CRISIS IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R009600250001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

?... CONFIDENT 51,0
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\VStt ' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
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COUNTRY czcchos1ovak5.a
c,#)
IVIATION REPO
SUBJECT Crisis in the Czechoslovak Connunist. Party :
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The characteristics of the crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party are the
following: it is caused by excessive economic demands by the Soviets, but
is not directed against Moscow, still acting as the supreee arbiter in the
internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Comeunist Party; the Soviet demands
were accepted by Gottwald, but cannoi, be met; as a result) the radical
Sovietization of Czechoslovalda may be expected in the not too distant future.
2. In addition to the four groups existing in the Czechoslovak Cormaist leader-
ship since 25 February 1948, that is, the pro-noscolv group, the Lationalist
groups the Pan-Slav i-roup and the Trotzkyist group, a further division oenurrod
in 1949 and 1950 because of the fundamental rift in the auesian Communist
leadership, culminating in the internal dissension in the Politburo during
the Korean crisis. This split is still influencing the policy of the Soviet
Union and is dividing all the other Communist Parties and their leaders,
especially the Czechoslovak Cornunist leaders, into two principal categories:
a. :Zenists, who believe that canitalism will only collapse after a new
military defeat and uho,thereforetbelieve that war is inevitable. The
-Zealists put military victory, achieved at the propitious moment--in any
event before the -Jest has rearmed--as a condition which must precede the
forld Revolution.
b. Opportunists, who believe that .7estern rearmament is accelerating the
financial bankruptcy and economic disintegration of the west,, and will
achieve the aims of the World Revolution without war, especially if con-
tinued and ruthless Communist pressure is exercised on capitalism every-
where, at every opportunity.
3. President Klement Gottwald and the Czechoslovak Communist Government headed
by Zapotocky? who on 25 February 19248 took over all political power
in Czechoslovakia, unaminously and vehemently shared the views of the Opportun-
ist school of the Politbnro. At the beginning, however, they were somewhat
inclined also to share the views of the nationalistic school of the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party, which waited to transform Czechoslovakia :Into a model
tiestern Coelunist State in Europe. The Opportunists have been gradually induced
to associate further with the Nationalist school as a result of the dualism
and separatism which has developed in the Czedhoslovak Communist leadership.
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Dualism in the governing arparatus of Czechoslovakia results from the inter-
ference and personal ambition of Rudolf Slansky? former Secretary-General
and leader of the pro-Moscow group of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who
wanted to replace Zapotocky as head of the government and was aided by the
Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Mikhail Silin. Separatism in Slovakia has resulted
from the opposition of the Slovak Communist leaders Husak, Clementis, Novomesky,
Melia Smidke and a large majority in the Slovak Communist Party, against
Interference by Prague in Slovak matters.
40 Hindered by the increasing attacks of Slansky and his followers (Geminder,
Frank and Koehler), and almost paralyeed in its activities by the dangerously
growing Slovak separatism of the Husak group, the Czechoslovak Commrtist
leaders, Gottwald and Zapotoeky, have been forced to accept the Soviet deem ds
for 23 percent increase over 1938 in Czechoslovak industrialization in view
of the need of the total war potential of the Soviet bloc, and 35 percent
over 1945 in Czechoslovak production, in view of the need of the total economic
potential of the Soviet bloc.
5. Obliged to comply mith the Soviet requests, the Gottwald-Zapotocky leaders.-
ship was immediately faced eith the difficult and delicate task of forcing
the Czechoslovak working class to accept unpopular measures In the form of
harder work, more severe restrictions, less pay and fewer social benefits,
With this proema, they rislted a further deterioration of their positions,
already undermined by Slanskyts intrigues and by the opposition of Slovak
separatists. The existing tension in the Central Committee of the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party increased dangerously after a split in the Gobtnald-
Zapotocky leadernip when Viliam Siroky? a personal enemy and rival of Pro
Vlado Clementis in both foreign and Slovak internal affairs, with the suppect
of Slansky and in opposition to Cottuald, insisted on Clementist impeison-
rent and trial. As a result, a general crisis seized the whole Comnunist
movement in Czechoslovakia and orought about a near state of anarchy. Thie
crisis culminated during the crucial months of the winter of 1950-1951 in y
disastrous drop in production in Czechoslovakia. As a result of the open
support given to Slanskyls aspirations by Mikhail Sinn, the Soviet Ambassador
in Prague, Gottwald tendered his resignation, silently follewed by Zapotockyo
After long and difficult negotiations, the Kremlin recommended a coepromise
which mould give a free hand to Gottwald and Zapotocky in unifying the Com-
munist leadership in Czechoslovakia, but under the pledge of increasing
production, terminate the policy of Slovak separatism, and purge all devie-
tionists regardless of their positions in the Government or in the Party.
6. This final decision was made by Valerian Zorin, Soviet Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, who, as Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, successfully
directed eottwaldts tactical moves against Dr. Edouard Benes in February
1940, and recently exercised supreme control over Czechoslovak affairs in
Voscaw, Because of this propoeal for the purging of all deviationists,
Gottwald was forced to accept the imprisonment of his personal friend, Dr.
'fled? Clementis? whose arrest made it possible to crush the entire oomerfuh
Nusak group in the Slovak Comnunist Party, and, for the time being, to end
the era of Slovak separatism, During the period of purees which followed,
Gottwald and Slansky eliminated the Trotzkyites, Titoiats and Nationalists
as deviationists? each of them trTing to eliminate as many of the otherts
supporters as possible? until, at the end of tho euriner of 1951, a new inter-
vention by Zorin became necessary. On 6 September 1951, a final settlement
of the Czechoslovak Communist crisis was reached on the following terms:
a. SlansNyts position as Secretary of the Party, a state within a state,
VW abolished and Slansky was made Deputy Prime :holster.
b. A temporary ntrucett in further purges was established, and all radicals
silenced by being placed in suboedinate positions..
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c. Zapotocky was given time to reorganize production, especially in the vital
mining district of Moravska Ostrava.
d. Julius Maris, a docile and obedient Slovak, was sent to Bratislava as
chairman of the puppet Slovak Deputy Government (Sbor Povereniku).
e. In the re-shuffle of the Government, weak and inefficient administrators
(General Svoboda? Evzen Erban) were replaced by more efficient organizers
(Bacilek, Vepomucky, Havelka).
7. The Kremlin's acceptance of all the measures taken by the Cottwald-Zapotocke
leadership on 6-7 September 1951 allowed the present Czechoslovak Government
to strengthen its authority, especially in Slovakia, and also inside the
Party to the detriment of Slanskyls pro-Moscow groups which is now practically
pushed aside. This success, however, is only temporary and conditional. A
noticeable improvement in Czechoslovak production is expected by the Soviet
Government in the next months, and the new Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Anatol
Lavrentiev? has received strict instructions to watch all mores made by the
Czechoslovak Government in that direction.
8. In case of failure by the present Czechoslovak Cormeanist leadership, which
was given full power and also full personal responsibility, the following
measures will take place in Czechoslovakia:.
a. -Gottwald, ill, will be invited to Moscow, and will be replaced in Prague
as President of the Czechoslovak Republic by Zdenek Nejedly, 73-year-old
Minister of Education, doyen of the Party.
b. Zapotocky will be given a Subordinate appointment and will be replaced
as Prime Minister by Rudolf Slans17 with Zdenek Fierlinger as his Deputy.
co Siroky will be given special dictatorial powers in Slovakia with Stefan
Bastovanslof as his Deputy.
d. Soviet ?larshal Nancy will take over the command of the Czechoslovak Army.
e. All Nationalistsavill be eliminated from the Party in a sweeping purge.
f, A new represeion of class enemies will be brutally organized and will
be acconpanied by the mass deportation of unreliable elements.
g. A state of general alertness will be proclaimed giving special emereency
powers to the government in economic (labor) matters.
h. The Sovietization of Czechoslovakia win be completed.
9. Because of the practical impossibility of any Czechoslovak Government complying
with the excessive Soviet goals in industrialization and pro?uction, a now
and serious crisis in the Conerunist leadership of Czechoslovakia may be expected
very shortly, on condition, of course, that no important international events
interfere with thet expected development.
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