REVIEW OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R009200450002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 13, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ai3j3'roinid F o r Release 1999/09/09 : C
4.
COUNTRY Burma
CLASSIFICATION,
rxm, :0144
cEN-rtiAc-r. LLI ENC
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lal 77"TCT'T.5 .1111T
REPORT NO.
UNFORNIATION REPORT
SUBJECT Review of CormunistActivity in Burma
its eamcm, ocular =sole
PLACE THIS REPORT IS NOT TO DI FORUM
ACQUIRED TRANSMITTED WITHIN THE UNTIBD
STATES, OR BEYOND THE BORDERS
DATE OF OF THE UNITED STATES, Willi=
INFO. Jly- September 1951 THE LITEESS kL. :CI, (4 Int
CD NO.
DATE DISTR,
NO. OF PAGES 8
C
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NO. OF ENCLS.
MISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
25X1A
25X1X General.
1. While major redispositions of the Communist insurgent forces have been in
nrogress, the past three months have witnessed little change in the general
situation and legal political parties have been preoccupied with the elec-
tion campaian and with mobilizing supnort in the districts. Analysis of
the results published for the first installment of the general elections
shows that the two principal leftist opposition parties, the Burma Workers,
and Peasants' Party and the People's Peace Pront, between them secured
23 percent of the votes cast as compared with 41.5 percent given to the
APPFL, including the Burma Socialst Party; the balance was east in favor
of other ninnr political narties and a number of independent candidate's.
To date however, it appears that the AFPFL controls about 64 of the 80 odd
seats contested.
2.. Official statistics reveal that in the year ending 31 August 1951, insur-
gent sabotage of communications resulted in the destruction of 86 road
bridges and 131 rail bridges. Practically all of them were repaired by
the Government within a few days and no serious disruption was achieved;
in rally cases, however, the repairs have been makeshift and temporary in
nature, thus resulting in a deterioration in the standard of communica-
tions.
Burma Commas t PaaBSEL.7__Ps_sas2s_a_mo
3. The rain development during the period under review has been the general
move northwards of the BCP and PDF Armed 7brces in Central Burma, which
appears to have been accompanied to a limited extent by a thinning out
of the BCP strength in Lower Burma. This move started at the beginning
of July and, by mid-August, what now appears to have been the first phase
was nearing completion. At that time the dispositions of the People's
Army were as follows:
a. The 2 Division, formerly based in the NYaungbintha-Natogyi areas
yin-an District, was moving north :into nmywa, Shwebo, and
Katba Districts.
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b. The 1 Division, formerly in the PyinmanaeLewe area, was moving
into the Nyaungbintha-Matogyi area.
c. The 3 Division, formerly in Teurigoo and Pegu Districts was
moving into the PyinmanaeLeve area.
d. The 4 Division, which is still very weak, was in the Northern
Shan States.
4. The estimated strengths of these formations smell Division 4,500,
2 Division 1,000, 3 Division 800, 4 Division 300. Thus the effect of
thee moves was to eroduce a heavy concentration of the People's Army
immediately south and southwest of Mandalay. The main concentration is
stal in that area, but it now seers that the northward move is continuing.
A combined BCPeCommuniet Party (Burma) (CP(B)) force about 800 strong was
retorted in the Bhamo-Mongmit area at the end of August and a further
group of 300 PCP insurgents WAS reported early. in September to be moving
from Shwebo District towards Mongmit. At the same time a similar group
was reported to be roving eastwards from Kyaukse District. Reports in
late July indicated the existence of a PCP Sub-Headquarters near Momeik
which is additional to the BOP Headquarters for Heipaw State reported in
April, and a Sub-Headquarters of the PDF has been reported to exist in
the Kedaung Hills area northeast of Mongeit.
). It seems clear that. the BOP is determined to establish control over areas
reaching right up to the Chinese border. A current report suggests that
the BOP intends to rove in some strength into Nbngmit and North Haenwi
States and Memo District, but the Purmese authorities believe that they
will attempt to maintain a corridor leading doe/xi to the east of Mandalay
into Meiktila and Yanethin Districts. It is probable, however, that their
erieary objective is to establish a firm hold over the thinly populated
areas in the Northern Shan States creating a stronghold which, if complete
collaboration of other insurgent groups - in particular the CP(B) and the
People 'a Volunteer Organitation (PIO) - can be achieved, could be extended
to include %the. and Shwebo Districts where the influence of those insur-
gent groups is considerable.
6. Reports have suggested that the main insurgent offensive in Northern Burma
is to be opened at the end of the rains, that is at about the end of
October, and allege that this is to be coordinated with operations across
the border from China by RAW MG, the Kachin renegade, and his "13 Burma
Comeemist Battalion." which has been in Yunnan undergoing training with
the Chinese Communists for the past year. The primary objective of this
latter group would almost certainly be the Kachin territories of Memo
and Myitkeina Districts, thus threatening the creation of a Communist
area of influence, supported by China, comprising the whole of Northeast
Berme. Thakin THAN TUN, leader of the PCP, is reported to have stated
his intention to capture the whole of Northern Burma by the end of 1952.
BCP Relations with Other Insureeldekeemee
7. It now seems probable that the report' of a Kawthelay broadcast announcing
the decision of the Karens to throw in their lot with the BCP was unfounded,
for reliable sources have indicated that the question of the degree to
which the raren National Defense Organization (KNDO) will collaborate with
the PCP is still under active consideration, certainly ameng the Karens
in the Delta areas. The PCP nonetheless appears to have been making
headway, and the establishment of a joint BCP-KV100 coward in the Toungoo
area has been retorted. It is also reported that Saw ORN PE, the Karen
leader in Tenasserim Division, who had previously avoided any entanglement
with the PCP, has been replaced by one DA SOE who is pursuing a policy of
more active collaboration, and this has resulted in an intensification of
'Karen and BOP Insurgent activity in the Tonasserim area.
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8. In the Volta areas, eollaboration in nilitary operations against the
Goveennent continues, but, :although there are pro-Communist elemente
among the Karen leaders, the decision Ilse still to be taken to collaborate
whole-heezetfidly with the Cotruniste; and if the Government can make an
acceptehle offer of a Karen autonomous state - the ultimate objective of
the Narens - that decision may never be made, but in the meantime it
apnears that the innuendo of pro-Communist elements among the Karees is
increaeing. In response to ferecent unofficial Government approach by
Mahn WIN MAUNG, Minister Of teansport and Communications, on the question
of peace terms, Brigadier KYAU SEIN, political adviser to the Kewthulay
Delta Commaed, refused to discuss the qeestion unless the following terms
were accented:
a. An immediate Government announcement of its readiness to implement
Protosale for a deearate Kawthelay State.
Discussion of reace terns should take place in Karen-dominated
territory.
c. the Goverment should take steps forthwith to replace the present
.bureaucratic administrative machinery with a democratic system.
de The Government should take immediete steps to effect agririan
reform.
9. IMAM SHIN, although having no Party affiliations, is an ardent Student of
Communism and it is possible that these conditions in particular "c"
and "d", were formulated:hy him alone. To what extent tbpy represent the
views of the Delta Command, or perhaps have been inspired by the BOP, is
not yet estatOished.
10. At the end of Sune a conference took place of district and regional
leaders of the Mevolutionary People's Volunteer Organization", that is
+he grope of Pre who did not break vitt the PDF when the malt split
occurred in March 1950. This group is led by Be VIM NAM, who was
appointed to the -Central Organization Committee of the PDF in February 1951.
The conference palled for the establishment of a single Communist Parti
in Berme and approved d proposal to merge the Revolutionary FVO with the
BCP before the end of 1951. This is the first positive reaction to Thakin
THAN TUT's call for the creation of a single Communist Party in Burma which
he male in his speech at the Upper Burma PDF Conference On 17 March 1951.
The group of pvris involved, however, it relatively smell and BOP attempts
to come to terms with the main body of PVC,: still In insurrection against
the Government, who call themselves the "People 'a Comrades Party", have
so far had no success.
11. Discussions have been held between leaders of the Upper Burma BCP and PDF
and TUN REIN and SEIN HLA, who are the principal officials of the CP(B)
in Upper Burma e These were designed to secure the fell participation in
the PDF of the CP(B), but the BCP could achieve no more than an agreement
In nrinciple that a PDF of all revolutionary forces should be formed.
The OP(B) deleeates maintained that the present rules and regulatioes
of the PDF required amendment and expansion before this mead be achieved.
It is also known that they are not prepared to recognize the dominant
position of the BCP in the PDF and in the People's Arpy; it ii on this
point that CP(B)-BCP negotiations for Closer collaboration are always
likely to fail.
/2. Leaders of the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP) are alleged
to have held a re-stint. in Rangoon at the beginning of July in which it
was agreed that collaboration with the BCP was desirable but that in
order to safeguard their constitutional position such collaboration
should be kept secret. A decision was reportedly taken that they should
seelea meeting with the BCP to discuss bow such collaboration could be effected.
b.
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There hie been no independent confirmation of this meeting nor has there
been sneereport of am subsequent discussions between BWPP and BCP leaders
but there have been Several indications to suggest that the parties are
?omit* closer together.: A May Day manifesto issued by the BCP10 underground
All Burn* Trades Uniert Congress (ABTUO) 'claimed that workers of the BWIT's
Bursae Trade Union Congress had joined bends with those of the weer/wound
ABTPC le Governmeeteheld areas with a view to forming united opposition
to the Goverment and American imperialism in Burma. In early June a
VAT seokesman at a tillage :meeting in Shwebo Distriet claimed that the
Goternment would to overtbrovn as soon as his party had merged with the
TCP, cp(B), and PVC. Towards the end of June, propaganda issued in Shwebo
Distriet in the name of the BCP' s All Burma Peasants Union., coincided
vith eerieus peasant Unrest in the area inspired by the BM, in the
poeree of which a number of WPP supporters were reported to have gone
underground and collaborated with the BOP,
BOP Linke with China.
13. Interrogation or surrendered personnel provides grounds for suspecting
that earlier reports of Thakin THAN TUN'S journey to Peiping and discussions
with PAO The-kung in Septembereoctober 1950 may have been unfounded, but
there is an increasing volume of evidence to indicate frequent and high
level liaison etweet the BOP and the China Communist PertY. - A report
that Thakie THAN TUN :attended a conference in Nanning in February 1951
cannot be confireed from loeal sources, but there has been seeeport of a
RCP Politbureau directive, probably issued in early July, which =Italia
instructed Party branches to disseminate the news that The:kin THAN-TWI
had recently cencleded-discussions with Chinese Ocevemdst representatives
On the subject of the imelementation of the BCP,s "Victory Within Teo
Years" nrogele. There is nothing to indicate where or when these die-
cussiene took rlace, but the tone of Thakin THAW TU71s speech at the Upper
Burma PDF Conference on 17 March, suegests exteesive liaison before that
date. Alternatively, it is possible that these discussions could have
taken niece at the ties of a reported visit o' ten Chinese CoMmuniste to
Buena during April 1951.
14. The discussions with the Soviet Military group were said to have resulted
In an agreement of which the main points were:
a.
That the BOP should not abandon its bases in the Pegu Yomas and
Arakan Mountains (see Paragraph 5).
b. The BCP should undertake to establish a Sovietized regime to whidh
Sovist Russia would extend aid (cf, the known BOP objective of
securing an area in Upper Dura and declaring the establishment
of a People 'a Demoeratic Government),
c. The establishment of a supply line between Burma and Democratic
Republic of Vietnam territory in Indochina.
d. The establishment of a 'Support Burma People's Liberation Com-
mittee" to take charge of aid to the Beeves? CevemmIste.
Although these three independent reports -teed te hang together, there
is so far no further confirmation on these developments.
15. Anther Information believed reliable has become available concerning
parties of Brrmese Communists who have gone to Yunnan for training, and
refers to four such parties- totalling about 110 as having crossed into
Yunnan between November 1950 and the end of July 1951. The last of these
was a rarty of ahont 60 streng which was led into China at the end of July
beea Chinese who had come from Yuman.
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Burma Workers' and Ittemietala_kar.
16. The accent in BOP activity during the period under review has been on
organizational work in the districts to secure further support for the
'party in preparation for the next round of the elections, while at its
headquarters In Rengoon classes have been run for training in organizational
aethods and political indoctrination. A class staged in Jaly was for
ahole.tire voraers in Rangoon and this was followed in August by a further
clean at wait* attendance was made compulsory for the secretaries of all
district branches and other district party leaders.
17. To Shwebo, where in one constituenor in the first installment of the
general election the BaPP candidate polled over 8,000 votes out of a total
of aboat 21,000, the 'Itirt7 has insnired serioue unrest among the peasants
in reotest against he methods adopted by the Land Tenancy Boards in
administering the Government Land Peform Program. The Beards, It was
claleed, were controlled by the Berme Socialist Party who were exclusively
favoring those peasants who gave their support to the Burma Socialist
Party's- All Barbel Peasants' Organization. This unrest started in June and
continued throughout July with almost daily demonstrations and frequent
incidents of forcible ploughing, and there are reports that a number of
local HIPP supnorters vent unaergroend and joined hands with the BCP
insuegents in the area. Government counter-measures involved the arrest
of nearly 300 peasants and a raid on the IYAPP's branch office.
deaoe iBurma
18. In parallel with organizational activity on behalf of the party, BWPP
leaders, who are also leading officials of the WPC(B)? have been setting
up district branches of' theWPC(B). Seem such branches have been
established since the beginning of June in Aye), Wakema, Patel, Benzada?
Letpadan, Seminal, and ahwebta Frequent mass meetings have been staged
to piss resoletions supporting the proposal for a Five Power Peace Pact
and sianatare camtalgas have been instituted both in the districts and in
Rengoon. aurerieiegly little nublicity, however, has been given to the
results of this signature campaign, apart from one isolated announcement
that over 21,000 signatures were collected within two days in Patgoon
in early tweet.
19. Four leaders of the WPC (B), ins) 'ding Its aeesident Thakin WIN, are
exnecte4 to attend a meeting of the World Peace Council In Vienna from
1 to 5 November.
Paar....-081211011Can.......?MaMir1129-1
20, On 25 July the BTDC announced that the World Federation of Trades Woes
and unanimously accented the PTO's application for Affiliation, but the
BTDO ap-ears to be having 'some difficulty in collecting the money with
which to nay its affiliation fee. Delegates were to have been sent to
a meeting of the Trades Vision International of Lana, Sea, and Air Workers
In 'Menne in mid-July but were unable to travel because of a lack of fends.
It is posaible taat this vine factor will prevent the implementation of
a current nrorosal- to send delegates to a meeting of the General Council
of the 14711T in Berlin in November. Thakin WI AYE, Vice President of the
BTUC, and Yabaw NY0 NYUNT? Assistant Secretary, have been nominated to
attend this meeting.
21, Agitation by the BTOD among minor labor unions in Rangoon has continued
during the period but still gives no evidence of air particular success
and an ettempt to stege a strike in the oilfields In which unemployed ?
laborers were mai to ricket the installations and were represented
an a strike of oilfield labor, fizzled out after Government counter-
action and the arrest of five of the strike leaders. This strike was an
attempt to stir up agitation for the nationalization of the Burma Oil
Cemnary and seers to have been Inspired by developments in Iran, to whose
Prime Nanister the BTDC sent a message of good wishes in May.
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Podeaels Peeve Front (ppp).
22. SuCh results as are available of the firet installment of the electiere
shoe that while winning may six Seats out of about 70, PPF candidates
polled about 11.5 percent Of the total votes cast as compared with,ibeht
9.5 percent cast in favor of BWPP candidates. Tetpongyi THEIN PE WINTD
oneetime member of the BCP Politbureau, has become increasingly prominent
in the affairs of this group, which apeears to be moving further to the
left.
23. The PPF's declared policy calls for the release of political prisoners,
the withdrawal of repreasive legislation, the granting of an unconlitional
ammesty to the insurgents, and the formation of a coalition government
of all political parties including the insurgents. It also supports the
policy of the World Peace Coneress and calls for all possible measures to
prevent Burma being involved in a third world war, In support of the first
two ales, the PPF has formed a *Committee for the Protection of Democratic
Rights". V AU1G THAN, President of the PIT, is also president of this
Coneittee, whose officials include prominent BWPP personalities, KC HLA WIN,
Preeident of the newly formed All Burma Student Federation, and representa-
tives of other opnesitioe political parties. Agitation by this Copeittee
has already secured the release of No THAN, President of the former All
Burma Students Union which wept underground to join the BCP in Nhrch 1949.
No THAN played a prominent part in the General Strike which was staged at
that time and had been in prison ever since.
....4eze.S'BureseeettienAssieLtiee.n.
24. In eideNuly? at the inspiration of Tetpongyi MEIN PE WIN?, a Sitek
Burmese Friendship Association was formed, whose principal officials,
apart from THEIN PE MINT, are mainly drawn from the ranks of the WIPP.
This organization is a revival of the SovieteChinese-Burmese Frietdahip
Society which was formed in mid.-1950 by THEIN PE }INT in collaboration
with TAN Kiet-hook of the China Democratic League (Burma), but suzeeeded
in attracting little attention or support. The new Association is hating
rather more success, net least because of a degree of recogrftion free
China.
25, The WPC(0) and the Sine-Burmese Friendship Association received an invita-
tion at the beginning of September to send a delegation tothe anniversary
celebrations in Peiping on 1 October. A delegation has been nominated and
consists of Thakin KODAW HMAING (Patron of the People's Peace Front),
U TUN NYINT (Secretary of the People's Peace Front and official of the
WPC (B)), Dew mar MLA (Committee member of the People's Peace Front),
Thakin BA U (Vice-President of the Burma Chinese Friendship Association),
Thakin MIN (President Of the BWPP, the BTU; and the WPC(B)), Dagon TA1A
(former President of the Burma Writers' Association and reported to be a
secret member of the BCP) and ?ung HLA WIN (President of the newly-fermed
All Burma Students Federation). The delegation left Rangoon by air on
25 September,
All Burma Students' Fed_ereatior_e_Leffje
26. In mid-August, a students conference at ithich an All Burma Students'
Federationias formed, was staged in Rengoon under the combined auspices or
pro-BCP and pro-BWPP student groups. rhissepeesented the culmination bf
the efforts of both groves since the beginning of the year to establish
an overt all Burma Students organization, as a revival of the former
All Burma Students Union (pro-BCP) which went underground in March 1949.
Ceder the Presidency of Nhung HLA WIN, who was an official of the former
All Burma Students' Union, the officers of the ABSF include five pro-BWPP
students, 3 pro-RCP students, and 2 pro-OP(B) students. This signifies
a further advance on the collaboration among Communist student groups
which had been evident in the Rational Festival Committee formed in
connection with the Berlin World Youth Festival. Official sources believe
that the ABSF's influence is likely to be strong in schools in Rangoon
and in the districts.
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27. Failure greeted all attempts, however, to incorporate the Rangoon University
Students' Union (RUSTY) in the new organization. The RUSTY is controlled
by a group of students which believes in a non.-political palmy free of
party attachments for student organizations and refused to participate in
the no' because of its political bias, The influence or this group,
who call themselves the Pure Students League, is still paramount in
Rangoon University; they have secured 100 percent suceess in the September
elections for officers for the year 1951-52.
Liermese deleestmeleenalleeillietierld Youth Peace Festimle
28, At the instance of the Berea National Festival Committae, 23 students
aubmitted apOlications for passports to travel to Berlin. Only two
applicants were granted paesporto, but, despite an energetic campaign for
reeds to finance the delegation, the proceeds were disappointing and, in
the event,neither of them traveled. Such funds as were available were
given to hakin LAY MAUNG Of the Verld lace Congress (Thema) who, because
of delay in, documentatioee was unable to leave Rangoon uetil 11 August,
by which time the conference was half ever'. Further difficulties ?ter
visae_both in Rome and the U.K. prevented him from reachirg Berlin in time
to plAY any significant part,
29, Tee other delegates rroe Burma who attended the conference without difficulty
were Maung OTT RUING and Bo TRETN RUING, representatives of the Burma
Socielist Party, who were unofficially eponsoeed by the Gavel:meant for a
"politicel study tour" of Europe. Since the restival, a joiet declaratien
baa been iesued in the name of the "Burmese delegation" fella supporting
the, resolutions adopted in Berlin. It purporta to be jointly signed by
Thakin LAY MAUNG, Bo ITEIN MAIM, Maung CHITIIAING, Ko TUN aeme and
ee eeN14114. Ke TUN NEIN is the accredited mresentative of the under-
eround All Burma Students' Union and the BOP, 'who has been in Prague
for the nest two years, and Ko KIN WIN is a stursent who has been studying
in Switzerland since 1949.
30. On 5 August, to coincide With the commencement ,r the Festival in Berlin,
a meeting was staged in Rangoon by the National Festival Committee which
tots Attended be a number of prominent personalities, including Thakin VItIN
or the BOP, and U KONG THAN of the PPP. Resolutions were adopted supporting
the main points propounded 117 the Festival inleelin.
-4.28.27.thliate2.11.4.101.11.
31, The open friction between the proeXMT and pro-Oimeaunist elements in the
Chinese communite in Berme whieh reached seeioas preeortiots in Hay and ?
June 1951 has ,been less apparent during the reriod 'seder review, probata7
because of the firm action taken by the Burmee'e authoritiec in Jene, Both
grouts have continued their respective efforts to increase tIleir influence
by recruiting for the various organizations ender their contrel. The
only incident of note was the departure for China on 11 Peptemtee 1951
of a Berme Chinese Trade Goodwill !lesion emposed of 22 local Ceinese.
This party comprised a cross-section of that part of the local Cht*ose
commurity ehioh supeorts the China Demotratic league (Burma) and inkluded
officials from most of its leading organizations. The visit was spowered
by the Chinese EMbasee and the arrangemencts were made mainly by the Mama
China Chamber of Commerce.
32. Close liaison between local pro-Communist Chinese organizations and the
Chinese Embassy continues. At the beginning of September the Chinese
Embasee was retorted to have made arrangmonts whereby all applications
for Chinese Republican passports were referred to the relevant local
class or trade organization for security screening. Two local organizations
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are known to have registered themselves with the Chinese Embassy for
official recognition by the Peiping Government and it seems possible that
this nrsotice may becom genera.
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