THE YUGOSLAV INTERNAL ECONOMIC SITUATION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 8, 2013
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 1, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3.pdf410.23 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 I. ? ' FEB 1902."?rr. S?;' ? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION REPORT REPORT COUNTRY Yugoslavia SUBJECT DATE OF INFO. PLACE ACQUIRED The Yugoslav Internal Economic Situation CIRCULATE CD NO. 50X1 -HUM 50X1 -HUM DATE DISTR. 1 July 1952 NO. OF PAGES 5 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 50X1 -HUM THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANINGOFTITLE 18, SECTIONS 783 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE- LATION Ot ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED' 87 LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 50X1 -HUM General 1. The internal economic situation in Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1952 was no worse than it had been in the past; Yugoslavia had successfully overcome such situations before. In facto there were now indications of an economic revival and signs of an improvement in the functioning of the Yugoslav bureaucratic machine. There was a recrudescence of initiation on the part of the senior staff, such as factory managers, technicians and skilled workers, attributed to the gradual disappearance of fear which had had a paralyzing effect during the last two or three years. . 2. The reasons for a lower level of output during the period 1947-1950, inclusive, were diverse, but were basically-due to the following causes: a. The economic blockade imposed by Yugoslavia s Satellite neighbors; b. The decrease and almost total disappearance of accumulated funds which had been built up by 1947, by strenuous efforts on the part of the Yugoslav working population and by Yugoslaviags access to the following resources, now cut off: (1) Expropriation and nationalization measures; (2) UNRRA aid and Czechoslovak assistance; (3) Yugoslav trading credits in Poland and Czechoslovakia; CLASSIFICATION SECRET/Ca4T3OL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY STATE NAVY NSRB DISTRIBUTION ARMY AIR FBI 1 I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 II Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R01275M10064"-i (l4) SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY -2- The exploitation and re-export of Albanian petroleum products; 50X1-HUM (5) SubStantial funds for the civil war which were administered by Yugoslav agencies at home and abroad; Trade with Trieste, which had gradually become more and more difficult; The greater productivity of the workers in the immediate post-war vglarst! 50X1-HUM Remittances from enigrgs the country by immigrants after the war; and (6) (7) (8) (9) and funds brought into immediately The post-war agrarian policy prior to the introduction of agricultural cooperatives, which scared off the peasants. 3. At the congress of the Communist Party of Serbia held in March 1952, Peter Stambolic, President of the Republic of Serbia, following-the lead given by Boris Kidric, Chairman of the *Federal Economic Council, defended the thesis of a revision of the economic plans, and the granting of greater freedom to private enterprise. He stated that economic planning should be brought on to a more realistic basis, and that plans should take into account the actual potential of the country. Private enterprise in small trading and in craftsmen's industries should be encouraged and not discouraged by Government orders; where the State has failed to realize the aims laid down, work should be banded over to private enterprise. 50X1-HUM this was not being considered only as a tanporary meas- ure by certain Yugoslav economic circles, but rather as the initial steps towards the founding of a new form of Yugoslav socialism, a form of compromise between the social democracy as expounded by social-democratic government and that of the People's Republics of the Soviet bloc. Labor 5. The position of the younger members of the Yugoslav working classes (the Yugoslav youth proletariat) has, however, worsened for the following reasons: a. Less opportunities for work; b. Decrease in public works and social benefits; c. Less opportunities to join the white-collar class of worker; and d. Diminished political influence of the masses on Yugoslav political firms. 6. The result has been an increase in Caminform influence on this section of the popu- lation since the end of 1951. 7. The Government has faced the labor situation by granting greater powers of dis- cretion to factory managers than has ever been the case before, and similarly to directors of import-export firms, who are now empowered ..to cOnClude contracts with foreign firms. They are eqaally empowered to nominate foreigners to repre- sent Yugoslav products firms abroad. The Government has also given final approval to measures entitling workers to consult with their superiors and to make suggestions to their superiors on matters affecting the factories. SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY -3- 50X1-HUM Output 8. The output of the last ten months has not been considered adequate by the Yugo- slav authorities, The weakest point in the Yugosilv production plan has been the following industries: a. Light industries; b. Agricultural and foodstuffs industries; and c. The petroleum industry. The first two categories above mentioned have not produced more than 70 to 72 per cent of their targets during the period in question. Agriculture 9.. Wheat production during 1951 was 40 per cent higher than during recent years but stocks are loner than in 1949. Potatoes are in the same situation; proddc- tion is higher but stocks are lower, and the alcohol-producing industries have suffered serious losses. During the second half of 1951, they were forced to buy on the open market at prices two or three times above normal, which had the effect of increasing production costs considerably.. Sugar-beet productiorymms 8 per cent above that of 1950 and the Yugoslav sugar factories were adequately and regularly supplied. 10. As regards produce for the pharmaceutical industries, Government farms and agri- cultural cooperatives produced 27,000 tons of opium poppies more than before with an equivalent increase in the production of pure opium. The North Serbian farms also showed an increase in pharmaceutical plant produce. 11. In general, individual production of agricultural produce increased, but produc- tion was diverted mainly, to that of necessities for the family and neighboring cities. Production on industrial account, with the exception of sugar beet, de- creased with consequent effect on foreign trade. The northern part of the country, in particular Serbia, gave the best returns, although Croatia and Slov- enia showed a marked decrease in produce for industrial use. During 1952, the situation in the South improved, particularly in Macedonia, where the position has shown a steady betterment in the last 18 months. This can be ascribed to the fact that the Macedonians have accepted the fact that the political situation will not change, as they expected earlier. Petroleum Industry 12. The petroleum industry did not succeed in realizing during 1950-1951 even 30 per cent of the target envisaged under the Five-Year Plan. The drillings in the Moslavina area of North Croatia and the Modjuxmure region of Slovenia did not give the expected results. The Modjurmure region was expected to produce 280,000 tons per annum by the end of 1951; the actual 1951 output was 33,000 tons. The exploratory soundings in the Kostolac area of northeast Serbia were only experi- mental, and no regular production took place. Shortage of necessary plant was the cause. 50X1-HUM 13. During 1951 and the first two months of 1952, Yugoslavials equirements were met exclusively by imports; 62,000 tons were imported during 1951. 14. Very rich deposits have been found in .SlavonsicaPozega in Slavonia; they-ames- timated to'be tha largest ion Yngoslav territory. SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIAIS LY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 SECRET/CCNTROL - U. S. OFFTCIAIS CULY 50X1-HUM Electro-technical Industries 15$ The Zagreb manufacturers of electric motors, batteries and electric-light, bulbs realized their quantitative targets at the expense of quality, which suffered from the negligence of the workers and lack of technical skill of the management. The worst example was that of the "Akumulator" (sic) works of Zagreb whose poor quality output caused considerable damage and losses to Croatian factories and other works in Yugoslavia. . The "Rade Koncar" works realized their program; the targets were, however, set lower than in 1949-1950. Despite all the difficulties which this concern had to face, such as a regular flow of raw material, particularly pig iron, it neverthe- less more or less reached its target. Production over the last two years has been, more and more concentrated on 1-Klito120,-KWmotors at the expense of conden- sers and power-station equipment. Rubber Leather and Plastics Industries 17. Over-all production has increased, but an analysis of the figures shows that semi- finished and finished leathers have increased by about 30 per cent. Production of synthetic materials (plastics) is cadpletely new and an increase in percentage here has no significance. Polivinyl production is largely exported in raw or semi-finished state Although the industry is going,,it is not of great importance in the world market. 50X1-HUM Agricultural Machinery 18. The. "Zmaj" works at Zemun_is the only works to have realized the appointed' tar- gets for agricultural machinery during 1951 and the first quarter of 1952. Metallurgical Industries 19. The general level of production in 1951 was lower than in 1949 because of diffi- culties in raw-material supplies, and also because of h tendency to attempt'to maintain a steady average output rather than to force production and wear out equipment which is later irreplaceable. 20. A new blast furnace was installed at Caprag in November 1951, which was produced by n3 May" Enterprise in Rijeka. Nevertheless the tendency was that of a de- crease in pig-iron output because of a dimunition in ore supplies. The reasons for this were antiquated equipment and a changing labor force, no longer closely controlled by the Government. 21. The production of rolled steel has slightly increased. The Zenica works, which consists of a new and an old rolling mill, have increased output by 40 per cent compared to 1949. New plate-cutting machinery , which ha5ox1 -HUM been installed at the "Ivo Lola Mbar" works at Zeleznik)improved the position there. These works supply the Slavonski Brod engineering industries, which are expected to produce locomotives for the first time in 1952. The target is set at 200. Power Supplies 22. The 1954-1955 target of a production of 7,000 (sic) kilowatts of electric power per annum appear since the arrival of imports during the 50X1-HUM period October 1951 to March 1952 to be a more practical proposition. The new hydroelectric stations, upon which so much depends, had to be partially closed down during 1950. Jablonica is now, however, fully operative, and great strides were made at the end of 1951. Thethermo-electric stations in Central Serbia are also gradually making their output felt. SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS am Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3 50X1-HUM 4 SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Railway Communications 23. The electrific;dcion scheme is vital for the improiement of the North-South line, and communication with the Central Adriatic littoral. The Ljubljana-Zagreb-Bel- grade-Nis, Belgrade-Skoplje-Greek frontier, and the Samac-Sarajevo-Dubrovnik are all to be electrified. Work on the Samac-Dubrovnik is finally to start on 1 June 1952 and is to be completed by samer 1952. 24. Lack of locomotives, and the inadequacy of track, are the main causes for the in- efficiency of Yugoslav rail communications, Priority is being given to the doubl- ing of tracks, in particular to the vital Samac-Dubrovnik line, which should be completed by 1953. When this occurs, Ploce port (Dubrovnik) will relieve Split? of 70 per cent of the traffic now handled by that port. River Communications 25. River communications daowed a marked improvement during 1951. Despite the gon- tinued tension with neighboring countries, the volume of Danube ?traffic increased by 25 per cent. It is hoped to overcome political tension with Rumania suffi- ciently to reach a modus vivendi regarding communications with the Black Sea. The Danube-Theiss Canal complex should be completed by 1953., Lack of labor has so far held this project up. There are adequate supplies of cranes and excavators to carry it out. The Sava Canal from Zagreb to Sisak has been completed. Its prolongation to Zidani Most by 1954 will greatly assist the transportation of Slov- ene, coal and timber to the Adriatic. The Samac-Dubrovnik line will then be the shortest route from river to the coast. Mining Industries 26. Copper - The exploitation of the deposits near Pec in northern Montenegro on the Albanian frontier started in the second half of 1951. By 1953 these mines are ex- pected to produce 20,000 tons per annum. This output will be entirely directed to exports, so that the production at Bor can be processed at the new copper works to be erected during 1952 near Krusevac. By the end'of 1953, the Krusevac works should be in a position to supply the needs of the domestic market in copper (par- ticularly electrolytic) wire bars which now have to be imported. 27. Coal - Coal production during 1951 was Uneven. The central Croatian lignite mines passed their target by 10 per cent. Those at Bosanski Krupa did not reach the target set. The new lignite deposits on the Sar area of northern Montenegro started production during the second half of 1951. Eventually their output will be larger than the, combined output of the two Bosnian fields. 28. The need for coke is, however, still very pressing. Home production barely covers 10 per cent of requirement. The lack of Polish coal and coke is very greatly felt and, in fact, constitutes one of the main reasons that Yugoslavia is being forced to try to seek some form of economic agreement with the Soviet bloc. SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700330009-3