MANUAL OF THE SOVIET ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 177
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 6, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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MAIM 11U.
FEB 1952 -
COUNTRY
SUBJECT?
25X1
DATE OF
INFO.
'PLACEhED
CLASSIFICATION
USSR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
INFORMATION REPORT
Manual of the Sovip,e2!pmy
REPORT NO.
CD NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES in
25X1
6 February 1953
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
2I7(9 Pages)
25X1
Table of Conte
Page
.Part I. State Structure and Military Organization 2
Part II. Military Organization and Capacity 6
Part III. Economic Sources of Power of the Soviet Army 15
Partly,
Part V, Armament and Equipment. OOOOOO BO.O0.000?00e. OOOOOO ? ***** 000?."22
Part VI. Promotion, Pay, RatiOne, Leave.,........ ...... ....... 69
Part VII. Uniforms and Rank Insignia ...73
Part VIII. Survey of SOViet Army Units.... ...... .....
\
,Part IX Training of the Soviet Army
Part X. The Most Important Military Leaders of the Soviet Army.. ?109
List of Attachments
Comments 119
0.00000414,C81
, 4 ....... 4, 0 0 098
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PART I. STATE STRUCTURE AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION
A. Area and Subdivisions
The USSR, with an area of 22,270,000 square kilometers, only 5,100,000 square
kilometers of which are in Europe, possesses one-sixth of the total land
area of the globe. The boundaries of the country are approximately 609000
kilometers, including 43,000 kilometers of coastline. The total population
for 1951 can only be estimated at about 198 million people, since official
figures have not been published since the census of 1939.
The USSR consists of 16 union republics, sovereign according to the constitu-
tion, but directed by all-union central state and party authorities in all
important matters. The size and population of the union republics are indica-
ted on the map, Attachment 1. The large number of different nationalities in-
cluded in the USSR has led to the creation of autonomous republics, autonomous
?blasts, and national okrugs below the union republics. Further administrative
subdivisions are the oblast, rayon, city, and the village. There are six krays
instead of ?blasts on the Asiatic border of the RSFSB.
B. Poli-Ual_s_Or
The political foundation is the so-called system of soviets. Members of all
soviets are elected directly by the people on the basis of the majority prin-
ciple; but,in view of the prevailing one-party system, the choice is actually
determined by the party leadership. Attachment 2 gives a survey of the organ-
ization and leading personnel in the state -setup.
lo Legislative Branch
The Supreme Soviet Is the legislative body of the USSR. In addition to
its legislative duties it regulates foreign relations, fixes the state
budget, and supervises the executive branches. At the head of the Supreme
Soviet is a Presidium selected by Supreme Soviet members. The chairman
of the Presidium exercises the functions of chief of state.
The Supreme Soviet consists of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and
the Soviet of Nationalities. Delegates to the Soviet of the Union are
in the proportion of one for every 3009000 of the population. Every union
republic sends 259 every autonomous republic 11, every autonomous oblast
five, and every national okrug one to the Soviet of Nationalities.
? 2. Executive Branch
The highest executive and administrative organ of the USSR is the Council
of Ministers,whose chairman, Generalissimo Stalin, exercises the functions
of minister-president. In the ministries,a distinction is made between
all-union ministries and union-republic ministries. The former are cen-
tral organs of the entire union, while the latter administer departments
for which there are corresponding ministries in the union republics. The
union-republic ministries have the right to give directions to the minis-
tries of the union republics.
The foreign ministers of the Belorussian and the Ukrainian SSR secured a
seat and a vote in the United Nations as a result of the creation Of a
Union Republic Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
In addition to the ministries, some independent administrative offices
such as .state committees, state councils, and independent main administra-
tions, including the particularly important State Planning Committee (Go-
plan), are under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers.
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3. Judicial Branch
The highest organs of the justice administration are the Supreme Court
and the Public Prosecutors Office. The Supreme Soviet makes appoint-
ments to both these offices and supervises them. The Ministry of State
Security (MOB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MU), however, also
have a part, in the selection of judges and public praseoutore and there-
fore exercise vigorous control over the administration of justice.
C. The Communist Party of the USSR
The All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) LEPSU (B)7 regards itself as
a part of the Third Communist International, It keeps on striving, as it
always has, to free the working classes from the yoke of capitalism and to
achieve a classless society by way of a world revolution.
1, Part.,101
The highest apparatus of the party is the party congress,which is sup-
posed to meet every 3 years, There is also a party conference which is
supposed to take place at least once a year. The party congress selects
members of the Central Committee,which directs the entire party appara-
tus.
The most important branches of the Central Committee are
a, The Secretariat
b. The Political Bureau
c, The Organization Bureau
d. The Committee for Party Control
See Attachment, 3 for the Communist Party breakdown and personnel in cen-
tral party offices. ,
There are also central committees in union republics and in other admin-
istrative subdivisions down to the oblast. The lowest organs are the
called primary primary organizations in villages and enterprises. There is ex-
tensive agreement between state and party organization,so that there are
parallel party institutions for all state organs and at times they handle
the same field or are responsible for the same administrative area, In
addition, party functionaries hold key positions in the state setup. Thus,
unlimited power is concentrated in a few top functionaries of the Polit-
buro and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Union,
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Lesalil=j2itznizationo
a, The political leader class of party and state is supplemented by the All-
Union Leninist Young Cotthuniat League (KOmsotol) which has an organiza-
tional structure corresponding to that_of the Communist Party.
b. The entire working class of the USSR is included in the trade unions,
which are joined together by s top organization, the Trade Union Con-
gress with an All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The trade
unions aid in spreading political propaganda and are, for all prac-
tical purposes, a party agency. Since membership in the Communist
Party is limited and only particularly trustworthy and thoroughly
tested persons are admitted to the party, trade unions serve the pur-
pose of organizing and controlling non-party members.
Other auxiliary organizations such as the Voluntary Society for Co-
operation with the Army, Air Force, and the Navy(DOSAAF), the Academy
of Sciences, the Academy of Arts, the Society for the Spread of Polit-
ical and Scientific Knowledge, the All-Slavic Committee, and others
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are under strict party control. The All-Union Society for Cultural
Relations Abroad is a purely party organization.
D. The Military Organization
1. The armed forces of the USSR are based on a system of universal military,
Service (see Part II). According to the Constitution, the Supreme Soviet
makes decisions on war, peace, and total mobilization. The supreme Com,-
mender of the armed forces is the chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Generalissimo Stalin. In case of war a small directive unit, the State
Committee for Defense, can be formed from key personnel in economics.,
transportation, and the armed forces in place of the Council of Ministers;
and the headquarters of the high command for strategic planning is to be
attached to this unit.
Direction of the branches of the Armed Forces is concentrated under the
Counal of Ministers in two of the total of 52 ministriesa
a. The War Ministry for the army, air force, and anti-aircraft
defense
b. The Navy Ministry for the navy, including the coastal defense
? force, and naval aviation
The quasi-military internal troops, convoy and railroad battalions, bor-
der guard's, and the police-like militia are maintained by the Ministry
of State Security (mal4 which took over the direction of these forces in
postwar years from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The MB troops
are recruited from the ranks of the armed forces.
2. The War Ministry comprises the following chief organs,which are directly
under the jurisdiction of the minister and his war council:
a. The general staff of the Soviet Army (army and air force)
b. The high command of the army, air force, and supply services
c. The main administrations of the strategic air force, antiaircraft
troops, and airborne troops
d. The main administrations of ordnance
e. The main administrations of the special services, Such as politi-
cal administration, personnel processing, financial administra-
tion, etc. (Attachment 4 shows the organization and personnel
in the War Ministry.)
3. Under the War Ministry the Armed Forces and the Air Force are concentrated
in 21 military districts within the state borders (see Attachment 5) and
in group command headquarters in the occupied areas.2 Organization of the
districts and command groups resembles that of the War Ministry on a
small scale.
From the headquarters of a military district the following are directeds
a. The armies themselves, corps, divisions, and smaller unite of
the arno
b. The air forces - via the commander of the air forces in the
proper military district.
c. The military commissariats of the krays and oblasts as recruit-
ing offices to which, in turn, the military commissariats of
the rayons are subordinate,and the so-called military desks in
the villages are subordinate to these.
d. Supply organizations insofar as the high command is not involved.
The group headquarters direct the forces of the arnor0such as armies and
independent smaller units,via tactical headquarters and the air forces ViR
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the colmander of the appropriate air unit. The units of the strategic
air force, the antiaircraft :forces, and airborne troops are under the
:immediate direction of the proper main administrations of the War Min-
istry and the antiaircraft forces are divided into districts, zones, and
sections according to the importance of the areas to be protected.
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PART II, II. MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND CAPACITY
A. Legal Foundations of Military Service
1. Compulsory Military Service
The armed forces of the USSR are based upon a system of universal mili-
tary service. The Universal Compulsory Military Service Law of 1939
constitutes the legal basis for the application of military service. All
men between the ages of 19 and 49 are subject to military service0 Women
with training in professions, such as'thedicine and 'veterinary medicine, may
also be drawn into the service.
The compulsory service law calls for the rendering of active service and
training in the reserves. Length of active service differs. It is as
follows
a. In the army - for privates, 2 years
- for noncommissioned officers, 3 years
b. In the air force - for enlisted personnel, 3 years
c. In the navy - for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned
officers of the coastal defense force, 4
years
- for enlisted personnel of seafaring units,
'5 years
d. In the MB troops - enlisted personnel, 2-4 years
Since approximately 1948, the length of active service has apparently been
tacitly raised to 3 years for enlisted personnel in the artillery and
mechanized troops of the army and to 6 years for personnel in seafaring
units of the navy.
2. Recruiting
The military districts are responsible for and carry out the entire re-
cruiting and training program. Subordinate to these as recruiting offices
are the military commissariats (corresponding to district recruiting head-
quarters) in the ()blasts and krays, military commissariats (corresponding
to draft boards) in the rayons, and finally the so-called military desks
(registration offices) in the villages.
All young men who have completed their 18th year by 1 January are regis-
tered and undergo a physical examination. When 19 years old, all those
subject to the draft are called to active service insofar as they are
physically fit and have not been deferred. In the postwar years, regis-
tration and examination have, in part, taken place one year sooner. Re-
garding inductions and deferments, the military commissariats of the rayons
make decisions and they also conduct examinations and give physicals. For
those who have completed secondary school,registration for induction May take
place one year earlier, that is, upon the completion of the 18th year.
According to more recent observations, inductions take place twice a year,
in spring and fall, while before the war they took place only in fall.
The physically fit inductees are assigned in accordance with their physical
and mental capacities to different branches of the armed forces,which have
set up certain requirement quotas.
There sra no postwar data available on the degrees of physical fitness.
However, it may be assumed that men are rejected, that is, classed as
physically unfit, only if they are more than 50 percent incapacitated.
The number of those who are partially physically fit is subdivided into
those incapacitated up to 20 percent and those incapacitated from 20-50
percent. The requirements of the active peacetime armed forces and of
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the national economy influence the percentage of physically fit deferred.
It is possible to be released also for personal reasons, as are, for ex-
ample, supporters of large families.
3. Classification According toAge Groups
The trained and untrained physically fit who are subject to the draft,
the partially fit, and women subject to service are divided into the
following age classes:
Class I: 19 (18)-34 years of age - 16 (17) age classes
Class II: 35 - 44 years of age - 10 age classes
Class III: 45 - 49 years of age - 5 age classes
According to law there are always 31 (32) age classes among those sub-
ject to military service who can be inducted at any time according to
the authority of the high command.
4. Subdivision of Reserves
After being detached from active service 9 fully trained soldiers are
transferred to reserve category I. Reserve category II includes the
following:
a. Untrained physically fit (deferred for various reasons).
b. Partially fit (suitable only for noncombat duties).
c., Women subject to service,
Training of the reserves is as follows:
d. In age class I of reserve category I) privates have to take part in
six 2-month periods of maneuvers and noncommissioned officers and
noncommissioned officer candidates have to take part in six 3-month
periods.
e. In age class I of reserve category II, enlisted personnel have to
take part in nine 2-month periods of maneuvers and noncommissioned
officer candidates nine 3-month periods.
f. Age class II of reserve category I and II participate in five one-
month periods of training.
g. Age class III of reserve category. I and II must participate in one
one-month period of training.
These requirements represent a maximum which can practically never be
attained., After being discharged from active service, the majority of
reservists will probably be called to only a few reserve training periods.
Nevertheless, the peacetime army is strengthened every summer by about
1,800,000 reserves.
Reserve officers are divided by age classes instead of by reserve cate-
gories.
h. Class Is Lieutenants up to 40 years of age, first lieutenants to lieutenant
colonels, and colonels up to 50, and generals of all classes up to
60.
i. Class Lieutenantsiup to 50, first lieutenants, captainsotc,
up to and including colonels up to 55 and generals up to 65.
J. Class All ranks between 55 and 65 years(sic).
Training is planned for these classes as follows: up to three months per
year for class 19 two 3-month periods for class II as a whole, and one
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2-month period for class III.
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B. Military
1. No exact figures have been published on the population of the USSR since
the census of 1939. However, an estimate of the military potential of
the USSR is necessary to obtain an appoximately correct survey of the
present and future military power of the country. Starting with the
published figures of the 1939 census, careful calculations and, in part,
rough estimates lead to the conclusion that at the end of 1951 the USSR
had about 198 million inhabitants and will probably exceed the 200 mil-
lion mark in 1952. These figures take into consideration all the changes
which have occurred since 1939 (increase in area, losses incurred in war
and as the result of war, drop in birth rate, etc.). According to the
census of 1939 the USSR had a population of 170,467,000. In terms of the
territorial status of 1945 the population would amount to 192 or 193 mil-
lion. This means that, in spite of the tremendous losses in war and the
debilitation brought on the mass of the people directly by the war, there
is already today an increase of five to six million people to be recorded.
The losses were leveled out not only by the considerable increase in terri-
tory but also by the fertility of the Slavic peoples. The map, Attach-
ment 1, shows the distribution of population in the different union re-
publics. It is noticeable in the present population figures that, in
spite of the total increase of 6 million, there are parts of the USSR
where the figures of 1939 have either not been reached or have been only
slightly exceeded. These are the areas which were most overrun by the
war, namely, the Ukraine and Belorussia.
2. Of the multiplicity of nationalities (about 45 different groups of people,
only the Most important will be mentioned. Table 1 gives an indication,
in spite of the lack of exact figures, of the composition of the Soviet
population according to national groups. The most salient points /Fe:
a. The preponderance of the Slavic groups, of which the Great Russians
alone make up approximately 60 percent of the total population.
b. The relatively small number of pure Asiatic national groups, making
up about 8 percent of the total population.
The Slavic groups represent, in addition to their purely numerical super-
iority, the dominating national element in national strength, intelli-
gence, and technical and cultural achievement.
The makeup of the armed forces from the standpoint of national groups
does not correspond exactly to the proportion of these groups in the
USSR. The proportion of Russians in the armed forces is somewhat less;
the proportion of the other national groups, particularly Asiatics, is
somewhat greater. On the other hand, Russians predominate in adminis-
tration and in the national economy, which absorbs a considerable per-
centage of the draftable physically fit. In the armed forces the Asi-
atics are employed predominantly in the infantry, while soldiers of
Slavic nationality are the chief contingent for technical branches of
the armed services (armored, artillery, air force, and navy units).
Table 1 gives a further indication of the proportionate composition of
nationalities in the armed forces.
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Table 1
CLASSIFICATION OF THE USSR BY NATIONALITIES
(Estimate of 1951)
National Group
Great Russians
(Slavic Indoeuropeans)
Ukrainians and Moldavians 22
(Slavic and Romance Indoeuropeans)
Percent of Total Percent of
.._120,2,1a11213 Armed Forces
60
Belorussians
(Slavic Indoeuropeane)
Caucasian and Near East Peoples
(predominantly Indoeuropeane)
Asiatics
(Turks, Tatars, Mongolians)
Other Peoples
(including Finno-Ugrians, Halts eta.)
3
55
20
4
5
13
3
3. Table 2 gives a survey of the available military potential in the way of
personnel at the turn of the year 1951/1952. The figures given in the
table are an estimate, with errors probably within narrow margins. Two
groups, which are hard to estimate, must be subtracted from the number of
physically fit (column 2)9 to obtain the number of available men (column
6)9 i.e., the actual potential. These two groups are the prisoners in MVD
prison camps, the total number of whom is roughly estimated at 49500;000
physically fit men in the age groups subject to military service (minimum
figure of all available estimates), and men deferred from military service
in war. To obtain the indicated percentages,a starting point was made with
the known quotas from the last war. These were lower than the presently
used percentages.
The following considerations are responsible for an increase in the defer-
ment quotasz
a-. In a future war the Soviet Union will be entirely dependent on its own
armament production. Deliveries from allied countries cannot be counted
upon. The requirements in manpower for a war economy will be consider-
ably greater.
b. Modern techniques have produced complicated weapons and equipment, such
as jet planes and atomic weapons, the manufacture of which requires a
greater expenditure of material and personnel strength.
c. The increased sensitivity of armament centers and transportation routes
to the air threat is to be taken into account. The troops needed for
the protection of these installations together with the antiaircraft
forces necessary for intensified civilian air raid protection will indi-
cate the use of strong forces in rear areas of the front and in the
home theatre ofoperations, and these forces will have to be formed at
the expense of front line troops.
The estimated number Of 26,2509000 available soldiers will have to be re-
garded as a maximum. The classification into three age groups as provided
for by the compulsory service law is as followsa
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,Age group I (19-34 years of age) - 18 1209000 million
Age group II (35-44 years of age) - 6,0109000 Million
Age group III (45=49 years of age) - 29120,000 million
In 'a total mobilizatiOn the USSR can, as in October 1941,. extend compulsory
? service to the 17-year-olds. This would mean that in a mobilization in 1952
the total military potential would be increased by the entire class of 1934
or by 196209000 millions.
The age-group composition of the Soviet armed forces may be characterized
as favorable since age group 19 comprising samost 70 percent of the total
numbers, represents the predominating part by far of the available able-bodied
men. This picture will9 however9 change unfavorably in the next 15=20 years,
as the classes with a low birth rate (especially 1940-1946) come to the fore
and the larger classes move into age groups II and III Or drop out altogether.
This fact ballet be taken into consideration in estimating the potential of the
armed forces up to 1965.-
The number of available able-bodied men will rise at first and will reach a
peak in 1956 with 2793309000 men. After that the potential will drop to
269790,000 in 1960 and will drop further to 2390009000 by 1965.
Table 2
AGE CLASS STRENGTH AT BEGINNING OF 10 2
(In millions
2 3 4
_hydallyalt _IL MVD Prisoner Net Balance
-----
0.88 0.18 0.70
0.91 0.18 0.73
0.98 20 0.20 0.78
l,O21 0.20 0.82
1
Q2L O21 _ 0.86
0.97
1
Age Claes P
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1.927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
III - 4.86
1.10
1.14
1.16
1.20
1.24
1.24
1.24
1.04
0.91
0 6
II - 10.90'
0.62
0.62
0.70
0.7
0.88
1.12
1.3
1.5C
1.68
1.86
2.02
2.0
1.99
1.99
2000
1
I - 23.03
0.22
0.23
20 0.23
0.24
0.25
0.24
18 0.24
0.19
0.13
0.09
2006
15
0.09
15 0.09
0.10
0.09
0.11
0.13
0.14
0,15
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.06
0.06
3 0.06
0.06
0 06
1.50
10
8
5
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0.88
0091
0.93
0.96
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.85
0.78
0.5
0.53
0.53
(%60
0.66
0.77
0.99
1.21
1.3
1.57
1.77
1.92
1.94
1.93
1.93
1.94
1089)
5
_LDeferred
0.31
0.33
.45 0.35
0037
0.39
1.75
0.31
0.32
35 0.33
0.34
0.35
0.28
0.28
28 0.24
0.23
6
Available
0.39
0.40
0.43
0.45
0.45
III- 2.12
0.57
0.59
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.72
0.72
0.61
0.55
=1/0Q9.....
2.83 II 6.01
0.12
0.12
0.13
22 0.14
0.16
0.14
0018
0.21
0.23
0.27
0.28
15 0.29
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.41
0.41
0.47
0.52
0.61
0.85
1.03
1.14
1.34
1.50
1.64
1.65
1.64
1.64
1.65
1.62
3.41 1- 18.12
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SUM TOTAL OF ALL GROUPS
Ellyskallyaitj
III 4.86
II 10.90
MD Prisoners
Net Balance A Deferred
Available
0.97
2006
1.75
2.83
III 2.12
II 6.01
I
23.03
_2A5.12_
-Jag-
-1111g-
38.79
4.53
7.99
26.25
1934
1.95
3
o o6
1.89
15
0-.27
1-62
40.74
4.59
8.26
27.87
Co Mobilization Planning and Execution
Regarding the planning of a future mobilization of the Soviet Arm only a few
fundamental conclusions can be derived from the total mobilization of 1941,
since the German offensive in the summer of 1941 upset the Soviet planning
in respect to time and place. Vague hints can be recognized in organizational
changes in the postwar years. In the following examination of the transition
from a peacetime army to a wartime army, the formation of a field army will be
treated; but the creation of a-replacement army will be ignored, since its
size will depend extensively on the development of the situation. The des-
cription of the anticipated course of mobilization remains an estimate to be
based on considerations and vague hints.
I. It is possible that the field army will be formed of the following parts
(compare strength data in Part IV - Organization):
a. The forces of the occupation troops are mobile units with a slight
shortage of personnel and vehicles. They are to be ready for action
2448 hours after being alerted.
b. The peacetime units in strategically important areas (Baltic countries,
Belordssia, Carpatho-Ukrainea Transcauca4a0 and.the Maritime Military
Districts) are either close to combat strength or even have a surplus
of officers and noncommissioned officers. They should all be ready
at their posts on the first or second mobilization day and the sur-
plus numbers are to be separated out here as the cadres for new units.
c. Peacetime units in the interior military districts have many vacan-
cies and must therefore be brought to military strength after the
proclamation of total mobilization. This is done by drafting reserv-
ists registered in category I. The time requirement for them to be
ready for service at their post might amount to three to six days,
depending on lotial conditions. At the same time cadres are separated
out bo .form new units.
d. Cadre units which, predominantly in the interior military districts,
are considered to represent an important mobilization potential, are
of about combat strength in numbers of officers and noncommissioned
officers, but have about a 75 percent shortage of privates. This
shortage can be quickly remedied from mobilization reserves (category
I) of the garrison areas, Since arms and equipment have been made
ready for these units, mobilization can be completed in 644 days.
e. A part of the peacetime units billeted in the interior military dis-
tricts is, in case of mobilization, formed into the next higher unit,
namely, a battalion becomes a regiment, and three divisions can be
formed from one division.
At the same time, special units (artillery, signal troops) must, under
certain circumstances, be assigned by the high command. The time re-
quired for mobilization is to be estimated at 15-30 days, depending
on local conditions.
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f. New formations from cadre units naturally require more time to be
prepared for activity. However, it is to be expected that, after
the personnel quota of these units has been filled from the reserves
(category I), and after they have received military equipment from
depots of the military districts or of the high command, they can be
completely mobilized in a maximum of 30 days.
2. Mobilization waves are staggered as follows:
First wave: Troops in the occupation groups i the bulk of peacetime units
in strategically important areas: from 24 to 48 hours.
Second waves Remaining peacetime units, primarily in the interior mili-
tary districts, those formed from cadre units: from 3 - 14 days.
Third wave: New organizations formed from active parent units: from 10 -
30 days.
The first goal of total mobilization can accordingly be attained within
30 days. All time data here refer to readiness for service at their post.
Time requirements for transport and assembly of troops for action cannot
be taken into consideration, since this depends on the strategic situation.
All combat units planned for as the goal of a total mobilization can be
formed from reserve category I (fully trained, of age class I - 34 years).
Only in the case of a long warsdll it be necessary to draft reserve cate-
gories II and III.
3. In view of the already mentioned increased requirements of the armament
industry, the carrying out of a total mobilization will be limited by the
Soviet high command to 12 or, at most, 15 million men for all branches of
the armed services.
The present peacetime armed forces are to be estimated at about 497009000
and are made up of the following groups:
Army
about 392009000 -
68. percent
Air force
- about 6509000 -
13.8 percent
Navy
- about-
4009000 -
8.5 percent
MOB troops
- about
450,000 -
9.7 percent
In the wartime armed forces, this percentage distribution will be greatly
shifted, since an increase must be effected particularly in the army and
air force, while the navy and MOB troops will be increased on a relatively
small scale because of the limitations of their tasks and means of combat.
The comparison of strength proportions in World War II and possibilities
based on unit numbers in peacetime lead to the following estimate of the
composition of wartime armed forces in the amount of 12 million:
Army
Air force
Navy
MOB troops
- about 9,0009000 -
- about- 1,700,000 -
- about 600,000 -
- about 700,000 -
75 percent
14 percent
5 percent
6 percent
A, strengthening of the wartime armed forces is to be expected only under .
an unfavorable development in the world situation and will be etfected
mainly by the further strengthening of the army.
The number of combat units in the peacetime army is to be estimated as
follows:
27 armored divisions
45 mechanized divisions
93 infantry divisions
12 cavalry divisions
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The supporting units are estimated at 15 artillery divisions and 60 anti-
aircraft divisions.
The number of armored and mechanized divisions equipped with numerous heavy
weapons cannot be significantly increased during the course of the mobiliza-
tion. Mechanized units not originating from strong parent units can only
be formed after the first mobilization goal, perhaps up to M-day plus 120.
The number of infantry and cavalry divisions will, on the other hand, be?
more than doubled during the mobilizationIsince the peacetime units will,
in part form new units and in part expand to the next higher unit.
The number Of units in the wartime army can be roughly estimated as follows
on the basis of these considerations with the attainment of the first mobi1i-7
zation goal 30 days after M-dayg
35 armored divisions
60 mechanized divisions
220 infantry and motorized infantry divisions
24 cavalry divisions
about 340 combat
divisions
Da L.)ratiatusa:Lt.Lie.E/._..acUaL/91-1,
1. Personnel Demobilization after World War II
On the basis of the total mobilization of 22 June 1941 and the 1 October 1941
order to lower the draft age to 17 years, the Soviet Union had, during the
war, drafted those subject to military service from the age classes 1888 to
19279 with some volunteers from the class of 1928. The noncommissioned offi-
cers and privates from age class 111,1888-1892, were discharged from the
field forces during the last year of the war. Between June 1945 and March
1948, 32 age classes,1893-1924? were discharged from the army by six demobili-
zation orders. Thus, at the beginning of the fall of 19519 the Soviet Army
had no personnel with military experience at its disposal except a few volun-
teers from the class of 1928.
2., Draft Status
In the fall of 1948 new conscription set in on a broader scale to include
the bulk of the class of 1928 and those deferred from the older age classes.
Further conscription continued in two waves per year, so that in the fall of
1951 the small remnant of the class of 1931 and the bulk of the class of
1932 were available.
3. Present Makeup
At the beginning of. the fall of 1951 the Soviet Army included privates and
noncommissioned officers as follows
a. In the USSR - Privates of the age classes of 1928, 1929,
1930, and 1931. Noncommissioned officers of
the age classes of 1927, 1928, and 1929. A
start of discharging age class 1928 and of
drafting age class 1932 is to be expected.
bo occu - Privates of age classes 1928-1931 with possibly
some remnants from age class 1927.3 Noncom-,
missioned officers of age classes 1927-1929.
4. Conclusions
While conscriptions since the fall of 1950 have been carried out by plan,
according to the stipulations of the compulsory service -act, discharges
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have been made, in part, considerably late (one-half to one year after toom-
pletioh of eerVice time and one and one-half to two years beyond the age
class requirements for the personnel involved),
While service is thus prolonged, for a part of those in active service, re
quirements of the national economy result in big gaps in the age classes of
thciae doming up for the draft according to the compulsory service law.
These gaps at present make up about 3540 percent of the class strength.
Thus, large proportions of able-bodied young men are relegated directly to
the reserve category II. In a later mobilization this fact could work to
the disadvantage of the first and second mobilization waves if the Voluntary
Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF), under
strong political pressure did not carry out basic military training of those
deferred. Even if the Soviet Union can, at present, maintain the high status
of a peacetime army of 3,200,000, nevertheless the number of physically fit
in the age classes coming up for the draft is currently dropping. In 1963
this number will reach a low point of 8509000 men. As a result of this the
USSR must gradually lengthen periods of service if the present strength of
the peadetime army is to be maintained.
Such a lengthened period of service seems to have been tacitly introduced
in the case of special branches of the service such as the artillery and
armored troops. Nevertheless, the high rate of deferment in recruited age
classes must be gradually stopped in order to avoid overage in reserve cate-
gory I in case of mobilization.
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PART III, III. ECONOMIC SOURCES OF POWER OF THE SOVIET ARMY
Introductory Remarks:
The purpose of this manual, being to give a survey of the leadership, organization,
and combat strength of the Soviet Army, makes necessary a short clarification of
the performance and capacity of the Soviet armament industry. Present estimated
figures for the most important raw materials and producer goods are given with a
brief explanation. Figures for present manufacture of weapons and ammunition must
be dispensed with for lack of clear data.
A. Develo ment of the Armament Potential
As a result of completely centralized planning and direction of all branches
of the economy during the five-year plans, the USSR has developed at an aston-
ishing rate of speed from an agrarian country to the second most important in-
duetrial state in the world. The chief goal of the five-year plans was the
radical expansion of producer-goods industries which were developed at the ex-
pense of consumer-goods industries and the standard of living of the Soviet
population. In every comparison of absolute production figures and capacities
of the Soviet Union with those of the Western World, it must therefore be
taken into consideration that the Soviet figures on the proportion of armament
are to be estimated as substantially higher.
The economy of the Soviet Union has not only recovered from the damages in-
curred by war, but it has already far outstripped its prewar status. In par
-
titular, the heavy industries have at their disposal today capacities which in
case of war would need only to be converted; for example, the tractor industry
could be converted to tank production. As the result of relocatiOn to the
East, industrial centers were created in all parts of the country. The Soviet
Union is thus prepared for a multiple-front war and for atom bomb attacks. The
generation of electric power likewise exceeds the prewar level considerably.
Natural gap deposits have been opened up and made available to industry. This
has greatly relieved the strain on coal and petroleum as sources of power.
Although the technical level and individual performance of specialists and
engineers of the West have not yet been reached in the Soviet Union despite
the most Modern work equipment, these differences are gradually being leveled
out.-1rhese hidden reserves will make themselves felt in the future.
B. The Most Important Raw Materials
1. goal
The coal output is, at present, about 70 percent above the prewar level.
The eastern regions, including the Kuzbas , Karaganda, and the Urals, are
responsible for the greatest part of this increase. The shate:of the Don-
bas in the total coal output has dropped from over 50 percent before the
war to about38 percent in 1951. Difficulties exist in the Production of
coking coal, the centers of which are in the Ukraine, Urals, and Kuzbas
The construction of coal-cleaning plants has lagged behind the output of
coking coal,'which,according to the plan, was to be 53 Million tons in
1950. Coke plants have been receiving coal whose ash content is too high.
The development of the iron industry can be considerably hampered by re-
ceiving a supply of coking coal which is inadequate from the standpoint of
quantity and quality, The coal output of the eastern European satellite
countries is about the same as that of the USSR in tonnage, but contains
very little cokintdoal. Only Poland and Czechoslovakia can Meet their
own coke requirOmon:46
;4
Although the coe stippay of the Soviet Union is strained, the consumer,
and not industry, suffers from the lack of coal.
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300
250
200
150
100
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OS 41
* 41
Coal Production
(millions of tons
Iron and Steel
0 5/
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Table 3
So
40
30
20
10
Centea.1 Asia
Percentage of USSR.Coal Production of the
Various Coal Producing Regions (1950)
The production of pig iron, steel, and rolled stock rose considerably after
the war and is far above the prewar level. With the present level of pro-
duction, the USSR -is in a position to raise armament production to any ;level
which appears necessary. As in the case of coal, the eastern regions of the
Soviet Union, including the Urals and points east, are chiefly respoTrsible
for the increase in the production of iron and steel. The western regions
at present produce only one-half of the total production, whereas they pro-
duced 70 percent before the war. The most important centers of production
are at present the Ukraine and the Urals., which account for 70-80 perospt
of the total output. Civilian consumption of iron and steel, including hous-
ing construction and household utensils, is of very minor importance. There-
fore, iron and steel production figures of the USSR mean almost twice aS much
in terms of armament as the same figures would mean in the West. Eastluro-
peen satellite countries are producing 7,6909000 tons of raw steel at Present,
and their capacities are being developed further.
30 Pailaions of tons
25
20
15
10
5
Table )
1
4'5. 94 #7 We 4# 50 SY Hp y5" ii6 41 448 4/9 .5, /F09 itr 4' 47 qg 5.0.57
Pig Iron
Steel Rolled Stock
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=17-
3. Zdialp
The petroleum output rose more slowly after the war than the coal output or
the production of iron and steel. At present it is about 30 percent above
the prewar level. This slow development is to be explained by the fact that
the output in the Caucasus area has declined greatly while the output in the
Volga-Ural area has remained somewhat below expectations3 and that ofthe
Emba region has lagged quite considerably below expectations. As was made
known at the end of 1951 the Saviat leader tap still hopes to athieve
the goal set by ,Stalin in 190 of producing 60 million tons per year before
1960.4 In spite of the decline in the output in the Caucasus9 this area
still Recounts for more than 50 percent of the total output. A further in-
crease in the output of the Volga-Ural area is expected.
30
20
10
Table 5
ii
1.
_z
U
CI_
(ft
te
0
QJ tl '
., 0 I
te,
? x. -..... et -.,
x as A, 04.
0
?-..,
o
,i
1.?
0
25
?
?
1990 '7' 46 417 43 49 50 5/
Petroleum Production
Percentage of Total Soviet Petroleum
Production from the Most Important
Petroleum Producing Regions (1950)
In 1950 the following petroleum derivatives Were produced:
Aviation gasoline 394009000 tons
. Standard gasoline (for autos) 535009000 tons
Diesel oil 391009000 tons
Illuminating oil 638003000 tons
Gas oil and fuel oil 1292009000 tons
Lubricating oil 39300,000 tons
Total 3493009000 tons5
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To be added to thia amount are 497009000 tons of petroleum derivatives which
come from the satellite states and occupied areaslso that the USSR has a
total of more than 29 million tons of petroleum derivatives for its own useo
The rest remaining in the satellite countries and occupied areas barely covers
extremely restricted requirements. The goals of the last FivS-Year Flan,
including stockpiling, could hardly have been fulfilled without deliveries
from satellite countries and occupied areas.
Although Soviet Air Force requir mmats for high-grade aviation gasoline could
only be met by deliveries from the Western Allies during the last war, in-
creased production after the war has made it pbssible to stockpile aviation
gasoline. However9rthe conversion of the Soviet Air Force to jet-propelled
plans is leading to such a high rate of fuel consumption that in along war
supply difficulties are bound to ensue after the stockpiles hav been used
up. Increase in the petroleum output and the production of aviation gasoline
are, therefore, a pressing needo
C. ThejdutImnprtant Products of the Armotntin4Reta
Armored vehicles
Tank and assault gun manufacture reached a high point in 1944490 With
37,500 units per ye r. After the war, production wae at first slowly de-
er ased, but from th middle of 1946 it decrees d sharply. Production for
1951 is estimated at 10,000 units, 25 percent of the production at the end:
of the war.
The production process was changed after the war. The manufacture of separate
parts was distributed to a far greater number of supply plants while final
assembly was concentrated in a few plants seven are known (sic). Based on
these manufacturing cellerwhich are to be regarded at the same time as parent
plants for the production9 d velopment of types, and training of specialists9
a wartime production of tanks and assault guns can be built up in the shortest
possible time. The manufacturing center is in the Ural-Volga ar ao The pro-
portion of medium models has decreased in favor of heavy tanks and assault
guns. The ratio between production of tanks and assault guns Can at this time
not be determined assault guns probably make up 25 percent of the production?
In 19449 the proportion of assault guns was 20 percent and in 1947 about 15
percent.
Only improved models are being manufactured which have been developed from
types known inthe war. Their essential characteristics are: reinforced
front armor, better profiling and radio equipment9 and increased fire power.
The stock of tanks and assault guns can be roughly estimated at 809000 units
on the basis of production during the laat phase of the war and the first
part of the postwar period. Of these about 459000 tanks and assault guns
stem from production during the last war, and can be employed only in a limit-
ed way in comparison with improved defense equipment. However, 3500Q tanks
and assault guns are probably modern standard types. The war equipment of
presently existing units and training organizations would probably be about
299000 tanks and assault guns. An additional 5,000 tanks and assault guns
can be assumed to (dist in satellite countries. There is a stock of 409000.-
459000 tanks and assaylt guns in the storage areas of the military districts
and the high commando*.
20 Motor Vehicles
Motor vehicle production since the war has risen to two and one-half times the
highest prewar output (1938) and, with planned further development, could rise
to three times that figure in the near future, that is, 7509000 motor vehicles
per yearo7
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Trucks, particularly particularly important to the national economy, account for more than
85 percent of the total motor vehicle production. The planned quota for 1950
of 430,000 trucks was probably met; so that, with a further increase in produc-
tion, a future output of 500,000-6009000 trucks per year can be counted on.
The stock of two million. trucks planned for 1951 as against one million in
1940 was presumably not reached. The postwar models which in 1951 already
make up 60 percent of the total stock show considerable improvements as
compared with the wartime standard types. Load capacity (30 percent) and mo-
tor performance (25-60 percent) have been considerably raised and fuel con-
sumption has increased slightly (20 percent). The shift to Diesel engines in
the case of heavy trucks has even effected a saving in fuel.
Tractor production has multiplied compared with the prewar status both in
units produced and in motor performance. According to plan, 112,000 tractors
were contructed in 1950 and a rise in this figure to 130,000 is provided for?
in 1951.0
Agriculturees stock of 550,000 tractors in 1940 was greatly decreased during
the war because of wear and tear and a complete stoppage in production. It
is doubtful whether the prewar status was again reached by the end of 19500
In the first postwar years, newly built tractors were almost exclusively allo-
cated to agriculture. Recently, however, an increasing proportion of the pro-
duction has been made available for other purposes, such as forestry, land im-
provement9 and road building. Tractors employed here can be drawn upon for
military purposes much more easily than those employed by agriculture.
500 ,(thousands of units)
409
300
200
100
Table 6
loo
80
60
40
20
thousands of units
/938 89 410 r7 fir fd
1937 3 4to 61.5416 yyVir9 f0
Truck Production Tractor Production
3. 'Transport Machinery
The, recovery of locomotive construction from the effects of the war was at
first slow, but in 1951 a production of about 2,700 units was achieved and.
In the near future a rise in production to 4,000 units can be expected.
The construction of freight cars reached the prewar level it 1947 and at pres-
ent is more than double that level; in 1950 about 145,000 cars were produced.9
A further rise to 200,000 cars is to be expected.
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20
The stock of railroad cars, with 1910(4000
greater than before the war while the load
since the proportion of four-axie units is
cent in 1940i0
3000
2000
1000
uni
Table 7
150
units9.9 is numerically 30 percent
capacity is 50 percent greater9
now 40 percent as against 25 per-
thousands of units
100
/931
410 95 44 47 o' q
Locomotive Production
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Freight Car Production
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2l
PART IV, ORGANIZATION OF CONMAT UNITS
Attachments 742 give the estimated breakdown of the following Soviet Army
units: Infantry Army (motorized), Mechanized Army, Tank Division, Mechan-
ized Division, Motorized Infantry Division, and Artillery Corps.
The introductory chart, Attachment 6, gives a survey of the total number of
personnel and weapons as well as approximate figures for fuel and transpor-
tation requirements for the most important combat units of the armies.
There are no specific figures for the postwar organization of cavalry divi-
sions or of airborne units, which are stationed only within the USSR proper.
The following explanatory remarks are necessary in connection with the per-
sonnel figures given:
1. The wartime strength of the units has been deduced on basis of authentic
figures for the mechanized division coupled with fragmentary information
about the various other units. The wartime personnel figures were esta-
blished as of May 1950 and represent a personnel increase, according to
statements made by deserters. Documentary evidence reveals that, begin-
ning in summer 1950, these figures were used as a basis for troop
strength computation in the occupation areas.
2. The peacetime strength provided for constitutes between 60 and 70 per-
cent of the. wartime strength and apparently was made public simultaneous-
ly with the announcement of the wartime strength. The difference be-
tween the peacetime strength and the wartime strength consists partially
in understaffed units and partially in a complete absence of entire sub-
ordinate units. An example of the latter is the 3rd motorized infantry
battalion of the mechanized regiments. It may be assumed that the peace-
time unit strength is applicable to the majority of the units stationed
within the USSR and that it represents the actual strength of those units
at the present time.
3. The term actual strength in Attachments 6-12 denotes the assumed person-
nel strength of the units in the occupation areas at the present time.
These figures represent between 75 and 90 percent of the wartime strength
(or an average of 82 percent). This personnel strength was achieved
mainly through the addition of personnel during the summer of 1951. The
total number of personnel will probably be increased at a later date.
It is not yet clear whether these personnel totals also hold true for
the units in the most important border areas of the USSR, but it may be
assumed that they do.
4. The cadre strength of units is no longer cited, inasmuch as the former
cadre units stationed in Germany had been brought up to their normal
strength by the summer of 1950. The cadre strength included the normal
complement of officers and noncommissioned officers but included only 25
percent of the normal complement of privates. It is possible that even
at the present time a number of mechanized units within the USSR proper
are being maintained as cadre units.
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22
PART V. ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT
Approximately 80 percent of the Soviet Armygs weapons and equipment Consist
of types which had been standard by the end of World War II. Only in the
case of a few weapons have new or improved types, or imitations of foreign
types, been revealed. It may be assumed, however, that there are many suoh
types of weapons, even though they have not been definitely revealed through
the reconnaissancewindows of the European occupation areas. The identifi-
cation charts which follow deal with types of weapons and equipment which
were well-known by the end of the war and with types which have been positive-
ly identified as having been developed since the end of the war.11 The Lypes
delivered under Lend-Lease some of which were supplied in large numbers, are
mentioned only where it is know4 positively that they are still in widespread
use by troops, as in the case of antiaircraft weapons and wheeled vehicles.
The standard weapons with which it may be assumed the combat units are equipped
at present are listed in PART IV, ORGANIZATION. The identification charts
cover the following weapons and equipment currently in use:
A. Infantry Weapons
B. Antitank Artillery
C. Artillery
D. Antiaircraft Artillery
E. Rocket Launchers
F. Mortars
G. Tanks
H. Assault Guns
I. Armored Wheeled Vehicles and Halftrack Vehicles
J. Wheeled Motor Vehicles
K. Tractors
L. River-Crossing Equipment
M. Mines and Igniters
N. Radio Equipment
O. Telephone Equipment
P. Gas Protective Equipment
Q. Types of Ammunition.
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A. Infantry Weapons
1. Pistols
Model Designation
Type of Construction
Caliber
Length and weight
Cartridge Feed
Effective Range
Nagant revolver
Revolving cylinder
7.62 mm
235 mm
Cylinder holds
Up to 50 m
M 1895
(Barrel length 114 mm
7 rds.
Weight 0.8 kg)
TK pistol
Korovin type, recoil
loading, semiautomatic
6,35 mm
127 mm -
(Barrel length 67 mm
Magazine hada
rds.
Up to 50 m
Weight 0.4 kg)
TT pistol 1930
Tokarev type, recoil-
7.62 mm
195 mm
loading, semiautomatic
(Barrel length 117 mm
Magazine holds
rds.
Up to 50 m
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Outmoded - in'
very limited
use.
In limited use
Standard weapon.
Also known as
TT 1933
Model Designation
Rifle, M 1891/30
Carbine, M 1938
Carbine, N 1944
Self-loading automatic
rifle, M 1936 (Simonov
model - AVS)
Self-loading automatic
rifle, M 1938 (Tokarev
model - SVT)
Self-loading semi-
automatic rifle, M 1940
(Tokarev model - SVT)
Self-loading automatic
rifle, with telescopic
sight, M 1940 (Tokarev
model - SVT)
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2. Rifles and Carbines
Rate of Fire
Caliber
Length
Effective Rene
per Minute
7.62 mm
730 mm
Up to 400 m
8 - 10 rds.
7.62 mm
510 mm
Up to approx. 400 m
8 - 10 rds.
7.62 mm
510 mm
Up to approx. 400 m
8 - 10 rds,
7.62 mm
610 mm
Up to approx. 400 m
15 - 20 rds.
fired singly
7.62 mm
625 mm
Up to approx. 400 m
15 - 20 rds.
7.62 mm
625 mm
Up to approx. 400 m
15 - 20 rds.
7.62 mm
625 mm
Up to approx. 600 m
20-25 or. 70-80
rds0 depending
on the model
SECRET
Cartridge Feed
Centered magazine
holds 5 rds.
Centered magazine
holds 5 rds.
Centered magazine
holds 5 rds.
Magazine holds 15
rds.
Magazine holds 10
rds.
Magazine holds 10
rds.
Magizine holds 15
rds.
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
Weight
3.9 kg
Remarks
3.6 kg Standard weapon. Also
known as M 1924/37
(without bayonet)
3.99 kg With attached folding
bayonet
4.3 kg Capable of either
Single-round or auto-
matic fire
4.0 kg Capable of either
single-round or auto-
matic fire
3.9 kg Fires single-rounds
only
4.0 kg Appears in both semi-
autotatio and fully
automatic models
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
SECRET
-25-
3. Submachine Guns
Rate of Fire
Cartridge
Model
Caliber
Length
Effective Range
per Minute
Feed
Weight
Remarks
Submachine gun,
M 1934/38
7.62 mm
785 mm
Barrel length:
260 mm
Up to 200 m
Theoretical:
Actual:
900 rdi.
75 rds.
25-rd.
straight
magazine
3.45 kg
Outmoded
Submachine gun,
PPD 1940
Degtyarev model
7.62 mm
785 mm.
Barrel length:
260 pm
Up to 200 m
Theoretical:
Actual:
600 rd
100 rde.
7Ird0
di type
magazine
3.5 kg
Outmoded
Submachine gun,
PPSh 1941
7.62 mm
840 mm
Barrel length:
Single rds:
up to 300 m
Theoretical:
Actual: .
600 rdS.
100 rda.
71-rd.
drUm4ype
3.9 kg
Standard
weapon
Shpagin model
270 mm
Short bursts:
up to 200 m
Magazine
Suatained fire:
up to 100 in
Submachine gun,
PPS 1943
7.62 mm
' 831 mm?
with extended
shoUlder stock
Up to 200 in
Theoretical:
700 rds.
? 35rdo
Straight
magatine
3.0 kg
Standard
weapon
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
SECRET
-26-
4. Light, Medium, and Heavy Machine Gans
Rate of Fire per
Model
Caliber
Length
Effective Range
Minute
Cartridge Feed
Weight
Light machine
gun, DPM 1928
7.62 mm
1270 mm
Barrel length:
Up to 1,000 in
Theoretical:
Actual:
550 rds.
80 rds.
47-rd. drum
9.2 kg
(Degtyarev)
605 mm
Light machine
gun, M 1946
7.62 mm
Similar to
DPM 1928
600 to 1,000 in
Actu 1:
250 rds.
250-rd.
ammunition
belt or 47-rd.
drum
13.0 kg
with
bipod
Medium machine
gun, Maxim,
M 1910
Medium machine
gun, M 1939
(Degtyarev)
Medium machine
gun, M 1943
(Goryunov)
7.62 mm
7.62 mm
7.62 Bun
Heavy machine 12.7 mm
gun, M 1938
DShE (Degtyarev)
1100 mm
Barrel length:
720 mm
1168 mm
Barrel length:
721 mm
1168 mm
Up to 3,500 in
Up to 3,500 in
Up to approx.
1,000 in
Theoretical: 500 rds.
Actual: 250-300 rds.
a. 500-600 rds. for
ground targets
b. 1,000-1,200 rds.
for aerial targets
Theoretical: 500-700 rds.
Actual: 300-350 rds.
250-rd.
ammunition
belt
250-rd.
ammunition
belt
50- or 250-
rd.
ammunition
belt
1625 mm Up to 3,500 In for Theoretical: 500-600 rds 50-rd.
Barrel length: ground targets; up Actual: 125 rds. ammunition
1000 mm to 1,500 in for aer-
belt
ial targets; up to
300 in against tanks
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
SECRET
Remarks
Standard weapon. DT
version used in ar-
mored vehicles.
Standard weapon for
infantry companies.
An improvement over
tode1-DF4-1928. In-
ter-changeable belt
or drum cartridge feed.
18 kg Outmoded, though still
present in_many units;
can also be used in an
antiaircraft machine
gun.
13.55 kg In limited use
13.8 kg Standard medium ma-
chine gun
14:0 kg Multipurpbae machine
In wide use by
armored vehicles as
an antiaircraft ma-
chine gun,
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
SECRET
-27-
5. Antitank Rifles
Muzzle
Rate of Fite
Cartridge
Model
Caliber
Velocity
Length
Penetration
Per Minute
Feed
Weight
Remarks
Antitank rifle
14.5 mm
1,000 in sec.
2,020 mm
30 mm at 100 in
8-10 rds.
Single
15.75 kg
Standard weapon
PTRD M 1941
Barrel length:
25 mm at 500 in
(Degtyarev)
19350 mm
Antitank rifle
14.5 mm
1,000 in sec.
2,130 mm
30 mm at 100 in
Up to 15 rds.
5-rd. clip
20.0 kg
Standard weapon
PTRS M 1941
Barrel length:
25 mm at 500 in
(Simonov)
1,350 mm
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
SECRET
-28-
B. Antitank Artillery
Barrel Muzzle Rate of Fire Weight Traveling Weight of Weight
Model Caliber Length Velocity Penetration Range Per Minute in Weight Shell and of
Firing Shell Case Shell
Position
AT gun M 3 37 mm -- 885 in sec 56 mm at 500m L19760m -- -- 0.73 kg
Light AT gun 45 mm 2.8 in 820-1070 112 mm at 500m 7,770m 25 rds. 550 kg 2.8 kg
1942 msec
Medium AT gun 57 mm 4.162 in 1020 in sec 83 mm at AP shell -- 1125 kg 1125 kg
VI 1941 ZIS-2 1,000 in 4,000 in
HE shell
5,200 in
Medium AT gun 57 mm 4.162 in
M 1943
Medium AT gun 57 mm
Ml
1020-1200 104 mm at 500m 8,300 in 25 rds. 1148 kg
in sec
700 in sec 85 mm at 500m 9,930 111
Field gun N 76.2mm 3.2 in 680 in sec
1942, Z13-3 (L/43)12
Heavy AT gun 85 mm
85 mm
Heavy AT gun 100
141944
5.99 in
with
/Mae
brake
905 in see
59 mm at 13,000 in
1,000 in
105 mm at 20,900 in
1.000 in,
300 angle
ofIm_pact
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013000110003-6
SECRET
ZOOM
1225 kg