JPRS ID: 8292 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'100020037-8
~ . ~ i iOF i

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
FOR OFFICI~IL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8292
27 February 1979
~ ~
~
TRA~lS LAT I QNS ON NE~R EAST A~VD NORTH AFR I CA
. CFOUO 4/79)
� '
~ ~ e
U. S. JOiNT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
NOT~
JPRS publications cottCain informaCion primarily from foreign
newspa~sers, periodicals ~nd books, buC also �rom news agency
transmissions and broadcasCs. Materials from foreign-language
sources qre translaCed; Chose from ~nglish-languane sources -
are Cranscribed or r~printed, with Che original phrasing and
other characterisCics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, an, materiul enclosed in brackeCs
are supplied by JPR5. Processing indicaCors such as [Text)
or [Excerpt~ in the firsC line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
maCion was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar nam~s rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mat�k and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. _
Other unaCtributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items~-are as
given by source.
The cor~tents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
r
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGIJI.ATIONS GONERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
OIDLIOGRAPHIC DATA 1� Nepott No, 2~ 3~ Hecipient's Arre~aiun \u,
SH~~T JPRS LI H292
. I i~ c.in ~u u it r 5~ Neport Uate _
Tfu1N5L1'1'IONS ON N~AR LAS'C AND NORTII AFRICA, (FOUO 4/79) 27 FebrUarv 1979
6~
7~ Authur(s) 8. Per(orming Otganiaatiun kcpt.
- No.
- 9~ F'crforming Urganieation Neme a~d Addtesa 10. Ptojett/Ta~k/R'utk l;rur \o,
Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North Glebe ROad 11. Conttact/Grnnt No.
_ Arlington, Virginia 22201
- : 2, $poneoring Organitotion N~me and Addtes~ 1J~ Type of Report E~ f'eriud
Covered
As ebove _
t
. 15. Supplementary Note~
16. Abs~r~cc~
11ie seri~al report containa information on socio-economic, government, political,
and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Kcy u'ords ~nd Document Analysis, 17a. Descriptots
' Political Science yInter-Arab Affairs Libya SulCanate
Sociology North African x Mauritania of Oman
Economics Affairs x Morocco Syria
Culture (Social Sciences) Afghanis[an People's Demo- x T'unisia
tithnology Algeria cratic Republic United Arab
Geograpt~y Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Tec}~nological ~Egypt Pers~ian Gulf Western
Military Sciences xIran Area Sahara
xIraq Qatar Yemen Arab
1)b. Idenii(iers/Open-Ended Terms Israel Saudi Arabia
Republic
wJordan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa
_Leb~non Sudan
t~~. cosnTi r�~rw/c~o~P SD, SC, SK, 15
18. Availab~lity S~~iement 19. 5ecurity Class (This 21. \o. of :~s
F'or Offici~l Usc Only. RQp��~ � 65.
Limited Numbcr of Copies Available From JPRS. ��~~~~y ci~ss crn~: 22.
Page
C'~CLA~SIFIFD
~ONw HT13�I! IqEV. )�721~r
TFItS FORA1 MAY BE REPRODUCED ~scou4.oc �.as~�p,~
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~ CUk Ol~'I~'I(;CAI, U51: ONLY .
JPRS L/8292
27 February 1~79
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ~
(FaUO 4/79)
CONTENTS PAG~
II~F~t-ARAB AFFAIRS
P~leatine Reaistance Leadera Asked Reasons for Disunity'
(Fayiz al-Mur'ibi; AL-WATAN AI,-~ARAgI, vari,ous datea~ 1
IIt~N
Correspondent on SAVAK, Corruption as Causes of Present
Crisis -
(Arnold Hottinger; EUROPA-ARCHN, 25 Jan 79) 26
IRAQ ~
, Vice President's Recent Trip to Paris Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'A.RABI, 11-17 Jan 79) 36
MAURITANIA
Cuxr ent Developments Discussed With Mauritanian l~eaders
(Moustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck, Ould Mohacued
Laghdaf Interviews; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2f3 Dec 78,
_ 3 Jan 79) 42
MOROCCO
Briefs
~traleum Products Refining 50
_ Islamic Bank Loan 50
Strikes 50
- Agricultural Situation in 1978 51
Agreement With Belgium on Kenitra 51 -
_ Air Agreement With Netherlands 51
Citrus Production 51
Cost of Living 52
Signs of Uranium 52
Oil Basin 52
- a- [III -\E F~ A- J 21 FOUO)
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
I~UIZ (11~b'ICtAL U5I: ONLY
COMl'CNrS (Cont:taued) Page _
TUNTSIA '
Operating~ Capital Budgets Up for i979
(MARCHES TROPICAUX LT MEDl~~ ~NS, 19 Jan 79)..... 54
- - b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
TNTER-,ARAB AFFAIRS
PALESTINE RESISTANCE LEADEIt5 ASKED REASONS FOR DISUNIIY
Paria AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10, 11-17 Jan 79
/Article by Fayiz al-Mur'ibi: "On the Occasion of the Approaching Nation-
al Council Session: AL-WATAN AL-�ARABI Asks Re~istance Leaders Why -
~ Palest'.nian UniCy Is Not Being Attained -
' /4-10 Jan 79 pp 26-31/
/Text/ Eyes are riveted on the coming session the Palestinian National
Counct.l will hold in Damascus around the middle of thia month. The re-
_ sults the council produces will conatitute the true indices of the size
of the step the detachmenrs and organizations of the revolution have taken
and will take toward national union, in attainment of the Tripoli Charter
and the recomnendations which came atter it.
In the light of the new variables in the A~.�ab aituation and the general
conditions in the area resulting from the joint national action compact
between Iraq and Syria, and as a result o� the Baghdad summit conference
resolutions, the need for unity within the resistance has become more -
~ pressing so that all vacuums,in the cormnon Arab front which has resolved
= to countera~:tack the two Camp David agreements and the effecte which could
- arfse from them may be filled.
1
Relying on and proceeding from the Tripoli Charter, meetings took place
between resistance leaders which led to promulgation of a draft political
proPram and an organizational and unificationist formula which the Nation-
al Council will discuss.
In response co many queries ~n the tendencies of the detachments of the
Palestinian revolution, and their viewpoints regarding theae historic
steps, AL-WATAN AL-'A[tABI's correspondent, Fayiz al-Mur'ibi, conducted a -
series of interviews with five leadere. -
- Three of the interviews are published herewith--t:~oae conducted with:
Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), FATN. '
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
FOR OFI'~CIAL USE ONLY
~ 'Abd-al-Rc~him Ahmad (Arab LiberaCion Front).
Zuhayr Muhsin (al-Sa'iqah). .
This is in the form of an indirect dialo~ue setCing forth viewpoints on
the pagea nf AL-WATAN A1.-'AltABI. ~
~ Sutah Khalaf (FATH Or~;anization): National Unity Is Not Posaible
/(~uestion/ Let us bebin with a quesCioi? we have asked of the other reais-
tttnce leaders: how far have efforts to achieve national union, which
began after al-SadaC's viait ro the occupied Cerritories, gone?
/Anawer/ Let us begin by tglking about Che noCion of naCional unity, lesC
the Arab citizen give this iasue more than ita due. National uniry, in
tlie sense that organizations are to diasolve infiellect~~e~lly, politically
and militarily into a single framework, in order Co become one movement, -
is impossible for many reasona. Nowever, national unity in the sense that
there be a single command wiChin a eingle national front as part of an r
abreed-upon political program, along with unificatio~~ in the areas of the -
- military, finance and, if possible, the media--this uniCy, for example,
- can be achieved. ~
'('here remains the organizational.and intellectual issue. Each organiza-
tion has freedom with regard to means for acculturating its staffs and the _
_ nature of the organizational frameworks it approves; in this sense, I be-
lieve that national unity is possible, in@eed must be achieved. .
The meetings which occurred on the level of the Central Ccsncil and the -
� secretaries general in past months confirm that it is possible to estab-
lish such a'unity, in the sense I have propounded. Agreement was made to
a political platform and organizational principles, and the coming Nation-
a1 Council is to approve these plana. Lee ~n important point begin, which
is the matter of practice on these basea.
~
, IF the confirmation of practice and commitment to the political Iine and
organizational plan does not occur, national unity will be afflicted with
tlie same catastrophe it experienced in past yeara. In addition to that,
it will be necessary to etress the issue of confidence among Palestinian _
detachments, on grounds that all information within the Palestinian com-
mand be provided so that decisions may be issued from within this comamand
in the light of this information. :
_ In addition to practice, and comnitment�to practic~--and in addition to
confidence-�it is neceasary that the Arab statee, or some of them, cease
their guardianship over or interference through some organizations, be-
cause without this it will not be possible for national unity to last or
be Pstablish~d, basically.
. 2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
I'OR OFFIC7.AL USE ONLY ~
Q
Or~;anizational Fanaticism
/Queation/ Whet in your opinion are the obaCaclea whfch prevented estab-
- lishment of national uniCy during the previous atages, in ap~,Ce of its
importance for the Palestinian cause?
/Anawer/ The real reasona why national unity has not been established lie -
- first of all in or~anizational fanaticism. It might be permiasible for
such fanaticiam to exiat within the context of each organization's ambition
to be paramount; thia ia very legitimate, eince it is obvious that each _
_ organization should strive to be paramounC. However, on numeroua occasions
this organizational fanaticism has bsen without real justification. In
- spite of rhat, given c~rganizationa have inCended to educaCe their staffs
in un,jusCified fanaticism.
The second reason for the obstrucCion of national uni~~ is Arab xegimes'
intervention in Palestinian action, and their interesta in maintaining a
number of arganizntions which they can each deal with as they like.
_ I believe thaC many of these regimes find a direct interest fn keeping
Palestinian action constricted. We find some of them choosing the organ- _
ization which will deal With them the way one sometimes chooses songs,
- from the standpoint of mood--from the standpoint of "what the listeners
want."
Unfortungtely, some organizationa respond to these divisive appeals for `
momentary,trivial material benefits.
_ �The third reason is an objective onE related to the intellectual and ideo-
logfcal disputes among organizations preaent on the Palestinian stage, -
which cause the process of thinking about methods of action to differ �rcim
one organization Co the next. This, in my opinion, is by far the easiest
of the reasons, because it may be solved through correct relations within
the context of the front and aareement on a common minimum among these ~
detachments.
FATII Is the Backbone
, /c~ucstLon/ There are people who say that the FATH organization's inclina-
tio?i to dominate and monopolize power is one of the major reasons why -
national unity is being obstructed. "
/Answer/ There musr be collective leadership and there must not be dom-
inancz in the strict sense of that word. However, at the same time, x -
~ state most frankly that if the leaders do not have a head which will con-
sequently bear resonsibili.~; for decisions and respo*?sibility for carry-
in~ out decisioos, there will be no revolution. Show me one revolution
in the world which emerged without having a head; show me any revolution -
in the world which was established on the basis of alliances among a num-
ber of organizatfons or parties yet did not have a major party represent-
ing the backbore of that revolution.
- 3
_ FOR OFFICIA.L USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~
FOR OFFICL~ USE ONLY
'!'he issue is cleur, from the standpoint of principle, Ther~ should be a
heacl leadi~n~ theae orbanizations within the contexr of: collective leader-
- ship, but it is in no way permieaible that th~.revolution be ~overned by
' its wenkeaC ally; otherwise, actian will be disrupted and there will be
r~o serious revolurion.
Il: is Crue that there has be~n aome mc?n~olization of power on FATH's part .
tn some institutions of the PalestinP Liberation Organization, and it is
neceasary thaC this phenomenon be correctad. However, in my opinion this
is a secondaxy matrer because there must ultimaCely be a body which is =
able to adopt decisions within the context of unified front action and is
not condemned ~o failure by any link wiCh we~k alliea. Ha who pays the
price for decisions, materially and ;norally, muat have a part in decision-
making which is commensuxate with the extent of his reaponaibility.
There are people who call this dominance and there are people who call it
_ guardiunship, but in reality it is guardianship over the weakest links in
= ttie alliance which exists on the Palestinian stage.
For example, but not exclusively, FATH, by vLrtue of its position in the
Palestine Liberation Organization, ia compelled to deal with all Arab re-
~;imes, except for those which have been convicted o� treason against the
nation, such as al-Sadat's regime, for example. The others can attack
Arab re;.imes as they like and can categorize them as they wish. Ultimately ~
they know ~hat responsibiliCy for the families of martyrs, for example,
ltes on FATH~s shoulders, and that this budget comes to more than $15
million a year. Let me ask where this money would come from if we follow-
ed the same techniques as other organizations which categorize regimes as
= reactionary or non-reactionary.
What we ara getting from some progressive countries in the form of finan-
cial support can be described only as s~ tragedy, but this in no way means
that the cc,nservakive states are payfng what they should. -
tde are compelled, for example, to finance the Palestinian Red Crescent,
- which offers services to all Palestinians without exception and to any
_ organization they belong to. Where should we get the money for this'
. This is a responsibility which on most occasions causes us to be silent
about facin~ up to regimes. Should we stand behind microphones and tell
all the facts we know about these regimes, leaving the families of ma~tyrs
to eat these words instead of bread?
tt is sad that most Palestinian leaders know these facts and feign ignor- _
ance of them in their talk or when they stand behind microphones.
These are some examples which we are presenting in order that the picture
may be clear. This does not mean, by the nature of the case, that the -
particination process must not exist. This in no way means that we do
not honor the opinions and positions of our brothers and comrades in other
~F
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
FOR OFFZCIAL USE O1~ZY
~
organizatione. Althou~;h we ~ppreciate their role within Che framtWork of =
_ Che Paleatine Liberation Organization insCitutions, Chese people must com-
- mit themaelves Co the resolutions and posttiona which are adopted and they r
must cortnnit themselves Co what is said inside closed rooma.
If there 8re aome errors which may be interpreted as dominance, we are -
_ ready to carrect these errors, on condition Char it be known--wherher aome -
people wiah it or not--that FATH ~aill have a large ahare in Palestinian
decisions becauae iC is r.he largest or~anization and bears the responsi-
biliry for these decisions. This is not narcissism or conceit at all, so -
' much as reprasenCation of a reality which exists in the contexC of actual~
ity.
A Dispute on Technique tl
/C~uestion/ There are people who say that it is Che political disputea
~ which have arisen in the pasC period that have obstructed naCional unity.
/Answer/ Let us ask ourselves what political dispute is. If we want to
be mor~ exact, we can say that Chere is a dispute on methods for dealing
with political events, but not a comprehensive political dispute.
- If we Admit that there is a political dispute inside the Palestinian stage,
this n~eans that ~re admit that there are people who want to liberate all of
- Falestine and people who want to liberate half of it, or a quarter of it.
The dispure concerns the method and not the substance. Before the OcCober
war, whaC was the polit~cal dispute? _
' There were, naturally, ideological disputes. Before the 1973 war no
- political disputes concerning major issues had yet appeared on the stage, _
and there was no national unity. ~ -
The ideological dispute exists; true. However, I am convinced that three
_ quarters of those who claim to be Marxists do not understand or practice
Marxism. The quarter that dues practice it practices it erroneously, be-
_ cuuse it has not assimilated it or has tried to adopt it out of whole -
- cloth; Marxism is a guide to action for every situation and not a carbon-
cop~~ guide to action which people arply in iCs original form in every
country. China apeaks of Marxism, yet its relations with the United
States are stronger than its relations with the Soviet Union; which of
the two is the proper Marxism? I am convinced, though, that the Soviets
are very Marxist.
Thus the issue of the political dispute is a lie through which some peo~le
= try to make fun of the masses.
After the October 1973 war we propounded a stage-by-stage solution which
hol.ds that a Pulestinian state must be establfshed on any square inch of
_ 5
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
1'ulestininn rerrieory which is liberaCed, or from which Israeli forces
- ~~vncu~tCe. We nre. now in 1978, nnd what has happened? Lde Cold Che re jec- -
eirn~ises, ('We have been re,jected but we are not re~ectionises,') and time
I~us aceually proved that we have been rejeceed and are not re,jecrionists.
A devastatinq wAr passed over us in Lebanon; if the staCements of surrenJer
and of rhe capitulationisrs had been correct, we would not all be in one
Crench now, agreecl on one political plan which all or~anizations, as well
as the Central Council, have approved.
The Rasis for NuCional Unity
/c~ue~tion/ Some people propound the norion of working to establish military
a~~d nr~;ani~ational unity, provided that the door be left open Co the forces
to stru~;gle Politically with one another in accordance with democratic
principles, What is your opinion on that?
/Answer/ There canno~ be military or organizational uniCy without political
unil�y. liowever, if Che intent is to attain a for;~ of military and organi-
Lacional unity within the framework of the Liberation Organization, while
retainin~; ideolo~icA1 disputes, that is possible.
- We Want Agreement
/guestion/ Do you believe ehat the scope for attainment of national unity
has now broadened?
/Ai~swer/ We wi~~: and !~ope for this with all our hearts, provided that the
conditions we previausly mentioned be taken into consideration, that is,
rr~ist, practice, snd abandonment of organizational fanaticism, as well as
the need for every unit to realize its actual, real materfal potential.
lJe are optimistic as far as the coming National Council goes; our people
have had enough of the experiments we have made, especially since the
people arP not on their territory but ere in exile.
Tt~e Important Thing Is That There Be Trust
/c~uestion/ Do you consider that the new p olitical and orRanizational pro-
~;ram has transcended the weak points of previous programs, which did not
lead to establishment of the requisite national unity? -
_ /Answer/ I stress once a~ain that it is not the political progr~-~ whi~h is
tmI>ortant, and it is not the or~;anizational programs that are i;~~portant--
althou};h I believe that they are necessary and that it is necessary that
there be agreement on them; rather, I believe that what is most important
is trust, practice and a readiness to sacrifice within the framework of
- ,jotnt ~ction in the 1.iberation Organization.
lJe hav~ tlexed our muscles enough and everyone has become familiar with the
s.tze of given organizations and their resources and powers; there is not -
reason--after the'passage of these long years--for us to contYnue adhering
t:o names and slogans.
' 6
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
i
i
, n
rox o~rrc r~w usE ornY
IE we make Che Liberution Organizarion predominant, we, our people and
_ our Arab nation will be at ease and we will en,joy greater respect from
our friends and enemies alike.
The Minimum Required
/QueatLon/ Do you believe that there is now a reul seriousnesa on every- ~
one's part to realize national unity'?
/Answerf I do not believe that there is now a real seriousness to realize
nationel unity in accordar~ce with Che co~ncepC I have mentioned, which is -
that there be the highest level of political, military and organizati onal
coordination.
We wanC everyone to be guided by a serious attitude this time, lest we
continue to be the laughin~;stock of Arab and internarional public opinion
and in orcler that the slogan of democratic dialogue may dominate Che
Pulestininn sCabe so thut we may achieve what we all aspire to.
The Important '"hinb Is the ApplicaCion
/(~u~stion/ Wiil the National Council be an index of the seriousness of
moves toward national union?
/Answer/ The conveninb of the National Council is not in itself an index ~
b~cause iC convened in the past, more than 12 times, ar.d always produced
serious resolutions and good programs agreed upon unanimously, or almost
unanimously.
~Jhat is impa:~tant, in my opinion, is the application. I am often amused,
durin~ the convening of the National Council, to turn on the tapes of
sessions or previous councils and see how similar the discussions were,
~ �.J
- how similar the dialogues were, and how similar the interruptions were;
almost Che identical sentences were repeated, the same words, the same `
notions-=ev~n the people were always the same, and the same is true of ~
Che resolutions and concluding statements.
We hopP that a.quantitative leap will occur this time and that the talk -
or the dialogue will not be the same.
Tti~ Iraqi-Syrian Compact
/(~uestion/ Do you not }~~:lieve that the national action charter between
- Iraq and Syria has help~d create suitable ground for Palestinian national
unity, by vlrtue of its repercussions on the stage? -
/Answer/ What is certain is that the charter has probably helped generate -
- a new climate for mutual understanding among the detachments of the resis-
tance, in view of the fact that the dispute between Syria and Iraq was
not just a dispute between two Arab countries but was elso a dispute `
-
fl 7 -
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
,
~'OIt OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
I~etwce~i two purttcg nnd Consequently between Cwo orUanizations present on ~
r:he pnlesti~ian eta~e; this naturally had a negnCive in~luence on Che tev-
olutinn gnd nn naCienal unity apecifically. Therefore, in my opinton~ elie
value of the Iraqi-5yrian m~rCing lies in cloaing nn imporCanC breach on
th~ rnnd to n~tionnl uniCy; this might bp Che important positive aspece nf
tl~e ch~~rter, in additiot~ Co the other national ar.d dom~atic pogiCive fea-
Cures with which it has been dietinguished.
l~~nt Iu Uegired
_ /'c~uegeton/ Whee in your view is the pr:~ctical way to atCain national unity?
/Answer/ That tl~e detachments of the Palestinian~revolur.ion cause the
ma88C8 to have confidence in this unity and its benefits, without any
- Cl~irr~nery or behind-the-scenes maneuverin~, and in tts importanc~ as far
_ as ehe nuCiongl cause and the quesCion of continuing the sC.u~gle are con- -
cerned; that certain Arab regimes take their handa off the Palestinian
revolution; and, lastly, that each unit be humble enough to atay within
_ tl~e limits of Lts capabilLCies for participating actually and sincerely
in creatinh unity.
'Abd�al-Rahman Ahmad (Arab LiberaCion Front): We TJill Not Accept Co-
opr.ion, Dominance or Cuardianship ~
/~ues~ion/ Many people see, in Palestinian national unity, a real bulwark
for and ~;uarantee of the triumph of the revolution; how far have the efforts
co achieve this unity bone?
/Answer/ Durin~ the convocation of the firot Peraeverance and Counter-
actio~i Conference in Tripoli, it:a intrinsic circumstances, and objective
Arab circumatances. compelled the detactw~ents of the Palestinian resis-
tance to meet among themselves on the sidelines of the conference to dis-
cuss the specific Palestinian sit,iation following the developments which
al-5a~iat's treasonous visit to occupied Jerusalem had created. Following
thts meeting, there was issued What it was agreed would be called the
Tripoli Unificationist Charter. This cherter was draom up in order to
f~rm u conar,on denominator among the various Palestinian detachments, and
_ it wag to have been translated into action and practice by everyone.
flowever~ as usual, some people determined to dilute this compact on various
- pr~texts and excuses, among them the fact that it had not been signed by
the Palestinian National Council, that it was not binding on the Executive
Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (which commits itself
only to the resolutions of the Palestinian Natianal Council, which had not
yet ratified the charter), and so on and so forth, and we kept going around
in a vicious circlc.
'I'he~~ came the st~;ning of the two Camp David agreements, which imposed a
new statc of affairs on the Palestinian sta~;e and the Arab stage in general;
f3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
_
~'OI2 t~I~'F'YCIAL U8~ ONLY
thie of necaseity led to n n~eting among the detachmente of the resig~ance~
in order ~hat the mee~ns for copin~ with the probable eudden dRnger to the
PaleaCine ceuee and the overell narional cauae of our Arab people be
~tudied,
A sertes of ineetin~;s took plnce, during which a feeling of danger aas ap-
parent on everyone's parC. At the end, after lon~ meetinge, agreemenC
wns reached on a political progrum representin~ a minimum and on general
organizational principlea:
'The political program concentrated on means of reaisting the concluaiona ~
of Camp David, especially as regarda its Palestinian portion, and the need
to counteract the autonomy conspiracy, which is one form of 2ionist nccu-
paCion. The organizational principles defined the framework of future
yoinr action and Che manner of developing that throu~h the participation
of all detachments of the Pelestinian revolution, in the contexCs of ~
_ Paleatine Liberation Orgenization inatitutiona aced leaders, by forming a -
front con,nand, compriaing all detachmenta, on condition that this be gov-
~rned by democratic relations so that the minority wnuld be auhject to ehe
view of the majority and the ma,~ority would aerve the view of ehe min~rity, `
that is, that all would have room to take part in Che adoption, an.d also
the implementation, of decisiona.
This ia what we have come up with so far. However, in general ti~e organ-
izational principles need greater explanation and detailing, and this
should have been the sub,~ect of diacussion among the leaders of the detach-
ments of the Palestinian resistance or the National Union CommiCtee formed
by the Centrel Council of the Palestinian Revolution. Unfortunately~ this
committee has not yet be~un its meetings to consolidate the various notions
on organizational principles, especially since this dilution attemnt could
influence the rate at which national unity is attained. Also adding to
doubts is the fact that we are moving toward a new Palestinian National
Council and Chat the oUjective of these dilution attempts could be to dP-
lay convening of this council by the stipulated date on the pretext that
agrtement has not yet been reached and that we must therefore not go to
[he council as disputants lest it blow up from within. ~
Nationel unity, as we have viewed it, has made great strides, but it still
is in need of nurnerous finishinf; touches, politically and organizationally,
and this still conflicts with some people's efforts to obstruct, dilute
and delay total and final a~;reement on overall details before the details
can be discussed conclusively and given a le~A1 form in the comirg Pales-
tinian National Counctl meetings.
Thc Obs:acles Arc Always the Same
/c~ucstion/ Is this the first time the issue of national unity has been
propounded and yet real~ palpable results for the sake of attaining ft have
not been realized.' What obstacles have obstructed, or still are obstruct-
in~;, national unity?
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
IroR OFFTCIAL U3E ONLY
/~nswer/ I~t my estimation, ehe obstaclea to uniey have not changed in ehe
pnst or tt?e present. ThPse obeCacles for the mose part erise from the
partic~lar nature of the PalesCinian scene, It ia true ehar averyone on -
the I'uleatinian scene realizes the imporCance of naCiont~l unity, in view
of the fnct ehat ir is a basic condiCion for safeguarding the Pelestinian
revolution, not eo ment:~n ChaC it i~ one of the conditione for its triumph.
It is 4ie11 known tf~at the Palestinian gcene has iCa pareicular characCer-
istics, Uy virtue of the dispossessinn of our Palestinian people and the
n~ture of the struggle they are wagin~ on behalf of their cause, These
' cliaracteristics have led eo the emer.ge:~ce of a number of intellectual cur-
_ rcnts which have become embodied in one form or another in the detachments
of the revolution~ and thia of neceasity has led to diaputea on Che over-
ull general political aituetion, especially after the capitulationist set-
tleinent platform was clearly propounded on the f alestinian sCage following
tlie Octnber 1973 war.
_ I~owever, desp~.te the existence of opposing intellectunl currents and poliC-
ical disputes, it would have been posaible to bring national unity about,
because this kind of unity has been achieved in various revolutions, in
the Arab world nnd inCernationally; we have a clear example in Che exper- -
icnces of Algeria and Vietnam.
. In most countries which have embarked on a people's war, roughly the same
situation has been faced, either from the intellectual or political point
of vicw. However, there slways was one general danger and one goal, namely
liberation, which drew the forces enba~ed in this people's war togeCher.
Therefore I believe that the basic obstacle in the way of national unity
assun~es the form of nn erroneous undersCanding, on some people's part,
of the means for attaining national unity. There are people who under-
stand it as co-option and dominance over and guardians'.~i,p of the Pales-
tinian revolution, in the sense Chat they have the right to have the~first
and last opinion on the totality of issues and that the others have only
to implen~ent it.
- ~!~-~turally this is not a national unity founded on democratic bases, nor
can this understandin~ encourage others to rush forward on the road to
true national unity. This understandinb thwarts many people's concerns
and makes them unenthusiastic about attainin~ national unity. Unless this
understanding is eliminat~d, it will be difficult to attain true national
uniCy.
Iii cxchange, there are peo~~le who consider that a diminution of their aa-
vant~~;es and their presence at the center of the stage will result from
nntional unity~ and they therefore fabricate pretexts to avoid rushing
onto the road to national unity, especially since they find, in the former
f;roup's conduct, an excuse to evade the issue of attaining national unity.
10 ~
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
Ib~t 0~'P'rCrAL U5~ OIQi,Y
i'o1LtiC~1 Uigputec ~xi~t -
/c~uc~stion/ Thexa are people who eay th~C th~ basic reason for ehe failure
_ to ~teain national unity liea not in political diaputes, becauae ehese do
not exist, but in the extenaiotts of Arab regimes onCo Che PaleaCinian
stage. Whnt ia your opinion on thia staCement7
/Angwer/ I do noC bnlieve that this contention is valid and I do not be-
lieve that it ie accurnte~ either in its premiaes or in irs conclusions.
They say there is no p?litical diepute, while we say~ yes, there is one,
and Che crucial point ..s not in the texta which are written or the resolu-
eions which are adoptec. IC ia true that theae Cexte and resatutions, in
r_heir final version~ r~~flect an agreement among the detachmenta of the re-
aistance concerning th~~ political issues at hand~ but the disputea become
conspicuous in aa obvi~~us way in implemenCation, when some of them are
iKnored.
There are people who try to conceal this atat~ of affairs, which is un-
rtatural, unhealthy and inappropriate for national unity, by claiming that
iE tt were not for the interference of Arab re~imes, there would be no ~
political disputes on the Paleatinian atage. This talk in reality is an
evasion of the truth, and I do not believe that thia issue would be an _
_ obstacle in the way of national unity if those who made allegationa of this
sort were serious, in deed and not word, about attaining national unity.
This excuse and pretext has been expoaed, especially since What is meant
by this statement are che progressive and national Arab regimes which have
experience in national action and know that no achievement ar progress can
be rcalized except through national unity. However, if what ia meant by _
this statement are regimes which endow some people with dominance and
power, this talk is really valid.
From [he standpoint of us in the Arab Lfberation Front, we consider that
we have been pioneers of true national unity since the establishment of
the front. The programs which the front has presented to the Paleatinian
National Council in its various se$eions bear witneas to that, and all our
positions, forms and formula for expressing this position have been pre-
sented in the tramework of consolidating and stren~thenins national unity.
We, as a national liberation movement, know the nature of the alliances
which we must nchieve at every stage of our stru~gle; but what we know is
one thi~i;; and What some people practice is something elae, because these
people practice policy through tactics. I do not believe that this kind
oC policy can lead to a real national unity because it shifts every day,
accordint; to emerbency circumstances. Real national unity is aPreement
on strate;;~� concernin~; overall issues. Tactics remain subject to circum-
stances but unfortunately some people in the Palestinian arena practice _
exactly the opposite.
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
P'OR 0~'~~CIAL U8~ ONLY
/~uanti.c~ii% 5nme ~~enple sny ehgt ChoeQ who bear th~ reaponeil~iliey of imple-
n~euCgticm u~usC h~ve t~ri~nary re~ponaibility for leaderehtp gnd decision-
makin~; wh~C is your opini.on7
_ /An~wer/ ti1 my ~ptnion, h~re is Che disease and the so~irr~ of. the malndy,
It ts true C1tt1C ehere muet be a basic organization which constitutes the
baricbone nf ,yc~int a~rinn in gny r~a1 naCionnl unidn. However, this or;;an-
Lz~~ton must undersCnnd nattonal unity in the erue aenee, and the other
p~rtLes mugt realize ehe exC~nt af Che seriougneas of Cheir p~trticiperion
t~i settini; dut decisinng a~ well ge in carryin~ Chem oue. This Calk abdut j
primary r~sponsibility for leadershir and decision-makinb cannot encnurage
nCher F~c~lcsCini~n parties ro proceed in the direcCion of national unity,
bec~use nne cnnnot accept disaolving Chem in the intereats of one parey.
Nneurally we ~11 ~sntr~ uleimately to become one d~eachment, but ehe pxe- +
: ~e~~t rec~lity dictates thaC Chia is ouC of Che queseion eC the currene time. ~
'Cherei'orc, ndhcrencQ to ar?d insiseence on this viewpoine inspires a lack
of desire to aCtni~~ iiational uniCy in proper form. As long as everyone is
not convinced that nntional unity will offer Chem acope to play a Yole and
hnve Rctive, influential positions i~~ the framework of Palestinian aceion~
te ~otll I~e impossible to achieve true national unity and induce other par- I-
ties to emerge from Cheir intellectual, political and organizaCional struc- ~
tures tnt~~ seructureg und ideas whfch are still uncleur. Etevolutionary
~:~r~:ri~nr~ in all corners of the world has confirmed that no power, however
~reat, can achieve serious accomplishments alone on the road of the struggle
towc~rd liberr~Cion.
~
Nnturally we underline the importancc of FATH and its pre-eminent role in
any Palestinian national unity. The greatest detachment :?.s supposed to be
ehe pioneer in proviciing concessions which will encourage the other detach- ~
ments to move toward national unity. The FATH mo~ement, by virtue of what ~
it represents on the Palestinian sta~e, must be the one to take the initia-
tive to in,pell others and encourage them to achieve national unity through
correct cfemocratic practice based on respect for all parties' role in de-
cision-making and implemenCation.
Unsuccessful Experimcnts ~
/~juesttoi~/ Sorne people propound the idea of working to achieve miliCary
a~ul nr~ant~citional unity within the framework of the Liberation Organiza- ~
tton, on condttton that there still be room to continue the political ~
str~~t;j;les tn n democratic manner. What is you opinion on the outlook for ~
attatniny; t}~is sort of unity?
/Answer/ It is true that ~e can envision the possibility of attaining many
thi�~;s, l~ut envisionin~; is one thing and reality is something else. Mili-
tary unity Chrough wha[ vision? Organizational unity through what vision^
We have expertence tn this, exp~:rience on the Palestinian stage, and what
has the result been? We have experimented With some forms of military
12
FaR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
F~OR OF'T'ICIAL tJ9E ONLY
union and have tri~d aome forms o� organizaCional unity; o� these~ only
rhe name has remained. Why? Because rhe same causes which ob~Cructed
- naCional unity aleo obaCrucCed the attaf.nment of leaser unificationist
ereps of thie snrt. We have Che experience of the unified media; is this
the media of the whole Palestinian revolution? We have unified security; -
ie this socurity for the whole Paleetinian revolutton?
These small ~nificationist experiments ocaurred as the resulC of agreements,
but, becauge thQre were no sound visiona oF unificationiat action, these
baiies b~came gtripped o� Cheir meaning and aontent and rem~air.~d ~s slog~ns
aeen on televiginn, a small experiment on the road to national unity.
The malady is the same in Che case of small atepe and big ones; if we over-
come this malady, it will become poesible to achieve national uniry with-
out ie being necessary to carry ouC emall stepa. We went complete, Cotal
unity on Che various levels--polieical, military~ organizaeional, media,
Einuncial, popular, and Crade union--founded on bases of democracy in de-
cision-making and democracy in implementarion, aupported by the broadest
_ participation of all Falestinian detachments.
The Seasonal NAture of National Unity
/suestio_n% It has been observed that the issue of national ~.nity is aliaays
raised in a seasor~al fashion~ eapecially following the crises the Pales-
tinian revolution pasees through; why is talk about national unity stifled
in ordinnry circumstancea and inteneified in exceptional ones?
/Answer/ The reason foc this seasonal approach may be attributed to the
fact that there ia no :erious, real orientation toward naCional unity; -
the situation consista of nothing but an attempt to exonerate one self
before the masses, eapecially during crises, by a show of anxiety over
the course of the revolution, and by struggling for the sake of the cause
and the objective of liberation in auch a way as to attenrpt to absorb the
masses' resentment over the currenC atate of fragmentation and rally around
real national unity programs. tJe have been accustomed to thia style since
the days in Jordan, and nothing has changed but the details.
Caps 5ti11 ~xist
/c~uestion/ 1{ave the new political platform and the new organizational
principles aucceeded in r.ranacending the gaps in the political and organ-
izational platforms which were sat out on previoua occasions but did not
result in the attafnment of nationel union?
/Ansc.er/ 'The fac[ is [haC the gaps of the past have not been transcended.
The orranizational principles could have partially transcended the gaps in
the prevtous platforms, but that ia not the case with the politicel plat-
Eorm. Uurinh the transactions on political conditions, we were all con-
demne~l to failure by a Ca~ David complex and there was a perception on
13
FOR OFkZCIN.IU USE ONLY .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~ ~'OR O~FIC7AL US~ ONLY -
~v~rYane~~ purt oC the ~;rgviey nf the new srage, xh~refore talk wgs almogC
enttr~ly ftxed nn mQene for resieting the rQeuleg which ch~rneterized ehe
tw~~ i;n~~~~, Uavid ngreQn~e?iCs, ~
HnwQVer, in spire of thae, thQ pro~;ram was not fully conaolic3aeed--rather,
it was ~reaCly deficienC. We agreed to it because w~ were Convinced~
throut;h experienc~, Chat the leeaon lies noC in texta which ~re wrieCen
dnwn but in real praCtiae. Therefore ouz efforts were directed Co the
or~gniz~Cional plaCform, on Che basi~ of which we could tranalate the
pnlitical plaCform Cexts in the beet possible way.
The sibnificant Ching ia that khe poliCical and organizational platforma
nr~ still ink on paper and consequently still need to be CranalaCed onto
the ~round of actuality end daily praceice. This i~ tha practical touch-
stnne of the sincerity of intentions and directives on aCtainins of naCion-
~1 unity, if only within the lowest limiCa of this unity. .
The Cnmin~ National Council
/c~ue~tion/ Will Che Palestinian National Council be an indication of the
seriousnes;: of directives and the aincerity of intentions Yegarding the
tsgue of national unity?
/Answer/ I~i brief, we can say yes. The coming session will be one of the
very most importanC sesei,ons of the council, becauae if during this aession
we ure able to achieve what hae been agreed upon, either politically or
or~anizationally (which ie more impor~ant), we aincerely believe Chat we
will have :~chieved a quantum ehift in Paleatinian action. However, if
aCten~pts t~~ dilute and then delay the council continue, as some people
are heekin~, to do, in spite of the lau?rhing of official appeals, we be-
lieve this will be a sign which is not to the benefit of national unity
(ever~ if tl.e council is held at the stipulated time), and if we do not
attatn tf:e achievementa reached during meetings among reaistance leaders,
that wi.il have a negative reflection on the overal2 courae of the Palea-
tinian stru~;~le during the next stage, which is to be conaidered one of
the ~~ery Kraveat the Palestinian cause and the national cauae have passed
throu~;h. Therefore the council which is ta be held muet adopt clQar, firm,
decisivc decieions and e collecCive~ homogeneous leaderahip capable of
bcarin~; the ssrious responsibilities cast upon its shoulders in the next
stm~e rtwst emerge from it.
Thc iraqi-5yriau Cr~mpact
/~~iestion/ N~s the Iraqi-5yrian compact come about as a atep which will
promote the road to national unity, through its positive repercussions on
Che Palestinian stabe?
/Answer/ N.nturally we look upon the Ireq-Syrian national action charter
as a solid wnll buttreasing the Palestinian revolution, becauae, folloWing
14
FbR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
T'OTt 0~~ IC~AL U5L Oi~I~Y
~~ypt'~ deparCure f.rom the arenn oE Chd Arab-Zionise sCruggle, $ psycho-
logical dieruption occurred wiChin the Arab citizen Ln general and the
Pgleetinian cirizen in pnrCicul~r. This compacC has come to constiCutQ
- ~;reat bulwark in his behAlf, in Che f�orm oF a front n� confrontdtion
with and resistancc Co Che zionist enemy through revival of the northern -
frone and conaoltdntion of th~ Arab poaition--as wAS cl~~rly and plainly
inanifest~d throu~;h Che racent I3aghdad gummit. ~
Tlie positive effeces o~' this new re;. '.ry, which has been made mandatary by
the Ir~qi-Syrian compac:t, must be highlighted on the Palegtini~n stabe and
musC impnxt to the Palestinian revolueion more confidence nnd optimism f~r
the future and Che at~ility to emerge from the circle of mistaken gambles
on various Arnb pnwers revolvins in the firmament of a settlement, so that
perh~ps the revolution may Ue able to nchieve something.
The l~alestinian revolutinn ought to benefit from the combative, fi~hting
atmo~pheres wieh which the compact has been and is distinsuished, in order
to stren~then the context of confronCation wiCh the Zionist enemy by con-
saltdating Che Palestinian sta;e, strengChening the internal unity of rev-
olutionary Paleatinian forces, and moving on to new levels of relationships
governing these forces--as far as they themselves are concerned and as far
as their relationships with th~ masees and their p~pular bodiea are con-
cerned.
- Zuhayr Muhsin (al-Sa'iqah); Everyone tiears the Responsibility for k'alling
Short
/c~u~stion/ The results which have arisen from al-Sadat's platform have in-
tensif.ied the need for attc~ining Palestinian national unity; how far have
attempts to achieve this unity, and to transcend PalesCinian disputes,
~;one^
/Answer/ Ic~ the past 4 years, twc~ groups which believed that a settlement -
was close or inevitable have appenred on the stage. One of these tried to
ad,just its wavelength, and the other undertook to fi~ht that group. Thus
rhe two parties became immersed in a deepening internal crisis founded on
illusory bases, because ths objective conditions for realizing a settle-
ment were in no way present durin~ these years.
This was proved in the practical sense at the end of the journey, when the
- two parties discovered--after not a brief time had elapsed--that they were
= fighting one another over an illusion. Then al-Sadat's repeated acts of
_ ~ treason took place, particularly throu~h the Sinai agreement and its after-
. math, gtving a clear idea of the form of settlement which was possible in
the li~ht of these circumstances and the reliance of al-Sadat's Egypt on
the United States of America, and also drawing an accurate map of the place
the Palestinian party mi~ht have in the American settlement program--a
formula which no Yalestinian combatant, or any citizen possessing a mini-
- mal national conacience, could accept.
15 _
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~ run ul~r.~v,~.t,~ uoL ~ivLi ~
tJe CAti sny eliat ehe blunder nF tho$Q w1TO bet nn ehe aCCninment nF a bal-
nnced nr reasonnblc ~QCtl.emenC Chrough the m;~~emEnts of al-Sad~t and Che
United Statea was a grea~ one, but Che blunder of Chose ~oho believed that
- America~s will is a power which muat aeserC itaelf, and thgt auch saCtle- -
mente ::an be imposed on our naCion or nur people, was ~leo great--perhapa
~reater.
We gre divulging no sec~ers whe?z we say Chat al-Sadat, American imperial-
ism and their allies in the area aspired to ~xploiC the early internal -
_ Palestinian disputes, then disputes feuricated among varioua Paleatiniana
and vArious national Arab governmenCa from time to time, in order ro im-
pose the settlement throubh the breach Chey had succeeded in creating once .
upon a time. ,
~Jc cnnnot ignore ChaC Chis schism, aC specific timea, created improper con-
ditions within the Paleatinian naeionaliat man in the street in particular,
~7nd the Arab mnn in the sCreet in general, nnd spread about a broad atmos-
rliere oE deapair and dissension among the Paleatinian and Arab masses.
'I'his pl.7yed a bnsic role in causing the reactions to al-Sadat's visit to
,ierusalem to be less violent and extensive than those which high treason
of this magnitude should have stirred up. In fact, in the framework of
~he atmosphere of despair and dissension, we must suppose that many Pale~a-
' tintans themaelves prefered to wait, since they were hoping Chat al-SadaC
, mi~;ht achieve a miracle for them through the adventure in which he placed
liimself and with which he proceeded to the end. Perhaps some of these
people were within the very ranks of the revolution, increasing the scope
of chaos in people's spirits and the intenaity of cloubts and fears in the
ranks of the revolution.
I.et me say here that the firat perseverance summit, held in Tripoli a few
days a�ter al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, was the first step toward salva- -
tion for both the Palestinians and the Arab citizens as a who?e. On the
sidelines of that conference, in order to make the conference succeed, on ~
top c~f the growing feeling of danger, responsibiliCy and the need to close
- tanks to confront the danger, the Palestinian leadera managed to formulate
a ~nited position which was established in the'unificationist compact
known as the Tripoli compact. We believe this atill is valid as a basis -
- Cor starting to set forth an organizational and political platform which
meets the requirements of this atage.
Therefore we have been anxious to eatablish a commitment to this compact ~
in the detailed national action platform approved last October by a special ;
courtnittee formed by the Central Couneil which lost no time in ratifying -
the platform a short time before the convening of the Baghdad sumnit, and ~
even before the great hisCorical transformation in Syrian-Iraqi relations,
which must havP important repercussions on the overall situation in the
_ reF;ion, including the internal Palestinian situation and the relations be-
- tween Palestinians and others, could take place.
l6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~ P'~t OFF'ZCZAL USE ONLX
c:hronic E'Alesttnian Dieputes
- /(~uestion/ Whnt are the obeCaclea preventing the aCtainment of national
unity?
/Anawer/ The aub,~ect of national unity has always been discussed, even
before a rift became cry~tallized in bloca, which happened after the idea ,
of the Geneva conference was p~,:opounded. Stumbling and diaputes have been
endemic and old in Che Palestinian atage, and have ac~ompanied the revolu-
tion almoat eince its beginning. I do not w~nt to ~uatify this sort of -
phenomenon, although by the nature of the case there has been an explana-
tion for it; foremoat among its causes was a f~eling on the part of some
deC~chments that aCCempts were being made on the part of aome people to
e~~ulf and dominate them,
In addition, poliCical dispuC~s, especially in tactical, everyday mat~ers, -
have existcd since the baginning. However, whatever the dimension of these
political disputes, and in spite of the difference in the ideological Foun-
dations of most organizaCions, it would noC have been difficult to attain
nationat'~nity in the framework of balanced relaCions of aolidar~ity, on the
basis of A front, had ttiere been an adequate amount of seriousness, desire -
= and so~nd appreciation for Che narional interest and the greaCer interest
the revolution, and every detachmenC by itaelf, could reap through a
- nationat union.
,
Perhaps the element of fear o� dominance and arrogation of authority still
has a greater effect than that of political division in obstructfng nation- -
al unity. While it is necessary to impose the responsibility for this _
shortcoming on everyone without exception, each detachment's share of this
responsibility must be proportionate to its si2e and resources; therefore
the greater responsibility lies of necessity on the shoulders of the larg- -
est detachment, which is suppoaed to assume the greater share of responsi- -
bility for leadership and a serious desire to establish relations of close
adherence and stability among all detachments.
The Basic Complex
We have said this more than once to our comrades in all detachments. We
have demanded a~start toward the solution of the organizational problem,
on grounds that all should be given their roles and their rights and that
they should be required to commit themselves to their obligations and re-
strict themselves to the principles of unified action, on the basis that
the principle of collective leadership and demacratic relations within
tfie revolution should be respected, in exchange. At that pofnt, we would
find ourselves discussin~ political propo~itions among ourselves openly
and with full ease as to intentions, without being compelled to go to
~reat tenKths of doubt and suspicion.
- ' 17
~ FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
T'OR OT'FZC~L USE ONLY
7.'he Texts Are No~ What Is ImporCant
;
/c~uec,tinn/ Thln Ls nat the firer time platforms to atCetn national untey
havC I~~.ei~ e~t fc~r~h; hnve the draft polittcal p1r~tEorm ~nd orqttniznCionnl
~~rinciples r~cenl:ly set forth tranacended the gapa in previous platforms?
/Answer/ Unfortunately there has not been sufficient surmounting of these
- ~aps, rWhile efforCs were directed towArd formulaCion of a political plat-
= form with compleee, accurate details, talk abouC the organizational aspECC ~
was restricCed to general outlines. i
~ t
In any event, it ia noC what ia writCen in texts that ia important but what
lies in people's spirits; aince 1968 we have written many texta but all ~
theae texts taken CogeCher have helped the advance toward national unity
only in smnll, limited measurea.
We hope that Che experiences of the past will have convinced everyone that _
?~o one organization, whatever its aize and resources might be, can lead
alone, thar, the process of eatablishing an axis to co~e with an axis fs
also an op~ration lacking ,justification which benefits no one, and that
this stage requires a serious pooling of all efforta and powers. The bat-
tle needs r?11 theae efforCs, several timea over, and does not need to have ~
them scun~ble and lose much of their effectiveness in internal wars of ~
attrition. i
/Question/ What is your evaluation of the chances for auccess in applying ~ I
rhe political platform and other organizational principles?.
/An~wer/ 4e hope that the destiny of the platform and principles will be
diff'erent f:om that of many previoua plahforms, especially since a big
basic prob]sm was solved after the Baghdad conference--that of financing,
which was c;ie of the major reasons organizations had become alienated from -
one anothec and disputes among them had become aggravared. The desire to
please souices of financing had overcome all other factors.
- This is a new opportunity for the revolution, and its detachments must ex-
ploit it to the utmost, in order to liberate themselves from mortgaging
- themselves to sources of financing in every form and in order that we may
be zealous of solidarity with one another, tn order to en$ure the use of a ~
sLngle fund, and consolidation of the role of this single Palestinian fund, i-
_ in achieving Palestinian independence and bringing to prominence a Pales- ~
tinian national will which is not stained by any blemishes. .
A Decisive Arab Shift -
/(~uestion/ }iow can the Iraqi-Syrian agreement contribute to the attain-
ment o� national unity through repercussions on the Palestinian stage?
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
roR o~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
,
/Answer/ 'Che deciaive shifC in Iraqi-Syrian relations, which has occurred
to fill the void which had resulted from Egypt's shift from Arab ranka Co
_ the ranks of the enemy, has had ;.ts direcC effecta, which will increase
nnd escalate with every pasaing day in Che "psychology" o� the Ps~lestinian
Combatnnt and the ordinary Pnlestinian ciri,zen, both inside and outeide
tlie occ~ipied territories,
This agreement has rainspired hope For the future, self-confidence and con- -
fidence in Che inevitability of victory against the enemy, in addiCion to
the guarantees it has provided that the ravolution will prevail and the
feelinga of self-confidence it has inspired that a positive spirit h~s be-
gun Co replace every form of negaCivism and pessimtsm engendered by the
withdrawals of past years--especially Che treacherous acts of al-SadaC,
from the second Sinai agreement up Co the Camp David agreementa, via the
visit to J~~rusalem.
This ',mporlant positive shift, which has been the beFinning oF a new re-
surgc~:,ce mc~vement tn the Arab region and a basic step along the road to
creatinf; a new "~eopoliti~cal" reality-~ns it has been a basic achievemant
= toward correcting the balance of power in Che region between us and the
enemy, after this balance had been blaCantly disrupted to the enemy's ben-
~ efit--today places all Palestinian leaders before a resgonsibility of a
completely new kind and dimension, since it is no longer ~ustifiable or
reasonal~le in the eyes of the Palestinian man in the street or of the Arab
man in the street Chat Palestinian detachments should continue to be pxe-
occupied with organizational competition and maneuvering against one anoth-
er, cr with any illusory struggles of the kind that had previously dom-
inated.
All thfs of necessity requires an unflinching initiative to cut off all
c~nnections with the American settlement plan and its praponent~ and
symb~,ls and the closing of ranks of the forces of the revolution and the
_ massr�s of t~he Palestinian people in ordcr decisively, absolutely and rad-
ically to c~ppose the ~Smerican settlement plan, of which the Cam~~ David
agreements are an expression. This all requires as well that one hasten
to estat~li:h serious, firm relations of strategic alliance with Syria and -
Iraq in a nanner enablin~ the revolution to assume a greater role in con-
frontins tt~e Zionist enemy a?~d to increase its activities in all fields.
This rare, historic opportunity, which the masses of our people have been
dreami~ig of for a long time and which will recur again in history only
with difficulty, is an opportunity which the leaders of the revolution
must have the awareness to snatch and keep from losing.
This opportunity must give birth to a new pattern of [hinking on the part
of the leaders of the revolution, and it must impart a new sense to
_ Palestinian national unity which is more positive than it has.been in the
past. t mean that while feelings of fear were the basic motive behind
national unity, prior to the Syrian-Iraqi meeting, with the result that ~
the notion of ui~ity was depicted as guaranteeing the means to protect the
1g
_ FOR OF'FICIAL U5E ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
P'OR OFFIC7AL USE ONLY _
rev~~lutian uiid Chwnrt nttempts to liquidnCe it, ehe motive Eollowin~; Che
Syrinn-Iraql mecting must be firat of ell the resCorution of hope in the
c~ttainmei~t of victory and optimiam regarding the inevitability of tha
triumph of oiar naCionA1 cause. Thus the new notion will be offensive and
nor defeneive, acCive and not passive, positive and not negativ~.
T'he emer~er~ce of thia riew situation f.acing the Palestinian revolution co-
inc[des wii:h rhe immin~~nt convening o~ the 14th session of the Palestine
Nariunal Cc~uncil. Thi:~ will help the leaders of the revolution to offer
the Plationril Council, perhaps for the first time, an integrated polittcal _
anci or~unizational platform which will take the initiaCive of planninb
for Che fur.ure and aCtuining achievemenCs along the road to the triumph of
rhe i~evolur.ion and resCoration of the homeland, rather than revolving
arour~d wuys to protect the Paleatinian revolution and cope with the dangers -
surroundinfi it. .
The Role of the National Council
- /(Zuestion/ Will ehe Palestine National Council, which is supposed to meet -
- the n~icldle oE thts January, be an indicator o~ the seriousness of the trend
COWIIICI n~t.i onal union?
/AnsGer/ ~t is well known that the National Council is no more than an en
larged map of the Central Council and the Executive Committee, and what the
detachment:; of the revolution cannot realize among Chemselves, the t~ational
Council cai~not realize. The National Council might be able to vote on a
specific oi~anizational resolution, but it is more important ~hat the de-
tachnents ~,~hich are requested to implement this resolution have conviction
in it.
We do not intend, generally, that the National Council should achieve our
unity for ~.s; we ourselves are supposed to go to thQ National Council
- unired or agreed on achieving unity, lest the council Tose much time in
srerile debate over issues which can only be solved in a practical way by
direct mutual understanding among leaders of the detachments of the re�~
sistnnce,
Tlie P~ationF+l Couiicil~s time must be wholly dedicated Co a discussion of
the ~,oLitLcal situation and the political platform of the coming stage, -
~~nd this is a matter in which every Palestinian must have his opinion.
I
The National Council ~enerally blesses all steps taken by the detachments ~
of the Palestinian revolution along the road to unity; when these detach-
ments fall short of achi~ving this kind of step, the National Cou~ncil does
its duty by inviting Chese detachments to resolve the organizational prob-
lem umonf; themselves.
20 '
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
roR o~FZC r.~w us~ orr~Y .
Civin~ Everyone Ilis Role
/sueation/ IdhaC is Che practica; mPthod f4r ac.r.ieving Pdleatinian nation- -
al unity?
/Answer/ I am still wholly convinced that any serious sCep to achieve _
national unity must start on th~ basis of solving Che organizational prob- -
lem, first of'all, and giving everyone his role an3 his righCs, pr~vid ed
that he commit himself to his duties and confine himself to the principles
of unified action. ,
- It is impossible that the day could come when political positions and ideas =
~uill correspond compleCely; rather there is nothing to prPVenC differing -
political ideas from being subjected to democratic organizational relations -
which guarantee that Palestinian efforta will be wholly directed toward =
Cacing the enemy and at least guarantee that sporadic instances of armed -
clashes beeween two or more detachments be avoided and that all forms of -
murunl vLtiiperation and slander and hosCile political mobiliZation on the
pttrt ~f o~i~~ detachment or another against certain other, or all, detach-
ments be e.~iminated.
The Requisite Positive Development
It is [he ~rogressive formulation of national ~:nity on democratic bases,
alone, whic�h will enable the revolution ko gain time and fully exploit the
opportunit:~es available in order to serve its combative purposes in a man-
ner enablii~g the Palest:inian revolution to gain greater respect on the =
Arnb and i�ternational levels, official and popular simultaneously.
The f.uture which lies before our people is brilliant and the fact that the
triun~ph of our cause is inevitable is beyond dispute. However, this all .
requires tl~at positive development within the Palestinian arena be wedd ed
to pusitiv~: development on the Arab stage, as represented fundamenCally by
the }iistor.c meeting between Damascus and Baghdad.
_ /1~-1.7 Jnn 79 pp 30-33/
Un thc eve of the convening oE the 14th session of the Palestine National
_ Counc:il, A;.-WATAN AL-'ARABI is continuing its dialogue with three lead ers
of tlie reststance--Messrs Nayif Ilawatimah, secretary general of the Demo- -
cratic Front for the Liberation of ,Palestine; Ahmad Jabril, secretary gen-
eral c� the Popular Fron[ for the Liberation of Palestine, ,eneral Com-
- mand; and Samir Ghawshah, secretary general of the Front of the Struggle
- of the People of Palestine--thus cornpleting the dialogue it started last _
week with Messrs Salah Khalaf, 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad and Zuhayr Muhsin, in
or,der to set forth the viewpoints of t~:e leaders of the detachments of
!~he PAlestinian revolution regardin~ ehe national union plan which will
head up the National Council session's agenda and the variables presuppos-
in~ attainment of the goal of unity within a clearly-defined organization-
al political platform.
21
,FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~'dti dI~'~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
.i
Nr~y( I Ilnwntiuinh (beinocrntl~ F'rdnt Cnr t1~e LibQrnt[on nt I'~legttne);
We Wnnt a Nettan~l ~il;I~tiny; H'ront
/~ur.~tinn/ el-5adr~t's vl.~it to orcupied rales~inc hen a~~in raiBed the
tssue uf netic~i~~l unity on th~ Pgl~etininn gt~p,~. Now fgr hgve eEfartg
~one in this directto~~'
_ lAnswr.r/ Ngtiongl unity ig a m~jor, pregsing iggue for a small pe~ple~
mor~ than two Chirda of which have been digposeee~pd gnd are f~cing ~n or-
~;nnized exp~nt~ionist c~lnniel zioniet inv~gion supported by Che forces nf
~~orld imperielism, in p~rticulgr Americ~n imperinlism and Che w~rld ~ion=
_ tst movement. Therafore one of the mosC important eg~ential ingredients
for victury c~ver thia vicious hogtilQ i'ront ia ettainment of the unity of
thc peoE?le and a naeional revolueion in the cor~text of the Palestine Lib-
cratic~n ~r~;enLzation in this atege,
'l'n Chis en~l, the Uemocratic F'ront hag Cgken the inttietive of ofEerin~; the
1'.-+lesti~~e N~tinnal Council and gll detachments nf the revolution more ehan
one plnn Lor nationaL unity. The f irst plen waR in SepCember 1969, the
secon~l iri July 1971, and the third in March 1972. 1`he latter wgs the first
i?~tcj;r~~ted nntional ~nity plan offered by any detachment of the revolution.
The Nr~tio~ial Council recommended it, but none of these pldna h~ve seen the
_ li~;ht oE day d espite the daily urgency of the necessary ingredients for
national unity.
. 'This year~ followin~ al-Sadat's capitulationist visit to occupied Jeruealem,
the seasonal spirit of propounding the issues of national unity was renewed.
The 'rripoli unificntioniat compact was a preliminary framework along this
rond, prior to the convening of the benner of the National Unity Committee
corr~osed of the Lxecutive Committee of the Liberation Organization~ the
secretary generals of the revolution, and a number of inembers of the organ-
ization's Central Coun~~il.
'C}~ree unity plans were before this National Unity Cortmittee: the first
[rc?rn ~ATi~, the secnnd from the Democratic Front~ and the third from the
P~~lestinien Rejectton Front. We ourselves proceeded to publish these three
p!nns in the Lebanese ma~;azine AL-HURRIYAH so that they would be in every-
o~~a s grnsp ancl so that judKment, in times of confuaion, would rest with
tl~e court of the masses and the fighting men.
FATII'S Plan: hftlitary Unity -
Ptr Nayt f Ilawot imah went on:
ii~~re we must observe, first of all, that FAT}I's plan was not politically
sp~~c:tftc but reduced the whole national cause to a unity of rt~ilitary
Eorces along. In addition, a apirit of domination emanated from it
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
F'~It d~'.CC~'1lL U5~ ONLY
n~;atn, ntnn~ with the ~ppe~l to ~ive ~ATH wid~ powera in forming ehe
~xeCUtive Committec: of th~ p~le~tine Lib~ration nrganiz~tion.
- 'Ch~ b~mocretir ~ror~C'~ plan r~lie~ on the pr{~cipl~ of naCional uniey by
m~r~er~ nn th~ ba~ig of prnpnrtional repr~Bentation, in accordance with
Che r~gvlutiong o~ Che Pel~stinian Ngtional Council held April 1972.
_ This plan deals with thQ ~nity nf fdreeg~ the militia, the media, diplo-
matic repr~g~ntc?tion, Ch~ national fund and the mas~, tr~de union gttd vo-
Cntionai nrganizgeinns~ via drganizations which will regulr in the ~volu- .
rion oE the Li.b~ration Urg~nization and iCg instituCions intd a nationnl
liberation front.
[n ics political espect, it relieg on Che etage-by-sta~e national platfdrm
ratified by the detachments of the revolution aC the National Councit held
tn Jun~ 19~4, which aet torth realistic, po~itive solutions to Areb-
Palegtininn poliCical relatiens end international-Palestinian relaCions,
throuy;h relinnre on Areb sumnit and United Natinns General Assembly reso-
luttons ~ince 1974~ all of which approved the historic righta of our people
and the notional pluCform to return, determine our deatiny, and establish
n nneionnl state wtthout condiCion or reatriction.
~ The i~e~ection firont's plan propounded lon~;-ran~e political strategic prin-
cihles, thu~ j~mpin~ over the isaues and tasks of the revolution, our
people und the Liberation Organization of the present and during this stage,
on the orEanizationel uide, it was also confined to principles for coordin-
ating the detachments of Che revolution.
The National Unity Committee discussed all this and concluded by approving
a~joi~t political platform which in essence conformed to the politicAl
plan the Uemocratic ~ront had presented, which was fully harmonious with
the Phased National Platform of the Pa:estine Liberation Organization which
was approved in 1974.
This mea~~s that the correct political platform our people have chosen and
rallied around, the pletform of the return, the right to determine one's
desliny nnd the independent state, will succeed. The resoLuCions of the
Al~;iers, Raba[ and recent Baghdad sumnits were obtained under its banner,
.hlon~~ with thc resolutions nf the United Nations General Assembly, in a
manner ~;uaranteeing [he emergence of our national cause in iepecific polit-
tcnl lan~;ua~e into the conscience of the world and its adoption by all the
forces of democracy, progress and peace in the world.
The ~pprovnl of this plan rneans the defeat of the tendency which leaves
n~atCers u~ispectfied and is content with long-range strate~ic stogans.
~ On the or~anir.ational sicie, mattera remain within a framework of general
prtnciplcs, such as approval by the leaders, collective resolutions, the
refusal to deviate fror,~ these reaolutions, minori[y commitment to the
position of the majority, and strengthening of coordination among
23 -
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
1'Ott OH'~'SCIAL U3L ONLY
, d~ttlChtnerlt8 nf the revolution. Th~se orggniz~Cional limitg wer~ a respange
td the po~ieinn o~ the mg,~nrity of Che deCachmenCs, whereag nur plgn pro-
pounded the uniey of ~11 commdn n~Cional inseruments Chrough incorporarion
by pro~~~rtional repr~g~nteCion.
Wc are now awniein~; ehh convening nf the I'al~atinian NaCiongl Cc~uncil in
the miclcil~ of January fnr th~ politicgl plaCferm ~nd organi~ational prin-
ciples tn b~ l~~;iglgr~d~ ndw ChgC they have been ratified by a11 paleetin-
ien det~Chments end approved by the C~ntral Coun~il of Che Liberation
Orgn~tizntion.
ilowever, on thie occasic~n we muat point ouC thaC efforrg Cn violate this
platforn, and the desire tn rush away from it will conCinue, as a resulC of
presgure frvm Arab regim~s, on the one hand~ and the inclination of some
cietecl~rne�ta of the revolution to comnit Chem~elves to Cheir private polit-
ic~l ;~l:itform ~nd cnmmiting themaelvag Co it in letCer end apirit.
An example of Chat ie what is going on in the first rounds of Palestinian-
Jordaninn talks, since gor?~thing called Che framework of connnon action hae
_ been Enrmed and this constituteg ~ violation of the ,~oint platform of
national unity, which specifie~ the pnlpable national foundations for
Palestinian-Joxdanian relationa.
The Main Contradiction
/Questton/ There are people who eay Chat it is political dispuCea which
have ~~revented national unity and can prevent the establiahment of this
unity as wcll; what is your opinion about that?
/Answer/ Our people, like any people on earth, consist of numerous nation-
- al classes which express themselvea through organized political and intel-
lectual ten~!encies, also numerous. This is not odd--indeed all revolutions
at ~11 sta~;~:s of their struggles, especially in the stage of national lib-
erati~~n, ha�~e recognized it. These intellectual and political contradic-
tions have heen resolved for the sake of the main contradiction with the
natio~al en~my. This has happened in China~ Vietnam, Angola, Algeria,
Cubn .~~~d otlier countriea in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Tlie contradictions in the rnnks of the people and the revolution must con-
scantly F;ive way to the major contradiction with tt?e enemy and it has there-
f~re always ~een our appeal that the contradictions within the ranks of the
- revotutton should be put in their true place, as secondary contradictions,
end they should rive wa~� to the ma,~or contradiction with the national enemy.
iraqi-Syrfan Relations _
/~luestionl Ilow will th~: Syrian-Iraqi agreement contribute Co movir~g the
_ wheel of national unity forward, through its positive reverberations with-
in the I'ale::tinian scen:?
24
FOR OFFICiAL USE OI~TLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~R 0~'t~'ICIAL US~ f~NLY
/An~wer/ We in thc UemocratiC ~ront have struggl~d Cor the pe~t lU yearg
en rr.ctiEy Ir~qi-5yri~n relbtinne, and we have p~id ~n exorbir~nt pri~e
. tnr thig principled gt~nd.
We hpvE geru~~f~l~d on b~h~lf of t~ uniC~d Ir,~qi-Syri~n-pglemtininn gdv~nce ~
Irent rdn~CituCing th~ m~in exig di the Ar~b p~r~evergnre frdne; the ~trug- -
~;lc with the 7ionist enemy must be along an advane~ frnne wtthin th~ ne~u-
pied terriCoriQg and aldng lin~s df Goneerd in rh~ Argb encir~lement
countrieg, ~gp~Ci~lly Ch~ 5yrian norrhern frdne. t?~r glogatt ia, "tet all
Syri~n-Ir~qi-pa1~~Cinian powera be united along the ~dvgnc~ frdne ~g~inst
the Zioni~t enemy, the C~mp Uavid ~nnspiracy and ~utdndmy."
The unity dE ehege thr~e fnrcee in the conCext of rhe Ar~b rejectidn front
will ~uarentee the reBtoration df a atrategic balence with the imperialigt~
ZtoniBt-re~ction~ry enemy, fnllowing ita diaruptinn by ~~ypt's departure~
et th~ hnndg dE al-Sadat, from the frnnt of eonfxontation wirh the en~my.
Ahmgd Jabril (Gen~ral c'dmm~nd): Is There Middle Ground beCween tlnity and
the Preeervation of Or~;anizaCione?
/suestion/ Whe~t ia new ag regards the attainmene of Palestinian national
tmiCy~ following the long ,~ourney?
/An~wer/ There is no doubt that the iesue of national unity is an old one;
it hasrbeen prominent since the bireh of the revolution, although at the
be;;inning it was resCricCed to the detachmente which were present on the
scene. Here we might remember that with the launching of FATH in 196S we,
ns a front, tried to get in contact with it. It ia well knoWn to all thet
~ r~volutionary gCCion at that time wea secret~ so we did not kna~r the lead-
ers oE ~ATN,and ~'AT}i did noC know abou[ ue. The meeting betWeen us took
place after FATN's first operation; then we held a number of ineetings which
res�lted in the eatahlishment of jt~int leadership bodies, including the
6mer~~cncy Committee, which took charge of commanding action, the Central
Com�ittee, which pinnned the ~eneral movements of the revolUtion, and the
;;edin and Military Gonanictrrg.
'This continued until the end of April 1966, when opinions became divided,
and [het led to the end of united a~tion.
AE~cr that--specifically, after the June 196~ defeat--we in the front had
the honor of callinf; for establishment of a Patestintan national union
c~n,~~risinf; [he detnchments which were prominent on the scene. Thus the
first meP[infi was held in Damascus, in response to this invitation~ and
Lt uas atcended by repreaentatives of our Eront, FATH, the Revolutionary
Youtt~, the fleroes of Che Return, the Palestine Branch of the Ba'th Party
/Text ends at this point/
COPYRIGHT: A1-Watan al-'Arabi
11f~'l
C:,O: 4f t0^
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~UR U~~IGIAL U5~ bNLY
IRAN
CO~~SpONb~ ON SAVAK, ~O~2ttU~ION AS CAUSES 0~' T~f2~SLNT C}tISIS
~lnnn rU~OPA-ARCNIV in Cerman 25 Jgn 79 pp 4~~52
~ArtiCl~ by br Arnold tloeting~r, N~U~ ZU~~CH~tt z~i'rUNG cnrr~gpnndent fdr
Sp~in and the Arab coun~rieg, trritcen nt ehe turn of the ye~r folldr~ing ~
trip to tr~n: "'Che Cri~is in Ir~n~~a Cdn~equ~nce of the Secret S~rvice
Ite~ ime" ~
('Text~ The old Ay~tollah Kazemi, who has been resisting a particularly brutgl
milit~7ry r~kiment in Isfahan for more than 5 monthg end h~s encouraged th~
pa~ulntinn nf his city to off~r r~s~~tnnce un~il the ov~rthrow ~f the gh~h,
incerrupted hig ~ides and int~rpr~C~re in th~ courg~ of ~n ineprvi~w in
Uecc~nber 1918, as they were expounding to his foreign guest Ch~ origin nf the
unrest in Isfahan, and said: "~irat of all it neede to be stated that ehe
- c:nuse of the evil And its real root are to be eought in the shnh'g autocr~cy."
And indeed thcre is no better point of departur~ far explaining the unr~gt
nnd illg th~t have befallen Iran since the beginning af Jenu~ry 1978. Until
tt~at t[me Shah Mohammnd ~exn pghl~vi ngd shoWn a tend~ncy amnunting te gn
increasin~ly absolute gnd arbi[rary rule and to a gro~ring unwillingness to
ltsten to the opinton of others--Wh~ther high-ranking advisers or men-in-the-
street--daring to exercise criticism of ~ny aspects of. his regime.
'fhis unWillingness on thC parc of the mc~nnrch even to take note of voices -
nti~er tt~an tho~e of pure flnttery can be expl~ined primarily by the f~ct that
fii~ secrer service and in[elligence organizations--particularly the secret
vrcurity ~ervice, SAVAK--hnd got to be bi~~~r ehan he ~ag ~nd aere able to
~~revent liim ~ven Erc~m seeing any langer the social, political, economic and
lu~m~n re.~lity in the country under his rule. 5uffice it to recall the ruler's
Wrll-knnwn remrrks .~hout the "~reat civilization" he thought he Wns building
- nr, for inst.hnCC, his predictiona that Iran Would "overtake" Creat Britain
in .h feW ye~~rs.
The .~~ct~icy of the secre[ services really was Whut set the strategic course
leadin~ to tt~e monnrch's disorientation and isolation. They had alWays
.~ustified their actions hy the alleged need for fighting subversive leftist -
~roupg r~nd r~e e.~rly as in 1953 (Che time of the coup under Ceneral Zahedi
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~Utt tl~~tCtAL USt~; ONLY
whir.h brdught thc ~h~h b~Ck td pdwer) extettd~d them to the media nnd
_ iinivergity 1ife, ~'h~re th~ir ddminaei~n w~g ao c~mplee~ eh~t th~y nnt dnly
proce~ded ag~ingt peopl~ aha vaic~d apininttg whieh Che eecret police did not
lik~ but, in nddieidn to th~e, told Che newapap~r p~ople what to writ~ and
t'dreed m~ny pr~fes~c~rg, dver nnd above eh~ir ~ub~e~e mnet~r, to d~liver
c~nCUmiumg nf the sh.~h ~nd hig regim~ tr, th~ir gCud~nt~, Wt~~ever did nat
Co11aw the ~rderg ~nd ~u~ge~tiong ~f Ch~ g~nClemen nf SAVAK h~d tn ~xpect _
gr~du~~lly incr~e~~sin~ p~r$~cutidtt, gCarting wieh chicanery and financial
lh~qes ~nd, in C~1l9~ ~E p~rgigt~nC refu~nl to "co~per~ee," ending in ~~v~re
torture ~~nd quit~ frequ~ntly gecr~e gervi~e murd~r~.
'Che Gag~ing df ~ 5dci~ty
t'urquin~ the ~omber logi~ char~~teristic of such 5pi'ViCes, the 5AVAK penple,
wtth the qliah'~ C~ngcnt, exacerbated their r~gime even furthpr when in 1g71
the firat Fruitg df r~n inrt~e~~qing prd~p~riey, du~ eo the ~xpdet df petroleum,
br~.~n cre~~ting a ktnd ~f middl~ cl~es. A reasdngbl~ palicy, of C~urge, wduld -
h~~ve rroceeded Che oppogite way: it wbuld h~ve h~d td gr~nt th~ better
~~duc~~ted members of a Rrtdu~~lly growing middl~ ~l~~g a greater g~y, and thus
f;roWing concern in the interegts of the regime. 'The birth of violent
revolueion.~ry ~roups eau~ed by the represgidn of 5AVAK, gave the lgteer
further exCUVes for pngging Irani~n society ever mor~ completely. The shah
,~t the t~p app~lrently, to ~ f~r-reaching exeent, harbored the illusinn that
thc lac~k oE nny d~b~te in the country was du~ to th~ f~ct th~t the great
ma~ority ef Iranic~ns .~gre~d with hig government. Similar illusiong app~rently
spre.~d to numerous foreign observ~rs. Actually the lack of any crieiCi~m and
the ~eemingly universal conaent xere nothing but the r~gult of 5AVAK's -
virtu711y perfect m~chod~ of repression.
'1'h~ secret services extendpd their cottCrdl to more and more sphere~; aft~r
intellectu.~l liEe ~nd the media, it was the turn of the economy. At the same
tir..~ a ban on parties and the founding of a government party caused all
political activity to come under the stric[e~t control. Through courts-
martial, sp~ci~~l coures and state control ov~r the appointment and removal
nf judgeg, the whole legal system was turned into a caricature of a~udiciary,
_ With thr judRe~ increasingly b~~oming mere recipients of orders nE the all- -
~~nwrrf~il scrret services.
1lcvet~nmrnt Undcrmined by Corruption
c:orru~:tiun incre.lsed accordingly* manifesting itself most grossly at court
in che immedi~te environment of the shah but taking in ~usC about everyone ii~ ~
_ poWer down to the moat remote provinces. Corruption became the actual
"economic motor" of Iranir~n "development." Thanks to the foreign currency
ohtained Erom petroleum, ic was possible to import enormous quantities of.
j;oods ~ynd Whele manufaccuring process~s, but corruption led to a situation
= Where the bribe~ received by leading governmen[ and indus[rial personages
from interested firms abroad and at home increasingly played the main role.
27
FOR OKFICIAL U5E ONLY
_
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020037-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024437-8
~Olt tl~FICIAL U5~ ONLY
Wh~n nt tlic bhginninY c~f 1974 eh~ ~h~h mgde Che CruCinl migtnk~, ngaingt
the ndviC~ d[ ~xp~rt~, ~~mply to dnubl~ Iren~a exigting 5-ye~r p1~n in
light dE the country'~ qundruplpd petrdl~um incnme, 1ie furthered Che a1r~~dy
pl~nted trcnd~ dE rorruption ~nd inflntidn td an ennrmnu~ ext~ne~ The
cnuntry did ndt h~ve the hum~n, ingtitutinnnl and pt~y~icgl infr~~truceure
en~bling it u~e~ully td epend Cwice a~ much mnney originally ~lann~d,
Th~ result wae a~ump in the growth of inflation, corrupeion and f~ilures.
Hut ~11 th~~~ ga~t~ were swept und~r th~ rug by ehe g~cr~t service~, gnd
the qu~egtian tr~d~y ig to wh~t ext~nt the monarch in faGt reali~ed what the
rrdblpmg w~r~ ehat n~eually had bpen crp~tpd for the country by hig rul~ gnd
the ru1~ df hi~ gerviCe~.
Logs of c2unlity eg n Resu.lt of L.gck of Ir:tormation
Th~ r~~im~ of Che qecurity gervices thus led indireCtly to th~ degtruCeion df
the r_ountry'g rconemic base. Agrfculture guEf~red p~reiculgrly, because, a~ `
the pr~duct nf ~ l~nd r~fnrm placpd egpeCi~lly under Che rul~r's ~~gis (p~rt
c~f the ~oacn11ec1 W}~ite itevolutian), it had to be a pric~ri abdv~ ~ny critiri~m,
wtth ~ny db~pceive inform