ESCOBAR SPEAKS ON DEFENSE. NEUTRALITY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 20, 1977
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00r88003R000400030008-4
vr. 29 Aug 77
ESCOBAR SPEA3 '= ON DEFENSE, NEUTRALITY ISSUES
19 Aug Assembly Speech
PA281918Y Panama City MATUTINO in Spanish 20 Aug 77 pp 1-A, 8-A PA
N 1
I7 r.i F!L J
[Panamanian negotiator Romulo Escobar Bethancourt'o address to the Assembly of Corregi-
miento Represent::atives at Justo Arosetuena Palace on 19 August 1977--excerpts of Panama
Radio version of Escobar speech were published on page N 13 of the 22 August DAILY REPORT]
[Text] Those who say that we are not revolutionaries should pick up their knapsacks and
their grenades and remove the Gringos from the Canal Zone, Dr Romulo Escobar Bethan-
court told the National Assembly of Corregimiento Representatives yesterday.
Escobar responded in this way to some criticism by groups opposed to the negotiations
which led to the agreement in principle with the United States for the establishment
of a new canal treaty.
The following art. Dr Romulo Escobar Bethancourt's statements concerning the discussions
during the negotiations with regard to neutrality and the option for the construction
of a sea-level canal:
relented in maintaining its position that it should guarantee the neutrality of the
canal.
said they wanted a neutral canal, and we said that we were in complete agreement
with them. The difference lay in what they understood neutrality to be and our
understanding. They suggested that Panama and the United States declare the
canal's neutrality and that the United States guarantee that neutrality. Panama
opposed this concept, explaining that. we did not want the United States to be a
guarantor for the state of Panama under the pretext of neutrality. This led to
another discussion that kept the negotiations stalemated until the United States
war was being waged to defend the Panama Canal. That was a position Panama maintained
until the United States stopped insisting on the military pact, and discussions began
regarding only the neutrality pact.
With regard'to the neutrality pact, the following occurred: The United States asked
whether Panama was opposed to having the canal be declared neutral. We said no,
that, on the contrary, Panama had always wished to have a neutral Panama Canal. They
It was stated that in order, to negotiate with Panama it was first necessary to establish
a neutrality Pact and a military pact between the two countries. The military pact
had to be concluded before the end of the century so that it could go into effect
after 2000. This created a deadlock in the negotiations for some time because
Panama opposed the signing of a military pact. And it opposed such a pact because
the military pact entailed two things: First, the U.S. military presence in Panama
after the expiration of the new treaty; second, as a great parer, the United States
is often involved in wars in other parts of the world and we did not want a situation
in which, on the basis of a military pact, our country's future generations would
be required to fight in U.S. wars under the pretext that they were fighting because the
Another.proposal they presented was that Panama commit itself to keeping the canal
permanently neutral and open. We said that Panama could commit itself to keeping
the canal permanently neutral because this is its desire. Panama has no interest
in having the Isthmus of Panama become a theater of war because of the Panama Canal.
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-0080;3R000400030008-4
VT. 229 Sep 77 N 2
However, there could be no commitment to keeping the canal permaently open for, three
reasons. We explained that because of natural causes there could be an earthquake-,
that you can close the canal because it is unprofitable. And we said that we could
not present an article which obliged us to keep a onaal permanently open when we did
not know if that canal would become unprofitable someday. We agx?eed to eliminate
the article, so that Panama was freed of the obligation of keeping the earal per-
manently open. The negotiations continued exclusively concerning the problem of
neutrality.
following agreement. They said! We cannot present to our Congress an article saying
for example, which would close the canal, and Panama could not be obliged to keep it
open. We explained that for climatic reasons there could be landslides and the
canal would have to be closed to clear them. Third, the canal could turn out to be
unprofitable and,then Panama could not be obliged to keep open a canal which did not
bring in money. They accepted the first two points--the matter ornatural causes and
climatic causes. But they did not accept the third cause--the lack of profitability.
This also halted the negotiations for a long time.
They suggested that if the canal were not profitable, Panama could obtain money from
the United States or the other canal users to keep it open. We said that when the
treaty expires, we do not want Pane" to have either;.a direct or indirect obligation
to turn to the United States or any other country to ask for money to keep the canal
open. The two countries remained steadfast in their positions until we reached the
Panama and the United States and no one else, because they did not want the Russians,
the Cubans or the uhinese--and I am quoting them--to participate in the neutrality of
the Panama Canal. Our position was that neutrality made no sense if it were limited
to two countries by means of a pact between the United States and Panama, that we
opposed withholding from other countries the right to subscribe 4o the pact. They
changed their position and said, very well, they would accept that only the countries
of the American Continent, except Cuba, subscribe to the pact. We said no, that in
the event of a war between them and Russia or China, those countries would have no
commitment to respect the canal or the Isthmus of Panama if they had not subscribed
to the neutrality pact. This again led to lengthy discussions until they finally
agreed that all the countries of the world could subscribe to the neutrality pact.
would take place or any say with regard to whether to accept or reject countries which
sought to subscribe to the pact. This led to another discussion which results in an
agreement to draft a protocol of neutrality--that famous protocol that has been
criticized here and there on the grounds that it gives the United States the right
!.o intervene in Panama. Those who are attacking it seem to have read it In a Miami
newspaper.
Later, there was 'a problem as to the place at which the countries of the world would
subscribe (to the pact). We said that it had to be at the United Nations. They
replied that they did not like the idea of the United Nations very much because they
have many problems with the nonalined countries, the Third World, the Arabs and so
forth. They proposed the Organization of American States. We said that we had no
objection to having the place be the OAS as long as that organization were simply the
depositary of the pact and that the other countries could subscribe to the pact there,
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
SNPO 1%40
The protocol is merely a note recording the existence of the neutrality pact, explaining
what it consists of and indicating that this or that country tubscribe,.~ to it. That
is the famous protocol. It is the same neutrality pact, but only outlined in a protocol--
which is what it, is called--and the OAS is its depositary.
The other problem was the preferential passage of U.S. ships through the car.%al. They
said that they were faced with two problems. First, they had to please their Pentagon
and had to present them with something they would like so they would support them in
this matter of the treaty. Second, they said that since they are leaving after the
expiration of the treaty, they should at least have that (preferential treatment)
because they had constructed the canal. We told them that we admitted that they had in
effect constructed the ce.nal, but that to put down in the neutrality pact that U.S.
warships were entitled to preferential transit in relation to other ships violated
the neutrality pact itself, contradicting the very idea of the pact we were nego-
tiating. This was another subject of long debates and thorough analysis. They kept
looking into their books, we into ours; they kept quoting their theorists we kept
quoting ours; for this is the way in which these debates are conducted. Changing
to have the warships of another country spend such time in its territorial waters, so
the faster they go through the better.
the Canal. The understanding is that they will have the right to a speedy passage--
the speediest possible. We agreed with this, because it is to no Country's advantage
States, in times of peace and of war, and Panamanian warships --although we have none,
but by the year 2000 we might have some--have the right to expeditious passage through
preferential passage, and we reached the agreement that the warships of the United
their position, they proposed at least preferential rights when the United Staters
is at war--originally the proposal was during times of peace and then required only
that the captain of the ship notify us. We said that in wartime it was even less
proper to grant preferential passage because neutraility would be violated. After
we had discussed this for a long time, they agreed that U.S. warships could not be
granted preferential passage. The two countries then sought a formula other than
our isthmus and that our neutrality made sense only if it applied to the Canal and
all the rest of our territory. We had nothing to gain if (some enemy] were to refrain
from dropping a bomb in the canal and instead were to drop it in Ocu or Santiago,
for example. They agreed to a declaration of neutrality in which neither the canal
nor any part of the territory of the Isthmus of Panama would be the object of reprisals
in any conflict they might have with another power.
declaration. After much discussion, they agreed to have the declaration made solely
by Panama; that in, it is Panama which is declaring that the canal is permanently
neutral. The. following other proposals were made: They proposed that our declara-
tion of the neutrality of the canal state that it was being made so that the Panama
Canal would not become a theater of war. We said no, that we were declaring the
neutrality of the canal so that neither the Panama Canal nor the Isthmus of Panama
would become a theater of war. They wanted to separate the canal from the rest of
the isthmus, and we told them that we could not do this, that the canal is a part of
Another of the points in the neutrality pact which we were, in other wads, this is
the real picture of what the neutrality pact consists of. (sentence as published)
With these statements, we did not agree to have the United States and Panama declare
the neutrality of the canal. We said that the declaration of the neutrality of the
canal was an act of sovereignty on Panama's part and that it had to be a unilateral
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
 Approved.Foorr Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-08 38000400030008-4
x4
And the other point of the neutrality concept is that it is not a neutrulity only for
the peaceful passage of U.S. ships, but a neutrality for the peaceful passage of ships
of all flags of the world regardless of the country to which it belongs; that is,
whether the country is communist, fascist, capitalist or monarchic. It did not matter
to us whether or not it was a democratic nation; we only wanted the peaceful transit
of all ships of the world. And, lastly, that the pact was being entered into by the
two countries and if it is stated there that Panama declares the neutrality of the
Canal, as I have already indicated, that Panama later on enters into a neutrality pact
vomit themselves to maintain such neutrality. [sentence as published] This concept
of maintenance was the concept that replaced their original position that they would
guarantee neutrality. The maintenance of neutrality is set forth in the pact and the
protocol. The other countries adhere to the protocol.
Then followed the discussion, because what I [as published] originally proposed was
that the two countries pledge to maintain the neutrality under any circumstances.
We said that it the phrase under any circumstances was inserted, we would have to
make two important exceptions: First, that always provided the circumstances were
not internal in nature because these internal circumstances were problems of our
country and of our [National] Guard; and, secondly, we had to point out that it would
have to be an attack against Panama or the Panama Canal by third countries. This was
the subject of much discussion. They finally decided riot to include this phrase in
order to avoid having to accept our exceptions. We also pointed out that within
the framework of neutrality it had to be clearly established that beginning on
31 December 1999 at 1200 as Edwin [Pabresa] says, or at 24,00 midnight as Ahumads
says, that beginning on that date there could be no U.S. troops left in Penaama.
After much discussion, they told us: Well, we do not like this phrase that there
can be no Russians or Cuban troops. Then a proposal was made to change the phrase
to make it read that only Panamanian troops would be left after 31 Deoesber 1999,
with which we fully agreed. They were happy because for some reason they think we are
going to call in the Soviets. We are happy because we believe that one of our
aspirations is precisely that the only troops here be ours.
So this is the bad part of the neutrality pact. The Criticism being made against
it--some of which you may have heard or read--by a number of people who like to
nitpick is that we are giving the United States the right to intervene in our
country after the year 2000. Those people believe that the right to intervene is
granted, but nobody grants the big powers the right to intervene. They intervene
whereever they damn well please with or without a pact.
When they landed in Santo Domingo they did not have any military pact with Santo
Domingo, nor did they have any right to intervene in Santo Domingo. But just the
same, they landed there. But there are people here who believe that it is the
articles in a code which tell a country whether or not it has the right to intervene.
They do not know that it is the bayonets and cannons and the atomic bombs which give
a country the right to intervene. A country like the United States Can land its troops
in Panama whenever it pleases after 2000, with or without a neutrality pact. But
it cannot land its troops in Russia, even if Russia told them to do so. This is
reality..;. In other words, with the neutrality pact we are not giving the United
States the right to intervene. What we are giving them is an assurance that the.
canal will remain permanently neutral. that we are not going to close the Canal
to their ships or those of any other country.
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
 pprove c r e lease -
KUF'd2 80
- 400030008-4
VI. 29 Sep 77 N 5
to us.
appear here with the military treaty and the neutrality treaty they originally submitted
So, this is the true content of the neutrality treaty, Honorable Representatives. Much
thought was devoted to this topic because of all the reasons I have been explaining to
you, because of the way it developed until this wording was reached. By the way, we
are very proud of its final wording. You should have seen the original they submitted
together with the military treaty. That would have indeed been shameful. I would not
in Miami.
truth. It is a question of their internal policy. They are solving an internal problem
regarding a Congress that is largely opposed to these negotiations and which even has
members who have not been elected b, the '.merican people but who have, of their own free
will, turned into members of the U.S. Congress. They are Pf~namanians who live here and
make sure right now that even if our country becomes socialist, it cannot prevent them
from using the canal. To be even more frank, they do not need that neutrality pact to
tell them whether or not they may intervene. They need it to show to their Congress
so they can tell their Congress: Look, we are turning the canal over to those Panaman-
ians but we will still have the right to watch over them so they behave. That is the
Why this neutrality pact? Because they think that maybe in the year 2000 this country
e other problem we discussed was that of the option for the construction of a sea-level
canal. Two months ago, almost simultaneously with the inauguration of the Alaskan
pipeline, President Carter delivered a speech during which he said that his government
the negotiators had brought and we read it to them, and the negotiations between the two
negotiators. [sentence as published) They [presumably the U.S. negotiators] proposed
to us that Panama grant an option to build a sea-level canal without setting a date. They
negotiators Linowitz and Bunker, and through our Foreign Minister Gonzalez Revilla and our
in effect they did prepare them--and they were stepping up plans for the possible con-
struction of such a canal. But during these negotiations it seems that they had
discarded the issue until President Carter's speech and the issue of Alaskan oil came up.
And that is how the discussion of the option began. We discussed this about two times
and nothing came of it. Then came the Bogota conference.
That is where the problem of the option really reached a crisis. It reached a crisis
because there a very complete proposal among all of the presidents Carter and through
that time--Dr Diogenes de la Rosa and others. At that time, they were preparing studies--
p
of 1966 and 1968 this problem was the subject of much discussion by the negotiators at
was deeply interested in building a sea-level canal either through Panama or at some
point in Central America. In the wake of the speech, the U.S. negotiators raised the
to is of the option at the negotiating table. During the previous negotiations, those
countries were virtually broken.
The general said during his speech that we had gone to the conference in Bogota to
struggle between the two countries began. Bogota was between the two, because the other
celebrate a new treaty and that it had turned out that we had gone to a wake. There the
presidents became involved as if they were Panamanians also.
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
 . Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4
*010 *400
There r3., it') to ruao:. at. ijr,roement on their proposal. The Panamanian represeptatives
:,uLut{ i. f.,'i a de`ad'; prupo: a7 L " ' ' nted. f'L e to everyone.
1. The Republic of Panama and the United States agree that a sea-level canal may be
Article 3. The possibility of constructing a third set of locks or a sea-level canal.
The text read more or less like this:
better than the 1903 treaty; that perpetuity is better; that 2 million balboas are
better than the current proposal.
Those who are going to have a problem are those who cannot prove that this treaty is
publicly discuss it.
become an official document. We will publish it completely when it is and we will
waiting for the announcement by President Carter and General Torrijos. Then, it will
construct it. If in 10 or 15 years. [sentence as published] The future generations
will be much more prepared. We have not given you a copy of the treaty because we are
the United States to study if the matter is feasible. If it is, the two corntries will
Consequently, after appr::vine, the sea-level canal, they will ar,,ree on its construction.
There is not even an option. That option [as published] is to study, to sit down with
important for international relations [as published] in the future.
and let their actions speak.
and say that we are not revolutionaries, let them pick up their knapsack and their grenade
We do not care if they say that General Torrijos is a dictator; those who are opposed
we will bury the enemies in a mountain of votes in the forthcoming plebiscite byapprov-
13, Escobar expressed praise and confidence in General Tor.rijos' work. He said that
ing the treaty.
labor and peasant organizations at Justo Arosemena Palace in Panama city--live]
President Demetrio Lakes, Vice President Gerardo Gonzalez and representatives of civic,
[Statement by Panamanian treaty negotiator Romulo F,soobar Dethancourt at meeting between,
PA281802Y Panama City Domestic Service in Spanish 1724 GMT 27 Sep 77 PA
be jointly defended over a 5-year period, renewable if both parties concur. I think that
this is what a sovereign nation would have done. Therefore, they have imposed their perma-
In a treaty being negotiated by sovereign nations we could have said that the canal will
What they do not say is that the United States will be our ally in this defense, permanently.
nice to say this--by Panama and the United States, by Panamanian and American forces.
that says permanent. The neutrality of the canal will be defended, yes--and it is very
have skirted the issue and at no time have said that there is a word around somewhere
ing the neutrality issue, I also want to state that the negotiators, quite intentionally,
I want to ask a few questions and make a few comments regarding the treaties. Regard
of Panama and secretary of the association of real estate brokers and promoters.
[Excerpts] Good afternoon, I am Luis Pimentel, national director of the junior chamber
nenee on us here.
Approved For Release 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP82-00803R000400030008-4