MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R011300250007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 7, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R0,
FORM NO. 51-4AA
IfEB 1952
f 1-J
C1
ua
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE
ACQUIRED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SFCRR
SECURITY INFORMATION
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT
CD NO.
Hungary
Miscellaneous Military Information
25X1
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 193
AND 794,. OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM 15 PROHIBITED.
DATE DISTR. 7 April 1952
NO. OF PAGES 2
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
UA'TEQ1NF
DO NOT CIRCULATE
1. The reorganization of the Army on the Soviet model has been nearly completed.
The present strength of the Army is about 8 to 10 Divisions, including 2 tank
divisions. Light and heavy equipment with. standardized arms are available:
partly from Soviet Russia. (e.g, tanks, heavy artillery, planes); and, partly,
from home production (e.g. tommy guns, light artillery), The main problems of
the Army are (1) lack of buildings and. other quarters; (2) lack of heavy armament;
(3) low officer caliber; anxi (lv) low morale of troops,
2. Rui.ldingsa Despite feverish construction of military installations and barracks,
there is a. real lack of sufficient quarters. Some units are still living in
camps (sic)'.*
3. Heavy Armament. Despite government pushing, industrial production is behind the
requirements of the Five-Year Plan. Al.thougi, coal production in 1951 was
16.2% higher than in 1950, only 90% of the "RMkosi" quota was accomplished; pig
iron production which in late 1951 was 15% higher than in 1950, should have been
30 to 35% higher. The failure to achieve goals in these key industries has had.
:repercussions in all phases of the armament program. Severe restrictions. have
been introduced, to save iron.
. Officers. The newly created officers of the Kossuth Academy, together with the
political officers (poli.truks) of the Pet5fi Academy have neither theoretical nor
practical experience. Former career officers, especially those in the higher .ranks.
(above that of Major) have nearly all. been purged. Even. the last remnants. of the
so-called "Communist collaborator" ex-Horthy Army officers, who were kept.on to
ass'(lre the necessary training for the new officers' corps, are to be completely
eliminated.. A new charge wi..ll be launched soon against this group of "collaboratoral
Including Col. ?A.la-Kiraly of the Kossuth Academy and his cohbrts, to prove
their 'anti-democratic" tendencies and. contacts with Western imperialists. As
experienced career officers are being dropped from the Army, it is necessary
to activate former reserve officers in order to complete the ranks of the newly
and inadequately instructed new career officers. Since the summer of 1951,
nearly all ex-reserve offi.cer?s- have been registered. (sic) and, in most cases, given
ARMY Fd
NSRB
X FBI
DISTRIBUTION
Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011300250007-6
 Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011300250007-6
SECRET
6.
one rank lower than. what they held. before.
Morale of the troops? While troops are generally well paid and fed, the common
man in the Army, even if he was a former Communist, can be considered as
unreliable in case of a conflict or at first contact with Allied troops. The
exceptions to this will be. the Political Officer Corps; the Militarized
Police forces, which have committed such acts of terror that they have no
choice but to fight; and the newly created Women's Auxiliary Corps (Budapest,
Pecs, Szeged., Debrecen, Miskolc). The WACs number. 400 per battalion and
are recruited. mainly from former Police Agents.
Army Construction. An u.r.identified. architect had to give up his private
business and, is now engaged by the State to check military construction.
This architect earns 1,600 :florin.rs per month, and is constantly travelling
throughout the country., Although he is under drastic security control, this
architect has let it be known that he is supervising the surface and sub
terraneari. construction of barrack-s, arms depots, bridges, and airports.
7. Concomitant with the reo.rganiya,ii.on of the Hungarian Army, Soviet troops are
organizing their bases throughout the country. It is popular opinion that
Hungarian. military const.:ruction. is behind schedule because the Russian installa-
tions have priority.
8. Extremely secret; and. highly important dumps, mostly underground.,are under
construction in the region. of Mad (Toka,j area) The project is exclusively
under Soviet control and will serve Russian military purposes. Underground
railways (sic) indicate that this regLon, near the communications lines of
Czechoslovakia (Ko_$ice) and. the Soviet Carpatho-Ukraine (U horod.-Beregszasz )
will be the main military depot of Soviet troops in Hungary.
25X1 * I
Comment. Probably tents.
25X1 * Comment,. It is more than evident that this ex-reserve officers' corps
_ . the most unreliable element of the .Hungarian-Soviet Army in the event
of mobilization, even if they are controlled. by Loyalist officers or Politruks.)
Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011300250007-6