JPRS ID: 8291 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS SOVIET ARMY AIR FORCE COMMAND AND STAFF IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945

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_ i ~ ~ ,
~ - SOVIET ARM"~ AIR FORCE COMMAND AND STAFF ~

27 FEeRU~Y i979 IN THE Gi~EAT PATRIOTIC WAR i94i-i94S i OF 3
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JPRS r~/sx9i ~
27 February 1979
~
- TRANSI.~TIONS ON USSR f1ILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/79)
SOVIET ARMY AIR FO RCE COMMAND AND STArF
IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945
.
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFI CI AL USE ONLY
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OIULIOGRAPHIC DATA 1� Reprn~ No. 2� 3. Recipient's Ae~canion No,
SHEEt JPRS L/ 829~ ~
4~ I ii I~~ an, tiu i~ i~ S. Report ote
7'ItANSl.AT1c1N5 ON U55It M1LI;A~Y AFFAIR5, (FOUO 6/79) 27 Februa 1979
SOVZET ARMY AIR FORCE COMMAND AND 5TAFF IN THE b, -
GREAT PATRIOTI WAR 1941-L945
8. Pcr(orming Orgenizetion (~e~:,
, M.N. Kozhevnikov N~~
q. I'r~lurminK Ur~;anic~uion Nam~ anJ AdJres+ 10, Project/Task/Work Unit No,
,loint Publicationa Research Service
1000 North Clebe Road 11. Conerect/Gtant No~ ~
Arlingeon, Virginia 22201
12, tit+~,~aurinR ()rR~nizstion N~me snd Addreas 13. Type of Report ~ Period
Covered
ny nbove
t ~
15. tiu~~~,lcmcnt~ry Note~
KOrtANI)OVANIYE I SHTAI3 VVS 50VETSKOY ARMII V VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE 1941-194
16. Ahsirerts -
~
'I'I~~~ r~~~~ort cc~ntatn:~ information on the Soviet military and civil defense
c,~~r~l~l islimentti, leaderai~ip, doctrine, palicy, planning, political affairs,
ur};ant�r.~[Ion, and cqutpment.
17. Kcy R'nrds and Document An~lysis. 170. Descriptors
USSIZ
Mililary Urf;uniz.itlons
Military ~~acilItie:;
Milit.iry f'cr:;onnel
116. I~Irniilu�r~/l)p~~n�1�:nd~�J 'Terms
~
17c. ~ I�A I I Fn�I~1/c~ruup l j(,
, 1B. .?~.u1.~bil~~y ti~.~~rm~�nt 19. Security Class (This 2L Ko. o( PaRes
I~OR t)I~F IC[AI, i1SE ON1,Y. Limited Number of R~corc) 253
C~~~tiu:; AV:i11.1hiC From .IPRS . ecurity a,s (This 22. Pnce
~ Page
UNCLASSIFIFD
, � ~ ~
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JPRS L/829
27 February ~.979
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/79)
SOVIET ARMY AIR FORCE COMMANb ANll STAFF
IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 194~.-1945
Moscow KOMANDOVANIYE I 5HTAB WS SOVET5KOY ARMI~ V VELZKOY
OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE 1.941-1.945 gg in Russian 1978 signed to
press 5 Jul 77 pp 1-281
[Book by M.N. Kozhevnikov, IzdateI.'stvo Nauka, 70,000 copies]
. CONTENTS PAGE
Annotatiun 1
- IntroducCion 1
Chapter I. At the Eve of Che Great Patriotic War 4
Chapter II. Soviet Army Air Force Command and Staff at the
Beginning of the War and in the Summer-Fall Operations of _
1941 32
Chapter III. Further Reinforcement of the Soviet Army Air
- rorce 66
Chapter IV. The Fight for Strategic Air Superiority in Spring
and Summer 1943 107
Chapter V. Soviet Army Air Force Command and Staff in the
Battle of Kurak 127
Cl~apter VI. The Soviet Army Air Force in Operations of the
Concluding Period of the War . 141
Ct~apter VII. In the Far East 198
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (ConCinued) Page
- Air Force Peraonnel of Che Greae Patriotic Wur 213
Conclusion 222
- Appendix. Soviet Army Air Force ExecuCives in Che Great
Patriotic Wur~ 1941-1945 235
_ ~
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Annotatiott
This book is devoted to the activitiea af Che command and staff of the
5oviet Ar'my Air Force r.nd repreaentiatives of the Hq SHC (Headquartera,
5upreme High Command) ~t the fronta of the Great Patriotic War. The
activiCiea of� the command and staff of the Soviet Army Air Force, of
many generals and officera of the central administration, of sCraCegic
~viat~.on, of Che air armies, of frontal aviaCion, and of many combined
unit~ and uniCs are demonsCraCed on the background of the past wnr's
};reatc:~t opc:rations. All acCions of the air force command and staff are
c:x~mined in close association with the activities of the General SCaff.
Introduction .
The Great Patriotic Wnr of the Soviet Union against fascist Germany and
- irs allies in Europe :~nd Aaia was the greatesC armed collision between
" .socialism and the att~ick forces of imperialiam, the hardest and cruelest
of all wars ever survived by our motherland. Under the guidance of the
Communist Party the Soviet people and their armed forces annihilated
Hitler's Germany and its satellitea, defended the li~erty and independ-
ence of the socialist fatherland, campleted their great missio~ of lib-
- eration, and honorably completed their int~rnational duty. "The victory a
won in the engagements of Che Great PaCriotic War," L. I. Brezhnev noted,
"was a victory of our heroic working class, Che kolkhoz peasanCry, and
- our intelligentsia, a victory of all Che multinational SovieC people. _
~rhis was a victory of the glorious Soviet Army, an army created by the
revolution, nurtured by the party, and inseparable from the people. This -
was a victory of Soviet military science, of the combat proficiency of all
arms anJ services, of the art of Soviet troop commanders with their origins '
:~mon~; tlic common people."*
The Sovfet Air Force played a significant role in the defeat of fascist
Cerman troops. Interacting closely with ground troops and the navy, it
participated most actively in all fxontal and a~l of th~ large~t strategic
operat;~ns of the groups of fronta, and it conducted independent air
*Brezhnev, L. I., "0 vneshney politike KPSS i SoveCskogo gosudarstva,
Rechi i stat'i" (The Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet StaCe. ~
- Speeches and Articles), Moscow, 1975~ pp 834-$35.
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on~r~Ciocis. Concentration and masaed acCion oE tihe air force on the mosC '
important nxea incre~sed the acope and decisiveness of operatione, being =
~ one of the rnoer imporrant �actore imparting a maneuverable naCure Co the i
war. In n long and etubborn fight~ by aummer 19~F3 the SovieC Air Force
achieved aCrategic air supremacy in a11 0� thE most imporCant aectors, _
thus creaCing favorable cdnditiona for the ground Croops to conduct ma~or
offenaive operaeiona~ By ita actions aviation cleared the way for infan-
- try and tanka~ Aasisted them in penetrating defenses more quickly and ,
pursuing the enemy swifCly, encircling and annihilating his groupings,
' crossing rivera, and seizing and holding iraportant beachheads, and it -
foiled the plans and intentiona of the Fasciat German Command.
The missions of the Soviet Army Air Force commander and his sCaff were Co
organize Che fighC for sCrategic air superiority~ achieve inCeraction
among Che branchea of aviation (fron~al, long-range bomber, air defense
fighter aviaCion), coordinate their efforts in aCrategic operations con-
ducted by groups of fronts and in independenC air operations, direct
management of tl~e combat activities of long-range bomber aviation (DBA)
at tt~e beginning of Che war, generalizaCion of the air force's combaC
experience, and development of proposnls concerning its operational
dpplication. The air force command wus responsible for training air -
reserves, for supplying aircraft and equipment to units and formations, -
for developing the technical specifications on new types of airplanes -
and armament, for writing airfield consCruction and reconstruction plans,
and for training and retraining aircrews aizd Cechnicians. Its functions
included generalizing the best experience in application of different air
- force arms and servicea in combat and operations, and introducing it into
the units and formations. ~
Air liaison officers with the Hq SHC coordinaCed the actions of frontal ~
aviation in all straregic operationa. These offi:.�~rs were senior avia-
tion chiefs in charge of the air force--the commander, the Military
- Council member, and the deputy commander of the Soviet Army Air Force.
Initially Chey were givEn the sponsibility of organizing massed air
attacks in behalf of ~ust one front. Beginning with 1942 the air
liaison officers with the Hq SHC coordinated the efforts of aviaCion in '
several fronts with the assistance of DBA (ADD)* forces. Jointly with -
frontal commanders and frontal air force commanders, Hq representatives '
wrote the operation plans, monitored execution of the missions of avia-
tion, tiandled its efforts in the course of an operation, distributed air -
reserves arriving at the front, and provided air-technical and airfield
~
support to air forces participating in the given operation. Coordinating
the actions of air forces in from one to three fronts in his position as
tiy SHC liaison officer, the air force commander maintained constant
operational communication with the General Staff and Air Force Head- '
quarters, I~e was ulways aware of events occ:urring in all other operating
*In March 1942 long-range bomber aviation was :-~named strategic (long-
rangej aviation (ADD).
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fronra, and he ieaued rhe necessary instructions ehrouei~ his operaCional -
group or through Air Force Headquartere. -
The ob,JecCive of ttie author of thie work is to demrnsernCe the ucCivities
~t thc Sovlet Arrny Air l~'orce Command, rhe work o~ the stuft, ~nd th~ con- -
tribution made by liaison officers wiCh the 5upreme High Commac?d Head- -
quarters to coordinating r.he actione of the aviation of several fronts -
nnd atraCe~ic aviation.
This chronologically organized work embraces the period from 5eptember
1939 Co September 1945--�that is, from Che beginning of Worl~i War II to
Che Soviet Army'a victory in the Far East--defeaC of the KwanCung Army =
and tot~l surrender of imperialiaC Japan. The book describes the combar
activities of Western capitaliat air forcea preceding fasciat German~~'s
- aCtack on Che USSR, and it examines the work of Che air force comman,
and staff at the eve and in the initial period of the GreaC PatrioCic War, -
in operaCions of the summer-fall campaign of 1941, in the great battles ~
of Moscow, 5talingrad, the NorCnern Caucasus, and Kursk, and in the con-
cluding offensive operstions of Che Great Pntriotic War of 1941-1945. _
� The work describes the strucCure of the air �orce staff, its principal -
directorates and sections, Che directiona of Cheir activities, the muCual -
_ , relationships of the air force command and the sCaff with the General
SCaff and with the command and ataff of the fronts and air armies, and `
the role and place of the sir forca in defeat of fa~cist Germany and
militariat Japan by the Soviet Armed Forces.
In writing this book the author made uae of archival and published nate- _
rials, his own experience as a pt?rticipanC of the described events, and -
numerous discussions held during and after the war with Chief Marshal of
Aviation A. A. Novikov, who head~d the Soviet Air Force during the Great
Patriotic War, his deputy General A. V. Nikitin, Air Force Military Coun-
cil membere Generals P. S. Stepanov and N. S. Shimanov, and many war
veterans.
The author expresses his sincere gratefulness to Generals V. I. Semenchikov ~
and C. A. Pshenyanik, and Colonels Yu. V. Plotuikov, C. Ye. Sokolov, V. S.
5humiktiin~ F. P. Sheaterin, N. Ye. Platonov, and N. N. Azovtsev for their
kind advice.
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, CHAPTER I. AT THE EVE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR -
The Actions of Capitalist Air Forces in the Weat
= Un 1 5eptember 1939 Hitler's Germany attacked Poland. At 0445 hours -
fascist German,a~~~iaCion made massed attacks againyt Che airfields, Crans-
portaCion ~unctions, and ecottomic and adminisCrative centers of Poland. -
~ Ttie Wehrmacht's gr~und forces crossed the bordPx and invaded Polish
- territory from the north out of E,~stern Prussia, from the west out of
_ ~ast Germany, and from the south out of Slovakia. World War II began.
-
_ ~ The forces of the sides were rather unequal on the ground and in the air. -
; liitler's Germany launched about 2,000 warplanes againat Poland (1,000- ~
= 1,100 bombera, 600-650 fighters, and 200-250 reconnaissance airplanes).
_ The Polish Air Fr,rce had only 824 warplanes, most of which were obsolete.l
_ Polish sir defenses were also very weak, having a strength of only about
400 medium and small caliber antiaircraft guns. Nevertheless Polish -
; pilots courageously entered into battle with enemy aviation, knocking
- down 14 German airplanes on the firat day and 130 in subsequent acCions.2 ~
Being numerically and qualitatively superior to Polish aviation, the
German Air Force easily achieved air auperiority and promoted advance
- of the German ground troopa.
- The g~vernments of Ergland and France, which had signed treaCies with
Poland,~were forced to declare war on Germany. On 3 September at 1100
= hours the government of England and, 6 hours later, Che government of
- France declared war on Germany. Following England, Che British Common- .
. wealth declared war on Germany. The USA and South European countries
- declared their neutrality. England and France declared war on Hltler's
Cermany not to help Poland but in the interests of their own far-reaching -
- plans. The imperialist circles of England and France held to the hope
that after seizing Poland Germany would go to war against the Soviet
- Union. Capitalizing on the connivances of England and France the fascist -
Cerman troopa swifCly defeated the Polish Armed Forces, and in the first
, days of October 1939 they mopped up the last centers~of resistance of ~
regular Polish units. The Wehrmacht's Polish campaign came to an end.
The tremendous combat capabilities of aviation and tank troops were
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reveiiled in Che German-Polish war. Massed use o� aviaCion and mechanized
troopA in �nrrc,w sector~ riade it poseible Co quiclcly collap~e enemy
defunses throughout t;heir entit:e depth, commit mobile for.mations Co the
breakCtirough~ and exploit r~.he `oreakChrough awiftly. The increased sig-
- nificance of air superiority Co acCions of the ground Croops made iCself
obvious. .
- After Ct~e defeat of Poland faycisC Germany began concentraCing troops and
aviation on its wesCertt bordere wiCh the objective of aCtacking the armies
~ of Che Anglo-French a111ance. In the period from 3 SepCember 1939 Co
- 9 April 1940 neither side engaged in active combat operations. During
ttiia Cime the governmenCe of England and France incited fascist Germrsny
_ to w~r againsC Che U5SR. This explains the slow deployment of Anglo-
rrench troops and the pass iveness of their acCion~ on the ground and in
- the air. Lnglish aviaCion conducCed air reconnaissance on the ports and
roadsteada of the German Navy, while French aviation scouted groupings of
German troops deployed along Che French border. Fascist German aviation
= conducted air reconnaissance above norChern France, England, Belgium, and
the Netherlands. Cerman bombers were aceive only sporadically against -
troops and industrial facilities. On 9 April 1940 fascis~ Germany occu-
pied Denmark and niade a surprise attack on Norway withauC a declaration of
war. In 'its attack on Non�ray Germany committed, in addition to ground ,
formations, up to 1,300 warplanes (1,000 bombers and 300 fighters).3 The
_ Norwegian Air Force poss~.ssed only 180 obsolete airplanes.4 The Norwzgian
capital of Oslo was captured by a GeYman airborne assault party, landed
right at Oslo Airport and consisting of 1,500 enlisCed men and officers
and armed wiCh automatic rifles, ~nachineguns, and light guns. Abandoned
by their allies (French units had abandoned their positions on 5 June,
being folYowed 2 days laCer. by the English), the Norwegian troops were
forced to surrender on 10 June 1940.
The captu:e of Denmark and Norway by Hitler's troops improved Germany's
strategic po~ition, placing all countries of Northern Europe under its
control. The Western powers were unable to organize and conducC active
coL~?termeasures against fascist aggression in Norway. English aviation -
was found Co be incapable of preventing the landing of fascist German
troops in Norway, supporting and covering the actions of its own and
Norwegian troops, or providing air cover to Norwegian shipping. En~oying _
air supremacy, German aviation provided effective support to German
ground troops and once again demonstrated Che growing significance of
initial surprise massed strikes on troops, airfields, and porCs. _
Fascist Germany's aggression against Denmark and N~rway did not interrupt
Che Wehrmacht's preparations for a Western offensive with the ob~ective
of defeating Belgian, Dutch, and Anglo-French troops. The plans of the
Germar. Command foresaw a thtust by a strong grouping of ground truops
inCo the center of the disposition of allied armies, fracture of ~iie
allied fronC, isolation of the northern enemy grouping at the English _
Channel., and iCs annihilation. The core of the strike grouping was to
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conai.et of ta?Zk and m~Corized formationa, the actions of which were to
be aupporCed Uy ma,jor forces in the air. In accordance with the plan
three army groups conai~ting of eighC armies were depLoyed (136 diviaiona
~ in all, including 10 Ca~ik snd 7 motorized divisions), the acCiona o�
which were to be supported by Cwo German air fleetis (the 2d and Che 3d)
with a strength of 3,824 warplanea.5
Tlie command of the 2d and 3d air fleets was given the missions of achiev-
ing air superiority, disorganizing enemy troop command and control, and
providing direct supporC to advancing troopa. TwenCy minutes prior to
the offensive of the ground troopa, 1,20Q-1,400 sirplanes were to strike
~?"ilied airfields, headquarters, communication cenCers, and transportation
_ ~unctions in the combat zone in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. At -
the beginning of Che offensive all of Che efforts of aviation were
direcCed at supporting the ground troopa, main~.y the tank formations.
France and England had 108 divisians on the Northeasrern FronC. In this
area the French possessed 2,789 tanlcs (of these, 2,285 were modern) and
- 11,200 guns with calibers of 75 mm and above. The British Expeditionary
Forces possessed 310 tanks and abor~t 1,350 field guns. The French Air
Force had 1,648 warplanes in its first line, to include 946 fighCers and
, 219 bombers. In May 194U British aviation possessed 1,837 airplanes in
the ftret line, to include more than 800 fighters and 544 bombers. About
_ 500 English airplanes were based on Frencr~ airfields. The Belgian Air
rorce poasessed 186 airplanes, while the Dutch Air Force had 120.6
The German offensive caught Alli~d troops and aviation unawares. It began
_ with an air attack against airf~elds, command posts, military supply
depots, and the most importanti k~ar industry facilities of the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France. In terms of design and methpds of action, the actions
of the Luftwaffe differed in no way from its acCions during the invasion
of Poland. At 0330 hours on 10 May 1940 a powerful strike was made from
_ the air against abouC 100 airfields in the Netherlands, Belgium, and
northern France to a depCh of up to 400 km. The first groups of German
~ paratroopers were dropped in the rear of Dutch and Belgian troops at -
0430 hours. At 0535 haurs the Wehrmacht's ground troops began their
invasion of the Netherlands, Belgiwn, and Luxembourg. The massed sur-
prise attack on the airfields by German aviation played a major role in
seizure of the initiative and air superiority. Working on its mission _
- to attain air superiority in the West, owing to its agents and air recon-
naissance the main command of fascist Germany possessed exhaustive data
- on the composition, basing, and the state of readiness of Che enemy's
aviation and air defense forces. The sudden maesed raids on the air-
Fields by German aviation inflicted great losses in airplanes and person-
nel on the air forces of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. During
the r~dvance of the ground troops fascist German aviation easily attained
stratetic air supremacy on all of the most important axes. French and -
~;nglish aviation did not render adequate opposition to the air attack
of the Luftwaffe.
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The Dutcti Armed P'orces were almost rotally inacCive. The Belgian Army �
aurrendered on 28 May. The at~empta of the French Supreme Command to
organize active counCermeasures against Che enemy by ground troops were
not graced with succesa. Fascist Ita1y enCer~;d Che war againsC England
and France on 10 June. The French Navy did noC engage in active opera-
tions at sea, and prior Co 20 June ].940 it ~lid noC suffer large losses.
Petain's French government hastened in its decision to aurrender, signing
~ the surrender documenC t~t 1832 hours on 22 June 1940. On the day of -
France's surrender English aviation basad at French airfields returned to
its own airfields in ~ngland. On 24 June 1940 the French GovarnmenC
signed a truce with Italy, after which a11 miliCary actions by the French
Armed Forces were halted. The Anglo-Frenc:h Alliance once again suffered
disaster.
Whae were the most typical features of Che actions of fascist Germany's
air Eorce? They were: ConcenCration of large air furces for powerful
preemptive strikes against the principal airbases with rhe ob~ective of
seizing the initiative in the air; broad use of Cransport aviation Co _
drop numerous sabotage groups o� paratroopers in the NeCherlands, Belgium,
and northern rrance; redirection of Che air force's efforts following
_ 3uppression of enemy aviation to supporC and cover advancing tank and ~
motorized troops, together with concurrent inCensified air xeco.znaissance.
- Follow~ng France's surrender HiCler's leadership sought ways, including
- ~ military, for hastiening the signing of a cc,mpromise peace with England,
to Germany's advantage, and turning Co Che East. "Our principal atten- -
~ rion is toward ttie East.... We will probably have Co demonstrate our '
force against En~land once again before it halts its struggle and frees
. our hands for the East."~
Nftler hoped that English ruling circles, considering Che swift defeat -
of France, would be ready for pe.sce talks wi.th Germany and for sizable
concessions. BuC although the reactionary ruling circles of England -
were prepared to negotiate with tascist Germany, they could not take
this step due Co the antifascist mood of the broad masses, fearing uni-
versal embarrassment. Without waiting for peace proposals, the fascist
command decided to act on England with its air force. Hitler's command
assigned the air offensive to the 2d and 3d air fleeCs, which had a
strength of 1,480 bombers, 760 single-engine fighters, 220 two-engine
figtiters, and 140 reconnaissance airplanes.8
- The 2-month breathing spell enjoyed by England following Dunkirk (the
defeat and evacuation of Allied troops from the Dunkirk beachhead--from
'L8 May ta 3 June 1940) permitted the British Command to strengthen its
air Lorce. While on 4 June 1940 English fighter aviation consisted of
446 combat ready fighters, on 11 August the number already reached 704. -
'Phe reserve fleet of the RAF grew in size. The Air Defense Command had _
at its disposal about 2,000 antiaircrafC guns of various calibers.9
7
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' ~~dx d~rYCint, us~; nNLY
Germ~ny ul~o gugmeneed iC~ ~ir power. Ileginni?ig in July 1940 Che Luftw~ffe
_ begnn m:~~~~d ruidg ~n Cnglnnd. The rnid~ were p~rformed in d~yCime by
_ l:.irge groupa o~ bomber~ accompanied l~y fighCers. Airfields, porte,
~c~troleum clumpg, ~upply depote, plnnCe, mgrine sliipping, und ciCy resi��
~~~~tia1 dl~Crlct,a were struck. ~nglieh ~ighters off~red neubbnrn
re~intunae. Combat wus continuoua in Che air. 13y 18 August 1g40 fascist
Cermc~n ~vigeion lose 375 atrplanes, while ~nglish avi~tion losC 213.
_ Beginning wiLh 5 September 1940 t1iCler'~ Cnmm~nd conc~nCraeed a11 gir
str3k~g on London. The ciCy wae sub~ecCed to gerikes glmosC every nighC
- Erom 2100 Cn O60U. As ~n exqmple, on the nighC of 15 5epCember 1940
l.nndon w~s sub~ected Co n massed raid by '1,000 airplanes~ Itepellin~ this -
~ir r~id, English fightera and antiaircr~ft artillery knocked down 60
Germnn ~irplanes, losing 26.10 Periodic night air raids on ~ngligh ciCiea -
continued until the second half of February. The Luftwaffe performed itg
Ein~l mngs ruids on ~ondon in the ~econd h~lf of April and ehe beginning
of May 1941. After thia ehe main forces o� Che Luftw~ffe began tn be
trnngferred East. German nvinCion wag unable to inflice coneiderable harm
on BriCish industry. The hope of Che German Command L~ brenk English
reeiseance through the actions of 3ts air force turned out ~o be fal:~t.
~ buring ehe raids~ ~use from July Co November 1940 fascieC German aviation
lost 1,733 girplanes while th~ RAF lost 915.11
'Ttie combnt activities of the Luftwaffe were not sufficiently purposeful;
for a long time it subjected too large a number of dtverse fucilities Co
periodic aCtacks, and damage Co or annihilation of these faciliCies did
not liave a significanC influence on the outpuC of war industry.
Nor did Cnglish bombers operate purposefully. 5trikes were made against
Germnr~ objectives by small forces, mainly aC night and at rather long
inCervgl~. Such bombing operAtions could noC do serious harm to the
economy of fasciat Germany or hinder its preparations for an attack on
the USSR.
The Italians, who had seized Albania in 1:39, invaded Greece in October
1940, but Chey were unable to defeat the Grecian Army. At Che beginning
of April 1941 fascist Cermany aCtacked Yugoslavia and occupied its terri-
tories. 5triking airfields and cities with its bombers, in April 1941
Cerm~~ny occupied Greece wiCh tank and motorized formationg of the ground
troop~.
Ilavin~; occupied Yugoslavia and Greece, in May 1941 the Germans undertook
~in airborne assault opQration to aeize the island of Crete. Encountering
no active countermeasures on the part of Englund and the USA, the fascist
commanders continued tt~eir preparations for an atCack on the Soviet Union.
Tl~e greater combat capabilities of the air force and its great role in
support of the missions of the ground troops revealed themselves clearly
in tt~e military activities in the Weat. The Soviet Command studied the
actione of capitalist aviation in Western Europe. The Communist Party
8
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~Oit O~~ICIAL USC bNLY
~nd SovieC Government arrived aC epeci~ic conClusions nnd eook ef~icient
ateps Co gtrengChQn Che air fnrce.
- '1'l~~ Luftw~ffe l~rior Cn the ACeack on tha Soviet Union
Ely Che moment of the attack on the Soviee Union the Luftwaffe had grown
qu~ntitntively nnd qu~ii~~ti~aly in compari~on with the situneion in fa11 -
L93g. In June 1941 the LufCwaffe had a strengCh of 10,000 warplnnes~ to
include ree~rve airplnne~ and trniners~ ICg1y had 2~416, ~inland had 307,
Itomanig had 699~ Hung~ry had 269, and ehe total serengtih of gCaCes in ehe
faecist bloc wae 13~690 airplanes.~2 Organixaeionally Che Luftwaffe wae
J subdivided intn the gir forcea of the Main Comu~nd (gir fleets), Croop
~viation (nrmy nnd corps)~ and naval air forces. The compoaiCion of the
~ir force included uir defenae forcea and airborne gssaule troope~ The
~ir force rear wge organizaCionally separaCe from the flying unite.
Commander in Chief keichsmarechall H. Goeri;?g commanded Che LufCwaffe,
~nd Gener~l (G. Yeshotmek) wae chief of ganeral staff of the Luftwaffe.
The air fleet was the highegt ma~or air formaeion of the air force. In -
n11 by June 1941 there were five air fleets. Each of them had a strQngth
from 800 to 1~600 war~~lanes The sir fleet conaisted of air corpa (one
or two), an antiaircr~ift corps, and a aeparaCe air squadron. The air
corps was the highest tactical formation, and it us~ially included two or
three bomber squadron~, one or two fighter equadrone, from one to three
reconnaissance groups, r:1d one or two airlift groups. The air aquadron,
the principal tactical air formaCion, contained two or three air groups.
The sir group had a sCrengCh of 39-47 airplanes, including the airplanes
of reserve and organic aubunita. FascisC German aviaCion was armed with -
airplanes of fulZy up--to-daee deaign with relaCively high tactical-
technical data, as can be aeen from Table 1.
Preparing for its attack on the Soviet Union, the Ger~an leadership built
and reequipped airfields at an a~celerated pace. From aummer 1940 to May ~
1941 more than 250 ~irfields and 160 landing aCrips were erecC~d on German
territory. During this time 100 uirfields and 50 landing stripa were
built and restored on Polish territory. Airfields were built in Romania
and llungary. The well developed airfield net permitted disper.sed basing
- and freedom of maneuver in all directions to the Luftwaffe. The strate-
gic plan for the war againat the USSR (Operation Barbarossa) foresaw a
surprise attack consisting of several powerful sCrikes by large air forces
and tunk und motorized troopa with the objective of isolating, encircling~
and annihilating the main forcea of the Soviet Army in the western Soviet
Union, followed by u swift advance deep into the country to a line extend-
ing from Arkhangel'sk to Astrakhan'. The German Command allocated 190
divisions including 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions to Operation
g~rbarossa; these forces also included the armed forces of German allies.
The fascist German Rrouping had a strength of 5.5 million men, about
4~300 tanks, more than 47,000 gu~ns and mortars, 4,980 warplanes, and 192
warships. Four out af the five air fleets were targeted for tha USSR.
9
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On z5 M~y 1941 ehe op~reCionnl �ormaeione o~ the Lu�tiwgffe ~nd troop avia-
Cidn inr~ndad for gcCinn ggaineC the Soviee Union congi~Ced of 306 combgt
gquadron~~ ro include 127 bomber and 89 fighter squadrons, The reserve
aontnined nbout 400 ~irplanea.~3 BombQrs made up ehe bulk of ehe Luft-
wuffE?.. 'I'I~ey cnntribuCed 5'7.8 percenC eo the enCir~ airplui~~: L1eeC. 'Thu
proportiona were 31.2 percent for fighr~rs and 11 percent for raCattngi~-
sance airplanes, Hitler'e strategiaCs be~.ieved that ea had bean tihe case
in Poland and ~rance, ehey would bc~ able to annihilaee 5ovi~e ~viaeion
within thc first days of ehe war wiCh bomber etrikes on uirfielde. This
ie why they eurtted g great degl of aetenCion to developing bomber aviaCion.
The main thrusts were to be made against Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. _
The forcea gnd equipment of Chree strategic groups were deployed on thege .
~xea. Army Group North on the Leningrad axis, consiaCing of 29 divisions,
wne to destroy Soviet Croopa in the Baltic staCes and capture Leningrad
and Kronahtadt. The army group was eupported from the air by Che 1sC Air
~leet~ which hnd a sCrengeh of 760 girplanes. -
In central Poland Che strongest Croop grouping--Army Group Center con- -
sisCing of 50 divisiona and 2 brigades--prepared for Che offensive. With
Che support of the 2d Air Fleet (1,670 airplanes) it was tn fracCure the
straeegic defeneive front~ encircle and annihilate Soviet Army Croopa in
Belorueaia~ and exploit the offeneive in the direction of Moscow.
Army Group South consisting of three Ger~an And two Romanian armiea~ a
tank group~ and a}iungarian mobile corpa, 57 diviaions and 13 brigades
in all~ had the misaion of annihil.ating SovieC troopa in the Right--Bank
Ukraine, reaching the Dniepr, and developing Che offenaive eastward with
the aupport of the 4th Air F1eeC and Roman~an aviation (1,600 airplanes).
The German Norway Army and two Finniah armies--21 divisions and 3 brigadea
in all--were deployed on Norwegian territflry and in Finland. With Che -
support of the Sth Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force (547 sirplanes in
all), these forces were to capture Murmansk and Polyarnyy and aseigt Army
Croup North in capturing Leningrad. The main command of the ground troopa
had 24 diviaions in reserve.
Table 2. Number of Warplanes Poeseesed by CounCries of the FaecisC
Militariat Bloc That Were To Participate in the Attack
Agninat the USSR* _
Cermany Italy Finland Romsnia Hun a Total -
about 70** 307 623 48 4,980
4~000
*"Istoria vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945~" Vol 3, pp 328~ 338.
**At tl~e end of June 1941 Italy eent 70 warplanes against the USSR as an
"expeditionary" corps.
11 -
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The German Cornm~nd pn~ed ehe �o~.lowing missions eo the Lufewaffe: ACCgin~
ing nir ~uperioriey and p~ralyzing the ncCions of SovieC avineion; dis-
rupeing~~~he work of ttie lineg of communication and preventing the re~erveg
from maneuvering; eupporting tihe swifti advenae o� ground troope.
'1'hus fas~igC Germ~ny macia comprehensive preparatian~ for w~r ~gninSC th~
Soviet Union~ ~nd it po~sessed sizable armed forcee, including ~n ~ii
force ourfiCted witih all forms of combat equipmenr.
The 5eaeus of ehe Soviet Air Force at the Eve df Che War
The Communiet Party nnd 5ovieC GovernmenC were aw~re that an armed colli-
sion w3th Che forces of imperialiam could occur, nnd in the years of peace-
ful sacialisC conatrucCion they took tihe neceasary sCepe to atrengChen the
cnuntry'g defense capubilities. Much atiCenCion was dev~~ted eo eCrengChen-
- ing nnd developing the SovieC Air ~orce. In September 1939 the Politburo
of the CC VKP(b) [CenCrc~l CommiCtee of the All-Union Communiet I'arty (of
- Bolsheviks)J adopted eh~~ decree "On ReconsCrucCion cif Exiating Airplane
Plants and ConetrucCion of New P1anCs." The plan wa7 Co build 9 new
plnnts and reconstruct h old plante in 1940-1941. By as early as 1940
the 5oviet Union's aircraft planta were producing 19 percent more war-
planes than in 1939.14-15
In Jnnuary 1940 Che PoliCburo of the CC VKP(b) discussed Che work of the
Ycople's Commissariat of Aviation Induatry. CC VKP(b) member A. I.
5hakhurin was appointed people's conunissar of aviation industry, and
aircraft designer A. S~ Yakovlev was appointed his assistant for experi-
mentul construcCion. By the end o~ 1940 significant organizational
changes had been made in aviation industry. Independent designer teams
led by V. M. Petlyakov, A. A. Arkhangel'skiy, P. 0. Sukhoy, and V. M.
' Myasishchev were aeparated from the experimental design office headed by
- A. N. Tupolev. New aircraft design offices were creaCed with A. I. �
Mikoyan, M. I. Gurevich, S. A. Lavochkin, M. I. Gudkov, and V. P. Gorbunov
in charge. Existing enF,ine design offices were expanded, and new onea
_ were eatablished. .
The technical flight ch~racteristica of the new Soviet warplanes satis-
fied modern requirements. For example, the MIG-3's combat characteristics
were superior to those oE Engliah, American, and German fighters of the
same class. The Pe-2 wns better than German bombers of the same class,
_ thc J-87 and the J-88. Capitalist air forces did not posseas ground
:~Ctack airplanes of the I1-2 clasa. In 1939 and 1940 the Soviet Union
produced more airplanea than Germany, but German aircrafC industry was
producing new types of sirplanes, while our aircraft industry was only
just beginning to assimilate production of new airplanes. Owing to this
the western frontier military diatricts still had many obsolete airplanes
- as of 2Z June 1941; as an examp~e they poe:seased 1,762 I-16 fighters and
1,549 I-153 fighters.l6
12
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~Ok OFFICIAL U5~ UNLY
T~ble 3. Number of New Types of Airplgnes produced by Aircr~Pti Indu~try
at the Beginning uf the GreaC Patriotic War*
a Type o� giralane 1940 1941. nrior Co 22 June Totel
YaK-1 64 335 399
MIG-3 20 1,289 1~309 -
LaGC-3 322 322
Pe-2 2 458 460
I1-2 249 249
Total 86 2,653 2~739
*TsGA5A, [CenCral State Archivea of the Soviat Arary], f. 130, op. 25, Y
- d. 199~ 11. 4-5.
. On 25 ~ebruary 1941 the CC VKP(b) and the USSR SNK [Council of People's
Commiseara] adopCed a special decree "On Reorganizarion of the Red Army
Air Force" approving the plan propoaed by the People's Commiesariat of
Defense for development of Che air force. The plnns called for increas-
ing the atrength of aviation in frontier mil3tary districta~ improving ~
the training of aviation personnel, reorganizing the air force rear, and
- implementing far--reaching measures to reconaCruct and expand the airfield
net so that it could aupport the baeing and combat use of new types of
airplanes. By as early as spring 19~i1, in comparison with the beginning
of 1939 the numher of airplanea in the air force more than doubled, end
the numbe~ of air regimente increased by 80 percent.l~ Formation of 106
new air regiments began in Che airports at Che start of 1941; of these,
only 19 were forn~d by the beginning of the war, to include 13 long-range
bomber regimenta.18
_ Reequipping the air force and improving its organization, the Communist
Party did a great deal of work to develop high moral-combat qualities in
the personnel. Sixty percent of the peraonnel in the sir force were
co~mnuniats and Komsomol members who played a leading role in combat and
political training and in the fight for higher battleworthiness and
combat readinesa of their air unita and formations.19
The battleworthiness and combat readinesa of air unita and formations and
the effectivenese with which combaC equipment was employed were directly ~
- dependent on the morale, akills, and creative initiative of the airmen. -
- Tt~e high morale of 5oviet pilota, being one of the most important factora
of the air force's power, was a product of our socialist social and state
structure~ the sociopo2itical and ideological unity of the Soviet people,
and the tremendous amount of work done by the Communiat Party in ideologi-
cal ttieory, organization~ and agitation and propaganda.
Mucl~ wae also done to train pereonnel. A new principle was adopted in
December ;.940 for selecting cadeta for air force schools: Candidates were
selectecl Erom routine drafte of young people for military aervice. A decree
13
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14
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o~ Che CC VKp(b) end the U551t SNK dared ?5 ~eb~u~ry 1941 eseabligh~d a new
gygeem for trgining piloeg~ airnraft engineer~, and Cechnicians. Three
type~ nf miliCary ~vieCion echool~ offering compressed Craining courses -
wpr~ intr~duc~d: I3asic eraining achools offerictg n 4-manth course in
_ peuan~imd und ~ 3~mnnth Cnurge in wartiime; miliCary X~ toC schools wieh n
g-monrh trnining course in pegC~Cimg gnd ~ 6-month cc,,.se in wartime;
~viation schoole with a peaceeime training course of 2 years and a w~r-
time eraining anurge of 1 yenr. -
5Cep~ were taken to expand the training of aviation commnndere with a
higher military education. ~or many years this rraining was conducted
only nt the Air F'orce Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovakiy and at the AviaCion
UQpartment of the Military Acadertq? imeni M. V. ~runze. In March 1940 the
following gchools were creaCed by order of the U5SR people'g commissar
of defense at the Air ~'orce Ac~demy imeni N. Ye. zhukovskiy (chief-- _
Uivisian Commnnder Z. M. PomeranCaev, military commissar--Brigade Commissar
M. I. IzoCov): Command, operatiannl, correspondence com~~and, navig~tor,
and advanced training courses for air force commanders; these achools were
reorganized into an independent acndemy which later came to be called the
Red Army Air Force Military Academy of Command and Navigator Personnel.
- The last graduaring class of the command school aC the Air ~orce Academy
imeni N. Ye. Zhukovakiy in 1940 included P. I. Ivashutitt, S. N. Grechko,
5. A. PestoY~ V. A. Novikov, A. I. Podol'skiy, N. N. OsCroumov, G. A.
Pshenyanik, G. K. Prussakov~ A. C. Kravchenko, A. A. Karyagin, N. P.
Kuz'min, N. N. Kozhevnikov, P. N. Aseyev, M. V. Afanae'yev, A. V. Zhat'kov,
A. V. Khramchenkov~ A. F. Iaupov, A. S. Bolotnikov~ M. I. Makaimov, A. F.
MaCisov, M. M. Orkin, A. Ya. O1'shvanger, G. M. Sokolov, A. T. 5hevchenko,
and others. During Che Great Patriotic War, graduatea of the Command
school of the Ai~ Force Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy worked at command
and etaff posta with great energy, dieplaying high theoretical training,
~ood organizational capabi'itiea, the ability to command troops, and limit-
less devotion to the people and the Communist Party. The academy's execu-
tives included command school chief Colonel M. D. Smirnov, school commissar
Regimental Commi~sar A. T. Chumakov~ navigator achool chief Hero of the
Soviet Union Brigade Commander I. T. Spirin, officer inatructore N. A.
Zhuravlev, A. S. Pleshakov~ A. I. Chugunov, N. F. Kudryavtsev, M. D.
Tikhonov~ G. D. Ban'kovskiy, V. P. Kanokotin, T. M. Artemenko, ~nd V. S.
Pyst~nov~ and many ottiers.
In March 1941 the Air Force Engineering Academy was eatablished in Lenin-
grad, and subsequently named after A. F. Mozhayakiy. In all by the begin-
ning of the war three air force academies were operating, training person-
= nel with a higher military education epecifically for the Soviet Air Force.
Ttie Air Force Military Command and Navigator Personnel Academy became the
principal source of trained commandera and staff officers. Political
officers were trained for air force units and formations by the Military
Political Acadertry imeni V. I. Lenin.
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Lxtensive me:eures were implemenCed Co prepare Che Cheater of wgr. Con-
~truceion, expansion, and reconstrucCion of Che landing seripa of more
thnn 250 ~irfieYda ~g~umea broad scope in spring 1941. A significanC
proporrion of Che airfiolds wQre built in the new frontier zone formed
_ ns g re~u1C of Che annexaCinn of western Be~oruesian ~nd Ukrainign
regiona and admission of new republice-~Latvia~ Lithuania, xnd ~sConig~~
into ehe USSR. Snme 164 airfielda were builr beewee.n 8 April ~nd 1.5 July ~
- 1941.2n
There were plans to have three airfields (main, aCandby, field) for every
~ir regiment Co inaure htgh combat readiness and permit maneuvering of
nvtation. One hundred airffeld construcCion battalions were formed with
elie purpns~ of accelerating the conaCruction of previously sCarCed ~ir-
" tieldg. In addiCion 25,000 laborers were transferred at the end of .
Mgrch from railroad conseruction pro~ecta to compleCe construction of
gir�ields.21 In wnatern fronCier military dietricts ae many exiaCing
airfielde, where new types of r~irplanes were ro be based, ehe landing
sCrips were lengehened ~nd giv~n a concreCe surface, and fuel and ammuni-
tion dumps und airfield contro:l poats were built. Owing to thia the new
types of uirplanes could not operate from these airfields temporarily,
wtiile use af obsolete airplaneii was restriceed.
~
A decision adopted by the CC V1CP(b) and the USSR SNK on 10 April 1941
- reorganized Che air force rear servicea.22 Prior to this decree, air
force reur units were within ttie composition of air formations. Combat
pracCice, especially in the Soviet-Finniah War, showed thaC this struc-
ture reduces maneuverabiliCy of air unita and rear units. To corr~ct
these shortcomings Che Fiir forc:e rear was taken out of the air forma-
tions and organized on territorial basis.
The entire terriCory of the western frontier military districts was -
divided into 36 airbase regions (RAB). The airbase region became the
principal air force rear organ of the combined arms army and the mili-
tary district (front), nnd it was inCended to provide logistical, sir-
field, and medical support to three or four air divisions. Each region
- contained an airbase for every division. The airbase was directly sub-
ordinated to the region chief and, in operational respecCs, Co Che air
- division commander. The base had three or four airfield service bat-
talions (DAO). The airfteld service battalion was a aeparate rear unit,
and it was intended to provide direct support to one air regiment armed
with two-engine airplanes, or to two air regiments armed with single-
engine airplanes. In operational respects the baCtalion commander was -
subordinated to the air regiment commander. This rear structure relieved -
the air units oE cumbersome rear services, made all forms of rear support
more consistent, and hei~htened the possibilities for maneuvering air
regiments and divisions. The plans called for completing reorganization
of the air force rear by ~ August 1941.
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Me~~ures were ;planned Co dieper~e and camouflag~ airplanas at airfialds.
On 14-19 June 1941 the U5SIt people's couunissar af defene~ o~cdered tho _
commund of the froneier military diserices tio deploy ehe fronCal admin-
i~~r~eions in field commr.nd posCg between 21 and 25 June. Orders were
publiehed on 19 June to camoufl~ge airfields, military units, gnd impor-
- tant facilities, Co paint tanka and vehiclea proCective colors, and Co
dieperse nviation.23
~ut the treacherous surpriae attack of fasciat Germany disrupted most of
the measures aimed at achieving fundamental reorganization and rearmnment
of the 5oviee Air Force. It wae preciaely for ehie reason that aviaeion
found itself in an exrremely difficult aituation at the start of the war
in the wesCern frontier military diatricCs. ConatrucCion of many air-
fielde was not completed~ Che poasibilities for maneuvering aviation were
limited, nnd the air �orce rear had not been fully reorganized into the -
- new system of services.24 Because Che air force command sent new types
of airplanes coming from the plants right to the airfields in the western
frontier military districCS, a large number of obsoleCe airplanes accumu- �
laeed at airfields locaCed not far from the state border.
F
There were up to 100 and more airplanRS aC some airfields of Che Western
and Ktev special miliCary diatricts. During the retraining period a aig-
nificant proportion of the obeolete airplanes at Chese sirfields were
- left without crews. For thie reason the airplanes could not take off
~ at Che moment of Che enemy's atCack, being lefC defenaeless against
German aviation. P~11 of thia ciramaCically limited the combat capabili-
tiea of the Soviet Air Force.
Th~ mission of repelling Che aggressor's attack from the wesC was
assigned by the Soviet Supreme High Command to troops of the Leningrad
Military District, the Baltic Special Military Diatrict, the We~tern and
Kiev special military dietricts, the Odeasa Military District, the air
force, and three fleets--Northern, Red Banner Ba1Cic, and Black Sea.
Formations and units af the national air defenae forces~ combined into =
five air defense zones--Northern, Northwestern, Weatern, Kiev, and -
Southern, were to protect rear facilities from air strikes in the western
frontier zone. Forty air fightPr regiments pos~essing about 1,500 air-
planes were allocated from the air force by special order for sir
defensc.25
There were 170 divisions ~103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 motorized, 7 cavalry)
and two brigades in the western frontier military districts. This group-
ing liad a strength of 2,680,000 men, 37,500 guns and mortars, 1,475 tanks =
of new types (KV and T-34), 1 540 warplanes of new types, and a large
_ number of obeolete warplanes.~6
At the beginning of the war the Soviet Army Air Force was composed of .
aviation of the Main Command (long-range bomber aviation), frontal
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uviaCion (thc nir aervices of the milieary districtg), ~rm,y aviaCion (rhe -
air ~crvice~ of ttte comUined arms armies), and eroop aviaCion (corpa air
squndrons). Of the total air force atrengxh, ~3.5 percenti wae with tihe
Muin Command while 86.5 parcent was with the ground troops (frontal avia-
tion--40.5 percent, nrmy Aviation--43.7 percenC, tr~~op aviation--2,3
pArcent).
The rati.o of aviation arme in rhe air aervices of rhe weatern military
_ diatrices was 50 percent fightera, 31 percent bombera, 4.5 percent ground -
attack airplanes, and 5.5 percent reconn~iseance airplanes.Z~ ~
Air servicea in the frontier military dieCricr.s were headed by: Lenin-
- grad--commander, Ma~or General of AviaCion A. A. Novikov, chief of sCaff,
Ma~or General A. P. Nekraeov; Baltic Special--commander, Ma~or General of
Aviation A. P. Ionov, chief of ataff, Ma~or General of Aviation S. P.
_ 5lnyakov; Weatern Special--correspondingly Ma~or General of Aviation
- I. I. KoneCs and Colonel S. A. Khudyakov; Kiev Special--Lieueenant Gen- `
eral of Avi~tion Ye. S. PCukhin and Major General of Aviation N. A. Laskin;
Odessa--Ma~or General of AviaCion F. G. Michugin and Ma~or General of
Aviation A. Z. Ustinov. 1'he air force commanders and chiefs of staff of
_ the f.rontier militar; districts were experienced, and in operationnl -
respects Chey were well trained military leaders.
The air services ~~f internal military districte located behind the
frontier miliCary aisCricts were headed by: Moscow--command~r, Colonel
N. A. Sbytov, chief of staff, Colonel A,. N. BurCsev; Orel--~~rreapond-
- ingly Colonel N. F. Naurnenko and Colonel A. F. Vanyushin; Khar'kov-- ~
Major General of Aviation S. K. Goryunov and Colonel M. A. Belishev;
North Caucasus--Major General of Aviation YP. M. Nikolayenka and Colonel
N. V. Korneyev; Transcaucasus--Lieutenant General of Aviation S. P.
Denisov and Brigade Commander S. P. Lavrik.
In the Far East at the eve oF the war there was r.he Far Eastern Front,28
in which the air force commander was Lieutenant General of Aviation -
K. M. Cusev and the chief of sCaff was Ma~or General of Aviation Ya. S.
Shkurin.
Tt~e air services of the internal military districts were composed or
several air formation5 and unita outfitted with obsolete aviation equip-
� ment~ and a large number of aviation schools. Air regiments, divisions, _
and groups were formed on the terrltory of the internal military dis-
ericts and sent to the front aC ttie beginning of the war.
Gong-range bomber aviation experienced major organizational aiterations
at the eve of Che war. In order to improve command and control and
eliminate a len~thy chain of command, the three special-purpnse air
armies (AON) of the Main Command, which were created back in 1936-1938,
_ were reorganized into bomber sir corps with two two-regiment air divi-
, eions each. In all five air corps and three separate air divisions were
18
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- 19
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created. rormaCion of one long-range escort fighCer air diviaion was _
starCed in each nir corps at the beginning of the war.
- I~our sir corps and one sepurate air division were deployed in the viciniCy
of Novgorod, Smolensk, KurSk~ Zaporozh'ye, and Slcomorokh~l; Chis w~is a
totzl of nine diviaions (2~) air regiments) with a strengCh of 1,346 air-
planes and 931 combat crews.29 Eighty-six percent of the long-range
bombers were DB-3's, and 14 percent were TB-3's. There were only 11 of _
the latest airplanes--the TB-7 (Pe-8)--in the line units.30 At ehe eve
of the war the air corps were commanded by: I Bomber Air Corps--General
V, I. Izotov, II Bomber Air Corps--Colonel K. N. Smirnov, III Bomber Air
Corps --Colonel N. S. Skripko, IV Bomber Air Corps--Colonel V. A. Sudets,
and 18th Separate Bomber Air Division--Colonel A. M. Duboshin. The V Air ~
Corps was undergoing formation in the Far EasC. A special air arm of the
air force, long-range bomber aviation, wae headed by a specially created
aviation directorate of Che main command. Hero of the Soviet Union,
Lieutenant General of Aviation I. I. Proelcurov, a veteran of Che war in
5pain, served as the chief of the directorate until April 1941, after
which he was replaced by Colonel L. A. Gorbatsevich.
. At the eve of the war the Soviet Air Force was directed by the Air Force
, Main Directorate. The ~hief of the Air Force Main Directorate was Lieu-
tenant General of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev, who had replaced I.ieutenant
General oF Aviation P. V. Rychagov on 12 April 1941.
Pavel Fedorovich Zhigarev was transferred to aviation from the cavalry.
In 1927 he graduated from a military pilot school, and in 1932 he grad-
uated from the Air Force Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy. He commanded
air squadrons, an air brigade, and the air forces of the 2d Separate Red
Banner Army in the Far East. In December 1940 he was appointed to the
post of deputy chief of Che Soviet Army Air ~orce Main Directorate.
Corps Commissar P. S. Stepanov was appoinCed to the post of Air Force ~
- Main Directorate deputy chief for political affairs.31 Organizationally
the Air rorce Main Directorate consisted of the air force headquarters
- (chief of staff, General D. N. Nikishev and, as of May 1941, General
P. S. Volodin), directoratea, and independent sections. The long-range
bomber directorate and a number of orher directorates were subordinated
to the cl~ief of the Air I'orce Main DirecCorate. The central adminisera-
� tton oI the air force did nor have an independent reserve at the begin-
lljlls of the war. Directives concerning the work of the rear services -
of military district (frontal) air services came directly from the Soviet -
- Army Air Force Headquarters. These functions were performed by the head-
quarters rear services secCion, the chief of which was General P. V.
Korotayev. _
At this time the Soviet Army Air Force Headquarters consisted of several
independent sections, Section One being the principal one. General B. L. -
Teplinskiy, one of the well known Soviet, military theoreticians, was
chief of Section One; he was concurrently air force deputy chief of staff.32
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'rtie Air I~'orce Headquartere was undargoing reorganization, and new o�ficers _
were asaigned Co the principal sectiona. Section and department chiefs
included Gener~l D. D. Grendal', Colonels V. V. SCorozhenko and A. I.
- llogdnnov, and Ma~ors N. F. A?adria~ov and D. K. Karpcvich.
Highly skilled officera who in Cheir time had flown warplanea and, for
the most part graduated from Che command or navigator school of the air
_ f~~rce academy, worked in the headquartera: I. P, Potapov~ V. I.
Artam'yev, V. P. Pocrwkhontsev, A. Ya. 01'shvanger, I. M. Kuz'min, Ye. 5. -
- Chalik~ A. M. Vlasov, and V. A. DmiCriyev. The work of the headquarLers
was structured in� accordance wiCh operational axss, with one or two offi- ~
cers working with each of them. They mainCained maps of the operational
' situation of the air services of several milirary districta, they studied
the probable enemy, Chey computed and analyzed his combat composition and ~
the airfield net, they maintained Gonatant communications with the air -
- servic:es headquarters of Che military districts, they prepared draft .
instrtictions and orders Co Che troops and reports to the General Staff,
they moniCored Che work of reorganizing and rearming the air force, and
they inspected air units.
Afeer fascist invaders occupied ~oland and France Che situation on our
western borders became more and more Cense. The Germans ~egan to violate
our motherland's air borders with increasing frequency. Performing recon-
naissance, between 1 January and 22 June 1941 the Fascist German Command
violated the USSR air border and penetraGed up to 300-350 km into our
- territory in some cases. A number of times Soviet fighters intercepted
German reconnaissance airplanes and forced them to land. Our fighters
- were prohibited at that time by the Soviet Command from using machinegun
~ fire against the violating airplanes. Explosians often occurred auto-
- matically in the cockpits of German airplanes following a forced landing.
This happened, as an example, on 15 April 1941 in the vicinity of Rovno,
when a Soviet fighter intercepted a J-86 reconnaissance airplane and ~
forced it to land. Two explosions occurred after the German pilots
abandoned the airplane. The airplane caught fire, buC the fire was
extinguished. Three cameras were discovered aboard the airplane, of
which only one survived. Its film bore images af rail junctions in the
Kiev-Korosten' rail section.33 ~
SomeCimes German airplanes violating our airspace opened fire at fighter-
interceptors demanding them to land, and then left our territory. This -
was observed especially often at the eve of fascist Germany's attack on
the USSR, in May and June 1941.
The intensity of violations of the USSR's western air border by German
airplanes increased significantly in May-June 1941.
"Concurrently with developing Operation Barbarossa," the ristory of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union reads, "in summer 1940 the Fascist -
Cerman Command began deploying troops on the borders of the Soviet Union.
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Snbdreur~ and ~ple~ began td be eent into U55tt territory much more fre~-
quenCly~ and Che ~requency of reconnaie~enne flight~ increaged drgma-
eic~lly: Juse in Che fir~t hnlf of 1941 ~lone there were 3z4 documented
cns~s t~f fueci~t ttirplgn~~ violnCing Che US5f~ ~ir border,"~4
1'he Air I~orce General Neadquarters and Command took ~teps Co increase the
number of petrolling figheerg ~C Che ~irfield~ of all five western
frontier digericC~~ Ag ~n exgmple Che fdlluwictg numbers of fighter
= flights were p1~Ced on duty every dny in ~ummer 1941. in the Wegtern
Special Milie~ry Uigtrice: 5 flight~ nf I-153 and I--16 airpl~nes,
3 fllghts of the new MIG-3'g, and 8 flighCg held in gmbush, for a total
oE 16 Eligtits.~s A somewhat gmaller number of fighters patrolled in
other fronCier mille~ry districtg. ~aerolling fig}~Cerg plnyed g m~jdr
role in the firat mnment nf repelling Che tre~ch~roug ~urprig~ ~et~Ck df
_ fusc:ist Cermun aviatinn ne dawn on 2~ June 1941. Together with frontier
tronps the SnvieC pilots ware Che fir~t to enter into Che unequal battle
with the aggressor, and they offared geubbdrn registance to superior
enemy force~.
In the central air force adminisCration, the principal directorgees attd
- ttie matn secCions ot Che Air Force HeadquarCers were hggtily mnnned by
~fficer piloes, n~vig~tors, and engineers whe had gr~dusted frem mili-
tary acudemtes. The Air ~orce HeadquarCers and iCs operational section
wrote directives nnd orders to the troops concerning operational und
comb~C training. Preparntion of all aviaCion manuals and regulations as
well as the drnfe 1944 ~'ield Service Mnnual was also completed with the -
participntion of the Air ~orce HeadquarCers. We know that as long ago as
in January 1940, field manuals had been introduced into bomber (BUBA-40) ~
and fif;liter aviation (SUTA-40) by order of the US5R people's commissar -
of def~nse, nnd the troops used them as rheir guidelines. In that same
y~ar an order from the chief of the Soviet Army Air Force Main llirectorate
defined the list of individual theoretical topics to be worked on the com-
manders oF military districC air services. In February 1941 the Air Force
Eleadquarters developed a list of operational and tactical subjects to be
Included in the training of officers for the headquarters of military
JisrricC air services and air diviaions. On 28 February 1941 the chief
oE the Air rorce rfain Directorate published an order in which he staCed
that work on an individual topic was one of the most important measures
by whicl~ to heighten the operational and tactical preparedness of higher
and senior commanders in aviation.36 These topics corresponded completely
to the requirements of waging war against a strong enemy, and they were _
sufficiently well defined and concrete. Here is the list of topics:
Actions of the air force in aCtaining air supremacy in a frontal offen-
sive operation; actions of a frontal sir force in interdicting enemy
5tiipments and concentration; actions of a frontal air force to prevent ~
advunce of strategic enemy reserves to the place of a breakthrough;
lctions of a frontal air force in an encc+unter engagement of a mechanized
cavulry ~;roup; actions ot a frontal air force in annihilating major enemy
mecher~1 V. Ye. Negkertgev, ~nd VIII Air Corps--Gener~l
N. N. Buyanskiy. 5nviet Air ~orce commanders ncquired ehe experience nf
contro111ng ma~or air formgeion~, torm~eious, and unitg in modern warf~re.
preparing new gtraCegic offengive oper~tions in spring 1943, Che Hq SHC
ordered the air force Co perform n decigive gttack dn enemy gvigtion end
achieve str~C~gic air e~perioriCy forevex~. ACtninmenC of g~raeegic air
- ~uperiorlCy wn~ one of the mo~C importac?C prerequiaites for a fundnmeneal
turning point in Che Great PaCriotic W~r. A11 of the nece~eary conditions
for tl~i~ miesion exigted.
'~tic operating grmy's 5ovieC Air ~orce posgessed more Chan 5,500 warplanes
in spring 1943, surpasaing enemy aviation by 1.8 times.5 The command and -
gCnff of the 5oviet Army Alr ~orce acquirad ~ gre~C deal ot' experience in
orgunixing the fighC againat enemy aviaeion, boCh in terms of daily com-
b~C activitiea pertaining to defensive and offensive operations, and in
- regnrd to the conduct of special nir operations.
r
'The first signR of a turning poinC in the fight for strategic air
sup~riority aC Leningrad enjoyed furtti~r development in air engagements
in tt~e Kuban' and in the spring-summer air operations of the Soviet Air
Force, and the turning point was compleCed in gummer 1943 at Kursk.
Air Engagements in the Kuban'
Air engagements in the Kuban' in spring 1943 ~:nterPd history as one of -
the most important stages in the Soviet Air xorce's fight for strateZ;ic
air superiority on the entire Soviet-German front.6 They were most
intimately asaociated with operaCiona of the ground troops, and they
develd~ped in the unique situation which evolved in response to military-
political and physicogeographic factors.
The North~tYn Caucasinn Front had to complete Che destruction of fascist
Cerman tioopa in the Caucasus and Iiberate the Taman' Peninsula. In turn
the Fnscist German Command pursued the goal of retaining occupied posi-
tions at all coat~ and wiping out the beachhead southweat of Novorossiyak~ -
where b~ck on 4 Februa=y 1943 an assault landing party of seamen under the
conan~nd of Mnjor Ts. L. Kunikov lattded in the vicinity of the fishing
village of Stanichka. The assault landing troops, who Were subsequently
reinEorced by troops of the lSth Army~ held firmly to their beachhead
with active air support from the Northern Caucasian Front and the Black
5ea ~leet.
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ml� Germ~n 17Ch Army, whiCh h~d ~~trengCh of 15 divigions, was defend~
ing iC~al~ ge the lnwer regCh~~ nf the Kub~n' Itiver ~nd on the '~aman'
penineula~ Ie oCCUpied n line ea~t of Krymskayg, aon~i~ting m~inly of
~trongpoints ~nd pocketg o~ re~igtgnce in p~pulgeion ceneer~ ~nd on hill~.
Kr,ym~k~yn St~tion w~~g the en~amy's mo~e impdtiennt ~eneer of defet~ge, ~ince
the mgin line~ nf cnmmunicgCion eo Navnro~~iy~k, Annpu, `Tam~n'~ and
~emryuk;pa~~ad through it. The Gettit~n Sup~eme Command reinforced the
17eh Arm~:,wiCh two German inf~ntry divi~iong ~nd dne Ftomanign G~valry
divigic~n.
Tronp~ of tl~e Northern C~ucagign ~ront were euperior td the enemy in
infanery ~nd tank~ by a fgcenr nf 1.5~ ~nd in artillery by a somewhgt
lower gmount. _
~eelit~g ttie el~ortege nf troop~, Che enemy laid hig hopey on halting Che
prepuratinnH fnr the SovieC offen~ive gnd deeCroying our gggAUit l~nding
group aC My~khgko with the ggsieC~nce of avigtion. It was with this
gc~~l Cha~ up to 1,000 warpl~ttee of the 4th Air ~leet (510 bnmberg, 250
fighterg, 60 reconnaissance airplanes, ~nd 170 transport ~irplanes) were
concenerated et the ~irfields of Critne~ and T~man' in mid-Apri1.7 In
nddition ehe enemy brought in 200 bomberg based in the boneeg $~sin and
in the ~outhern Ukraine for strikeg ggain~t Croop~ of the Northc~rn
Caucaslan Frone. The enemy's air grnuping on this axis consistc~d of the
beat Luftwaffe units--ehe (Udet) ~ighter 5quadron and the 5th (ri~l'dera)
~ighter Squadron, nutfitCed with ex~erienced flight crews and new Me-109
and FF1-190a xirplanea.
Prior to 23 April 1943 the air eervices of the Northern Caucasian ~ront
included Che 4th Air Arnry poeaeeaiag ?.SO airplgneg (cemmander, General
N, Naumenko) and the 5th Air Army wiCh a strength of 200 airplanes
(commander, General S. K. Goryunov). In addition the troops of the
- Northern Caucasian ~ront were aesisted by 70 airplanES from the Black Sea -
Fleet's air ser~�ice (commander, General V. V. Yermachenkov) and one
gtrategic aviaCion divieion with a aCrengCh of 60 sirplanes.$ The
- Northern Caucasian ~ront's air service Was headed by General K. A.
Verahinin.9 The previously etarted offen~ive of the Northern C~.ucagian
Front'e troops was resumed on 4 April. The design of the operacinn
foresaw bypassi�g Krymskaya on the north and south, capturing it, and
exploiting the nffensive aith troope of the right Wing and center toWard
Vnt'enikovskaya, and witl~ troops on the west Wing CoWard Verkt~ne-Aakanskiy
nnd Mnpu, destroying the main enemy grnuping on Taman' t'eninsula in
' pcsrte. Fierce battles raged in the vicinities of Krymskaya and Myakhako
throughout April.
In response to a directive of the aupreme high commander published
18 April 1943 Headquarters liaison officers--Mershal of the 5oviet Union
G. K. Zhukov and Mxrshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov--came to Taman'.
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�
�
"I w~g nrdered~" wroCe Mar~hal n~ ehe 5nviet Unidn G. K. zhukov in hig
memoirg, "td dept~rt by ~ir for eh~ Northern C~uCagian ~rone on 18 Apri1,
'~he ~r~dp~ of thi~ ~ront were fighting hard b~trleg wiCh the oU~eCtive
of ciegtroying the enemy'e `Taman' groupittg, consistin~ for the moat pnrt
df Che w~11-equipped Germ~n l~th Army.
"Degtrnyin~ the ~n~my on th~ T~mgn' P~anin~ul~ h~d gr~gt impdrt~nc~ tn
the 5~vieC Command, ~n nddiCion Co d~~trdying ~ l~rge enemy grduping--
14W16 diviginng or nbout 1g0,tln0-2UO,U00 men were dpereting in ehie
area-~g~ g regult of rhe nper~tian we liberaeed Nnvoroggiyak~ Here on
sm~ll begChhend ~ heroic deCachment nf goldi~rg frdm ehe 18eh Army ~nd
- gl~ck Se~ ~leet ~eamen fought in tha firgt half of ~ebru~ry.
"I ~rrived together wieh N~v~l peaple'g Commigggr N. G. Kuznetgnv, Air
~orce Cnmm~nder A. A. Noviknv, ~nd Gener~l 5. M. 5htemen~ka fram eh~
General 5ta~f ~t General K~ N. Legelidze'g lSth Army."10
`The ~ir force commander'~ operat~on~1 nrmy included I~olonels N. F,
Andrlattov ~~nd A. N. Mal'egev gnd Li~utenant Co1Q~te1 M. N. Kozhevnikov. -
'Chere w~s ~lgo ~ sm~~ll oper~tidn~l group of several otiicerg from the
Ceneral 5taff. Tl~e 5oviet Army Air ~orce lleadquarters worked out the
measures for concentrating air formationa of the Nq 5HC Iteserve on tlie
southern axis back in the beginning ot April.
Hy 20 April the nir service of the Northern Caucasian ~ront wag r~inforced
by the He~dqu~rters reserve's II Bomber Air Corps (comn~nder, Gener~l
V. A. U~hakov), IIt ~ightar Air Cnrpg (commander, Cenergl Ye. Ya.
Savieskiy), II Mixed Air Corp~ (co~u�nder, Gener~l I. T. Yereme~ko~, and
the Z~2d ~ighter Air Divisinn (comn?ander, Coloael 5. P. banilov).1
Strategi:. aviation gent the S~Jth Air bivision (commander, Colonel 5.
Lebedev). The 62d Air Division (commander, ~olonel G. N. Tupikov) also
- arrived in April. The strategic aviaCion forces Were brought in under
the command of Cencral N. S. Skripko. Including the arriving air forma-
tions and the air gervice of the $lack 5ea ~leeC, our air grouping noW
con~isted of 900 aarplnnes~ to include 800 airplanes in frontal aviation
(270 fighterg, 170 KrounJ attack eirplaneg, 1G5 d~y bomberg, an~l 195
nikf~t bombers).12
Thus When We include airplnnes brought in from the air services af neigh- '
boring fronta, the balance of poaer in the air Was approximately ~equal.
Overall leaderehip and c~~ordination of the air force's activities Was
the reeponsibility of Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.13 The battle-
worti~inese of our ~viation aas exttemely t~igh. There srere many Well
trained air formations and units in the air service of the Northern
C~ucasian ~roat. 'I'he propnrtion of neW types of airplanes in bowber
nviacion was 65 percent. ~ighter aviation had been almost totally
rearcned With new nirplnnea--Yak-1~ Yak-7b, and La-5. In all, 11 percent
were American- and ~nglieh-produced airplanes--B-20 and B-3 bombera, and
Aerocobra ~nd Spitfire fightecg. In regard t~ th~ rntio of farces, We
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lind eh~ gdvgntage in fighe~rs, and the enemy w~~ ~uperior to us in bdmber
~vlntidn gnd en~oy~d b~teer bnging end a lgrger qunntity nf ~irfield~ for
mnneuvering.
~'1~~~ Inlldwing miysiona were aeaigned to the ~ir fr~rce on the Northern
Cauc;.~sian ~xig: Artain air ~uperinriCy, dependnbly cover ~rdun~l tronps,
~uppnrt ehe offenaive nf the 56eh Army, ~nd seubbornly defend dur ~gsnult
lnnding unie~ gduthwe~t ~f Ndvorossiysk~ -
Utilizing the rich experience nf empldying gvintidn ~t Sealingrad, the
plan of nn ~ir offensive wds written in fu11 volume fdr the fir~t time;
it wa~ gigned by ttie N~rChern Cauca~ian ~ronC's tronp commander, General
I. I. Maslennikdv, by the.front'g MiliCary Couttcil member, Gener~l A. Ya.
I~'ominykli, and by ehe fr~nr'n gir force cammander, Gener~l K. A. Vershinin.
On 20 April 194~ the plnn fdr the ~ir dffengive of the Norehern Cauca~ian
~rnnt's nir se~vice and gviation cantributed by the Hq 51iC Ye9eCVe to
de~troy the enemy grouping on ehe Tgman' I'eninsula was approved by Marshal
_ ot the 5oviet Union G. K. zhukov and hfarshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.
The pl.nt~ fore:~aw: Attaining nir superiority; destroying enemy manpower
and artillery by bomber and ground atCack sCrikes Co support Che defenges `
, of our ~sgault l~~nding uniCS eouthwest of Novoroagiysk :~nd the advance of
the 56t1~ Army; performing air reconnaiss~ace in behelf of the front's
troope and avintion,
The following were called in for thege miseions: 733 ~irplanes from the
air service of the North~rn Cauragian ~ront~ 79 from Che ~ir gervice ~f
the Ulnck 5ea ~leer, ~6 from Che air service of the Southern ~ront, and
200 airpl~neg from strategic gvi~tion--1~048 eirplgnes in all (508 bomberg~
170 ground attack airplanes, and 370 fighters). A portion of the South-
aestern ~ront's avintion was called in as we11.14 In the event that the
enemy were to be ~aspecinlly active on the ground and in the air against
the a~sault landing graup southwest of Novorossiysk, all ~viatian was to -
be retargeted for ies ~upport.
buring preparations for and conduct of the operation the cammand devoted
a great deal of attention to organizing and achieving interaction betWeen
the arms ~nd gcrvices oF aviation and the ground trodps. Interaction
betwcen frontnl nvir~tion and the air service of the Black 5ea F1eeC Was
to [nvolve digtribution of areng nf regponsibility and times of action~
anJ crangfcr of gome of the fightere of the Sth Air Army to the commander
oI tl~e t~lnck 5en Fle~t's air ~ervice in operational respects. The front's
:iir Kcrvice deployed an nuxili~ry control post together With the front'g
fo n+ard rommand pdst in the vicinity of Abinsk~ya 5tation to control all
avlatlon abov~ [he battlefield. The auxiliary control posts of the 4th
and Sth air atmies Were deployed and moved to the front line. Air liaison
officers ~?ere designated in the rifle diviaions.
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N'lve rndi~ ~t~~tinn~ were deployed ne ehe front line to contrnl fighters
above the battle~ield; ehr~e of tihem were in tihe ~eceor o~ Che 56Ch Army,
i~iCluding one main cnntrol radio et~tian.15 A. A. Novi~~c~v, K. A,
Ver~hinin, 216th ~'ight~r Air Divi~ion Comm~nder General A~ V. t3orr~an
(itt ch~rge of fighter guid~nce), and g grdup of offic~re from ehe 4th
Air Army aere present in Che m~itt conerdl r~did staCion for the time of
ehe ~ir ~engngcm~nty.
1'he firgt nir eng~gemene begnn on 17 April when the enemy gttempCed to
deytroy agsault lending uniC~ on ChP be~chhead near Mygkhnko. AC 0630
hourg~ following intenne arCillery and nir preparation, Che enemy went
over to the n~fensive. The enemy launched 450 bombere and abouC 200
fighter~ ~gninHt trodps of ehe 18th Army d~fending ~ beachhegd with n
totnl ~ren ot 30 km7. 'To npp~se ChQ enemy offen~ive in the vicinity of
Myqkl~~ko, the 5oviet Co?nm~~nd launched 500 ~irplnneg, includin~ 100 bomber~.
on that day Germnn bombers flew mnre th~n 1,OOU sorCies ggninst Myskhgko.
5oviet figl~terg oppoged them ~~eive1y.16 On 20 April the enemy once
- ag~~in undertook ~n powerCul offensive ugninst the defenderg of Che "Little
Land." About 30 minuteg bpfor~ Che beginning di the enemy'g offensive -
frontnl ~~vidtion madc an effective strike wirh a force of GO bomberg and
3U Eighters t~gainst enemy troope preparing for the ~etgck. After a sma11
intervnl of time the offensive of the enemy troops was halCed for prac-
ticnl purpnseg by e seCOnd serikc made by g group of 100 eirplanes.
Ceneral K. N. Leselidze, coromander of tlie 18th Army, wrote the following
ir this regnrd: "Tlie massed atrikes of our aviation against Che enemy,
wl~o wns trying to degtroy the ass~ult l~nding units in the vicinity of
My~kheko, foiled hig plans. ~er~onnel nf ehe assaulC landing group
" g~{�ed confidence in their gtrengCh."17
Tt~e high morgle of the defendera of the "Little Land~" their steadfast-
ness, and thair bravery Were constantly maintained by party-political
work conducted intensively by Che political departmenC of the 18th Army,
which was tieaded by Colonel Leonid I1'ich Brezhnev.
On ~ubgequent days tl~c power of our air strikes against the enemy grew -
continuausly due to commitment of SNC reserve air corps arriving at the
front. The enemy launched large fighter forces againsC our bombers and
~round attack airplnneg~ and he continued making bomb rung against the
defender~ of tl~e "Little Lend." ~ierce air batCles went on continuously
in et~e nir. On 'LO April 5oviet fighters knocked down 50 German airplanes.
- llaving loet 182 .7lrpl~~nes (152 knocked dot~m by fighters and 30 by anti-
:iircrnCt nrtillery) in 8 days of bnttle (from 17 to 24 April), the
faycist Cerman squadrons Were compelled ta abandon the battlefield to
our aviation.18 A turning point occurred in the air situation. 'The
activity of fascist German aviation declined noticeably. The Germans
were Eorced to i~alt the offensive atarted on 17 April and withdraw to
l.l~eir s~tarting position, and the Luftwaffe went over to defensive opera-
tlons.
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"Uur nviutinn plnyed gn important role in repelling a11 enemy ~Ceacks nt
My~kl~,~ko~" wrotin M~rgh~l of the Soviee Union A. A. Crechko in his mamoirs~
"lfy it~ mn~sud acCione~ iC contained Che enemy offenaive ~nd forced enemy
_ ~vinCion Ca reduC~ itg acCivity. The commander of the 17rh Army wa~ ~
~'orced Co reporC Co tfie hendqu~rCer~ nf Arm;� Group A: 'Toduy's nir offen-
" giv~ di the Itu~~i~n~ iniCiACed agninet Nova: isiyslc frnm Ctie 1~ncling ~rea -
of th~ a~~ault lending party, and the gCrnng ~eCack by the ltusstan Air
Corce on Che airfielde demonaCrated the great pot~nCi~1 of
~ussi~n avia-
tion.' The fir~C air eng~gementa nn the Novaro~eiysk gxis were won by
our aviaCion."lg -
O~~r piloes displayed greaC courage and heroiem. On 21 April piloe N. V.
Itykhlin of the 805th Ground ACtack Air Itegiment wa~ atCackin~ ground
t~rgeCs in hi~ I1-2. 5uddenly four German fightera ~mbushed him. In
Che unequnl nir bnttle above tha baCClefield pilot N. V. Rykhlin gnd
gunner I. 5. Yefremov kndcked down twn enemy fighters. The I1-2 had been
gtruck many eimes~ buC Cl~e piloC managed Co reCur.n Che crippled uirplane _
to t~i~ territory and land succesafully ae a frantline field airfield.
Marshal of AviaCion A. A. Novikov wiCnesaed the entire baCtle from ehe
forward commnnd post. Tl~e pilot and gunner were ordered eo appear nt
the forward post, and th~; two men were awardad ~n irregular promoeion
, for bravery and valor by gn order eigned right Chere on the spor. Junior
Lieutenant N. V. Rykhlin was promoted to senior lieutenant and Senior
Sergcant I. S. Yefremov wae promoCed to ~unior lieuCenant.20
The glory of outsCanding aces resounded over the Kuban' in Chose days--
A. I. Pokryshkin, tt~e brott~ers D. B. Glinka and I3. I3. Glinka, V. I.
_ ~aJeyev, V. G. 5emeniahin, G. A. Rechkalov, and oChers. After the
enemy's offensive in the viciniey of Novorossiysk was hnlted, the
Northern Caucasiatt Frone's aviation was reassigned to support troops of
- the 56th Army in their offensive in the viciniCy of Krymskaya SCation.
Concurrently~ on urder of the Hq SHC the Soviet Air Force made syste-
matic atrikea against enemy airfields on Che Taman' Peninsula, in the
Crimea, and in the southern Ukraine between 17 and 29 April. These
actions evolved into un air operation. The goal of the laCter was to -
we~ken enemy avintion in Che southern sector of the Soviet-German front
and thus promote aCtainment of air aupremacy.
In addition to the 4th Air Army, the participants of the operation
_ included formations of the Sth Air Army of the Southern Front, the 17th
Air Army of the 5outhwegtern Front, Che sir service of the Black Sea
_ I~'1eet, and straCegic aviation. Airfields at Saki, Sarabuz~ Kerch',
T~man', ~nd Anapa were :~ubjecCed Co massed aCtacks. Strategic aviation
degtroyed 170 airplanes jusC at the Saki and Sarabuz airfields alone.
In all, between 17 and 'l9 April Soviet pilota put 260 airplanes out of ~
actinn at enemy airfielda.21
Tl~e suvage battles on tl?e "Little Land" were followed by a lull on the
enttre Northern Caucasian Front, lasting until 29 April. On that day at ~
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0740 hourg, follnwing areillery preparatinn ~nd with aCCive gir suppore,
eroopg of 56Ch Army resumed Cheir offengive with the ob~eceive of eplie-
ein~ the enemy grouping on tiha Taroan' Penineul~ wirli u~Crike on
Krym~kayu 5tarion ~nd Anapn and Chen annihil~Cing iC. The 56Ch Army's
nffensive wg~ preced~d by ~ir prep~r~tion, which laCer transformed into ~
air gupporr. Jugt during tt~a firet 3 hours alone, 144 of our bombera~
82 ground aCCack nirpl~?nes~ and 265 figheerg foughC over rhe baetle- _
field. ~nemy bo~nbers rried eo halti ~he 56Ch Army's offensive. Bartles ~
lasCing houre on end went on in ehe ~ir. T'orty-two group air bneeles,
in wliich 5ovieC fightors knocked down 75 enemy airplanea, occurred on
ehae d~y. Uurin~ the d~y our gviaeion flew 1~268 soreies.22
l~y ~Ctacking norCh And south of Krymsk~ya 5eation, eroops of ehe 56Ch
Army threatened the enemy's Crimean grouping wiCh encirclement, forcing
lr Co withdraw its troops ~rom ehis area. Krymskgya 5taeion w~s lib-
eratnd on 4 May. I:xhausted, ehe 56th Army hnd eo nbandon any further
offensive acCian. I3attles on the ground gradually died down, while tha
fight in the air flnred up wieh new, improb~ble force. In a relaCively
narrow sector of tlie front (25-30 km) up to 40 group air batClea occurred -
in a single day, with SO-SO airplnnes from both sides p~~rticip~Cing in
eact~ of them. '1'he inCensity of the air sCruggle persisted into the
future.
In all beCween 29 April and 10 May the 4th Air Army of the Black Se~
Cleet's air service and strategic aviation flew about 10,000 sorCies,
50 percent of ttiem againsC enemy troops and equipment on the batCle-
field. In this period 368 of the enemy's airplanes--that is, more Chan
one-third of his iniCial grouping--were desCroyed. The losses of the
Northern Caucasian Front's aviation were 70 airplanes.23
After liberation of Krymskaya Station troops of the Norther.n Caucasian
Front began prep~ring for a new offensive operation with the goal of
penetrating the enemy's "Blue Line," defeating the German 17th Army, and -
liber~Cing all oE Taman' Peninsula. On the morning of 26 May, following
powerful artillery and air preparaCion, rroops of the 56Ch and 47th
armies went over to the offenaive on an axis between the settlementa of
Kiyevskoye and Moldavanskoye. Air preparation consisted of one massed
~ attnck by 338 airplanes (84 bombers, 104 ground aCtack airplanes, and
150 Eigl~ters).24
'~tie enemy resisted suvagely, especially in the air, concentrating up to
1,400 ;iirplanes in a radius of up to 500 km from Krasnodar25--that is,
- witliin range of Kiyevskoye and Moldavanskoye--against troops of the
Northern Caucasian ['ront; this required him to transfer bombers in from
the Ukraine. In the first 3 hours of the offensive enemy aviation flew
more than 1~500 sorties. Eie managed to seiae the initiative in the air
- ~emporarily, and in the second half of the day he was able to make a
strong attack against our trocpa witti about 600 airplanes.26 A major
- engngement once again took form in the sir. Our fighter pilots fought
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enemy ~vi~eion h~roicglly. The command o~ the 4rh Air Army tiook ~teps -
eo heighCen eh~ effecCiveness of fightier aviation. Cnemy bombera beg~n ~
Cn be ir?rcrcepeed by Cigheere aC the Par appro~ches, ~nd rhe "independenti
I~unring" Cucelc: c:r~mc into broader use, 7'h~ number of nighC sCrikes
~ .ignlnsC en~my nirCi~ldg was increased. I3eCween 26 May and 7 June 845
sortles wer~ flown uguinsr enemy ~irfields.
'The steps taken made ie possible for our gviation eo recover Che initia-
- rive in Che air within a relatively short period of time. In the firse
dnys nf June enemy ~~ir aceiviCy began Co ehow signs of a decline. 5ovieC
figliCers once ag~ir. yecame Che mastera of rhe Kuban' skies. The third
~ ma,jor air engagement nt the Kuban' was once again won by our aviation.
Stubborn battles continued on the ground and in Che air uneil 7 June.
~ur troops of Che Northern Caucasian Front were unnble Co peneCraCe Che
- entire depth of enemy defensea, and on order of the Hq 5HC Che offensive
~cCions were halCed.
Air bnttles lnated more ttian 2 months over Che Kuban'. In the period of
~crive operaCions by the ground troops they took Che form of ehree ma,jor
~ air engagements. Tl~ese were Che largest of Che war thus far in relaCion
to tl~~ number of uir battles and the number of sirplanes participating
~ ~ wi~h.tn them iu a nurrow aector of the fronC. During the air engagements ~
our uviatio~i Clew about 35,OOU sorCies, to include 77 percent by frontal
aviation, 9 percent by str~tegic aviation, and 14 percent by aviation of
tl~e l3lack 5e~ rleet. The enemy lost 1,100 ai.rplanes, to include more
elian 800 airplanes destroyed in the air.2~
Air battles and engagements over the Kuban' demonstrated ttte greater
skills of flighe crews and air commanders. Extensive use was made of _
vertical maneuvering, disposition of combat formaCions in alCitude,
commitmenC oE reserves to the engagement, a~d control of a group air
battle from terrestrial conCrol posts. The fighter warning and guidance
- system was well organized, and the strategy of intensifying air activity
in t}~e course of an sir engagement was broadly employed. FighCers were
often ~~mployed in the "independent hunting" strategy, and they often
- blocka~led ~iirfields. Bombers~were intercepted by sCrong maneuvering
groups oC Cighters ar the far approaches to the front line. After
figtiters were furnisl~ed with radio sets, Chey were able to abandon dense,
closed combat formations. While formerly a commander could control his
subunit in the air only tt~rough evolutions performed with his own air-
plan~: or tl~rough personal exa~rple, which required visual cammunication,
tn tl~e battle of Stulingrad and especially here at the Kuban' he exer-
cised control only by radio. Owing ~o Chis the fighter combaC formations
could be disposed in altitude and front; Chis came to be called the
"Ruban' Eormation."
In Cl~e Kuban' battles Soviet pilots displayed bravery, boldness, inven-
tiveness, and extreme devotion to their people and their Communist Party.
Fifty-two pilots were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title. The
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: numc:~ oC tl~os~ who diytiingul~hed thems~lvc:g in air eng~ng~menry nver th~
- Kubc~n'--A. l, I'okry~lilcin, wlio knocked down 20 ~nemy airpl~nes over the
Kub~n', C. G. Golubev, A. P'. Klubov, N. F. Smirnov, V, G. Semenishin,
V. T, l~adeyef, I3. Ii. Glinlca, D. I3. Glinkn, G. A. Rechk~lov, ~nd many
others--t~ave been in~crioed on a glorinus page in Che hiseory of eh~
5ovieC Armed Forces.
'rt~e vicCory over Che Kuban' w~?~ a new, importanC stage in Che 5ovieC Air -
~orce's ~ighC for srrateg:tc air superiority along ehe enCire front of
~rmed conflicti. The ouCcome of tihe air engagements over the Kuban'
altered Che subsequent course of the fighC tor air superiority in favor
of the Soviet Air rorce.
" Speaking at a conference c~f air division and corps commanders and execu-
_ Cives oE the 4th Ai.r Army, Northern Caucasian N'ront held 11 May 1943 aC
l'astikovskaya Staeion, near Krasnodar, Marshal of AviaCion A. A. Novikov
- pruised the actions of our nvintion in the viciniey of Myskhako and
witttin tlie 56C1~ Army's secror of advance, He also dwelled on three of
- the movt imporCunt problems in the theory and practice of sir operations,
as reveulecl in the batrles at Stalingrad and here at the Kuban'--air
superioriCy, the air offenaive, and organization of aviation's radio
control. In t~is statements he defined str~tegic nir superiority and the
uir offensive. 5ummarizing the two air engagements that had occurred
ovcr Cf~c Kuban' between 17 ApriJ. .lnd 10 May, A. A. Novikov pointed out
til?at eh~ 4Ch Air Army en~oyed all ~ne conditions for retain~.ng Che
strute~;ic air superiority it had won over the Kuban', and i~r success-
fully conducting a powexful air offensive in behalf of the front's troops.
He noted that the fight for air superioriCy is Che most imporCant mission
of frontal aviation, successful compleCion of which would deprive enemy _
bombers of tlie possibility for flying bomb runs againsC combat format.ions
of our eroops ar.~d insure completion of the missions of our bombers and
- ground attack airplanes. In such a case fighCer aviation could destroy
enemy bombers with less inCerference and force them to dump their bomb
loads on Cheir own rroops. He once again confirmed that the air offen-
sive concept includes the entire complex of missions performed by an air
army in an oEfensive operation of FronCal troops. He devoted special
~~ttention to organizing and exercising control of aviation by respotisible
air commanders guiding their airplanes from radio stations located at
forward control posts next to the front line--wherever ground troops are
= engaged in active operations, wherever they are making the main strike.28
~ n. A. Novikov's speecti at the commander's conference was subsequently
publist~ed in an informaCive collecCion by the Soviet Army Air Force Head-
quarters and brought to the awareness of executives in all ai~ armies.
The actions of aviation over the Kuban' demonstrated rhat tlte air force
command anJ the commanders of the air units and formations had increased
ct?elr skill in controlling tlie formarions and units.
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-
AIr Operutions oF the �ovieC Air I~'arce To llesCruy Lnemy Air Groupings in
Summer 1~I4J
_ liy summ~r 1943 elic cenCer of graviCy of rhe fi~ht for strar.egic air
superiuriCy shifted eo th-~ central sector of Che SovieC-German front.
PrepnrLng the country's armed forces for the summer-fa11 ~ng~gements,
the tlq 5HC att~ched extremely greaC significance to compleCing the fight
for straCegic air superioriCy an~ disorganizing concentraCion of German
troops on tt~e Kursk axis. The conditinns favored lnrge air operationa by
C?ie air force Along a broad fronC. Being a combination of single or suc-
cessive massed strikes and air baCtles (engagements) following a single
design and platt, the air furce air operation seriously weakened opposing
enemy~air groupings and improved the air aituation.
- In May t~nd June t943 the Headquarters decided to conducC two large air
operntions witti the goal of destroying Che enemy's main air groupings.
IC was concurrently decided Co fighC enemy rail and motor CransporCaeion _
in tlie frotit's central sector. The decision to conducC the first upera- _
Cioit was made by tt?e Headquarters at the beginning of May. On order of
Cl~e Ilq SFiC, on 4 May 1943 Chief of General Staff A. M. Vasilevskiy
c~rclered tl~e military councils of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, -
5outliwestern, and Southern fronCs to organize destruction of enemy air-
planes at nirfields and in Che air, to interdicr rail shipments, and to ~
clisorganize moCor traffic on highways and dirt roads. The plan was to
contriin the actions of the Luftwaffe Chrough simultaneous surprise attacks
- oii airfields along a broad front 1,200 km long from SmolEnsk to the shore
of tlie Sea of Azov and defeat Che enemy grouping~ near Seshcha, Bryansk,
Orel, Kliar'kov, and Stalino. The Cime for the first massed attack
against the airfields was set at from 0430 to 0500 hours for the lst,
15th, 16th, 2d, l7th, and 8th sir armies; these attacks were to be fol-
lowed by actions against Chese airfields for a period of 3 days. After
a 2-day break, the enemy airfields were Co be struck once again by the
Soviet Air Force for 3 days. AcCions against rail facilities, highways, _
- and dire roads were to continue for 10 days.29
- Air reconnaissance was given an imporCant role in the air operation. Its
purpose w~~s to deCermine the locations of airplanes at airfields, the
disposition of air defense resources, and the locations of ammunition
and fuel dumps, and to determine the most concealed routes to and from
the airtields for our ground attack airplanes and bombers. Beginning
- witt~ tlie start of May, the enemy's principal airfields were sub~ected
to air reconnaissance three times a day--in the morning, in the after-
_ iloo?i, aud at twilig}it--without disturbing the established pattern of
reconnatssance. Lengthy surveillance revealed all of the airplane park-
tng pads, tlie disposition of antiaircraft resources, and the timas when
all enemy ~irplanes and personnel were present at most of the airfields.
Tlie plan developed for the air operaCion by the General Staff foresaw
_ active participation by the air force command and staff. In a directive
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d~ted 5 May 1943 Che air force commander issued specific insCrucCions Co -
_ khe commandera ot fronCal uir armies on t�lie t~~ctics Chey were Co employ
in their missions. The directive stated: "Fulfilling ehe order of the -
- lleaclquarters, you must simultaneou~ly att~ck all of the enemy's principal
- nirfie lds at which ~irplanes are accumul~ted. The bulk of the enemy's
uviaCion must be suppressed in the first day. Thus Che enemy airfields
must be sub~ected to repeaCed atC~cks on the same day, and nighC bombers
must operaCe against them a~ night. In rhe ttext 2 days, without reducing
Che stubbornness and persistence of the ~ctions, continue to strike enemy
aviaeion both ar the principal airfields attd aC new ones discovered by _
nir re connaissance.... Strike the airfields in large groups, allocat3ng _
enough aircraft ouC of their composition Co suppress enemy air defenaes."30
T.n accordance with directives of the Hq SHC and the Soviet Army Air Force
commander, the air armies were to operaCe against the following numbers
of. airfields: lsr Air Army--six, 15th--two, 16th--five, 2d--eight, 17th-- -
two, and 8th Air Army--three airfield~.
To complete these missions, the air armies were to f1y the following num-
ber of sorties in 10 days: lsr Air Army--2,800, 15th--650, 16th--1,050,
2d--1,900, 17th--2,300, and 8th--1,600, for a total of 10,300.31
Tt~e covertneas and carefulness of rhe preparaCions for the air operation
insured full surprise and high effectiveness for Che firsC massed strike. _
Some 434 airplanes participaCed in it, simultaneously attacking 17 enemy
- airfields. Caught unawares, the enemy was unable to offer organized
resistance and lost 194 airplanes at the airfields and 21 in air battles.
Soviet aviseion lost 21 airplanes.32 On the average one enemy airplane =
was destroyed in two of our sorties. A second strike was made on 6 May
- at 1500 hours by 372 airplanes against 20 sirfields. The enemy offered
signif icAnt resistance in Che second strike. He had all of his air
defenses at full readines~~. Fighters wer~e patrolling in the air, and
antiaircrafC artillery covered the airfields with defensive fire. The
Soviet Command had expected this. Additional resources were assigned to -
EL~iit tl~e enemy's air defenses and blockade airfields at which fighters
were based. Surmounting savage resistance, SovieC pilots destroyed and
clamaged 134 airplanes at airfields and knocked 24 German fighters, losing _
46 of their own craft.
tn ttie third massed attack, which was made on the morning of 7 May, 405
Sovie t airplanes attacked 22 airfields and put 122 enemy airplanes out
of actton, to include 2J in air battles. Our losses were 46 airplanes.
The command and staff of the Soviet Army Air Force continually monitored
- the actions of tlle air armies in support of the operation. On 8 May 1943
the air force commander published a directive stating: "Our attack on
- enemy airfields on 6 May 1943 was successful owing ta surprise. The
Rituation was different on 7 May 1943. Enemy figtiters were on alert, at
iiigiie r comUat readiness, closer to the front line.... In such a situation
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tl~e acCions should b~ direcred only aC we11 reconnoiCered airfields, and -
- the number of fig{itcrs covering ehe aCrike groups should be increased.
(~round aCtack groups muat be conatantly aCrong so that ehey ~-:ould nor -
only sCrike airpla~nes at airfields but also dependably ar~pprese air
defenses.... The tactica of the raid should now be based on strengCh
and cunning, since we can no longer counC on surprise."33
~
_ On 8 May the Soviet Air Force made a fourth strike with 181 nirplanes.
But Chia strike produced Che poorertt resul~s. Our aviation desCroyed -
only six enemy airplanes. The in{tial surprise was lost, and the H 5HC -
- ordered a temporary cessation of acCivities against the airfields.3~ On
_ 13 May 1943 the Soviet Army Air Force cammander reporCed the following -
summary data to the supreme high coamiander concerning Che actions of our '
aviat:ion in the air. operation of 6, 7 and 8 May 1943. "In 3 days our air
_ force flew 1,392 sorties, desCroyed 373 enemy airplanes at airfields,
dumaged 51, knocked down 67 in air baCtles, and damaged 10 in the air. -
In ~um total the enemy lost 501 airplanes. These data are based on piloC
ciebriefings, information from partisans, and phoCographs. Our losses
were 122 airplanes, Co include 21 in air battles and 8 knocked down by
enemy antiaircraft artiLlery; 93 airplanes failed to return from their
missions."35 The report stated that an analysis of the results oi the -
Soviet Air Force's actior~s would demonstrate tne high effectiveness of a -
simultaneous massed atkack against enemy airfields situated along a broad
Cront.
_ Iu the first massed attack two sorCies were flown for every enemy air-
plane destroyed, 2.4 wer~ flowu in the second, as many as 3.2 were flown
in the third, and 30.2 were flown in the fourth attack. This means that
the enemy's opposition i~tcreased. In the first massed attack one Soviet
- airplane was lost in eve ry 21.7 sorties, one was lost in every 8.1 sorties
in the second attack, ancl one was Lost in every 8.4 sorCies in the third.
= The fourth attaclc, which was made on 8 May, Curned out to be totally
ineffective.36 Thus it ~~~as correctly concluded that simultaneous sur-
prise attacks against en~~my airfields by large numbers of our airplanes
were Che most suitable. The report analyzed the reasons for the lower
ef�ectiveness of the subsequent strikes--the higher combat readiness of
enemy aviation, especially fighter aviation, and rebasing of enemy avia-
tion to standby airfields, which were extremely difficult to attack
without preliminary detection and reconnaissance. This is why the report
suggested simultaneous surprise strikes by large forces as the strategy
to be used against enemy airfields wiCh the ob,jective of destroying his
aviation. -
The results of the air operation improved the air situation for the
- Soviet Armed Forces in the central and southern sectors of the fro*~t. `
13ut the power of the LufCwaffe had not been broken yet. It supported
its troops and raided im;~ortant rail terminals and industrial cenCers
- in our country, and our riirfields.
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~OIt Ul~l~iCtAL tlSL t1Nt.Y
Uy d~cigiott di the !1q 511C on g~10 June 1943 the 5oviee Air ~orce condu~ted
~nother very lar~e ~ir operatinn ed destroy enemy aviatiott at ~i~fl.eldg.
It~ ob~ective wng to gerike bomber ~viaCion m~king night r~id~ on imporW
~ tant indu~trinl regiong itt our Counery~--Gor'kiy, S~r~eov, dttd Yard~lavl'.
' The 1~e, 15e1~, r~nd 2d air r~rmie~ ~nd aer~tQgi~ ~vintidn fdrm~tiqn~ p~rti- -
~ CipgCed. rir~e 15, gnd l~ter gnntl~er 13 ~irfi~lds were ~truck. The mgin
attention was turned to deatroying airplaneg gt the ~irfields rs~ S~sh~ha,
I~ryangk, K~r~chev, Ore1, 01~uf'y~vo, Khar'knv, Stalino, and zaporozh'ye,
where gir rec~ntt~issttnce reve~led ~h~ gregeegt ~CCUmul~tion df ~nemy
bombprg. ThQre were unique fenCure~ to ehe pl~nning gnd prepgr~tion of
- thig ~ir opergtinn. The comm~nd gnd ~egff nf Che Snviet Army Air ~t~rce
pogsesged dt~ta indicating thaC ehe ~~sci~t Gertnan Co~nd had given cc~n~
sideratton to the shorecomings nf air defenges against our airfield
sCrikeg in M~y~ ~nd Chat it had eignific~ntily gtrengChened ~irfield ~nver.
Thig is why in his directiv~~ the air forCe cnnrmander drdered the air ~rmy
cnromanderg to cc~mmit lgrger forceg to Che ~uppore wave ineended for sup-
pres~ion of antiaircrgft regource~. I~'ighterg were given the mig~ion of
cont~ining enemy fighter~ in the uir by bnttle and block~ding forward
airfields. Up to 160 airplanes p~rCicipaCed in aCrikes againat individual
airfieldd, t~~lf of them operaCing gs fighter escortg. As a result bf the
mass~.d strikes by fronCal and atraCegic aviaCion 141 enemy airplanes were �
destroyed und damaged on S June; the figures were 92 airplanes for 9 June
and 16 Gerrn~n ~irpl~nes for 10 Jun~. In all during tlie air operation the
- Luftwuffe loat 168 airplanes ar airfield~ and 81 in air bgttles.3~
In gll three air operaCions conducted in spring and aC the beginning of
summer 1943 the Soviet Air Force destroyed a total of more than 1~000
airplanes, wl~ich significantly accelerated our attai_nment of strategic
air superi.ority in summer 1943.
In May--June the Luftwaffe attempted a number of retaliaCory strikes
_ againse our airfields. About 300 raida were made against Soviet air-
fielda, with more than 1,200 airplanes participating. But owing to dis-
persal and meticulous camouflage of airplanes at the parking pads, crea-
tion oE dummy airfields, and strong air defenses, their effectiveness was _
low. liere is what xhe air force commander reported to the supreme high
commandcr on 22 J'uly 1943 in this regard: "We are employinE dummy air-
fields witl~ great succesa as one of the measures of airfield antiaircrafC
deEense. ~or example the enemy dropped 2,214 bombs weighing 46,755 kg on
dummy 7irfields QE the Sth Air Army, SouChern Front in the last month and
- a half, dropped 61 bombs weighing 2,750 kg on real airfields during this
time." Tl~e enemy struck dummy airfields, the report went on, supplied
- with good models which could not be distinguished from real airplanes on
photographs. It was requested in Chia connection to have the People's
Commissariat of Aviarion Induatry build 100 dummy Pe-2's, 300 dummy
I1-2's, nnd 500 dummy fighters.3~ ~ _
Thus tt~e air operations conducted with the objective of destroying the
enemy's air groupings were diatinguished by great scope, decisiveness of
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~Oft n1~'1~'ICIAL USL C)NLY
the goalg, gnd high effec~ivenea~. They were ~onducted in periods nf
- relntive ~a1m on the ~ront;, whet? Che grdund traopg were mgkitlg prep~rg-
tiong ~or fo~thComing e~ng~~gemeni:~. Cnn~equettCly eh~ avi~eion of ehe gir -
grmies wag nne busy guppt~rting i:roop~ of eh~ frones and grmiee. Thig
permitted rh~ ~ir force i,o rdncc~nerdt~ itg eff~rt~ dn indep~nd~nt mi~-
ginng. Neverth~l~gg ttie ~ir op~~~tidn~ were conduceed mainly in beh~1t
of forthCOming gtrgtegi~ off~ngiv~ ~p~r~eidn~ by ~rnup~ df frdneg.
nuring tlie air operatinne enemy ~vi~tion w~g gimult~neougly guppregged
- ~~.ong n brn~d front ~nd to g greaC depth; clnse inCeraction wgg gcttieved
between the ~rdnegl air ermie~ and ~trgtegiC ~vigCion fdrmatinng. buring
the np~~ration~ the enemy wa~ deprived nf the posgibility of maneuvering
hi~ avi~tinn, Cnncentr~Cing hig effortg on eh~ axig of the m~in sCrike~
made by our n~r force, attd m~king ret~li~eory grrikes on e brogd front.
All of this permitted the comm~nd ~nd ~C~ff nf the Sdviee Army Air ~dr~e
to reach the correct ronclusinn th~t gir oper~tiong were an effective
fdrm for gttnining gtr~tegic air guperiority.
As a r~sult of the fierce battle for gtrategic air superiority in epring
and tt~~~ beginning of summer 1943 the power of the Luftwaffe wa~ s~pped
away. It lost abnuC 3,7U0 girplanes on Che 5oviet-German fronC beCween
April and June 1943.39 The enemy wag elready lnsing Che gCrategic
initiative in the air, but he continued to try to mainCain his grasp on
it witl~ all of his Eorces. The gCruggle wns resumed with new force at
the be~;inning of Ju1y 1943, When the Germans went over eo the offensive
on the Kursk nxis.
Actiony nf the Soviet Air Force To Interdict Rgil Shipcneatg and Disorganixe
~nemy Motor Treffic
The mo:~t important mission of the Soviet Air Force was to fight the
enemy's rail shipments and disorganize his motor traffic on highways and
dirt roads. It acquired eapecially great aignificance during preparations
Eor the decisive summer engagemente of 1943. An order WritCen by People's
Commiss~r of befense I. V. Stalin on 4 May 1943 atated: "Strikea againeC
r~ilroad trnins and nttacks on motor columns are to be the mo~t important
mi~sions of our air force."40
The air armies of seven fronts and etrategic nviation Were committed to
these missions. A directive published on 4 May by the Hq SHC assigned
thc mission oE interdicting rail shipments and disorganizing motor
trnffic to the frontal air armies; the Cable below shoWS the sectors
assigned.
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F'ntt U~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
A~r Armv lt~il Shipmentg _Mdtor Shivmeneg
~d, Kalinin ~rnnC On th~ 1in~: 5eb~zh, Novo- ~g~t nf Che 1ine:
Sokn~'niki, poloegk-Nevel', Pu~tdshk~, Neve1',
ViCebek-N~v~l' Gnrnddk
lgt, W~gt~rn ~rone ~~~t af the 1ine: Vitebek, ~~gt di the line:
M~eiglg~~1.', pochep 5mdl~nsk, Itnglavl',
Brygn~k
l~th, Bry~ngk ~ront ~rdm Ilryansk to brel and on ~agt di the line:
to the frnnt line K~rachev, Dmitrovsk-
Orlovgkiy
16th, Centrg2 ~ront ~rnm Un~ch to Mikh~ylav~kiy ~agt of the line:
and from Konotap td Vorozhbg Trub~chevsk, Konoedp
2d~ Voronezti ~ront ~rom polC~va to Khnr'kov ~get di the line:
$elopol'ye, Akhtyrka,
Nov. Vodolagn
- 17t1~~ SouthWegtern On the linea: Novo-Mo~kov~k, ~nst of the line:
t~rnnt Merefa~ Krasnograd, 51gvy~nsk, Krasnograd, Kresno-
pbvingr~d, Merefg armeyskoye
8th~ Southern Front On the lines: Chaplino, E~st of the line:
Krngnnarmeygkoye, Gorlovka, Krasnnarmeyekoy~~
D~b~l't~~vn; nnrth of the M~riupol'
lin~s Gorlovke~ Uebal'Cgevo,
Mariupol', Stalino, Gorlovka,
Taganrog
The ob~ectivea of frontal aviation included locomotives, railroad trains,
nnd motor vehiclea. One ground atCack and one fighter air regiment uere
allocnted from each air army for destruction of these ob~ectives on order
of the commander of the Soviet Army Air Force. Operating in small groups
using the independent "tiunting" atrategy, theae regiments effectively
= degCroyed their assigned targetg. A permanent group of "hunters" was
asgigned to each r~il route. OWing to this, within a short t!me the
pilots manaRed to determine the traffic pattern of enemy Crains, the
terrnin~ and the air defenaes along each road section, and to success-
fully fighc enenry shipmenta. Pilota of the 16th and 2d sir armiea flew
.~bcut 2,000 sor[ies Eor this purpo~e, degtroying six railroad trains, up
to 260 loaded cars~ seven locomotivea, and more than 120 motor vehicles.41
5trotegic aviation operated systecmtically to interdict enemy? rail ship-
ments in spring 1943. ln compliance with directives of the Hq SHC it
conJucted r~ special nir operation in March with the goal of disrupting
enemy ahipn~nts in the deep rear.
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~Oit 0~~'tCIAL US~ dNLY
L~ter it gtruGk rail ~uncCiong, gt~tinn~, and traing at sidingg for
mdntt~g. ~he d~pCh of gtrategic avigtion'g operaeions attained 4.50-6d0 '
~ km, and~`,Ehe breadth of the ~ecCor wiChin which it m~de ieg gtrikeg wag
~SU-4dd'k.m.
The following rail termin~l~ w~re gubjeceed to intense night raid~ du~ittg
ttii~ p~ri~d: flr~?~ngk--2,H5~ ~~rCiegi Orel~~-2,~~5, G~me1's~1,b41, UrieCha=~~ -
y6z, 5molen~k-a5z~, Ur~h~--483~ Vy~z'ma~-4z~, and Nnvozybkdv-~400 goreieg.
Certain r~il terminale t~ere ~ub~ected to several strikeg. A~ an ex~mpl~e
the rail terminal in ~ryan~k wa,~ ~truck 11 timeg in Apri1, 7 times in May, '
~nd 4 times in June; ehe Orel eermin~l W~g atruck 1g, 1 and 2 timeg ~ory
regponding1.y; Gome1' wag ~truck 4, and 1 times; and Unecha aas gtruck
3, 1, and 2 time~. In all ~trgtegi~ aviatir~n flew 9,400 gdrties in
Apri1, Mny, and June 1g43~~+~
The e�feCtiveneag of air force operaCiott~ t~a~ high. Worlting edgether
with pnrtiggns, on 6 March 194~ the air force put the Uneaha~-nryansk
rail ~ection out of aceion for ~everal dayg, and in April it h~lted
traffic in the Itoslavl'-Uryangk section. As a result of a raid on the
rnil terminnl in Gomel' 17 loaded fuel tank carg and 2y food carg were
burned, and ~8 ammunitintt cars were demolighed.4~
The enemy suffered gignifiG~nt 109gE'.5 ~nd his lines of COti~nUri~Cat~dri
were sygtemntically ittterdicted through the joint actions of frontnl
~viation and ~trategic gvigtion. Concurrently, strntegic avigtinn
~truck the cent~r~ of gov~rnment ~nd war industry deep in the enemy
rear.
In Aprll the city of Koenigsh~rg aas gub~ected to five ~ir ~trikeg,
nanzig wag subjected to tao, Insterburg wag struck once, and Tilsie Was
struck three times. In all durin~ this month strategic aviation flew
920 sorties against these cities, dropping about 700 tons of bombs.4~+
On the night of 29 April a 5-ton bomb (~AB-5000~ was dropped for the
first time on facilities in Koenigsberg. While sCrikea by straCegic
nvintion ~gainst industrit~l and administrative centers deep in the
enemy rcar did nut cauae etgnifi..ant taaterial losaes, they did force
tl~c ~nscist Cerman Camm~nd Co keep air defenae forcea combat ready, and
tl~ey did h~ve a certnin influQnce on the enemy's morale.
11ie ac[ions of ~he 5oviet Air ~orce to interdict rail shipments and dis-
orgnnize motor traffic delayed the concentration of enemy tronps on the
Kurek axis, hindered their maneuver, and in the end had their influence
on the fact thn[ the eneroy had to poatpone the offensive from June to
July 1943.
,
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~f,
~Ott O~~IC~AL U~~ ONLY
~OOTNO~~S
1~ ~~t~~oriyh vtnroy mirdvoy voyny 1939~1945" (itigtory nf Wdr1d W~r LI
19~y~1~l4~), V~1 6, p 16U.
A mulEipurpn~e fight~r h~rring ~ m~ximum gpeed df nver 600 k~n/hr gt
6,U00 meters; armamenta=four gung ~nd tad m~~hineguns?
3. A twtdaengine gingle-~e$e a~rplgne pngge~ging pdWer~u1 gun and
machiri~egun ~rm~ment.
4. "Igtnriya vtdroy mirovoy voyny 19~9~1'945," Vo1 7, Mogco~, 1976,
p 101.
5. Timokhovi~h, 2. V.~ "Uperativnt~ye i~kusstvo rdvet~kikh t?V5 v Velikdy
Oteche~tvennoy voyn~~" ~Sovi~t Air ~orce Strategy in tt~e Gre~t patriotic
War) ~ MbgCOiJ~ ~976, p 41.
b. Air eng~gement~ oceurred frdm 1~ tc~ 24 April, from ~9 April Co 10 M~y,
and from Z6 May tt~ ~ June.
_ 7. Gr~chko, A. A., "B~tv~ za Kavkaz" (The i3attle nf Che C~uc~gug),
Mu~cdw, 197~~ p 3~i2.
8. "5ovetgkiye W5 v Velikoy Oeech~~tv~nnoy voyne 1941-194S gg." ~The
5oviet Air ~orce in the ~reat Patriotic War 1941-1945), p 155.
9. In reepon~e co a direetive of the Nq SHC, on 24 April 1943 the admin-
igtration of the Sth Air Army tr~ngferred its gir formatiang to th~
4th Air Army and withdreW to Kursk, plecing iteelf at the disposal
of the command nf the 5teppe District (~ront). General K. A.
Vershinin assumed command of the 4th Air Army. The air force staff
of the Northern Caucasi~n ~ront Was disbanded.
10. Zl~ukov, C. K., "Vosrominaniya i razmyshleniya" (itecollections and
Reflection~), Vol 2~ Mosco~+, 1974~ p 149.
11. Arkhiv MO SSSCt [USSR Minietry af Uefense Archives), f. 319, op. 4798~
d. 70, 1. 9.
1'l. Crechko, A. A., "81tva za Kavkaz~" p 3y2.
13. Ibid., p 363.
14. Arkhiv MO 555R, f. 224, op. 214836, d. 5, 11. 105-107.
15. "5ovetekiye Voyenno-Vozdu9hnyye Sily v Velikoy Oteches[vennoy voyne
1941-1945 gg.," Moacoa~ 1968, p 158,
124
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1G. Arkhiv MO S55I~i f. b~98, dp, 12475~ d. 140~ 1. 134~ '
17. Arkl~iv MO 555lt, f. ~71, np. 13g95, d, 2, 1g0.
1~. "Ietoriya Velikoy Otechea~vennoy voyny SnveCSko~n Sayuza 1941~1945
gg~" (Nistory r~f the Gr~at Patri~tic t~gr nf the 5nviet Union 1941~
194~), Vol Mogrtiw, 1'964, p~88,
19. Gr~~hko, A~ A~, "gitva z~ Kavk~z~" p 367~
20. "5nwet~kiye Vdyenno~Voxdughnyye 531y v Velikoy UteChegtvenndy voyne
1941-1945 gg.~" pp 161-162.
21. "I~t~riyn Velikoy Ote~he~tvennoy vnyny S~vetgkogo Soyuza 1g41-1945
gg.," Vol 3, p ~88.
22. Crecl~kn, A. A., "Hitva za Kavkaz," p 376,
2~. "Igtoriya Velikoy Otecl~e~tvennoy voyny 5ovetgkogo Soyuza 1941-1945
gg.," Vol 3, p ~88.
'l4. Arkhiv MO SSSR, E. ~19, op. 4798~ d. 4~, 1. 73~
~ 'l5. Ibid.~ 1. 74.
26. Ibid.
Z7. Ibid.~ 1. 81.
28. Arkliiv MO SS5R, f. 35, op. 11280, d. 88, 11. 27-42.
29. Arkhiv MO 55SR, f. 48-A, op. 2, d. 8~ 11. 103-104.
30. Arkhiv MO 5S5it, f. 290, op. 3280, d. 50, 1. 58.
31. Including 2,500 sortiea f1oWn by night light bomber aviation.
~2. "5ovetgkiyc Voyenno-Vozdushnyye 5ily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
1941-194S gg.," p 175.
33. Timokhovict~, I. V., "Operativnoye iskusstvo Sovetskikh W5 v Velikoy
Otechestvennoy voyne," p 80.
~4. Arkl~iv MO 555R, f. 48-A, op. 2, d. 8, 1. 136.
~5. Arki~iv [~0 5SSR, f. 35, op. 226133~ d. 1, 1. 99.
7G. Ibid. , 1. 99.
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~7. TimukhnviCh, I. V., "Op~r~Civndy~ i~ku~~tvo 5dveC~kikh VV5 v Velikoy
OteCh~~tvennny voyne," p g3.
3g. Arkhiv Md 555~, E. ~5, np, 11285, d~ gU7, 11. 89-90.
39. Arkhiv MO 53~1~, f. 35, op. ~2G14, d. 8, 1. 164.
40. VdY~NNO-IS'Cn12ICN~5KIY ZNUItNAI., No 1, 1g75, p 78.
41. "Sdvet~kiye Vdy~ttno>Vozduehnyye 5ily v Velikoy Otechegtvennny voyne -
1941-1945 gg.~" p 1~7.
42. Arkhiv MO SSSR, f. ~5, op. 2$3235~ d. 94, 1. 4.
- 4~. Arkhiv MO 555It, f. ~9, np. 11495~ d. 1~, 1. 33.
44. Ibid., op, 11519, d. 64g, 11. 52~62.
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~'0[t 01~'~ICtAL US~ dNLY =
Ct1A~'T~It V. 50VI~T AItMY AIIt F'OItC~ COMMANb AND 5TA~~ IN TH~ BATTL~ 0~ KURSK
'Thc Struteg.tc 5iCu~tion on ehe Kursk Axis in July 1943
~y yummer 1943 thQ center nf graviey of ehe ~rmed confllct ahifCed eo ehe
centrr~l ~~cCor di the 5oviet-German fronC.
'rhe victory of the 5oviet Armed Forces in winter and spring 1943 shook _
the foundation of the fascist bloc. By this Cime Germany's general siG-
uaCinn worsened considerably. Diapleasure wiCh the war intensified in
satellite countries. The pre~Cige of Germany fell in the eyea of ita
~11ies. Italy was on the verge of quitting the war. But deapiCe the
undeninble facts Hitler's poliCiciana and serategists te1C thaC the war
was not yet lost. The Fasciet German Command decided Co conduct a ma~or
summer offensive on Che 5oviet-German front with the goals of improving
the army's morale~ preventing disintegraCion of the fascist bloc, and
recovering prestige. The Fasciat German Army was atill a large force in
summer 1943. There were about 4.8 million men on the Soviet-German front~
wt~ich was abour 72 percent of all forces of Che operaCing army. In addi-
tion there were 525,000 men here in satellite armies. Tn all, countries
of the German bloc had 5,325,000 men in the SovieC-German front.l BuC the
ratio of forces was not in favor of Hitler's troops. As of July 1943 the
- Soviet operating army had a sCrength of 6,442,000 men. We surpassed the
- enemy by 1.2 Cimea in manpower. The superiority of the Soviet Armed -
Forces was even greater in relation to equipmenC: We had 98,790 guns
nnd mortars as opposed to 54~300 enemy weapons, 9,580 tanks and self-
propelled guns as opposed to the enemy's 5,850, and 8,290 warplanes as
opposed Co tt~e enemy's 2,980.2 The front line extended from the Barents
_ 5en to Lake Ladoga, then along the Svir' River to Leningrad, and from
there south. At Velikiye Luki it turned southeast, forming a huge salient
in the vicinity of Kursk, deep into the disposiCion of the German Croops.
Next from the vicinity of nelgorod the front line passed east of Khar'kov,
after wtiich it followed the Northern Donets and Mius rivers Co the east
shore of the Sea of Azov. On the Taman' Peninsula the front line passed
east oE Temryuk and Novorosaiysk.
PreparlnR for his offensive on the Kursk axis, the enemy concentrated
ubout 50 of the most bnttleworthy divisions--up to 900,000 men, about
10,t)UO guns and mortnrs, and 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns.3
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lly ~Crikt,ng townrd Kurgk on converging axeg, tih~ German Cnmmand plnnned
Co encircle gnd deeCroy Sovieti tiroops ~ti tihe Kurek ~allene, crueh our
~Crgregic re~ervee ntt rh~ Livny, Nnvyy Oekol line, and regain ehg
etrnCegic initiutiv~.
'rh~ C~rm~n Commgnd plgCed high hopea on maseed use of heuvy Tiger and
I'anttier t~nk~ and Ferdinand gelf-propelled guns, which h~d eound nrmor
prot~cCion gnd powerful grmgm~nC, and on iCg sir force~
The ~ascist German Command created two powerful air groupinga to support
- Crnops from tihe air in the vicinity of th~ Kurak salient. The 6th Air
~leet wus eo support Che serik~ grouping in the area soueh of Ore1.
_ Hetween 15 March and 1 July Che f1eeC wae reinforced by �ive air groupa
transferred from Germany, France, and Norway.
The 4th Air ~leee supporeed Che sCrike grouping north of Khar'kov. At
Che beginning of the offeneive Che fleet was reinforced by five bomber
groups and one figheer group and by two groups of dive bombers, each
- cont~ining 30 airplanes.
In al,l the enemy air grouping at Kursk had a strength of 2,050 airplanes -
(1,2C~0 bombers, 108 KhSh-129 ground attack airplanes, 600 fightera, and
150 reconnaissance airplanes4).
The lines of defense of the Kurak salient were occupied by troope of the
Central und Voronezh fronts. Their strength was more Chan 1.3 million
men, 19,300 gun~ and mortars, and more than 3,300 tanka and SPG.S The
Steppe Front, which including aviation had a strength of 573,000 men,
3,397 guns, 4,004 mortars, and 1,550 tanka and SPG,6 was concentrated
in the second strategic echelon.
- The air grouping conaisted of the Central FronC's 16th Air Army, the
Voroner.h Front's 2d Air Arnry, and the Southwestern Front's 17th Air Army
(conana~ided respectively by Generals S. I. Rudenko, S. A. Krasovskiy, and
V. A. Sudets), and the main forces of atrategic aviation. The composition
of Che 5Ceppe Front included the 5th Air Army (commander, General S. K.
Goryunov). The air armies were reinforced by air corps of the SHC reserve.
The 16t.h Air Army contained three air corpa and aix separate air divisions
with 1 total strengCh of 1,000 airplanes; the 2d Air Army had two fighter,
one ground attack, and one bomber air corps and two separate air divisions, -
for a total of 880 airplanes; the 17th Air Army had three mixed air corps
and two separate sir diviaions, for a total strength of 735 airplanes.
In gum total our air grouping poasessed 2,900 ai~planes (1,060 fighters,
940 ground attack airplanes, S00 day bombere, and 400 night bombers),
and if we consider strategic aviation, our strength was 1.4 times greater
than that of the enem; air force.~ -
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'rh~ 5nviQt Army Air Cnrae Commgnd ~nd 5C~ff nuring Prep~rntiions for ehe
ll~CC1e of Kur~k -
_ The 5nvieC Supreme 1{igh Command discovered the enemy's pl~ny for a summer
offensive in Cime. To defeat the enemy with the lowest lossea to our-
gelveg, ae long ago as on 12 April 1942 u preliminary decision was made
to firat'c'aeer ouC the Germgn strike groupings with an nceive defense and
- tihett go over Co a deciaive counteroffenaive ending in their final desCruc~
rion. zC w~s with this in mind that all arms and serviceg of Che Soviet
Armed F'nrces were prepared. On receiving Che baeic insCruceiona from Che
Getter~l Se~ff Che command attd sCaff of the SovieC Army Air ~'orce b3gan
m~~or preparaCions for air operation~. These preparationg consisttad -
mainly of creating a strong air grouping, preparing ehe airfield net, -
manning tl~e unies and formationa, and creating Che necessary logiatical
reserves. ConcurrenCly Che air force command and staff carefully studied
tl~e enemy und Che combat capabilitiea of the atr forces of the bel7.igerenta,
und took ateps to ineure more effecCive uae of aviaCion commiteed Co the ~
operaeion.
The constanCly increaeing deliveries of new types of airplgnes~ radio
staCiona, and material and technical maintenance resources from induetry -
made this possible. In 1943 the average monChly outpuC of warplanes
increased from 2,100 in 1942 to 2,900 in 1943. The airplane fleet of Che '
5oviet Air Force underwent fundamenCal renov~iCion. By the beginning of
the battle of Kursk basically only night bomber air units still had
obsoleCe airplanes. Especially great changes occurred in the fighter
fleet. Several modifications of Che new La-5fm and Yak-9 airplanes
assumed dominance in 1943.8 By July 1943 all regiments in ground aCtack
uviation were armed with I1-2's, and the overwhelming ma~ority of Chem -
were two-aeat ground attack airplanes. The bomber f1eeC was almost com- -
pletely replaced with the Pe-2. By 1943 fighters in frontal aviation
were armed with M. Ye. Berezin's large caliber machineguns (12.7 mm), -
which replaced the ShKAS machineguns. In addition to large caliber
machineguns, 20-mm caliber guns designed by B. G. Shpital'nyy and S. V.
Vladimirov (ShVAK) were installed aboard all airplanes. Beginning with _
spring 1943 the 37-mm gun designed by A. E. Nudel'man and A. S. Suranov
(NS-31) were being installed aboard Yak-9 airplanes. The Germans did not
possess an sircraft gun as powerful as Chis.
Invention of the PTAB-2.5-1.5 hollow-charge antitank bomb by engineer
_ t. A. Larionov in 1943 had extremely great significance to heightening
the effectiveness of ground attack aviation. This bomb was highly
desCructive, it was characterized by low weight and small size, and it
was not expe:-isive to manufacture. By decision of the USSR GICO, trans-
ceiving ra~;io aets began to be installed in one out of every two fighters
as of October 1942.9 In 1943 every new airplane was outfitted with a
radio set. The ZOS [ground aids to navigation] service enjoyed extensive
development. The number of radio communication stations within it
increased fron 180 in 1942 to 420 in 1943. Redut and Pegmatit radar -
devices were adopted in frontal aviation.
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in ehe fir~r hnlf nf 1943 Che adminiseraeion of Che Sdviee Army Air I~'orce
commander underwenr furrher improvemenes in iCa org~niz~tiinnal etirucCure
und in tt~e methods of troop commattd and conCrol~ Many secCions wer~
enlnrgad ineo direceornees (the Navigaeor 5ervice llirecCoraCe and others).
- M nir de�ense ~~rvice, a rear service, a directiorate of air gunnery
~ervice, and a E?.:�n UirecCoraCe of FronCal Aviatiinn CombaC Trgining were
crea~ted. Two direceornCes were creaCed wiCh3n Che Air rorce Main lliracto-
rate of Air ~ngineering Service--the Field itepair DirectoraGe and ehe
Overh~ul and ltecovery nirecCoraGe. Th~ Air ~orc~ Mnin Organizing nirecCo-
rate was rennmed the Air Force Main Organizing and Training Directorata~~~
'ft?e 5oviet Army Air F~rce MiliCary C~uncil w~s made stronger. General
Nikolay Sergeyevich Shimanov was appc~inted full-eime member of the Air
rorce MiliCury Council in Mnrch 1943; he concurrenCly performed the
duties of dir~ctor of ehe CC VKP(b)'s AviaCion Section. N. S. Shimanov
re:nained aC theae posta for the rest of ehe war. During Che war Che _
- memberst~i~ of the Air ~dree Military Couucil included P. F. zhigarev, _
A. A. Novikov, P. S. 5tepanov, L. G~ Rudenko, N. S. Shimanov, G. A.
- Vorozheykin, F. 'n. Faluleyev~ A. V. NikiCii~, A. I. Shakhurin, A. K. Repin,
5. A. Khudynkov, and other troop comananders.
The Air Force Military Council discussed and resolved Che most imporCant
issues concerning the life and combat activities of Che 5ovieC Air Force.
_ A11 fundamental issues pertaining to developmenC of Che Air Force were
discussed as a rule at meetinga of the MiliCary Council, and ~lecisiona
made by the air force commander were reported to the General Staff, the
IIq SHC, or the State Defense CommiCtee. -
In its pracCical activiCy the Air Force Military Council relied on com-
mandera, political agenciea, party-poliCical staffs, and the party organi-
zaCions of air units and formations and training institutions.
In May 1943 General S. A. Khudyakov was reappointed to the post of air -
force chief of staff. General F. Ya. Falaleyev was appointed full-time
deputy commander of the Soviet Army Air Force.
- The air force command and its military council did an extremely great deal
of work to organize reserve air regiments. Creation of reserve air regi-
ments began back in the first days of the war in compliance with an order
of the USSR NKO dated 11 July 1941. The most important task of the
reserve air regiments wus to learn to operate new airplanes. On sugges-
tion of the air force command on 7 May 1943 the USSR GKO adopted a decree
calling a hult to the practice of withdrawing air units from Che front to
serve as reserve air regiments and air brigades for the time required to
bring tliese units up to strength. ReplenishmenCs were now sent to the air
units at the front from sir squadrons, flights, and individual crews _
trained in reserve regiments. As a result of this measure the number of =
air units temporarily assigned to reserve regiments in 1943 decreased by
Cour times as compared Co 1942. This put an end to hasty training of
flight personnel, which was often the case in previous years.
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~ I~Oit n~~YCIAI, USL ONLY
Tt~e ~ir fnrce commnnd geenched gre~r gignific~nce eo correct use of ehe
nir corpg of Che 5EiC resnrve. On 29 March 1943 tihe Sovi~C Army Air Force
- comm~nder in~tructed tihe commgnders of the gir armie~ ~nd commgnders of -
th~ nir corp~ e1~~7~ SIIC regerve air cnrps aCCnched to ~ir nrmies wera Co
be used nnly on the axe~ of ehe main sCrik~s, ~nd rhne in nn wny were
Ch~:y tn be dispersed for ~imul~~neous serikes on ~ l~rge numUer of ob~ec-
tives or �or performance of many mieaiona. ~
Uiscusging the results nf air ~ctivitiea ae the Kub~n', the Air ~'orce
- Kilienry CounCil devnCed much aCCention Co making broader use of radio
and keeping Che air army etaffs muCunlly informed on the nperaCion~l
situaeion. The Soviet Army Air Force commander publiahed an order on
20 April 1943 r~questing Che air army commanders Co make broader use of
radio reeources Co conCrol aviation on Che ground and in Che air. Another
order of Cl~e nir force commander dated 11 M~y 1943 obllgaCed the air army
sCaffs to inform eacl~ oCher abouC the operaCion~l siCunrion ott Che front _
every d~y. These orders had a posiCive influence, improving conerol over
uviaCion und promoting betCer work by sCaffs. The resulCs of fulfilling
these orders had an effece in Che battle of Kursk~ in which Hq SHC liaison
' officere t~ad Co organize and coordinaee the sir activieies of several
CronCs and sCrategic uviaCion.
As wiCti frnntgl troopa, Che Soviet Air Force capiCalized on ehe 3-month
pause in ucCive operaCions of Che ground troops preceding the battle of
Kursk by making preparations for the forthcoming engagement,
At ttie end of June the Hq SHC ordered A. M. Vasilevskiy to put all of his
efforts inCo preparing troops of the Voronezh Front, and G. K. Zhukov to
caordinate tha actions of the Central, Bryansk, and Western fronts.
SovieC Army Air rorce Commander A. A. Novikov and his deputies, Generals
C. A. Vorozheykin and S. A. Khudyakov, who were present in the frontal
- air armies together with small operational groups of air force head-
quarters and rear services officers, were ordered to prepare aviation
and coordinate its actiona.
Preparntions had perhaps never been so methodical, so systematic, a~d of
sucl~ a great scale in any previous operation. In compliance with a~ deci-
sion of tl~e !lq SHC, air corps and separate air divisions of the SH~:
reserve were rebased. On 1 May 1943 the command and an operational group
Erom the hcudquarters of the Sth Air Army arrived from the Caucasus in
Che vicinity of the city of Uaman'. By that time formations of the
II [~ighter, IV Ground Attack, and VII and IX mixed air corpa were com-
pleting their redeployment to airfields of Che Steppe Front.ll-12 ~ir
corps and separaCe divisions of the SHC reserve were taken out of the
fleadquarters reserve and from other sectors of the front and concen-
trated on the Kursk axis. The plans for combat use of the aviation of -
the t6th .~nd 2d air armies and strategic aviation were written right in
the troops.
~
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The plang for cdmbaC uge of ~vigtiion were wriCten in accordanct~ wiCh Che
pJ.ans of ehe frontnl rroops~ in four coneingenc3~e raking ~ccounC of rhe
probable axeg of the enemy'e mgin serikes ag~inse ehe norrhern and
souChern ~aces of Che Kurek ealienr. Much aCCenCion was devored to ~
organizing interaction. In order Chat aviation could be used eff~cCively,
plnne were written for intoractinn betweQn the 16eh und 2d nnd beeween rhe
2d and 17Ch air armies. The platt for inCeraction between Che 2d nnd 17Ch
air armies in the defeneive operation of the Voronezl~ and 5outhwestern
fronC~ was signed by General G. A. Vorozheykin and Che commanderg nf Chese
armi.es, Gener~ls S. A. Kras~vakiy and V. A. 5udets. The plan foree~w
muCual assistance among Che air armieg. The 17th Air Army contributied
180 airplanes to operate with an intenaity of 990 snrties in the first
3 days. The 2d Air Army contribuCed 170 airplanes to help Che SouCh-
western Front, these airplanea flying 900 sorties in the first 3 days.
The plan also foresaw maneuver of aviation utilizing the airfields of
neighboring air armiea for theae purpoaes.l3
Air reconnaissance wgs intense. As long ago as on 14 May 1943 A. A. -
_ Novikov reported to Che 5upreme High Command Headquarters ChaC phoCo-
graphic air reconnaissance conducCed by Che 4th Reconnaiasance Air Regi-
m~nt eatgblished a large accumulation of enemy tanks and motor vehicles
in the viciniCy of Orel and Kroma at Che end of 14 May. The report con- -
Cained the conclusion thaC Che enemy was obviously preparing for a
pnwerful offensive by Cank and mechanized formations, and that he was
creaCing a atrong air grouping at airfields of the Kursk axis.l4
Air reconnaissance reveuled the concentration areas of the enemy's main
troop groupinge, the locations of enemy air bases and the composiCion of
the Luftwaffe, the airfield air defense system, the nature of defensive
fortificaCiona~ and the locationa of strongpointe, artillery positions,
and enemy reserves. All of this helped the Soviet Command to reveal the
enemy's deaign better, to take steps to organize a stubborn defense in
time, and to prepare for the forth~oming offensive more purposefully. _
The efforts of air and combinea arms ma~or formations and formations were
caordinated upon in place and in time during the preparations.
On the most highly threatened axes, operational air groups were organized
in combined arms armies and air liaison officers were appointed in rifle -
corps.
On order of the air army co~andera, the air corps and division commanders
traveled to the forward edge of defense with the goal of recounoitering
the terrain, defining the ob~ectives of their strikes, and coordinating
with the ground troops on the signals to be used for mutual identifica-
tion and target indication.
An extremely great deal of work was done by air force political agencies
and by pErty and Komsomol organizations, which directed their activities
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roR orrtcz~, usL or2Y ~
' -
_ m~lnly at hel~hCening the buCCleworChiness of tk~e air uttits and forma-
rions, and at srrengChentng friendahip be~ween airmen and personne]. o�
rfie combineJ arms and tank armies. -
Air army rear aervices and rheir atCached engineering batCalions worked
inCensively Co prepare tl~e airfield naC and accumulate reserves of muni-
tiona ttnd m~teriel. With the active assistance of the public, 154 air- _
Cields were built wiChin the zones of operaCion of ehe 16th and 2d air
armies; in nddition ehey built 50 dummy airfielda.15 To permie maneuver
of aviaCion, reserve uirfield maintenance baCtalions were creaCed in the
air armies. Logistical reserves supporring 10-15 days of active combat
operations by aviation were created.
Aviaeion of the air armies did not halt ies combat acrivities during Che
preparations for tlie forthcoming engagemenC. It covered the movements of
the concenCraCing troops, repelled enemy raids on rail ~unceions and air- -
~ields with the help of fightera and antiaircraft artillery, periodically -
struck enemy reserves, and mainCained purposeful air surveillance over
all enemy troop movements.
lluring prepuraCions f.or Che summer offensive the Luftwaffe inCensified
its uctivities a~ainsC rnil ~unctions, staCions, bridges, and sidings in
the vicinity of tt~e Kursk sttlient, atCempting to paralyze the communica-
tions of the 5oviet troops. The Kursk rail Cerminal was the principal
ob~ective of enemy aviation. The first massed raid on Kursk was under-
taken by enemy aviation on 22 May. About 170 b~~mbers participated in
_ this raid. The raid was opposed by fighCers of t!~e 1,;Ch and 2d air
armies as well as the lO1sC righter Air Division of the national air -
defense forces. Most of the bomber groupe were dispersed by fighter
attacks at the approaches to the city.
The LufCwaffe made its largest raids on the Kursk rail terminal during
the day on 2 June and in the night of 3 June. More than 500 airplanes -
participat~d in the day raid, to include 424 bombers. Some 280 ~ighCers _
- of the 16th and 2d air armies, forces of the 106th and lOlst fighter
divisions of the air defense forc~s, and antiaircraft artillery of the
Kursk Air Defense Group were called in Co repel Che raid.
_ 'fhe assault echelon of~ enemy aviation, consisting of more than 150 air-
planes (137 bombers and 30 fighters) and flying from the direction of
Orel over Patezh, was intercepted by fighters of the 16th Air Army, which
boldly attacked the enemy and knocked down 58 craft. Onl.y occasional
enemy bombers penetrated to the city. There were 175 airplanes (120 _
bombers and 55 fighters) in the second and third echelons traveling from
the same direction. Eighty-six_ Soviet fighters were raised into the air
to repel the raid by these two echelons. The Soviet fighters attacked
tl?e enemy zirplane columns continually, knocking down 34 craft. Up Co
55 airplanes managed to penetrate to Che city as scattered groups. _
~ -
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~Ott n~'~ICtAL US~ UNL,Y -
Tl~e fourCh gnd fi~th echelong conC~ined more th~n 1g0 enerny ~irplanes
(167 bomb~r~ ~nd 14 fight~r~), They eravel~d frdm g n~W directidn, f~om
Ubuynn'~ ne nn nleitude of 6~400-7,000 met~r~~
7'h~ SdvieC Comm~nd c~11ed in maJor fighter forcee--abnut 2U5 creft--t~
repel tlie enemy rgid, buC Chey were un~ble tn interCepe nll bomber grnupg.
Abnue 100 ~nemy ~irplaneg gtruck the Kurgk r~i1 terminal ~nd put it o~t
~ of ~ction for 12 hnurs. 'Ct~e ~netrty'g air log~es were tremendnu~ in Che
raid of 2 June. The enemy 1ngG 145 c~irplan~~, td inClude 1U4 kno~ked
dnwn by fighrere ~nd 41 brought dnwn by ~ntiaircraft ertillery fir~~
Soviet ~viatinn lost 27 fightere.l6
Th~ magged uir r~id on Kurgk wa~ Che Great patriatic W~r'g i~gt majdr day
raid by f~sci~t gvigti~n ag~in~t regr fgcilieieg. ~litler'~ coiamand ~rag
forced tu subgequently abandon aCtiviCi,es againet rear f~cilities during
- daytime, nnd to limit the action~ of its bomber aviation to nighttime.
_ ~
- Thus the ~iq 5NC gnd the coamn~nd of the 5ovi~C Army Air ~orce did a great
deal of purposeful work to prepgre troop~ ~nd aviation for forthcoming
engugemenCs in the cenCral sector of the 5oviet-German front. buring the
3 monCh~ of prep~rations tt~e 16th and 2cf air armies ~nd str~[egic avia~
tiion flew more Ch~n 42~000 combat sorties, completing ~11 miggiona.1~
Actione of 5oviet Avi~tion in the B~tCle of Kursk
On 5 July 1943 powerful groupinge of tt~e fescigt German troops went over
to the offensive on the northern und southern fac~~ of th~ Kurak a~li~nt.
It was not a aurprise to our ground troops and aviation. On 2 July the
Hq SHC warned troop commanders of the Central and Voronezh fronts that
- the enemy might go over to the offensive in the next few days. Thus the
troops and aviation werc~ combat ready.
Interrogation of prisoners captured by our scoutg revealed not only the
day but also the hour oi the atCack--5 July~ 0300 hours. At dawn on
5 July powerful artillery counterpreparation was initiated on order of
Marehal of ttie Soviet Union C. K. Zhukov. Simultaneously, 417 ground
.~ttack airplunes and fi~~hters of the air formations of the 2d und 17th
air armies made a maesed strike againet seven of the most important air-
Cields (Mikoyanovka, 5ok~1'niki, Pomerki~ Osnova~ Rogan', Barvenkovo,
Kramatorskaya) with the objective of weakening the enemy air grouping
' und disorganiztng his uctivities, destroying 60 enemy crnft at these
:~irfields. Cerm;~n forces were weakened by the artillery counterprepara-
tion and tl~e strikes agatnst the airfields. The surprise the fascist
command had counted upon failed [o msterialize. Fascist German troops
f~ad to postpone the begi~~ning ot the offenaive from 0300 hours to 0530
- t~ours. The offensive of the enemy troops began With the support of major
uir forces. Under the cover ot'fighters, fascist bombers flying in group~
of 100-150 uirplanes ntt:icked tt~e positions of the Soviet troopa. They
- wcre met initially by pilots of the VI Fighter Air Corps (commander~
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t;enernl Ye. Yr_, Y~rlykin) ~nd ehe 1gt Guardg ~ighter Air bivigion (com-
mr~~~dcr, 1,i~utcnnnt c.dlunel I, V. Krupenin) of the 16t1~ Air Army, c?e we11
a~ piidt~ oC ~hc 1V ~nd V fight~r nir cnrp~ (cotnmanderg, Getter~lg U~
t~odgornyy ~nd ll, p, Galunov) df rhe xd Air Army.
An air eng~gem~rit tnok pl~~~e nv~r th~ po~itidng of the traops. I~ the
firge h~lf nf 5 Ju1y Sdviet figheerg knacked down 79 fgscigt airpl~neg.18
Concur~rently pilots df Clte III gdtnber Air Corpg (commander, General A. Z.
Karavatgkiy) and the VL Mixed Air Corpg (GOtmnander, General I, n.
Antoghkin), nnd of the ~d Gu~rde (cotmn~nder, Colonel G. I. Komarov) and
thc 299th Grdund Attgck Air Uivisions (conm~nder, Colonel I. V. Krupgkiy)
~tt~ckec~ enemy t~nkg gnd infantry on the baeelefield and ne~r Yasnay~
E'olyan~, Oz~rki, nnd Arkl~angel'gk in groupg of gix to eight airplaneg.
~tiis wng t1~e ~irst day our grnuad ~tt~ck airpl~neg uged the new pTAti~2~5-1.5
~utitank bombg. They were able to penetr~te the armor of fascisl 'Tiger
and Pantt~er tankg. Just pilotg nf the 291st Ground Attack Air Uivisintt
(cnmm~nder, Cdlonel A. N. Vitrutt) annihilated 30 enemy tankg with these
bombs in 1 day nt Voronezl~.19 General (F. Mellentin), formcr chief of
staff of rhe German XLVItI Tank Cnrps, lnter wrote: "Many tanks became
the yacriflce nf 5oviet aviation, and Itugsi~n pilots were extremely
bolcl . "2U
buring 5 July our avi~tion actively helped Croops on the Central ~nd
Voronezh frontg to repel gavage nCt~cks by enemy infanCry and tankg,
tnteractin~ With the 2d Air Army, Vornnezh ~ront, the 17th Air Army~
5nuthWestern ~ront ytruck ettemy tnnks gnd infantry crossing the Nnrthern
bonetg in the vicinity af So~omino and nezlyudavka, while units of Che
15th Air Army, Bryai~sk F'ront helped the 16Ch Air Army, Central Front to
repel raids on our troops by bomber aviaCion.
Wittiin the zone of the Central F'ront, at particular moments there were
simulCaneously up to 300 German bombers nnd not less than 100 fighters
over t}~e battlefield on 5 July. On thig day pilots of the 16th Air Army
flew 1~2J2 combat sorties, fought in 76 group air battles, and knocked
down lOG enemy ~irplanes. In all, the four air armies of frontal avia-
tio?~ flew 3~385 sorties on thie day. ~nemy aviation made 4,526 over-
fli~;t~ts, to include 108 within the zone of the Bryansk Front, 1,737
witl~tn tt~e r.one of tl~e Central Front~ 2,561 wiChin the zone of the
Voronezl~ ~ront, and 120 in the zone of the Southwestern Front. _
Uurin~; S July 5ovict piloCg knocked down 260 enemy airplanes in air
battles and destroyed 60 airplanes at airfields.21 Our losses were 176
:i~ Yr ~ 1fl~S .
As a result oE the opposirion of our fighters and the losses suffered by
tlic enemy, tt~e activity of enemy aviation declined somewhat in the
Central Pront in ttic second half of 5 July~ While in the Voronezh ~ront
tl~~~ enemy was totally unable to surmount the resistance of our fighters.
Ilowevec, not evcryttiing went so smoothly. Shortcomings were revealed in
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the nctiong ~f our fighter~~ Th~y w~re lured intd battleg with fighter~,
~ometimeg legving enemy Uomber~ ~ntouched. The sygtem fnr gignalling the
npprnaCt~ nf C~rman bomberg w~s noe nrgattiz~d ~ufficienCly well. Aceion~
by ~m~11 gr~upg of ~ur grnund ~tt~ck ~irpl~neg a~id Uomb~r~ ~ggin~t ~n~my
tronps pr~venred ~ffectiv~ ~~ei~n ~gai~se the enemy'g anei~ir~r~~t greil-
- 1r.ry, ~nd l~rg~ numberg of fighCer~ h~d to be g~~igned to ~dver thege
gm~ll gir groupg.
Cdngidering e11 of thig, ori Che follc~wing d~y the ~ir fnr~e Cnmmand gnd
the ~ir ~rmy Commander~ ch~nged the forms and m~thods nf ~~eintts by our
avi~tion, gait~hing t~ m.~geed gerikeg ggaingt gdvgnCing enemy Croop~.
Utilixing d~egiled ~ir r~conn~i~sance data, on 6 Ju1y gviation of the
~ 16th Air Army m~de g m~~~~d grrike ag~in~t ~n~my tanke and motorized
in~~nery in th+e vicinity of Podolyatt' end Sobnrovk~; 45~ ~irpl~nes df
� the VI Mixed C~rps ~nd tt~e 2d and 299th ~rdund gttack ~ir diviginng p~r-
tiCip~ted in the ~ttgck. Thig gtrike in~ured the guccegs of the counter-
gerike mgde by the fr~nt'g trdopa. On thaC d~y the 1Gth Air Army per-
formed another two magsed strikes. Ag g result nf the counCergtrikes of
nur tronpg and the m~ssed aCtion~ df gviation the enemy ~uffered serinug
loggeg in manpdwer and equipment. The offengive spirit of the enemy
tronpg declined notiCegbly. 5trikeg by the 2d and 17th air armies were
no less auccesaful o~~ that day on the Belgorod-Kursk axig.
Concurretttly~ ma3or ad~ustments were also made in the nrggnixarion of the
combat activities of fightere. The commandere nf fighter air formations
Cravcled to .forwxrd control postg, from which they controlled their unite
direetly. Fight~r patrol zoneg Were extended into enenry terriCory. The
fighter~ now began ea be guided to enemy girplaneg, mainly to bombera,
by radio. Competent guidance and increase of force in the air battle,
presence of air fighter formation commanders at the control poats, and
the pilots' fnmiliarity with the voicea of their commanders in the radio
netwark had their influence, dramatically altering the sir gituation.
Cerman aviation drastically reduced its activity as a reault of the large
logses. While 4,298 sorties were recorded on 5 July in the Central and
Voronezh fronts, only 2,100 were documented on 6 July.Z2
In tl~e Central and Voronezh fronts Soviet piloca flew 2,800 combat sorties~
tl~~y knocked down 217 enemy craft in air battles, and our losses were 171
airplanes.
On 7 July 1943 the enemy concentrated the main efforts o� his aviation
against troopa of the Central ~ront. Here the enemy operated in groupa
of 80-120 airplanea, but once again he was unable to achieve air
superiority. Oper~~ting together With the 15th Air Army, the 16th Air
Army flew 1,370 sorties~ While the enemy flew a little more than 1~000.
On the Voronezh Front the 2d Air Arary, supported by some of the forces
of the 17th Air Army~ flew 1~100 sortiea, While the enemy flew 560. The
~~ctions of the I Cround Attack Air Corps (commander, Ceneral V. G. Ryazanov)
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~OIZ O~~tCIAL U5~ ONLY
- were e~pecially e~fecti~e. With two power~ul gerikeg the corpg foiled
the ~Ctack df m~~or ~nemy ennk fnrceg nnd inf~nery in the vicinity of
Syregevd ~nd Ynkovl~vo~
Un the g~me dny 2~~ ~nemy ~irplnneg were knncked ~ldwn and lz were
de~trdyed ~t girfielcl~ of the Centr~l ~nd Vdronezh froneg, Our losgeg
were 122 ~irpl~neg~~~
beginning with this d~y 5nviet figheer~ goundly tield thE inieiative in
the ~ir. MdsC eneu~~ bombers were intercepted and ~nnih~tlated by our
fighters at the gppro~che~ Co Che ob3ect Chey were covering. The ~ctiv-
ity nf the Luftwnffe declined with every d~y.
On 8 Ju1y ~viatidn of the 16Ch Air Army flew 1,070 ~~orties, it knocked
down 88 enemy airplaneg in 4n ~ir bgteles, ~nd it losC 43 ~irplanes. Ar
tt~e Vordnezt~ ~'ront German aviaCion flew only 118 sortieg by 1~00 hours.
5oviet pilots E1ew 1 Z10 sortieg, knocked down 78 enemy airpl~nes in air
battles~ l.oeing 54.2~+
A magyed strike made by the 16th Air Army on 9 July wag typical of ehe -
.~ctions of nviation. Under fighter cnver, 150 ground uCtack airplanes
and bomberg gtruck the enemy's 9th Tank nivision in Che viciniCy of
Soborovki; tl~e srrike was so succQSaful that it halCed the enemy's
advnnce~ and ~fter iC the enemy exhibiC~d no activity wh~Csoever through- -
out Che entire day.
Thuy the giant batCle t}~nt hnd taken shape on Che ground ~nd in the air
began to gradually ~~bate. The activiey of enemy aviatl.on declined with
every day. By 10 July the offengive capabilities of fascist German
troops on the Orel-Kursk axia were exhausted. 5uffering Cremendous
losses, the Germans went over to defense, never again to recapture the
initiative.
The battle went on for .~nother few days on Che Belgorod-Kursk axis. -
After the enemy's plan for breaking through Co Kursk in Che shortest way
Erom the south ttirougt~ Oboyan' failed compleCely, he began seeking vul-
nerable places in the defenses in other sectors, and he concentrated his -
m~hin efforts in the direction of Prokhorovka. AttempCing Co foil the -
enemy's plnn, with ttic approval of the Hq 5HC the command of the Voronezh
l'ront decided on 12 July to make a powerful countersCrike with forces of
tt~e Geh Cuards and lst Tank armies, which were advanctng from a line
nortt~ of Melovoye ~nd Kruglik in the direction of Yakovlevo. General
P. A. Rotmistrov's 5th Cuards Tunk Army and part of the forces of General
A. 5. 'Lhudov's Sth Cuards Army made the principal thrust from the vicinity
of Prokhorovka in the direction of Yakovlevo. Three rifle divisions of
tt~e 7tt~ Guards Army went over to the offensive east of Belgorod.
N'or 2 nights ~ust b~Core the offensive, ADD formations and the night
bombcrs of the air armies constantly bombed enemy troops on the
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~o?~ o~~iCint. us~ ncvLY _
bnttlefield gnd de~trnyed railroad ei~lingg. Air prep~rgeion beggn ~n hour
Ue~ore th~ Counter~CCg~k df dur eroopg. The ~ gomber Air Corpg (~ommander,
Colonel I. 5. t'olbin)~ ehe I Ground Aet~ck Air Corp~ (cnmm~rid~r~ G~n~rn~
V~ C. ityaz~nov), ~nd th~ 2glgt Grnund AeC~ck Air nivi~inn Cnok p~rt in it,
gtriking g~CUmulntiong of ~n~my t~nk~ ~n~ ~rtill~ry ~e gun p~gieinng.
~dllnwing 15 minuteg nf ~reillery prepgrgeion, ~C 1830 hours nn 12 Ju1y
~ormatidn~ of Che 5rh Guard~ and 5Ch Guard~ t~nk armies went over to th~ �
dffengive. Abnut 1,2t~0 tgnk~ of boeh sides took pgrC in eh~ ~ngggement
ne Prnkhorovk~. 5tubbnrn bgetl~s tio~k shgpe in the ~ir during thi~ Cime,
lu~Cing throughout the enCire d~y. Ground attack airplane~ and bombers
~ ~f the 2d Air Ar~y acCively BupporCed the t+anka. As a reault of Che ~oinC
~~eione of grn~nd troop~ and aviation the German armored wave was h~lted.
The ~nenry lost mar~ rhan 350 tanks and ov~r 10,00d ~nli~ead m~n and offi-
c~r~.25
Tl~e enemy'~ lnst ~ttempt at bregkirig ehrnugh Co Kurek was foiled by the
afforts of our ground eroope gnd aviation~ By 23 July troops of ehe
Voron~zt~ ~ront hgd recovarpd the poaition they had occupied before 5 July.
The defensive period of the great batCle came Co an end.
In ehe defenaive period the 5oviet Air ~'orce flew more than 28~000 sortiea~
prov[ding considerable assistance to ground troops in repelling thia power-
Eul enemy offenaive. In the air, Soviet aviation fought about 1~000 air
battle~~ in which it knocked down mere than 1,400 enemy airplanea, to
include 517 on the Orel-Kursk axia and 899 on the Belgorod-Kurek axis.
'The defeat of the advancing enemy groupings created favdrgble conditions
for the counteroffeneive of the Soviet troops. The plan for this counter-
offensive was developed and approved by Che aupreme high commander back
in May, after which it was discusaed many times at Headquarters and
adjusted by the General Staff. Two groups of fronts were to participate
in the operation. The enemy's Orel grouping was to be destroyed by troops
of the left wing of th~ Western Front and by the main forces of the
Bryansk and Central fronts, while the Belgorod-Khar'kov grouping was to
be destroyed by troopa of the Voronezh and SCeppe fronCs. Strong German
troop groupings were operating forward of the Soviet fronts. DeapiCe the
tremendoue loases they suffered during their offensive, the total etrength
of their armies in thie sector was 900,000 men at Che beginning of our _
counteroffensive. The troops posaeased about 10,000 guns and mortars,
up to 1,800 tanks and assault guns~ and 2,100 warplanes. Such concentra-
tion of forcea was attained by tranaferring new divisions to thia area
and replcnishing the divisiona preaent on foot. The strength of the
Soviet troops was 2,226,500 men, over 33,000 guns and mortars, 4,800 -
tanks and SPG, and over 4,300 warplanes.26 The Soviet Air Force was
given tl~e following missions: Maintaining air superiority and dependably
c:overing the strike groupings; supporting ground troops in their penetra-
tion of enemy defenses; preventing fascist German troops from occup~?ing
defensive positions on intermediaCe lines; foiling the enemy's attempts
_ :it maneuvering tiis reserves; disrupting troop command and control. This
was to be an air offensive in Che full sense of the term. Strategic
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~viatinn w~g Ca11ed in to parti~ipate in air prep~ration and to etrike
rail ~uncCiong and other ob~ecCiveg in Che enemy rc~r. T'igheer gir
fdrm~tion~ oE th~ Nyeinnal Air n~fen~~ ~nrc~g w~re c~11ed in to cover
~rdop~ nttd ob~eCtivep in Che CrdnCal re~r.
'1'li~ c:dw~tero~fenytve nt Che erndpg of the WegCern ~nd llryangk frone~ on
- Che Or~1 ~xig beg~n wi~h acCive gir ~upport nn 12 July. 'Troops of Che
Cen~rgl ~rnnC went dver tn th~ nff~n~ive on 15 July.
In nddition to three frontal air grmies, ldng-r~nge bombera of the I, II,
~nd ItI Gunrds air corps (commanders~ Gettergls n. p. Yukh~nov, Ye.
Loginov~ N. A. Volkov), Che V and VII ~ir corpg (cnmmgndere, Gener~ls
I. V. Ceorgiyev, V. Ya. NesCerC~ev), ~nd Ch~ 45Ch Air bivigion (commander,
Cnlonel V. I, Lebedev) took un ~ative p~rC on the Ore1 axig.
l~ifteen minutes prior to the att~ck 70 I'e-2 bombers and 48 I1-2 ground
~ttnck nirplanes of Che lgt Air Army made a concentrated strike against
enemy nrtillery and ~trongpoints in ehe breakChrdugt~ sector within Che
r.one of advance of tt~e llth Guarda Army, Wegtern ~ront. ADb formations
:ind tt~~ lst Air Army's 213th Night B~mber Air bivision also operated in
this aren during the nighC. Air preparation w~s conducted aC night in
the breaktf~rougt~ sector of the 61st Army, Bryansk ~ronC by atraCegic
~vi~tion and the 15eh Air Army's 313th Night Bomber Air Division. As a
re~ult of the air and urtillery preparation enemy defenses were signifi-
canCly wenkened in the breakChrough secCors of both fronts. Frontal
troops exploited the offensive during the dny with the support of avia-
tion. On 12 July our nviaCion flew 2,174 sorties, ~nd in 72 air battles
it knocked down 86 enemy airplanes~ losing 59 of its own.2~
The fascist German troops offered stubborn resistance. In 8 days troops
of the Western Front advanced 70 km, while Che Bryansk Front troops
advanced 20 km. Between 18 and 25 July th~ XXV Tank Corps, the llth
Army, tt~e 4th Tank Army, and the II Guards Cavalry Corps were committed
to the engagement. Their commitment to the engagement and Cheir opera-
tions deep in enemy defenses were supported by all forces oE the lst and
15tii air urmies. Tlie enemy's Bolkhovo grouping was destroyed by 29 July.
Concurrently the troops advanced on the Orel and Kromy axes. So~e 120
ground attack airplanes, 112 bombers, and 200 fighters of Che 15th Air
_ Army ~upported the 3d Cuards Tank Army on the Orel axis, fulfilling
their missions of covering nnd supporting the tank army quite success-
fully. Tt~c fighter pilots of the French Normandy Air Squadron fought
valorously together with Soviet pilots on this axis. Arrivtng at the
- Eront on 25 March 1943 and joining the lst Air Army, the French volun-
- teers displayed their high skill and courage in the very first battles
witt~ the enemy. On 2 July 1943 a ukase of Che Presidium of the USSR
5upreme Soviet awarded Soviet orders to the first five French pilots
_ (Zh. Tyulyan, A. Litol'f, A. Dyuran~ M. Lefevr, L. Dyupra) for exemplary
completion of their combat assignments and the bravery and valor they
Jisplayed. By the end of July 1943 the French pilots were credited with
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knoCking ~own more thgn 30 ~nemy uirpl~nes.~~ On 5 July 1g43 ehe ~rench
' nir ~quadrnn wn~ renrgnnized ge eh~ ~igheing ~rench Norn?~ndy 1~e 5epnrate
Cighter Air Itegiment (regiment commander, Ma~or p'yer Puyy~d).
Uuring th~ nffeneive Croop~ of ehe Cene~~l ~rattt rennvered eheir 5 Ju1y
- po~itidn~, nnd nn G AugueC Chey liber~eed the city of Kromy. The 16th
Air Arrrry provid~d ~f~eCtive supporC tn ehe eroops during Che nff~ngiv~,
flying 1,n01~ gnd mnre ac~rC~.e~ every day. t~n 5 Auguse eroopg of Che
Bryanek ~ront 1lberated rhe ciey of ~r~l wieh the support of erdopg of
the WegCern and Central fronte on tihe flanka. 5ubsequenely taking
8olkhovo nnd Kromy~ troope of theee frone~ orggnized the pureuit of
~nemy trdop~ with the ~uppore of gviation, and by 18 Augugt they reached
Che line zt~izdra~ Kargchev, Umitrovsk-Orlovskiy.
Troopg of ~he Vornnezh aad Steppe frones wenC over to ehe counteroffensive
on the Belgorod-Khar'kov axie on 3 AugusC. On Che night prior Co ehe
offensive~ eCrategic aviation formations and the 2d Air Army's 208th
Nigl~t Bomber Air llivision operaCed inCensively against enemy defensive
gtructures and Croopa in the breakthrough sector. They flew 370 sorties.
Cround attack nirplanee ~nd bombera were commieted to the battle 2 hours
prior Co the aCCack of the troopg. ~nemy Croops and strongpoints within
tl~e zoneg of tl~e Voronezh Front'e 6th Guards ~nd Sth Guards armies were
guppressed and partially destroyed by powerful artillery fire and air
- strikes. The troops of these armiea captured the main defensa zone in
thc firet }iulf of the day. In the second half of 3 August the lat and
5th Guards tank armies wQre committed to the engagement within the zone
of operations of the 5th Guarda Army. They were supported by the main
forc~s of the 2d Air Army. Our aviation flew 2,670 sorties on ttiat day.29
By 11 August the tank armies reached the vicinity of Vysokopol'ye and
Kovlyagi. By this time troops of the SCeppe Front had liberated
Belgorod, reached the outer Khar'kov peritaeter, and began the fight to
penetrate it.
On 5 August 1943 our motherlaad's capital--Moscow--gave the firat salute
in honor of a major victory--liberation of the cities of Orel and
Belgorod. An order of the aupreme high commander dated 5 August 1943
stated: "Todny on 5 Au~;ust, troops of the Bryansk Front took the city
of Orel following savage battlea in which troops of the Western and
Central fronts provided support on the flanks. Today also, troops of
the Steppe and Voronezh fronta broke enemy resistance and captured the
city of Belgorod. Today, on S August, at 1500 houra our motherland's -
capitul, Moscow, will salute our valorous troopa who have liberated Orel
and Iielgorod with 12 artillery salvos by 12 guns...."
In the period from 11 to 17 August 1943 troops of the Voronezh Front -
repelled a counteroffenalve in the vicinity of Bogodukhov with active
atr aupport from the 2d Air Army, nnd between 18 and 20 August they
repelled a counteroffensLve in the vicinity of Akhtyrka. Suffering
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tremendou~ loese~ and f~iling Co achieve his ob~ecCive, Ch~ enemy wa~
fnrced to wiehdrnw. On 23 AugusC 5ovieC rroopg liberated the ciey o�
Khar'kov frnm eh~ fngCi~~ German inv~ders~ I3y 23 Auguse Che op~rarion
to de~~nr khe 13e1gorod-Khgr'kov grouping wgs compleCed~
Uuring the ~elgorod-Khar'kov opergtion 5oviet avinCion flew 28~265 combat
qoreie~. The enemy lnse 800 airplanes in suvage ttir bnCel~a and ne air-
fields.J~
~or the Soviet Air ~orce, Che bgCtle of Kursk was a Cime of further
_ improvementi of sCrnCegy and tacCics.
An gir off~naive w~s conducted in its ene3reCy by Che uir army commanders
in th~ cnurse of the couneeroffensive on ~11 fronCe of the Kursk axis;
tl~e ~cCion~ were coordinated by Hq 5HC air liaison officers Generals
C. A. Vorozheykin and 5. A. Khudyakov. After air preparation, ground
:~ttnck gnd bomber avintion immediaeely swieched to support of Che
~dvancing troops throughoue the entire depCh of the operaCion.
The efforts of our nviation were concentraCed on narrow secCors of Che
- front againge Che mosC importanti ob~ectives, mainly enemy tanks and
arCillery. Tt~rough continuous preasure on enemy Croops, frontal aviaCion
reduced their capability for resistance, inflicted large losses on them,
~nd thus promoted Che succesa of penetration of enemy defenses by our
Croops. Ceneral 'L. Z. Rogoznyy, commander of Che XLVIII Rifle Corps~
5teppe ~ront, wrote in a report daCed 3 August thaC ground units were
able to advance succesafully only owing to well organized inreraction
and the massed strikes of ground atCack pilots.31 When Cank major forma- -
tions and formations were cocmnitted to the engagement, the air armies
directed their efforts at suppressing enemy antitank defenses, at pre-
venting reserves from reaching the battlefield, and at providing air cover �
to Cank and mechanized corps. From 50 to SO percent of the forces of the
air armies were commitCed to supporting and covering these corps and to
fighting antitank resources. For example the lst and 5th Guards tank
- :~rmies were supported by the V Ground AtCack (commander, General N. P.
K~manit~) ~nd the X Fighter Air Corps (commander, General M. M. Golovnya),
as well as by the 202d Bomber Air Division (commander, General S. I.
Nict~iporenko) and the 291st Ground Attack Air Division (commander,
Colonel A. N. Vitruk).
Sovict aviation took the most active part in purauit of the withdrawing
enemy troops. During the counteroffensive our aviaCion successfully
completed its mission of interdicting enemy rail and motor shipments.
Wtien the fascist command began transferring tank and motorized divisions
from the llonets Basin and other sectors to the vicinity of Bogodukhov
:ind Akhtyrka on an emergcncy basis~ the 8th Air Army, Southern Front was
c_ommltted to action first by order of the Soviet Army Air Force com-
m~incler. As the reserves moved along the front line, the 17th, 5th, and
2c1 ~ir armies entered into battle with them, destroying enemy trains at
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the rail etationa of Gorlovka, Slavyanak, Barvenkovo, ~nd Pavlograd, and
nnnihilating motor columns on ehe roads. In rhis game perind aviaeion
oC the IV and VI Allll aix corpe operated againet ruil. ~uncCiona and aCa-
tion~ ~n~ ['oltavu, Lyubotin, Kraenonrmeyskoye, Krasnograd~ and Merefa.
lietweetl 4 and 12 AugueC our avigCion flew more Chnn 7,100 sorCies to
inC~rd:lcC Che enemy's rnil tranefers. JusC air formations of the 8Ch
and 17~h air armies alone burned 16 erains ~nd destroyed 20 t~nks and
about 30 motor vehicles on the roada.3Z As ~ result of the combined
action~ of frontal aviation and aCrategic aviation, transfer of enemy
eroopa was retarded and entailed grea.*, losaes. During the counCer-
offenaive at Kurak SovieC aviation flew more than 90,000 sorties. In
1~700 air battlea i~ desCroyed 2,100 enemy airplanes; in addition~ 145
were destroyed and damaged et airfielda~ and 780 were knocked down by
antiaircraft artillery.33
T'he great baCtle of Kurak ended wiCh the brilliant victory of the Soviet
Armed Forces aver Che Faeciat German Army. "The giant battle on Che
- Orel-Kursk salient in summer 1943," said L. I. Brezhnev, "broke the back-
bone o� Hitler'e Germany and brought iCs armored troops to ashea. Our
~xrmy's superiority in combat akills, in armament, and in straCegic leader-
' ship became clear to all the world."34 The baCCle of Kursk had tremendous
aignif:icance to aubaequent developmenC of events on the SovieC-G~rman
front. It created favorable condiCiona for a general offensive by the
Soviet Army to liberate the left-bank Ukraine, the Donets Basin, western -
oblasts of the RSFSR, and eastern regiona of Beloruasia; the Dniepr was
crossed, beachheads were captured on its right bank, and on 6 November
the capital of the Ukraine--Kiev--was liberated. This was the period of
the fundamental turning poi~?t, which was marked by outstanding vic-
_ tories of the Soviet people and their army and which dramaCically altered
the military-political situation in the international arena.
For the Soviet Air Force the baCtle of Kursk was an intenae sCruggle for
straCegic air superiority in the concluding stage. Up to 35 percent of
all sorties were flown in behalf of this miasion. This fight~ which went
on for almost a month and a half, culminated with defeat of the main
enemy air forces and attainment of strategic air superiority by the
5oviet Air Force.
Soviet pilots displayed mass heroism and high combat skill in the battles.
Un 6 July 1943 pilot Communiat A. K. Gorovets performed an immortal act
of lieroiam. lie knocked down nine enemy bombers in a single air battle.
This was the only time such a thing ever happened in the world. A. K.
Carovets was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title posthumously.
The ciCation accompanying his award read: "In this air battle Comrade
Gorovets displayed exceptional flying skill, valor, and heroism, he
~ personally knocked down nine enemy airplanes, and he himself died the
deatli of the brave."35 k'ilots S. D. Luganskiy, M. S. Tokarev, V. I.
Andrianov, A. P. Mares'yev, A. N. Yefimov, N. D. Gulyayev, A. V.
Dobrodetskiy, and many othera fought selflessly. Junior Lieutenant
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I. N. Kozl~edub~ who eubsequently wenC on Co earn the Hero of Chc Soviet
Union CiC1e ehrQe timea, experienced hts b~pCism of bnttle here. -
Th~ bnttl~ of Kurek demonstrgted ehnt Che ta~CiCg Che air arms emp~.oyed
in Che actione of our nir force had improved. The tacCics of ground
- utC~Ck ~vineion flying in large groupa en~oyed fureher deve~.opmenr.
lfomber evlution nccumuli~ted much axperience in dive bombing ~nd in
muking concentrated nttii~cks in uniCs of up eo divieion strengeh inclu- ,
- sively. Figheer aviaeion diaplayed greater skill in group air baCelea
- and air engagemenCe.
_ On the wt~ole many new premiaes were ~dded Co air force stratiegy and to
the ractics nf Che air arms at the battle of Kurak, rising yeC unoCher
ttotch in their development.
Tt~e Soviet Army Air Force Command and Che commandera, staff, and political
aganciea of the frontal air armies broadly uCilized the lessons learried
by aviation in the baCCle of Kurek on other axes. Measures were imple-
mented to improve the organization of air units, to generalize and dis-
seminate the combat experience, and to heighten the level of logistical
support. In October 1943 new manni.ng Cables were spelled out for fighter
and ground attack air regimenta by deciaion of the Air Force MiliCary
Coun~i~. ~nlargement of the air regiments satisfied Che growing require- -
meneA of air force tacCica and strategy.
Tii llecember 1943 the Air rorce MiliCary Council lield a meeCing of the
military disrrict air force commanders, commanders of reserve air
- brigades, and representatives from the operating air armies devoted to
- upgrading ttie quality of pilot training in reserve air regiments. The
proceedings of the conference were utilized to develop new combat train-
_ ing courses for fighter, ground aCtack, and bomber aviation, to be
introduced in 1944.
Forms for improving the combat skills of flight crews such as practical
flying conferences en3oyed extensive support in many air armies. In
Uecember 1943, during preparaCions of troops of the 3d Ukrainian Front
to liberate the right-bank Ukraine, a conference was held in Che IX Mixed
Air Corps, 17th Air Army. It was aCtended by the commanders of air
divisions, regiments, air equadrons, and flights, by pilots, by chiefs
of staff, and by party-political workers. Hq SHC lisison officers Marshal
of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy and General F. Xa. Falaleyev, the
Cront's troop commander General R. Ya. Malinovskiy, and General V. A.
5udets, commander of the 17th Air Army, took an active part in the con-
ference proceedings. The conference played a positive role in preparing
commanders and flight crews for the offensive operations.36
- Commanders, poliCical agencies, and the parCy and Komsomol organizations -
of units and formations in the operating air force utilized the intervals
between battles to train the personnel. Recalling this, Chief Marshal of
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AviuCion pgvel Srep~novich KuC~khov, an ~ctive parCicipant of ~ir bgttleg -
in ehe Noreh, wroCe Che following in the newepaper KRASNAYA zV~znA: "The
beetles were seubborn~ Yt would have appeared that we were eoo exhgusted
tio erain in Che ehore inrervnle beeween Chem. Neverehele~g we managed
to fight and eo Crain.... A bunker containing a smoky heater mxde from
~ gpenC ~hell caeing served gs the clasaroom, and the auditorium in which
we took our examinatione was the air~ eh~ b~CCle. The buttker in which
we underwer~t rheoretical Craining had e magnetic pull on us. We ofCen
atudied in it at the expense of sleep and resC."37
Air force political agencies reorganized the primary party organizations
in June 1943 in accordance with a directive of the RKKA Main Political
Uirectorate dgCed 4 June 1943, "On Che Structure of Red Army Parry
i Organizationa."~a Some 23~ new primury organizatione were creaCed in Che
air force. Their number was increased by 13 percent. A11 flying aub-
= units had their own party organizaCions. Enlargement of the number of
parey organizaCions, growth of party membership, and encouragemene of
fresh party forces to lead and pareicipate in partp life reaulted in
greater acCiveneas of party-political work. It became even more effi-
cient and more clos ely associated wiCh comb aC missions.
Generals and office rs of Che Main DirecCorate of Combat Training for
~rontal Aviution headed by General D. F. Kondratyuk did an extremely
great amount of fruitful work to improve the combat qualities of the
peraonnel of air force unita and formaCions operaCing in the fronCa.
This directorate was created by decision of the State Defenae Committee
back in January 194 3. In 1 year it held more than 2,000 lectures, mili-
tary games, group exerciaes, and various lessona in the units and forma-
Cions of the air armies. More than 4,500 demonstraCion and training
flights were flown with the purpose of teaching the tacCics of single
and group sir battles and demonstrating the combat formations used by
new typea of airplanes; different methods of atCacking small mobile
ground turgets nnd guiding alrplanes by radio to enemy air and terrestrial
- ob3actives were tes ted out.39
FOOTNOTES
1. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg.
Kratkaya istoriya" (The Great PaCriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-
19~i5. A Short lliatory), Moscow, 1970, p 237. '
- 2. Ibid.
3. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetakogo Soyuza 1941-1945
gg." (History of the Great Patriotic War of Che Soviet Union 1941-
1945), Vol 3, Moscow~ 1964, p 241.
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1 !f � ~y�� t~* ~t ~a}~ ~tt
- C~~ VPP~C1tW U~7G Ql\LY
y ~
4. "SoveC~kiye Voyennn-Vozdu~hnyy~ 5ily V Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
_ 1941-1945 gg." (Tha SnvieC Air F'orne in Che Gr~nt ~ntrintic Wnr
- 1941-1945), Mo~cnw, 1968, p 174.
5. "Vclikny~ neeche~tv~nnayg voyng Snver~kngo 5,~yuL~ 1g41-1945 gg.
Kratkaya igtoriyn," p 239.
6. Arkhiv MO S55R [USSR Mini~Cry of nefenge ArchivesJ, f. 13-A, np. 5G�4~ -
d. 310, 21. 4-160.
7. "5ov~tskiye Vnyenno-Vozduehnyye 5i1y v Velikoy Oeechestv~nnoy voyr.e
~ 1941-1945 gg.~" p 174.
8. AC gn ~1tiCude of 2~000-4,000 meters ehe Lg-5fn h~d a horizonCal
velocity 40-80 km greaCer ehan th~e of the Germ~n FW-190, and ir
w~g more maneuvernUle.
9. Arkhiv MO 5SSR, f. 35, op. 11250, d. 47, 1. 52.
10. Arkhiv MO SSSR, f~ 35, op. 11285, d. 5, 1. 33.
11-12. Arkhiv MO 55SR, f. 35, op. 11268, d. 5, 1. 33.
13. Arkhiv MO 5SSR, f. 302~ op. 4196~ d. 24, 11. 67-70.
14. Arkhiv MO 5S5R, f. 35, op. 92815, d. 59, 11. 22-23.
15. Arkhiv MO 5SSR~ f. 368, op. 11538, d. 3, 1. 114; f. 302, op. 20739,
d. 16, 11. 39, 117.
16. "Sovetakiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
1941-1945 gg.~" p 177; "Iatoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny
5ovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg.," Vol 3, p 395.
17. Arkliiv MO SSSK, f. 36~, op. 11588, d. 3~ 1. 214. -
' 18. "Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika SSSR" (USSS~ AviaCion and Cosmonautics), _
Moscow, 19n8, p 155.
19. Ibid. , p 1.i7.
20. Mellentin, i.~ "Tankovyye srazheniya 1939-1945 gg." (The Tank
~ngagements of 1939-1945), abridged, Cranslated from English, Moscow,
1957~ p 192.
21. "Aviataiy~ i koamonnvtika SSSR," pp 155, 157.
22. Arkhiv MO SS5K, f. 35, op. 11285, d. 822, 1. 36.
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- 23~ Ibid.~ 1. 47.
24. Ibid.~ 1, 58.
25~ "Iseoriya Velikoy OCecheeCvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 194~-
1945 gg~~" Vn1 3~ p 274~
26. "Veli~Cayg OCechestvennaya voyna Sovetskngo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg.
Kratkaya iseoriya." p 250.
Z7. "Sovetekiye Voyenno-~Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
1941-1945 gg.," pp 188-18g.
~8. "AviaCsiya i kosmonavCika SS5R," p 162.
29. "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otecheatvennoy voyne -
1941-1945 gg.~" p 195.
30. Ibid.~ p 197.
31. Arkhiv I~iO 5SSR, f. 327, op. 48734, d. 1, 1. 110.
- 32. Arkhiv MO SSSR, f. 35, op. 28344, d. 12, 11. 60-63.
33. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941- -
- 1945 gg.~" Vol 3, p 403.
- 34. Brezhnev, L. I., "Velikaya pobeda sovetakogo naroda" (The Great
Victory of the Sovi.et People), Moacow, 1965, p 13. _
35. Arkhiv MO SSSR, f. 33, op. 793756, d. 11, 1. 268.
36. Arkhiv MO SSSR, f. 370, op. 6548, d. 38~ 11. 42, 43.
31. KRASNAYA zVEZDA, 25 May 1968.
38. "'KPSS o'3ooruzhennykt Silakh Sovetakogo Soyuza' Sb. dokumentov
~i91?--i968)" ("The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union."
Collection of Documents (1917-1968)), Moscow, 1969, pp 323-324.
39. Arkhiv MO S5SR, f. 35, op. 11291, d. 8, 11. 6-7; d. 63, 11. 1-7. _
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CHAPTER VI. THE SOVIET ARMY AIR FORCE IN OPERATIONS OF THE CONCLUDING
PERIOD OF THE WAR.
The SituaCion at Che Fronta at Che Beginning of 1944 _
Measurea of the Soviet Army Air Force Command and Staff To Improve
Management of Aviation
Ttao and a half years of hard baCCles and engagements had passed. The
year of the fundamenCal turning poinC had gone by. By the beginning of
1944 Che situation on the front was leaning in favor of the USSR. The
~ great victories of the Soviet Army in 1942-1943 a,~monstraCed to a11 Che
world ehe greater baCtle power of the socialist staCe and its armed
forces. It became obvious that the Soviet Union was capable of con- _
- ducting Che war to a victorious conclusion with its own forces. This
resulted in further growth of the USSR's authority. The war economy
grew even stronger. Soviet industry continued to supply top-class com-
bat equipment Co the armed forces in ever-increasing proportions. The
Soviet Army's fighting strength was 6,165,000 men, 88,900 guns and mortars,
2,167 rocket launchers, about 4,900 tanks and self-propelled guns, and
_ 8,500 airplanes. Although the German Armed Forces had suffered consid-
erable losses on the Soviet-German front and experienced a certain reduc-
Cion in strength, nevertheless thPy were poweriul. On the Eastern front
the enemy t~ad 4,906,000 men, over 54,000 guns and mortars, 5,400 tanks
- and assnult guns, and 3,000 airplanes.l
The strategic initiative was in the hands of the Soviet Command. The Hq
SHC made plans for an offensive along the entire front consisting of a
number of powerful, successive strategic operations in separate highly
important sectors of the Soviet-German front. The main thrust was to
occur on the southwestern axis with the objective of destroying the =
_ largest enemy groupings and liberating the right-bank Ukraine and the -
Crimea. The mission on the northwestern axis was to destroy the enemy _
- grouping, relieve block~ded Leningrad, and reach the outskirts of the
Soviet Baltic republics. On the western axis, Army Group Center was to
be defeated and the enemy was to be cleared from a significant part of -
Belorussia. As.before, Che German Command considered the Eastern front
- tc> be the main front. ]C planned to concentrate its troops in those
_ �
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~ectors where ehrust~ by the Sovier Army were expecCed ~nd~ maneuvering
ies reserveg and nviaCion, td h~le Chd ~dv~nce uf SovieC troop~. In
the W~~t~ Cadai~t Cermgny made preparationg Co repel ehe as~ault 1~nding
in Noreh~rn I~runc~, eo g~ize Ch~ initinCive~ and tn nchieve viceory in
the wgr, The iden of sei~ing Che initigtive and gchieving vicenry in -
wgr wus gdv~nCur~.~Cic; it dtd not correapond to the real aituation that
had evolved on tt~e 5dvi.eC-Germatt front gg nf the begintting df 1944~
The Soviet Air ~orce began Che Chird gnd fin~l perind di the Gregt
- Pntriotic Wnr nutfltted wit;:i the lateet equipment gnd with a tremendous
umount of combat experience accumulaeed. Ie had maseered new forms ot
gtrgtegic use of lgrge air formgtions nnd method~ of gcCion for all air
arms and aervices boCh in independenC eir operations gnd in acCinns
jointly wiCh the ground traopa. The Soviet Air ~orce ftrmly held Che
~trategic initiative and air euperioriry along the enCire Soviet-German
~ front. Our aviaeion induatry produced 35,000 warpl~nes in 1943. As of
1 J~nuary 1944 the demand of 5ovivC Arury Air ~orce air units and mili-
- eary educational inseiCurions for nirplanea was satiefied by more than
100 percent. As of 1 January 1944, 86,7 percent of the airplanes in �
fighter aviation, 100 percenC in ground aCCack aviation, and 75.3 percent
in bomber aviaeion were new.2
' Aix divisions of the frontal nir servicea were reorganized from a two-
regiment to a three- and four-regiment compoaition, and 50 ground attack
and 36 fighter sir regimente were reorganized with a atrength of 40 air-
planea.3
The greater power and the superiority of Soviet weapons and SovieC mili-
tary science were demonstrated moat clearly in operations of the final
period of the Great Patriotic War, conducted on the central and souChern
wings of the Soviet-Germar~ front. Typical features of the actions of the
Soviet Air Force in Chis p~riod of the war included concenCraCion of
lar~e air forces on the main axea of operations of the ground troops,
mas:sing of the efforts of aviation within a narrow aector to complete
its main misaiona~ extensive maneuvering of SHC reserve air corps and
divisions, commitmenC of ~ignificant strategic aviation forc~s to mis-
sions in direct support of frontal troops, coordination of the acCions
of several air armies in the frontal air services and strategic aviation
= under the sole leadership of the eenior air chief.
New typical churacteristica in the acCions of Soviet aviation revealed
themselves moaC clearly in ma~or offensive operations such as the Korsun'-
Shevchenkovskiy, Belorussian, YisCula-Oder, Eastern Prussian, and Berlin -
orera,:iona. The command and staff of the Soviet Army Air Force took a
mnst active part in these operations. Creation of new aviation equip-
ment, its rapid assimilation by flight crews, and its correct utilization
on tl~e fronta of the war were the daily concerns of the commander and all
members of the Air Corce Military Council. At the beginning of January
i944 tt~e Air Force Military Council revi~.~ed the availability of new
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typeg of ~irpl~ne~ in frontal avi~tion ~nd concluded Chat regrm~ment nf
~vi~tinn in rhe ~~r C~gt, whiCh hnd been ge~rted e~rlier, had to be con-
tinued, -
A repnrt ~ddr~~~ed to the gupreme high anmm~nder st~eed: "...We t~~ve
nccumul~t~d n r~gerve of fighter airplaneg insuring replenishment of
1o55eg and ~u11 reequipment of uniCS plaCed ineo the regerve gnd newly
tormed unitg. Considering Chese favdrgble CondiCinn~, we bell~ve it
pdssible to continue re~rm~menC of the figheer aviation of the ~gr
~~gCern nnd Trungb~yk~l frdneg, the gir uniCs of which are armed wiCh
tl~e obsolete I-1G, I--153, gnd I-15bi~."4 In response the 5upreme High
Command nrdered renrm~menC of avineion in Che ~ar ~gst wiCh new Cypes
of airplgney.
Uu 7~ebr~ary 1944 the Air ~orce Milienry Council discussed the progress
~f designin~ new ~vi~tion equipmenC and made a decision to submiC a plan
tor experimentnl co?iyeruction o~ airplane~ and armamenC in 1944-1945 Co
tl~e U55R I'cople'~ CommissariaC of nefense. The problems of upgrading the
_ qu~liCy oC ;iirplanes nnd armament produced by industry were discussed
many time~ .yy we11.5
_ L~~ t~ebruary 194G thc 5oviet Army Air I'orce Headquarters held n confer-
ence of tt~e air for~e executives of military disericts and military
training institutions. At this conference Che Air ~orce MiliCary Council
demanded that its p~rticipanCS take efficienC sCeps to eliminaCe the
preconditions for flying accidents, to strengthen military discipline,
.~nd to intensify party-political work, viewing these as Che most impor-
tnnt prerequisites for high-quality training of cadees in flight schools.6
In Ptarct~ rt~e Air Force Military Council held a conference of Che chiefs
of technical schools, advanced Craining courses, and air mechanic and
j~m ior specialist schools; a decision was made at this conference to ~
improve tecl~nician training with a consideraCion for Che war experience.~
The 5oviet Army Air ~orce tleadquarters insured continuity or command and
control of clie :~ir ~rmies, it participated in the writing of plans, it
generalized the experience of aviation's combae acCivities, and it
brought it to the uwareness of Che Croops.
In tt~e first half of 1944 the generals and officers of Air Force Head-
, quarters wrote and submitted, to the Soviet Army Air For~e command, a
number of clirective~ addressed to air army commanders and aimed at
improving control oC aviation and achieving greater effectiveness in its
combat applicatiun. On 16 April 1944 the air force commander published
a ~irective concerriinb the fight against enemy air reconnaissance. It
stated that sin~;le Cerman air scouts had recently been penetrating deeply
into our rear and maintaining surveillance over our movements. All air
army commanders were ord~red to develop special measures to fight enemy
air reconnaiss~~nce; to assign particular zones to air fighter corps and
divisions for actions against enemy reconnaissance airplanes; to organize
- fightcr nmbushes on probable routes of enemy scouts and to make broad
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u~~ nf r~dio guidanC~; ~ighter~ enking to the gir were ordered eo pur~ue
~nd nnnlhilnCr. thc enemy airplnne~.8
Un 1S Muy 1y44 th~ ~ir forc_~ .:ommgnd publighed g direceive dem~nding th~e
ttir ~rmy commanderg to ab~ndon the ~rgCtice nf aesignin~ cnmbat migeion~
- eo 5t[C r~gerve ~ir cnrps and divisiong ag gingle sortieg; instegd~ they
wer~ eo asgi6.. missions for a particular period of eime, ~or th~ day of
nn operntion gs g minimum~ Mieginns nould be agsigned ~g single sorties
to ~ir cnrpg ~nd divisinns nnly in excepCinnal cgseg.9 In 1g44 gpecifi~ -
~ir farce gt~~f officer~ wer~ gppointied to wriee ~ummaries on ehe gir
~itu~tinn on the 5oviet-German fronC evary 10 days, to be reported Co
thc Commnnder and members o~ the Air ~orce Miliegry Council. Thia gumm~ry
lndicated Cl~e composiCion of Che air groupinga of the belligerenes~ and �
etinir quuntitutive nnd qugliCative changes; cnncenCration of aviaCian nn
~trnrc~giC nxgs ~nd ug~ of new egcCice; ehe number of aureie~ �lown ~nd
the irit~:ngiry of combnr ~cCiviCies of individu~l nir arros ~nd ~ervices;
the tnt~1 number n~ air bgtClea, gnd new tactiC~ employed in them, The
gumm~rieg ended with cottcluaions and proposal~ concerning more effeceive
u~e of the nir force.ln
Itt ~ddiCion air force etaff workers prepared monChly reporCs for the
Cenergl 5taff on the actions of the air force. A general large-acale
map of the strategic situation was conetanrly maintained by two highly ~
qualifiad officers, the aenior of whom wa~ Colonel I. M. Kuz'min. -
Uaually by 2200-2300 hours the worl: ~f plotCing Che daCa on the aituation
map and writ:~ng draft reports to the supreme high commander and the opera-
tion~l summary on the re~ult of air force actions in Che previous day was
complee~d. At Chis eicr~e Che commgnder attd u~embers of the Air Force Mili-
tary Council uaually came to a large room in one of the direcCorates where
n11 of the summary data were brought together; there, Che directorate
chief reported the strategic situation, the changes that had occurred in
tlie balance of power in Che air, and the preliminary data on the results
of air force actions in the previous day. Decisions were often made here
in regard Co n number of problems associated with heightening the effec-
tiveness of Che actions of different air arms and services, and these
dccisiong were documented on the spot by Air Force Headquarters officera.
A new section for staff operational training was created at Air Force
ileadquarters. Ceneral M. D. Smirnov was appoinCed chief of the section,
and his deputy was Colonel N. A. Sokolnv. Favorable condiCions were
created for more purposeful and integrated solution of many problems
concerning the strategic use of the air force.
The command and staff of the Soviet Army Air Force raised the level of
management of ma~or operational air formations at the fronts of the war
in 1944, and they acquired a great deal of experience in maneuvering air
reserves and concentrating the efforts of aviation on the most important
~ectors of operations of the ground troopa, at providing all-out support
to combat operations.
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'i't~~ KorSUn'-Sti~v~h~nk~vgkiy Oper~tion
In cnmplinnce wiCh rhe over~ll inCent of Che suprem~ high commnnder tiroope
of the four Ulcruini~n FronCgll initiaeed ~n offensive on Che southern wi.ng
of Che Sovier-Cermnn ~ronC nt Che end of n~Cember 1943 ~nd rhe beginning -
of Janu~~ry 1944. lleadquarters liai9on officers coordin~ted ehe actione
of Che Prdnes-~M~rgk~nl of ehe SovieC Union C. K, zhukov in the lse and
2d Ukraini~n frones, and Ma.rsh~1 of ehe 5oviee Union A. M. V~silevskiy in
the ~d and 4rh Ukrainian frones. The ~ction~ of evi~rion were coordinated
by Mnrshul df Aviation A. A. Novikov. Troops of Che 1sC Ukr~inian ~ront
were ehe fireC ro begin cnmbaC gctiviei~a nC the end of December Y943,
with the aceive supporC of aviation of Che 2d Air Army (commander~ General
S. A. Krnsovekiy). By 14 January Chey had almost completely liberaCed
Kiev and zhitomirskayn oblasts and many rayons of V.innitskaya and
Itovensk~yn obl~sts. '1'he 2d Ukrainian ~ronti~ the troops of which were
~uppnrted nnd cnvered by rhe 5Ch Air Army (commander, General S. K.
Cory wiov), went over tn Che offensive on 5 Jnnuary 1944. The front's
troops libcrated Kirovograd by mid-Jnnuary. The righC flank of the enemy
grouping in the vicinity of Koraun'-Shevchenkovskiy was threaCened.
'Ttie 3d and ~ith Ukrainiatt fronCs undertook an offensive on 10-11 January
1944 witl~ tl~e ob,jective of destroying Che enemy at Che Nikopol' beachhead
~nd in the viciniCy of Nikopol'. The fronCs were covered and supported
from Clic air by the 17th Air Army (commander, General V. A. Sudets) and
- etie 8th Air Army (commander, General T. T. Khryukin) respecCively. The
offensive actions of Che troops of Che lst and 2d Ukrainian fronts
resulCed in envelopment of both flanks of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy
grouping. The }ieadquarters ordered the commanders of these fronts,
Cener~ls N. VaCutin and I. S. Konev, Co encircle and anttihilaCe the
enemy's Korsun'-Shevchenkovakiy grouping. Troops of the strike grouping
_ oF ttie 2d Ukrainian Front began combat activities aC Korsun'-
Shevchenkovskiy on 24-25 January, and on 26 January the strike grouping
- of ttie lst Ukrainian Front attacked on a converging axis. The troops of
etie fronts were supporCed by the Sth and 2d air armies. The latter pos-
sessed 768 warplanes, being inferior in numbers Co the enemy, who concen-
tra~ed about 1,000 airplanes on this axis.12 The strike groupings of both
fronCs artacked on converging axis and met in the vicinity of Zvenigo-
rodk:i. Ten of the enemy's divisions and one of his brigades were
encircLed. By 3 February Soviet troops had creaCed an inner and outer
Front of encirclement. The actions of our a~~iation proceeded in extremely
complex meteorological conditions. Moreover a thaw set in at the end of
January and in ttie beginning of February 1944, meaning that dirt landing
strips could no longer be used. By this time the air a?:mies had only
two or thrce operable airfields left for practical purposes, wiCh 50-100
oC our :iirplanes based at each of them. Bu~t even despite these condi-
" tions tl~e ground troops received considerable assistance from the air.
- Between 29 January and 3 February 1944 our aviation flew 3,800 combat
sorties in tlie vicinity of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy grouping, while
~nemy aviation flew twice fewer.l3
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Un order o~ A. A. Nnvikov~ who betore leaving Moacow h~d reported his
~uggnaCiott~ Cd tih~ ~upr~me high c~mmander concerning the uee of ~vi~tion
to clc:gtroy elic ~nemy'~ Korsun'-5lievchcnkovekiy grouping, extensive usc
wu~ madc nE high-explosive bombg by I1-2 ground aCtiack nirplanes, ~nd
I'o-2 night 1ighC bombers were puC into broad uae. They were especially
he:lpful in repe111ng enemy c~unCeratrikea on the outer fronC of encircle-
ment in the vicinity of Tolmach and Lisyanka. On 4~ebruary, when enemy
tnnks wedged Chemselves into Che defenses of the 53d Army, 2d Ukrainian
I~'ronC, the enemy's atrempt aC peneCraCing inCo the encircled area was
foiled by the effores of ground attack sircraft and artillery. Ground
uttr~ck nviaCion of the 2d Air Army made two powerful atrikea againat
- enemy tank groupings aCtempting to relleve the encircled grouping.
German diviaions managed to penetrate to the vicinity of Lisyanka ae
ehe cos~ of high losaes, while Che encircled rroopa pushed toward the
1~eter, reaching Shenderovka. The two formationa were aeparaCed by a
serip only 12 km wide. But they ware unable to cross it.
After Che hope for assiatance from wiehout was l.ost, encircled fascist
Cerman troops attempCed to break out of the encirclement independently.
On Che night of 17 February 1944 Che enemy troops formed into columns
and began marching souChwes~ from Shenderovka. Crews of ehe 312Ch Light
llomber Air Division headed by Colonel V. P. Chanpalov constanCly bombed
the Cerman columns; fleeing the air sCrikes, they fell under intense
rocket artillery fire. Most of them were annihilated, and only a small
group of tanks and armored tranaporters was able to break out of Che
encirclement during the intense fire storm. The air blockade of the
encircled enemy grouping was organized and mainCained well, and there -
was mucl~ to be learned from it. Following the experience of Stalingrad,
jointly witti the 2d Air Army commander, General S. A. Krasovskiy, and
Cencral L. C. Rybkin, conunander of the X Fighter Corps of the National
Air Defense Fnrces, A. A. Novikov created four zones for annihilation
of enemy transporC aviation attempting to supply encircled troops by air.
German aviation was destroyed in the four zones by fire from the 2d Air
Army and the X Fighter Air Corps. Beyond the outer front of encircle-
_ ment, airfields at Uman', Vinnitsa, and Novo-Ukrainka were struck. Enemy
airfields and landing strips were struck simultaneously. The 5th Air
Army provided support to troops desCroying the encircled enemy.
I3etween 31 January and 15 February our aviation knocked down 257 enemy
airplanes, to include 31 transporters, during the air blockade, and in
Che entire period of the destruction of the encircled grouping 457
fascist Cerman airplanes were annihilaCed in air baCtles and at air- _
fields.14 As a result of Che air blockade, the encircled grouping was
isolated and deprived of external assisCance, which went a long way to
facilitate its final destruction.
- I~orty-nine tons of gasoline, 65 tons of ammunition, and 525 rockets were
delivered Uctwnen 8 and 16 February to forward units of the 2d and 6th ~
Tank armtes by tlie 326th Night Bomber Air Division. This was invaluable
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~g~tgt~nc~ to Che tronps in ehe Cli~w Condieions, when ~tuck vehicles
c:lureer~d rlie roncl~ and Crnctors were nor ~lw~yg nble to travel. Tlie
Korgunti!~Sh~vchenkov~kty oper~tion ended. 5ome 55,Od0 Germ~n ettllsted
men nnd~'df~iCery wcre 1ci11ed nnd wdunded~ and more ehnn 18,000 were
t~k~n prisoner.~5 'I'he Koreun'-Shevchenkovgkiy opernei~n eneered ehe
hi~tory of Che Great Parrioeic War g~ ~ remark~ble ex~mple o~ encircle-
mene ~nd annihll~Cion of a l~rge en~my grouping. Onc~ a~ain rhe Soviet
Army demnnstratpd iCs nbility tn COttdUCC gn encircling operaCion, which
i~ one of ehe mase complex forma of combnC nceivities. 5ovieti aviaeic?n
damonsrrated iCs CoCal guperi~riCy over enemy ~vi~Cion, isnlaCing the
- encircled grnuping from exeerngl assiseance by air. In winter and spring
1944 Crodps of the lot, 2d, 3d, and 4th Ukr~inign frones inflicted a
ma~or defeat upon tlie enemy wiCh active air supporC. The right-bank
Ukrnine w~s totally libernted, The Sov3eC Armed ~orces enCered the eerri-
tory cC Itomania. In Chr first 3 monChs of 1944 the 5ovieC Air I'orce flew
more ~l~:an 7U,000 sorties and dropped Chous~nds of Cona of bombs on enemy
- ob~ec~ives. It annihilnted 1,467 enemy nirplanes in air b~etles and ae
:iirfieldy,l6 .
Uii 21 Cebruary 1944 u ukase of the Presidium of tt~e U55R Supreme 5oviet
awnrded Che highest rank in nviaCion--chief marshal of aviation -to
Aleksandr Aleksnndrovich Novikov for his exemplary miliCary service to
the Communist Parey and our sociulist motherland. -
T}~e 13elorussian Oper~tion
In wineer and spring 1944 the Soviet Armed Forces sub~ected the enemy to
serious defegt and reached Che eastern regions of Che I3altic, Belorussi~, -
tt~e western oblasts of the Ukraine, and NorCheastern Romania. In Che
second lialf of April 1944 the 5oviet Army halCed its offensive on order
oC the !iq SHC. Troops of the lst Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fror~ts
went over to defense on 17 April, troops of the 2d Baltic Front went over
to defense on 18 April, and troops of the Leningrad, 3d Baltic, and 3d and
2d Be?orussian fronts went over to defense on 19 April. An order was
~,ublished on 22 April to strengChen defenses within the secCor of the
lst Baltic Front, and on 6 May the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts went over
to defense. Intense preparations began for the summer strategic offensive `
operations. in winrer and spring 1944 the Soviet Union consCanCly in-
creased its Eigl~ting power. In the first half of the year about 14,000
medium and henvy tanks and self-propelled guns, 26,000 guns with calibers
ot 76 mm and higlier, and more thnn 90,000,000 artillery shells, bombs and
mortar shells were produced. In the firsC half of 1944 aviation industry
_ proJuced 16,ODU airplanes, which replenished the losses and made it pos-
sible to form new air force units and formations.l~ In the first 5 months
oC 1944 Clie numb~r oC airplanes in the operating army increased by 25
percent.18 Multimillion armies continued to oppose each other on a front
4,450 km long, from the Barents to the Black Sea. The operat;ng Saviet
Army h:id n strengtti of about 6,500,000 men, 83,200 guns and mortars,
about 8,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1.1,800 warplanes. Troops _
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~f th~ fn~c:i~t binc on Che ~~gtern front hnd 4,000,000 men, ~bout 49,000
gune ~~id mnre~r~, over 5,200 tnnke ~nd ~~snu1C gung, nnd nbdur x,800 war-
plnneg.l`~ Ue~piCe the landing of Americ~n and ~nglish troopg in Norehern
E~rance ~n E'i June 1~144, Che 5ovi~C-German frone conCinued Cn be Che de~i-
:~ivc front of ehe w~r. ~'ifty-~ix percene of a11 df Che W~hrm~chC's ground
tdrees were nper~ting here, and if we include ~ntplliee eradp~ the figure
climb:~ en 63 p~rCenC.~~
Ln yummer 1944 ehe CommunigC Pnrty ~nd the 5ovieC Gnvernmene po~ed Che
following mieeinn Cd Che grmed forc~s--cle~r Che invaders from ~11 Soviet
land, ~nd begin th~ libergCion of the peoples of Pdland, Cze~hnslovgkia,
liulg~rin, and orher ~urnpean couneries from fascist ensl~vement.
'The neldrussinn operation occupies a specinl plnce nmong the offensive
operc~tion~ nf tl~e second h~lf of 1944. pr~pnraCions for it began in
- r~prin~ 1~~44. Itg ob~ective was el~e destruction of the Germ~n Army Group
Cen~er n~~d 11ber~nCion ot the ~elorussign 55R and iCs capienl, Minsk. The
pla~i of ti?e Helorusgign offensive operution was wriCten by the General
5taCf ~nd discussed in tlie Hq 5HC on 22 and 23 May. parCicipant~ of the
disc:uysio?i included G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vnsilevskiy, I. Kh. Bagramyan,
K. K. Rokossnvskiy~ A. A. Novikov, N. N. Voronov, N. D. Ynkovlev, A. V.
Kt~rulev, M. P. Vorob'yev, I. T. I'eresypkin, and A. I. Antonov.21 On ehe
1,100 km front from Lake Nestierdo to Verba, the fascist German grouping
in llelorussia wus opposed by four Soviet fronts--the lst $altic and the
' 3d, 2d, nnd lst Belorusaian, as well as the Dniepr Naval ~lotilla;
t~elorussian partisans were acCive in the enemy rear. The main idea of
the operation w:~s to penetrate enemy defensea on six axes by frontal
strikes, encircle and annihilaCe Che enemy's flank groupings at Vitebsk
and Bobruysk, destroy enemy Croops in the vicinities of Orsha and Mogilev
- and, by a swift maneuver of troops of the 3d and lst Belorussian fronts
in the general direction of Minsk, encircle and annihilate the German 4Ch
Army. Partisan acCivity was to be coordinated with the powerful strikes
of t~~e four fronts from the east.
Tl~e S~~viet Supreme Iligh Command concentrated the main air force grouping
of Eive atr armiea in tt~c central sector of the front: the 3d l~ir Army
(comm:~nJer, Ceneral N. F. Papivin), Che lst Air Army (commander, General
'f. 'I'. Kl~ryuktn) , tlie 4th Air Army (commander, General K. A. Vershinin) ,
~nJ tl~e lbtli Air Army (comm~nder, General S. I. Rudenko) . -
'Chc Gtli Atr Army under the command of General F. P. Polynin operated in
tt~c secoiiJ phase of the operation on the left wing of the lst Belorussian
i~ront; back in April this army was within the composition of the front
(tlic ~d i,uards Ground Attack Air Division, the 242d Night Bomber Air
I)ivi~ion~ .~nd two separate air regiments). In all, these five air armies
~~usyassed r~bout 6,000 airplanes, to include more than 1,100 day and night
Iwmi~~rs :~iiJ :,(lU0 ground attack airplanes.22 In addition eight ADD corps
wcru brougl~t in--about 1,000 bombers.
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I~~iyciyt Germ~n troops nf Army Grnup Ceneer were ~upported by ~ir form~~
rinna uf Ch~ GCI~ Air I~leer, which pdsg~~~ed 1,342 w~rplaneg.z~ Irg ~ir
gquadr~ng were bag~d ~t ~irfield complexe~ ~e Minslc, I3~rattovichi, and
13obruy~k. Bringi~lg avi~tiion closer eo Che center of Che I3elorussian
~~lient~ rh~ ~'~igcigC Germatt Command intiended to uge iC ~g the mnsC mobile
reserve in uny ~ecCor nf Che frnnti from Vitebsk to Kove1'.
'Thus t~t~~ ~ir ~ituation ~volved fgvorably fnr our nir force at Che begin-
ning of~ehe I3elorusgian opernCinn. The air force had the possibility for
yuccegsfully m~king powerful stirikes ag~ingC ehe enemy ~nd aceively sup-
poreing Chc offengive t~f rhe ground Crnops. 'The Soviet Army Air rorCe
Gommander senC ~ direcCive to ~11 nir nrmies at the beginning of June 1944
cdncerning the results oE air force activiCies in winrer-epring 1944 and
the migsion~ of the summer. The direceive made n deCailed analysis of
shortcomingg, it expl~ined eheir caus~s, nnd it provided concrete instruc- ~
riuns on tiow to correct ttiem. ~light crews were ;t_�dered eo constanely
:~Cudy their eargets, ~nd ~ir seaffs were encouraged eo work more care-
fully on ehe pl~nning Cables of inCeraceion of aviation wieh Cank and
mecl~~~nized formarions, especially at the Cime of rhe laCCer's commitment
Co the engagement and in actions at straCegic depCh. In July 1944 all _
tlgl~ter division conunanders~ eheir deputies, the chiefs of staff, and
executives of air armies sCaffs were ordered to acquaint themselves with
- Ct~e work of Ctic command posts of the fighter air corps (divisions) and
gain the pracrical skills of conCrolling aviaCion in the air by radio.
It was recommended that ground aCtack aviation be controlled over the
battlefield in accordnnce with Che principle of fighter aviation control.
Air army comm:~nders were categorically prohibited from controlling Che
sorric~s~ and ~ctions of individual groups of airpl~nes; insCead, it was
recommended that tl~ey pose concreCe missions only to air corpe and divi-
sions, leaving tt~em the right of mattaging the lower levels; the chiefs
of staff oE the air armies and air corps were obligaCed to visit their _
subordinate staffs systematically and provide concrete assistance to them
in planning and control.
A fightcr :.~ir corps or division was to be assigned by special order in
cacii air army to figtit enemy aviation, and radio resources were Co be
- provided; Cl~e f.ight was not to be limited Co air battles: Strikes against
ciirftelds werc to be organized mandatorily.24
In compliance witl~ a decision of the Hq SHC, Headquarters liaison offi-
cers traveled to tlie front to coordinate the efforts of frontal troops
and avtarton in the operation: On 5 June, Marshal of Che Soviet Union
C. K. Zhukov to coordinate the actions of the lst and 2d Belorussian -
IronCs, and somewhat later, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.
M:irsh