JPRS ID: 8207 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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8 JANUARY i979 CFOUO 2179~ ~ i-OF i
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JPRS L/8207
8 January 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 2/79)
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The s~erial reporC conCains political/economic information on West European
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in the docCrine, programs and problems of the ma~or communist parties,
inc?uding their r~latior.s wiCh communist parties ouxside the WesC Luropean
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17. Kcy a'ord~ and Da:umcnt Analysis. 170. Ueacriptors ~
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~'OR 0~'F~C~AL U~E ON~Y
JPRS L/8207
8 January 1979
~ TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 2/79)
CONTENTS ~ PAGE
INTEEZNATIONAL A~~AIR5
LDC bebts Pose Prnblem for North-5ouCh RelnCions
(Hans J. Petersen; BUROPA AEtCHI'!, 10 Nov 78) 1
~Et~1NC~
CharncCer of PSF'g Michel Rocard Viewed
(Arthur Conte; PARI5 MATCH, 8 DPc 78) 13
Further Discussion of 1979 Defense $udger.
(Jean Laruelle; TAM, 12 OcC 78) 17
Briefs
F'irst AMX 10 RC Deliveries 21
MAS 5.56 As~ault Rifle 21
ITALY
Commentary on Worldwide Implications of U.S.-PRC Ties
(Frane Barbeiri; LA STAMPA, 17 Dec 78) 23
PORTUGAL
Government Attempt To Deal With Azorean Rebels Fails
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 25 Nov�78) 26
UNITED KINGDOM
British Press Reacts to U.S. Initiative on PRC
(Various sources, various dates) 2P
Editorial Report '
'DAILY TELEGRAPH', Editorial
'THE GUARDIAN', Editorial �
~ 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES', Editorial
UK Communist Paper, Editorial
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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INT~ItNATIONAL A~~AIIt5
LDC DEBTS POSE PROBLEM FOR NOItTH-SOUTH RELATIONS ~
Bonn EUROI'A AfiCHIV in Germ~n 10 Nov 78 pp 693-702
(Article by Hans J. Petersen: "The IndebCedness of the Developing Couueries
as a Problem of North-SouCh Relations"]
(Text~ Background
Besides the problem areas of "trade" and "transfer of resources,"1 the in-
debCedness of thc. developing countries is a main issue in the North-South
dialogue. Although an independent topic, it ie very closely connecCed with
the two other main topics of the "dialog." Indeed, the uncertainty about
indebtedness exists only because there are problems in the two other areas.
Indebtedness is nothing but the refYection of capital influx, the mosC
important component of the international transfer of resources to the
developing countries. Unless iC is a gift, each mark that is transferred
increases the indebtedness of tt-~e recipient; and the demand for larg~r
capital transfers to the developing countrips implies by definition readi- -
ness to accept greater indebtedness.2
But, to be sure, increasing inCernational indebtedness is zot a problem a3
long as its conditions--i.e., its interest rates and repayrnent ~erms--corres-
pond to the ability of the indebted countri~s to meet its debtt-service
obligations. But in the past few years, this has become more difficult for
an increasing number of countries, since their export proceeds rose more
slowly than their debt-service obligations. Thus the ratio between debt-
sezvice costs of public or publicly-guaranteed foreign debt, and the export
of goods and services, the so-called debt-service costs/ex~ort quota, was in
1967 above 10 percent in the case of 16, but in 1976 already in the cac~
of 23, d~veloping countr~es, and in the case of 12 countries even above 15
percent; and especially in recent years, it has risen drastically for some
countries, although this is not sufficiently recognizable from offic3al debt
statistics.
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Bu~ ehe debC-gerV~Ce COyt8~2XpOrr qunra is nbsolutiely noC a reli~ble indic~-
tor of Che ttcCu~1 burden impn~ed on ~ cnunrry by ie~ fnreign indebredness,
or, respectiv~ly, of its ability r.o cope wieh �urCher indebeedness. ror ehig
purpoae, u combinntion of other indic~Cnrs4 is nf gre~Cer value, ~nd ~tiere
~re exnmples nf Cnunrri~s ehne hnve run inrn difficuleies wirh statisticnlly
r~laeiv~ly lnw debC-servic~ coers/export quotas, while other countries mnde
good ecnnnmic progress with high inCerest ttnd repttyment obli~atiions. In ehis
conneceion, it is by no me~ns unimpoLtane ChnC cont:inuous economic progress
areracts nddirion~l Foreign c~pital, so Chae 1~rge pares nf debt service
obligatione acrunlly do nor have to be mer out of exporC revenues at a11,
buC cgn be rerinanced from cnpieal influx.5
BuC such ~"rollover" is the less to be expected and Che more difficulC ~o
achieve, ehe more backwArd n country is ~nd the more slowly ir develops.
On rtie other hnnd, poor nnd ineufficienely dynamic countries--and they still
consCituCe the ma~ority of the Third World--a:e pnrMicularly dependent on
capital influx, buC are ae the same time the least able to mobilize export
revenues Co meet debt service obligations.
This problem can be solved by means of development aid, in other words trans-
fer of goods, services, knowledge, etc at clearly more fnvorable conditions
than exacted by the market. 7'he scale of noncommercial conditions is wide.
It reaches from services rendered free of charge (primarily Cechnical aid),
via commodity aid at Coken prices and financial aid at extremely easy crediC
conditions, to staCe subsidized export credits.6
Of course, even easy credit conditions do not necessarily give protection
- from indebtedness problems. India and Pakistan are ouCstanding examples
thar even under such conditions mountains of debts can accumulate over the
years as repayment dates and interesC payments come due that can hardly be
met without additional aid. Just the same, indebtedness problems of develop-
ing countries would hardly play so important a role in North-South discussion,
if the developing countries did not chronically and considerably lag behind
international goal concepts. While most Western industrialized countries
envision, as a rule-of-thumb, development aid under easy conditions of 0.7
percenC of gross national product, an average rate of 0.35 percent has never
been surpassed since 1970; and, measured by that norm, net contributions~
of WesCern industrialized countries should in 1976 have amounted to US
541.4 million, while they actually came to only $13.7 million.8
Especially in cecent years, however, would it have been more importanC than
ever to bring development aid closer to the quantitative goals since, as a
result of the oil crisis, the foreign-currency needs of many developing
countries have expanded further. Their import needs have increased consid-
erably, not only because of higher priced fuel imports but also indirectly
because of price increases of finished goods brought about in part by the
oil-price explosion; the cyclical recession in the industrialized countries
has af the same time not only reduced the exports of developing countries
because of weakened demand, but has also led to increased defensive measures
by the industrialized countries, which do not want to enhance the problems
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of eheir prec~riou~ 1~bor-m~nrket condirion by 3mpart cnmpeCit:Lon from Che
d~veloping counrries.
The "currency hole" of m~ny developing countries, thus nugmeneed by lenpg
and bounds, has been increasln~ly filled by commercial funda with accordingly
shorC maCurity dates and high ineeresr rares. Such credits h~~+e nor been
difficulr to obtain from banks nnd exporters in the indugerialized counrries;
they were even 3n p~re virrually forced on the developing countries. ror
~urope~n finnncial markets--their inclinneions Co invest wenkened ns a result
of Che economic recession--were swamped with excess dollttrs from rhe ai1-
producing countries, nnd enterprises made atrong efforrs Co compensate for
r.Qduced developmenC of domesCic sales at Leasr part3a11y by increased exports.
The reaulting cnpital transfer did have the posieive effect that in recent
years the exrernal difficulties of nonpeCroleUm-exporting developing counCries
were far from being as exCen~ive ~s had first been feared in light of the
critical development of the world economy. But as a negaCive consequence,
a debC mountain formed whose structure of due daCes and inCerest charges gave .
ever~ reason for algrm. This does not manifest itself Qo dramaCically in
official sratistics, especially since problematic debCs are not included at
a13. The we11-known indebtedness staCistics overwhelmingly fail to take inCo
cor.sideration not on~y military credite but also credits with maturity daCes
oi less Chan 1 year as well as those long-term credits which are not guaran-
Ceed by governmenC agencies in the creditor or Che d~btor nations.9 But
particularly shorc-term arid unofficial crediCs, above all from the Eurodollar
market, have in recent years gained enormously in imporCance in a number of
countries, so Chat actual debt-service obligatior~s arP much higher and are
rising considerably more drastically than is revealed in the staCistics.l0
Hence, in spite of reassuring comments,ll we cannot dismiss the danger that
develo ing countries may in increasing numbers run into indebtEdness prob-
lems.l~ But it is not merely the economic dimensions of this problem that
have induced the developing countries to emphasize the indebtedness topic in
the NorCh-South discussion. RaCher, beyond it, the indebtedness difficulties
contain political aspects derived from the fact that the industrialized '
countries, apart from their already dominating international position as
trading partner and sources for capital and technology, find further possi-
bilities for economic-political dominance opened to them through the in-
debtedness mechanism. These could perhaps be in !�he form of levies which
the International Monetary Fund ties in critical situations to assistance
grants, or within the framework of creditor clubs in the case of multilateral
funding operations which--apart from even considerably more numerous bilateral
funding operations--occurred between 1956 and 1977 in 37 instances in the
case of 12 countries.
r-
Demands of Developing Countries
Under these circumstances, developing countries resist the traditi~nal
practice of treating indebt~dness problems merely as exceptional situations,
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whpre BC@~8 hnve eo be r~ken only if ~ crisis comes eo tt he~d, i.e., when
~z cnunCry hns requesred debr rend~usCmenCs which ehen bring only shorr-Cerm
relief n~ a rule only after time-conauming r~nd often humiliating deAlings,
And which, mureover wirh rel~eively high interese raCes, develop quite
diff~~rently from case Co cnse.~4 They have, raCher, Lar some Cime been
emphnsizing ehnt when it comes en indebCedness uncer~ainC3es, ir is a mareer
o� developmene-policy scope, making ir therefore necessary to proceed here
on a broxd Front, and to insritutionnlize overl~pping mechanisms so ChaC as
much as possible latent debt problems do noC become ttcuCe at a11, and yeC
indebtednesa crises th~t do arise be solved according Co uniform rules,
rapidly, permnnenrly, and in conformiry wiCh developmentnl-politic~l criterin.l5
The IIN Conference for Trnde ~nd Uevelo~menC (UNCTAD) firsr o� n11, wiCh iCs
commission~ nnd special global conferences, serves ehe Third World as n forum;
apart from thaC, the developing counCries articulate Cheir demands also within
C~~e framework of oCher confertnces where (as for instance as "nonaligned
countries"16 or as the "Group of 77")17 they are primarily among themselves,
or--as in ~he Conference for InCernaCional Economic Cooperation [CIEC~18--are
represenCed by a few members facing represeneatives of the industrialized
countries.
In doing so, the. developing countries emphasize completely differenr issues
, from case to case, anu it is undeniable Chat during Che past few years their
posiCions have chanbed, and have in any case become more flexible, after
they first pleaded for radical solutions in the confronraCion mood nf the
world economic: crisis. Thus, at the UN exCraordinary general assemblies of
1474 and 1975, and also at the conferences of the "Group of 77" and of the
"nonaligned" at that time, the convening of a world debt conference was
discussed, where in a rather speculative manner, general--and noC merely
individual-case--measures for the disencumbrance or the alleviation of debts
of developing countries respectively, was to be negotiated. As regards
public indebtedness, two especially needy groups of countries w~re given
pricrity from the outset. For the so-called MSAC group (tl~ey are those
develop~ng countries deemed particularly hard hit by the world economic
cris-isl ) a 5-year debt moratorium was to be secured, and for the LLDC
group (thPy are the particularly backward among the developing counCries20)
the cancellation of debts. As regards commercial debts, a 25-year payoff
extension supp~rted by a multilat~ral fund, was drafted.21
At the Fourth UN Conference for Trade and Development in Nairobi in 1976
(UNCTAD IV), these postulates were pushed into the background and they are
now either not advocated at all (world debt conference, global extension of
commercial debts) or merely in weakend form (relief for MSAC and LLDC
groups). On the other hand, constant emphasis is put on the demand to in-
stitutionalize internationally uniform guidelines for the treatment of cases
of indebtedness. These guidelines are to be applicable in reference to
early recognition and avoidance of indebtedness problems,22 as well as their
solution in acute cases of crisis. The developing countries would lil:e to
replace arbitrary procedures determined hy creditor nations with calculable
and neutral mechanisms.23
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Bnsic ArCie~des of Ind~iserialized CounCries
~
Now na much ~s ever, mnsr indusrri~lized countries find ie difficulr to
recognize the inde~ieedness of developing cc~unCrl.~g ns ~ genernl prnblem nnd
~n indep~ndenC field for their developmen~-poli~y ~cCiviries. Th~ socialise
nountries do noC feel Ch~zL th~s eopic concerns ehem ar nll, bur rnCher regard
- indebtedness phenomen~ ns inherent ch~rncCeriseics o� cttpiralise economic
rel~eiona.24 The Wesrern industri~lized countries which coordinaCe eheir
developmenC pnlicy in Che D~velopmenC Aid Committee (DAC)ZS of the OECb
continue to emph~size tl~at indebCedneas problems hnve constituted the ex-
ception rneher ChAn the rule, thne they are by no means uniform, thar they -
in each ~a~~e h~ve tiheir specific causes and require correspondingly differene
thernpi~-~, and ChaG the indebCedness problem c~ul~d, as it were, impliciCly
be solved by an ~dequaee deveiopment-aid policy: since all poCenCinl cnuses
of indebCedness problems--nnmely inndequaCe c~pirnl formaCion and productiviCy,
fi~cnl and foreign tr~de weakn.esses--are in uny case primary development-
policy points of deparCure.26
So far as indebtedness problems have up to now become acute, they have grown
out of inadeq~iaCe commercial credit rransactions which development-policy
authorities of industrialized counCries do not feel responsible �~r (nlehough
private and commercial capital fl~ws into the developing counCries are
vigorously advocaCed by public auChorities and also fostered by diverse
mensures). It is feared, raCher, Chat expecCatiuns of rapid and generous
aid in problem-situations would induce developing countries to follow unsound
indebtedness policies and wou13 undermine the fundamental principal of econ-
c~nic relations Chat obligaCions once undertaken, should be met as far as
possihle under all circumstance ("pacta sunt servanda").
The industrialized countries, by Che same token, do not want to be pushed
into assuming responsibility f~r early analysis and pr~ventive therapy of
indebtedness problems. They are willing, to be sure, to so coordinaCe their
development-policy measures that the capacity oE receiving countries to
meet their debt obligations is not outstripped and also to see to it that
they contribute to the sCrengthening of economic power and to the abiliCy
to meet debt-service obligations. But they consider debt management per se
a~ob for the debtor countries alone, and beyond that any interventian on
the part of the creditors in this area as harmful. If official authorities
in the creditor countries were to deal in advance with possible indebtedness
crises, Chere would be the danger of a signal effect that might well pre-
cipitat:e rather than prevent crises.
Most industrialized countries hold therefore strictly to the principle of -
dealing wtth indebtedness problems only as exceptions, and of then treatii.g
them in each case as individual actions.27 There is extraordi.nary resistance
against any kind of "automatism" both in the sense of institutionalizing
uniform mechanisms to ward off threatening problems and also in the sense of
generally valid guide lines for t:~e solution of indebtedness crises which
have already occurred.28
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This bns~~ ~rCiCude ig furChe~ reittEorced by Che argumenC ChnC iC would be
exeremely difficulC rn dr~?w up ~nd follow uniform guidelines fnr comprnm~.~es
necess~ry for rhe geCtlemenr nf debCa ttmnng crediror counCr3es us we11 ~g in
cr~dienr-debCor rel~Cinnships, since Clte eypes of crediry eo be funded nnd
r.he struceure of cr~dienr~ nh~ng~s from Ca~~ Cd ~~ge. In rhis connec~ion,
~11 credieorg should ~s s~ m~CCer nf principle rnnke equivnlenC concessiony so
~s Co ~void rhat enugher cnndiCions of some creditors ~re fin~nced by greater
concessinns of oehere. Thig prinCiple requires in mo~C c~ses long-drnwn-nuC
negotiaeions, since so fnr r~o simple formultt for "burden gharing," g~eisf~ceory
;:o ttll, hns been found.Z9
~tn~iiy, nttenCion is called en g reshuffling ef�ect of debr setClements, un-
desir~ble from a developmenC-policy point of view: indebeedneqs problems
occur primar3ly in the cas~ of reLneively advnnced countries which hnve access
to internationnl Cnpit~l m~rkees ~nd c~n cope with cnmmercinl indebtedness
much more easily Chnn backw~rd couneries which nre less ineegrated inCo inCer-
naCional financinl relaCions.30 If difficulCies Chus caused are ehan tnken
c~re of by public aid, funds are Cied up ChuC nre Co serve developmenC-policy
purposes and that should be employed with prioriCy for backward counCries.
FormaCion of DifferentiaCed PosiCions within Groupq of Countries ~nd Pointe
for Compromises
The antagonism among principal argumenCs in the NorCh-SouCh dialog does not
mean ChaC Chey are defended with equal vigor, and ChaC they are not even
partinlly ignored, within the camps Chat stend opposiCe to each orher in this
, "dialog." Indeed, clearly differentiated positions in regard to indebtedness
difficulries have emerged in Che Third ti'orld as well as in WesCern industrial-
ized countries, a situaCion that reduces fundamental counterposiCions and in
individual cases hold out prospects for compromises.
It is thus surely a unique fact that the oil-producing countries, which in
the early '70s decisively mobilized the rest of Che 7'hird World with Cheir
aggressive raw-maCerinl policy, and which assumed a spokesman's role in the
NorCh-South dialog, have not only themselves largely caused or intensified
the indebtedness problems of rhe develo ing countries, buC are also in part
building up massive creditor positions.~l While their Crade-policy contri-
buCions to the inCensification of international trade problems of other
dereloping c~untries has not diminished the solidarity of the Third World,
it should be difficult for them as creditors to consistently take the side
of the debtors in the framework of indebtedness discussions.
Nor do the more advanced developing countries in Latin America and Asia stand
fully behind the postulates that are being raised in the name of the Third
World. Even if, under the pressure of the world economic crisis, they may
for the time being have kept less of a distance from the other developing
countries, still, countries like Argentina, Brazil, South Korea or the
Phillippines, to name but a few especially important countries of this group,
are in no way particularly interested in impairing their already widely dis-
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pereed ~nd much urilized cr~diC annnections on inrernnCion~1 Capir~?~. mc~rkeCs,
through ~ drmm~ei.zariun of rheir indebCednege posiCion.
Ztt Che me~ntime, Chege cnunrrips hnve reg~ined rheir digeunc~ frnm the globnl
dem~n~g nf Che 7'hird Wdr1d ~C �ir~C gn vehemenCl,y ~dv~nc~d ~nd Chig sur~ly
cnnCribuCeg consider~bly Cn rhe fanC rh~C Che Nnrrh-Snuth deb~Ce on debt
gllevi~Cinn is foCUSing ar ehig Cime on ehe LLnC ~nd MSAC groups. Here,
~noner Chan gnywhere ~lge, c~n cnnceyeinns by the indugtrt~lized couneries be
~xp~cC~d, fnr they recognize on ChC whol~ a dev~lopment-pollcy pridrity of
CI1~8p groups of Countr~.es, nnd c;onCpssions in ehe indebtedness sector do nor
COgC very much here. WiCh the exception of India nnd pakistan, it is ~
quegtion only nf smnller counCries tliae phttre minimglly in outsCanding
dem~nds.~z
Since Che induserialized countries agreed some time ago eo consider the need-
iest countiries, especi~lly rhe LLbC, noC only quanritntively more in the dis-
tribution of funds, but Co granC Chem Chereby also parricularly eaey cnnditions,
it would seem that the condiCions of former crediCs Co Chese counrries, and
}ience Cheir accumulated indebCedness, would be ad~usted Co the now prevailing
egsier conditione.3J~ Thus, Che indusCrialized countries have in ehe meanCime
also declnred their readineas Co accepC in principle corres~~nding debC
setClemenCs. Tough negotiations at the ninth exCraordinary ~~ession of the
Council on Trade and DevelopmenC of UNCTAD in March, 1978 led to a declaraCion
of intent along Chese littes.34
But to be sure, ~ill the industrialized countries do not react alike. Countries
like Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada which among the indusCrialized
countries have for some time represented a development-policy line of relative
readiness to grant concessions, have rather readily canceled the public debts
of the poorest countries. Moreover, Great Britain, Switzerland, and now also
the FRG, have agreed to the same measures. In the case of the FRG, this step
comes as a complete surprise since until recently it couYd, Cogether with the
United SCates, Japan, and France, be counted among the strictest defenders of
"orChodox" positions. But it certainly does noC surrend.er Cherewith Che
principle of settling each case individually. Within a year (but retroactive
Co 1 Jan 1979) special agreements are to be worked out--albeiC according to
common guidelines.35 The rest of the creditor countries, especially the
United SCates and Japan, will take more Cime for the announced concessions,
and they will in all probability also noC be equally generous. They are
also unlikely to relinquish selective debC settlements.
A further result of the ninth extraordinary UNCTAD session--certainly still
less sensational than the above-mentioned "declaration of intent"--is the
- resolution to form a committee of government representatives to make further
progress in the area of general guidelines for preventive and curative treat-
ment of indebtedness problems. For the time being it remains unclear which
compomises in particular will be reached here. Nevertheless, it is discern-
ible here also that mechanistic and obligatory global formulas have no
chance; but it appears achievable that on request of interested developing
. ~
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counCries, re~crion to indebtedness problems be more rapid, in some ~spects
more uniform, ~nd under Che chairmnnship of neu~ral or even sympatheric
aurhorities (for insr~nce Che Wor~.d Bnnk or other developing counCries) and
th~e development-policy criteria p1~ty n grearer role rh~n Uefore.36
Promising beginnings for it have, to be sure, already been made for some rime
for a number of countriey within the framework of country-aid conso.r.tia and
Chrough advisory commiCtees formed by granCors of developmetiC aid.3~ Expecial-
ly in very recent Cimes, "overt" indebtedness crises (i.e., requests �ar
mult3laternl debC settlements) would presumably come ~bou~ consideraUly more
often th~n is actually the case, if potiential indebtedness problems w~re noC
also nnalyzed wiChin the framework of such commiCtees in Cheir investigation
of. develupment programs and if Chey were nor taken into considerarion in the
coordination of intern~Cional developmenC aid.38
W3th all the search for rules and instruments for the avoidance and solu~ion
af indebtedn~ss problems it must not be forgotten that iC remains in any casE
more important to find satisfactory soLutions for the body of problems
connected with "trade" and "Crans�er of resources." WiCh every advance there,
indebCedness difficulties lose in importance.
FOOTNOTES
1. "Transfer of resources" is the collective term customarily used in develop- ~
ment-policy discussion for the transfer of ..apital, technology, knowledge, -
etc from indusCrialized to developing countries. ~
2. Edgar Kroeller, "The Debt Problem of Developing Countries: A Challenge
to the International Commuriity," THE OECD OBSERVER, No 90, January 1978,
pp 25 ff.
r
3. Cf WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT, 1976, Washington, 1976, Statistical Appendix,
Table 6, pp 104 ff; also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1978, Washingtan,
1978, SCatistical Appendix, Table 9, pp 92 ff.
4. Hans J. Petersen, "Debt Problems of Developing Countries: A Pragmatic
Approach to an Early Warning System," KONJUNKTURPOLITIK, Vol 23, No 2,
1977, pp 94 ff.
5. For Che breakdown of debt service components and their varied theoreCical
dimensions and practical relevance, see OECD, DEBT PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, Paris, 1974.
6. Subsidized export credits, to be sure, do not count as development aid
in the narrower sense. For a definition of development aid performance
and for computation of elements of differentially coordinated capital
flows, see United Nations, THE CONCEPTS OF PRESENT AID AND FLOW TARGETS,
New York, 1975.
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7. Gross c:ontributions minus repaymenCs. In 1976, repayments of bilaCeial
public development aid amounted to 38 percenC of the respective gross
contribuCions. Cf OCCD, "Decelopment CooperaCion, 1977," ItEVIEW, I'aris,
1977, Tab].e A 10, p i74.
8. Ibid, Tab1e A 2, p 165.
9. For the undersCanding and demarcation of available indebtedness sCatistics,
see Thomas M. IClein, "Foreign Indebtedness of Developing Countries,"
_ FINANZIERUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG, [Financing and Development] Vo1 13, No 4,
, 1976, pp 21 ff.
10. The balance of payments staCistics of 15 developing countries, published
by the International Monetary Fund, show for 1976 a Cotal of interest
payments more than twice that of Che indebtedness statistics of the
World Bank. See WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1978, op cit, p 117.
11. Cf Helen Hughes, "The International Indebtedness of Developing Countries,"
FINANZIERUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG, Vol 14, No 4, 1977, pp 22 ff; also, United
States Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Policy, Washingtor_, 1977, pp 51 ff.
12. Cheryl Payer, "Third World Debt Problems: The New Wave of Defaults,"
MONTY.LY REVIEW, New York, Sept 1976.
13. Edgar Kroeller, op cit, p 29.
14. "United Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Development," REPORT
BY THE UNCTAD SECRETARIAT, New York 1y74, pp 18 ff.
15. Ibid; also, "Debt Problems of Developing Countries," REPORT BY THE UNCTAD
SECRETARIAT, New York, 1972.
16. The group of "nonaligned" countries is a union, now of more than 80
countries, which since 1955 met together at seven conf erences. See
Bundesministerium fuer wirtschaftliche Zusammer.arbeit [Federal Ministry
for Economic Cooperation], JOURNALISTEN-HANDBUCH ENTWICKLUNGSPOI,ITIK .
[Journalist Handbook, Development PolicyJ 1978, Bonn, 1978, p 178.
17. The "group of 77" has been in existence since the Fir~t UN Conference
on Trade and Devt'opment (UNCTAD I) in Geneva, 1964; by now, about 120
members belong to this group. Ibid.
18. From the end of 1975 to mid-1977, representatives of 27 states and com-
munities of states participatied in the so-called "Paris dialog;" ibid,
pp 154 ff. See alsa the documentation about the final conference of
CIEC [Conference for International Economic Cooperation], EA 17/1977,
pp D 469 ff.
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19. Uy now, 45 developing counCrie~ beLon~ Co Chc~ Mngt Seridu~ly A~f~Ceed
- Cnunerie~, M5AC. IIMZ [UCItLINL'It rti'TmAG5 zCI~UNG, t3~rlin Nnon N~w~pnp~r],
JOURNALISTCN-HAi1bi3UCN CNTIJICKLUNCSpOLI'TIK, 197g, o~ ~it, pp 1~6 ff.
20. ThirCy co~nrrieg belong tn the Le~sC nevelop~d ~nunerie~, LI.bC (Che dnuble
L is u~~d ~n diseingui~h rtiis apprevigCinn from LUC which gCend~ fnr Le~g
nevelnp~d CounCries). Ibi~!, pp 174 ff. (Africn, Lehiopin, 13enin,
I3nCgwnn~, ~urundi, G~mbin, ~uinea, C~pe Verde, C~mernnn, Lesorhn, M~1awi,
ht~li, Niger, Upper Volt~, itwand~, Som~lia, Sudnn, Tanzgnin, Chnd, Ugandtt,
Cener~l Afric~n Republic, Asia nnd Ore~nin, Afgh~nisenn, B~nglgdesh,
BhuC~n, Yemen Arnb Itepublic, P~ople'~ nemocratic Itepublic of Yemen, 'Lnog,
l~inldiveg, Nep~l, WesCern Snmo~, LnCin Americn, Nniti.)
21. Ueue~cheg Institut fuer WirCschnfCsforschung [Geiman InsCiCUCe for
~conomir. Itesearch] "Indebtednes~ nf developing Counerieg: Case by Cgs~
or Univers~l Solutions?" ~dOCH~NB~RICHm, No 3, 1976, Iierlin, 1976.
22. ~'or difficulty in defining indebtedness problems and for. hiCherto aCCempted
analytical forecnsCg, see Hans J. Petersen, "On ~~?rly ItecogniCion of
CriCical IndebCedness 5iCuntions of Developing CounCries," DIW
VI~RTELJAHIt~SHEFTE ZUtt WIItT5CNA~TSFOItSCHUNG [QuarCerly Journal of ~conomic
ItesenrchJ No 3, 1977 pp 180 ff.
23. UNCTAD, "Selected Issues ItelnCing to the ~stablishmenC of Common Norms
in Future Debt ReorgnnizaCions, NoCe by rhe UNCTAb Secretariat," TD/AC.2/9,
13 OcC 1977.
24. UNCTAD, "Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on External
Indebtedness of beveloping Countries on its Second Session," TD/B/685,
21 Dec 1977, Sections 43-46; also Appendix III, "Position of the Experts
from the SocialisC Countries of Group D."
25. Seventeen countries and the Common Market belong to the DAC (DevelopmenC
AssisCance Cammittee). 5ee OECD DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, op cit,
Statistical Appendix, Table A 9 ff.
26. For classificaCion of differentiated complexes of causes and development-
policy starCing poinCs, see OECD, DEBT PROBLEMS 0~ DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
Paris, 1974.
27. For practice, up to now, see UNCTAD, "Present InstiCutional Arrangements
for Debt Renegotiation, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat," TD/B/C3/Ac8/13,
26 Feb 1975.
28. On this, see Nans-Bernd Schaefer, "Gradual Abolition of Foreign Indebted-
ness in Developing Countries and the German ~evelopment Policy," Guenther
Esters (Publ), NORD-SUED-POLITIK--UEBERLEGUNGEN ZU AKTUELLEN
WELTWIRSTSCHAFTLICH~N PROBLEtdEN (North-South Policy--Thoughts on Actual
World Economic ProblemsJ Bonn, 1977, pp 80 ff.
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~9. ~'or r~view nf ehe inCensiCy with which this principle ig de~end~d, gee
UeuCg~hey Itt~CiCuC fuer Wiregchnftgfnr.~chung, UIW, np ciC.
30. ~f ~dnrld Bgnk, WORL~ t~~VELOPMCNT RCPdR`C, 197g, op Cit, rr ~o ff~
31. ~or development nid of dp~C c~unCrieg, ~ee n~CU "Upvelnpm~nC-Codp~ernCion,
1916," ~~VI~W, pnris, 1976, pp 99 ff.
UNC'TAU, "The ~xCern~l IndebCedne~s nf beveldping Cnuntrieg: A gnrkgraund
5t~tistic~l NoCe, NoCe by th~ UNCTAU SeCreC~ri~C," '~n/B/695, 27 ~eb 197g,
Ph 8 ff.
~3. Ibid.
34. UNCTAU, "Uebt ~nd bevelopment prdblemg nf neveldptng Cnuneripg, tt~gnlueinn
5ubmiCted by the president df rhe '~r~de nnd Uevelopment Bonrd," Tn/B/L
Sb1, 3 M~rch 1978.
3S. A presg release nf the ~eder~l Mittistry for ~cnndmic Cnopergtidn published
on 4 OCt 1978 comments on the iss~e: "The ~eder~l C~binee h~g decided
thnt d~velopment gid lo~ns prnmised in the pgst years to the lenst
develdped countries can, ~fter exgmination of each individu~l case, b~
converCed into s~bsidies for the Cime Chey still h~ve Co run, if the
re~pecCive country requeats it.... 1'ha_ regulation on prucedure decided
on Codny npplies to the group nf ehe 30 very poor cnunCrieg, gs determinpd
by rhe United Nation~. They nre lnbeled as 'least devploped cnuntrip~'
(LLDC) nnd they suffer under particulgrly severe struceurnl dev~lopmenr
preblems.... The regulation will take effect at Che enrliest on 31 Uec
1978. It will apply to repayments and interesC pa~menCs due on and after
this target d~te. The existing lonns will not be universally converted;
each case will be carefully examined. Those least developed countries
that receive new aid from us can en3oy the benefits nf our action. On
petition of the respective country, the conversion itgelf is grrang~d
for in a government ngreement. On this basis are prev!ously concluded
loan agreemenCs appropriately altered by supplementary contracts. Pro-
visiens about utilization ~f funds, proj~cC cdmmitm~nt e~rtain conditions
and controls, are not touched." The Federal government points out further,
that with this remission of debts that supposedly amounts to ~ grand
total of more than 4 billion UM, it ha~ abided by the March 1918 request
of the UNCTAD council; and it expresses its expectation thaC therefore,
apartfrom other countries which have already decided on similar me~~ures,
the other donor c~~untries "including donors which do not belong to the
circle of Western indus[rialized countries," will fo11nW Wi[h equivalent
measures. It is explicitly emphasized [ha[ the loWer revenues of the
Federal budget, caused by the remission of debts, will not lead to a
reduction oE new development aid to be budgeted for the affected LLDC
countries; on the contr.ary, above aveLage increases in the developmen[
aid budget nre planned for the n~xt few years.
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~6. UNC'~AU, ~~S81pCCpd I~tlUB~ It~lneing td ehe ~~tnbli~hmene o~ Cnmmon Nnrmg
in ~utt~re U~be R~dr~nni~nCi~n~," dp ~it.
~7~ UNCTAb, "prc~ent tn,~titu~idn~l Arr~n~~m~ne~ for Debe RenegnGi~eien~,"
dp cit pp 7 f~.
3~. Hnng J. Pet~rg~n, "Jn ~~rly tte~ognieinn nf Criti~~l ~ndebCednp~s
S~.CUnCitittd nf Develdping Cdu~tries," dp cit, p 1gx ~nd Summ~ry l, p 1~5.
COpYi2~GN`~: 1g7~ Ver1~g fuer ~neern~tidn~l~ pnlitik GmbH, Bnntt
9011
CSU: 3103
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~0lt d~'~tCIAt, U5~ t~NLY
~ I~ RANC~
CHAt2ACT~Et 0~ PS~' S MIGH~L itOCAttn VI~W~n
P~rig pAiti5 MATCH in ~'rench ~ bpc 7g pp 77, 11~
~Artialp by Arthur Cdnte: "An Untduclied pnrtr~it of Michpl ttdr~rd"~
(TexCJ ~~liticg ig ~ h~rd ~nd Crue1 buginp~g. Ndt wiehdut gnme ggdism,
Chnnne pl~yg n disprnpnrtidngre role in ie. Itt o;~er Cd gucceed, rath~r
ehen t~lent nr g~nius, ie ig luck that one ne~dg. Tnke ~rur~coig MiCterrand,
fnr exnmple. Une mgy well wdnder whether h~ wgg nor. bnrn under the sign nf
migfortunp ~nd migchgnce. Hp mgy w~ll wonder hi~ns~lf if he hg~ not worked
fnr 20 year~ f~r ndthing, p~ined by vain imaginingsl He will nnt ~ven be
gbl~ tn cl~im the credit highly illusory at the outg~t for having re-
invented soaialigm. A mocked ally, dieavowed prophpt, wounded goldier gnd
nnw g leader qu~gtioned by hig best lieuten~ntg, he mgy soon find him~elf
aieh norhing but ~~h~teered crystal ba11 in hig h~ndg. Perh~pg, by vireue
df his gupreme talent as ~ m~gician, he will gtill succeed in egfegugrding
the theoreCical unity of his party utttil the European elections in June
elections that are going to provide him personally with an unexpected way
out. Barring a supreme blessing of chance, it is highly likely that noC
only will he not be ~ candidate for the third time in Che pregidential
election because of his age and aelf-exhaugtion the e~me thing thaC
h~ppened to Adlai 5tevengon in th~ United StaCes following his two defeats
in 1952 and 1956 but he will not be able to prevent hig party, which got
too big too fast, from ~xperiencing the mogt gerious intern~l upheavals,
even rhe splitg and quarrels that chnracterized it "before Epinay." We need
g plutarch to tell the tale of such a dramaCic spectacle, illustrated by his
atar With an exception theatrical ~ense.
Will ~rancois Mitterrand even know how or want to prepare for his
s`~cession? The observer immediately wants to take a closer look at how he
acts wi[h the contenders, esperially the leading one: Michel Rocard, to
better observe how Michel Rocard himself Works.
And who is this Rocard after all?
I once called him "Tintin" because of his jerky style, his candid reflec- -
tions, his deceivingly artless look, his label as a defender of the innocent
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~Oit OC~ICtAL USL hNLY
nnd hig mdp df unruly h~ir~ I wduld h~ve don~ b~CCpr ed dub him "Lucky Luk~"
if I h~d e~kpn n beCter l~ok ~e hi~ prderuding e~r~ dr his n~rvoug mnueh, nr
iF I h~d d~~cribed him at n time when his dark eyes bur.n wieh ~ng~r nr g~d-
n~~g~ Nis ~dmp~nidn~ frem S~outing dnyg r~11ed him ehe "erudir~ h~m~e~r."
Nig ~nemi.~g cnuld ndC find n morc aruel nickn~m~ Ch~n "W~1deCk-ItnqunC~"
Oth~rg lnbel~d him ehe "pink squirrel," Che "liCrle gp~rrdw," ehe "Arttb
among ehe ~eubbdrn," gnd finnlly, "the fn~eege m~a in ehe gdG~F31~5C gCgb1~."
Wh~t ~11 af Ch~ge epiChet~ hnve in cnmmnn i~ ehe ~eeempe eo de~cribe ehp
- m~n's mogC ~ppnr~ne qua~liry: hig gpdnCnneiey, his quiCknpsg. Ynu gee g
bird perched nn ~ br~nCh; ie sings be~ueifully. Ynu geop, bue ehe bird h~s
nlre~dy flown Co nnoeher br~nch, gingg ngnin, ehen eries oue nn nnk rueher
Chnn nn a~h, ~Cill chnllpnging ynu wieh hig nmuged glnnce. ThnC ig Rncgrd.
~reshn~s~ ig hig firgC gign.
The secdnd h~s Co do with ehe zodi~c: Virgo. He wgs bnrn in l~ti~ A~guse
1~~0, a ye~r when, in one of Andre Tgrdieu's c~binees, Ariseide Bri~nd,
well-esCgblisned for yegrs at the Quai d'Ors~y, could seill dr~gm nf mgking
~r~nce "rhe Corch of n~tions," when the lnst ~rench Occup~eion soldier wgs
le~ving Che Ithinelnnd nnd when Briand h~d n famous, vain memorandum senC
Cn th~ 26 ~uropean gnvernmenCs belonging Co the League of N~Cions for Che
consCrucCion nf Che ~uropegn Union. Virgo is Che sign of Itonsnrd, Alfred
,Tarry, Goekhe, Charles de ~ouc~uld nnd...5~inC-Just. It essentially points
to ~ nervous temperamenC. All the strength nf ehoge born under the sign is
in their intelligence. They are intelligenC because they are curious,
curio~s becauge they are restless and because they abhor prolonged stops.
"Ap~rt from Cheir emotional life, they easily become careful observers,
attenCive analysts who let noChing escape Cheir scrutiny of Che facCs."
Their greate~t weakness is perfectionism. They are never satisfied with
oChers or Chemselves. Out of self-defense, their principal mc:rit is their
love of culture and work. Our sub;ject is faithful to the description of
the zodiac.
Michel Rocard's third main sign is that he is a Protestant. He shares this
Crait with Gaston Defferre, plus that of loving sailboats and the sea. Ac-
tually, he is basically quite austere, very strict. While he does noC like
high mass and iCs or~an music, he is always impeccably dressed with a neat
suit, well-chosen tie, a casual but confidenC elegance. He must have remem-
bered the advice of Paul Ramadier, who liked to tell young deputies: "You
do not make yourself look more like the people by being messy. At my public
meetings, with farmers or with miners, I have never taken off my coat."
Rocard certainly also followed the training c,f his father, a Polytechnical
School graduate, directur of the Advanced Teacher Training School Labora-
tory and one of the creators of our atomic bomb, who taught Rocard respect
for proper style. He is so Protestant that for 15 years, he remained
a Boy Scout that is, a Calvinist Scout and, choosing a pseudonym
for his Eirst articles, he selected "Georges Servet," Georgea being the
Eirst name of his mother's brother and Servet being the name of a 16th cen-
tury docCor-theologian who was burned alive in Geneva under Calvin. This
would rather lead one to intransigence, which is the case. If one looks at
the face a liCtle closer, the smile is charming and youthful, but it suddenly
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Curn~ inCo n neewnrk of bierer wrinkle~; ie i~ n gmi1~ of sCernnegs~ Hi~
vni~~ ig chnrmi.ttg ~1sd, like g r.e11n, buC h~ gpenkg roo r~pidly, Con vnlubly,
gnd suddenly Chere is a whole burse nf fire: Thc ce11o onp wgs ndmiring hgs
alreedy rurned inCo ~ machine gun.
The fourtih gign m~rking 1toC~rd is th~e he hns ChargcCer, he kndws whae he
wnnCg. AC Ch~ age of 17, he: wng sCudying poliCicnl science even ehough his
f~ther wanted him ed ~rCend Che PolyCechnicgl YngCieuCe. Sd whgr if D~ddy
wag tn geC mgd, cuC nff his ~1lowance ~nd stop speaking en the rebell Roc~rd
got ~~nb as ~ miller-eurner to pay his wgy ehrough school ~nd, having dis-
covered soni~lism through the friendship of a Trorskyiee foreman, perfnrmed
brillinnely and enrered ehe Nariongl School of Admini~eraeion gnd ehen the
~in~ttce Ingp~ctorgCe. Nnr was he to be eaken for a page. When h~ w~s ~9, there
w~s g presideneial election fnr the successor Co General de Gau11e. Georges
Pompidou's main op~onent was A1~in Pnher. ~rnncois Mitrerrattd could not get
on Che Crack; Pierre Mendes-France did not wane eo, but ehat was no obstaclel
The litrle Tintin became aecretary general of rhe small PSU [Unified Sociglist
Partyj, a dissident fgceion oF the Socialist ParCy, which put Gaston Defferre
up as a candidate. Rocard boldly and fearlessly declared himself to be a
candidate, wiChout complexes or conceir. He was a young man who dared.
An amazed France discovered this tiny, almost unknown imp who had ~umped ouC
of some magic box.
He won nearly a million votes, almost as many as Gaston Defferre.
Other signs: Rocard plays chess, like Napoleon's generals. When he skis,
he swoops down better than he does the slalom. When he speaks, hP uses
concise language, makes a minimum number of syntactical errors, and then
suddenly, the eternal student, the native of Courbevoie, becomes capricious
and says: "Then bang! W~aC did the kid say?" or "Bang! Right in Marchais'
nosel" or "You know, Debre's nnt really a whole laC of fun!" or even "Politics
is a real bawdy housel"
His qualities: promptness, perception, a certain niceness, a great deal of
expertise, which caused him to be named finance inspector by Michel Debre,
secretary general of the important National Auditing Commission by Valery
Giscard d'Estaing and adviser by that other great strict Protestant, Maurice
Couve de Murville. He is also undeniably sensitive.
His weaknesses: excessive haste, which prevents him from remaining at a
sufficient distance to take the exact measure of an event and a decision;
raging anger that does a disservice to any statesman worthy of the name; the
growing heaviness that can come from a machine, the party remaining the old
party, 3ust as slow, cumbersome and superstitious as always, still distrust-
ful of unorthodox talents. He is small, but he does not act small. He is
perhaps sectarian, but he is very human. He is a technocrat, but he is
capable of denouncing "bureaucraCic appropriation." He knows all the ins and
outs of high finance, but he has remained a simple man. One can be sure that
an important role awaits him and that he is even capable of not letting him-
self be devoured in his own party. Above all, while he is a methodical
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ttn~lyst, he i~ ~uge ~s c~pnble of synehegis. Ne is ~v~n undoubtedly one of '
ehe few ~reuch poliCicigng Cn hnve ~n overnll view, Co serve ~ coherenC
conc~pC, MiCeerrand possesses the genius of Ch~ virCuogo. Abov~ ~11, ItoCnrd
thinks. Deepiee his ~erlcy stiyle, he cdnfidenrly follnwy hig persev~ring
and we1.1-Ch~ught-ouC convicCions~ He is ~ p~tient, strict, concentrnCing
Chs59 plttyer, whi1~ MieCerrnnd ig rnCher n poker player. He c~n rherefore
break ehrnugh, ~s ehey sgy, und brettk thrnugh in high plgces.
Tt remnins Co be seen wheeher, beynnd Che in-fighting di the pol3tical ,jungle,
he wi11 be nble to pursue something higher: achieve Che metamorphosis of
Che nld mnchines, impose the re~l problems of the future, tear gway the old
mngks, give up the vnin feeishes of nuCdaCed docCrines, boldly build or help
ro build ehe hum~niseic front nf the men of good will which nlone will bring
about ~ustice, snve bgsic freedoms nnd achieve the Criumph of the "open
worlds" over the "closed worlds," and finnlly, go beyond narrow-minded
mediocrities Co reach the potenCial of the universe. Alasl jJe are sCi11
fnr from being uble Co tell whether our unruly-hnired Tintin will tculy be
able, even if he is gifCed for all Che games of the forum, to escape the
shoals nnd reach the summiC!
For our observers at least, it is a climb thaC has become extremely Chrilling!
COPYRIGHT: 1978 par Cogedipresse 5A
11,464
CSO: 3100
16
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1~'RAI~Qt
P'UATi~R DI90U9SI01~ OF 19'~9 DS1Rl1191~ BUD(i~'P
~ Pasi~ TAM in !'srnch 12 Oot q8 p 4
[As~iol~ b~r J~at~ Laiv~ll~~ "Tiw 19'r9 D~f~~as~ 8ud~t thut Mill b~ Pr~s~nt~d
to Parliaa~nti ~ns~thin6 Yau rNd To 1snoM"]
[T~xt] "I N?y it in all f~~sa~ I aa a~inist~r who ie aatisli~d Nit,h
his bud6~~. To ha~n a aood budg~t is no~ an ~M in i~l! but it i~ ~atis-
f~i~ broaw~ it ~nabi~s o~ to aoat:nw xi!?h a aovsw oi aotion t,hut Iw
alr~ad~ b~un." Thns conolud~d Mr Baus~ ~,~inisbr of d~i~ns~ ~ Mho h~t! ~ust
o~ntliiwd th~ ~a~or aep~ats of th~ 1979 d~f~as~ budg~t to a psr~~ conf~r~na~
h~ld on 25 9rpt~~b~r 19Q8.
M~~uaination of th~ tisusrs ~hows as a satt~r o! laot t,hat aariQ~rab1~
~ttos~ has bNn rd~~ in spit~ o! tM wono~lo oiraurtaac~s ourr~ati~
att~lin~ t~ cauntr~r. to adh~r~ to tM ps~o~?i~io~s o! th~ 19 Jna~ 1976
l,ar p~rlainin~ to ps~r~ d~~nlo~pMnt. It is o! cau~~ not possibl~ for
ns to ~i~~ a d~tail~d accautt ot t~ ~inist~r ot d~f~a~e~ s p~s~ conf~srno~.
~1ut it sNrd to ns t~hat it xauLd b~ ns~t~i, i~wauoh a~ t1~ bad~! i~ about
to bs Qiscw~~d in parliwnt, to ai~n otir s~~s~a th~ ~a~or points.
~ 1979 d~f~tw bud6~t is a~t at 92.24 billion lranos,* or 3.26 psra~nt of
th~ 6s~oss dorstic produat. Thi� ao~pur~s to 2.9 p~ro~nt in 1975. 3.12
p~so~nt in 197? aad 9.2 p~re~nt in 19't8. In r~lation to th~ 19?8 bnda~t it
s~ps~s~nts a s+N?1 inasws~ o! 14 p~rc~nt. ~is arowth is distinatl~r ~at~r
thaa that o! ~h~ buds~ta of t,h~ oth~r ~ini~tri~~ (an o~nssll a~n~~ of 11.9
p~ro~at). This incrsaa~ is dud g_riACipslly to i~rw~d s~cp~nditur~s for
~quip~wnt~ 33.3~5 billion lrancs (up 1? p~rasnt). Our as~d ioress Nill thus
haw ~quiprnt thst i~ ~osr ~od~rn ~M ~if~cti~n.
Th~ ~s+ox~th in allocations to th~ razious pro6rar--42.892 billion fra~ncs--
is also v~r~ si6nifioaat~ an~ incsrass o! 24.6 p~rc~nt in 19'l9. This incrw~
Nill p~s~it an incr~aae in tunding !or tM nucl~ar ioro~s~ sn inar~as~ in
~ndititr~s for sr~~arch and d~~~lapMnt atid th~ oarr~ins out of Pross+as
to ~quip th~ thsre a~i~s.
* Inaluding 15.129 billion fs~ano~ for p~r~ion pa~rnts.
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I~'dR 0~~'TCIAL USC dNLY
The Firr~E AMX 10 AC
In~o!'ar se th~ lat~d ar~y Ss concerrNd~ 60 AMX 30~a~ 60 AMX 10 A~~s~~
95 ~ p~r+~onnsl ar?d PC ~ s~ 350 VAB' e~ 22 Gaa~l'le~ ~ 250 lssg~ oa~o truake
�nd x3S0 tactioal ~ehiai~s wt11 be ordsswl~ all of whioh wS11 incresee ths
~obilSty of ths ground unit,s.
Th~ =irs~ 5~000 1ti+i+~s 5.56 rsfi~e xill bs d~liv~r~d ~o unita [i~sre?t~d in
seooe~psnying bri~f~.
In~ofar aa the air arnqr is co~o~rn~d~ tr~~urch on t,hs Mit~~ 2000 e~nd ttw
M53 ~t~sns ~ill contim~~. Also~ 8 Trsnsa112 ~ud 22 A1pKa ~~ts hav~ b~sn
ord~r~d. By 1980 oid~rs for ~he F1 ~nd tla~ 200 ssriee Jagusr Nili bs
corrpl~t~d. And finslly ttu 4 euppl~Nntar~r eeo~iot~e o! the Orot,al~ Mill b~
start~d slong xi~h 56 0!' the dual 20~e gune for ths anti-airorstt s~ctill~r~r.
7Phs 90a~ A"Nsve,l Plan" in Prspe?ration
Insof~?r aa ths Na~r~r le aon~ornsd ~ ignoring ths 9NL~~ e~ 9~ 000 tons o!' n~w
ship conetsvotion xill b~gin in th~ ahip~axds n~xt ysar, In 1979 th~r~ ~ill
thw~ b~ und~r coa~tsvation~ 2 811L~~r 3 nuol~u sttaok aub~arin~e~ 6 aos~nttee
(4 ~ntiaub~arins arid 2~ati~airorutt~, 7 6unboats~ 5 sin~ sxeep~ra and 2
o~l~s~~ or 25 ahipa r~pr~senting ~or~ than 85~000 tons. BetK~~n 1980 and
19~ � lotal of 17 nsw ahipa Mill �nt~r ~sr~ric~.
On t~M other haad~ no d~cision has bNn Md~ and non~ rill b~ M?d~ prior to
1980 rssasdi~ any n~N airossit carrier~ due to th~ ~aot t.hat th~ eatus+~ of
ths aircrsft lhat rill b~ ~~bark~d is not ~rst lwoxri. ! TM onl~ b~QRst it~r
pla~e~d sr~ for ths propulsion s~rst~~e for the f;:turs carrisr~ sinos in uqr
cas~ ths~ Mill be nuclear po~srsd.
In total wd Nithout counting th~ 9NLa~s~ l,hs goal to b~ r~aoh~d by 1990 is
109 co~bat ship~ and 26 sup~port ships Mhich Mill ha~n aapabiliti~e far
eup~rior to thoe~ oi ths pr~s~nt il~~t.
Prparing for t!� lliture
llotic~ ahould also b~ 61wn to ~fiorts suthoris~d ior the str~agt~nin6 of
th~ 6~nda~ris aad ~ r~l~ase ei initial fuads !or th~ constsvction o~ a
nsw school in L~ron for the Militas~r Health 3ervic~.
1'I~1~ ~,t1 NYdi~7 ~1NAt SA PlOY1M N111 b~ ~ t12'8t 1lYi1t t0 b~ ~QY1p~Q
Mlt,~1 tfN A1A 1~ I~:.
2 Th~~ ar~ i~provrd Tra?sisall~ s abl� to ts~s~ort 14 t,on~s. inst~a~ or 8 tons
owr a distance o! 4,OQi0 k~ and capable o! inrilisht r~tu~lins.
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~o~ nr~rctnL usc ocvLY
At~d liwll~~ t~h~ aontinuing �lfort ~pu~ los~th b~r !h~ ~i~nistr~ of d~f~t~a~ to
pr~pas~ !or ~ tutur~ Mill ~o on~ th~ aieouttt oi t'unds ulloaot~d to z~~er?rah
�nd d~rr~lapNnt h~ b~~n oo~id~rably iner~~ed. Tt is f~lt t,hut at? a~r that
lail~d ~o psrpar~ �~riou~ly for th~ tutur~-�workin~ in ciac ooilabornlion
wi~h o~rilie?n r~s~arah a~nt~rs and labor~toris� and ~i~in6 i~tus to ~Eh~
Q~~rslo~pNnt of r~~~aavh ~t~d t~chnia?1 and t~ahnolo~ioa7. ituiowtion--would b~
ws~r quiokly i~fb b~hind.
Iluolsar 3t~~~r~ Still a Priori{~y
Th~ ~inist~r al~so aaknonl~~d thut priority is ~ti11 bsin~ giwn to ths
asra oi nuolsar ~s~?~snta. TMO tt~w proara~re +?rs pl~n~asd~
OrN progra~ oonc~rru a~diu~ air to sround we~pon. It is a t~,aotical
~napon that Mill b~ fit~d iro~ an airor~tt aad will con~inu~ b~ Mans oi a
st,a.tie-sraotor ~ngin~. Thi~ ass~~nt xill ~quip th~ Miras~ 2000 xf~ioh Mill
b~ ap~rational in 1982 u N~11 as t,h~ ~~be~rlc~d 9up~~3't~nQor~'s.
TM s~cond prosras in~olws a nucl~ar eubsarin~ tha! xill iir~ a~~ t~
o! ~is~ils kno~m as th~ "Intl~xibl~". TM M4 dssil~ Nill hare ~ullipl~
xasfi~ad~ arid a rwge that i~ ~uoh ;up~rior to tha~ o! curr~n! t~rp~s aad
~?ill b~ ~uoh ~oz~ p~oi~~ aad h~w str~n6thsu~d d~i~n~~e. ~hip ils~l!
~11 haw b~tL~r n~~risational c~pabili~i~s bu! ZM ~ost i~pos~?t f~aZur~ i~
t,Mt tM ~i~sil~ firing ~yst~� Nill b~ diff~r~nti th~ iiring Nill bs eor~
=spid e~e~d ~or~ dir~ct.
Mor~ Int~nsi~n Training
Op~ratin6 ~~nditur~s (43.766 biilio~n issuaa) as~ risin6 i~sa but n~wr-
th~la~ at il.?2 p~rc~nt tM ris~ i~ ao~passbl~ to that of olh~r ~o~ws~nMnt
bnd~t,~. Tfi~ ~ilitary aoudition Nill b~ , i~pro~r~d lOSO ~ob~ !or r~ors rill
b~ cr~at~d) ~ tM pa~ for dsattNS will b~ saiNd 2'l0 ls~.tios p~r ~oath
b~inein~ on 1 Jnl~ 1979) alot~ Nith s~cial p=+o6~e~ssi~n pyr, th~ �is~ o!
t,1r ~ndas~ri~ Mill b~ incr~a~~d (1600 po~itiars inolndins 63 oi'!lo~ra~
1S0 non-coiuis~io~d oific~rs, S6~ ~ndas~~ aad 220 wocilias~r ~~nda~~)
wd it~d~ rill b~ incsras~d ior ir~~l ~ed ps~o6rMrd rint~tMOa~.
1l~s aati~ili~s of aur ari~~ rill inor~w accosdin6l~ la T9'l9. ~'or ths
6ro~ued arip t,his will a~aa 100 da~s of sorli~~ !or all s~irat~ of Mhich
4q da~s (co~p~r~d to 45 in 19?8) Mill b~ d~~ot~d to ~uwrs ntiliEina
th~ i~ll ao~pl~Nnt of a nnil~s ~quip~snt aad ~at~rial.
l~or t!r Ra~ it Mill ran 94 da~s at s~a (ao~p~,t~d to 92 in 19?8). Thi~
incsras~ r~ sN~ in~i6nilicant to th~ l~an but in s~alit~ is i~portaat
for tssinias. As for th~ air as~q it Rill b~ abl~ to lvs 45A~000 hous~ oi
riisht tir, co~pasod to 432,000 in 19?8~ Mhich Mill uo~ oth~r thi~s
~e~bl~ oo~bat pilots to riatain th~ir hi6h ap~sstioocl swdin~ss.
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.
Cn[Z 0~'t~ ICtAL U5C ONLY
TM ~bo~w is thu~ ~ bri~f o~r~rrisM~ Nithout ~oin~ inlo too suah d~t,~il~ -
of t,M pro~por~d bud6~t for 1979 whioh Ni,il ~oon b~ ~x~M~n~d bq owr.
rrpr~s~ntati~~~.
It srlUota � poilor t,h~~ is not contsnt ~Sth oorr~otin~ a!~M i~rf~atioro
or i~uffiai~noi~~~ but rat,Mr is oou~itl.~d to oontinu~d ~nd p~xrsv~rit~g
~!lort ~o~ a iix~d ~a?1.
COPYRI(3HTi 1978--"TAM" M~aein~ d~s A~~s
??79
C50; 3100
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T'p.ANC~
BRIl~'9
P'IA9T AlO~ 10 AC DaLIViR~~9--Ths ~ruc 19?9 Nill writ !,M fiirt d~li~nri~s
to tM ~rouad ~s~qr o! th~ AlOt 10 AO aetit~ank co~b~~ whiol~s (AlOt 10-
�obil~ Qaanon). TM~q
uipNnt~ rfilah Maa d~oid~d on la 19'15 ~nd ranntaa~ur~
of Mhioh b~an in 1976~ riii ~o to tfw r~conn~?i~w~o~ r~iNnts in our
~o:rd oorps u x~li aa to t~h~ lisht as~wsrd oa~ral,r~r s+~iMnb in th~ u~x
int~nl~r~r diri~iotr. It rill s+~lao� th~ ~A~ �(at~o=+~d s+~conn~?i~sano~
whiai~r) Nhioh h~?v~ bNn in us~ in our unita for ~or~ tf~at? 20 ~rrara. T!N
p~rforw~c~s tusTMd in b~r the tirst produation ~od~is ps~o~v~ t,h~ ~xcrptional
qualiti~s o! th~ Al~f 10 AC. TM whioi~ !w ~lu ~hNL. It is aaphibiaw ~
psr~~nris~d~ has 6s+N?t opssstin~ sst~e (800 iu or 18 hoars of ooabat) ~ad
i� o~p~rat~d b~r a 4-~a os+~x. Its rol~ is t,hat oi a?n aatitat~k ~apon. A~sd
xith a hi~h ~us:l~ wlooity 105 u ci?naon firing a hollox chat~~ ~h~ll
stabilis~d b~r a f].n, it haa s ~~r~ psrcis~ fir~ control syst~~ utilising
laa~r t~l~rtx~r. In~~svMnts for ni~ht ~i~ia? in th~ tus~t also ~nabl~
it tQ ~nsa~ in ni~ht ao~bat Kith ~xc~llent ~!l~ctiv~tr~~. Th~ 9th Hussas~
R~irnt in Fravins xill b~ f,M fis~t nnit to s~w~iw tM wN antit~at
�~hicl~ in 19?9. V~hicl~s oa or~~r inalud~~ 1976~ 20, 19'r7~ 10, 19?8~ 40~
1979~ 60 and 1980-82~ 220. [T~xt] [P~?ria TAM in lh+~uch 12 Oct 78 p 4] 77?9
lIAS S. s6 A59AULT AI1~'Li--It xa~ in 19'~5 t~t th~ ~inist~r o! d~i~nN d~cid~d
on tM dnr~lo~nt o! � 5.56 a~lib~r asswlt rifl~ built b~ th~ 3alat-sti~mr
Arr Ma~nfaeturi~ Co~pas~. By Ausust 19'~' tfM rif1A xaa r~ady. ~ t,otal of
20~000 of t1~ riri~s x~s~ or~~r~d in 1977~ 27~000 in 19?8 aud 48~000 in
19?9. Riwl era~rs Mill total ~100~000 uoit~. Contala~d la tM 1979 bud~~t
asr osd~r~ for 95~000 as~s and. 380~000 ca?rtridass lro~ 1Mnch iadnsts7. TM
dsliwr~r sch~dul~ provid~~ !or th~ fitrt 5,000 as~s to arri~n in 1979. Z~
~t ~Od~ls YNnit rifl~s r~aufacttisrd in t~ ~orld (eoM ~uah wapo~s
har~ bNn ~?ro~und tor ~osr t!~?n 20 ~n~), th~ ~'aw 5.56 is oo~pl~t~l~ ~ad~m
in a..i~n s~ ,~ur.otur.. Z1~i. .ocplaias tn. �ta.pt. tnat ~.r. in~ttall~?
~ to di~at+rdi~ it ~ att~~rpts which hai~ si~ c~s~d ~�in~ th~ !'aw 5. s6
i~ ~ns~ oo~p~ti~iw wit,h co~p~ra~l~ xr~pons in us~ !.n et~r aa~i~s. It has
a calib~r ot s.s6~ ~nishs 3.7 Ics ~ad althoush it haa a lon~~r barrl~ ~t a
l~n~th of ?6 0~ it L~or~ thaa 20 0~ ~hort~r thau ~ost of ita co~p~tition.
It has a~nssi~ wlocit7 0! 9S0 Mt~rs p~r ~aid. Its ssb o! iis~ i~oind~s
~in61~ ~hot ae ~ell a~ ~hort atd 1~ b~rsts (it has a rariabl~ busst Nl~etor
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~OTt O~~TCYAL US~ ONLY
�nd �~od~ of Sisr ewi~oh). It o~an fisr a gr~n~d~ Neighing up to 500 gs+~~s.
A~ a gsrwd~ ],~?unoh~r it can ~ir~ an "~?nti~+~r~onn~l" ~s+~nad~ b~r Matu~ of
a ousrid tra~~ctos~r a diet,~ac~ of bst~nsa 60 and 300 ~steae ~ and by dirsct
fir~ up ~0 100 Nt,~te. For ~atitadc grenaQ~s it is o~pable of dir~at
prot~otiw fir~ up to a dist,~uw~ of 100 Mt~srs. It is ~,Lo ~quipp~d ~ith
~ bayau~. [Zyxt] [Pas~i~ TAM in P`r~noh 12 Oct 78 P 4~ 7779
CSO: 3100
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FOR OFFICIAL US~ ANLY
ITALY
CO1~IIrIENTARY ON WORLDWIDE IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.-PRC TIES
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 17 Dec 78 pp 1-2 LD '
[Commentary by Frane Barbeiri: "The Triangle Is Closed"]
[TexC] Carter and Hua Cook everyone by surprise when they announced
the "historic event" in relaCions between Wasliington and Peking. AC
least, Carter was not expected to decide on such a step before meeting
wiCh Brezhnev. But it almost always happens in top-level poliCics tr,at
when the most surprising and least expected events occur, tliey sudd~anly
appear most logical and most normal. The same applies here: Indeed one
wonders why it did not all happen before. The normalization of Chinese-
American relations at last closes the triangle of the ma3or Powers, which
has already been ouClined for some time in the world constellation. The
strict American-Soviet bipolarism was waning since it could no longer
embrace all the ferments in an increasingly diversified world.
The triangle which has now been formed does not put an end to Che inter-
play: It raCher opens iC up, spreading it right across the world chess-
board. The two powers representing the two worlds are ~oined by another
born against the background of the emerging Third World. The picture
o� the globe is being changed. Even the picture of Asia is being
altered. America seemed Co be excluded from the continent and to have
withdrawn and entrenched itself on the nearby islaiads; China did not
manage to fill the gap left by the Americans and indeed seemed more and
more surrounded by Soviet penetration, first inCo t~iongolia and then
India, Indochina, Afghanistan and now probably also Iran; the agreement
with Japan opened up a breach in the encirclement, which was so impor-
tant that it prompted serious Soviet remonstrations in Tokyo.
_ The bond between Peking and Washington must not be regarded solely as a
bxeach. It i.s a turnabout which enables China to roam politically across
the entire world. America is not setting foot on the continent on the
old strategic terms, but with a masterly stroke of the still dis~ointed
and contradictory Carter policy it is gaining much more: It is creaCing
the space needed to strengthen China, a natural Asian force keen to
counter Soviet expansion on the yellow continent.
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t~'Olt dI~'~tCtAL U5~ dNt,Y
![u~ Kun-geng ~mph~~iz~d ewd p~ine~ in ehe ~gre~ment. ~ir~~: "We hgv~e
norm~li~ed rel~tiidn~ wiCh eh~ Ut13C~d 5C~Cetl~ ~u~t gg rel~einng beeween
rfn~c~w ~nd Wg~hingtnn h~ve be~n nor.m~li~ed." S~~nnd, "The new rel~e'~n~
wi11 mnke g Cnneribueion en eti~ ~eruggl~ ~g~in~e ~m~11 ~nd 1~rg~=~~~1e
heg~moni~m." Cttreer g1~o ~er~~~~d two ChgrgCCeri~Ci~ agp~reg: "~h~ ~
Unit~d 5C~Ce~ wighe~ ed C~ke pgre in Ch~ currene ehruge f~r lndu~~ri~~
mod~rnix~eion wtiieh gh~uld 1~~d Chin~ e~ gd~spe ~h~ rulE of ~n ~a~~n~~a
~nd ~rrong n~Cion in ehe indu~~rigl �i~ld nnd ~11 neher fieldg." "I dn
noC b~lieve Ch~C thi~ dev~iopmen~ could h~ve even et~~ glighe~gt r~p~r-
eug~ion on U.S~-U55R negoel.~eioh~."
Tog~Ch~r, Cgre~r'~ ~nd Hug'~ poineg indic~ee ehge Chin~ ig ~neering fu11y
onto th~ world ~cene w3.ehouC b~ing ch~ll~nged ~ny 1ong~r ~ preggure
Cool in Ch~ h~ndg of ~ieh~r of Che ewo gup~rpowerg in eh~ bipol~r eri~l
of ~tirengeh. AC le~ge, Am~ric~ ig ce~~ing eo r~g~rd it in ehig u~y,
ineofar Chin~'g role gn independ~at pow~r i~ ug~ful to it. Th~
~dvanegge to th~ 5nviee Union is undoubt~dly gm~ller, but if Chin~
mgngge~ Co ~gegbligh ieg~lf ~g a fu11y fledg~d pdwer Mog~aw wi11 b~ lefe
with nn glCeritgCiVe buC Co gncepe iC ~nd tre~t iC ~g gu~h. dne e~nnot
ge~ how ie could, withnuC a rggh violent coup, ~ggin reduce Chin~ to g
giant gl~ve of rhe bipol~rigm on which Mo~COw'~ entire ~erntegy g~il1
hinge~ (gnd Chig d~1ay now highlighCe more th~n ~ver the grexhn~v diplo-
mgcy's c:riCical lack of cr~aCivity and incapnGity for renewgl).
However, in view of the lateet "higCoric ev~nt," it ig difficult to e~t~b-
lish who is the winn~r and whn the loger, ~xe~pt if one m~ine~in~ tha~
everyone wins. One can only hazard a forecagt of hnw th~ force~ Wi11
move in the field. China will take the opportunity eo ~pr~~d politie~lly
and economically acrnsg the aorld in the quest for itg four mod~rniza-
tions and in an attempt to e~tabli~h it~~lf g~ the Third-World ~ati-
power. Americg~ involving China in the great interplay, ai11 no longer
be tempted to return to the bipolar rules and "hotline" diplomacy.
While Hua has managed to deprive Moacow of its position gg the ~xcluaive
representative of the communiat world~ Carter is Co an extent rendering
the separation between the two great communist capiCglg definitive. ~t~e
move is so important that Wa~hington has even accepted th~ con~equ~ncea
of the lack of confidence and disappointment Whi~h Will c~rt~inly spregd
from Formosa right across the ieland fringe of the contin~nt.
What is more difficult to predict, undoubtedly, ig grezhnev'g gttitude
to the hiatoric event, which involve~ him against hig will. (iill he
accepC the triangle or will he try to break it, by challenging both
America and China? This is the biggest unknoWn factor at the moment.
On various sides it ig also eonsiderpd the most dangerous. .
On the one hand it is feared that Mo$coW might emerge benefited by ~om~
allied governments' loss of confidence in America--principally in Asia.
On the other hand--mainly in Europe--it is objected that the challenge
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~dtt d~~tGiAL U~~ dNLY
ed eh~ 115~~ i~ p~rhgp,~ tnd gr~g~ ~nd ehge ehp gtr~ngeh~t~itig af Chin~ ig
nr~e w~reh ~ C1~~h wieh Ma~~~u. Tti~r~ migh~ ~1~~ be ~ d~n~~r if eh~
K~~miifl do~~ nde m~n~ge t~ ~dgpe ie~p1~ eo ehe ~itugeinn~ N8V8~'t~1p~I~tlH~
ie wouid h~v~e b~~n pqu~iiy d~ng~rou~ eo k~e~p ~~ai~g~u~ wi.~h ~ biiiion
inh~bie~ne~ i~olge~d, ~~e~r~g~eit~~ ie from eh~ r~~e nf ehe w~rid for th~
~ake o~ ~ pr~c~riou~ btp~l~ri~m.
~or ~urop~ eh~ innov~ei~~ 1i~~ n~e ot~ly in ehe n~ed e~ gdgpe ed ~ n~eN
erf~n~ul~r, r~Eh~r eh~n bip~i~r, poi3cy; it ig e~~r~ ~ qu~~eion n~ ~~e~r-
in~ ~oon ~g po~gibl~ ineo eh~ ne~? di~ieeei~ i~ ard~r ea er~n~fdrm eh~
eri~ngie ifleo ~ reeE~ngl~, wieh ~ unie~d ~urop~ ehe faureh warid
pot~er. in Ghin~ ie eauid ~nly find ~n ~ily.
CdPYttiGN~: 197~ ~ditr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
C~~: 3iU4
25
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~aR a~~~CIAL U9~ ONLY
~nlt7'tiGAL
~dVERNM~IV`T A~~~MPT TO D~AL WI`~N A~Oft~AN REB~L3 ~AtL~
~r~nkfure/M~in ~itANKFttRT~tt Ai.L~~M~iN~ in ~~rm~n ~5 Nov 7g p 6
[T~x~~ C.G. Ligbon, 24 Ndv~mb~r. Th~ ~~p~r~~igm on ~h~ A~or~~ iglandr~
b~lon~ing ~d Por~ug~l i~ ~oming eo ~ h~~d: ~ccordi~~ ~a ~ repdre c~f ehp
Ll~bon p~p~r JditNAL NdVd in ~~r1y D~tdber, ~n ~etemp~ ~e unilgtpr~l d~elgr~-
tic~n of indep~nd~n~e on eh~ i~1~nd group f~i1~d; ndw ~ m~mber df ehe mili-
e~ry r~volueionary ~oun~il, Mgjor C~nea ~ Ca~era i~ ~aid ~.d hav~ b~pn in
th~ Azor~g and fo h~v~ tri~d ed mov~ th~ ~~uding Wing~ of eh~ ind~p~nd~nc~
_ mav~menE ~LA (Fr~ntp d~ Lib~re~rgo do~ Aror~s) eo ~oin eo~~th~r. JOEtNAL
NOVO ig r1~~~ eh~ ~on~~rvgtivp ~ori~i demo~r~e~, who po~~~~~ gn gbgolue~
majnrity in thp A~ore~ ~nd Madpira and c~mpri~~ the r~gion~l gdv~rnm~nr.
Con~~erning th~ unususl ~v~ntg th~ R~volueion~ry Council in Li~bon h~g now
d~clared eh~t thi~ body ig noe involv~d in eontacts with th~ ~LA; M~jor
C~nto ~ Cagtro ig B~id eo h~ve undertak~n "individual a~ctiong," which he
mugt "~xplain himgplf."
Mini~e~r pr~~id~ne Moea puneo ~pok~ for 2 hour~ aith th~ h~~d of governmene
c~f thp ~ueen~mvug regian of the Axor~~, Mota Am~r~1, ~n Lisbon. The ap-
pdintm~nt of the preaid~nt of the r~giongl parliament of the Azores, Mon-
3ardino, ag minister at Che initiative of Pregident ~anes is welcomed by
Mota Amaral, but nevertheless reggrded as an "attempt at colonialization"
by the PLA. It is eaid thgt in the FLA ~ radical Wing under ~LA chief
Almpida, gupported by a Germgn r~eident for gome y~~rg in th~ Axore~, i~
fueding With ~ moderat~ majority group; Almeida and the Ceraian urge im-
mediate independence of the i~lgnd ~roup, iC is said, and are fighting
~gain~t Amgr~1 a~ ~"tr~itor," While the moderate majority group maintaine
cvntact With the regional head of gnvernment and is seriving Wich Mota
Amaral mainly for the realization of regional autonomy, and only later
Wants tn ~xpand this step gradually to full independenc~. Due to insuffi-
cient support by the majority gro~p, which hae gupport among the busineasmen
of the islanda, and due also to the intervention of police and the army
ordered by the regional government, the declaration of independence planned
by Almeida on one of the Azores islands is said to have bogged down in early
October; uncil noW there has been silence in Lisbnn abouC it. October is
- said zo have seemed favorable to Almeida for his action, because at that
tia~e the Nobre da Costa had been overthro~m in Liabon and the new government
not yet appointed.
26
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FdR ~~~~G~AL t)~~ aNLY
Th~ m~~ar frdm Eh~e rpvdlueinngry edun~il ig ~gid n~w e~ h~v~ ~g11pd upnn
ehe madergt~ dppnnent~ ~f Almeid~ ~nd the G~rmgn, for tnotiv~~ y~~ un-
~1~~r, nde to p~ermie ~ e~mpl~e~ br.~ak b~tw~en th~ f~~tion~~ Th~ C~rm~n i~
~~id td b~ dn t~.~ ri~ht politi~~lly, ~s i~ ~l~o ~ 1arg~ p~rt ~f th~ ~LA;
ge eh~ g~m~ eim~ Cammuni~eg ~r~ ~~id e~ link eh~ir inC~r~e~~~ wi~h thd~~ ~f
the ~LA. Weapona ere said to be pregen~ gmong the ~LA, ehe Communigt, ~nd
dther lpft rgdi~nl grnup~ in tih~ Aznr~~, A~Eivi~t~ di th~e ~LA ~r~ ~~id
hgv~ b~ren trgin~ed in S~ueh Y~men~ Thp A~n~ric~n ~irbg~p Lg~pg, imp~re~ne for
ehp ~nuEh~rn North Atl~ntic, ig in rhe Aznr~~. Th~ h~nd af ~dv~rnm~ne nf
eh~ ~~ednom~u~ regidn df rt~d~ir~, ,~~rdim, r~e~nely ~gid ehgt th~ ~~p~rgeigtg
~Geiv~e dn M~dpir~ (~IAMA) h~v~ bg~n ~uppore~d by eh~ Savi~ti Unian, bee~u~~
th~y ~erv~d ehe ~tr~e~gie ~im~ df Md~enw.
Ct~pYRIGH'~: ~.A.~. GmbH, ~r~nkfurC nm M~in 197~
610$
CSn: 3103
27
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~Ott 0~'F~C~AL US~ ONLY
UN~~~U K~NGndM
~t2~~I5H pIt~55 It~AC'TS TO U.S. INITIA~~VC l7N ~ItC
~diCnri~l Repore
[~ditorial iteporr LD) A11 ma~or British new~paper~ give exeenaive cover-
age Co the U.S~ deci~ion to e~tigbli~h �u11 diplomat~.c relatiions wieh ehe
pitC gnd tio end Che defen~e Creaty wiCh Taiwgn. In early regctiion on 17 Decem-
ber London'g TH~ OBS~ItV~it reporeg on Che frontpage tihat "A polieical seorm
brbke in W~shingeon yagterday" over Che decision, with angry republicans
and some conaervaCive democraCg saying that "by abandonin~ a long-seanding
a11y, Che CarCer adminieCraCion would seriously weaken America's seanding in
the world."
Also on the 17Ch, a bAILY TEL~GRAPH editorial on page 18 sees the decision
as the "Natural almost inevitable climax Co a process aet in motion more
than seven years ago." Speaking of Taiwan's fate, the edieorial says "For
the world at large, noC excluding America's NATO partners, it is a grim re-
minder that no alliance can last forever and that, ultimately, Chere is no
subgeiCute for maximum self-reliance Co ensure one's own security." The
ediCorial adds thaC "This is not to condemn America's decision in those
broader perspectives against which Washington has seen it."
THE FINANCIAL TIMES on 18 December carries several signed articles on the
sub~ecC, including two articles by its U.S. editor Jurek Martin. Mr t4artin
feels the deciaion was "logical" and adds in his frontpage story that the
administration "Fe1C that Che old 'Free China Lobby' has lost its once
vaunted steam." He adds: "IC is believed that those in the Senate who op-
pose Mr Carter over China were bound equally Co oppose him over a Strategic
Arms Limitation Agreement wiCh Che Soviet Union.
"Some people here remain nervous about the Soviet response but the adminis-
tration appears convinced thaC President Brezhnev wanCs a second SALT TreaCy
as much as President Carter does...."
More provincial interests are expressed on page 26 of THE FINANCIAL TIPiES
18 December issue. An article by Michael Cassell says: "The move to estab-
lish normal relations between the U.S. and China will be greeted with mixed
feelings by British industry. Although it should provide further impetus to
China's policy of increasing the scale of her trade with the Western world
generally, the full participaCion of the Americans will inevitably increase
competition for Chinese business."
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I~'OR OFx~C~AL US~ ONLY
On pgg~ ~4~ ~h~ fingnCig~. pgg~, eh~ bAILY ~~L~G~AI'H an ~8 nQC~mber g~.gn
cnnaider~ ehe fin~ncigl ~~p~Ce~ in g r~pnre from iC~ N~w York cnrr~gpnnd~ne
J~m~~ Srndeg, which g~y~: "13nCh Ch~ Am~ric~n gavernmenr nnd UniCed Stg~~g
bu~in~s~ 1~~der.~ ~r~ ~erv~.ng noCice tihne th~y cv~nti Co g~C inrd tihg rnn~ eo
deve~.op Ch~.na in ~ b~.g w~y."
Th~ UAILY T~L~GI2A~'H'g d~fens~ cdrrespondenr Clgire Hollingwortih wr~.C~~ dn
pag~ four of ehe 1~ n~n~mber isgue: "Th~ sCrgr~gic gc~n~ in Che ~'gr ~g~C
~nd eh~ WesCern Pgcific, wher~ 5dviee miliea~y power hns increased 5~.t1C~ ehe
end o� the VieCn~m w~r, wi].1 benefie from ehe eme~bl~.shm~nC d� di.plom~tiic
r~lgCions b~tw~en W~shingtion ~.nd i~elcing. ~'nr ehe Chinese leaders, Chairman
Hua Kuo-feng, is ttnxioug the region shnuld be tranquil ~.n order Co enable rhe
p~ople's Itepublic eo become a great ~.ndusrrialized nation by ehe Curn of Che
~enCury."
The bAILY T~LBGItAPH on 18 D~cember also fronCpgges a report by iCs Moscow
Correspondene Itichgrd gpeston which sgys eh~t "The new diplomatic embrace
between Washingeon and Peking has senC a cold shiver down the spine of ehe
Kremlin leadership, and arousEd fears of worse eo come, which were voiced
yesCerdgy by the�important SovieC Armed ~orces paper It~U 5TAR."
~
TH~ GUARbIAN in English on 18 December carries a�rontpage arCicle by He11a
Pick which says the decision "has taken the Soviet Union by surprise" and
"iC is already reported as having an unfortunate effecC on the SALT nego-
eiations and rtre summit berween Mr Brezhnev and President Carter." Ms Pick
notes Che SovieC aCCempCs eo rally Warsaw Pact countries in support of in-
creased defense budgets which it has ~ustified "in terms of the growing
closeness between China and imperialism."
Also in THE GUARDIAN of 18 December, John GitCings writes a feature article
on the decision on page 15. After examining the impact the decision will
have in other Asian countries, he concludes: "If there ever is to be any
prospect of some sort of rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union,
this weekend's agreement will...have brought it nearer."
Editorially, the London Press on 18 December views different aspecCs of rhe
decision on U.S.-PRC relations. THE GUARDIAN editorial on page 14 hails
the "common sense and courage" of President CarCer's decision. ~ The FINANCIAL
TIMES in its editorial on page 10 sees the principal task of U.S. foreign
policy to be maintaining "A global balance of power." It adds that "the
establishment of proper relations with China could contribute to that end,
buC not if it is seen as an anti-Soviet alliance..."
The DAILY TELEGRAPH editorial on page 12 appreciates Che timing of the decision
and concludes: "The choice lies between helping China to survive the Russian
threat or leaving her--isolated and disgruntled--either to succumb or volun-
tarily to resume the former alliance with Russia." The Communist MORNING STAR
in its frontpage editorial hopes that "China's leaders will resist the bland-
ishmenta.of the White House, and see thaC China's future lies in close al-
liance with the other socialisC countries and pro~ressive forces Chroughout
Che world."
29
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rox o~~ricin~, us~; ortLY
~ bAILY T~L~GI2ApH'
London TH~ DAILY TEL~GRA~'N in ~ngli~h 1$ nec p 12 LU _
(~d~.torial: "The Ching Connection"J
[TexC] CrediC for good tiiming musti gn Co pres~.denti C~r~er and Chgirman Hua,
for eheir mom~ntioue agreement--excepC, of cours~, ~.n tihe eyes of thoge who
are outraged at ehe dumping of ~'ormosa ~nd worr~.ed gboue the pose3ble develop-
ment of ~ eacie allianc~ wieh g communise gigne. Oeherwige, reagonable gnd
modergte men, accepein~ ecumen~ciey in diplomacy, legit~.mately concerned about
the world balgnce of power and righely eager for mutually beneficiene economic
expgnsion, will find ehat these facCors preronderate, in mose cases overwhel-
mingly, over misgivings. "When 'eis done, then 'ewere we11 iti were done
quickly."
There was no chance ~f China ever atomaching coneinued diplomaCic re~.ations
beCween America and Formoea or Che defence treaty beCween them. The agree-
menC to disagree over the.conCinued sale of American arma Co Formosa was as
far as Peking could be expected to go. On the other hand~the post-Mao govern-
ment of Chairman�Hua and Vice-Premier Teng '?~..:d exceeded a11 expecCaCions in
the speed and effecCiveness wiCh'which it has swiCched to a healthy pragmatism
about the West. The remarkable "Democracy Wall" phenomenon in Peking showa
rhat China is in motion, and ChaC the new regime may be�prepared to allow it
some freedom Co move.
There were also external considerations. Rusaia, expanding her influence and
pro3ecting her military power, is getring into the habit of threatening the
West: "bon't develop the neuCron weapon...don't aell arms to China...or else!"
If America had withheld full diplomatic relations from China much longer, she
would have look afraid to offend. The agreement with China at the very moment
when the Strategic Arms LimiCation Treaty seems at last on Che ver~e of con-
clusion adds point to Mr Carter's assertion of his freedom of acCion. His
move is also Cimely in view of Russia's apparenC intention to use Communist
Vietnam as a proxy againsC China by aggression against China's protege Cambodia.
So far as the balance of power.is concerned, the Soviet Armed Forces' paper
RED STAR has been quick~to see a supposed danger that China (20 years behind
Russia and rapidly falling farther behind), Japan (with exiguous "self-defense"
forces) and Mr Carter's America~will gang up to cause trouble. America has
declared Chat ahe will not sell arms to China. But the supply of technology
will doubtless now speed ug and with fewer questions asked.� Britain should
drop her un~usti�fied inhibitions about the sale of Harriers and other items.
And France will see a big green light. Meanwhile China's nuclear deterrent--
still decades behind Russia's--will.be gathering weight and versatility.
By the end of the century, China will indeed be in a position to throw her
massive weight about if so inclined. But this is a risk that the West must
take. The choice lies between helping China to survive the Russian threat
or leaving her--isulated and disgruntled--either to succumb or voluntarily
30
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~n~ nr~zci~ us~ oNLY
Co re~ume Ch~ former g1li.anc~ witih Rus~ig~ The W~eC, thrdugh negl~nC and
ln~s nf wi11, ~re ~.n ehe ggm~ boge~ The gregtesr dgnger now ~.s Chae eh~
We~C will �ind ye~ another excuge ~or giCti~.ng back~-by 1~~ving ir gii r,o
Ching.
'TH~ GUARDIAN'
London TH~ GUARDIAN in ~ngli~h 18 llec 7$ p 14 LD
[~diCori~1: "The Peking Special RelaCionship"]
[TexC] PreaidenC CarCer's decision to come Co civiliaed eerms wiCh China
and to demote Taic~an from ita h~.sCorically privileged poaition is an acC
of common sense,and courage combined. China ia Coo big to be ignored, whae=
ever you think of communism. It is common sense to recognise the naCional
identity and gove~nment of 900 million people ehrough diplomaCic relat~.nne.
IC is common aenae also Co inform the leaderg of 250 million nCher people
in the Sov3ee Union about what you are doing and why and whett. For in hie
efforts to de-isolate China Preaident Carter seema to have worked hard, with
SALT 2 in the balance, Co avoid upseeting America's relations with the Soviet
Union. Both counCries and naCiona are Coo big and Coo proud (and their pride
in their achievements deserves undersCanding) Co be ignored. Somehow we must
a11 learn to live together on this planet and President Carrer has ventured
a long stride in the direcCion of civilisation and amity.
He deserves much.credit also for risking the wrath of the China lobby which
was yesterday in full and predictabl~e cry. The China lobby, which now means
the Taiwan lobby, became convinced by Pearl S. Buck and others than the only
true and enduring representative of the Chinese people was Che late Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. A�whole generation of US citizen~ believe, even now, Chat
Chiang Kai-shek was God and that Mao Tse-tung was the Devil. President Carter
has now decided, in the interests of common sense, to invite the China lobby
to do to him its domesCic political worst. When Senator Barry Goldwater con-
demns the President of.the United States ("One of the most cowardly acts ever
performed by a president") the president is probably right. But no one should
underestimate the strength of the lobby or the president's coura~e. In prac-
tice the China lobby has been a powerful force from 1941, when it became clear,
aC least to the soldiers, thaC Chiang Kai-shek was using American aid at least
as freely to defeat Mao Tse-tung as he was using it to defeat the Japanese.
Mrs Barbara Tuchman, the hisCorian of Sino-American relations, has written
that after 1941, "the flow of sid became an investment and the need to protect
the investment increased the flow until it became a silver cord attaching
America to the Nationalist Government. There is no more entangling alliance
than aid to indigent friends."
What remains true, in spite of yesterday's historionics in Taipeh, is that
t:he friends--no longer indigent--are still there. President Carter has now
given up the pretence (which, to his credit, was nearly abandoned by Presi-
dent Nixon) that the Taiwan government is the real and chosen government of
China. But there is no reason why~the people of the United States should
stop being friendly to the people of Taiwan or of coming~to their aid in times
of trouble. 31
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~dlt Ot~CtCIAL USC ONLY
And eh~r~ i~ nnoCh~r ~en~~ nnd dir~~einn in which ~h~ r~nd~ring oE norm~l
r~lnCinn~ b~ew~~n Chinn gnd Ch~ UniCed 5C~tieg c~n b~ b~tt~fici~~.. If preg~.-
d~ne C~reer Cnn r.~m~i.n on ~p~aki.ng Cerms wiCh boeh Ching gnd eh~ Sdvi~e Uninn
he cgn nr lenge~hop~ tio b~ ~ccepC~d ~s g m~di~rnr ~.n Ch~ m~nifnld gnd murky
qu~rre].~ which div~.de rwo n� ehe world'~ ~~rg~sC ~nd md~ti imporennr nnti~.ong~
P~rhgpg h~e nould p~rsu~de Ch~m eo b~h~v~ nnd C~1k mor~ ~~i~,iy (rh~ Chin~ge
in p~re~.~u].~r) gbouC n~viggCinn nn rhe remote r~.vers of Aai~. Perhaps he
nouLd ~v~n p~r~u~d~ Ch~m Co dignnur~~~ Ch~ wttr-by-proxy which ehey gr~ fighr-
ing on Ch~ bord~rs nf Cgmbodi~ ~nd Vi.een~m.
CnpYItIGN~: GUAItnIAN N~WSpAP~Ft5 LIMI'T~b, U~cember 1g, 197g
'THE ~'INANCIAL TIMES'
London TH~ ~'INANCIAL TIM~S in ~ng].ish 18 Uec 78 p 10 LD ~
[~dieorial: "The Wor1d as a Who1e"J
[TexC] A11 Chis year China has been moving ouewards. Chinese leaders hgve
visieed Yugoslavia and Romania--in SovieC eyes Che'dissident staCes of EasCern
~urope--as we11 gs SouCh ~ast Asia. Theze have also been high level visits
eo the WesC and Chere is talk of more Co come. Ae no stage have the conCacts
been purely poliCical: As often as~not what the Chinese have been seeking,
especially in the Wese, has been commercial and Cechnological know-how.
Reverberations
In Chat sense, iC is noC surprising thaC Peking should have wighed to accel-
erate the normalisation of ies relations with ~dashin~ton. If it is access
to technology that the Chinese want, the United States after a11 is as good
a place to go as any, not least in the key fields of agriculture, mining and
energy. It is also true that the leadership had already come to terms with
Che other advanced industrial democracies. The signing of the treaty wiCh
Japan earlier this year was the final evidence of that. It would indeed have
been abnormal if Sino-U.S. relations had remained on a~lower level than those
between China and other western countries.
It should not be forgotten either that although the announcement of the Sino-
American agreement may have seemed to come out of the blue, there had in fact
been a steady diplomatic build-up over a period of years. The breakthrough
came in 1972 when President Nixon visited China. The joint communique then
left open a number of questions--particularly that of the future of Taiwan--
but it left no doubt of the mutual desire between Washington and Peking to
put their relations on a normal footing.
The question of Taiwan remains open to this day and is perhaps insoluble in
the short-term. At thc: same time, however, there is nothing in the behaviour
of Che Chinese leadership to suggest that Taiwan will be taken by force. Nor
would it be in the Chinese interest to attempC any such thing. All Che signs
32
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_
,
~dtt O~~~CtAL USC ONLY
~r~ ehgC Chinn i~ lonkit~~ ouCw~rd~ ea.g wid~r w~r].d, ~ncl eh~r~ i~ n~ obviou~
r~~~on why i~ ~hould noe ~om~ Cd ~.i.v~ wiCh Tg3w~n in ~h~ w~y eh~ti iC hg~ eam~
ed 1iv~ wi.eh Hdng Knng. Thng~ r~l~eiong, en~, Cgn b~ norm~lix~d nv~r eim~.
Y~C~ how~r~r far~~e~~b1~ ~nd how~ver much ~.e e~n b~ ~xpi~in~d m~r~ly a
ingi.n~l d~v~la~~m~nr of pgge diplom~cy, Ch~ e~e~b~.ishm~nr of full diplom~~ie
eie~ beCw~en China ~n~1 eh~ U.~~ is bnund en h~v~ ~~v~rb~r~tidn~ ~rdund ehe
world. In p~rtieul~r, eh~y wi11 b~ fe].C in Mo~eow wh~r~ eh~ Sdvi~e ~.@ga@L-
ghip i~ beli~v~d Co be on ~h~ brink of ~igning ~~~nond Ser~e~~i~ Arm~ I,imi-
C~Ciott Agr~~m~ne wieh ehe Arnericgn~; They w~.il ~l~o b~ f~1e in Indo~hin~
whpre g bieCer w~r i~ gCill gning on wiCh Ch~ Chin~~~ ~nd ~h~ [tu~gi~ng in
many w~ys ~cCing gg proxi~g. Ind~~d t~ngions ~r~ li.k~ly Cd inCrp~~~ in ~ny
p~re of Che world wh~re f~eking ~nd Mosnow ~onfront egch oeh~r, h~w~ver in-
direcely. The Ru~~ians beli~ve, righCly or wrongly~ ChaC Ch~y are being
h~mmed in. Th~ Chi.neg~ ~r~ br~aking oue, eh~r i~ hgrdly ~ r~~ip~ for-~t~-
bility.
There i~ Chug g~p~cigl regponsibilitiy on eh~ U.S. tn. Ch~ gericC ~enge of
the world, ehe U.S. is the world'~ only superpnw~r. ~he Sovi~C Union m~y
h~ve ~chieved seraeegic pgrity, buC is way behind economicglly gnd in mogC
aregs of eechnology. Ching i~ a gr~~C pnwer which ig now undersCandgbly
seeking to play a larger role in rhe world. It ~hould be ~ncour~ged Co do
so, but ie is noe a superpower gL g11 and it would be dangeraus if it came
to entertain delueiong of grandeur. Boeh economically and politic~lly Chere
have been signs recently ehae ie has been taking on too much, too fast. U.S.
diplomacy would be wise if it could seek Cn eemper Chese ambiCions.
Strategic
The principal task of U.S. foreign policy must be to mainCain a global !~al~
attce of power. The establishment of proper relations with China could con-
tribute to that end, buC not if it is seen as an anti-Soviet alliance--as the
Chinese are Cending to present it. In other words, there is a difference
between normalisation--which is to be welcomed, and rapprochement--which
could be misunderstood. It is necessary now for the Americans Co conCinue
their negotiations with the Russians and to explain to them what they are
doing with China. Equally, the Chinese need to be told not to let their
own relations with the Rusaians get completely out of hand. A7 anti-sovieC
confrontaCion would benefit no-one, not even the West. It is a difficult
world in which to maintain stability, but the latest developments are at
least a reminder of the necessity to think--in strategic terms--of the world
as a whole.
COPYRIGHT: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD, 1978
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~d~t d~~IGIAL U3~ dNLY
UK Communigt p~~~r
London ~i~ MdItNING STAIt i.n ~n~li.~h 1~ n~c 7g p 1 LD
(~ditori~i: "Chic~~'.~ R3gheful P1~c~")
(T~xej F~w ~h3ng~ i.n Ch~ mod~rn world w~r~ mor~ ~b~urfl eh~n e1~e f~ee ehgC
Wg~hingron could n~e brin~ ie~~lf eo r~co~nig~ eh~ Peop1~'~ Itepublic of Chin~.
~~p~ci~lly ~in~~ eh~ recognir3on nf ehae otih~r ~u~ey ~nd d~v~lnpm~nti non-
exi~t~nt l~nd, Ch~ ~lltt.
If h~ had left ir uneil n~xe yp~r Pr~~idene Carter would hgv~ been rhree
d~e~d~~ go by b~for~ Ch~ U~S~ accepted one of =:h~ greae inevie~bl~ n~ceg~i-
ti~~ of higeory.
Th~ wgy h~ h~~ gcted gnd th~ wgy in which NAT~ pow~rg ure f~113n~ ov~r Chpm-
~~lv~~ in ehe r~c~ to gell grmg to Chin~ promptg one or ewd quesCion~.
COCOM, the NA~d Committe~ curr~nCly r~viewing rh~ lifC of goodg ehat the
Cold War pace'~ members cannot ~ell Co China and th~ other gocialist stateg,
h~s ad~ourned for the Christmas break.
Perhap~ when it regumeg, U.S. erms will be on Che liat of potential ~ates as
we11 as Harrier ~ump jets.
Imperialiats like nothing more than to aee the two big powers of the social-
ist camp at loggerheade.
TNE MORNING 5TAR hopes that China's�leaderg will resist the blandishmenCs of
the White House, and see that China's future lies in close alliance with the
other socialist countries and progressive forces Chroughout the world.
CSO: 3120
END
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