorphar~ of
i~~ p~r3ph~ry. Japan gs dne of th~ greate in ecoriomicg ie becoming th~
cpnter of ever gt~owing r~qaerrs for aconomic and t~chnological ~ariAtaece
frem the outeide aorid and tha opporturiitie� for nwking eoritribution~ ar~
on the increaee for ehe fdr~~~~~b1e future. If Kagum~g~r~ki w~~c8 capable
of coping aith such raque~t~ Wa wou~d ind~ed be happy but in ita curr~rit
~t~te~ w~ cannot cl~a~nee oursalves af d~ep miagivings.
"The Thra~ Bviis" of ~oreign 5~rvice
'1`he daye we could dr~am about g~tting resultg if ~11 g~a~ t+~ll hav~ long
gon~. A Japan etand~ng firmly with Japan-U.S. in the background, aith
Japan-Chiea and Japan-BC a~ it~ leger Wi~h diploa~tie relatione aith the
Middl~ ~~~t and ASEAN as ite erm~--that i~ hoar 3onoda e~ye he ~avisioee
J~p~~t'~ diplomacy. But doas the current foreign ~ervice have a forpign
rel~tiong pl$n f~r Japan, eo poor in natur~l rerource~, to liva gnd gYOw
into the 80'r? A We~t C~rman ~ournaliet made the folloaing obaervation:
"Optioes catu?ot be in 11m~t1eee aupply in for~ign relations but the Japa-
n~~e eeem to be under the impreeeion thgC they ere." It ie true that the
internationgl environment~ ~he internal gtr~ngth, and the domeetic eitu~-
tion all contribute tn making the options to chooge from vety narrow in
~cop~.
~
Diplomaey i~ founded on compromiee. Poreign eervice officers are apt to
complain that, "although conditione which eurround diplomacy cannot be
divided into black and white, (the people. the medie~ aad the politicigng)
are too impatient in thair demand for final eettl~ments." Siece it is
normal for diesatiefaction to be expreeeed vhenever a goodly portion of
one's demanda are not accepted~ maqbe the Foreign Ztiniatrq is doomed to
be uader conetaat criticiem. _
It is for that very reason that v~ look for foreign aervice officere to
have the power of pereuasion over the people and to mgke ef;Eorta to get
the people's aupport for those thinge vhich are in their interest.
Sonoda frequently makee reference to vhat he cnlla "The Three Bvila of
Foreign Service Officere" and he characterizes them gs being "hateful
toward the USSR~ do Whatever the U.S. telle them to und to South iCoreg f
they are mean and eneaky." Such generaliaatione prob~bly aren't limited
to the USSR, U.S., and South Korea; the foreign eervice officer who falls ~
back on reminiscing about the old couatry which is a thing of the past
or indulges in eelf-aerving actiona has no place ia this ara of people's
diplosoacy.
Foreiga aervice officera are generally categorized as being uaekilled
at coping aith parliament or at getting along i+ith politiciana. But if
"diplomacq is the axteasion of domeetic politics~" ho~r can a foreign eer-
vice officer conduct hia diplomatic dutiea in isolation of political
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pgrti~g, polt,tini,ane, ~nd th~ 1egi~igtive body? In rac~nt ya~r~, th~
I~or~ign Mieietry ie fineily getting aroui?d Co thinking about itttremini~-
t~~ri~i it~rovemerit~ ~nd hg~ ~et up ~n orgnn named the "Cgpgbi~ity gnhanCe-
ment Offic~" in an ~fforC ro 3mprove i~e 3mgg~~ On gg~uming the po~t of
vi~~ foreign mini~tar g decada nr ~o ~go~ Takeao Shimod~ ~formerly a
supreme Court ~udge) eaid, "I F?ould like to eolidify domeatic paliei~~
~nd dip~om~cy. On~ cgn't be in fnr~ign ~ervic~ wiehoue being familiar
wieh hig country'~ poiitic~ and people'e thinking." Ba~~d on th~t cott-
c~pt~ the etructurnl re~tnforcament now b~ing con~amp~ated cnn be faulted
oniy vlth being r~th~r belated.
Ther~ hga lo~g b~~n mgny amc~~n~ for~ign ~~arvic~ officerg vho hav~ gdvocated
r~etructuriag the ~oreigri Mini~try and poiating ouC epecific defici~nciee
in postura and po2ici~e of ite p~rgoun~l. The pointe hav~a bean argued at
eom~ length in the paet Bo ae will not belabor them hcre.
Th~ l~te Hachiro Arit~, fath~r of the curr~nt vic~ miniet~r, epegrheaded
g group of fore~gu gervic~ offic~r~ iri th~ Tgigho e~ca tn forming th~
"Geimueho Kaku~hin D~~hikai" [5oci~ty to Makeov~r the Poreiga Minietry~.
it r~i~ed ite voire in b~half of 1) 4pen the t~oraign l~tiniatry tn the gen-
- ergl public to allow th~ influx df quglified per~onnel from the outside
ag ~ meaee of building for the future; 2) Fulfill the aim of ~trengthen-
ing it~ fntmdation by offering more language traiaing and deepen the under-
gtanding of intern~tional gitugtione; 3) F~lfill the need for intelligence
and propagenda +ac~ivitieg end make it capable of coping aith changing in- _
ternntional situationg and obtain budgptary requirpmente (Appropxiation~)
to ~chieve these goal~.
Aren't thoee aim~ and concepte eg applicable today ae they vere when they
vere voiced? The only difference is that curr~ntly there aren't anq'for-
eign service nfficers qualified to even participate in such a movemenC. ~
COPYRIGHT: Bungei Shun~usha 1978
Defenge Agency Uiscarde Kuriau _
Tokyo BUNGEI ;~HUNJU in Japanese Nov 78 pp 196-211
(Article by Sakae Kashivagi: "Malyzing Organiaational Ier~otency Bven Nith
Congtitutionul Amencl~emeat Bnabling Action in Bmetrgencq"~
[Text~ Ununified Double Structure
Triggered bq the reaignation of Chairman Kurisu of the Joint Staff Couacil,
there hae recently beea a wealth of convereation pieces imrolving the d~-
f~nae ageacy aad the e~lf def~n~~ farce: I.egi~lative m~u~ure~ to cope
with aa emergency; direct retaliation to eurpriae attacks; low level flight
of maritime aelf defenee force a~rcraft; u crash ia populated area. 8~v-
iug e~erieaced these varioue "incideats" ~re began to aonder vhat the
etatue of the defenee agency aad aelf defense force is. Sie couldn't help
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bue wund~r wh~thar th8y ~re b~ginning to ~how grroggnc~ ~nd 1~xit~~g in
dieciptin~.
'1'h~ ~~lf dafenre force hae e hi~Cory nf 28 y~~r~ ~inc~ it vng f~wnd~d in
Augu~t 1950 ae th~ n~tional polic~a reeerv~ force. It ha~ baen 24 y~er~
~ince th~ d~af~nee ag~ncy aee found~d~ In both inetancee, they are in
th~ir third decade and We decided to make an inveetigation with ~mph~~ie
on the etgtue in gan~r~l ~nd the concep~~ under ahinh they operate.
The defens~ ag~ncy'e pred~ceeaor, police r~eerveg, w~~ founded by dr~wing
together paraonnel from neh~r elementg but it~ nucl~ug w~a p~r~ong having
had ~{om~ Mini~try and polic~ background becauee thig wag not to be ~ mi11-
tary foYCe but a police ree~rva force.
The fir~t re~8rve force c~na~ndant aa~ K~ikichi Masuhara (currantly a -
r~pr~~entative in the upper hou~e) who Waa th~n gov~mor of Kagavg pr~fec-
tur~ th~ eelection of vh~ch had b~en che~?g~d from bur~aucratic eelection
to open elecCion. A~ governor~ hg had gone to Tokyo to preeent a concept
paper on a Combined Shikoku Davelopment Pl~n. While on thie migeion he
aag tapped to become the firet commandant. Keizo Haya~hi (currently
preeident of Japan Aed Croe~) v,ae named chief inepector (currently c~lled
chief of ground etaff office). So practicg~ly al~ of the leadere had
Home Nin~etry background~ and thie trend hg~ con~~nued. A listieg of ad-
miniatrative deputy chief~--Muneo Toga, Hieaehi Imai, Yoso Kato, Yaeh~o
Mit~uo?a, ttin Uteumi, Yutaka Shimada, Takuya Kubo, Ko Maruyama (current
gdminietrative vice chief)--ehowe tha~t they all have had Home Ministry,
palice backgrounde.
L~adere in uniform Were, in the beginning, Kome M~nigtry peopl~e but from
about 1954, former army and navy men began to ae~ume the pogt~ anr~ since
then, With one or two exceptiona, th~~ have all had military background.
2raditionally, former military peopl~ and the police have been at odda
and friction betveen the uniformed personnel and the internal bureaucracy
can be traced to these ecar tieeues.
The hold that the bureaucracy had on the main structure of the police i8
apparently becoming ehaky; in 1974, Kaztmasa Taehiro became the firgt
vice chieg to have had a Finaace l~iinistry background and vice chief
Maruqama's eucceeeor ie echeduled to be Akira Hatari (curr~ntly ~hief
of dafenea facilitiee agency) aiso with a Pinamce Hinietry background.
Toru Hara (currantly chief of the bureau of accounte) aleo a Pinance
Minietry man, vill probably become a vice chief via the poat of defenae
, bureau chief.
Some commente ere being made to the effect that "it should reach the time
ahen people nurtured in the defenae agency can take over the leaderehip."
But there ia still S or 6 years before thoee wt?ose careers have been
limited to the defense~egency to mature gufficien!:ly to aseume the neer
- top poete. There are e number of reasons for this: Recruiting key
managament candidateg (through ptomotion examinatiana) from ~rithin the
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d~f~nee ag~ancy did not get underw~y until Japan fiecai year ~J1rY~ 19SS~
mor~ov~~, thar~ rs~r~ ~aly from tao to po~gibly f~va or ~ix quglifi,ed
candid~t~� eal~cead to egke the ~xaminaeion with, on ncC~etone~ only o~~
cgnd3d~C~ rucc~erfully p~s~ing it. The Cop poeition held by ~nyone whn
hge come up ehrough thie ~oute i~ noar ~ defane~ councillar ~bat~?aan g
bureau and ~ection chief in th~ pecking order). Of those who aere re-
cruie8d in thi~ maaner before 1961 are noa? eaction ~hief~ gad thoee prior
co 1~64 ara aactioe chiafe of ~~.~xili~ry ~~gan~. ~or the~~ pereone to
reaeh the poetr of burpau chief or vice chiefr aill teke 5 or 6 more years.
- 'Ph~t i~ raaeon number ona.
Among tho~p aho ar~ c~t~gorised ~e having been eurtured in thp defenee
~gency, there are thoee Who fir~t ~erved in other mini~tries or agenciae.
Of tihase paople~ eome are alr~ady aerving in euch k~y pc~tg gg chief nf
procure~?ent headqu~rt~re and ae defenee bureau chiefe. BuL theYe ie
little chance that they wi11 achieve the gtatug of vice chief.
Th~ bur~aucrecy airhin the def~n~e ~gency i~ ~tructur~d to h~ve Lhe l~i-
ngnc~ Minietry de~eggt~ to it~ it~ ~hief of bur~au of accounts, MITI itg
fgcilities bureau chi~f, the Poreign Mini~try it~ councillor for interna-
tiongl affaire, and th~ Minietry of He~lth and Welfgre ite bur8au of
m~dicin~ chief. In th~a~a bureaug, moet of the eection chiefe are aleo
on loan from thoee verioue ministr~ee. It can be seen that the aivilian
contingent in thig ~tructure, is a looae canglamorate and gince mo~t af
those Who are eerving at the agency eti11 have Rtringa which tie them ta
their parent organizatinn~ it ie difficult to get an hone~t~ indepandent
coneeneue with the agency.
The nature of the main etrpam of thoae in uniform is aleo uadergoing
changes; looking at the educational background of the self defense force~s
managerial claee and dividing them inCo highest educationel level com-
pleted--collegp, junior coll~ge, higher sehool ~prepj (including the
former undergraduate profeaelonal schools), middle achool ~high echool~,
former military academiea~ and defense college--in 1968 the pro~ortion,s
Were: college, 23.1 percent; ~unior college, 11.5 percent; highar school~
25.6 percent; middle school. 15.2 percent; former military academies,
~1 percent; Defanee College, 13.6 percent. The breakdown in JPY 77 vae _
college, 23.4 percent; junior college~ 4.8 percent; higher ech~ol~ 33.6
percent; middle school, 15.8 percent; former militarq academi~s. 2.2 per-
cent; Defenee College, 20.3 percent.
Notable in theee figurea ie the drop to a mere 2.2 percent frc~m 11 percent
for thoee ~+ho had graduated from the former military academies and the
increaee in Defense College graduatea from 13.6 to 20.3 percent. Initial
graduates from the Defense College have now reached the rank of field
grade and it aill not be long before they will be up for general grade
selection. In other ~,+ords~ the majority of self defease force officere
are ehifting from former academy men to Defenee College graduates and in
aaother 4 or S yeare the last veetage of former academq mea aill have
vaniehed.
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Now do Cheee d~,e~pp~gring "eenior" officer~ vi~w Ch~ curre~C crop of self
d~fen~e nffic~r~? W3eh regard to tihe rei~eiona between tha uniformed and
the bureaucrattc civilians in tha agency~ a certain former eenior officer -
~aye, "The uniformed groupa ie an ~oppreased racel"' He further comments:
"In my day~ we fought with our bureaucratic civilian compatriot~ but with
it there Wae an underly~ng friendship between us. Things seem to be dif-
ferent now. There eeeme to b~ a gradu~l dimun3.tion of thax deep-rooted
friendship. In Che old days tihere were occasions when a buregucraC would
come to the eraff office to study for a yegr or two before returning eo
hi~ pe~ti. Thig doeen't h~ppen any more eo the opportuniCy tn eatablish
friendehipe aC th~t 1eve1 hge been le~sened. Moreover, we in uniform ueed
to believe Chat we were in the driver~g seat as epecialista which gave us
confid~nc~ in oursalvee. Recently, the officers are young and aince they
become attached to gtaff work and expoeed to budgete and defeneE: plans,
they become administrative officers. They don't have thae milit:ary bear-
ing--and I ref~r to thet in tts favorable aepect--thet they uee~i to have."
Old Cim~ civiliane' regctiong ~ffirmed Cheee cnmm~te. "The uniformed
peopla we de~..lt with in the old d~ys were all people ~ith comt,at experi-
ence~ They w.+.re people who were well aware that they muat not reveal eny
>,af the uneavory traits attrit~uCed to Che old military and we mutually
r~apected our restrainte. So though we may have had our confrontationa '
and differences at work, we were abla to get along We11 aocially as indi-
viduals. Although there is conCact between civilians and uniformed per-
sona now. differencea in~fundamental social concepts have made eaey rela-
tions betWeea them more difficult. I suppose it is ~uat a~nother eign of
the timea."
In recent times, one often heare that~ "The defense agency hae lost its -
eense of dedication." If it has~ one of the reasona for it ie the fact
that enthuaiaem generated by the task of ahaping the new self defense
force and defense agency gradually waaed ae most of the canatruction work
Was completed and thoae efforts Were converted to the leas exciting daily
maintenance and operation dutiee. We wonder if this apparently weakening
eense of dedication is taking ite toll in eapirit de corpa. The aituation
is eimilar to the difference betaeen the exciting phase of layiag tracka
for a neW railroad line and the routine of running trains on them when
thar phase ie completed. In mentioning this analogy, one is reminded that
there seeme to have beea an uausually high incidence of miehape on the
euper expreee lines recently; ahen one realizea that the aelf defenae ;
forc~ and defenee agencq has only one goal--that of being prepared for ~
the completely uaexpected event--~e caa underatand how easily it could
fall victim to boredom ot paesing what muet aeem like an interminable
number of uneventful daye. It ie an eveatuality we do not like to con-
template.
Salariedmen: Arnry
Ie the self defenee force a military organization? This has been an issue
Which has beea argued pro and coa ever since it xas formed. The tradi-
tional tone of the LDP government on this issue is as folloire: "The self -
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defenae force h~s the duty of coping aith an invaeion by a foreign country.
If euch gn entity is n military forc~, then the eelf defense force 3e a
military force. But Chapter II, Article 9 of the conetitution atipuleCee
that it cannot engage Che nation in combat without authorization. So -
though it ie an insCrumenC of aelf defenae~ it does not have the authority
to ~xerciee that capability. It is not given the authority of courC
- martial nor doee iC have epecial military lawe given to ordinary military
entiCies. In thie aepecC at leasC~ it differe from the ugual mi.litary
entity."
We do not intend here to rehaeh the rather pointlesa argumente as to
wheCher the aelf defenee force is a military entity or not. According -
Co the government's definition, the self defenae force ie an extraordinary
military entity. But in the general sense, it could be viewed as a mili-
- tary force. If it is an extraordinary m1liCary entity it is noC becauae
iC doesn't have court marCial righta; we would agree to ita being an un-
usual military force if it were to be defined ae being a salaryman army.
The ~oyride flighC taken by the maritime eelf defenae force plane during
the nighC of 7 September illuatraCea the "salarymen force" aspect. On an -
impulse, the 27 year ~ld lst lieutenant who was at the controls decided
to take a look at Tokyo. No doubt t'ne beauty of Tokyo's night lights and,
_ being a baseball fan, aeeing the ba'ilparka from the air thrilled him and
the two other crew membera. We can well understand his feelings--some-
~ thing like the salaryman who takea a break to go to the moviea or to a
sporta arena. But we can't have the self defense force emulating a eimple
salaried clerk. Why? Because in this specific incident, the flight was
being made without running lighta with the inherent danger of craehing
and because it was done in clear violation of training orders. In the
old days, the aircraft commander would undoubtedly have been aub~ected to
a trial by a military court. In this incident, however, he was arreated
for violating the lawa of air navigation; within the unit to which he was
attached, he wae suspended from his duties for 35 days and the commander
- and othera in responsible positions were either reprimanded or received
werninga. The penalties meted out were fairly aevere for theae days.
. There was an earlier incident: A pilct while on a training flight sud-
denly felt an urge to make a flying visit to his home tawn and ended up
crashing. Although such incidents which occasionally occur do not really
earn the aelf defense force the label of "salarymen force" in themselvea,
they do contribute to it. The self defense force diffeze from the mili- _
tary of old in both nature and acope; it makes no incursions into politics
and is a force which exists for the sole purpose of being prepared for a
hoatile invasion.
In about 1964, the then chiAf of the defense agency ordered that all self
defense force peraonne;l be in uriiform when commuting to or from his duty
etation. All those in the etaff office who were diviaion chiefs or above
Were provided limousine traneportation to co~ute and they were in uniform.
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Their aubordinaCes, howe'ver, had to travel by bus or streetcgr and they
habitually wore civilian clothes and changed into uniform on arrival at
Cheir officea and changed back Co civilian clothes ~o make Che trip home. ,
"To maintain the pride oa: being a aelf defenae officer even while commut-
ing," it was ordered, "w~ar the uniform while in tranait." The order was
reapected while he was in office buC afCer hie departure, the commutere
gradually reaumed wearing ciwies until today almost all have gon~2 back
to wearing regular sCreet clothes.
When queried, a self defenae man replied: "In the rain, if we are in
uniform, we can only wear a raincoat and may not t~se an umbrella. People
around us don't like it when we get on a crowded public transportation
vehicle all wet." We get the impreasion that the arrogance diaplayed by
the old military men on etreet cars ia missing snd we must admit that we
. favor the restraints ahown by the current defense people. In West Germany,
the slogan for military peraonnel ie "civiliana in uniform" with Che impli-
cation that they are civili~ne before they don their uniforms and Chat they
have the basic rights of freedom to meet, to form groups, and of speech
that all citizens have even while serving in the military. We would like
to have thia principle of their being a citizen first applled Co the mem-
bers of our self defense force too.
The pay acale for Self Defense Force [SDF] officers is a level ab~~~a the
pay for general government employees for the reason that danger is in- _
herent to the occupation. General grade officere are paid 354,000 to
188,000 yen a month; field grade from 258,000 to 361,000; and the classi-
cal "flowera" or company grade from 135,000 to 271,000. The bureau chiefs
in the bureaucracy receives from 276,000 to 420,000 per month so though
his treatment and privileges equate to those of the general grade officer, -
his actual pay equates to the general officer candidate grade. From this
it can be seen that the uniform ia given some favorable considerations.
The director general of the Defense Agency hae traditionally ordered that,
"The SDF will be etrong in spirit" but Director General Kanemaru went a
step further and directed, "Be an SDF that instills fear." It is not clear
what an SDF which ia feared describes but it is a fact that the SDF--
generally labeled "the salaryman force"--has not even r~aached the point
of being combat ready. Some years ago, a seagoing tanker named thP Yuyo
Maru went aground and it was decided that it woul.d be towed out to sea and
sunk by torpedoes. Then it was found that no direct line torpedoes were
available at Yokosuka and the target practice had to be postponed until I
the appropriate weapone were delivered to the scene all the way from Kure! _
A similar situation ex~.sts with the Air SDF's sir-to-air missiles. There
- may be some merit to the explanation that, "Those situations exist only
becauae it is peacetime; should an incident occur, we will asswne an imme-
diate reaction posture." But the point of the isaue is not in facilities
- and hardware but in the training and spirit of readiness in normal times.
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~ox n~~i~int, us~ nrtt.Y
'There ig gmple evi,dence to endorae rhe eugpi,cion thgt the egleryman atti-
tude has so permeeted the fEorce that it will be tne;Efecttve in time of
ne~d. '
We had an opportunity to observe g SAC C~gC gt Gu~m. An obeervgCion p~ane -
from Tachikawa flew into Andereon airbgee on Gu~m without werning and dis-
$orged ingpectors of gen~rgl gradee who ~c~tt~red to piloCe' briefing
roomg and other key pogtg to conduct t~~t~ on the spot. All pilot~ who
fgiled to paes the te~te werp ordered home.
In comparieon, the SDF'a inepections are mere formalities and almoet cere-
monial in nature. inepection notices are i~eued in advance giving ample
time to prepare for ir; in most instances only prearranged locatione ar~
in~pected~ Director General Sadandri Ygmanaka once made a eurprise in~pec-
tion by automobile and wae eoundly criticized by the uniformed officera
on the grounds ChgC "it wasn't nice to have the director general come on
a xour without warnic~g." ~as the force become accuatomed to being a eglary- -
man army?
Big Ship~ Big Gun Principle
It is a well known fact that the big ship~ big gun advocates were in the
majority in the pre-war era. It is also generally accepted that that led
to the conetruction of the world's largest 69,000 ton Yamato and Mueashi
which were armed ~aith 55-cm guns.
The postwar Maritime SDF doeA not~ of course~ have either Lig ahips or
big guna; ite biggest veasel is the 4100 ton Haruna-class equipped with
5-inch guna. We cannot guarantee, however, that there is no trend toward
the big ship~ big gcsn principle. The Maritime SDF once progra~ed an
8,000 ton heliport equipped escoxt vessel but it was scrapped in favor of
building two 4~000 ton heliport equipped eacort vesaels on the grounde
that damage could diaperee more broadly where there were two ves8ela in-
stead of one.
The Air SDF will shortly be armed with 100 P-15's classed as the beat and
_ most modern of ~et fighters at a cost of 7.5 billion yen each. Appropria-
tion for E2C early warning aircraft has also been requested. In compari-
son with the firat jet fighters obtained by the Air SDF at 110 million
per plane~ the coat of the F-15 has increaeed 68-foldl
We can understand the uniformed element's desire to procure the best
available in the world's arsenal of weapons so that the defenae posture
can be mainrained most effectively. But the constitution stipulates that
our defense potentials muat be kept to the essential miniIDUm and the LDP
_ government has held defense costa to under 1 percent of the groea national
product. A broad interpretation of security guaranteea, it ahould not be
essential that we have the best and the moat expensive weapons in the
world in our arsenal.
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Etec~ntly, relative to th~ ~~cnrl,ty guaranteee ieeu~, the concept of cri~ie
inan~gem~nt ha~ be~n ~ttrACting attentinn. Th~e ealienC p~int~ of cri~i~
n?~nag~m~nt ar~: 1) Cri~is prevention measures; 2) ~mergency mea~ur~~ Co
cope with a crigie ehould nna arige; 3) Meaeure~ tn cope with ~~ieugtion
which hgg no eggy ~nlution~ Ineofar as th~y pertain Co J~p~n, w~ wonder
whether we ehouidn't concentrate on "criee~ prevention m~~~ur~e" ae th~
meang of aeeuring our eecurity.
Magic Worde
The mechaniem with which the independent action of the military is kept
under wraps and politic~ given authority over military affairg i~ civilian
control. At th~ time the SDF wae created~ the Japanes~ could not swallnw -
th~ concept of the U.S. type civilian contro~ end Colonel Kowaleky of Che _
GH~ wrote that he h~d g hard time eelling it to Director Cen~ral Ma~uhgrg
and hi~ subordinatee.
We are under the impresaion that the "American atyle civillan control" ie
not completely underetood even in ite home grounde~ the U.~. In 1949 a
big reorganization of Che national defenae eetabliehment wag u,~:,,~~~~taken.
At that Cime Ferdinand Eberetaadt who participated in a manager:al capa-
city in the national defense committee of the Hoover Commisaion~ said in
a speech at the Naval Academy aC a later date~ "Civilian control is a eort
of a mythical expreaeion.... Nobody knows What it means." It is ironic
that he who had made the greateet effort in eetabliahing civilian control
throughout all of the military etructure and was the one pereon more than
any other who ehould have known the definition of civilian control, was
the one who made that admiseion. It ie not unreasonable~ therefore, that
its meaning eluded those who were involved at the time the SDF was founded.
We cannot say that even today ita meaning is fully underatood in Japan.
Although the expreseion~ civilian control, ia toesed around freely as if
everybody knew what it meant, it is yet to be firmly defined. In a paper
authored by Lincoln and Jordan who were instructora at the Military Acade~y
at West Point in the U.S., iC was etated that, "all people boW their head~
in respect (to civilian control) but it ia a holy cow that has never been
clearly defined." The following premisea that were eet forth by Louie
Smith in hie "The Strength of American Democracy" are, however, accepted
by most echolara:
1) The head of the atate is a civilian and repreaenta the majority of the .
people; he ie reeponaible to the people and may be unseated through exist-
ing legal or political channels;
2) The commander of the military forces who is a profesaional military
man, is under the command of a civilian politician;
3) Military related organs and hence operationa conducted by military
pereonnel are under the direction of authorized civiliana who will coordi-
nate military related plana at all stagea; the civilians eo authorized
ahall be membere of the responaible executive branch;
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_ 4) 'I'h~ rapr~eentgtivee elecCed by the peopia (memb~r~ of Congree~)
~hgll darermin~ th~ etate of ~x~ the allocation of funde to achieva mili-
tary ob~ectives ~appropriation~)~ human re~ources r~quirad and g~ner.vl
mea~ur~~ to b~ tekpn under emergency gituations and maintain specilic
and gen~ral c~ntrol over thoee ~tho are to ba held reepon~ible for ia~pla-
mentation (legi~lative control);
S) The ~udiciery i~ in g po~ition to authorisep Che militery to ag~ume
re~poneibility for the protection of ~n individugl'e bagic righCe guaran-
Ceed him und~r the democracy (judiciary contrnJl).
~'he basie for civili~n control as deacribed b; Lonig Smith ia being ful-
filled by 1a~r in Japan at the pregant time. Chapter V of Article 66 of
the constitution ~tgte~: "Th~ prime mini~ter ~nd other mi.nieterg of eCgte
muet be civilian~." And the authority for i~upreme comm~nder of the SDF
reete in the prime sninister representing Ct+,e cabinet (Article 7 of Self
I~fenee Porce itegulation~) and that the prime minister 38 a civilian.
'I'he defense agency ie eubordinate to the cabinet and ite chief commande
the 5DF under the direction of the prime miniater (Article 8 of SDF Regu-
lation~). The director general of the Defense Agency is a minister of
the national government and ie a civilian.
Additionally, the following agsuree fuactions to be under civilian con-
trol:
The office of Parliamentary Vice Minieter of the Defenae Agency ia filled
by a member of the Diet and ie a civilian. Hia ma~or duty ie to keep the
director geaeral advised on political mattera; the poat of the agencq's
administrative vice miniater ia a8eigned to a civilian official of the .
defense ageacy; he is responaible for adminiatrative mattere of the De-
fenae Agencq and ia in an advisory capacity to aeeist the director- -
general'e command authority over the SDF.
The offices of Counsellor and of the Internal Bureaus are uader civilian
control and even thoae who are outeide of the agency but have dutiea
pertaining to it auch ae the National Defenee Council and the Finance
Miniatry vhich has a check on budgetery mattera, all come tmder civilian
- control.
In the final analyais, however~ the ultimate in civilian control is the
Diet which is the organ which controls che make-up of the cabinet. To
legislate on defenae mattera and defenae appropriatione, it has the
authority of overaight and decie:on making. It also controls the cabinet
in establiehing basic defense policiee.
In such diverae Ways. the SDF is under civilian control in both theory
and law. Effective implementation, however, ia the iseue.
There have been occasional incidents ahere civilian control has been vio-
lated. The moat recent of theee vas the atatement made by former Chairman
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of Joint 3t~ff Counci,l Kurisut "In th~ ~vent of a gurprig~ ~te~ck,"
gaid Kurisu, "the SbI~ may take actions whi~h eupe~c~d~ th~ 1~t." On the ~
grounde that ~hi~ infringed on th~ civilign conCrol i~eu8~ tha Chairman
wa~ relievad of hie dueiee. Othar ~x~mples of violatione includ~ th~
Mit~uyg Plan ieeue of 1965; ~vacu~tion of the '~achikawa i~~ue of ~.972;
the iseue involving the traneporCing of m~terial to Okinawa which ~ro~e
in the e~me yeer; and the matt~r of as~uming prior ri~hte to gpproprin-
tione for th~ ~ourth Def~n~~ plen.
iteviewing thie ~eriee of incidenCe having pertinence to nonconformity with
civiitan coetrol~ most were tgken up by the Diet and couid be uaed g~ evi-
denc~ that civilian contral ig functioning effectively. They do point up
doubt gs to whether it ie bping effectively gppli~d by th~ director gen~rnl
of the Defense Agency within hie ~gency and whether the prime minieter is
executing the euthority given him in ~ proper manner.
Tenure of Direceor Ceneral of Defen~e Agency
'I'here rould be eeveral rea~one fnr the failure of the director general of
the Defense Agency to fully implement the contral. One ie that hie tenure
in office is too ehort for him to fully grasp the concept. We believe
that this point is Well taken.
Counting from Keikichi Maeuhara (who vas then given the title of Chief
of the Police Reserve Force) in 1950 when the preaent SDF wa8 founded,
the curr~nt incumbent, Shin Kanemaru~ ie the 34th director general. In
other words, there have been 34 chiefa in 28 yeare~ making the average
time in office of ~bout 9 and a half months. This is an astounding figure.
r
When a new man takea office, the vice miniaters and various bureau chiefe
brief him on their respective duties. Of course, this is normal procedure
in not only the Defense Agency but in all governmental ministries and
agenciea. But these briefinge preempt the entire day for about a moath.
Even then~ there ie no Way that all he ehould know about the agency can
be crammed into the newcomere head in that period of time, particularly
if he hae had no experience or knowledge of matters pertaining to the
Defenee Agency. With this in mind~ the briefers try to give him a broad
brush picture at firat and get into more details at a later date. The
briefing elemente are apt to consume conaiderable time since they are
anxious to give as much information about their functiona as poasible.
Specialized language or ~argon is inherent in mattera pertaSning to the
milieary or defense. This cauee for the ordinary person to say, "I just
can't understand military mattera" is frequently due to thie language
barrier. i,ihen Naoki Niehimura becgme director general, he heard the ex-
presaion MAP fre~uently in the briefings. He had asaumed that the brief-
ere were referring to mapa of a geographical nature and it Waen't until
considerable time had elapsed that he Wae made aware of the fact that it
_ referred to the U.S.'s military aseietance plaal
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When ~ueh thing~ nre Eeken into considar~tion~ the a~aount of tima thp
neM? mae davota~ to eeudying bacom~s a lantor. Of all tho~a aho hav~ haid
the poat~ Sadanori Yamanaka probably put in more tia~ studying Chan any
other. Not only was ha ~ diligene ~tudaint ~t th~ offic~ bue ha davoted
much of hie tim~ gt home try~ng to abeorb defenge regulgtion~ a~nd othar _
raference ma~erial m~king it poe~ible for him to master the baaic knarledge
in ~ comparatively ehort period.
The later birector Generel 5eneuke Fu~ied~ remains in our menary ag a
~ereon who grasped the bugineg~ in a ehort time to the point t~there he could
ably reepond to questiona at Diet hearings. Handing him the aub~ect mate-
rial for a hearing wae eufficient for him to bone up on it and do an ad-
mirable ~ob to an aegemblage Which vae attended by feo? if any pereons from
the electorate. He aae, to hi~ office, an "excellent etudent boee."
Moet, hawever~ took a long time to learn their ~ob and at hearings the -
usual reeponse va~ "I hgv~n't been on the ~ob very long and will have a
government's expert on the ~ub~ect regpond Co you." There have been occa-
sione when important n~attere were under diecussion~ an exaeperated oppogi-
tion member would protest that, "We can't permit a eituation in vhich the
cognizant minieter is unable to have aneWeral"
Among tfie 34 vho have held the post, there have beea aome repeaters.
Keikichi Masuhara aerved three timee and Naoki Niahimura and Naoaumi Esaki
have each served tWice. But repetitive aervice doea not aeceaearilq make
the peraon a veteran; Keikichi Nishimura had to reeiga over the incideat
involving the collieion of an All Japan Airlinea plane and an SDF aircraft
aad he vas guilty of making a miaetatemeat; Naoki Niehimura had to step
down becauee of a foot-in-mouth incident.
It normally takea about a year for a person to learn the rudimenta of the
dutiea of the director general. Needless to say, 9 and a half monthe ie
much too ehort a term even from learning oaly the concept of civilian con-
trol. A 3 year term ehould be the minimum. It ie reported that former
Prime Miniater Tanaka envisioned the nurturing experieaced director gen-
- erals by fo~ing a pool of tWO or three men With good poteatial8 and have
them aseume the poat of a rotating basie. This may be a waq to fulfill
the need for experience but wouldn't the application of the U.S. aqstem
in Which a civilian is aseigned to the post for a period of 4 or 5 qeare
be a daring but good alternative plaaZ
Intra-Agency Internahip
Civilian control is enhanced by thoae Who assist the dir~'jator general
including the administrative vice miniater and the bureau chiefs of the
Defense Agency, the chiefa of etaff of grouad, maritime, and air SDFa~ the
chairman of joint etaff couacil and othera. On revieWing the varioua de-
_ ficiencies of the paeu. a number of them can be traced to the areas liated
above.
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W~ hav~ ~iraady ment3,oned th~~ tha office~ and bureau~ in the D~fenr~
Agenry fYequentiy hgva ovarlgpping or dupiicative functiona. Many of
tho~e who come to the Agency fYom the police or other ministriee and agen- ~
cieg, etep right into bureau chief po~tg. Poesibly Ch~~~ p~opl~ couid
iearn the funcC3ons of their n~av ~ob~ if givea 2 or 3 y~~rg but in ~xppri-
~nce, they cannot eompet~ with the career m~n in th~ AgenGy~ Any per~on
who i~ to ageume the poet of admini~tr~tiva vice minigter ~hould b~ moved
up from the Ageacy's b~fen~~ Bureau becguee the areg of thgt buregu'g
cognizance includeg the folloaing making 3t the moet important one in Che
Agency: 1) Mattere pertaining to the begice and ad~ustmente of defense
and protactiori; 2) Matter~ perteining to the baeic movemente of the SDF;
3) MBtters pertaining to the baeic gtructure, compl~menti~ organization~ ~
equipment, and diepoeition of the ground, maritime~ and air SDF's; 4) Mat-
- terg pertaining to the procuremenC and collation of reference and intelli-
gence materiale; 5) Matter8 pertait~ing Co the bggics of training of the
SDF. ;
Responaibility for auch ma~or functione as the procurement of both domestic (
and foreign military intelligence and SDF planning and training ig concen-
trated in that bureau. Familiarity with moet of the eeeentia~s of the
Defense Agency Cherefore becomes inherent to the function of the chief of
the Defenee Bureau. We cannot but feel that a person who triea to func-
tion ae the administrative vice minister without having been chief of the _
Defense Bureau will lack confidence in thie ma~or area at least.
Another misgiviag we harbor ie in the educational and nurturing aepect of ~
the managerial personnel. The executive clasa people are shot,m reepect
becauae they are asaigned considerable responeibilitiee and authorities.
Upon graduating from college, they had to pass upper grade examinatione
and, if picked up by the Defenae Agency, epend a year's internehip. Dur-
ing this period of interaehip~ they vere aesigned bookkeeping and reference
material collection taska--literally~ a period of on-the-~ob training--but
once they had completed thie term of aervitude, they ~aere aseigaed to a
working poet. For example~ in the Defenae Section of the Defenae Bureau,
one may be paired ~ith a senior member to eupervise one of the ground,
maritime or air subsections. His dutiea will include checking and col-
lating plane and appropriationa drafted by the reaponaible staff office.
The peraon Who prepared the drafts is uaually a peraon of more experience
who is probably a firat or second field grade officer. Thia officer will
sek the new men to come to hia desk where the sub~ect at hand will be ,
explained to him so it must be said that the greenhorn is being handed
considerable authority right from the atart.
~
At the same time~ it cannot be denied that this procedure which has been 1
in effect since the inception of the Defenae Agency, arouses a certain
degree of antagonism in the civilian toward the uniformed men. But.how
_ can thiF pattern be reviaed? In other ministries and agenciea~ even the
key executivee in the National Railwaya for inetaace, atarted out as ticket
sellers and train conductore for the reason that the future executive
ehould be familiar with the work-a-d,ay man's problems.
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W~ are of tha opinion thge thie practica ohouid ba appiiad eo th. t~fanaa
Agency. Wa baliov~ thar the axecueiv candideCa ehould otare his caraar
wirh e year or tfro's axperienca in tha defen~a foraae or 3n tha sraff
afficae ae part of hie nurturing proca~~.
Unrii about 1965~ night watcha~ ~n tha Defenre Agency officee Mare ae-
eumed ~olely by uniformad pereonnel. But becauee there wae a faaling thaC
the aiviliane ehould be train~ad to cop~ ~rith all problema on a 24-hour
ba~ie two young career men ware aesigned tho~e a~tchee on a rotating baeie.
Thia, too~ ehould be looked on ae part of the caraermen'e education.
Reformation of National I~fenee Council
Tha National D~fenee Council plays a ma~ar role in effecting civillan con-
trol becauae when the prime tninieter ie confront~d viCh a naed to obtain
_ a coneeneue of Che people~ there are many important caeee in Which the
National Defenee Council's compliance becomes esaential.
~ The National Defense Council is composed of the prime minister~ the for-
eign miniater, finance minister, director general of defenee agency~ and
the director general of the economic planning agency. We have referred
to the importance of the National Defenae Council several timea but we
cannot atate that iC h~e fulfilled its role to maximum effectiveaese. We
say this becauee for one thing~ it has met on an average of only~two or
three timea a year. Though we realize that the membere carry a heavy
echedule making it difficult for them to find the time~ but convereely.
it would eeem to indicate that they do not attach the merited priority
- to those meetinge.
Unfortunately. the Council seems to limit itself to approving measuree
- introduced by the prime miaieter and concerne itaelf almoat exclusively
- to mattere pertaining to the Defense Agency. The Council should be a body
which addreeeea itaelf to braad iseues aad to coordinating varioue aecu-
rity measurea rather than confine itself to Defense Agency related mattera.
The National Defenae Co~mcil hae an adminiatrative bureau in which coun-
aellora from the various miniatries se~ve in eubordination to the bureau's
chief. They are there for the purpose of adjueting differencea Which
arise among the miniatries and agencies. Though that ~a the aominal fuac-
tion, in reality,, their dutiea aeem to be limited to acting ae channel~
through which information from their parent ministry ia requeated and
procured. The couneellore do not eeem to exercise their authority to ef-
fect any ad~uatments or changes ia their parent minietries.
Should the National Defense Council be restructured and if ao, how? The
ma~ority opinion indicated that it ahould be molded in the shape of the
U.S.'s National Securitq Council. The ma~ority opinion prevailed and _
atarting t~rith the U.S. atyle civilian control concept, Japan has copied
the U.S. in the formation of the compact Natioaal Defense Couacil.
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In abouti 1953 Cha Kaiehi,n Party rook on th~ 3~curitiy Ag~ency--rhe forerunner
of the nefenee Agancy--Whtch ~ras contro~led by the former ~ome Minietry~
and advocatad th~ eatabiiehmant of eomathing aktn to tha U.S.~e National
S~curity Council which includee people with civilian background. It i~
reported that the behind tha ecene eupporter of thie concept wae the
Hattori group compo~ed of ine~n of Che old army gnd headed by Colonel Hgt-
tori. T'h~ Liberal Party, though claimieg that th8re ~r~~ no real need for
any kind of an organiscgtian~ did not ob~a~ct to the formation of a ema11
compact unit. In the origin~l Nationgl Defen~~ Council pla~n, the group
wae to include some knowledgeable persone from civilian ranlce. Thie por-
tion of the propoeal was deleted by an amendment in the ~iet. Since then ~
ther~ h~ve been eeveral attpmpte made by membere of the Democratic Social-
iet Party and othere~ to include civilians buC they heve be~t~ argu8d down
on the grounde of gecurity risk~ and for the re~son that the Cabinet ahould
be held reeponeible for national policy.
. The National Senurity Council in the U.S. operatea under the National
Security Act as amended in 1947 and in 1949. Its regular members are the
preeident~ vice preeident, the secretary of atate end the aecretary of
defense. Ae advisore to thoae four, the director of central intelligence
and the chief of the ~oint chiefs of etaff attend as asaigned membere and
the aide Co the preeident (currently Brzezinaki) and the presidential
secretary (currently David Marlin) aleo participate.
The National Security Council aaeiata the president to coordinete domea-
tic, foreiga, and military policies for smooth implementation of military
and other executive functiona Co guarantee national aecurity. More defini-
tively, it hae the follawing duties ae directed by the preaident:
1) EvaluaCes and eatimates the current military strength--both overt aad
covert--of the U.S. to asaiet or warn the president on ob~ectivea, offi-
cial international arrangemente, and of risks and changes involved.
2) Analyze national aecurity policy mattera which may pertain coa~only
to more than one of the varioua depart~nente and agencies and advise the
president of the overlapping factors. -
3) Report to or adviae the preeident on his apecial requeat or even with-
out his requeat on items deemed appropriate.
~ -
_ Compared to our Natioaal Defenae Council, the structure of the National ~
Security Council ie considerably larger. It ia composed of nearly 90
profe8aionals (our defenae council has about a dozen) aad ita dutiee (di-
vided ia five groups auch as Europe~ Asia, etc.) are broken down into
plans analysis, prograa~ming and adminiatration. It has two standing com-
mitt~ea, the cosmnittee on policy (composed of secretaries of departmenta
and chaired alternately by the secretaries of atate and defenee) and the
committee on epecial situationa (chaired by Brzezineki and hes control
of emergency eituations and intelligence fiuectiona). There are, addi-
- tionally, subcommitteea which are composed of aix departmeat uader secre-
taries.
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Rec~ntly, tha Nation~l Sacuri.ty Counci,l wg~ i,na~rua~antal in puttiing ite
~fforte to a paper ~~iled the pRM No 10 rrhi,ch h~r draWn aorichtida atten-
tion. It eont~in~ ~n analy~i~ of the military balance batr~taan the 8aet
and the Weet and of tiheir reepective etrategiee. ~his papar--~ portio~
of ahich ~rag leaked to th~ preeg--~aas digcuAeed by the Council and acei-
v~ted ae a "preeidential Order."
The regl poWer in the Natior?al Securiey Council ~ppearg to be Pre~idential
Adviger Bra~azin,~ki. He i~ not ~n offici~l Council member but in his cap~-
city a~ preridential adviser and ~leo ae chairman of ~he epec~gl com~ittee~
he ig acting ae an overall control officer. Hr:ezineki is the firet pareon
to eee the preeident every morning; Brze~in~ki'e offica in tha wast Wi~?g
of the executive office building ie ~ugt acroee the h~ll from the preAi-
den*'e office.
The efficient and e�f8ctive functioning of the U.5. National 3acurity Coun-
cil ie attributable to the gupport it can ca11 on from a pool of experte
~ not only in government but from the academic, bueineeg and othar areae in
the civilian environment. It ie reporCad that reorganization and re-
gtructuring of the Japan~se Natio~al DBfen~e Council ie uader conaidera-
tion. Although We do not need one of the ecape of the U.S.~ there ia
undoubtedly much that ae could draW on from it~ particularly from tha
standpoint of concept.
Immeture Defanse Concept
In analyzing the Defenee Agency, pereonnel is, of couree, an iaportant
factor for coneideration. The highest priority~ hawever, muat be given
to the question of what type of a defense plau ehould be conceived and
what would be the appropriate ecope of the structure to implement it.
There has~ of courae, already been a mountRin of papere writtea and pub-
liahed on theee aub~ecte. What a~e can say at thie point ia that if the
provisions of our current peace conetitution are to be adhered to, ae -
muet think in terms of defining the minimum defenae mu8cle required to
assure those provieione not only in terms of miliCary neede but ou a
much broader acope including naturgl reeourcea~ euergy, and foreign rela-
tions. Thie type of broad thinking for ~ecurity ia finally catching on
as being eaeential but has not yet been implemented ae a national policy
concept.
Up to now, the Defense Agency has proposed five defense plans and they
have been implemented after being approved by the governmeat. Theae have
been the Firet Defense Plan (embracing 3 yeara. JFY 1958-1960); Second
Defense Plan (apanning S years~ JPY 1962-1966); Third Defenae Plan (for
the 5 yeare~ JPY 1967-1971); [Fourth Defense Plan (for the 5 yeare~
JFY 1972-1976); and the ma~or defense plaa (Which was lauached in JPY
1977). The first plan covered a 3-year ~pan aad the subeequent aecond.
third, and fourth were for 5 yeara each but the practice of putting a
time limit on the plane Was abandoned With the one which ~rent into effect
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in J~'Y 1977 in favor of a~ormule #or dra~ring up plane on an annual [fiecal
year~ b~eio. Tha t?a~r program r~rai i~piamanted ~eceuea coec of goode inf~a-
~ion and increaea in pay scales mada it impo~eib~e to adhera to programe
drawn up savaral yeare in advanca. Pianning, therefore, wae changed over
to a fiecal year ba~ie. It ia an adaptation of the eyetem in eff~ct in
the natioaal defane~ budgating in the U.S. ca~led the rolling budgat eye-
t~m or the PP$S (~lanning, Programm~ng, Budget Syrtem).
Up to noa~ the defenea plans aere generally kno~? by their eobriquet:
"military hardwara ehopping list." It muat ba admitted that one could
find litLle tn the portions mada publia, on concepte on how to cope with
What eituation. Sxceptioas could be found in the etgt~ment in th~ Second
Defe~t~e P1an ahich included a rtatement to the effect that, "To cope aith
localized ware With couv~ntional weapon~"; and tihe u~e of the expree~ion,
"repel" for tha firet time in the Third Def~n~e Plat~ in th~ pa~,~ag~ which ~
read~ "hava on hand defanae pa+are to ~ffactively repel an? invaeion." The
Fourth Defense plan included a atatement to the effacC that~ "The goal ie
to have Cha capgbility to mo~t �ffecCively and moet efficiently cope in
a~ av~~t af ~rt invaaioa aith convatttion~l aegpons on a locglised warfar~
acale." Thie ie approximately the uama in intent though ueing diffargnt
- saorda ae that contained in th~ Sacond Defease Plan.
The main thruat of defenee pleaning uadetvant a complete chaage in style
in JPY y7 with the advaflt of the "Baeic Defenee Poaer Concept." Cynice
quipped as to whether "there could be a defeaee concept aithout auy baeis~"
but the explanation in over aimplification, ia that the new coucept ia to
maintain a basic atrucCUre for defense adequate only for peacetime (such
as for normal patrol and reaction~ structural bases for command, conmuni-
cation~ traasportation. reecue aork~ supplq and guard duty) Which could
- form the fouadation for grovth ae needed.
Even the con.ept of coping vith iavaeion haa undergone a change: Whereae
it had been merelq to reeist threate in our peripheral area8, the thinking
noW is based on a divisioA betweea intent and capability on the concept
of "precluding threats based on deterrenc~." Implementation of the new
concept Will be baeed along the following thinking:
"There ie no chaage in the concluaion that intents caa chan$e eaeily but
are difficult to discern. The vaetneae of globel influence and the
gravity of the reeults, however. act ae inhareat brakes againat the mak- ~
ir~g of freewheeling chaages in intent. Resietaace to change 38~ further- ~
more, in direct proportioa to ite acope. ~
"Unaer thie coacept, the threat of our defease structure ehould not be ,
calculated eolely on the basie of caQability of coping with all emergencies
but that its peacatime structure be well balaaced without heving a~r vul-
nerable spote in ite deploqment eo that peacetime watch caa be adequately
maintained. Inetaad of trying to fulfill the traditionallq espreesed goal
of "coping i+ith localized aarfare ~rith coaveational weapone" but build a
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capebility of predat~rmining th~a gi,ta, purposa, and duration of the
~ 1oc~~is~~ conflict and i~ve a rtructure capabl~ of copi,ng within tho~e
confine~~
"Tha moet di,fficult to ba far~?arnad ~re thea~ minor incureione; thay gre
thog~ Which raquire no 1arg~a ec~le preparation but ar~ perp~erated a~
surpri~e gtcacke wnd are over in a very ~hort pariod of time. Tha main
- thruet of our thinking i~ to b~ pr~parnd for ~ u~t thie tyrF,~ of event ~t
= gil time~." (from Defene~ White Pgp~r, "D~fenee of J~pan" of July 19y8)
Though this axplanation pertaining to thie type of threat i~ put in more
underrtandabie language th~n praviougly~ e~nco the facr remgin~ that it
is exc~~dingly difficult ta wncover ehe other partq'� intent before the
fac~, the traditional mathod of maintaini~g a capabillty to cope ~?ith the
unaxpeceed at auq time and any plgce mu~t ~igo be g built-ia fuctor.
There ig no doubt thet th~ thing called the bagic defenee structura con-
cept ie an offepring of "D~fenre Strength in Peacetime" by Takuya Kubo
(former Chief of Defenee Burer~u~ vice miaister for admini~tration of the
Defense Agency, and curreatly the chief of adminigtration of the nutionul
d~fenee couacil). The paper va~ probably prapared to quail the waasineee
, expreeaed by oppoeition party membare ae vell as some of our peopla to
the eff~act that. "jugt hoi? far must Japan'e defanee capabilitiea be in-
- creased?" and ~o shw+ the extent required in peacetioe. Thare is aaple
evidance ehat much effort Went into its preparation but ragrettabiq th~re
are eoma faulte in the logic employed.
Because of the aeveral provieione stem~ing from AYticle 9 of our cenati-
tution, our defenee cannot contain veapons auch as the ICBH which could
have a detarrent factor. Oura !e a military structure maique in the world
in that it ie etrictly limited in function to defense of homelaad. Becauae
tt ie unique in fuaction, a unique operaCional philosophq muat be fouad.
The Kubo concept did not find approval am~ng the uniformed sen; their
reasoning aae the intimidation ia the foundation on vhich all couatrie~
- build defenee atructures aad Where it ie imposaible to foretell a poten-
tial antagoniet'e intent (the concept of a purely defeneive atructure ia
not feaeible.J
The eervicemen's disaffaction was put in aords ~rhen former Chief of Joint
Staff Kurieu etatad that in the event of a eurpriee attack, "the SDF
- ahould take supra-legal action." ?his c~uld aignal the servicemen's
breaking aaay from the fruatrating "oppresaed race" atate ~+hich they have
been eaduring.
Coordinated Salf Defensa Concept
The concept Which the servicemea have beea nurturing i8 begim~ing to take
solid ehape. The Defenee Agencq with the Joint Staff Council taking the
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l~~d, pr~pared tatn pgperet g"Coordinated Eetim~te of the 3ltuation" (on
a fi~c~i yegz ~nd medium rang~ basa~) ~nd ~"Coordinatad D~fen~~ Pl~n" (on
a fiscal year~ medium rauge, and long range baee~). The formnr ie ae -
the ri,tle euggaet~, an analyeie og eh~ mili~~ry eituation in the countries
which a~re peripheral to Japan~ and th~ Coordinata+~ D~fenee ~1an ie that
pi~n wh3ch Wou1d b~ implemented in an emergency eituation ~under which de-
fen~~ and maint~ngnc~ of ~tability action~ are order~d).
Since both of the~e pgper~ gre given top eecr~t claeaification and ere noC
availeble to any exc~pt som~ epecified per~ong in the Defenee Agency, Che
cont~nts are not known. We imegine~ however, th~t actiong to b~ taken
gubsequent to the outbreak of an ~mergency eituation (D-dgy) are delineated
is~ con~iderabl~ detail? Needleee to egy, the actiona would be bgsed on Che
premise thaC ther~ aa~ an incident. T'hie eituntion i~ the crux of the argu-
ment for le$alizing imm~diate action in the event of gn incideet.
Of che varioue dutiee aeeigned to the Maritime SD~~ the ma~or function is
aa?tisubmarine aarfare (ASW); ehould an incid~nt be perpetrated~ one can
imagine that the antegontat aould undertake a blocka~de of our harborg and
bayg and peripheral eeae aith mines requiring that our traneport fleeta
be escorted and protected and all merchant vesael~s' movemente be put under
regulated control. ~
The Air SDF Would, in an emergency, have to tmdertake control of air navi-
gation and the Cround SDF aeaume reaponaibility for overland transporta-
tion and communication. It is not difficult to aesume that plaue for theae
functiona are contained in the clasaified documente.
Should an emergency arise, the actions of the three SDF's would be coordi-
neted under an operational concept to be implemented by the Coordinated
Defense Plan.
Viewing it from that atandpoint~ it would eeem that in the event of a
hoatile incident, the Ground, Maritime~ and Air SDFe would carry out their
operations emoothly. But we don't think that that ia necesearily so for
the folloaing reaeon: The Maritime SDF believea that should defense on
Che high aeae be broken~ it ie finiehed and in the same way~ the Air arm
thinks that it'e all over for it if air defense breaka down; the Ground
SDF covertly thinkg that the reaponaibility for finoing up the final de-
fense is its. ,
It is not implied that the three SDFs harbor antagonism toward each other
ae was the case between the old army and navy. But it seems that tradi-
tion has fouud a way of being nurtured and there are signa of walls grow-
ing up arouad the respective services. In this respect, because the air
~ arm came into being after the aar and Was built arouad former army and
navy men, it displays a~uch more open aad cooperative attitude toward
~ the Maritime and Crouad SDFs.
~
1
~
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_ In the pggt, becgu~e of deficient cap~bili,ey, th~ Ai.r SD~ could not aupport
ngval wgrfare from Che air but currently~ the fighter plgnes which are
being deeigned to ~ttack ground tgrgets~ are being used for training to
eupport veasele aC eea. But now the old argument Chat "an air arm for
the navy ig essenti~l" ie again finding voice.
When con~idergtion was firat given to developing air-Co-ground miesilee,
it i~ raported Chat the air people suggested to the eea arm that, "Since
a new weapon ig being designed why ahouldn't we think about developing _
one which could be used against targete at sea?" The report adds that
the euggeetion got a cool reception.
Z'her~ is no aeaurance that interservice wa11e like Choae won't grow higher
in the future. The plan we propoee is to unify the Ground, Maritime and
Air SDFe into a eingle entity.
A dozen or ao yeare ago, Canada u,nified the three services into one force;
= it was forcib?.y accomplished by the young 42 year old minister of defense
who fired tha top military officer who oppoaed it. Same colored uniforme--
khaki even in winter--were ordered worn by all services. The unified force
wae divided by function; for example, the Task Force Comroander controlled
the ground taek force, defense againat air attacka were placed under the
air defense command and eo on. ~'here were several bugs in the new organi-
- zational etructure in the beginning but it ia reported that Canada now
has a stable, unified milltary force.
When the ground-to-air Nike misaile procurement program was introduced,
the Defenee Agency waa confronted with a atiff ~nriedictional squabble
between the ground and air SDFs. The Grourd SDF ineieted that the missile
ahould be put under ita ~urisdiction on the grounds tha~ the army exer-
ciaed that right in the U.S. The Air SDF countered with the argument that
ground based though they were, the sir arm could operate them more effi-
ciently and effectively as part of its reaponaibility for air defense.
The director general of the Agency who had the unenviable task of making
a decieion, gave eome tl~ought to dividing the Nikes between the ground
and air arme but apparently the argument put up by the Air SDF prevailed
since the misailes were finally asaigned to it.
The Air Traneport Group which had control over the C-1 transporta and was
responsible for the movement of inen and materiel was placed under the
~uriadiction of the Air SDF. Since it was under the sole control of the
sir arm, thinge did not move smoothly when the Ground SDF needed trans-
por[ation. To overcome this defect, some Grouad SDF officers were as-
signed to the Air Tranaport Group ta overaee its Yequirements. This odd
peraonnel errangement did not work out aatiafactorily and t~ose ground
officere who had been loaned to the air group were returned to their old
nesting grotmda.
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Whither Goes tha Defenae Agency?
To fell these growing walls and uni.fy Che three SDFa is not as yet out
of the realm of poseibility. We believe tfiat such a unificaCion wuuld ~
also contribute to the more effective utilization of the defenae budget.
Up to now, de�ense planning and budget es~timaCing was done separately
by the varioua staff offices and thPn submitted to the InCernal Bureau. _
The Internal Bureau coordinated Chem and whittled them down to fit a given
framework. This system would work satiafactorily if the given framework
~ was sufficiently large buC it aeldom is. With a amall frame to work with,
- even some of the ma~or mainetay proposals had to be, on occasion, shaved
down to a point where its capability to support became questionable. Under
suct?. circumstances items~of lower priority to a given service component
- were deleted completely. Let us assume that a Maritime SDF's request for
appropriations for ~anding crafts (LST's) were given a comparatively low
priority by the Maritime SDF and thErefore was dropped completely from
budgetary coneideration. To the Ground SDF, however, these landing craft
could be an essential factor; most of the tanke are deployed in Hokkaido
and ahould an incident arise in the western part of the counCry, trana-
portation by sea would become the main factor in mobility.
Admittedly, if those low priority items which had be~n deleted by the
various ataff officea could be restored during tihe coordination phase at
the Internal Bureau level, the problem would be solved. But the fact of
the matter is that the Internal Bureau has neither the capability nor
- the manpower to prepare a well coordinated budget or defense plan. In ~
the case of the U.S., the civilian body in the Defense Department has
both the capability and the personnel to accomplish those coordinations �
on its own. Given those factors, we could start thinking idealistically
in terms of civilian control; but in the case of Japan, all we can do at
the t~},rrent stage is to think of how the system could be improved with
what we have.
We hope that the above gives a broad bruah description of the current sta-
tua of the Defenae Agency and the SDFa and the problems inherent to them.
Th~.s is a time when the concept of reai:tion defense is being rekindled
and when much thought is being given to the defense function and estab-
lishruent. The next 2 or 3 years could be crucial to the future fate of
Japan. Needless to say, that which will seal the fate is public opinion
but we cannot help but harbor a aense of uneasiness if we allow the cur- ~
rently impotent Defense Agency to continue on its aimless meandering
course.
COPYRIGHT: Bungei Shun~uaha 1978
`o~~
8358
CSO: 4105 END
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