JPRS ID: 8353 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6
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RIF
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U
Document Page Count: 
30
Document Creation Date: 
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number: 
56
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Content Type: 
REPORTS
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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'100030056-6 ' ~ ~ i i ~ i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 ~0~ OF~ICIAL USE ONLY JrRS r~/8353 2G MA~'CZl 1979 - TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE (FOUO 18/79) . ~ , U. S. JOIN~' PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 NOTE JPR5 publicaCions conrain informarion primarily ~rom foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, bue also from news ttgency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sourcea nre CranslaCed; Chose from ~nglish-language sources are Cranscribed or reprinCed, o~iCh the original phr~sing and other char~zckeristics reCnined, Headlines, ediCorial reports, and material enclosed in brackeCa ~ are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text~ or [ExcerpC] in the first line of each item, or following the lase line of a brief, indicare how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicaCor is given~ the infor- mation was summarized ~~r exCracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or CransliCerated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- Cion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied asappropri~Ce in context, Other unattributed parenChetical notes within Che body of an item or,`;nate wiCh the source. Times within items Bre as given by source. The contents of th is publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. GovernmenC. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND ~EGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS RF.PRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF TNIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONLY. ~ I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 UIOLIOGF2AF'HIC DA7A 1, I~`'r~'� N", /g353 2~ 3~ Itcripirnt's Al'l'l`Bp1Ul1 Nu, SNEE7 ,1pItS T. - 4, I i~ c,~u tiu ~t It c ~ 5~ Itcpott U:~te - 2G March 1979 _ TR~INSLAT?.ONS ON Wls57.'1~,ItN Ci)ItOPE, (FOUO L8/79) 6, 7, Auil~nr(.r1 8. f~crlorming (hgnnir.,~tiun Itcpt. V U. ' 9~ I'cr(urmin� l)rx,iui~ntiun Namc nnd AdJrrsa 10, I~ti~jcct/1'nsk/Watk Unit ~o. Joint publicntions E~eseurch Service 100q North Glebe R08d , 11. Contruct/Grant No. - Arlington, Virginia 22201 14. Spi+nswin� Urtianix~itian Name and Addtess 13. 1'ype of Rcpott ~ I~ctiod Coveted A~ abovc 14. 15. tiupplcmcmary No~es , 16. Ah4~r~~cts - Tt~e serial report contains political/'economic information on '~est European energy, finance and trade policy matters as well as developments and trends in the doctrine, programs and problems of Che ma~or communist pArties, - including their relations with communist parties outside the West European area. ' ` 17. K~ry a'orJ.r :~nJ 1lucument Analyqis. 170. I)cscriptots ~ Political Science Internatianal Affairs Luxembourg - Sociology Austria Netherlands _ Propaganda _ Belgitan `?orway Economics CanAda Portugal ~nergy _ Cyprus Spain Industry _ Denmarlc Sweden Tracle Finland Switzerland Finance France Turkey Greece United f~ingdom 17b. I~Icnt~(irr./Upcn-f.ndcd Tums , Ieeland WE'.SC Germany Italy t7~. c c~,~r~ r�~~�~,Vc~~�~c+ SC, SD, 10 18. r\~.i~I.~Lility ~t,urwcnt 19. Srcur~ty Class (Thls Z~. \u. oI F'.~Rrs R~~~�? 26 For UEficial. Use Only. = ~ . S~rutity (_I.~sc (flus 2~. {'rice I.imited Numbcr of Copies Available From JPRS. N,~B~ t;:1c'I.A�IFIED ~pNM ~~n~�~s ~ae..v. ~-~n THIS EORM MAY BE RFI~RUUUCEU ~~SCOMM�OC ~~~ea�d?i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 F'OR OFFICrI#L US~ ONLY JPRS L/8353 26 March 19'19 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE (FOUO 18/79) CONTE~VTS � PAGE - ~~vc~ Crzrter Seen ' Putting Warld in ik~nger' (Arthur Conte; PARTS MATCH, 2 Mar 79) l Rocard Seen as D:tvisive Force in French Socialist Paxty - (Christian Fauvet~ Jacquea Roure; L'EXPRESS, 3 Feb 79)~ 5 - Positions on Lur~tom, Nuclear Wastea Discusaed (Yann de L'Ecotais; L'EXPRESS, 3 Feb 79) 9 r_ _ ` PCF's Financial Connections Bared in Detailed Book (Jean Montaldo; L'EXPRESS, 17 Feb 79) 11 Briefs Overseas Intervention Capability 25 - a - (III - WE - 150 FOUOJ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 ~'OR OFTICZAL US~ ONLY - FF2ANC~ CAR'rER SL~N 'PUTTING WORLD IN DANGER' I~aris PARI5 MA7~CH in F'rench 2 Mar 73 pp 60, 79, 81 (Article by Arthur Conte~ (Text~ In attacking Vietnam, Teng Hsiao-ping must have had the impression that he had in some way gotten the green light from the Americans. During }~is trip to tihe United States, he stepped up his startling statemen~s and apocalyptic visions, without ever being seriously cro3sed by thoae with whom he spoke. Far from being satisfied, to smoke the American-Chinese peacepipe in the temple of the White Nouse, he endlessly berated the Soviet beast and was not seriously admonished by h.ts hosts for all that. With ex- treme ease, he even persuaded Jimmy Carter to sign with him an unplanned text whose anti-Soviet spirit is beyond doubt. This suggests one of two things. Gither he in some way considers the great chief across the Atlan- tic to be an incompetent man whose opinion matters little or who has such w~~vering opinions that they have become ridiculous. Or else he is abso- lutely convinced of always being able to sway the chief, or so-called chief, of ~he American administration to accept his own views. Basically, what - threatens world peace is the "American void." That is now the source of thc real specter. The tragedy is that Jimmy Carter's weakness is proving to be so great that all world balances have suddenly been affected or upset. That is when the worst can be expected. 'I'hc Russians themselves have always been glad to hold a dialog with a ::trong and candid American president. Even during the worst period of the Cold War, they exemplarily respected a Harry Truman, so explicit and so i?nE>eccably direct. They were always very cautious witi~ a cowboy and "finger-on-the-trigger" style president like Johnson. They were evidently heartbroken over the resiqnation of Richard Nixon, who exemplified an astute and detErmined model sovereign in foreign policy. We remember how, in the ~ixties at the time of the incident of Soviet rockets in Cuba, the young Kennedy was able to force Khrushchev's respect. The Russians Iike to deal with a man who knows what he wants. They value this for three main rcasoru^. cfie reason is that they want to be able to assess the exact risks of tt~eir own initiatives or reactions and not to exceed the limits. The other is that a weak or fickle president, from weakness as it happens, does 1 FOR OFr ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY not have good control over himself, is noti safe from re~ctiions which are too impulsivQ and may suddenly give way to rash decisions which create an irreparable situation. The ~hird reason is thati a president who is too weak abandons the sphere of authority, the initiative for action or thQ choice of response ~o forces which are not responsible, such as the army, the treasury or intelligen~e services, which are not in a position to mea- sure all tihe consequences of their political acts. A presiddnt who is too weak brings in too many unknown factors on every occasion and communism does not like to qamble with the unknown. Now as i1: happens, this is _ exactly ~he case today. We would probably even have to qo back very far in American history to find a president as surprising and vague t~s the pale Georgian in charge of the White House. Ir? the beginning, however, the man had many assets. Eiis origins are simple. This is a considerab.le advantage. It is better not to be weighed down by heavy intellectual baggage for such a position. _ 'I'he extraordinary Truman, one of the greatest presidents in American his- tory, began his life as a shirtmaker. Johnson managed America no differ- ently than a ranch. Nixon was certainly not a well of knowledqe. From his experience in sports, Kennedy had acquired a direct and lively style which made people forqet the refinement of his tastes and the elite side of his development. From a family of peanut farmers, Jimmy Carter could have re- tained much of his good country sense. He basically had a lot going for him. The governor of Georgia, i.e., the proconsul of a modest state with _ a relatively 1~,: population, he was able to remain in direct conL�act with dynamic problems. He was able to remain aloof from the guile, lies and false communications of far-flung capitals. In general, such trials harden a man against all unreasonable fears. He is working hard to succeed. He has a retinue which exhibits an identical zeal. If. pitiless newspapers have cruelly published photagraphs _ in which the American first lady appears to be conversing pleasantly in one ~ instance with .Tim Jones, the false prophet destined to order the collective suicide of the Guyana Temple sect, and in another with John Gacy, since ar- restEd in Chicago for the sadistic murder of 32 young men, we know that J ihese are not rash acts, but accidents in a job which requires coming into - contact with too many people without any control. Obviously, the Carters have a high awareness of the public welfare. The Fresident even handles with dignity the prohlems posed by his family. - Ruth Carter Stapleton, his younger sister, an electrifying evangelist who preaches the miracle of "internal healing" worldwide, was naively de- ceived by the 1lmerican porno king Larry Flynt, who has been prosecuted in - the courts for publishing one of the most obscene magazines, HUSTLER, and wt~o was only too happy to take advantaye of the friendship of a Carter. Eiilly, his younger brother, a stranqe clown afflicted with an irrepressible 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 J rOR OI~'ICIAL US~ OIVLY - stiammerir~g and thc~ black sheop of tho family, has madd a fortiune since ~immy has taken o~fice by lending his name, in return for huge royalties, to beor, ~ee-shir~, and peanut candy b~r ~rademarks. The President has exhibited deconcy and patience which demand respect. This man knows how to calmly swallow abuse. - In getting himself elected, he demonstrated a lot of ability and tactical sense, even upsetting all predictions. No doubt it has lottg been knowil that someone can be an excellent candidate as well as a poor presiden~. - It is one thing t~ be elec~ed= it is another to deserve having beer~ elected. This is quite true except that on such a scale, victory implies a lot of know-how, some gift of foresight and a good deal of adroitness, qualities required for exercising the presidency itself. But overly severe handicaps did not fail to crop up. Carter was unable at ~irst to establi~h a clear and obvious public image, even physically. ~ 'I'elevision viewers like to define the highest figures in terms of simple and even simplistic visual images. De Gaulle was the volatile maste.rmind, not always easy to take. Nixon was the shrewd o~~~rator. Kennedy wa~ the scion of an elite family agreeing to box in the most popular matches, capable of playing Superman. ~isenhower was Percival, whose purity merited the helmet. Truman was the tough sheriff who couldn't be duped. Car~er? We dare not answer. We look at those teeth so real, so displayed that they appear false. We unmask that wrinkled face, from deep discourage- ments, which belies the good humor trying to break through. We observe the strange vague look which, even during press conferences, seems more in- clined to turn inward than toward those questioning him. We view the game of hands which do not know what to do with themselves. We see a short fore- head under a thick shock of hair, becoming furrowed with so many wrinkles because of both big and little problems. The observer does not at all "sense" the kind of man he is dealing with. He suddenly experiences an ir- ~ ritating feeling of uneasiness. Equally as suddenly, he is led to attribute the same ambiguity, the same "incompleteness," to the man's thoughts as to his face. Next, the I~resident continued to act in a manner which was too religious. In the long run, too many sermons sound f:alse in the White I~ouse. The ser- mon cven begins to seem like the easiest way of avoiding real problems or real explanations. I~'inally, with as much evidence, Carter apraared to be contradiction itself. There is no end to the list of his wrong moves or turnabouts. After sift- ~ ing through 4,000 pages of documents, Andre Halimi has even devoted an en- - tire book to this, "Carter si, Carter no" [Carter yes, Carter no], as enter- taining as~ it is ominous. A famous caricaturist depicted him as yr Samba, one step forward, one step backward. He has come to be known as "Ji~mny Who?" Of course the times, spinning too fast, expose any politician to contradictions. The modern tribune, bent on overexpressing himself, can necessarily only seriously contradict himself or act inconsistently in the 3 - FUii OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030056-6 rox nr~~c.r.~ U~~ oNL~ fin~~? analysis. Yet any objective observer has no choice but ta believe thai: ~immy Carter will ultiimately hold tihe world record �or self- coni:radictions, providing his own antitheses and tripping himself up. We havE~ seen hizn become entangled in his own counterpositions and counter- prot~osals even in the most important matiters, such as Lebanon and Iran, - whi