JPRS ID: 8208 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN

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8 JANUARY i979 CFOUO 2179~ i OF i

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JPRS L/8208
8 January 1979
~ ~
TRANSlATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO 2/79)
U. S. ~OINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVI~E
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61BLIOGRA~IIIC DATA 1~ Report No, ~ R~olplent'~ Aece~~lon No~
SHesT JPRS L/ 8208
~ t e~n u t t e . epon ~te
TRANSLATiONS ON JAPAN ,(FOUO 2/79) 8 Janua ~979 .
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16. Ab~tt~tu
The repor~ contains prese and radio coverage nn poliCical, economic, military,
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. Ker � ~~nd Document Ao~ly~ii. 7~. Deaccipton
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JPRS L/820@
8 sanuary ;19 79
YRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO 2/79
!
CONTENTS ' PA~~ _
POLITICAL AND SOC~OLOG~CAL
_ 'ASAHI JANARU' Analyzea Ohira's Victory
- . (ASAHT JANARU, 8 Dec 78) ..................e........,.... 1
'YOMIURI' Diecusees Iaplicationa of Attack on Ohir,~ ~
k~dit .
' oria~.; THE DATLY YOMIURI, 20 Dec,78)............... 9
'MAINICHx' Pull: 37 ~ercenC SupporC Ohira ae LDP Leader
(MAINICHx DAILY NE~S, 14 Dec 78).....~ 11
'YOMIURI' Poll Shovs Sli$ht Drop 3n LDP Popularity ~
(THE DAILY YOMNRI, 13 Dec 78) 13
'YOMIURI': USSR Off icial Kruglova Rap~ Sino~Tapanese
Normalization
(Xasuo 5uzuki; THE DAII.Y XOMIURI, 23 Dec 78)...........
15
Japan Defense Agency Criticized�for Its Secxetive Actions
(Toahihiro Yamanouchi; NIHON KETZAT SIiTNBUN,.
.
12 Nov 78) 18
ECONOMIC
Japanese Note U.5. Pressure for H~gP~er Grovth Rate
(MAx1VICHI SHIMBUN, lb Dec 78) 21
Editorial: 'Broken Promises' on GroWth
(Fditorial: MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 14 Dec 78)........... 23
Parasite 'Sokaiya' Plague Japaneae Business, Industry
(Various sources, various dates) 25
Unit Share System
Billions Paid to Sokaiya Annually ~
Ties With Banks Expoaed -
a - [III - ASiA - 11~ :OUOj
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~aSe
I~D Investigatiee Banking Ties
Police Director Urges Bxeak in Ties
CnrporaCione Eiu~angax Free Society, Fd~.Coz~,a].
Srockholdere' Meetings Kept Short
Artivitiea in Fulwoka NoCed
One Firm Expels Sokaiya
Sokaiya Entertained at Theater
Arreat of Executives Urged
Two Soka3ya Arrested
Police Halt Golf Tournament
Names Should Be Made ~ublic
Police CrackdoWn O~cdered
~ � Japan's November Imports Show 8iggest Ga3n Since 19~4
(THE JAPAN TIME5, 14 Dec 78) 50 -
...,,...,..5GIENCE~ANU ~TEC'~idOLQGY , , , .
Kansai Power To Burn Pluton~um as LWR Fuel
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 23 Dec 78)~ 51
~ -b-
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'ASAHI JANARU~ ANALY2E5 bHIRA~S VICTORY
Tokyo ASANI JANARU in Japanese 8 Dec 78 pp 6-9
(News spot; "Drama of Reversal Which Went Accordin.g to the Scenario"]
[TextJ "Lamp in Broad baylight" Operation Gives BiY~th to New President~Ohira
The counting of vo~ea for Che LDP pres3dential primary elec~ion, which began.
on 27 November, revealed a surpr~aing development. 5ecy Gen Masayoahi Ohira
led w~th a difference of 110 covnted p~,ints between him and the incwnbent
president, PM ~'ukuda. Y~ was a nationwide avalanche-like phenomenon, which
even the Ohira camp did not anticipate. -
Followi.ng the negative report of hia losing battle, PM Fukuda, who had with-
drawn to his office in the official residence, appeared at LDP headquarters
aC 7:30 pm and agreed to a press conference. "Frankly, I am surpriaed.
Sir~e I said t would respect the resulta of the primary, I have decided
not to run in ~he main elecCions." At that moment, the new PM Ohira became
a reality. In the long histciry of the LDP, it ia the first time an incumbent
preaident has been defeated by a challenger.
The press shot blunt questione at the prime minister, such as "What do you
think is the cauae of your defeat"? and "You said that a voice from heaven :
called for your reelection....what did you mean by tt~at"? PM Fukuda's fa-
miliar lofty tone was subdued and his voice was heavy. "I have my own
thoughts c�+ncerning the turn of the election, but a losir~g general does not
discusa batt:l,es." "There are sometimes strange voices coming from heaven,
you know." His words showed a trace of chagrin. Standing up, he repeated,
"A losing general does not discuss battles," as h;:,left the press conference
hall.
Thirty minutes later, Secre~ary General Ohira held a press conference at
his office. Responding to the camerr~man's request, he smiled occasionally,
but it was a forced smile. He seemed tense, as if he was not fully pre-
pared for the sudden turn of events. Saying, "Isn't it rather premature '
to say anything"? he discussed his aspirations as the new president, in the
form of replies to questions by the press.
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"I wiah ~o expreae my respece ,~ar PM ~ukuda on h~,e dec~.sion not to run ~.n
the main party elece~,on. Fir~r, ~or puetiing into pract~.ce what h~ etated
during the primary. T reepect him deeply Por his decision aA sGamming from
his party spirit which caused him tio avoid ineer-partiy stirife, although he
had the ~bili~y to carry rhe bat~le further." '
, Since it wa~ Ohirn who had cr3ticixed PM Fukuda as "a man of words, not ~
deeds" and who re~ected a proposal for settil3ng tihe nain election through
nQgoti~~ion, his remarke cou~.d be taken as irony. Howaver, hia tenae facial ,
expreasion incllned the observe to accept hie remarke at face value.
Ohira Camp Expected Viceory by a Noae
Ohira liated three asp~.raC~ons as Che new pr~sident. One, to work for har-
mony and unity in a difficu].t period at home and abroad. T~ao, to canvas
ralenCed men from Chroughout the party and te abetain strictly from leaning
towards special intereste. Three, to be thankful ~�or the smooth and peace-
fu1 implemeneaeion of ehe party'g f3rst primary and to review it from varioue
angles, but to avoid regreasing from the basic part!/ 13ne. Inasmuch as a
larger vc?ice for ~i~e Tanaka faction is being whi.epered about, his remnrks ~
ahowed his c~u~ion. "Sometimes, a single moment has great signif~.cance and,
sometimes, 10 to 20 years mean nothing. History ie indeed strange." The
only time he ahowed any emotion was when he exPressed this bet c~f Ohira
philosophy. It revealed the Ohira brand of 'poli~ics' whereby he chooaes
his words carefully, calculating the future and avoiding irritation towards
the other factione.
On this aingle day, the chief role in the LDP presidential primary shifted
abruptly from PM Fukuda to Secretary General Ohira.
The ma~ority of the press had anticipated a v3ctory for PM ~'ukucln by a widp
nargin in the primary. The trend was also clearly indicated in the polla
. of the party members throughout Japan, which were carefully prepared and
catried aut by the respective media. It was apparent that the Ohira camp
was ra~idly catching up during the last atretch, but nevertheles~ the gen-
eral view was that PM Fukuda would win over Secretary General Ohira by
some 100 points.
If the margin was within 100 poinCs, Ohira and Fukuda would meet head-on in
the main election. The ~hira camp's emphasis on "a main election, in ac-
cordance with party rules," gnd the movea by the Fukuda camp toward an a~c-
commodatior through negotiation to avoid inter-party strife were naturally
considered to be developments made with the primary election's progreas in
mind. On 24 (November) when the primary passed i.ts zenith, PM Fukuda
specifically requested a talk with the press and said, "The developments
and results o� the primary should be given due regard in the main election.
I nryself shall do so." There is no doubt that he premised this on a Fukuda
victory. This statement resulted in bringing the incumbent president down
without a main election. ~
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FOIt 0~'~ICIA1. US~ ANLi'
"I fee1. ~.t in my bonea Char Chere w~11 b~ Celephone c~lle, 1eCCerg and tele-
grame, a~king me ta cone~.nue." "Who else can conduct a Tokyo summit? The
worl.d is counrit~g on ~ukuda." "A voice from h~ave;~ cal.ls �or a Fukuda re-
elerCion." As these Fukuda quotes indicare, PM PukudA was fuZl of confid-
ence as he faced the pr3mary. The~opening of Narita A~.rporC, the signing
of the Japan-Chi.na friendship treaty, and Che stabil~.zatiion of commodity
prices--such ~chievemenrs and the fe~l3ng Chat the aecond half of the ~'ukuda
adminiatration was blessed with luck were probab~.y in his mind. Ke had also
~udged that the Tanaka fac~ion and relations wieh tihe other factions within
~ the LDP were w~rking towarda a Fukuda reelection. Consequently, the result
or Che primary was P. "bolt from the eky." Ir was no doubt an unbelievable
"drama of reversal."
In contraet, the Ohira camp was making ita movea under the strategy that
2 years would be Che 1~.miC for rhe Fukuda regime, to be succeeded by an
Ohira regime. Of course, Che primary and main elect~ons were the immediate
goals, but ultimate vicrory was in Ohira's mind. Since he did not expect
the 110-po~nt margin in the primary, whi.ch compe~~l~d PM ~ukuda to step down
w3ehout a main election tight, he did feel it was an upset victory. On the
other hand, there appears to be an interpretation within the Ohira camp that
the victory was due to the a11-out election campaign 3t had carried out. In
other worda, Chey don't appear Co be as surprised as the others.
7'he Ohira faction did calculate that it would win by a nose in the atretch.
At the same time, it took paina to keep the vote counC from becoming public,
in order to gain an advantageoua position in the main election. It took
every precauCion to gain an upset victory, in case the vote counC ahould
, turn to its disadvantage. At this point, PM Fukuda's overopCim.tsm worked
in favor of the Ohira camp. The Fukuda camp, which had forecast "a remark-
able margin in the primary" of some 200 points at the outset, hastily reseC
its goal at about 20 points. However, the mood was generally set for a
certain victory in the main election, in the event trat the primary margin
should be within 100 points. The Fukuda camp hr~d paved the way for its own
defeat.
Since the Fukuda camp had counted heavily on the floating votes be~ausP of
its incumbency and achievements, it was probably unable to make an accurate
forecast. .
When I was covering the Ohira election headquartPr3 for the primary on
17 November, General Manager zenko Suzuki received a phone call from former
Upper House member Shintaro Nishida in Hokkaido, reporting that "13,000 votes
are in the bag, with lesa than 10,000 votes for Komoto. I don't know the
vote count for Fukuda, but he's sure to be second." Also, DietmaY~ Iwazo
Kanek~ personally broughC in a report on the voting in Nagasaki, announcing,
"10,000 votes for Komoto; 7,000 for Ohira; and 5,000 for Fukuda." He
stated triumphantly, "Fukuda telephoned the bankers and ~ther leaders in
, Nagasaki to round up more votes for himself, but there isn't a vote left."
Ohira had 1,118 votes and Fukuda received 4,408 votes. It was evident that
the forecast on Ohira's votes was extremely accurate.
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On Chie day, L C~lked wiCh Masaya ICo, Former secretary to PM Fukuda and
preaent consulr~nt Co SecreC~ry Ceneral Ohira, on the outlook of the pr~s~.-
dentia:~ primary. Ito said, "There ia only one way ~or Mr Fukuda to retain
influence within the parCy. ~'haG is to abatiain from the main elecCion."
Ar t~e time, T interpreted it as seemming from the confidence that a reversal
~ could be brought about in rhe ma3n el~ction. However, I know now that Mr Ito
had tncreased his confidence in a victory ~.n the priarmy. On Che following
day, 18 November, Secretary Gen~ral, Ohira, who was on a campaign tour,
spoke as followe at a press conferetice he~.d in the city of Gifu. "After
rouricig the various areas, 7 have deepened my confidence in an ultimate
vicCory. The situation has made a ma~or turnabouti toward the main election
with the support of my colleag~ea.. Y am sure of v3ctory."
It is a subtle declaration which could be taken as being based on the premise
of a vicrory in ~he primary. Z had an opportunity Co speak w~ith Mr Ohira
on 22 November. He impressed me with his high-apirited analyais, while hold-
ing a morning edition copy of MAINICHI SHINBUN which reported a 70-vote gap
beCween Ohira and Fukuda. "Y feel that things are going pretty well. One or
two points in each prefecture could add ~:p to a lot of difference. If the
voCes come in from Saitama, Nagasaki and Hyogo (nr~~ectiurea) it might mean
an upset." ~
'The cadres of the Ohira faction became extremely cautious during the atretch.
Such remarks as, "You can't tell until the results are in" became common-
place.
Actually, the final forecast by the Ohira faction for the primary foresaw
706 points for Ohira and 669 points for Fukuda. The Ohira faction, which
could ttot count on the floating votes, concentrated on a heated campaign
centering on the support of the "Tanaka army." Its estimate was fairly
accurate, since it was based on votes by fellow party members.
~
' Prime Minister Seals Ow-n Fate Through Overcontidence
About this time, however, the Fukuda camp still believed in winning the
primary. The theory of a"remarkable margin" was still discussed by faction
members and it seemed that they were unable to grasp the situation until the
end of the primary. It is proved by the fact that, while the Ohira faction
was unable to win any votes in four prefectures, the Fukuda faction was
blanked in eight prefectures. The latter's careless defeats were con-
spicuous.
There is probably no disagreement with the view that PM Fukuda's defeat
was due to overconfidence. However, there is an indication that the Ohira
~ and Tanaka factions played a role in PM Fukuda's overconfidence.
It appears that the sCrategy o~ what might be called "a lamp in broad day-
light" was put inCo effect. In other words, it was a kind of operation meant
to cause carelessnesa on thepart of the Fukuda faction.
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This sCr~Ce~y caueed Ch~ opposiCion to dnube eh~ eagernese of th~ Ohira
faction ~.n wxesting pol~.e~.c~]. pnw~r, and ehe v~.ew was epread thae the Ohira
fncCion hoped to w3n second place, wl.Ch rhe r~.ght to euccession Co be ceded
after a second t~rm of the Fukud~ regime. xn addition, the strategy of the
TanakafacCion was generally seen as ~aking the poait~.on that the Fukuda-
Ohira-Tanaka alinemenC, or the ao-called All Party Cooperation Syatem, was
the best meana to eradicate the damage done by the Lockheed ,affair, and to
create ~n Ohira administration wiehin Che continuation of Che ~linement.
The inner though ts of former PM Tanaka aside, ~,t is a fact that cadrea of
the Tanaka faction were expres~3ng such a view and ChaC many Tanaka-facCion
dietmen were in agreement. IC is not surpriaing Chae PI~ Fukuda beli~ved in
his own reelection on ~he baeis of the T~naka faction's "sCrategy." PM Fu-
kudn did criticize the fierce elecCion campaign during the primary by the
OhirA-Tanaka alinement as an aCtempt to spread factional influence into
rural areas. However, the reason his criC3cism was not expresaed in terms
of "money politica"--an expression most disliked by the Tanaka faction--was
because he expected until the very last thaC the Tanaka faction would work
Co harmonize relations between the Ohira and Fukuda factions.
However, at i.ts general meeting held on the morning of 20 November. when the
primary passed its peak, the Ohira facCion resolved to "wage Che main elec-
rion" according to its esCablished plans, and in the afternoon th~~ Tanaka '
faction nlso held a general meeting, at �-hich it insCanCly decid~-.d ~n a
policy to "carry out the main election according to rules and to participate
in unity." PM Fukuda's expectations were undermined and he was caught in a
trap. Fukuda stated on 24 November that "the present presidential ~lection
which atarted with former PM Miki's description of it as 'the root of all
evils' has taken a strange turn in November. If left to its present course,
I Am terribly afraid that it might produce a deplorable result reminiscent of.
the 1972 preaidential election," and he sent for the first time a leCter of
challenge to the Tanaka faction. He also made a sharp turn and approached
the Miki and Nakasone factions. However, by this time victory by the Ohira-
Tanaka alinement was already decided.
The general view was that the "lamp in b;oad daylight" operation by the
Ohira faction was cauCious and lacked clarity, and it was characteristic of
Secretary General Ohira, who detested in:tighting. It is true that this
aspect exigted. It could also be said that the operation was successful
because the central figure was indee~J such a person.
In January of th~s year, the Ohira faction teamed with the Tanaka faction
and exerCed all efforts in lining up affiliated party members in order to
outnumber the Fukuda faction in the primary and to do battle on even terms
even if there should be a"Joshu coalition (Fukuda-Nakasone alinement)."
In the main elec tion, it would aline with the Miki faction to defeat the
Joshu coalition. While maintaining full cooperation with PM Fukuda, it
built up its positian so that it could win so long as it was able to bring
_ about a public election for the parCy president. Once this position was
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eaCabl~.shed, Che so-called "secreti pacC on Che succe:saion from Fukuda to
Ohira in 2 yeers," wh~.ah was exchanged 2 years ago at the time of the ~
"toppling of Mik~,," would become feas~.ble. It would become pos~aible eo take
~ver the adminis~ra~ion w3tihout a~i~hr, with PM xukuda declinir~g to run.
At any rt~te, the Ohira ~actian was resolved rhae ehe Fukuda regime would be
limited to 2 years. There wae nQ room for a~`ukuda reeleation 3n the Ohira
sCrategy.
This strategy cou~.d be upset by a Cabinet disaolutiion and general election
ordered by PM ~Fukuda. The Ohira faction did its utmast Co prevent this from
hnppening.~
In May, a signaCur~ campaign was launched to oppose any Cabinet disaolution
or anyr reelection moves by PM Fukuda, based on the argumenC that "there are
no iss~ues on diasolution to be fought between the ruling and opposition
pnrties." SecreCary General Ohira appealed to the party members that "I
wi11 defini~ely ~carry out ~he presidential primary which has been real3zed
' as the initial s,Cep in Che par~y~s modernization." He thus made efforCs to
forestall any pof~sibility of a dissolution through sheer lack of time.
PM Fukuda'a obse:3sion with the idea of a disaolution and general election
stemmed f~om his lack of c;onfidence in a win in the pub~ic presidential
primary. Whi1e revealing his desire for disaolution as a stepping stone to
reelection, PM Fukuda stated on 17 June, "In order to carry out an orderly
public presidential primary, I agreed with SecreCary General Ohira to freeze
a].1 preliminary campaigna at the end of October;" and he moved towards a ao-
called "poliCical armistice." I~ was a condiCion which the Ohira faction
was obliged to accep~ in order to avoid dissolu~ion. At a discussion meet-
ing with the media on l~. July, PM Fukuda went so far as to state, "It ia a
nolitical armistice and, l.f there are any moves, we wiil a~vail ouraelves of
our positions as president and secretary general to discourage them." While
working tu incumbent president Pukuda's advantage, this "political armistice"
tended to lessen the existence of his challenger, Secretary General Ohira.
PM Fukuda further stressed repeatedly that "Ohira and Fukuda are united, and
the breakup of this relation will not augur well for the LDP."~ It was in-
tended to place the burden of ceding on Secretary General Ohira's shoulders.
Both strategies appeared to be succeeding ostensibly.
Zenko Suzuki, general chairman of the Ohira faction, traveled to Mexico and
Argentina in early August for about 20 days, returning home on 31 August.
This trip created the impression that the Ohira faction lacked the will to
wage an all-our fight, and,ther~ was reportedly`a scene in which your fac-
tion members castigated Suzuki. Actually, the trip was made with Ohira's
~ bleasing. Meanwhile, tactics for the presidential primary were being worked
aut in unseen places. It was during this time that the talk of a Fukuda
reelection began to e.~aanate from the Tanaka faction. Ohira's popularity
consequently took a nosedive. ~
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IC was decl.ded L~ hold tt summiC conference o:E advmnced nationa in Tokyo nexC
year, r~nd in Auguat the Jttpan~-Chin~ friendshi~ pact was to be s3gned. Under
such c~,ndiCions, it was no~ surprising ~haC k'M ~ukuda deepened his confidence
in reelection. This overconfidence reaulred ix? his overlooking the extra-
ordinary Die~ session ~.n Che ~all, rahich was considered Co be the final
opp~rCunity for h~m to br3ng about a disso~.ution and gener.al election, and
it was a factar in Che dec~sia~n by Nakasone, who was later to become a
direct sCumbling block for PM Fukuda, eo run in the primary. In other words,
3t became the establiahed view ~tnat, desp~te Nakasone's candidacy, PM Fukuda
would undoubtedly capture first place in Che primary. At this point, the
Ohira fact3on cadrea expresaed the view ehat "xhe Nakasone candidacy has
created conditions which can give ua victory."
Nakasone's Populr~rity Servea as "Reverse Kamikaze"
Nonethele~s, Che operaCions by the Ohira faction b~? no means succeeded as
' planned. It can be sdid that the only point which went according to plan
was the 2-year limit Co the Fukuda regime.
- The graves~ miscalculaCion was regarding the sudden rise in Nakasone's
popularity. In contrast to the increas3ng ambiguity due to Secretary Gen- '
eral Ohira's "political armistice," the popularity of Nakasone, whA pur-
posely used hawk-like rhetoric, rose r.o a point where he was shoulder-to- _
shoulder with Ohira in the various polls. Tt is ironic Chat this miscal-
_ culation became a"Kamikaze (divine ~~ind)" for the Ohira faction. It re-
minds one of the adage, "Fortune and misforCu~rie are like the intertwined
cords of a rope."
'irst, because of Nakasone's hopes for the second spot, the possibility of
"Joshu coalition (Pukuda-Tiakasone alinement)" at the primary stage dis-
appeared. Also, the change in condiL�ions enabled Ohira to receive full sup-
port from the TanakR faction without feeling guilty toward PM Fukuda. On
21 October, chairman Eiichi N3.shimura of the Nanokakai (Tanaka faction) made
a statement before Ohira's very eyes to the effect that the Tanaka faction
would offer its support for an Ohtra win of the second spoe. The same
Nishimura made a far more positive statement on 1 November, the first day
of Che primary, that "we will fight as if it were our own el~ction, our
own affairs." The Fukuda camp did not notice the ctzange.
~The Ohira-Tanaka coalition wa3 :.riticiz~d by the other factions for its
money politics a�:~d materialisttc election." In other words, they were
able to campaign directly toward Che party grass roots. The Ohira-Tanaka
union took the view from the outset that, ultimately, the number Af aff3.l3.-
ated party members would be. the deciding factor, and they put full efforts
into preparing a membership list. Some dietmen say this took 2 months.
It is a3sumed that they began in secret a long time in ~dvance. There fs
no doubt the 'iTanaka army" was able to exercise its mobility, thus leaving ~
:.?ze other factions far behind. ~
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'1'h~re ~xi~te al~ao the theory ehaC Ohira b~lievsd~ until the very laat, ~n
the secret understanding betwee� himael~ and ~M k'ukuda on the auccesaion of
regimes nfter 2 yeare. a etory wn~ c~,raulaeed ~~ound Nagaeacho, th~ PM'~
ree~.dence, rhat on ehe morning of 24 Octob~r Ohi.ra final.ly decided to fight
ir out after a phone ca11 from PM Fukuda. 5eme (Zenko Suzuki) say that
14 Oct~ber w~a the day of d~ci~~.on when Ohira first mentioned th8 "liq~ida-
tion of rh~ Ohira-~Fukuda relationsh~p." Roku~uke Tanaka, who was involv~d
~n the "senret underetand3ng," said iC took place on 1 NovembQr, the firse
d~y of th~ prireary. it ia an interesting episode which expla3ns Ohira'e
del~y in elzetion campaigning and.hia lack of a confrontiation attituda.
Nowever, while only Ohira himeelf could know the truth, under those condi-
rions Ohira apparently hnd vieualized a fighe long before thgt. When I
talked with Ohira in eaxly March, he eaid in ~ffecti, "PM I~ukuda eaya many
thing~, you know. I don'C know which is true. Ie is the end when one's
~taepments are no longer bel3evefl." Perhaps one ehould Cake the view that,
when ltokuguke Tanaka began tio leak the "eecret understanding on a succeseion
of regimes in 2 yeara" to rhe press this spring, at least the expecCationa
for an "abdication" had disappeared...aside from whatever statement PM
Fukuda made to Ohira.
Innnediately prior to the atart of the presidential election, the theory of
a"sec~ understanding" again emerged suddenly in many forms. They appear
to have been purposely spread by Lhe Ohira camp in order to gather sympathy
within the party. Anger within tbe party is also a powerful source for en- r
hancing a fighting spirit. If Ohara had persisted naively in hoping for
~'ukuda's "abdication," it would b.ave been absolutely impossible to gain a
"brilliant victory" over PM Pukuda in the primgry w3th a margin of li0
points. ~ .
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shinbunsha 1978
5884
CSO: 4105
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POLITICAL MiD SOC~OLOQfCAL
'YOMIURI' DT3CUSSES II~LICATI4N3 OF ATTACK ON ONI1~A
Tokyo TNE DAILY YOMIURI in Englieh 20 Dec 78 p 2 OW
(Editori~L: "Ghoet of Miehi,ma"~
[Text~ The attack on Prime Min3eter Ohira by an ultrarighCiet at hie of-
fic3al residence once aga~n raiaes the specter of the Japanaee toralitarian
mentdlity of the past gnd Yukio Mlehima.
' It is not yet clear if the terrorist intended to aseaseinate the prime
minister, but the blade of the knifa which he carried measured more than
10 centimetere in length. While feeling relief thar Ohira escaped un-
harmed, we also felt hatred for terroriem.
tn the manifesto, Which the ultrarightist youth carried with him, he ex-
presaed this view: "Yukio Mishimg Wanted t~ ehoW the existence of a value
worthier than life." Whea queaCioned by polica, the ateacker said he thoughe
he could change the course of politics by in~uring Ohira.
We w~ere struck by the youth's anachroniatic thinking, t~hich aas 8imilar to
(that of) the ultrarightists who stormed the Keidanren building and aeized
it for severel houre in Marc h 1977.
t~:istaken Adoration
Some intellectuals in their excessive adoration of the "Miahima aeathetica"
even praiae Miahima'a dangerous antidemocratic ideology. Theae people ehould
realize that their thoughtlees pronouncements encourage rightwing terrorism. :
Aft~r all Miahims held a very narrow-~minded, dogmatic vieion of ~hat the
nation and society ahould be.
t To Y~turn to this age of illusion is the last thing the people Want, de-
spite its glorifica[ion by ultrarightists. No doubt those with fixed ideas
may groa impatient With parliamentary decwcracy under Which reform of so-
ciety takes place only sloaly. But the Jaganese people learned by bitter
experience about a society dominated by a uniform 8ense of values. '
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Dropout From Democracy
The uitrarightiet Who artacked Ohixa aae a dropoue ~rom democrec� and there
are tmny young pnopie Who 6ai~av~ that the reai~e~ea o� the3r soc~eey are
far from tAe3r 3deale. Ohira'e aetacker wae attraceed firet by a epeed-
heppy motorcyela p~ck end then g righriet loudepaakar truck, wt~~ch eym-
bolized ehe uleraright~ete' dogmatic 3mage o! What oociety ehouid become.
in ~~is narrow v3sion, he could oniy eee a ehortcur to pol3tical reform.
Thig and othar attacke by uleraright~ete upon prime minietere in ehe poetWgY
y~are ra3ae the queerion of whether the polic~ are nor mare tolaran~ of
r~ghtiat terroriem than ieftiet. To prove ehere i~ no eupport for or
favoritiem toward r3ghtaing te~crorises, poi~ee end au~horieiee should Conerol
better these groupe. ~
7'he people know very aell that a democratic eociety wt11 eolerate radical
opinione but not rhe deni.al of democracy ireelf .
COPYR~GHTs The Daily Yomiuri 197$
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~ C0~ ~~aC 6b1~ UJUi o1~4Y
POLYTICAL AND SACIOLO(i1vAL
~MAINICNI' POLL: 37 PERCENT 3UPPORT ONIRA AS Lb~ LEADER
Tokyo MAINICNI DAILY NEWS in Englieh 14 Dec 78 p 1 OW
~TexeJ The number of those who gave a poeitive avaluation of the laeti
presidential elaction of the ruling Liberal~?Democratic Party (LDP) ~rae
eiightly more than troee who gave e negative avaluation in a recent poll
conducted by the MAINICHI. The raeio Was 37 perceet (affirmative) to 32
' percent (negative).
To a queetion asking their overail evaluation of the election, 11 percent
of reapondant8 ana~?ered that "it Wae good," and 26 percent eaid that "it
aas fairly good," i.e. 37 percent gave a poeitive evaluation.
On the aeh~r hand, 12 percen~ said that "it aa8 not good," and 20 p:rcent
replied that "it Was not very good," conetituting a 32 percent negative
evaluation.
The poll vae conducted for three days from December 3 among 3,000 eligible
voters on a random eampling baeie acroes the nation. Seventy-five percent
responded to the questioning.
In the foregoing queetion almoet three out of 10 (or 29 percent) said that
they had n~ intereet in the electio~n.
But among those aho eaid they aupport the LDP, 57 percent gave a positive
evaluation vhile only 24 percent replied in tt~e negative.
Thia phenomenon aas reversed among those aho 8aid they 8upported an opposi-
tion party. For instance, in the case of Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 26
~~rceat of the supporters gave a positive evaluation while 43 percent re-
p~ied in the negative. In the case of Japan Communist Party (JCP) 15 perceut
of the supporters responded favorably while 55~percent gave a negative eval-
' uation.
By age, only 30 percent of "pasitive" reapondent$ aere in their 20s and
30s, while more than 40 percent of those 40 or over gave positiv~ evalua-
tion.
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Among thoee who gave a po~itii.v~ evaluat~on, 24 percent cited "contribution ~o
the modernizat~on of the parry" a~ A reaeon for their evaluetion, and 17 per-
cent pointed oue that the e1~ce~,on w~~ u,~~fui eo pu~ ~r? end to "behind-the-
door" polirice. `
BuC 31 percent replied that there was no change, 21 percent pointed out
thaC "plutocracy wae rife" in the el~ction, while 11 percent ~aid that'"it
wae comical."
In general, more people gavo a poeitive eval~ation than those who apptiaised
ehe elaceion negatively. ~
Thie rer~!=~:y was more clearly reflected in that nearly 60 percent replied,
in one way or anoeher, thae thay were for a cnntinuation of the primary eye~-
tem in the LDP preeidential election.
Only 12 percent eaid thati the primary election'system ehould be al+olished. .
Aaked about whether or not they were satiafied with the result of the el~c-
tion, 32 percenC anawered rhat they ~rere "satiefied" (with Ohira), 26 per-
cent anewered that the~? were "di,esatisfied" While 39 percent said they ware
unconcerned.
If these figures could be interpreted as eupporting and noe-supporting rates
given to ~he Ohira Cabinet~ hie aupporting rate at the etarting period
would be a 1lttle higher than the 27 percent given to the preceding Fukuda
Cabinet, 31 percent for the Aehida Cabinet, but lower than the 53 percent
for the Tanaka Cabinet, 47 for the Miki Cabinet, and 46 pes~e~?t for the �
Sato Cabinet.
COPYRIGHT: Irlainichi Daily Ne~ts 1978
CSO: 4120
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POL~~ICAL AND SOC~OI.OGxCAI, ~
'YOMIURI~ POLL SHOWS SLIGHT DROP IN LDP POPULARITY ~
Tokyo THE UA:iLY YOMIURI in English 13 Dec 78 p.l OW
[Text) Popular aupport for the ruling Liberal-Dem~craCic Patty (LDP) has ~
dropped gl~ghtly, while that for tihe opposition Socialiat (JSP) and Demo-
cratic-Socialiat (DSP) partiies has slightly increased, a po11 recently con-
ducted by the YOMIURY SHII~UN revealed Tuesday.
The poll ~.�as undertaken on November 25 and 26 on aome 3,000 people through-
ouC Japan.
~ It coincided with the LnP pr~sidential primary elections, which were held -
on a prefectural baeis and closed on November 26.
The poll also ahowed that pApular support for Komeito, the Communist Party '
(JCP) and the United Social Democratic,� Party (USDP) remained the same.
It revealed Chat 39.b percent of the pollees aupporCed the LbP, 0.9 percent
down from the previous survey carried out last October.
The apread of factional gtrife with~n the LDP across the country during the
primaries apparently alienated many supportera of the LDP, and this reaulted
in the decrease of popular support for the ruling party, observers believe.
Women in their 30s and who are residents of large cities were mostly those
who discontinued their support for the LDP. .
By profession, they are self-employed, specialist$, Cechnicians, in admin-
~ istrative poats or engaged in clerical work.
These ~,romen do not believe that the primaries vere held clean and fairly,
the poll shoWed.
Popular support for the JSP increas~d Co 13.4 percent from 12.3 percent
, registered in the previous aurvey. :
~
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It had ramained on the 12 pexcent 1eve1 in ~ive surveys ~ince last June~
The recent adoption o,P more xealietic pol3cies by the JSP in ec~nomic and
security probl~mA helped realize the ~,ncrease in popular eupport~ observere
eaid.
_ The nSP won a on~ percent ~ncrease in popular supporC, up to 2.8 percent,
compared with the three percenr level from March through AugueC th~e year.
P~pular aupport for the New Liberal Club (NLC), KomaiCo, Che JCP and the
USDP were respectively 1.6 percent, 0.6 peraent down from OcCober; 3.5
_ percent down from Che eame month; 2.4 percent, the same as October, and
0.5 percent, 0.2 percent up from the previous aurvey.
COPYRIGHT: The Dai1y Yomiuri 1978
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL MiD SOCxOLOG~CAL
'YOMIURI': USSR OF~ICIAL KRUGI.OVA RAPS SINO-JAPANE3~ NORMALIaATION
Tokyo TNE DAILY YOMIURI ~,n English 23 Aec 78 p 7 OW
[Article by Yasuo Suzuki) ~
[Excerptj It was rather surprising when Zinaida Kruglova, head of the All-
Soviet Society for Frtendship and Cultural Relationa With Foreign Countrles
(SOD), etarted criticizing the recently concluded Japan-China treaty of
peace and friendehip on the very first ~~1~y of her recent viait to Tokyo ~
at the head of a three-~member miesion to promcte friendship bet~een the
Soviet Union and Japan.
In my talk with her, however, it became clear that the Soviet Union thinke
that friendly relationg at the people's level between the two countries can
not be promoted smoothly without Caking the Sino-Japanese treaty into con-
aideration.
This was the firet time for Kruglova to visit Japan in 12 yeara.
Thasgh she did not see much change eince her first viait in 1966, she was
sure of one thing when she agreed to an intervie~ on the very day of her ~
arrival in Tokyo--the atmosphere of Japanese-Soviet relaCions.
'Anti-Soviet Pact'
Kruglova said it was a cru~cial moment and both countries should make utmoet
efforts to promote bilateral friendly relations.
"After all is said and done, we cr~nnot deny that Che recent Japan-China
treaty is anti-Soviet in its nature. But ve don't blame only the treaty
for the worsening of the bilateral relations," ehe aaid.
Despite the strong criticism of the treaty, Kruglova stressed that Moacov
really Wanted to further promote friendly relations between Japan and the
Soviet Union.
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"We muat endorse things not by words, but by deeds," ehe atire~sed,
implying that the Japanese Govarnment'g d~rl~r~d pol3cy of "omnidiracricn-
al diplomacy" is merpiy a varbal play. She expresaed the hope that Japan'e
new Prime Min~ete~ Ohira will pur~ue a Friendly foreign policy toward the
Soviet Union by taking concr~re seeps~
Kruglova plays two other very important functiona 3n the Soviet Union. She
:a a member of the Central Committee of the Sov3et Communiet Party and also
a deputy of th~ Supreme Soviee (parliament).
Kruglovg ie the higheat ranking 9aviet citizen, though ehe might not be a
government official, to v3eit Japan eince the cottcluaion of Che Japan-China ~
treaty of peace and friendehip thie summer.
Policy Shift?
Qualified sourcea in Tokyo recently said ~hat the Soviet leaders in~the
Kre~lin have apparently ewitched their foreign policy toward Japan, Which
heretofore w,as characterized as "wait and aee" diplomacy.
The Soviet Union had been rsfraining from aending aenior party and govern-
mental officiale, including ministers and their deputiea, to Japan until
Tokyo ehowed ite willingness to mend the strained relationahip by taking
subatantial eteps.
Under these circumsta~cee, it i8 quite apparent thaC Kruglova had a very
important role to play during her visit in sounding out future directione
_ in Japan-Soviet relations because a central committee member sx~metimes
atanda higher ~han an ordinary cabinet minister in Soviet politice.
Her visit gives the imptession that the Soviet Union ie trying to mend bi-
lateral relations not only in the political field but also in�the cultural ~
area in the coming year.
Cultural Ties ~
Kruglova, in her capacity as chairaoman of SOD, diacloaed that SOb vouid -
conclude a five-year agreement (1979-83) With the Japan Aasociati~n of Cul-
tural Relationa With Foreign Countries on Cooperation in Cultural Exchaeges.
So far the two associationa have had oaly oae-year agreements.
One of the planned projects'under the pro~ected agreement is a syeoposium of
Soviet and Japanese Writers.
The first symposium ~rilZ be held in the Soviet Union under the title of
"The Writer's Role in the Contemporary World" some time in 1980. It vill
be folloaed by another aympoeium in Tokyo or another Japanese city uader
the theme of "The Writer's Responsibility ae a Citizen for Destiny of Peace"
in the folloaing year.
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A forum by Jnpnnaer and Snviat pr~�~crural gov~rnor~ and ciCy mayoYe wfll ~
u~~o be hc~id, Kruglovn eaid.
The three-mamber delegaeion which K~ruglove 1ed had a very busy echeduie
in Japan. They met representativee of aimost all the oppoeit3on parties
and friendehip organizationa and vieitad many citiNa from Hokkaido to
Kyushu.
COPYRIGHTs 7'he riaily lomiuri 1978 ~
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND 30CIOLOOICAL
JAPAN DEFENS~ AGENCY CRITICIZED FOR ITS SECRETIVE ACTION3
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI 3NINHUN in Japaneae 12 Nov 78 p S
L~orum colunm by To~hihiro Yamanouchi: "Defense Agency MuaC Changa Ita ACtitude
Toward Secrecy!'/
, ~,Text/ One of the things I cannot agree Wieh in the recent debeate on
emergency ~efenae/ legislation" has been the befenae Agency's proclivity
for secrecy. It is my feeling that the Defense Agency hae usurped the
people's 1�right to know" in deciding to earneatly conceal a number of mater-
ials thought ro be fundamental to the people's coneideratis~n of the problem
of emergency legielgtion. '
- Towarda the end of August, Secretary General Narazaki of the Social Democratic
LeagnA demanded that 10 documents closely related to emergency legislatio7,
materiale related to the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Force, be made
public. Aarong these Were the so-called 5anya %rhree Arrowa/ 3eudy and a
document entitled "On Proviaions That Should Be Added to the Legal Code in
the Furure," which ia a 1966 Defense Agency Lega1 Research Office draft,
but the Defense Agency refuaed to make any of these materials public.
Further, in connection wtth the eo-called problem of coping ~ith a surprise
aeCack, it has been atated t',hat there exiat "secret ordera" vhich authorize
the use of weaponry by the Aix Self Defeese Force against %an~aircraft/ vio-
lating 1Japan's/ airspace, but in responae to Communiat Party dietman
Higashinaka's requeat Yn the Diet that they be provided, the~Defense Agency ~ -
refused on the grounds that "secret orders" are classified.
Moreover, it was stated in response to a question from Socialist Party dietman
Iaatari that at present in the Defense Ageacy there exist 94,000 classified
defense documenta as well as 742,000 classified agency documents. This has -
to be called a surprising n~~mber of secrets.
Recently, among reaearchers concerned with queations of the Constitution's
pacifism and of the citizens' right to know, there was a decision to lodge
a demand ~ith the Defense Agency that the aforemeationed document entitled
"On Provisions That Should Be Added to The Legal Code in the Future" known
to exiet should be made public. ~
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The reason for rhis wa~ thet the doeument con~ains proviaione--a National ~
U~fen~e Seerets Proteceion Aet (Kokk~ Boei HimiC~u Kogo Ko), a Sp~cisl
Emergency Measures Ac~ (Ni~o Jit~~ Tokubetsu Sochi No), and estabi3shment
of a~y~tem for general mobil~.z~t~on--conceived ae emergency legislarion
ChaC remind us of the state-of-emerg~ncy lawa of prewar Japan. In view of
tha ConeeiCurion, a grave probl,em which could noC be ignored waa coneidered -
to exiet.
~
In reply Co g written requeeti which the five of us reeearchers involved a~gned
~ and took to Che Defense Agency, the Agency promptly and eimply responded with
a re�usal to make public the maCerials~ Their reason was that "These materials~
at the time, were internal working materials. Not being completely finglized,
they should not be diaclosed Co outaider.~."
It very well may be that there are instances when, for logical reasons,
materials such as dra�ts actually in the working aCage within the adminis-
tration ahould not be released to the public. However, the document which
we requested ahould be aiade public wae prepared more than 10 y~ars ago and
can already be called hiatorical. Also, we have not heard anyone auggest
that the document has apecifically been classified.
The officer in charge of the Defenae Agency Legal Research Off:~ce that we
met with streased that "if the document were made public, it might easily
be taken as the official view of the Defense Agency." However, the document
is the conaequence of a formal deciaion taken at a me~ting of Defenae Agency
counaelors on 11 August 1965 to direct that a study of ecnergency legislation
be made, and certainly the work done at the Legal Reaearch Office was in
consequence of auch instrucCions. Moreover, if final approval at a mee~ing
of counselors could not be obtained, there is an implicit queation of why
not, and I certainly do not find it unreasonable from the standpoint of
citizena as taxpayers to demand the release of the document to the public.
Such a responae on the part of the Defense Agency is basically identical
to the government's thinking when it comea to emergency legislation, where
immediate enactm~nt of a secreta protection act is advanced.
Nonetheless, in the decision of the U. S. Federal Supreme Court which
sanctioned the disclosure of secret U. S. Defense Department documents con-
cerning the Vietnam War, Justice Black stated, "The guarding of military and
diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government
provides no real security for our Republic."
Faced with a Defense Agency which does not possesa this kind of awareness,
in a country which does not have a Freedom of Information Act such as that
~ in America, is there nothing our people can do other than simply stand by
with arms folded?
I should like to register my firm objection to the Defense Agency's
secretiveneas. If the Defense Agency intends to study emergency legislation
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truly an bahalf af tih~ p~ople, I~n~~~ti thgr the relev~nti materiule be
opened to the general public and thgG they be sub~ect to public discuas3on
and debate~ ~
(The author is profeesor of Coe~titutional Law at Dokkyo Univereity) _
COPYRIGKT: Nihon Keizai 5hinbun 1978 �
9398-R
CSO: 4105
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JAPANESE NOTE U.S. ~'R~SSURE FOR HIGHER GROWZ'H RATE
~ Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Dec 78 morning ed3tion p 7 OW
[Text] Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan o�ficials charged with interna-
tional moneeary affairs have suddenly become concerned over a possible re-
` vival of the theory 13kening "nations with trade surpluses" to "locomotives"
_ --a theory wh3ch~appeared to have died. This concern was prompted by U.S.
' Treasury Secxetary Blumenthal's atatement at the 14 December hearing of
the Joint Congressional Economic Committee in which he denounced,~Japan for
giving up its 7 percent economic growth target for this year. Blumenthal
said that Japan i.s "violating 3ts public pledge." In addition, key U.S.
officials have lately begun critici2ing Japan. This criticism of Japan is
believed to be based on U.S. fears that the U.$. economy, Che biggeat
"locomoCive" pulling the world economy, may face difficulti~s next year re-
~ sulting in stagnation of the world economy.
The U.S. criticism of Japan is likely to'have a delicate bearing on Japanese
efforts to formulate a budget~and adjust the growth target for the next
fiscal year. �
~ U.S. criticism of Japan's economic management is evident from Blumenthal's
congressional testimony and frum the U.S. position at the 11 December ~onn
meeting held to review the Bonn Summit Conference of Advanced Nations. At.
the meeCing Japan clarified its intention to give up its 7 percent growth
target for this year, to the gieat dissatisfaction of the United States.
The Finance Ministry is also paying attention to a speech by Senator Church,
who is acheduled to become the~next chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations r
Committee, made in Utah on.12 December.~ In his speech, Chur~ch said that:
1) The United States ahould cut back its overseas assistance and discontinue �
its overseas investment promotional programs; 2) The United States should
pursue domestic policies with emphasis on increased productivity and on
other private economic sectors and a foreign policy centered on +the economy;
and 3) The United states is now being challenged not by the Soviet Union
but by Japan, West Germany and other allies.
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The Finance Min~.etry 6el~.~vea that Ch~ new U.S. ehit~k~n~ i~ prompted by
Pears (expr~aead by BlwnenChal) that rha U.3. economic gxowth xQee for next
year may "dtiop ciose to 2 pexcenr," ~ar lese than the or~ginaily lor~caae
4.3 percant.
In 8ddit~.on, th~ next U.S. pY~~3d~n~iai ~i~reion ~ch~dui~d for 19~8.
~ The Cartar administration finde ~t diff~cult to inrrodUCa further doiiar
defane~ and anti-3nflarion meesuree wh3ch may tieeuit in furth~r aggravge~ng
the bus~nees receasion. Therefore, the Finance M3nietry ie worr~ed that "
ehe United SCates may aga~.n emphaeize the r~sponeihslitiee of Jnpan, ~iee~
Cemm~y and other rrade surplue natione and ;Qa:~Q the "locomotive" theory
to preseure them to achiave higher economic growrh raeee.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shinbuneha 1978
C50: 4105
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~'AR O~~iCiAL U3C t3NLY .
~CONOMIC
EDiTaRIALt ~BRO1t8N PROMISE3' ON GROWTN
Tokyo MAtNiCNI DAiLY NEWS in Engiieh 14 Dec 78 p 2 OW
(Editorialt "SrokBn Promises"~
(Texe~ At a mee~ing held in Sonn, Weet Cet~manx,Monday, Japan ~old the gix
Weatern induetrial democracies of the virtual impoesibility of ineeting its
internationaily pladged 7 percene real economic groath rate for fiecai year
'78, ahich ende nexe March. ~
The parley, attended by governm~nt repr~eentatiyee of the aeven--Japan, the
U.S., Britain, Iraly, Weat Germany, Canada and'Fraece--Wae held to review
the fulfillment of public pledgee made by eheir leadere at the July eummit
conference.
The Bonn eummit Wae not the firse confab Where Japan's "7 percent grovth
targee"--along With ite ineention of drae~ical,ly reducing ita huge curr~nt
account 8urplue--~was revealed. Similar promi8ea have been made by Japan in
the past.
It appears quite appropriate and natural that Japan ehould tell the eix
other countries of ite impending failure to honor ita promiee, noW that a
7 percent target ie impoeeible to achieve.
Na are of the opinion that Japaa'e attitude of frankly admitting ita failure,
arithou~ making any excuaea, aill enhanca international faith in Japan.
Extreme prudence is required in making any kind of international pledge.
Thus, making a pledge auch as the "7 percent groath," the attainment of
vhtch aae in doubt from the very beginning, should be coneidered as indi-
cative of a serioue lack of diacretion.
The former Fukuda cabinet disgraced itself last year by failing to live up
to ite promises of achieving 6.7 percent grovth and a$700 million deficit
in Japan's ~urrent account balance. ~
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Th~r~ c~n b@ no excU~~ for inv~,etn~ ridicui~ from oeh~r couner~~~ for tiao
~ucc@~~iv~ y88r~ by failin~ eo c~chieve promiA~d ~roath eargee~, although th~
improv~ment in reducing eh~ current accoune surpiu~ thie year mu~~ be ~on-
eido~ad a~ praieeworthy. ~
N~~~1~~~ eo ~~y, ~n ~aofl~ia g~a~eh ~ ~@~o~eapia figu~r~, ~hould b~
compilad oniy after taking ineo coneid~raeion minroecopie f~guree of var-
iou~ economic aceiv~eiea. in thie 8enge, making e promiee eo ategin ~ eer-
tt~in groarrh raee eeeme iliogical end indieereee. In addit3on, eh~ piedgn
to m~et the 7 percent groaeh rate wae made from a pol3tical coneidergeion--
in order to ward off mQUne~ng for~~gn cr~t~ei~m of Japan'~ ~aeeive current
8ccount ~urplus.
Woree y~t, the 7 percent grov~h pi~dge, once made public, b8came acknovi~dged
in~ernaeton~lly ae an B~Cabiiahed fact, dieregarding Jepen'e e~im chance of
re~~izing it. This ie ~vid~nced by the ~nternaeioeal Monaeary Fund's requ~se
ehat Japan atrain 7 perceat groweh nex~ y~ar el~o. The careleaely made
promise has led an international body to entertaie an ~~iusion.
Prime Mini~ter Ohira alpo ehares respon~ibility w3th former Premier Fukuda
ae Ohira Wae serving in one of the top poets of the ruling partiy--eecretary
gen~ral--at Ehe time Fukuda made the promise.
However, Ohira'e policy, made knoWn immediately after he aesumed the prime-
minieterehip, or not adhering to the 7 percene groath figure, ia commend-
able, aYthough it seemed inevi~able.
We hope the government aill refrain in the future from making public auch
a macroscopic figure as a 7 percent groarh ra~e and, inatead, manage the
nation's economy by placing more emphasis on ite microecopic aspects.
It ia sometimee difficult for us to underatand the attitude of bureaucrats.
They insiated the 7 percent grovth Wae poeeible right up until the change of
administration. No sooeer had the adminietration changed, hoaever, than
they abruptl; chenged their attitude. Their quick revereal ahould be coe- -
sidered ee part of the custom of "saving face" ror the man in pos~er.
Another international pledge made by Japan Wae that it Would "double Offi-
ci~l Development Aeaietance (ODA) wtthin three years."
~le feel this promiae aas aimed at reducing the current account surplus
rather than promoting international aelfare. At present, the progre8s being
made in fulfilling thia pledge is at a snail'8 pace.
We urge th~ goverc~ent to implement, and awiftly, a subatanQ^ive GUA plan in
order to avoid further ridicule from abroad.
COPYRICHT: Mainichi Daily News 1978
CSO: 4120 ~
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4
PARASITS 'SOKAIYA' PLAt3VE JAPANESB 8U$INS3S, INDUSTRY
Unit 3hare 3yetem
Tokyo YOMIURI St~IN8t1N in Japaneee 24 Mar 78 p i
~Comm~neary~
~Text~ In order to expel the sokaiya [a group of heckiers and biack-
mailera hired by corpotiations to obaeruct eeti-management movee at ehare-
holdere' meeringe], the paraeite of bueinese, the Minietry of Juatice
reportedly d~eires to adopt the "unit ahar~ 8yetem." Under thia syetem,
a share aith a face value of 50,000 yen ~rill ba coneidered ae a uait.
8hareholdera hoiding less thae.a unit vill not be aliowed to aetead
ehareholdere' meetinga or have voting righte. Under the exieting sys-
tam, anyont aith even one ehare may etrend and, if not obetructed by the
~ eokaiya, aek questions or etate their vies,re. It is this eimple procees
that makes ehe eokeiya rampant. Tha Minietry of Juetice, therefore,
hopes to impose some restrictione in order to expel the sokaiya. Hoir-
ever, the measurea against the sokaiya still aeem inadequate. Let ue
consider the changes uader the unit share syetem. While it may stem
the groatn of gdditional, nes+ sokaiya, a sokaiya With an inve8tment of
S0,000 yen multiplied by alpha (alpha refers to t~rofold increase in cur-
rent price againet face value) in e cer*A{r Firm wi~1 be anxioue to recoup
the loes reaulting lrom expulsion from'other enterpriaes. The end result
Wi11 be an enterprise under the complete dominance of a powerful aokaiya.
The abeolute amount of money equeezed out of a firm aould increase rather
th~n remain constant. It appears the aokaiya society is simply being of-
fered a chance to develop from an tnefficient hunting and collecting cul-
ture to a atable cultivating culture.
On top of this, there appears to be an intent under the unit ehare system
to get rid of the consumers' movement for the one-share shareholder; aad
it is questioaable whether consumers, who are already aeak enough as it
is, should be denied aa opportunity to air their views. But the esseace
of the measures against the sokaiya should be directed against corporate
payoffs. No metter what the soka~ya might utter at shareholders' meet-
ings, the management should remain unperturbed.
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J
The co1~~p~e of At~k~ 6 Co ~nd eh~ b~nkrupecy of ~idai Co probably du~
in pare to ehe ua~ of eokaiya ~o ~hutout eharehold~re' critici~m~. BAnk~
pay~3,ng out eeveral hundred miil3on yen annual~y eo sokeiya ehould eake a
~Qeeon from su~h firms ge Kyup~ (Cupid~ Mayonnaiee, Mitau-uroko~ 3hionog~,
Akai 8iectric and Nippon Mi,n~,aeure Bear~ng.
COPYRIQHT: Yom~ur~ ShinbunBhe 1978
~iliion~ Paid ro 3oka~ya Annually
Toky~ NIHON KEI2AI BHiNBUN in Japanese 5 Dec 7~ p 22
CArticies "'Unforeunate T3ee'.With 3okaiya Conrinu~; Caeh Paymente Harely
Laaful")
(Text) Enterpri~e~, caughe in ehe midst of the strin-
g~nt economic environmenr of receeeion and high yen,
ar8 not suppo~ed to ~quander th~3r money. Yet, 80 to ~
150 billion yen is paid annually ~Naeional Police
Agency estimatea) under the guise of coneributione
or,advertiaieg fees to sokaiya, known as "black
gpntl~m~n" or "~hady businees groups." Although
pol3ce authorieies have cracked dovn on sokaiya
groups which number about 5,200 persone, viewing
them as "entisocial groups" like ganga, the ties be-
tween eha enterpriees and sokaiya run very daep.
Never~helees, the time hae come for enterprises to
coneider 9evering such relaeions as the era When
the sokaiva Were condoned as a necessary evil hae
paesed.
Total Payoffa Are Top Secret ~
Shortly before 0800, about 10 veird-looking individuals loitered in front .
of a certain bank in the busineae~diatrict of Otemachi, Tokyo, as ealaried
men and aomen strolled past on their aay to Work. Wearing aide ties and
loud, large plaid suits, the individuals vanished behind the employeea'
gate ahen it was opened.
The sokaiya makes round after round of viaits to enterprises to open ac-
coun~s at betWeen 200 and 300 firms (his name ia recorded in company books
and he ie paid gt least t~ice a year). They operate early in the morning
as their tutn for Work Will depend on the order in Which their name cards
are submitted. This is their "w3sdom of liv3ng," and if required to Wait
until regietration (0800 at this bank), they vould have time to visit
a~other firm.
At this particular bank, aome 2,000 persona, including right~ringers and
shady magazine reporters are registered, 800 to 1,000 of ahich are sokeiya.
An assistant executive secretary of general affairs section said: "They
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are paid twice ~ yaar, from 4,000 or 5,000 yen to 200,000 or 30A,000 yen~
No oea ia g~tting a m~113on yen. Toeal peymente ar~ top eecr~t and cannot
be diwlged."
Foilowing Cha crackdown, e N~tional Pol~.ce Agency official raveaiad:
"Financial ~neeiCution~ pay ehe mo~t to sokaiya. When a bank initially
opene an 'account' and decides on the amount of tihe payo~f, it eervee as
a pattern for other affiii8ted firme to foli~w." Anoth~r reason gor
` ~okaiya's inroade i~ eha aesietanc~ provi.ded by eecurit~.ee firma in hirM
ing eoka~,ya for aharehoidere' mae~ing~ when a,firm's ah~r~s are lieted
on the stock exchange.
Many of the eokaiya operaee under euch titlea ~s an "economic research
institute" or a"po1~,Cica1 and economic probleme survey associaCion" and
carry ngm~ cards with titles as repreaentative director and preeident~
Even in ~ one-man operation, he ~he preaident~ He ~lways carries in
his pocket a book of r~c@ipte for contr~butiona.
The vocational background of soka3ya is varied, fkom former ealaried men -
to auto mechenics and taxi drivere, with an unusu~lly high number of ber-
tendera. There ie even a"bartenders' group." The bartender, after over-
hearing sweet talea between key aokaiya and top bu~inesemenn at Ginza bare
and cluba, apparently begins to think "a piece of paper [receipt] makea
money. There ia no better deal than ehis."
Ninety Percent of Firms Listed on Stock Exchange
Lately, sokaiya hae been organized into groups. Upon entering the office
of one group, a company aong was heard: "There ig a comorrow when looking
at the aky, a future in boiling blood [condensed~, and nothing bad ie our
path."
With hands behi~~d their back and lega apart, everyone w~s ainging as a
.middle-ranking officer beat time.
Mr M, the leader, ie 36 years old. A senior member pays a new member be-
- tween 20,000 and 30,000 yen, depending on the income earn~d, and guarantees
a monthly income of about 200,000 yen. It also has a system, unlike o~her
sakaiya, of housing all its Workers under one roof, in a mansion; of mriking
it clear to a worker's spouse and children that "papa is a~sokai}la"; and
assuring that hie income Will be at least 10,000 yen greater than what he
got in his former ~ob. Mr M did not deny that ties exist with gangs:
"It's money, first and last, ie this businese. It is not unlawful, ~ust
on the brink of it. We cannot operaCe without ties aith outlaWa."
~
Generally, the amount paid by a firm to the sokaiya is set aside in its
annual budget. The money is distributed by a person in charge in the
gemeral affairs section. The sokaiya are ranked A, B, C or D according
to their capability. A veteran detective of the Fourth Investigative
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S~ction, MaCropoliti~;~i Police Department, ~arimaeest "Of 1,700 firme
liet~d on tha eeock exchang~~ oniy ~bout 10 perc~nt hava no connection
wi.th eokaiya. Moet unlieted firms aieo hoid ehareholdere' meeeing~~ .
Counting theee~ a fi:m's budg~e for ehis purpose probabJ.y everages from
50 to 100 million yen." A white p~per on ~hareholdere' maetinge pYepaYed
by D~iw~ ~ecuriti~~ Co in Nov@mber r~pore8: "~~epit~ pubiic critic~~m,
tiea with ~okaiya have increae~d in one ouC of two firme...A decrease,
~ven ~11ght, Yegtstered only 4 percent."
On th~ other hand, the ~ok~~ya doe~ not neceesarily ateend every ~hare-
holdere' m~ering. Accordin~ to ehe ~ame white paper, 1)8 firme maintain
tieg with 101 to 200 sokaiya, 150 with 51 to 100, and 110 with 201 eo 300.
Fifty-gix firme hnve claimed afgiiiation with more than 500 sokaiya. The
+~verage number of ~okeiya attending ehareholders' m~etings ranged from
'3 ro 23.
L~tely~ there hes been an 3ncreame of sokg~ya who hold few if any ~hares,
as can be ~udged �roa euch co~enta as: "On1y ona-half of our sokaiya ~
have sharee in odd lote (Bank A)," "Only 20 p'ercent appear to own eharee
(pharmaceutical compaey and "A share ownership is not a critaria in
hiring; it ia based on affi.llated group end the content of their publica-
tiona (~utomobile firm C)."
Why do firms make payoffs to sokaiye who do not own aharea or attend ehare-
holders' meetings? Police authoritiea are keeping a cloee watch on the
sokaiya which is "a group engaged in extortion, blackmail and intimidation
to the point of violgting the la~." '
Decision Avaited From Top Hierarchy
One day, a veteran official of a major shipping firm, who despises sokaiya,
confronted a young man ~aith an improvised name card and said: "You just
graduated from the university? Do you really lcaow the aorld of sokaiya?
They're ~ust like paupers. Do you want to be like a proatitute?" The
official was sympathetic after observing the;youth for 10 or 20 minutes.
Finally, when the officiel etated, "Aren't you a man? There must be aome
decent ~ob which Wi11 bring perspiration on your broia"; the youth ansWered,
"I am sorry," and never returned.
~ At this shipping firm, some 80 sokaiya report every morning and are inter-
viewed in the order of their arrival. The person in charge of sokaiya af-
fairs is Mr K, an 80 year old man with 15 years of experience. Mr K is
kno~m to every sokaiya. Mr K stated: "Ten years ago onl~ executive
sokaiya came and, being key figures, they readily understood our problems.
The world of sokaiya is probably undergoing a period of transition, with
the younger generation seeking to replace their elders. I am fully aWare
of the undesirability of maintaining ties With sokaiya. Payoffs are made
- ae a custom. Our firm will not pay if all other firms stop. However, We
ha~e no intention of asauming the lead in ending the practice."
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That r~~poneibie per~on i~ c~ugh~ berw~en tha f~rm ~ad ~ok~~.ya. 3~ wouid
mean a faiiur~ to enrry out his du~ie~ if inappropri~te que~tione or ob-
eCruction of proceed3ng~ developed ap e eher~hoid~re' meating. An ae0ie-
~ant ~xecutive senretary of a bank in Otemachi commentedt "Sev:~ring ties .
aith sokaiya would b~ diff3cuit. Due eo rhe era of iow interaee~ every
b~nk f~eed wieh a ph~nom~non ~f b~ek-spread in profit margin and ~uff~r~
from depre~ead businese condition~. If th~e ~ituation continues, ties
with ~okaiya wou~d probably have to be draeticaily severed. This ~.e noe
a decieion eo be made by a reeponeibie person but by the top hiergrchy."
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Ke~zai sh~nbuneha 197g
Tiea With Banks Expoaed
Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCKO in Japaneee 6 Apr 78 pp 110-111
[Artic~.e: "Sanke and Soka~ya Are 'Golf Partnere'; R~p3.d I~ourfold Growth
in 5 Yeare"J ~
(T~xt~ Accord~ng to police eatimate~, tihe amoune of cash flowing from
enterprisea to sokaiya last year totaled from 70 to 100 million yen. The
sokaiya praepers, with it~ number gwellfng from i,600 in 1972 to 6,500 in
1977. The inroads made by gangstera has been noCable. Banks have
"obediently" cooperated with soka3ya. For example, a survey by Osaka
National Tax Administration Bureau 3 years ago dieclosed that totial
annual payoffg to eokaiya by the Sanwa~ Daiwa, Sumitomo, Taiyo 1Gobe and
Sumitomo Truat Banks amounted to 500 million yen (15 March morning edi-
tion of YOMIURI SHINBUN). According to one report~ one-third of all
"contributiona" aere made by banks.
. A Japaneee reporter sarcastically remarked: "The motto of aokaiya is 'a
nanthly ealary from the banks and a bonus from the manufacturers'."
He continued: "Nowadays, sokaiya usually maintain ties with magazines
and newspepers. At least once every 2 months or even monthly, the banks
Will accommodate them by placing advertisements. Manufacturers do like-
wiae each quarter. In addition, monthly lectur~-meetings or golf compe-
titions are held. The banks reportedly set the pace in determ~ining the
aawunt of payoffs and also introduce sokaiya to firma to Which they have
imde loans."
Someone asked: "Why are banks so weak againat the sokaiya? Is iC be-
cause their guilty conscience, apt to be picked on by sokaiya, cover many
facets?"
The Japanese reporter grinned and eaid: "Not necessarily. They place
utawst importance on maintaining public trust, even if they have to pay
money. They Wish to avoid any commotion at shareholders' meetinge or
articles in sokaiya publications chargit?g illegal loans (even if propa-
ganda). Also, as With other enterprises, the position of the person
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r~~pon~ibl~ for ~ak~iy~ ~ff~i.r~ mu~t b~ con~id@r~d. I~ would be ~ d3f-
ferene etory if th~ top h~.er~rchy ~taeeda 'it doee ~oe matter hoa iong
~ha aharehoider~' m~~eing coneinuea~ Fooiiah accueatiione wi11 be sCrongly
reakoned with.' But, ~n reali~y~ i~ ig ~ust the opposite, for the generai
feeling te that a 8mooth proceading la~~ing about 10 minute~ aouid b~ moat
ideal. A chi~~ of th~ g~n~~a1 aff~i~g d~parrmeat who ehinks he i~ head~d
for a prom3~ing caraar would n~ver io~e ~ight of the top hierarchy'e in-
teneiona~"
In th~ United 3ratee, an org~nization c~iied rhe SEC (Fed~ral 3ecuritiea
~xchange Cortm?i~aion, an organ Which monitor~ unfair corporate pYacticee
and wh~ch becgma known in Japen as a reaule of ehe Lockhaed incidene)
wouid immedietely initiate ~n inveetigatioe and ~xpoee the firm (noe the
~okaiya) if it discovered Chat a f~.rm had u~~d euch a g~oup ae 8okeiya
to trample on th~ ~hereholder~' righte or had convened a manipulated
ehnreholder~' meetin~. in ehe Un~t~d States and Europ~, ~h8re are no
peculiar paraei~ee like eokaiya. Thig ie becauee Buropean and American
enterpriees are ~oe ag ~ecre~ive as Japanese firms and they carry out
their obligations to provide the ehareholdars ~aieh information about the
management. In Japan, in contrast, only a limited number of management
peraonnel have accees to ineide information. To a Japaneae corporate
~ociety, which originelly developed aa governmen~ enterpri~~s and pur-
veyore and later as a homologous eneity called the zaibateu, eharehold-
erg' meeiinga are probably a me~e formality. Moreover~ the Japanese
eocieey is peculiar. Frictions and diaputes are considered abnormal in
mase eociety and, by the eime the isaue e~rrfaces~ the difficuleies muat
have been ironed out and a cour8a of action determined. The sokaiya is
a parasite eaCing away at this belief.
Dual Structure of Hypocrisy and Nonaenae
A BYitish correspondent sarcastically remarked: "If sokaiya's financial
backing comea from banks, its psychological support comes from Japan's
ma~or naWepapera."
Ne continued: "An enterpriAe baeically is bad, and for it to profit is
bad. It muat remgin pure. Such hypocrisy is apread by the preas. A
manager that reacts to such hypocrisy leaves somethiag to be desired.
A bank executive aho keeps a concubine has no direct affect on the bank's
profitability. HoWever, it appears that auch thinking is not underetood
in Japan. This is the point that sokaiya feeds on.
"The sokaiya tries to show thaC he ia a true friend~ ~ust as ma~or nevs-
papers often resort to pretty aords to cover up reality. Enterpriaes,
particularly banks, utter normal statements like 'trust is importaat,'
but they are an incanation of the 'eafety first principle,' and they are
pleased vith such hypocrisy. In actuality, it is difficult to aurvive
in Japan without aome frameaork of appearance. Hypocritical behavior is
evident in public, but in ~he background nonsensical situations exist,
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~o~ a~~~cin~. us~ oNVY
. ~uch th~ ~nrerprise~' 2 Cril~,ion y~n ~anugi ~aciai ~xpendieur~~. ~e
no wonder th~t gokaiy~ progp~r~ from ~ ehare of tha du~l etructure~"
CAPYRIONTs 3hincho~h~ 1978
1~D itt~?~~~3g~C~~ B~ttkit~g Ti~~
Tokyo YOMiURI 9NtN8UN ~n Jep~neee 15 Mar 78 p 23
~Article: "t~D Discovere Ma~or F~,nencial in8tieutione Soft on Sokaiya;
30 Mi111on Yen ie Haif ~ Ye~r eo One aroup"~
(Text~ As a raeule of an inv~atigetion by ehe Narional Police Agency end
MBtropolitan Pol~cn DeparemeeC (1~@D], ~ctivi~3ea of ma~or finnnciai ineti-
eutions invoivieg aokaiya were diaciosed for th~ fir~e t~me by rhe 14th,
haaing come to light during a related invest3gatioe into a gokaiyg, the
Koji Taka~a group. Ma~or city bank9 were foun8 to have contributed an
averaga monrhly eum of 700,000 or 500,000 yen to the on~-man sokaiya ont-
fit, confirming the gen~raliy accepted belief that "financiel inatituCione
are soft on eoka~.ya." Thie softnase towaYd ehe sokaiya also appliee to
entarpriseg affiliaCed with ma~or banks. Invastigativa ~u~horitiee eeti-
mate, based on cases uncovered during the year of 1977, that from 70 to
100 miilion yen heve be~n contributed ~o aokaiya. The National Police
Agency viewe the aituation aith alarm as the sea8on for shereholders'
meetinge is approaching. As a reeult~ ~he agency's director general,
Seitaro Asanuma, attended board maetinge of rhe All Japan Bank Asaocia-
tion and Tokyo Bank Aesociation ori the 14th and made an uausuai raquest
to the banke' top hierarchy, contending: "The eoft etance of financiel .
inatieutions ie one ree8on for the proliferaCion of eokaiy~: 3evar your
relationa With them firmly."
According to the National Police Agency, during the period of unragulated
political contributions, an "index" of the amount contributed by varioue
enterprisee was keyed to~the contributions by the three householde of
banking, eteel and electric poWer intereate. Other contributions to
sokaiya aere aleo determined in a similar faehion, aith corporate contri-
butions baing based on those of affiliated bankiag institu~ions in most
casee. Por this reason, moat sokaiya coucentrate their activities on
financiai ieetitutions.
The firat evidence of this Was the manner in ahich the Takata group
amassed money. Last year, follo~ring Takata's arreet and the investigatioa
into 771 related enterprises~ it was fo+aad, as the table showe~ that Takata
had received vast aums from major baaks, including 4.6 million yea~ the
largeat, from the Industrial Bank of Japan; 4.35 million from Long Term
Credit Bank of Japan; 3.5 million from Nihon Saiken Shinyo; and 3.45 mil-
lion from Sumitomo. Contributions by 20 banks in a 6 month period totaled
about 31 million yen, with an additional sum of about 150 million baing
diaburaed by 751 other enterpriaes. It vas proof of hoW soft banking in-
stitutions aere on sokaiya.
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The Takata group ~mploy~d ~~.ght org~ni~ation8, euch a~ pubii~hieg firma end
reeeaYCh ineeitutae which ie eoneroliad, to coil~ct the money, amount~ng to
51 miilion, 94 miilion and 146 million in 1974, 19~5 and 1976 reepeceively.
It coll~ce~A n~griy 400 miilion ~n th~ 3 i/2 p~riod ~nd3ng June 1977,
nearly hg~f o~ which came from peopse'~ e~v3ngs.
In addition, inveseigat3on~ by th~ O~Ake Tax Admin~,stratiion Bureau and
Kinki Financial Affairs Bureau revealed that 500 m311ioa was paid out by
rhe five ma~or bank~ of Sanwa, Daiwa, 3umitomo, Ta~yo Kobe and Sumitomo
Tru~t during a 1 ye~r period from October 1975 to Seprember 1976.
According eo rhe Net~ot~~i Police Agency, tha eoft stance af tiheae fi~encial
in~titueione appnal to gangetere.
Gangeters ~r~ incraaeingly chengieg their profe8eion, figuring thae rether
than takin~ a chqece W3th gembiin~ or etimulante wh~ch arE sub~ect to
etrict control~ it would b~ easier to work ea sokaiya--a sure and safe
way to make money. The nu~nbpr of eokaiya has increased from 1,600 in
1972 to 6,50~ at the end of liiet year, with nearly 1,000 coming from the
rank9 of gangsterg. Becauee o!' them, ehareholdera' meeCinga reportedly
ar,e eub~ected to greater violence and numerical dominance.
Tab le
ContribUtiona to the Takata Group
(total sum paid in first h~slf of 1977, as determined by the 1~D)
Induetrial Bank of Japan 4.6 miilion
Long Term Credit Bank af Japan 4.35 "
Nihon Saiken Shinyo 3.5 "
Sumitomo 3.45 " ~
Fu~i 2�9 "
Mitaui 2.6 "
Daiichi Kangyo 1.8 "
Mitsubishi 1.8 "
Sanaa 1.35 "
KyoWa 1.0 "
Taiyo Kobe 750 thousand
Sumitomo Trust 700 "
DaiWa 700 "
Mitsubishi Trust 450 "
Saitama 350 "
Tokai 350 "
Tokyo 200 "
Hokkaido TakuBhoku 150 "
Mitaui Trust 100 "
Yasuda Trust 50 "
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuru Shinbunsha 1978
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Pnlica Dir~aenr Urge~ Br~~k in Ti.a~
Tokyo YOMIURI SHIN~tJN in Japaneee 16 Mar 78 p 2
~Artialg: "'Aggnum~ Warn~,t~g' Impl~.es Naed for Conatitutional Improvement;
~nterpr3see Expel rhe Sokaiya; Enormous Funds to Qange"]
(T~xt ~ National I'olice Agency D3rc~ctor General Se:t~aro
As~numa attended the board meet3ngs of All Japan Br~nk
Aesaci~tion and Tokyo Bank Association on the ].4th and _
etrongly uYged.the severance of ties with sokaiya. An
examination of the background of hie reyueat revealed
a eituation far beyond one's 3magination.
The reason behind the Nae3onal Police Agency's appeal for se~verance of
~ t~es with sokaiya ie eimple and clear. According to the agency, eokaiya
has increased rapidly in recent years, having grown to 6,500 by Che end
~ of March laat year~ four times more than in 1971-~2. Nearly 1,000 of
them are former gangatera. Sokaiya also have made their way into enter-
prisea on xhe beeis of "the number and streflgth" of gangs lurking in the
background. Enormoua funde~obviously flow from sokaiya Co such gangs.
What arQ the coneequences? The police are cracking down through three
meana: 1) mass arreats of leadera, 2) choking off the sources of funds,
and 3) complete confiacation of weapons. To shut off the sourcea of
funds, the police have kept a strict~watch on gambling and barbiturates.
But as long as enormoue amounta of money are funneled by enterprisea to
the gange through aokaiya, no number of crackdowne will solva the isaue.
Another problem ia the difficulty of progecuting them as criminals since
enterprisea, fearful of losing "face," fail to make a police report even
where contributions virtually constitute extortion. To the sokaiya and
gangs, safe and guaranteed sources of funda are asaured. In auch a way,
� the gangater sokaiya are increaeing their take of contributions from ~
enterpriaes each year.
The National Police Agency eatimates that last year the sokaiya collected
from 70 to 100 billion yen from enterpriaeg. The I~'D's investigatiou
. last year of a sokaiya group and a tax investigation by Osaka National
. Tax Adminiatration Bureau have confirmed police euapicions about wide-
apread activities by enterprises, centered aYOUnd financial inatitutions.
Statementa to police by arrested sokaiya, such as "contributions are ob-
taiaable me,rely by printing on a name card the name of a legitimate re-
search institute," or "a person in charge of general affairs [dealing with
sokaiya~ handed over a fiatful of money in the order in which they arrived,"
reflect Lne enterprises' basic nature of settling all matters with money.
Certainly, the sight of gangsters and bartenders who know nothing about
econa,nic conditions or the commercial code being treated with respect as
a"teacher," riding around in foreign cars and residing in mansions is
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humorou~, bu~ ie i~a "an abnormal situatiion Chat cannoe be condoned (Na-
tional police Agen~cy)."
Director General Aisanuma's unusual request ia based on such a eituation.
Zmplying Che need ;Eor entierprises Co improve their baeic nature, he pointed
out, "the age of r~asolving a11 problems with money is over. 7'he sakaiya
iseue cannot be eo;Lved on-acene by chiefs of the aharea sectiion or general
affairs, but throu~;h a courageoue deciaion by the top hierarchy." ~
The reason for NaC~ional Police Agency's decision Co expel the sokaiya is
' tihat enormoua corp~rate cor.tributione are a great sourc~ o� funds for
gangs with which Chey maintain their organization. It is needless to say
that eociety desires the annihilation of gangs. Just how and where does
the li.nk between massive paymenta run counCer tn the desires of society
and the enCerpriaea' social. responsibilitiy? That puzzles as we learn
about the enormous contrib utions wh~.ch have been revealed by inveatigative
authorities.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbunsha 1978
, Corporationa Endanger Free Soc?ety
Tokyo YOMIURI SHINBUN in Japanese 19 Mar 78 p 5
[Editorial: "Enterprises Should Sever Ties With Sokaiya"]
[Textj Inveatigative author3tiea estimate that from 70 to 100 billion
yen were paid by enterprises to sokaiya last year. For this reason,
Director General Asanuma of the National Police Agency on 14 March at-
tended the board meetings of Al1 Japan Bank Association and Tokyo Bank
Association to request that "financial institutions firmly sever their
ties with sokaiya." ,
The banks have not yet shown any definitive reaction. Iiowever, if they
continue to maintain ties with sokaiya, saying, "for us, it is unavoid-
ab le," or "it is a necessary evil,".a serious predicament may ensue. Now
is the time to heed the investigative authorities' warnings and think
~ seriously about eliminating the sokaiya.
Banks are the corneratone of a free society. Unlike in the past, how-
ever, Chey cannot use their financial strength to move society in any way .
they see fit. They should be conscious of their social responsibility as
an imporCant eleme~nt of society, above all other enterpriaes. Yet,'fir.an-
cial institutions�purporCedly are the largest contributors to sokaiya, '
- setting the pace f~r other enterprises. The investigative suthorities' '
anguish is underst,andable.
Let's cite some fi;gures. According to investigative authorities, sokaiya
numbered 1,600 in :1972, 2,200 in 1974 and 6,500 in 1977, multiplying like
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rats. In some form or ather, ~hey are linked with gangsters~ and nearly
1,000 of them have conv~srtied into sokaiya.
Since 1975, shareholder~' meetings have been held annually. A atudy,is
underway to adopt a unit share system whereby a certaitt number of ahares
would be required to exercise ahareholders' rights. Such moves to amend
the Commercial Code include measurea Co cope with aokaiya. However,
sokaiya are running rampant as if to deride such moves. ~
The expuleion of eokaiya can be said to rest noC on the shc~uldera bf the
law and inveatigaeive authorit3es, but on the attitude of enterprisea, _
sCarting with banks. In Tokyo, more than 40U f~.rms are affiliated with
the Special Violence Countermeasures Counci~, organized by the I~D. In
. Osaka, an e~nterpri.se defense liaison council, divided into'18 blocks,
has been formed with some 340 firma listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange
as members. The etiructure has been formed; the remaining question is who
will imbue iti with a soul.
The answer is clear. Director General Asanuma explained at the bank asso- ~
ciaCion meeting, "The sok~iya issue cannot be solved on-scene by chiefs
of Che shares sec~ion or general affairs, but through a courageous deci-
sion by the top hierarchy."
It is convenient to utilize sokaiya to see that shareholders' meetings
end in 5 or 10 minutea or to conceal corporate scandals. However,
corporate management must realize that it certainly would destroy the
stock company system that upholda the enterprisea and the foundation of
a free society.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbunsha 1978
. Stockholders' Meetings Kept Short
Tokyo YOMIURI SHINBUN in Japanese 28 Jun 78 p 10
[Article: "Sokaiya Is Quietly Alive and Well; Unconcerned With Recession;
Clapping of Hands at 350 Firms, the Usual 10-Plus Minutes of 'No Ob~ec-
tion ~
[Text] Shareholders' meetings are now in full swing.
A total of 349 firms, or more than 30 percent of all
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Fxchange, are conven-
ing shareholders' meetings in Tokyo today and tomor-
row. The facial expressions of enterprises' top
hierarchy as the financial reports`'are made vary,
as oil and electric power firms are blessed with
high profits, while shipbuilding and textiles suffer
frnm structural recession. As in past years, share-~
holders have raised "no ob~ection" to various propos-
.als, and most meeting~ have ended quickly. Although ,
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~hn MPt~ tin~ crt~ck~d clnwn eo "~xe~rminee~ ehe mnii-
cious eok~iyn th~.~ y~ar," Eirm~ ba13~v~ th~t "~okaiy~
w~ll n~v~r ch~nge, ~lehou~h they may ~ppear qui~e on
~h~ ~ur�~c~."
The regular ehareholder~' maeeing of N~.hon Sekiyu (Tak@o Takiguchi~ presi-
~dent), wh~,ch had recordad 3t~ highea~ profie ever beceuse of the high yae
diff~rentiel of 170 bi113on yen, wA~ conven~d at 0800 on th~ 28tih ~e i~~
main office ~uditorium in Niehi-Shinb&shii Tokyo~
As chairman, Presid~nt Takiguchi repor~ed on cond~tion~ in the petroleum
indugtry and sought the ~haraholders' under~t~nding, ~ay~ng, "Demand is
- moving laxerally. Rece~~ion is fading, bue our gaine were ~ rasult of _
the high yen differential which, how~ver, were re~urned to tha coneumers."
After Preaident Tak~.guch~ read propoeals on financial accounts, charter
amendment and retirement allowances, a young sharaholder etood up and
delivered a supporting etatgment. Following the calls of "no ob~ection"
or "we concur" and a lap~e o� 31 minutes, the meating closed without
incident.
The firm'~ shareholdere' meet3ng wa~ rather lengthy compared to those of
17 out of 20 firms ligted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which lagted only
20 minutes on the 27th. At these meetinge, there wae only time to read
the first proposal on financial reports, to ~eelect officere and~make a
partial amendment of the charter, with hardly any time for ~hareholdera
to epeak. Thia ia in contrast to shAreholders' meetinge in the United
Statea where a full day is devoted to hearing from Che shareholdeYS.
Many firms noted: "It was almoat within Che eame timeframe as last year."
The longeet shareholders' meeting wae held by Hokkaido Colliery & Steam- ,
ahip Co, lasting 42 minutes. 7'his was due to an explanation by its chair- _
man, Yoshitaro Hagiwara, of the reason for the firm'e removal this fall
from the firat bection of Tokyo Stock Exchange, attributed to business
difficulties ever since the Horonai coal mine disaster. Said an officer
of general affairs section: "There was no way for sokaiya to cause a
coefusion since it even knew we had no money.
Whenever a ehaYeholders' meeting proceeds without a hitch, hardly any .
firm will deny that a sokaiya is behind the scenes. General affairs
section personnel of some firma commented: "As a general conclusion,
even sokaiya appears to have prestige by having a record of arrest
(Yashica)"; "Documents mailed by sokaiya to our firm are returned, but
now they ar~e being sent to homes of directors (Rhythm Watch Co)"; and
"Familiar fac.es are coming as usual, but this ye~r new ones have the
crass to show up (Nippon Hodo Co)."
Various firms agree that the MPD's tough crackdown has made "~akaiya
quieter this year." But the actual situation appears to be "a slight
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r~tr~ae ~feer ~xca~~~v~ ~u~~~c~,ng graund the t~.m~ o� tbe oil ehoek (JBpan
Syneh~e3c Rubber Co)."
At Ni,biy~ 3ogo Seeaubi Cn, which held it~ f3rst sh~rsholdera' meeting
gince baing 1iet~d 3n the eecond ~ection of Tokyo 3tock Exchanga ir Novem-
bar of laet y@ar, "sokaiya eppearad but did not utter a wotid" ae a former
1~@b ~fficer hed b~~n in~t~l,l~d d~pgrtment chief in charge of the meet-
ing.
Th~ group~ of nne-ehare ehnreholders who, at the time of the oil ehock~
ueed to converge on entarpr38ee respon~ir].e for poliution or Which capi-
t8l~zpd on the eituation and increaeed prices are no longer v3sibla at
ehareholdere' meeeing~. ~
. COPYRIGHT; Yomiuri Shinbuneha 1978
Activities in Fukuoka Noted
Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 20 Jul 78 pp 130-131
(Articie: "Sokaiya'~ 'Fukuoka' Offensive-Defensive War; 'If Not Good in
Tokyn, There Ig Always Hakata
~Text~ The black money received by sokaiya from enterprisea tota~. more
than 80 billion yen annually.
The number of sokaiya totals 6,500 (figurea provided by NaCional Police
Agency. Actual numbRr is reportedly 5,000 as some remain idle).
"Lately, however, around 20 percent of thoae sokaiya have begun to con-
verge on a few iocal enterpriaes here in Fukuoka."
Thus commented a local knowledgeable person 3n F~ilcuoka, which has been
hit by an abnormal draught and ~ater is available only 10 hours a day in
the Hakata deaert. He continued to speak about the endless floW of money: ~
"A certain secretarial section chief of a bank keepa a pile of 1,000 and
10,000 yen notes in the right-nand drawer of his desk, and when a sokaiya
eppears, he hands over the money in an unmarked thin brown envelope. A
majority of sokaiya are from Tokyo and Osaka. Apparently, they are im-
� portant figures, fo~ they stay at firgt cl~ss hotels, hustle in the
Hakata busineas district to collect money and leisurely pack up and
leave."
The desk of a secretarial section chief at another firm purportedly is
sCacked with one day's "neWapapers" and "magazines."
"Although the publications resemble some mysCerious documents, they con- .
tain remietance forms (not an invnice for payment) and receipts."
~
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Of cour~a, th~ aueharie~.e~ wil~. ~o~ to~~rae~ ~h~ ~~tu~t~.on. On 26 Jun~,
at a t3me when ~harehold~Y~' me~~in~~ ara ~.n fui~ ewin~, ehe Fukuoka ~
Pr~f~atur~~. Poli.o~, foli,owing eh~ ~x~mp],a of Tnkyo I~D aed O~aka Pr~-
f~ctur~l Police, ~~tabiished a"~okaiy~ informat~,on center" wieh3n the
Fourth Inveeti.gar~,v~ Seetion. Hitherto, a eix-man team of deeeceives as-
~igned to corporate viol~nce ca~es had coliecta8 information, which proved
~.n~d~qu~te. Th~ cen~er'~ �unetiion i~ ~o ob~~in informa~ion w~th the conp-
eration o~ tha ent~rprises~
Thi~ year, the po~.ice were mobilized to kaep a wa~ch over ehareholders' ~
meeting~ in ehe prefectur~ (most shar8holdora' meeting~ i~ Fukuoka ware
convened on eha 23rd by financial institution~ ~nd on 27 through 29 by
other local ent~rprieea). The numbeY of active ~okaiya in the prefecture,
according to the ~nveaeigat~ve eect~,on, ie "200 locals and 700 outeiders."
The same ind~.vidual continuad: "Formerly, in Kyuehu, th~re were eight
~okaiya--'three househo~d heada' and 'fiva ganior miniseers'--who main-
tained cloee ties with the etaff at local enterprises and assisted at
ehar~holders me~tings in a friendly atmosphere. Because of this tradi-
tion in Kyuehu, most 1oca1 enterpriaes tend ro cover up for their sokaiya
and refuse to show their liet~ to invesC~gators...For sokgiya �rom Tokyo
and Osaka who 3nfiltrate into auch a climate, there is no safer place to
~ make money."
As a result, ~ukuoka, after Tokyo and Osaka, has become the mecca of
sokaiya. "Nagoya ie like a tightwad and we cannot do business (according
to a sokaiya of inedium-rank)." -
Three Point Re~ection Movement Begins
Enterprises, obviously, do not neceasarily continue to make contributions
fre~ly upon the request of outsiders. With the steel and shipbuilding
industries in recession, the economy in entire Kita Kyushu is hit hard.
Purthermore, in HakaCa, turkish bath establishments and cabarets suffer
from a lack of patronage because of water ahortages.
A gtaff inember of a cerCain distributing firm said: "The 'calamity' began ~
around the time bullet trains commenced operation and air fares went down."
He went on to explain the status of enterprisea, atarting with commenta ~
on "needless expenditures":
"In those days, shares af local enterprises, priced at 200-300 yen per ~
share on the Fukuoka Stack Exchange, were sold in Tokyo by odd-lot dealers
for several thousand yen a share. We are in a predicament becauae those
who bought one or two ehares at that time are now converging on Fukuoka .
as shareholders."
Shareholders professing to be "strong in numbers" would stubbornly requeat
"detailed financial data," while those calling themselves "right-Wingers"
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would a~k ~uch difficuit que~eion~ a~ "Wh~C ~r~ your firm'~ view~ on th~
y northern t~rriCori.ai i~AU~?" Th~~~ "~h~reh~ldar~" ~re wail-dreoaed in
dark b~ue dou61~-bre~et~d ~u~t~; widp eie~ in pri~ry colors with p~tterna
ra~embli,ng a poi~onou~ moth; ~,nd gold-~immed spece~cl~~. Their ulterior
moeiv~ i~ to pxocur~ monay and good~. They ehout with only phyeical
eerengeh eo eheir cred~e.
"S~m~ nf eho~~ pr~s~nC ~aara tim~d (honest) ehareholdere asking for 'drink-
i.ng money �ox Conight'~"
Eventually, mon~y i~ given ro them to get tham Co ].eave. The problem,
then, is the amoune.~~~
"Bankg, electric power companiea and private railroads, aware of the pre-
vailing rate in Tokyo and Osaka~ seem to pay accordingly. As a reeult~
even unknowledgeable emall- and medium-eized firm~ mugt folloa suit [ac-
cording ro a general affaira eeceion chief of a 1oca1 manufacturer~."
In the Tokyo� market, rhe minimum contribution reportedly is 3,000 yen, but
average~ from 10,000 to 100,000 yen, the amount depending on the aokaiya's
ranking accordi.ng to his "abiliCy." Sometimes, payment ie made only once~
but when an account ~.e opened, 10 payments aYe made automatically each
year. Itanking the sok~iya is difficult because hie opponent'e "ability"
is unknown, being able to Apeak only a few words. "The aokaiya always
mention where h~ ia staying, without being asked (according to the ~hief
of a general affaira department of one firm)."
A sokaiya once was ranked according to the hotel in which he atayed. Thoae
lodging at Niehitetsu Grand Hotel were ranked A~ at Tokyu Hotel, B~ and ae ~
businesa hotels, D. Also, whether he took a plane to F~ukuoka or the bu11eL
train's gzeen car wae of utmost intereat to those on the offensive and
def~nsive.
"Sometimes, a person claiming to be staying at Niahitetau Grand Hotel
would only drink a cup of tea in the lobby and return to a cheap buainesa
- hotel (according to same general affaira department chief)."
Some sokaiya would go into a new line of businesa, preparing and selling
a"sokaiya roster" containing photographs and the background of sokaiya
for "30,000 yen." No doubt it comes in handy, but the fact is that firms
are compelled to maintain ties with sokaiya even long after.
Becauae of such ties, enterprises have seen their "budget increase 20 per-
cent annually despite resCraints." Finally, inciden~s began to occur.
The "Iwataya incident" last year is an example. At a shareholders' meet-
ing of IwaCaya Department Store, the Tokyo sokaiya assaulted the local
. sokaiya.
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"Th~ incidanr occurrad aEte~ th~ ~har~holdar~' m~ee~n~~ A ecuf�ie had
brcken out near th~ door ~nd the loc~], peop~~ wer~ brui~ed or auffer3ng
no~ebienda, ~o ~ Crt~d to seop ie~ When ~,e wae over end as I wa~ tidying
up, detr,ctivae ~rrived And made ~ome arreees. 'fh~nk~ to them, we were
` ev~n c81i~d 'amall Marub~n~,'...It wae cra~y after all we had done for
eokaiya (Iwataye ~taff m~mbQr)~"
~h~~ i~d to the formarion, under atrong pr8fectiu~~1 pnlie~ "~up~rvi~ia~,"
of thQ "~pac~.al violanc~ p~revention counc3l" composed og eeven ma~or 1oca1
firma, includsng banke and el~ctric power companiee. In addition, an
"en~erprise proeection meaeures councii" w~~ organized by 24 othar firms
(~n Sepeamber of last year). Needless Co say~ eha authcritise are con-
cerned about the contribuCionB a~ they ~erve as ~ourcea of funds for ~
_ gangs ~n Kanto and Kaneai. Currantly, varioue ent~rpriaes, encouraging
each other~ are conduceing a three-poinr re~ection movament ~no new rele-
tionehips, no increasa in contzibutions, and no temporary ralationshipa).
Thus, it can be eaid ehat a~Cructure hae been Eormad to maintain the
status quo.
True Colore of Self-Styled 'Ma~or Figurea'
Said a local mediutn-ranked aokaiya: "This year, wherever I went, there
ware always at leaet 10 detiectivee. There were always one or two detec-
rives who seemed etrong in ~udo." He went on:
"We and the firms do not like to eee such a situation. gut the detectives
make points by arrearing such clever offendere (criminals) as sokaiya."
This year there was no trouble and all firme were able to conclude their
shareholders' meetinga within 20 or 30 minutea.
"Even thoae from Tokyo were quiet becauae their buttocks were washed by .
the 1~D." ~
The sub~ect here is not about gay people. The 1~D reportedly has made
great strides in crime prevention thanks to the thorough investigation of
Chose soka.iya who require extra acrutiny. This is referred to ae "wash-
ing of the bu~tocks by detectives."
"Banks in Tokyo and Osaka have begun to cut back on contributions by 20 or :
30 percent. In our view, the banks are riding on the police policy. There
. is no problem in Fukuoka, however, as the situation lags behind Tokyo by
1 or 2 yeara."
The topic of conversation in the Hakata business district was the ap-
pearance at this year's shareholders' meeting of Mr Ichiro Matsui, 91,
the oldest sokaiya (probably in the nation) and head of the three sokaiya
households in Kyushu. Rather than talking to him as he was resting by
the doorway of his home after the meeting, we intervie~ed Mrs Matsui who
said:
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"Peopl~ f~om oeh~r praf~cture~ m~y ta~k b~g but, Co our ~ma~amenC, ehay ,
live in ~3mp1~ quartar~ and gat an aar~.y eC~rt on ~he~Y day'~ work~ Ac-
eualiy, thay may b~ eulfering a~ theYa ~ra too m~ny eoka~ye."
If eo~ why du rhay converge ~rom afar?
A young eokaiya, Mr Ryuich~: Koik~~ now popular in Tokyo, explgined: '
"Sokaiya ara united in a group. A pereon who 3s 3dla ie sel~cted ~o
coiiect for 5 or i0 oehere. H~ come~ from eha Ch~.rd or foureh c18ee.
After eleeping w~th e rural cabareti hoseese, he would becoma boid and
act like a 'b~,g ehot'."
In any event, information, for eom~ unknown raason, ie noC reaching the
"8okaiya information center.~."
' COP`:RIGHTs Shinchosha 1978 .
One Firm ~~cpel~ Sokaiya
Tokyo A3AHI SNINHttN in Japanese 29 Jul 78 p 11
(Article: "Sokaiya Finelly Expelled; Shareholdere' MeeCing Held Peace-
ful].y; Preaident of Tokyo's Medium-Sized Audio Producta Manufacturer Makes
Decision After 12 Yeare on Contribution Cutoff"]
[Texti] On 28 July~ the 44th ehareholder meeting of Foater Electric Co
(Hiroaki Shinohara, preeident) was convened aC 1000 sharp at Fukushi
Kaikan in Akiehima City, Tokyo. Attending were 47 shareholdera, naetly
employee-ehareholdere; only two sokaiya were present, both of whom were
old "ruling party aokaiya~" but on thie day, they remained silene ehrough-
out. After a chorue of "I concur," and "I favor," from the ehareholdere,
President Shinohara cloaed the meeting at 1006 ~rith the atatement: "Thank
you for your earneat diacussion." The firet meeting held aince ehe deci-
sion made early thia month to auspend payoffs to sokaiya ended in only
6 minutes wiChout any trouble. A total of eight investigatore from
Akishima Police SCation, 1~D, were oa guard against the poesibility of
sokaiya causing trouble in protest against the suspension of payoffe;
but there were no incidents and the police pulled out.
Money Saved To Go to Children of Traffic Victims
The firm, a medium-sized manufacturer of speakers eatabliahed in 1948,
had suffered an export decline becauae of the recent high yen offensive.
Its sales in the last fiscal year were 13.2 billion yen, a drop of 19 per-
cent from the preceding year, and austerity Was practiced in the firm.
Furtheraare, the nwober of sokaiya, about 80 last year, had increased
this year to 180, probably because of the firm's increased capitalization.
If contributions had been made to sokaiya at the usual rate, the sum Would :
have doubled. "But such a thing is impoasible." Coupled vith the problem
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Fot~ o~F~cint~ vs~ ornY
of tha high y~n~ rh~ po~~ib1~ deubl~,ng of rh~ coneribuei.on~ prompted the
Eirm tn d~cid~ eo t~rmin~t~ th~ pnyoff~.
'fh~ firm had a b3et~r ~xpar~.~nce in a~h~rehoider~' maeting in April of
iast year when 10 eokaiya, backad by a larger geng, converged on the maee-
ing~ Ju~t a few days prior to Chat~ a r~ght-wing organi.~ation had exerted
"~~1~~ preegura~" ~eying: "According to information, e sokaiya group wili
r~eorC Co violenc~. W~ ~h~11 que11 tt~~m if you ieave the meeting up t~
u~. When their propoeal wa~ re~ectad, not only the ~okaiya group but a18o
10 or more righti-w3.nger~ intruded and cau~ed turmoil fo~ en hour and a half~
Wh~n the maet4ng wa~ about to end, the MPD ~tapped in to conduce invastiga-
eion~, contending: "Thare ~s a~uapicion ehat the firm has made payoffe
to tha sokaiya to restore normalcy. If true, th~t would be in violation
of arricie 494 of the commercial code." Fortunately~ rhe firm was vindi-
cated, but the eiruation had caused great pa3n to the company ~exacutivea.
Pre~3dent Shinohara said: "A 8hareholder~' meating ia held Co enable a
firm to ii~ten fu11y to the viewe of sha~rehoid~rs who gre normally unavail-
able and to hold discuseinne. IC would be ideal if, ae in Europe and the
United Statee, as much time as needed could be devoted to diacusaiona; but
here, there are monetgry considerations...I am frustrated over tiae aith
sokaiya." The impre~sion thaC he received aC this time was a factor in
the decision to suspend payments.
President Shinohara continued: "gecause of social customs, We have been
making paymenrg, although we were aware of contradictions. I happened to
b~ in the ~ame clags in the military academy as the president of Kyupi
Co food company which has shut out eokaiya eince 1971). When I heard
about Che ~ay it handled sokaiya at my class reunion, I envied them."
Preaident Shinohara, age S1, cofounded the firm with the previous presi-
dent. In 1966 he assumed the posc as the firm's second president; and,
rather than a salaried president, he can be called an owner. A salaried
executive, to insure tranquility during hie rein, is likely to make pay-
offs to sokaiya as "it is company money and does not hurt his pocketbook."
For President Shinohara, it was a decision that he reached after 12 years
- in office. "I think a problem remains ~hen meetings aYe so short noWadays.
I had prepared imaginary queations and anewers in the hope of prov3ding
adequate answers to basic questiona regardless of possible aokaiya inter-
ference; but...the fsct thet the shareholders' meeting, the �irst since
~ the announc~ment of the termination of payoffs, Went amoothly ahould be
properly evaluated. If we assume a proper attitude, ae can suppress
1 sokaiya. 5"hat is clear and i feel relieved."
i
On the sarre day after the sharehalders' meeting, the firm decided to
donate a part of money saved--500,000 yen--to children of traffic victims
and to continue to do so each time a shareholders' meeting ia held.
According to the organized crime prevention headquarters ~t the I~D, cur-
' rently only 21 firms, including the above, have totally ehutout the
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~OR D~FZCiA~ U8E ONLY
eok8~ya, out of ~om~ 2,000 madium-si~~d f~,rm~ and ~bove l~,~eed on ehn
: Tokyo SCock Exchange.
COPYRIGNT: A~~hi Shinbun Tokyo ~ton~h~ ~,978
Sokaiya Entertained at Theater
'~okyo YdMIURY 5HINBUN in Jepaneea 6 Sep 78 p 23
~Article: "Sokaiye Forcefuliy Selis '~nviteeions to Impariai Thaater';
Enrerpr3eae Forced To Buy 800 Seats; 5 Million Yen Profit; MPD Fro~me on
C1oee Tiee"~
~Text~ The "unforCunate tiea" bat~+een eokaiya end enterpriees continue
ae before. Qn Cha nigh~ og 5 Seprambar, a"drama viewing party" eponeorad
by C1ase A sok~iya at eh~ Imperiai Theater in Marw~ouchi~ Toky~o, Was neariy
filled to capacity and wae a"resound3ng suncaes." 3ome 800 out of 1,145
C18es A seete were reaerved for epactatora who wera provided ~ieh food and
gifte. .Although the sponeor claimed: "It ie a monay loeing propoeition
to ehow our appreciation to patroni~ing enterpriees," inveseigatione by
the fourth investigative section, 1~D, and the Marunouchi Police Station
revealad that profits after expenaes totaled about 5 million yen. Stepe
are being eaken by the eame section to repoYt such "fund raising aceiv-
ities" to the National Tax Administratfon Agency. But the conetitutional
makeup of ehe enterprises which cbntinue eo deal ~rith sokaiya is likely
. to create a etir.
Tearoom 'Reservations' and 'Black Centlemen'
The drama witneesed by the "drama viewing party" ~aas "Elf Fire of:`
Satsukikan" starring Iguzu Yamada; the curtain rose at 1730. From around
1700, "sokaiya" vho could easily be recognized as such loitered in the
main doo~ay, handing a gift in paper bag to invited guests in exchange
for a ticket. A company employee, apparenCly in charge of eokaiya af-
faira, was greeted With compliments and emiles.
At the entrance to an upstair tearoom a sign read: "reserved today," so
regular customera were shut out. Inside there were 30 men Who appeared
to be sokaiya. They Wer~ conversing in private ~a3.th familiar corporat~
membere ie charge of sokaiya affairs who had come to give their "greet-
ings."
Many guesta, after concluding their business, vere seen off by sokaiya
without even staying until the end of the play.
Asked about their relationship with sokaiya, they would merely say: "I
came because I received a ticket from an acquaintance of mine," or "I
don't know anything."
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F0~ ~~I'iCtl1L U5~ ONGY
According ~o th~ four~h invn~Cig~tiv~ ~~ceion and eh~ poiice ~taeioe, eh~,e
"dram~ vi~w~.ng party" was coepon~ored by Mr T, ~ge S0, and Mr M, 38, botih
Cias~ A sokaiy~.
Both haii from Hiroehl.m~ and beioeg to the "ft~roehi.ma group," bQlieved .
by pol3ee ec~ h~v~ ii~k~ wieh ~h~ Sur~iyd~h3 Aili~nc~ g~~ng.
They have aponaored a"dYame viawing p~rty" ~very year for eha paee
~~ver~l yeara and are believed to have ~13c~ted the part~eipet~on of
~okyo ~nterpr38~~ whila making Che~r roUnds and coileceing dues.
According eo the eame inve~t3ga~ive ~ection, the p~ir asaeeaed 20~000
y~n in du~~ la~t yaar, and the emount i~ b8liev~d to be about the eame
for th38 year.
Totai expenses p@r per~on ware b~lieved to be around 7,000 eo 8,000 yen,
inciuding tha 4,200 yen Cla~~ A sea~, box luneh and gife. The exace
profit cnnnot be deeermined because of tha "compl~mentery ticketa" paeeed
out to sokaiy~ friends and relatives. But th~ eame eaction apaculates
that profi.te totaled a minimum of 5 million yen.
Many women also ~C~~nd~d, probably because the firms distributed the
tickete allocated to them by sokaiya to compaey employ�es and friende.
They Were obaerved raising their eyebrowa at eome 20 "black gentlemen"
dregaed in suits.
A sokaiya in the lobby streseed: "Not as many peopie are attanding ae
before because of trouble from the masa media and police. Only about 10
firms are repreaented today. The reason behind thie drama vieWing party
ie not to raise funda but to entertain corporate peraonnel Who have
helped us."
The event wae held shortly after the "special violence prevention coopera-
tive association" (16 organizations, comprised of 900 firms in the city),
egtablished under the superviaion of the same inveetigative section~ had
urged "nonparticipation in the sokaiya-aponsored drama viewing party."
As ehe "drama vie~ring party" Was held as scheduled in apite of those
firms' stand, tke same seceion is lamenting that "ties will never be
aevered as long as such a sttuetion persista."
COPYRIGHT: 'iomiuri Shinbunsha 1978
, Arrest of Executives Urged
Tokyo YOMIUttI SHINBUN in Japanese 8 Sep 78 p 7
[Article: "For Arrests of Responsible Corporate Officials on Friendly
Z Terms With Sokaiya"~
~i ~Text~ With contributions to sokaiya said to be 100
billion yen annually, the ties between enterprieea
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FOtt ORFICtAt, U~~ ONLY
- and ~ok~iya w~re oac~ ~g~in d~moa~e~~ted by eh~
"drama v~aw3n~ p~rty" ae ChQ imper~e~ Theaear. The
I~'D h~~ decided ~o ~ct firn?1y, m~k~ng publ~,c eha
namae of uncooper~t~ve aneesprieee and canducti,ng
inveetig~tiona ~,nto poe~~b~e breach of ttiueti.
Sxampl~~ of Ca~~~ of 'BY~arh af Trust' A.mong Corpoxete Offic~re in Cherg~f
A~sduced Payof~e a Mere Formaiity
The cueback in eha amount of conCr~,bueione wa~ propo0ed by the foureh
invQeeigaeive sention, t~D, in v3QW of ~he tiee batWaen ~neerprisae and
~okaiy~~ etart3ng 1~~t aueunm when sevarai taxeile miiie wer~ Bnffaring
from a aevere rece~eion. The Yeduction average8 about 20 percenC, bue
at eome receeeion-etricken firme it rangad from 25 to 30 parceet.
The cutback than ~prend to orhar indueer3ee. Since Aprii of this year,
even ma~or city banke and eecuritiee firme, ehe sokaiyg's beet cliente,
have ~oined eh~ move~ for a toeai of abou~ 30 enterprises, accoYding to
eh~ eame ~nveetigative eeceion.
Corporate contributions to eokaiya are made solely to insure an early
and peecafui conclusion of ehareholdere' meeCings. The number of eokaiye
~.8 preaently eetimated at 6,500, more than fonr timea ehat of 10 years
ago, and corporate "expenditure~" are on the rtse. One ma3oY city bank
pays abou~ 100 miliioe yen annually, or 8 total of nearly 100 billion for
the entire industry. Since it is a burden thae cannot be ignored by en-
terprises in thie time of receesion, general shareholderg havn b8gun to
ob~ect to unJust "disbursementa."
The 1~D hae aalcomed the raduction of contributions in viea of the rapid
increae~ of eokaiya gangs and eince contributions are their me~or aource
of funds. �
The aokaiya has reeieted atro~~gly; tao men aere arrested for aending
letters to enterpriaes threatet?tag to expoae ecandals or attempting to
extort money. To counter the m'tNe to r~duce payoffs, some sokaiya have
~ even claimed: "Actually, none c~f the firms have cut back. it ie merely
talk."
The reductions Were implemented and they dealt a heavy b1oW to eokaiya
initiaily, but according to a follos~r-up investigation and information
collected by the eame ievestigative section during the ehareholdera'
meeting season in June and July, enterpriaea all asserted that "they
vere continuing to cutback," but the "take" of moat sokaiya has not ac-
tually decreased. ~
According to the same section, this is due to: 1) although a specified
sum has been cutback, an equal aaaunt is paid separately for advertising;
2) at the time of near fiscal year, the amount of the contribution is kept
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FAR O~FiC~~1L U9~ Orit~Y
~t ~h~ ~~mp 1~v~1 o~s th~ m~r~in a~ ~n~r~~~~ ie narrew~d; 3) no actu~i
eue i~ a~d~, ~iehou~h eo eh~ aut~~d~, ~~ori~~ ~r~ ~pr~~d aboue "hav~,eg
~ff~e~~d eu~baek~~"
To suppr~~e eokgiya-~pon~or~d "epeciai ~v~n~e," euch as drama viewing
pnrti~~ and go~f cocnp~~titiong which are a ma~or eource of funde aiong wiCh
conrribue3on~, the �am~ inveetig~tive ~ection has ~ueceeefully urg@d
gom~ 600 ~irm~ rhi~ y~~r eo boy~oet gueh event~. ~ue, i~ 38 being ig-
, _ nored g~ready. On 5 9~peember, ehe dr~mg v~ewing party at Imparia~
Theat~r~ und~r Cha epon~oreh~p of ~ gang-connecead aoka~,ya, drew pereon-
nel from ~bou~ 800 firn~e, most~y from leeding enterprises, thue frueeret-
ing poiice inveetigator~.
AB a result of thi~ "couetererend phenomenon," conrribuCione to eokaiya
wera found Co b@ in a h~aithy se~te. ~The police inveet3gative aection
h~e decided, th~refor~, ro unify th~ enCerprieee' gokaiya countermeasarae
~ ~rgani~a~ion--"epeciai vioiance prevent~on coop~rative ~eeociat~on," now
divided into i6 bodies, and to e~rongly urge about 900 member firme ro
~ever rheir eiee Wi~h eoka3yn.
The eame eection 81go ig probing into poee3ble breach of trust caees
involving corporata g~neral affa~,rs pereonnei~ arieing from 1) k4~ckbacka
from eokaiya or as~rards of expeneive golf prizes, and 2) frequent invita-
tion~ ~o speciai evente ~uch a~ drama vieWtng parti.~~.
Unti1 noW the countermeasuree taken againgt aokaiya has been a repetition
of the enterpriae~' compliance With police r~queste for severance of rel~-
tiong and behind-the-ecenea breach of trust activities. To end thie
vicious circle~ ehe police department ehould noe only implement ite cur-
rent policy but aiso inve9tigate the enterpriaes Which etill maintain
ties with eokaiya anfl arrest those responeible.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbunsha 1978
Zwo Sokaiya Arrested
Tokyo YOMIURI SHINBUN in Japenese 9 Sep 78 p 23
[Article: "S00 Million Yen Damage Results From Forced Sa1ee by Sakaiya;
Zt+o indict~d" j
(Textj Chiba--In connection with a case involving intimidation and the
gale of heavy duty ropeg at exorbitant prices to government agencies,
monopoly corporations, government and public hospitals and uaiveraities
nation~ride by a sokaiya group in Tokyo, the Chiba District Public Procu-
rators OEfice on 8 September indicted cvo men, Tadashi Beppu, 40, presi-
dent, Teiyukai, National Defense Council, of Beppu Housing Complex,
3-18-19~ Nakamura-Minami, Nerima-ku, Tokyo; and Toshio Kato, 41 Tachikaaa
. Apartment, 2-2-11, Horinouchi, Suginami-ku, Tokyo, on charges of intimida-
tion. Covernment agencie8 and hospitals in 32 prefectures Were victimized
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by th~ two m~n. inv~atigae~.ong by Chi,ba Pregoctural Policn into other
poBe~bla cr3mee ind3ceta rh~t the damage may ultitaately axceed 500 million
yen.
CO~YRI~HTs Yomiuri Sh3nbuneha 1978
Po11ce Ka1t Qolf Tournamene
Takyo YOMIURI 3HINBUN in Japaneea 12 Sep 78 p 23
~Areicie: "Police 3top '8xceasive Profit' Compet~.tion by Sokaiya for 80
Paopia from Lead~e~ Firme Scheduled for the 20eh"]
~Text~ Yokohama--On i0 Seprember, the KenAgewe Prefaceural Police, in-
formed of a Tokyo-basad 8okaiya aponsored goif competition, wieh mambers
of laading firme in Tokyo and Kanagawa pYefeceure listed in ehe firet sec-
~ eion of the etock exchange ae participaee~, wae plannad for 20 Septamber
ae a golf courae ~n H3raesuka City, called on ~he golf course management
to cancel the event.
Word of the competition had been received from the t~D. Tha sponeor of
the game wae H group, a medium-ranking Tokyo eokaiya. According to pre-
fectural police, 80 pereona had eneered the game acheduled for 20 Septem-
ber.
Thie would have been the third year that Che H group had aponsored this
event. "Appeale" had been made eo firm~ listed in the first eection of
rhe stock exchange; dues Were set at 40,000-50,000 yen per person. Ar
40,000 yen per head and 80 parCicipante, roughly 2 million yen would have
been netted after expenaea for fees and prizea.
To the police request that the gamea be auspended due to the undeairable
ties betaeen enterprises and sokaiya~ the gold management reaponded:
"When a request for a re8ervation ie received, we check it out and refuse
if it is from sokaiya. Koaever, on this particular occasion, ~,+e cannot
because it's already beea accepted."
As a result, the KanagaWa Prefectural Police have prepared a list of par-
ticipating firms from laet year's roater and have made requests to several
firms in KanagaWa Prefecture not to partictpate directly. The competition
is expected to be cancelled ae a number of firms vill probably decide
against participation, especially in view of`similar mea$ures by the 1~D.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbunsha 1978
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N~me~ Shoul,d Ba Mgde Pub].ic
Tokyo XOMIURZ SHINI3UN in J~pgnese i6 sap 7a p i
[Commentary; artic;Le from coluron ent~.tled "Editor's Note"~
(Texr] 'rhe number of parasities--sokaiya--ie as high as 1,SOO to 2,000
in a single enterp~rise~ a ma~or~.ty having from 1.00 tio 300. A few enter-
prises are ewindle~ out of more tihan 100 mil].ion yen by ~hem.
Zt reminde u~ of countleas parasites clinging to an animal. It is lamen~
table that thie cond~.tion ~till persists even a~ter a eweeping operation
by authoriCies to ~oust the sokaiya. Theae figurea are based on a survey
conducted 1aeC Jun~a by the MPD of enterprises 13sted in the first and
second aections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange which convened shareholdere'
meetinge, eo there ia no doubti thaC the actual figurea are higher.
The reasona for th~.8 are clear. Whi1e there ia rhetor3c by corporaCe
management about the termination of relations with sokaiya, the fact ia
that there are beh~.nd-the-acenes ties with them to insure smootih proceed-
ings at ehareholders' meetings. Although the person who actually comes
in contacC with sokaiya may insisC on the termination of relations, tiie
management purportedly continues to make payoffs, fearful of the sokaiya.
The sokaiya, therefore, ia unmoved by any opera~ions to annihilate it.
Not only has it been getting contribuCions but lately it has diversified
its activitiea by sponsoring events auch as the drama vi.ewing party at the
Zmperial Theater and golf competitions. Being an easy way to make money,
gangs are entering thia field in greater numbere. This money, however,
ehould have reverted to the conaumers, been used for wage hikes for em-
ployees or for the shareholdera' benefita.
In the midet of recession, the enterpriaes' precious funds are paid out
to sokaiya to keep a lid on the apoils. The recent relentless tragedies ,
of bankruptcy or adornment of accounta ar.e probably due to the evil prac-
tice of uaing money to stifle'criticiam ot the management. Any action by
management to nurture the sokaiya are crimir.al acts which diaturb the sound
progresa of Japan's econonry. ~
If major banke and firms still insist on maintaining such ties to the tune
~ of yearly payoffs of several hundreds of milliona of yen, there would be
no alternative buC to sCop making deposits in such banks or stop buying
those firms' products. Ttte police should publicly disclose on each occa-
sion the names of enterprises which make payoffs to sokaiya or participate
in drama viewing parties or golf campetitions as early as possible. '
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbunsha 1978
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Police Crackdown Ordered
' Tokyo ASAHI SHINBUN in~Japanes~ 27 Sep 78 p 22
[Article: "Nar~.onal Police Agency Ordera Crackdown on Sokaiya AcCivi-
ties"]
[Text] Ir? view of the increased activitieo by sokaiya ~.n eponsor3ng golf
competitiona and drama viewing partiea as a source of funds, on 26 Septem-
ber the National Police Agency inatructed police headquarters nationwide '
to d~.rect enterpri.ses noC Co participate in auch events ao that the aokaiya
can be prevented from staging auch events. .
The instructions cover three pointa: ~l) atronger appeals will be made to
organizationa such.as the enterpriae violence prevention asaociation
againat participatin~ in sokaiya aponaored programa; 2) requeats wi11 be
made to gol� courses which were previ,ously utilized for golf competitions _
and theaters not to accept reservations from sokaiya hence�orCh; 3) warn-
ings will be issued tio sokaiya to cancel g~lf competitiona and drama view-
ing parties when information is acquired concerning them, and requests
wi11 be made to enterprtses, golf courses and theaters to ahutouC the
sokaiya.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shinl~un Tokyo Honsha 1978 .
9097 ` '
CSO: 4105 .
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ECONOMIG
JAPAN'S NOV~IDER Ii~ORTS SNOW BICGEST CAIN 3INC~ Q74
Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in ~ng].ieh 14 Dec 78 p 5 OW
('~ext~ Japan's imports licensed in NQVember showed the largest year-to-
year gain aince September 1y~4 to h3t an all-time mont.~l~r },igh, the Mfn-
ietry of International Trade and Induatry (,1:.'~?) annow~, ~ ~ Wednesda~~
According to the announcement, the imp~rts total~d $8 i~~S rii: :c~n ;n No-
vember, up 28.0 p~rcene over the same raor.ti~ last ye~~. ~d
the previou~ record of $7,539 mi113un in Octobe:.
Excluding large aircraft, nuclear fusl aad other .~i.~ i�' ~ im-
ported, the November total represented a 25.6 per~ant ir,. a year
ago.
Licensed imports in the April-November period, the fir -�~gh .chs of
fiscal 1978, totaled $57,272 million, up 15.2 percent o..r ;~a ~..me period
last year--a pace slightly ahead of the government's import ;r~~�th target
of 13.8 percent for the whole fiscal year.
MITI officiala said that Japan's importe for the whole f~scal y~ar would
exceed the government's taYget of $81.5 billion by $1 to 2 billion.
Manufactured gooda imports recorded a 74.3 percent surg~ while :ood i.mports
registered a 32.4 percent gain.
On the other hand, imports of industrial raw materials almost leveled off.
Because of the big increase in Japan's importa of automobiles [words mi~.ing)
gooda. The share of manufactures in Japan's total imports rose from 24.J
percent in April to 38.4 percent in November.
On a year-to-year basis, Japan's imports of automobiles registered a 129.8
- percent increase, those of aircraft engines a 312.3 percent gain, and -
textiles a 86.9 percent rise.
COPYRICHT: The Javan Timea 1978
CSO: 4120
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3CIENCB AND TECHNOLOCY
KAN5AI ~OWF.R TO` BURN PLUTOiV~U'i AS LWR FU~L
Tokyo ASANI EVENING NEWS in Engli~h 23 Dec 78 p 1 OW
(~~xt~ Kangai Electric Power Co (Kanden) plans to burn plutonium at a
iight-water reacror at ita Mihama Plant in Fukui prefectiure on a- experi- ~
mentai baeis, government and power industry sources disclosed r'riday.
This wi11 b~ eh~ fir~t time that plutanium ha~ been burned ae fuel for a
commercial reactor in Japan. At present, plutonium is used on a teet basis
for two pilot reactors owned by the eemi-governmental power reactor nuclear
fuel corporation--the advanced thermal reactor (ATR) named "Fugen" and the
fast breeder reactor (FBR) named "Joyn."
Accordir?g to the sources, the 1,960 kilograms of plutonium intended for the
Mingma reactor--actually a mixture of plutonium dioxide and lightly-enriched
uranium--was purchased from Westinghouae of the U.S. and�will arrive at Kobe
Port aboard a U.5. freighter early next week.
The rate of plutonium dioxide in the mixture is 3.8 percenC. -
Kanden contract~d for the fuel for uae at the Mihama Plant from the U.S.
firm in 1972, but the reactor in question--Mihama No. 1 reactor, Kanden's
first nuclear reactor--developed trouble in July 1974, and its operation
was suspended for four years until July thi.s year. The ahipment of the
fuel was postpnned at Kanden's request.
The U.S. Carter administration advocates a nuclear nonproliferation policy
and opposes the use of plutonium which is the principal raw material for ~
nuclear bombs, but the export of plutonium ~ntended for Kanden has been
authorized presumably because the contract was concluded befaYe the birCh of
the Carter adminiatration.
Circles concerned with the development of atomic energy here are paying
keen attention to Kanden's experiment. ~
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At prpg~nt~ th~ pluednium extra~e~d by burning uranium i~ k~pC in ~Cock ~
for u~~ as fuei fnr the FHR~ which ig Qxpec~ed Co be put ~nto commercial
dp~raeion in Che 200As. BuC if iC ~rnven that plutonium can be ueed
�ar ehe lighC-wat~r r~ae~r~r, which i~ ~lr~~dy 3n comm~reig]. operat3on~ it
wi11 mean that plueonium can begin eo be ueed widely end ~t will ai~o lead
Co economizing on uraniUm raeources.
However, it wi11. also lead eo the proliferarion of we8pons-gr~de plutonium
~nd touch off a wide conerover~y about ~gfety.
rf Kanden's experiment proves succeagful~ the Ml.niatry of International
Trade and industry intend~ to promote the use of plutonium for 11ghr-water
reactora. ,
COPYRICHT: Asnhi Evening Newa, 1978
CSn: 4120 E~
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