JPRS ID: 8274 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020019-8
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JrR5 L/8274
].z t'ebruary 1979
~CRANS I~IT I OP~S ~~d WESTERN EU ROPE
(FOUO 11/79) , ~ ~
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SH[ET JP1t5 L/8274
4, I itli~ ,in,l ~ubtitlr S.
Rrpon t)~tc
7'EtANSLA'CION~, ON WC57'i:RN I.UItOYI~,, (1'OUO ii/79) L~ ~~~rua 1979
e.
7~ Au~hu~l,l 8. f~cr(orming (hg~nir..~tiun Itcpc.
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As above
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16. Ab+tract~
Tl~e serial report contains political/economic informaCion on IJest European
cnergy, finnnce and trade policy matters as well as developments and trends -
in the doctrine, programs and problems of the ma~or communisC parCies,
including their relations with communist pa~ties outside the West European
area. �
17. i~cy NurJ~ .~nJ I)ucumcnt Analysis. 17a. Ucscriptora ,
Political Science x International Affairs Luxembourg
Sociology Austria Netherlands ~
Propaganda Belgium Norway
Ecanomics Canada Portugal
_ En~rgy Cyprus x Spain -
Industry Denmark Sweden
Trade Fin2and Switzerland
Einance X France Turkey
Gre~ce United Kingdom
176. IJcntific�t./()rcn-(~.nJcJ 1'crms Iceland X WeSC Germany
X Italy
t~~. ~~?.n�ri r�~,�t,i~~,~�~r SC, SD, 10
18. ,1v.~il.d~il~ry ~t.~l~�m~�n~ 19. Sccutity Class (Thi~ 21. \o. ~f I'~~rs
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,TPRS L/8274
1~ February 1979 -
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 11/79)
CONT~NTS ~ PAGE
:~NT~~n7~xortnL n~r~~xs
_ 11.incLton, Purpo~e o1' ~Br~udt Commission~ Discussed
(I`ritz rtscher; ~UROPA ARCHIV, 10 Dec 78) 1
~p:zn i.sh-German Agreement of' So1ar I~iergy Zmminent
(CI~NBIO l~, 1.4 Jan 79) 10
~ I~1tANC E~, -
New Post-Llect.ion Policy Tendencies Viewed �
(Walter Schuetze; EUROPA ARCHN, 10 Dec 78) 12
Mi.tterrund-Rocard ~uestion SePn He~ded for Showdown
(Robert 5chneider; L'EXPRES~, 16-22 Dec 78) 25
CLE2~ ~~i.id To Be ' Cut in Two'
(,;Jacques Roure; L'EXPRESS, 16-22 Dec 78) 27
lli~uly~is of Pierre Mauroy's Politic~l Strategy
(I~ot~ert Schneider; L'~XPRESS, 6-12 Ja,n 79) 29
ll~~vicw oi' PCI~' Stratepr, Tacti.cs
(Acuiie Krie~;el; PAR~DOXES~ Nov-Dec 78~ 3~
tT/lLY
M~�mbc~r~hi.~, ~Lrucl;urc, I~':iscal Policy of Labor Unions
(:~lvutore Col; IL SOLE-24 ORE, 30, 31 Dec 78) 3~
: ~PAIIY
Gover~unent Pres~uts .L3 Percent Economic Solution
(cnr~mlo 1C,, i'~ Ja~ 79) 48
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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COtJ'~~Ni'S (Con~inued) p~,ge ~
~ocial Lnplicationa of Lackl.us~er ~conou~y S~udied
(car~zo i6, i4 ,ran 79) 53 -
W.CSm GL'ItMAIVY
I'rospect;s �or Vttriou~ rndus~ries for 1.979 Give~n
(cnprmnz, ~r~,n 79) Go
~
- t~ -
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1~OIt Ol~l~'ICfAL U5t: (1NL1'
~ :CNrl'1~~EtN~~1'IdNtIL ~l~'i~'~Ilt:~
r
- FUNCTION~ PURP06E OF ~BRANDT COMMISSIdN~ DISCUSSED
Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV fn Cettieen 10 D~c 78 pp 703-710
[Article by Dr. }'ritz Ffscher~ LL.M. of Bonn, easigtant to the chwfrmAn of the
Independenr Commlstion on International Dev~ilop~eant Iaaues~ representing the
author~a personel oplnions~ , �
~Text~ Prevfous Nistory ~
The Indapendent Conm~is4lon on Internatlonal Development Issues t~egAn its
_ work fn December 1937, under the chalrmanahip ot the former German chencel-
- lor enA chaicinan o! tha SPD ('Social Deawc~~atic Perty of Germany~~ Willy Brandt~
end will conclude !ts deliberetfans in s~ring of i979 Mith the publicatfon of
e report. Th!� report Mil~ be trey~initted t~ the SecrotAry Ceneral of the
United N~tfons, and also me~de avaflaDle to all lnterested governmenta~ in-
tern+~tlonal orqanizationa, and tha public.
Ae tn the case o! the Pearaon C~sa.ion aome 10 year~! ~go, thia time also the
inspiration !or th~ formation o~ �uch a commfttee ca~ tron the president of
the World Benk. In a apQech betora tho World Atfaira Council in Boston wt the
baginning of 1977~iRoberti S. McN~aara auggested the estaDlishaent of en in-
_ depandent comaiaai~n, under tha po~siblQ chairnenahip of Brendt.
In th� opinlon o! th~ World Bank prosid~nt, th~ current in~tQrnational nego-
tiatlons tor th~ solution a! the east urgent North.South probl~~a had reached
a d~ad ond. In ordar to g~t ou~ at thia site~~tion an~ thua to improve Lhe -
� po~~lD111ti~a !or �gr~~~nts, e group o! ir~a~spend~nt peraonages ahould work ~
out ~ feM probl~m ereaa Dy mean~ oP ~+n impartial analyals~ and davelop pro-
poaals tor th~an tha~ could gain aupport !n rlch ~md poor countri~s ailke.
Naturally, it Mas poasible to evalvat~ thd prospects tor a realiz~tion of
World Benk Pr~sident McN~mara~s proposel only atter the close o~ the Peria
- Conl~cenca on Int~rnation~l Econoeiic Cooperatlon (KIKZ), vhich Mas ,arill in
aoa~lon at th~~ tima. Then th� una~tiatactory concllusios~ of KIfrZ itselt provad ~
to De da~rfineatal to the inltlal chanc~a ot such a canniasion. In the vieM
ot a numb~r o! A~velopi~R countrios~ this exp~rlment for solving san~e =
m~jor proble~ns fn ~ amall aroup outside the United Nations h~d lailed~ and
wereover hae qiven the tndustrialized ca:ntries 2 years to "catch thelr breath."
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t~~oK c~rrt.c;rni, u:~i~, c~tvt,~~
This also explelns their ~irm resolution~ln the KIW2 flnal reporC to carry
aut all ~u~ure dellberetfona only in the context of the UN organiLaClons, -
esp~cf~lly �~nce rhey have e m~~orlCy ther~.
In the many df~cusetons led by the tuCure commisaion chafrman !n the following
� ~erlod, !t thu~ had to be mede especfelly cleer thet such e commisaf~on Would
not be cfmllar to a KIWZ com~aittee~ ~nd that in perCicular the commfASion ~
_ would not try to teke away Che re~poneiblliCy of the goverrmaents and inter- _
natlonal or~anitetfons. 1'heret'ore there could eleo be no questian ot ineerrup-
_ ting the olflclAl negotiations for the c;uration o! the commis~ion~s �ctiv-
lttes~ ae Me, largely the casa during thr. PAris conPerence. Instea~d~ such e
commtasfon ehould use the c~eana at ita tliaposel to contrlbute to the lmprove-
ment of Che proapecta !or negotlaClon.
In retroapect, 1C can be ataCed that meanWhlle after the enauin~z @stablish~
ment oP the coamisaion thia group hes been aupported even by those repre-
aent~ttvea o! the Third aorld who had earlier expreased reservetions. In the _
- meen time, some of theae countxies have even ie~v~ted the con~isslon to meetings.
After e tlnel tormetfon of ldeaa in Waahington (annual meeting of the Norlcf
Benk end the Internetfonal Mor?etary Fund) end New York (UN General Aseembly),
_ Brandt lntormed Unlted Netiona headquarters in September 1977 of the formation
ot the "Independent Commisoion or. International Development Isaues.~' Thia step
_ vaa decfcfed by t~?o conaiderati~:~as the increased awareness the~ a aettlement -
of North-South relations repreaent~ the social question !or the reat ~f rhis -
cmntury, ahich cennot be ~olved by governmenta and internati4nsl orgenlzationa _
alone, and vhlch requfres [h~ aupport o! all; ead the confident encoura~ement
' for the commisaion chairman to make uae on a World~+ide acale of the experience
in peaceful aettlemQnt thet he hnd galned through his East European poii~y. -
Compoaition of the Comm~ission `
At the enc~ of Novembe~ 1977, 2 cwntha after the establiahment ot the com-
- misslon, lt,~ canpc~aition was ennounced. In thia connectlon, the following
= vlevs aere en;ong the central considerationss
On the one hend, all important polltical esnd regionel movements should be '
_ represented, insolar as poaalble. Thus it ~vaa only natural tha[ the repre~en-
tetlvea of the developing coi~ntriea had to be cl~arly in the ~ajority. On -
both aidea, lenule leadera �hould elso belong to the conrnission. Among the
membera from industrlelized countries, a representative of the labor movement -
should be i.ncluded, ae Mell aa from banking and industry.
Wfth a tote: of l7 commis~ion members (10 f ran developing countries and 7
� lrom industriallLed count~ies~ the above-named crlteria could be adequAtely
ta~cen lnto conaideretion. The executive secretary of the commisslon, as aell
as the dlrector ot the serretariet and the honorary treasurer, belong to the
coamnlssion by virtue of th~ir oPfice.4 In addition, an approxiamtely equal
number ot "eminent persons" W~re aakad to put their experienca at the aervice _
ot the commission.
. 2
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1~Ult OI~ I AL U5li ON1,Y
The secretArlaC of the ~o~,i~gior, conslsts of 8 to 10 lnkerna~ional develop- ~
ment experts, and its wbrk will be l~rgely ba8ed on the documentatlon that
alreedy exiata in exceea~ a~ Well as calling on appropriate ~nnri~utes and
specialiats !n particule~r ceaea. Eor reasons af exp~dl~ncy and on accaunC of
- tha Renerel slgnitlcence oP trade queationa, this stafP ia located in Geneva.
In contraet to the Peeraon conunlsefon, Whlch Was supported by Ct~e World BAnk,
ehe secreteriet end Che corteaisaion meeCinge are financed, fn the interest of
mafnteining their lndependence, by a number of unrestrlcted contributiona
Erom verious countrfes and foundations.s -
I'urposes and Po~ential
Brandt alluded to ~he potential end limitatiora of this comniesion in his
openin~ epoech cR rt,o constft+utive aasembly in Gymnich Castle near Bonn on ~
9 Do.cember 1977. Then~ e~tter this tirat meetinq, the commisaion cfiairman
intormed the public ot the b~aic orgenlz~?tion o! the future aork~ on the
occesion oP a ~tay !n India.
- The points o~ deperture for the commisalon~s deliberations are dete nained to
a IerRe extent by the fact that the relationa betWeen industrialiced and
- developlnR countries have chcnged conaiderably since the Pearson commission -
around 10 years e~o. At that tlme, beses for an analysls and prediction had
first to be set up, with the a~d of a very independsntly working secretariat~
and the recommendetions Were meinly directed to the industrialized countr!~es
and principally con~arned lncreased efforts in development policy.
Today, !n vleW of the profuslo;n of available materfal, it is much more urgent
to "recoRntze the forest among the many trees'~; end here the commission is
faced W~th the teak of limitin;g itself to apecific problems, in order to
au~rantee thet !ts voice Will +slso be heard.
In thls taak, !t must start fr~~m the political fact that the oil price ex-
plosion has reaulted in a prevtously unknoWn solidarity aarong all [he develop-
ing countrles. These cauntriea have been expounding their global demands for
_ a new world economic order for many yeArs on a broad f ront, and with their
mejority !n thE United NaCions, they have put throuRh corresponding resolu-
tfons. Thua it is no longer mainly a question of greater results in development
policy alone, as importent as these still remsin. Rather, they are demanding
a thorouRhaoing transformation oP the internntional economic system, thet
would meke them into equel partners in World trade.
The exceedinRly many internatlonal conferencea of the last fea years have for
the moat part brought only verbal progress to the community of developing
countries. ~n the contrary, the prospects for a speedy implementation of their
very exteneive demands heve scarcely improved, so thnt biCCerness and frustra-
- tion increasingly overshadov~ the debates. This feeling is fu~ther eccentuated
by the RrawfnR protectionism in the indusCrialized countries, and strengthena
the desire tor e permanent structure of economic conditions thaC Would be as
free ns possible from le+rge variations and that would alloa them to make
rellable plana for the future.
~
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- I~OIt UI~I~I(;fAL USl. ONI,Y ,
N~verrh~?tegs, Che mllitenC demanda of the Third World have strengChened the
reallteCion in r.he induatrlelized counCriea Chet consldereble chenges are
neceeeery !n t~orrh-South rele~tfonshlpe. At the aeme rime, hoW~ever, thu~? heva
Eound them~elve� ~or aevernl yeare teced Nith serloua and pa=~Cly novel Nk~ob~
loma !n their own economie~, Which can be ~tr`ated only to e limited extent by
Cradlrlon~l methoda. _
Theee apparently contrary tendanciea radlcal demands on the part of ~he
. developing countrfea for a nea Morld economic order on the on,e hand~ and
perefotent economic problema !n the industrialited countries on the other hand
represent both a challenge and en oppc~rtunity for the ~'Brandt commisslon."
It can contribute to Che proce~a by ~rhlch the long unproductive exchange of
_ proposal~, N~c1,~h.ha~ larg~ly d~tarminod the conferences of the last !ew ye~rs~
is transformed into a ph~eae of more promiaing endfseer efforts toWards solu-
l�ions thet can actuslly be put into practice. -
- Ae an independent committee, the commisaion has the advantage that its mem- -
be~~s can discuss openly, f~ree from instructions and detached from considera-
tiona of preatiRe, and can evaluete the problema from all aides without any
- taboos. The pjuideline ^f its deliberetions will be to expose the community of
intereBte fn eome important are~s; these ~lone can yield a lasting basis for
accepCable aolutlons.
At thefr ve ry lirat meetinR, ~t which the cortmiission members ~ere eble to
egree on a~orking pro~ram, theae "marchinp~ orders" for future work were
elready aet up. The recognitiun o! the increasin~ partnership interdependence
also inaplr~d the commisaion to depart lrom the traditlonel concep~ of ~'aid,~~
in order to mske the neW s[ert clear in the public mind in this Way also.
The independence of the cortm~iasion makes ft both possible and ne cessary to
present e carefully aefghed picture in its analyais of the previoua develop-
~ ment and the proapecte for future cooperation~ in Which ~ye opportunitfes and
potentiar of all the countrie~ concerned are discusaed. So the prospecta far -
:trengthened economic relationa ~mong the developing countries themselves, ae
well as the necasaity of satisfying the basic needa of the poorer aegments
of the populetion in th~ Third World countries, are alao to b~ inveatigated.
Here na !n other arees, the commiasion Will be conacioua of the increaaed
s~nsltivitiee end will try to Avoid the impresaion that a certain superior
knowledge lran out~ide and above Mill detarmine ehat is guod for the indiv-
fduel countries. It will Alao make it cleer that the satisfaction of baaic
= ne~ds doas not stand in the Way o! progreaa in other ereas (for example,
induatxialiaation), but that the increaaed afforta muat complement each other, -
_ rathor then being murually exclusivo.
Tha coanniaaion Nill ~lao not be able to cloae its eyea to the fact that the
countrles ot tho "South" have developed very differently~ and will continue
to do ao in the future. Some vill slready be considered industrialized coun-
tries in the tores~eabl� tutura, while othera h~ve fallen farther behind in -
thei~r develop~ant. In vi~x ot the graring i~npatience ot many of these countries
_ ~nd the eqwlly persistent expectation of a qu~ck chaage~ an indication ot
- e reeliatic time acale maq elso be given. -
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Th~ varioua tora~s o! furu~�+ coop~r~tion wlth the industr~allz~d countriei,
but al~o aaona the developing counCriea th~ns~lv~s, mu~t tak~ this di!leren~
tlation moro arrongly lntc? conaideration. B~ut auch A~~o~~rion or gr.xr -
�conomlc d!!l~r~nc~a !n tli~ Third World ~hould !n no w~y �nd~ngor rh� polit-
lc~l aolld~rlty of th~~e c;ountri~a~ Nhlch l~nd~ coil~ctive WaiAh~ to rt~ir
- d~mand~.
In the coma~i~siun~a view~ th~ Conna~miat-controllad aotmtriea should alao be ~
included to � gr~~tea~ exrant !n thia atr~ngthenad cooparatlon, eapecially
stnc~ th� d~veloping coun~rl~a lncre~aingly ass~ciate the8e countries wiCh
th~ industri~liz~d Nnrid ~~nd thua ~ith tho ~~Nortb." t~ihila the Pearson
co~lsaioa xagretlully aa~+r no poisibilftq o! going deeper into Chla importent
area, noa the int~r~at in a great~r it?~egret:on o! these countrias into the
_ trorld Qconomy fa to ba eve~lu~ted by contacts on the ap~cialiet l~vel~ so -
that !t will be possible ~o giv~ a cerelully Maighed~ non-polemical descrip-
. tion o! [his in the co~uninaion report. A!ea months ~go~ membera~ of the
Geneve secrat~ric.r h~ld the lirat diacusaion~? on this 8ub~ect in MoscoW, and
Chore !s hope !or a continu~tion.
- The commis~ion Mill �lso l�ry to maka a conne ction ae alweys~ to be con-
ditloned by the perticular casa bettiwen detonse savings and increased devel-
opmont eltor.tw into a major topic for internationel diacussion. In the com-
, mia~lon~s view, both lactora the continuing oxplosion o! delense outleye
- and th~ p~riiatonce of aconomic d~ltorenceo between North axid South and ~ith� ~
!n the varlous countrioa aqu~lly andenger world peace. To this extent~ there -
- !s every motiv~tion to rresr th�se poteatiel sourcea o! explo~ion in the
tramework ot a g1ob~1 policy o! detente and equalization. Here North-South
problema touch upon the Esst-Nest questiona.
In summeiry, it cnn be stated that the commiasion does not intend to concern
ltsel! wiCh ell the probl~ma presently being diacussed. It will enphasiae ~ _
!eM oi th~n in ita long-term prospecta tor cooperation, and in doing so vill
_ not Iimit ltael! to economic concerns ~lone. The ,,-~,iasior, Will aee its prin-
_ cipel task u~d thus its only potential in making an exact analyaia of
the "cocmaunity o! inter~sts" ia important arees, and in deriving initiai
aolutions ~rom them.
In this connQCtion, Me note the Qncouraging tact that the direct connection
, betwe~n amployment and more rapid growth in the developing countries ia geining
_ a gr~ater place in the general diacueaion in the inclustrialized countriea, and
thus mekes possible a concrete retarence to North-South probleans. At the
s~me time, thia laterdependence ia pro~ected to an increesed extent !n the
- n~xt deced� fn the investlgations and predictions of internationel organisa-
- tlona, in agreemant Mith the similarly directed efforta of the commission.
Tha Commission~s Pro cedure _
From the tlrst meeting on, the members of the commission have made full use of
- th~ir specisl advantago ot openly diacuasing, ia complete lndependence, all
the queatfona that appear importnnt to them~ a~tid approaching them f rom var-
lous point~ o! viex. In this connection, there is an obvioua etfort to
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- t~c~it c~i, i,~r.r, i ni, usi~; ntvi,Y
- ev~lu~rt� th~ vie~wpoint o! th~ Mother aida" also~ and not to stick to f ixed
_ po~itions. Tha cloa~d n~ture of Gh~ commission meetings, Which have rao
eudf~nce and ~1Weya t~k~ place fn a setting that encou ~agea dlalogue, may _
cantribute to thi� altuation ~s ar.ich ea th~ lact that no minur~a With nam~a -
are kept concernfng the pra~antaCiona~ end eapeci~lly that no pr~p~rad eta~te-
menta conc~rning them are glven to the praae. Alter the end o! the meeting,
the public !a lntormed through e coaamunicaCion lrom thQ ch+~irmu?.
B~olore the ectual (3�day) commisaion meetinga on various continenta bagln,
a!ea KaminenC paraons" aa Mell ~a leaders lrom the host country end t~e region
ere ge~rarally a~ked to axpreas their opinion on North-South queations. In '
certain casea~ tt~s commission membere are alao given the o~portunity to make
themselvei l~iliar With all aspecta of a specialized area in a hearing before
_ th~ meeting. For the ~esslona theaaelvea~ the baaic data !or discueaion are
prep~red in Engl~sh by the s~cretari~t according to a Norkin~ program that ~
f� kapt llaxlbl~; these papars slao contain options tor posaible recommendations.ll -
. B~etMeon me~tings, tho s~cretariati~ the commiasion membere, and ~apecielly the
chalrman m~intain many contacta t+~th high-ranking le~ders and internetional
orAanlzetfions. Thus~ for oxsmple~ in the laat tew months Brandt hea taken the
opt~ortunf4:y o! lntorminq �lmost all the heads o! govarnment o! the Neatern and
_ Lertern industrialis~d countrias ot' the commisaion~s ~?ork, end asking for -
thE~ir aug~estions. In addition, h� h~a also held telks ~riCh aiany political
lei~ders fn the dev~loping countrlas, viaited important international organiza-
tlonu, and apoken aith high church dignitariea.
Th~~ Coaraiaaiono� Firtel Report
Tha aommira~i8n~a raport~ which will be completed in early spring o! 1979, _
_ f~ ta Ds agmod et ~ddreasing a wlde eudience. The commi~ssion~s "message"
�hould ndt ba too bulky~ and should be presented !n such a Way that even the
average ci~izen undsrataads it. Specielized diacussions o! particular c~sea
Are to be publiahad in a separate volume, The report itaelf is to be oftered
in mdny lanqu~gss at an attordable pi�ice~ so as to be aveilable to large
segments o! ehe populetion. Ita main purpose will be to convince the decision- -
' mekera !n North and South~ and public opinion in these countrie~~ that
thoroughgoing chengQa !n lntprnational relations are necessary to
" craete a more equitable order on the Worid-Mide level. In this connection~ the
commission hopea to make it clear thet such a development does not repre-
sant e throat to the lnduatrfalizod couatries~ but rather an opportunity
, that, in the long run~ corresponds to their oxn interests~ e8pecially in the ~
~conomic area.
Naturally, an elforL rill be made to obtain the agreement of all the commission
~nembers on the repost. But if unanimity cu~ot be re~ched on certsin lndiv- -
iduel queitions, deapi~:e coma~on etforta~ then diasenting opinions appear to
be more convincing and aare honorable than compromise formulas that cover over
essantial diflerencea.
AlthouAh no unx~eelia tiaally high expectationa should be tied to the commissionia
Work, it i� to be hoped that its report Will contribute to changing the climate
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and tramev?ork o! inCernatlonal diacuasion, ao that last~ng solutiona can be
lound on Kfnich all the parties concerned cart agree, because they correspond
to their reapectlve intereats. The coa~nission aould like to make a contribu-
_ tion to the ~ccel~ration o! thls procesa With carefully conaidered, ob,~ectiva,
end coz~vincing proposala. Since it alao turns to the peopie in this proceas~
!t would also lfk~ to �rousd enough intereat in thie Way to facilitete ~nd
_ support th~ dtlci~ions o! th~ governments, Nhich �re Pinally responaible.
J Appandixt Members of the Commiss~on
~ 1. Abdletit Y. A1-Namad (Kuwalt)~ director geaerel o! the Kuweit Fund tor
Arab Economfc AQVOlopment.
2. Rodrigo Botero (ColombiA), economica ariter, tormer fin ance miniater.
3. Mtain~ Kipaa Dakoure (Upper Voita), pre~idential adviser, tora~er coor- ~
d~n~tton ~ainfater !or tho fight against the ds~ught in the S~hol.
_ 4~ Eduerdo Frei (Chile), Pormer prime miniater and cheirman of the Christian
Democraelc P~rty.
S. Katherine Gr~ham (United States)~ publiaher of the WtiS HINGTON P0.ST and
NL~'i1SWEEK. .
b. EdMSrd H~ath (Graat 9ritain), lornier prime mini~ter and chairmen o! the
_ Conservetiva P~rty.
7. Amir H. Jamel (Tanzania), minister for transporta~tlon and informetion, !
lormar finsnce and trade ministcr.
8. Khati~~h Atwad (Maleyaia), bank director, former adminiatrator o! the
- rica board. -
9. Lekahmi Kant Jha ( Indla), governor of Jamnu and Kaalunir, former president W
of the ~ank o! India.
~,0. Adam Malik (Indon~sia), vice president~ tonner foreign miniater and pres-
- id~nt o! th~ UN Genaral Aaaesbly. -
il. Haruki Mori (J~pan), nember o! the board ot directors of th~ Society for
Internatlonal Cooperation~ lormer deputy foraign miaiater and ambasaador.
12. Jo~ Morris (Canad~)~head ot the Canadian labor nwvement and chairman o[
the �dmini~trativ~ council of the Internetional Labor Organisation (ILO, ~
Genava), vica pr~i4d~nt o! the Intornational Federation o! Free Labor Ur~iona. _
13. Olof Palmo tSMOden)~ chairman o! the Social Democratic Partq~ former
prieme miniater. -
- 14~ P~ter G. P~tarson (Unit~d Statea), chai:san o! the boasd o! the Lohaian
Broa.~ Kuha, Loeb banking hous~~ loraer secretarq of coaimerco� -
-
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1S. ~dg~rd Pl~anf (Nr~nc~), a~ru~or~ former agricuiture mfnf~Cer ~M~A rec~nCly -
- naawd fnat~~d ot Pf~rr~ M~n~1~~~~'r~nc~, Mho h~d to Mfthdr~M trom the come~fasfon
on ~ccount ot i1ln~sa). ,
16. Shrldsth 5. Ra~ophal (Cu~~~na), �~cnCary gsn~ra~l o! the Comwnvealth Sac-
r~t~r~at, tonisr tor~lgn mfnl~t~r.
17. Layech! Y~ker ~Algexla), v!c� pr~ald~nt ot tha Natfo~al Asoombly~ lora~ar
trad~ n~ni~t~r.
- E~c otticlo ~a~b~r~a '
Coran Ot~lln (Sxad~n). protea~or o! �conomics at th~ Unlveraity ot Uppsale,
tora~ r~t~tf aa~ab~r for th~ P~ar~on Com~ia~fon.
~ Dr~go~i~v Avr~movic (Yugo~lavfa)~ lorar dlrector o! the Worid B~nk and
_ noM epoclal �dvlaer to UNCTAD.
J~n Pronk (Neth~rland~)~ a~mb~r o! p~t'lianent~ lora r d~wlopaMnt minlatar.
FOOTNOTP:S
1. S~� Ch� t~xC ot tho t1n~1 r~marks of th!� spe~ch on p. D 601
_ 2. Ct. th� t~xt o! the linal tw port o! the KIWZ (Mithout auppl~m~nta) of
2 June 1977 fn EA 17, 1977, p. D 493 ff.
3. S~a the ap~cf!!c lfst ot the comaola~lon wmD~rs above.
4. Ibid.
S. On the baals of e pi~dgo lrow th~ Dutch govern~nt, tha Brftlah and thQ
thrao Scandinavf~n govorr~nt� havf ineenwhil� made financfal donatlons t~
th� tot~l coata, vhich �r~ �stfe~t~d at around S 6�8 mlllioa. Cont~ibutions
have �lso b~~n ad� by th~ Gersan Marshall Fund o! tha Unlted Stataa and u
ennounced by tha Ford Poundation and th~ Can~dlas Int~rnational
D~v~lope~nt R~i~arch Council. Th� J~pan~a~ gowrnMnt has alao aade p1~dR~s~
~ ~rhil~ oa th~ G~r~aa ~id~~ !t !a mainly political loundations that ar~
partlcipating fn r~ising funds !or commissian ~~tinga in d~valoping
countrl~~.
6. T~xt of drandt~� sp~~ch in Cywnlch Castle~ p. D 602
7. T~xt o! ths D~ih! deciaratlon on th~ Hrandt Coaeiasion, 22 Decemb~r 1977,
p. D b04 tt.
8. Se� alao eh~ World D~velops~nt Report 1978 0! tho World 9u?k (p. 14 tt,)
�nd Norld 8~nk Pr~sid~nt Mct~tan~ra~� ape~ch at th� a~uai ~e~ting ot tho
Rov~rnlnq councfl o! th~ Tt~ and World Baak on 25 S~pt~ob~r 1918 ia
M~~hfngton. '
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. 9. At Chs N~~tfng !n th� Un1t~d St~Cwi~ th~ toilo~?fng~ ~aang oth~ra, ~pok~
N� r+pn~~nr~tiv~� o! rh� hoaC couneryt 9~netor J~cob J~vft~~ Und~r~~ore-
C~ry oC 9tNt~ Rfoh~rd Coop~r~ H~nry ltf~afng~r, N~r),~n Clav~le~d, ~rnd
_ Orvill~ fr~~wn~ ~'roro th~ lnt~rn~tlonal lleldy th~r~ w~r~! Konn~th Dedsie~
UN gener~l dfrsctor !or d~v~lopwnr and lnt~rna~ional ~conorlc coop~ratfon;
- Idrfa~ J~sNfry~ ch~lt~an o! Ch~ UN Committo� o! th~ Wholo; Mnbaaiador -
- Don Mllla (J~aoaic~), rp~~k~r o! th~ Croup o! 77; Dr. Raul Pr~biach~ for~
e+~r s~or~C~ey g~n~r~i oi UNCTAD ~nd of th~ UN Econo~~c Commiialon for
LaCln AnM rio~~ ~nd Jacqu~a d~ Laro~loro~ �xecuti~?s dir~ceor o! Che Intar-
natlon~l Mon~C~ry Fund.
10. Thua b~for~ th� ~~ting fn Mali (14�17 May t978), an exchanga ot vlaw~ wlth
a~~ri~r o! �xp~rt� on ra~ 'at~ri~l~ took placa in London traa 11 to 13
Mayi th~ ~ea~orlty o! tho coweii~~fon ~aembar� took part. Sioii~rly, a
g~ther4ng on th~ aubj~ct o! N9trength~ning ot Trad. and Cooperatlon a~ong
the D~wlopln~ Countrf~a," to t~ko pl~co fn N~w D~lh~~ ia �ch~dulad
b~lor+ ehs Nov~ob~r n~~ting in Kuala Lu~pur.
ll. The lolloMfng �ub~~cC� ~nr~ d~~lt with at tha May we~ting in Malit prob-
l~ais ot th~ poorsat d~v~lopln~ countrl~s~ satial~cCion o! baafc naed,~, and
raw mat~rf~ls qu~~tiar?s. In th~ Unitad Stat~t~ the loilowing Mere dlscuaaodt
conm~un~ty o! fnt~ro~t~ea, Qu~ations o! d~bt~ �lgrat~ryr eork~rs, and the
~ omigr~tion o! sp~claliaC� to th~ industrlalitad couatriaa (the ao-callad
brefn draln). Further~;.so~ tb~=~ Naa a pr~lfainaiq diecuaalon on quoaCions
oP nutrftuon ~nd ~griculture. AC ths coming na~ting i~t Mai~yaid, tha !ol-
lo~wing aubj~ct~ Ml11 b~ tr~~tad~ aaong olh~~a= ecotto~ic eooQer~tion ~moag
th~ d~v~lopfng countri~s~ ark~t ~ecosa~ ~nd ~elw~�ter~e econoralc dev~lop-
m~nt in tha world; th~n, oa~rgy and ~avironahatal quaationa~ auch aa
non-r~n~wabl� r~w mat~riala; and !lMily, tha area o! inv~atawnt aad
multin~tional �nt~rprla~a. All togethar~ th~ com~lsaion h~a pl~nn~d eight
aw~tlna~t ~itor Gyranlch (D~camb~r 1977~, Mt. Polerln, SMitz~rland (March
1978), B~uuako, M~li (May 1978), Tarrytam, United Statea (Auguat 1978),
and Kuala Luspur, Malayaia (November 1978), meoting~ in 1979 are acheduled -
!or Saud! Arebia (F~bruary)~ Latin An~rica (May), and Vl9an~ (Julq).
COPYRIGHTt 1978 V~rleg luer Intarn~tional� Politik GmbH, Bonn
8429
G40s 31~3
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~OR O~~ZCIAL US~ dNLY
ZNTEttNAmYONAr? AT'F'AI~25
SI~A,NYSH-GEFtNIIIN AGR~MIId'P ON SOLAFt EN~RGY TNQ'7.CNII~'I'
M~drid Ct1N~T0 16 in Spaniah 14 J~ 79 p 48
~,~"TextJ Within 1 month Spain and Germar~y will sign an agxeement to
Mxild~ over a 6-year per3od, the w~rld's larg~est solar powerplant in -
Almeria or Bada~oz.
Within 6 year~ soa.ar energy could be supplying eleatricity to a city of
150,000 inhabitanta~ suoh as Cadiz or Almeria, if plsne for the w~rld's first
industrial-eaale solar energy plant, to be put up in Spain, are
euocesstlil.
In easly 1979 the Sp~ni.ah Government will sign an agreement with the
Federal Republic of Germany~ for the construction,in Almeria or Bada~oz,
oS a 20 megawatt powerplant to produce electricity from eolar ener@~r.
Totbl investmQnts for the pro~ect will hit 13 billion peaetas, of which -
Spain will contribute 25 percent.
The powerplant xill cover a total surface area of one-half million
square meters, 120,000 of which will be taken up by the reflectors.
Participating for Spain in the construction, engineering and installation
are the firma Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A., the National Institute
for Aerospace Research, the National Alumimam Enterprise, Bazan ana
Maquinista Terrestxe y Maritima. Re resenting the FRG are the companies
Inter,~tom and KBU (nuclear equipa~ent~~ Man and GHH (machinery~ and NIDB
and Dornier (aeronautics~.
In terme of its power output and commercial acope, the pro~ect f a
unprecodented worldwide. Flarth,ermore~ it is geared towards "an
- ~unbitioue ob3ective," as I,uia Magana, the energy commiasioner, describes ~
it: saving energy equivalent to 400,000 tons of petroleum a year over ~
a period of 10 years. Thia would represent savinga of 4 billion pesetas
in our balance of p~rmenta.
Accorcling to Magana, this pro~ect, which could put out up to 100
megawatts by multiplying the modules~ is designed "to spur the
manufacture and deai~r? of the equipment during a first phase, and then,
if the results are g~ood~ to enable us to utilize them industrially."
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Not all experta ehare the optimism of the energy oommissioner. '~What
Spai.n ie doing 3n the field of ~o1ar energyr,'~ Bilbao expart Andres
Medrano ~old CAI~IO 16~ "ie stupid~ misguidQd and a fraudulent use
of taxpayer money." He advanoes the following ~rg+unents to baak these
deeaription,~s "Stupid~ beoauso they are trying to aor~vert solar en~rgy -
3nto electr3c3ty through ~he hel3othermal system~ which even Amerioan
e~ertg have adv3aed against; mis~uided~ becauee we are ignoring other
methode th~t are more wtthin our reaah~ and fraudulsnt because foreign,
not domestio teahnologiea are being used."
Solar E~rperiments
~'1~e SPanieh pro~e~ts ourrently under wa}r to davel.:,p solar energy are
merely experimental in nature. The three exist3n~,r ones are located
in the Almeria region and cover an area of 120,000 equare matere;
inveatments there total 3 billion pesetas.
The only totally Spaniah pro~eat ia CESA I, a 1 megawatt plant that
will be completed by 1980. The other two powerplant projects (each 0.5
megawatt) are multinational and promoted by the International F~ergy
Agency. Sixteen countries, including Spa3n (with 30 percent oF eaah
- pro~ect)~ are taking part in them.
Tn Spain, the Center for F~ergyr Studies has budgeted 800 million for
to promote new energy sources, and the Miniatry of Industry has kicked
- in another 150 million; both ftgures are for 1979�
Israel is the number one country in the appliaation of solar energy.
The United Statee has two 10-megawatt pro~ecte under way. Another 10-
megaWatt powerplant is being planned in Ita1y, and Japan is building a
1.2 megawatt plant.
COPYRIGf1T: INFURMACION Y PUELICACIONES, S.A., 1978
87~3
CSO: 3110
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~RANC~
N~W pOST-EL~CTION POLICY T~ND~NCIE5 VIEWED
Donn ~UI~OPA AItCHIV in (3erman 10 Dec 78 pp 77~-?$2
(Areicle by br W~1Cer Schuetze, reporCer at the C~antre d'Eeudes de politique
~trangere (Center for Poreign Policy Studyj, Paris (study commit~ee for
Cermun-French relations): "New Tendencies in French European Policy and
- Security Policy after the Electiona of March 1978"]
~ [TextJ Piore Freedom of Action for Giscard d'Estaing?
The unexpected outcome of the parliamentary elections of March 1978 opened
the way fox new initiativee in the area of French foreign policy and security
policy. The moat importanC and immediate consequence of the victory of the
government coalition was the stabilizaCion of the position in all of Western
~urope and in NATO. The hypothesis of a fundamental new orientation of
_ France nnd of a far-reaching change in the social and economic system de- _
manded in the joint governmental program of the leftist union has been -
dropped, and for the next 5 years, the length of the term of legislature,
the Pifth Republic will remain a predictable partner. The authority of the
president of the country was appreciably strengthened, which also increased
his chances of being able to put into action the internal reforms and ex-
ternal (foreign policy) course corrections which he has aimed for since his
election 4 years ago. In the euphoria of victory, in which many even within
the coalition had ceased to believe, such an opCimistic perspective seemed
to be completely ~ustified. Six months later a certain disillusionment has
spread whose causea are certainly determined by the state of the economy,
for une thing: rising unemployment accompanied by continuing "stagflation,"
and ulso a growing skepticism about the prospects for success of the neo-
liberal economic experiment introduced by Prime Minister Rgymond Barre. More _
important is the fact that President Gistard d'Estaing had not succeeded in
breaking up the rigid sociopolitical ideoligical fronts and creating the
conditions for a"government of the center" with the socialists--and if
necessary without the Gaullists.
_ Abroad, in view of the relief about French continuity which is felt in the
West as well as tf~e East, it is all too often overlooked that in the firs~
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balldt of 12 M~rch the m~~t~ority o� votera vdted ngainst the c~dlition
_j (which re~eived ont.y 46.45 percent of the vote) nnd th~t rhe final balloe
w~s primarily ~ vote ~gninge the pgrties of the lefe which hnd fought
Chem~elvey nut nnd logt Credibili~y u~ p~rCtters in gdvernmene.l '~he large
par.llnmc~nr~ry mg~driey uf the middle~C1(199 cnmp mny be ~ble to gloss ovcr
ehe very cln~e election ~egults, buC Che Complete pnl~rizgC~.on into l~fe
_ ~nd right wns unchnnged. -
'The pre~ident's ~ttempt td ghnke up Che middle ground was gtill not a
completely hopeles~ und~rtaking. The 5n~:ialigt pgrty, which was now in- -
sisting on putCing ~ cl~~r digt~nce beCween iCgelf and Ene Cnmmunigts and ~
_ was cunceling Che ~oinC governmental prugram, showed iCgelf re~dy for
p~rllamentary cooperation, end the large union heae!quarters let it be
known that they would not reiect out of hand the social concert offered
= by Cl~cnrd d'~eCaittg. Me~nwhile~ this "opening to the lefC" w~s nipp~d
in the bud by the GaullisC group movement (ItFR) when Cheir parliament~ry
- group refused to grant the chairmanship in Cwo df Clte six standing house
cortunittees to the opposition.3 ~or Cheir parC, union leaders felt duped -
when the prime minister, having been confirmed in office, annouciced a
stru~tur~~l improvement plan, the so-c~lled Barre pl~n, without consultation
- with representatives of tlie workers, a plan which demanded wage discipline
and consumer austerity along with deconrrol of industrial production prices.
Tl~e balance of power in the parliament had in any c~se changed only in-
~[gnificantly, for as before the Gaullists made up the bulk of the govern-
ment coalition (with 155 representaCiv~s as opposed Co 122 represenCaCivea
for the Union for French bemocracy--UDF--the ~oint pgrliamenCary group of
the threc middle-class parties loyal to Giscard), and thus they have the
possibility of blocking every decisive change of course in domestic and
foreign policy. On the other hand, the scope of Che president in the
executive area has certainly grown, and the Elysee Palace has been trying
silently but systematically since spring to displace the supporters of
.lacques Chirac from key positions in administration and diplomacy which -
tt~ey still hold. Presidential democracy has become a realit'y, at leasr
in the realm of foreign policy (but far iess in the realm of defense).~''
As will be shown in detuil, bounds have nevertheless been set to Giscard
d'Est.zing's scope by the necessity of not encumbering the relationship to
t}~e RPK by a too obvious break with the Gaullist tradition and of mainCaining
the precarious balance of power by constant compromises. On the basis of
_ this silent modus vivendi Chirac agreed to a parliamentary truce until
next spring. His scope is even more limited, for he cannot threaten a
breakup of the coali[ion--as demanded particularly by Michel Debre--all
the less since the greater part of the parliamentary group would refuse
to follow him out of fear of the new parliamentary elections which would
then be unavoidable.
_ Tt~e situation today is therefore characterized basically by institutional
and p~~rty political block~ge, which still allows the head of state a
relatively large amount of freedom of movement in the "domaine reserve"
(private preserveJ of foreign policy and security policy. If tnere is a
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~nts nt~~t~~tcrnt, us~: dNLY `
cunHrnyu~; ln l~r~znc~ tndny, then it i~ thi~: that it is not ~ spectacular
diplo~n~~tlc HUCC~~H but the gUCC~y9 or f~ilure of Che B~rre pl~n tf~~~tt will
deci~de in the coming spring wh~ther Gi~c~rd has his way in the face of thc
puwers of pereistenc~ ln bdCh c~mpg ~nd iy able to put the cldck of ~rench
progresg on Lurope~n time,
New I3eginningg in ~urdpe~n poli~y
'Thi~ efEorr to nd~pt ~rer~ch gtructureg--and ment~lity--td ehe ~urope~n
~cottomic C~mm~nity should b~ regnrded tts the leitmotif of the initiatives
undert~k~n by Cigcard aince MarCh. In the election itself ~urope~n policy
did not play n decigive role, even if prime minister garre emphagized again
~n~l ag~in that under g leftigt regime ~r�~nce would not be able to stay in
the Common M~rket. The leftist union had gn underst~ndnble interest, in
view of th~ deep differencee of opinion th~t exiat h~re, in not putting the
~urop~gn theme in the fdregrdund. 'The president himself used this argumenC
with gre~~t fdree on the eve nf the first ballot in his televised addregs
when he said "that ~r~nce, if it were to enter on a period of uncertainty -
and we~~kness, would ensure in a single gtroke the economic and monetary
prim~7ry in Eurnpe of our strong parCner, the FRG. And who ~mong us c~n be
content with thnt?"
If it is fiard to suy how many undecided voters were impressed by this, it
i~ beyond doubt th~t Giscard d'Estaing here expressed his basic conviction
tliat tt~e further development of the ~~C in all areas not only requires
_ political harmony between paris and ~onn, but also dem~nds above all the
~~pproximate equality of the two main partners. In a televised discussion
on 16 October he even designated it as being ~rance's goal to catch up
with the FRC economically within 10 yegrs.
This fixing on the FRG as the model of a modern industrial and commercial
state is certainly not new. Georges Pompidou was setting up this "German
norm" for his countrymen as early as 1969,S and his successor (but not his
first prime minister, Chirac) then personalized this relationship, character-
ized by Pompidou ae exemplary, by the constant emphasis on his good and even
friendly understanding with the Federal chancellor. The duo of Giscard and
Schmidt has already become the real driving force in European policy, even
in externals, through the encaunters which precede EEC summit meetings and
by t1~e state document in thp cathedral at Aix, the counterpart to the docu-
ment oE reconciliation between Adenauer end de Gualle in the Cathedral at
Rheims, which has a very marked Carolingian character; thus it is certainly
not ~7 case of pure symbolism intended to conceal an inability to act. The
new impulses emanaCing from this league of two are bearing fruir. in many
ways: in incerest in direct elections to the European Parliament, in the
mucu.~l Will to achieve expnnsion of the Community to include the three ~
":editerranean states, in the building up of the political consultatio;~
mech:mism of che F.PZ [European Political Cooperationj, in the strengthening -
of tt~c functions of the Guropean Council and in particulnr in the area of
rurrency policy.
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~ ~ox o~r;clnL usL or~.Y
_ Currency Yroblems .
'Che idea of a~urr~pe~n currsncy leggue, c~lled ~W5, is even consid~red Co
be thc pergnnnl wc~rk of the ~'rench president ~nd khe Germ~n feder~l
; chancellor to auch an extent that in the process the re~l context, i.e,, the
Community of Nine,6 tttreateng to be nbecured, quiCe ~side from Che facC Ch~t
the n~tionnl c~mp followers in boCh Countrieg, ehe p~rCipa, Che centr~l b~nks,
- Ct~e eCOnomic nllinnces, etc., c~n hardly keep up wiCh such ~ r~pid pace. Il-
' c~n hgrdly be gn error Co a~sume tihnC the cu:rency plgn is primarily ~ means
oE political sCabilization for Giscard we11 ~s for Sc~~midt, i.e., on the
G~rmnn side an honoring of ehe pregident'~ election viceory, and a regdiness
tu strengtl~en his position ~nd to further the process of adaptation to the
~ItG vungu~rd as much ~s poasible. That may well correspond to the inrentions
of thr_ Ciscerdians in ~rance as well. Frnm the French point uf view, ~
further fall in the dnll~r is a matter for concern, iC is Crur_, but not the
main motive for the creation ~~f Che ~WS. The top priority i~ tu assure the
prospects for foreign trade in gpite of ehe constant inflationary trend by
giving the franc solid parity in a sysCem of reference which is�--faute de
~ mie~x--not worldwide, but Western ~uropean.
~ur thi~ re~~~on the initi~l pdsitions in Bonn and Paris were a1.;o differenC:
from a technical point of view, in Paris they wanted a package of a11
eight ~EC currencies with an average value as a unit for calc~il~itions, by
wl~i~h menns the weakness of their own franc would be covered anct the brt
would be depressed; the more conventional system of clearly recognizable
bilateral currency parities which is envisaged in the present st:age of rhe
discuseion, on the other hand raises reservntions in financial circles even -
reacl~ing as far as the governmenC, because in view of the discrepancy in
economic development in comparison with Che FRG--the increase in cost of
living will be around 10 percent again in France in 1978, that is, four times
that in Cermany--the franc can only be drawn into an extended currency snake
after a devaluation. Recently the word "rattlesnake" has been making Che
rounds in Paris; not because the EWS has rattled from the beginning--which
cannot be ruled out, considering the nonparticipation of Great Britain and
hesitation on the part of Italy--but because the goal of currency stabiliza-
c ion :~imed Eor by the president. ~ _
~rom the point of view of experCs, simply because of the current phase dis-
parity on the t~~:o sides oE the Rhine--a moderate business upswing in the FRG
and a period of "austerity" in France which can be overcome no earlfer than
summrr of 1979--changes in structure of the economy can only be achieved in
the course of a long process, and it is therefore not very advisable to want ~
to overcome the results of being in arrears (the cu~rency weakness) by quick
solutions alone and [o make ~his into a question of political prestige.
fur[her Development of the EEC
It mutit further remain in question whether the initiative in the matter of
a currency alliance~ which is felt by the other EEC partners as a solo eifort
1.5
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FOR O1~~ICIAL U5C nNLY
by the Cc~rm~ins 7nd the I~rench, Can rF~~lly s~rengChen Che cnmmuniCy cnnCext.
- 5ome criticc~l voicey ~r~ ~lr~ady speaking oF the immuCnbility of Che pre-
- eminettce of Iidnn nnd I'~ii~,8 buC such u development is noC accepCed every-
where ~nd cerCainly not in I'ranc~ by Che Gaullists, sociali~ts and communisCs.
- 'Che ~c~ctu~?1 severing of ties wiCh weaker ~~C member~ of which Willy Br~ndt
once spdke wiCh tt very negative echo cannot be reconciled u~ith the declared
g~~s1 of riye ~rench pregidenC of strengChening the concert cf the heads of
stute and government of the Nine. The "European Council," afrer e11 ~rose
out oF ~n initiaCive of Giscard's, and since 1975 it hne de~�~loped from an -
informal fireside ch~t more and more ineo g real decision-mgking b~dy. In
view of th~ ~lysee Pal~ce, ev~n Coday it forms the superser~cCure of the
r.onEedertttion of ~urope which is struceurully still lacking. Consistently,
~iscard turned on 12 Septembe: to the heads of government, and not eo Che
~~:C organa in Brusaels, with his suggeation that the EuropEan Council should
: decide nt its coming session at the beginning of becember nbouC the summoning
oE "three wise men~" whose Cask it would be to examine Che institution~l
' problems which re4u1C from the expansion of Che BEC. In the Elysee Palace it
- is characterized as being completely unrealistic to use the existing mechanisms
' of an integrative and/or cooperative nature which were originally created for
st:c st~tes for 12 far less homogeneous states.9
~ Cor the strongly hureaucratized structure of the EEC in Brussels, the semi-
~ ~~nnu~~l rotation of the presidency of the cabinet council creaCes fewer `
problems than it does for the cooperation of the Foreign Offices in the
context oE European political cooperation (~PZ). French considerations on
giviiig the "diplomatic traveling circus" more permanence by giving each
president two vice-presidentsl~ (in each case the foreign minister immedi-
ately preceding and succeeding him) le:ad back to the old Pompidou plans for
the creation of a standing political secretarlat. Looking at the party
politic~71 differences in France, it is significant here thaC the emphasis -
c,n nonobligatory, intergovernmental voting (a federation of states rather
than a federated state) is an attempt to finally overcome the dogmatic
struggle over supranationality. _
With direct election to the "Europear. Parliamentary Assembly"--the term
~uropean Parliament" is banned from the official vocabulary in France--
tt~e old ideological contrasts sCill break out. The de facto alliance of -
tlie extremes is forming itself anew here: arch-Gaullists as well as com- ~
munists are con,juring up the spectre of German-American hegemony in the
_ context oF an EEC parliament which sees itself as a constituent assembly--
and fiere the former are pol~micizfng against the imperialistic aspect and
tl~e latter against the capitalistic aspect of such an integration through
the parliamentary back door. The socialists want to help fheir conception
- of a socialist Europe make a breakthrough in Strasbourg,ll and the Giscardians
see themselves forced onto the defensive and paradoxically forced to hold
- tu tti~ traditional line of de Gaulle that the French government will not
permit an independent extension of ~urisdiction for the Euro-assembly.l2
A coalition crisis about the European election in June 1979 is improbable,
since nei[her Chirac nor the RPR party wants to come to open conflict about
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Chig que~tion, which i~ b~sicnlly of secand~ry imp~rCance L�o them. I~or
the oCher parCiea iC is ~lso not so much u question of Europe, yut more -
of u domesCic ahow of power: since here for the first time proportional ~
voting (wiCh lists) is being used, each of the four great camps ie appearing _
HeparaCely and free from concessions based on voting tacC~.cs, aad socialists
as well as Gaullisr~ are counCing on profiCing from Che unpopularity a~' the
government and the failure of Che Barre plAn which they foresee13 and being _
nble to put Cheir respective rivals into t~ clear minoriCy. ~
The kI'R and the PCF [French Communist P~,rL�y] also find themselves CogeCher �
in the caCegoricel re~ection of the expansion of the EEC to include Greece, ~
- Spain and Portugal--in clear cnntradicrion to their traditions. After all,
_ it was Ceorges Pompidou who demanded the balancing of the EEC by the entry
of Che MediCerranean countries from 1969 on, while on the other hand it -
sl~ou].d be in the inCerests of the PCF to encou;:age the EurocommunisC element
through joining forces with the relatively strong communisC parCies of these ~
three countries. But here Che deciding factor appears to be the desire Co -
broaden Cheir voting base by making themselves the advocates of the wine
growers and fruit growers of southwestern France, who are afraid of over-
powerful Iberian competition. The socialists and the center parties as well _
as the government, on the other hand, are Crying for compromises in agrarian
policy to prevent a flooding of French markeCs. Thus it will depend among
- other things on the skill in negoCiation and the authority of the president =
wtiether a ma,jority can be found in the National Assembly for the ratifica-
" t?.on of the treaties for entrance into the EEC. Giscard d'Estaing will have
to aim to gain time in this difficult domestic situ~tion, and the suggestion
of summoning a council of "three wise men" should also be regarded in this
ligl~t.
The liberalism ordained by the prime minister of the French economy, finally,
must not be confused with a late conversion to free trade. Raymond Barre
spoke out for a"regulated" (or regimented?) foreign trade for the EEC even ~
_ before the elections, and the acute crisis situation in important economic
branches (steel and shipping industries, textiles and synthetic fibers, etc.)
forces him ratner to innovative protecCive measures which must necessarily
be adopted unilaterally. These problems, i.e. a very restrictive French
~ aosition in the current GATT negotiations and in reference to the steel
crisis plan of the EEC, to cheap imports from third countries, etc., cannot -
be presented here in detail. But it is still to be hoped that Barre will -
- not acz here according to the motto which the industry minister, Andre Giraud,
(until April 1978 leader of the Commissariat for atomic energy), announced
in reference to the energy policy of the EEC in the senate's European debate
oE 25 October 1978: "What is good for France is also good for Europe." -
Ciscard d'Estaing's Initiatives in the Area of Disarmament and Arms Control
In tlie area of disarmament and arms control the French president has taken
steps which mean genuine innovation and differ significantly from the negative
attitude adopted under his two predecessors. Tt:e reasons that moved Giscard -
d'Estaing to give up France's abstention in international disarmament nego-
tiations are manifold. It certainly went against his "universalist" attitude
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_ ~o seand apart here and be able to exert no direcC influence on Che course
- of events. In ~ddition, Chere was a growing concern abouC the increased
arms race even in the Third Worldl~+ and aboue rhe fureher vertical and
I~ori~ontul distribution oC dtomic weapona.15 Besides, it could be foreseen
_ witt~ ~peclfic reference tn I~'rench conditions that ttie refusal to t~ke up
_ the empty seat at the Geneva disarmament conference (CCD) and the conCinua-
Cion of underground nuclear teats in the Pacific would aga3n incur strong .
criticiam, pnrCicularly on the part of the Third World states, on Che
occasion of the special general meeCing of the United Nations in New York .
_ in the apring of 1978. Here attack appears to be the best defense, and so
Che hend of state had a plan of his own worked out in the fall of 1y71 which
he w~s to preaent in New York.
Tlie ~enesis of this pro~ect, in which besides the responsible offices un-
official institutions also took part, showed that the concepCual scope was
quite narrow. It was ouC of the question, if only cons'_dering GaullisC
_ ta~oos, to include n~iclear weapons in a disarmament proposal, and so this
reef was avoided by the master stroke of dividing the world in two, into
a zone of conventional weapons and the northern hemisphere covered by the
atomic sralemate of the two world powers, in which Washington and Moscow -
_ were assigned the sole responsibility for a reduction in the nuclear arms
race. Correspondingly in the first drafts there were no suggestions for
the European region. Giscard d'Estaing and his advisors, however, felt
obliged at the end of 1977 to add the idea of a disarmament conference in
Europe to the principles which were then published in January 1978, For the
first secretary of the Socialist Party, Francois Mitterrand, had put forward -
_ an inclusive plan on his part with the central point that a standing dis-
armament committee of all CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in
EuropeJ states ahould work out measures for the limitation of nuclear and
conventional weapons and armies.l6
- The Signif icance of the Giscard Plan =
Sigr?ificantly, ehe declaration of the French cabinet council of 25 January
was accompanied by a detailed endorsement of the doctrine of independent
nuclear strategy and defense policy. ;n this, as in the formulation that
a conference of signatory states of the Helsinki accords would have to have -
the ~,~hole area from the Atlantic to the Urals as its object, one should see
u concession to the Gaullists, particularly since shortly thereafter it was _
made clenr that such a conference would have to be limiCed to conventional
weapon potentials. That is "for[iter in re, sauviter in modo" [firmly in
substance, pleasantly in manner], a denial of all expectations that France
would take part in the current arms control negotiaCions. While the leftist
union demanded a radical change of course and subscribing to all partial
arms control agreements concluded since 1963, including the ratification of
- tl~e treaty banning nuclear weapons, the government held to the dogma of not
letting itself be bound by a"super-Yalta" decree by the two world powers.
This was more a question of Gaulli~t philosophy than of utility in view of
_ the circumstance that these partial agreements with universal applicability,
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wliicli were work~d out in the framework of the CCD in Geneva, do not even
Couch the technical development o� the French nuclear arsenal. On the
- complete utomic test ban, which is not yeC ready for signature, would
be nccept~ble for Puris an th~ basia of the great. need to catch up which
exteta in this area.
Thus it was no surprise rhat the conception which Che French head of staCe
presented to the tenth specia]. general assembly of the UniCed Nations on
25 May 1978 placed emphasis on the marginal or formal aspects of disarma-
ment. This included primarily the readiness to cooperate in a new expanded
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