GOTTWALD'S POSITION IN THE ARREST OF SLANSKY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R010600080006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 14, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
FOB ATRON REPORT
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1. Immediately after the removal of Rudolf Slansky from his position as Secre-
tary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) in September 1%1,
it appeared that he might merely have been set aside temporarily by the
Kremlin in the interest of increased Czech economic production. Considering
that Soviet policy in the Satellite countries usually includes the main-
tenance of two leading antagonistic groups to be played off against each
other, it appeared probable that Moscow had agreed to Slansky's transfer
to a less influential post, but that he was still to be kept as the head
of a group in opposition to President Klement Gottwald. His more recent
arrest and denunciation make it clear that Gottwald has taken this action
as part of his plan for gaining absolute power in the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment and KSC.
2. Gottwald began his offensive with the aim of gaining primacy for hi-self
in Government and Party in the fall of 1950. At that time Slansky initiated
a purge of KSC leaders, beginning with Ota Sling and Marie Svermova.. During
the early period Gottwald remained above the conflict , but soon began to
put men loyal to him in the positions left vacant by the purge. Later still,
at what he considered the proper moment, Gottwald was able to intervene as
the supreme judge, and to take action in the interest of vigilance and
caution and of a real purge of all inimical elements in the Party. Gottwald
accused Slansky of placing his own interests before those of the Party,
of striving for personal power and committing gross errors in the process.
As a matter of fact, Gottwald had knowingly allowed many of the errors
of S:Lansky to go uncorrected and to grow to serious proportions while he
collected evidence against Slansky and his supporters so that he could
persuade the Kremlin of the need for him (Gottwald) to assume control of
the purge and eliminate the Slansky faction.(1)
3. Gottwald denounced Slansky not o iy for his responsibility for the confusion
Czechoslovakia
Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky
in the Government and Party as a result of the duality of control but also as
a Trotskyist, a term no longer used in the USSR or in any of the recent
purges in the Satellite countries, with the exception of that of eJladyslaw
Gomulka in Poland. The reason for the omission of the accusation of Trotskyism
in most recent purges is that the term indicates a theory originating in
Marxism and Leninism and a deviation of Stalin's explanation of Leninism.
The fact that the accusation was made against Slansky indicates that Gottwald
and the leadership of the KSC. wanted to emphasize the difference between
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Gottwald's and Slansky's arproach toward the problem of transforming Czecho-
slovakia from a bourgeois democracy into a peoples' demoeracy.(2) Slansky's
approach to this transformation can be shown by Gottwald to follow the
Trotskyist deviation in its dogma of radical and permanent revolutiono
In September 1951 Gottwald accused Slansky of a failure to understand the
position of the KSC after February 1948 when it altered its revolutionary
function to one of directing State activities,
The decision to remove Slansky was not made without the knowledge and approval
of the Kremlin. This approval was evidently given in spite of the fact
that it meant a radical change in Soviet policy with regard to the develop-
ment of Czechoslovakia and the removal of Moscow?s chief exponent in the
country, It is not unusual, however, for.the Kremlin to abandon a particular
line or man if it means the attainment of its overall program. It seems
that Gottwald succeeded in persuading Moscow that Slansky?s policy was
exclusi.vely responsible for the failure of Czechoslovakia to fulfill the
economic plan and for the lowering of workers' morale in the country,
Gottwald-apparently argued that the situation could be improved only by
radical changes in policy and a profound reorganization of the existing
system, It is in accordance with Kremlin policy that leading Communists
who fail cannot simply be demoted and replaced; they must be severely punished
on the basis of accusations made in such a way as to preserve the theory
of infallibility of the Stalinist program. Moscow was, therefore* forced
to agree to the most drastic action taken against Slansky, The main motive
for the consent of the Kremlin to the removal and arrest of Slansky was,
not the political or ideological one, however, but its strategic and economic
interest in Czechoslovakia, which is paramount today. It was for this
reason that Moscow supported Gottwald's proposals for a solution of Czech
economic problems,(3)
The naming of,Anatol J. Lavrentiev as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia replacing
Mikhail Silin indicates that the Kremlin, while accepting Gottwald's argu-
merits for a profound political reorganization, and more particularly for
an end of the dual control of Government and Party, is not willing to permit
Gottwald to assume complete personal control in Czechoslovakia and sole
liaison with Moscow without taking certain precautions, Lavrentiev, who
was Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1945 to June 19488 is considered
the best Communist analyst of the deviation of Tito, After his recall in
1948 he was promoted to the post of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Especially in. view of the fact that it is not the custom of the USSR to
nominate Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs as ambassadors to countries of
the Soviet orbit, it seems apparent that Lavrentiev was sent to counter
the centralization of power in Czechoslovakia in the person of Gottwald.
The multiple liaison channels between leading Communists in Prague and the
Kremlin have been destroyed by the recent purge; their function is now to
be taken over by Lavrentiev with the aid of the Soviet missions in Czecho
siovakia, In spite of this actions it remains a fact that Moscow's position
in Czechoslovakia has been weakened by the removal of all its exponents
from positions ' of leadership, The explanation for the Kremlin's acceptance
of this situation must be its overriding interest in the productivity of
the country and the fulfillment of Czech commitments to the USSR.(4)
6. The fundamental reasons behind Gottwald's ouster of Slansky were, in addition
to his personal ambition and his dislike for Slansky, his recognition of
the serious condition of Czechoslovakia's econom4Ya with lowered living
standards and the resultant popular unrest, the deterioration of workers'
morale and the corresponding drop in productivity, and the increasing
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His importance and popularity are still too limited, however, for him to
take over the position formerly held by Slansky as leader of the opposition
groups
10, On the other hand, Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky, most popular leader
in Czech Communist circles after Gottwald, is even less radical than
Gottwald and is primarily interested in the well-being of the workersm
The relationship between Gottwald and Zapotocky is not especially good, but
the new trend in Gottwald's policy can be.assumed to provide a basis for
mutual support at least temporarily. Gottwald needs Zapotocky to pacify
the working class, to increase their productivity and improve morale.
Gottwald also needs Zapotooky to share the responsibility for the execution
of the program of which he has gained complete control. At some later date,
however, there is no doubt that Zapotocky will be relieved of his position
as Prime Minister because of his domination of the trade unions through his
popularity with the workers.. Zapotocky, who is an old man and in poor
health, will probably resign from his position and move into the background,,
11. Now that he has gained the complete control for which he has been striving,
Gottwald must take positive action to improve the domestic situation in
Czechoslovakia'and to increase production. Although it can be assumed that
he will not act in such a manner as to aggravate the Kremlin immediately,
but will start with minor measures which will give indicatidns of slow
improvement until he has consolidated his position in power,itt is -
inevitable that his program will cause a conflict with the USSR's interests.
The fact that the country has been transformed as a result of Soviet policy
into the most powerful arsenal in Central Europe means that in case of an
armed conflict Czechoslovakia would suffer in the first days of the war
more serious consequences than it did under the Nazi occupation. It is
believed that because of his understanding of this situation, Gottwald,
wishes to choose for Czechoslovakia a more independent line. Gottwald will
not follow the policy of Tito; he does not wish to sever the alliance and
bonds between Czechoslovakia and the USSR, but his primary interest is in
the well-being of Czechoslovakia.
(1) Comment: In a.self-criticism before the Central Committee of the
KSU n September 1951, Gottwald admitted that he had overlooked many mis-
takes, but added that it was better to act even though belatedly. It is
known that in March 1951 Gottwald was quietly investigating Slansky's
connections with Arthur London and the French Communist Party. The. manner
in which Gottwald assumed control of the purge initiated by Slansky is
similar to that by which Josef Stalin gained control of the purge of the
Soviet Communist Party after the assassination of Sergei Kirov in 1931
and secured for himself absolute power in the, USSR. Therefore, the Kremlin
can make no formal reproach to Gottwald for his conduct of the Czechoslovak
purge.
(2) Comment: For a fuller discussion of this point by the same sources,
see
(3) II Comment: It is also possible that the Soviet Politburo split on the
question of support for Gottwald or Slansky, with Stalin supporting Gottwald
and Zhdanov and Malenkov favoring Slansky.
(4) Comments This situation is comparable to that in Poland where Moscow's
exponent VVYadyslaw, Gomulka was removed from office for economic failures and
was replaced by Boleslaw Bierut, who was without rival in internal Polish
politics. However, Moscow is able to control Bierut in the person of Marshal
Rokosaowski, who has direct control both of the Polish Politburo and_Army.
Similar measures are anticipated in Rumania where Anna Pauker appears to be
the most likely victim of a Communist Party Purge,
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8. Gottwald's position is made clear by the fact that he is in the process of
gaining absolute control of both the State and the Party machinery by
removing from key positions all men not fully trusted by him primarily
all supporters of Slansky and exponents of the Kremlin, and replacing them
by his own followers. Control of the Czechoslovak Army is held by Gottwald's
son-irk-law, Dr. Alexej Cepicka; the Vice Minister of National Defense is
General Bohumil Lastovicka,, long Gottwald's personal secretary; Colonel
Leopold Hofman, like Lastovicka a veteran of the Spanish International
Brigade and, therefore, logically suspect, has been named commander of,
the SNB; Dr. Marta Gottwaldova-Cepickova, Gottwald's daughter, is'in
charge of the section for peoples' democracies in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Dr. Ivan Kopecky, 26-year-old son of Vaclav Kopecky, the Minister
of Information and Gottwald's closest collaborator and adviser, heads the
Soviet section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new ministries
created by the reorganization of September 1951 are headed by men trusted
by Gottwald, as are the political and organizational secretariats.of the
Communist Party Central Committee. Finally, the positions of vice ministers
in the various ministries are all held by followers of Gottwald and his clique.
90 As a result of this concentration of all power in his own hands, Gottwald
has wrecked the Kremlin's means of intervention. in Czechoslovakia through
its agents in key positions, and its policy of maintaining counter-balancing
forces with which to oppose Gottwald in case of necessity without direct
action on its part. Today there exists in Czechoslovakia no group sufficiently
influential and politically qualified to be used by the Kremlin in opposition
to Gottwald. The only man on which it could concentrate as a potential
rival is Viliam Siroky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is indebted solely
to Moscow for his steady .political ascendance since 19Li,8o Although con-
sidered a Gottwald supporter, Siroky is too ambitious not to be willing to
take such a position, even if it would mean the liquidation of Gottwald.
an effort to-obtain greater independence for Czechoslovakia, an improvement
of its security in international relations, and a recognition of. the specific
prablems that face the country. There is no doubt that Gottwald realizes
that the steady change in the international situation is forcing concessions
on the side-of Soviet policy. Gottwald today considers himself a President
who will make history and feels more than ever the full burden of his
responsibility. He may be of the opinion that,a modification of the.relation-
hip between his country and the USSR would be advantageous to both parties.'
Gottwald may not intend to create a situation which would lead to a break
with the Kremlin, but such a policy, even if based on his fullest sincerity
toward Moscow, carries within it the seeds on an inevitable conflict. The
USSR could not accept any modification. of the relationship between the two
countries, and it is doubtful that Gottwald will at a later date be willing
to make concessions which would reestablish the situation which he is at
present trying to alter.
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instability of the national regime. It is clear that Gottwald connected
the person and policies of Slansky with this situation; it is hardly con-
ceivable that he did not realize that Slansky alone could not be the sole
cause of the difficulty, but that the real culprit was Moscow, whose policies
Slansky was carrying out. By removing Slansky, Gottwald was actually
opposing Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia, in spite of the fact that he
has tried to disguise this fact by explaining his actions on political
grounds.
7. It is apparent that this new line taken by Gottwald represents at least
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