YUGOSLAV DEFENSE PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R007600320006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 2, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
l1`'
FORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
SUBJECT Yugoslav Defense Plans
25X1A
?LACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
INFO.
DATE DISTR. 2 May 1951
NO. OF PAGES 6
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
1. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1918, the Yugoslav
General Staff was faced with the problem of preparing a strategic plan
for the defense of Yugoslavia against and armed invasion from the east,p
particularly from Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria0
2. This plan had to take into consideration four main factors; morale, man-
power, material and.terrains . This report describes how these factors have
been treated.in the development of the strategic pattern of the Yugoslav
military defense plans over the past two years.
Morale
With regard to the problem of how to create and maintain the discipline
and spirit necessary for the successful execution of'. the plan, the
Central. Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav General
Staff made the following decisions:
Convince the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party of the justice
of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav. Communist Party case against
the Cominfox'm and: the USSR. This necessitated proof by the Centra].
Committee that it, -and not Stalin and the Cominform bureau, was
following the path of true socialism. This the Central, Committee
succeeded in doing through:
1) Aggressive propaganda, in which all, the reactionary, imperialist
and anti- tarxist features of USSR and Cominform policy were clearly
revealed and contrasted with the progressive and democratic policy
of the Yugoslav Government.
Marxist legislation, such as the laws providing for the creation
of workers' councils in the factories and the development of
democratic centralization in the administration of the country,
which aimed, perhaps a little too theoretically, at. withering away
the powervof the state, and which contrasted forcibly with the
anti-Marxist laws in the USSR which aimed at reinforcing the
centralized bureaucratic powers of the state.
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b. Convince the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party that economic
relations with the capitalist West were necessary, and that they
did not, in any way, compromise the political and economic integrity
of the Yugoslav socialist state. This the Central. Committee
succeeded in doing by:
1) Refusing to admit Western interference in the socialist control
of Yugoslavia's economy, or in the administration of Western
loans and the distribution of Western economic aid.
2) Refusing to enter into any political or military agreements with
the West.
c. Convince the masses that it lay in their interests to support the
Central Committee against the Cominform and the USSR. This the
Central Committee succeeded in doing by:
1) Persuading the masses that their choice lay between Russian and
Yugoslav Communist rule; that the latter was preferable, and
that the West was not prepared to supply a democratic or liberal
alternative.
2) Appealing to nationalist and patriotic sentiments against Russian
imperialism and ruthlessness.
d. Destroy or neutralize all Cominformiet sympathizers. How successful
the Central Committee has been in doing this may be Judged by the
followings
1) No Cominformiets have succeeded in removing the Central Committee
from power.
2) The number of persons arrested during the last five months as
Cominformists has been negligible.
3) Tito, in his speech to Party members of the Guards Division in
Belgrade on 17 February 1951, felt so confident that the Comin_
formist danger in the country had passed that he ordered the Party
to be more democratic , and urged Party ambers not to hesitate
to criticize the goverr=ent provided they did not allow their
vi to influence them to such an extent that they refused to
execute the decisions of the majority. The significance of Tito's
speech lies in the fact that until recently Party members were
terrified of criticizing the government. Nov that the Central
Committee has satisfied itself that the internal Cominformist
danger has passed, it can afford to be more liberal and suffer
criticism.
The Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party may be said to
have succeeded in creating the psychological conditions vitally needed
for the successful development and execution of the defense program.
It is true that some orthodox Marxist members of the Yugoslav Communist
Party still complain about Yugoslavia's trade and financial relations with
the West, the modifications made in the Five Year Plan, the vast sum
allocated to the armament industries, the shortage of raw materials for
industries unconnected with the defense program. It is also true, that
the masses complain bitterly of the rise in the cost of living, and the
shortage of food and consumer goods. To all these critics, the Central
Committee has one very simple,,ready and effective answer -- the danger
from the East. As the international political situation deteriorated and
the rhythm of the defense program increased, the cry of danger from the
East grew louder until, in December 1950, it reached its climax at the
extraordinary meeting of the National Assembly during the debate on the
military budget and the need to extend the Five Year Plan by one year.
A few weeks later, Tito realized that the price he had paid for this
magic answer was to throw the whole country into a state of war hysteria,
and so, on 17 February, he told a meeting of Party members of the Guards
Division that there was no immediate danger of war and that he did not
consider it necessary-to accept Western military aid and equipment.
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5.
With regard to the problem of how best to use Yugoslavia's manpower,
the Central Committee and the Yugoslav General. Staff have formulated
and implemented the following policy:
a. Maintenance of the r,m number of men under arms consistent with
the manpower requirnts of industry and agriculture.
b. Employment of the Yugoslav Army in the most efficient manner
possible.
c. Mobilization of the civilian population,
6 All males up to the age of 27 are liable for military service. Recruits
are called up every six months. Conscripts serve from one to three years.
Those with higher school certificates serve one year with infantry units;
those without higher school certificates serve two years with infantry
units; those drafted to armored and other specialist units serve three
years. University students may defer service until they are 31 years of
age. High school students liable for conscription may also defer service.;
about 20,0000 students fall into this category. Partisans with over 12
months war service are exempt from military service. Persons who served
for over 18 months with foreign or enemy armed forces during the war
are only liable for six months military service.
`i. So far the 1921 - 1932 classes have been called upd Definitely no secret
mobilization has taken place, although in the autumn of 1950 conscripts,
due for release were retained for an extra two months. No extensions of
service have been ordered since then,
3. Although mobilization has not yet been ordered, the Yugoslav General
Staff is proceeding swiftly with the task of perfecting its mobilization
plans. Most regular and reserve officers have already received sealed
orders concerning what they should do when mobilization is announced.
At present the administrative organs of the state are carrying out a very
secret census of all factories not engaged on vital defense work and where
thirty percent or more of the man employed are fit for military service.
The object of this census is to ensure that these men will be called up in
the event of mobilization and substituted by female labor. It sub-
stitution is impossible then the factories will be closed down.
9. The influence of Red Arm- strategy, tactics and discipline was dominant
in the Yugoslav Army until 1948. In June of that year, the Army suddenly
found itself cut off from its main sources of military equipment and supply
and obliged to reverse its strategic plane and interests. Faced with a
very serious shortage of heavy equipment and prospect of fighting alone
against enemy forces, the Yugoslav General Staff gradually modified the
Russian inspired tactical and disciplinary training program of the Army.
How far modification ' hays gone may be judged by Ivan Goaan ja k' s address to
the Yugoslav General. Staff and senior Party functionaries at the Ministry
of National Defense on 19 February 1951. He laid down the following
directives s
All officers must pay much more attention to the strategy and tactics
of partisan warfare and avoid accepting any rigid principles of
strategy and tactics.
b? Training in the army must be directed towards developing the personal
initiative of every officer and man, so that, in the event of regular
formations and units being broken up by the enemy, every officer and
m9m can carry on the fight as a partisan.
c. Closer and more friendly relations must be established between junior
officers and soldiers. Re3}ationa should not be too intimate nor too
distant. Every junior officer must take. a me L closer interest in the
welfare of every single soldier under his command, and subordinate his
personal interests to those of his mono Bearing in mind that dis-
cipline in partisan unitail unlike that in the regular a -, is not based
on military law, it is only by gaining the genuine respect and affection
of his man that the junior officer can retain the leadership and loyalty
of his men when the fortunes of war oblige him to become a partisan,,
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10. Mobilization of the civil population will be considered under three
subjects: preliminary military training, military training outside the
army and civil defense.
Preliminary military training
U. Already in 1918, preliminary military training was obligatory for all
male and female university students and students of the fifth and higher
forms of gymnasiums. Severe penalties are imposed on students who fail
to present themselves for training. Instructors on the courses are
invariably regular officers from'the ranks of captain to colonel. The
courses cover theoretical and practical military training. Theoretical
training includes garrison duties, organization of the army., balli?tics,
description of weapons, recognition of army ranks and badges, the rights
and duties of officers and enlisted men, and martial law. Practical
training includes rifle training, issue of orders, route marches and
parade drill.
Militar r rainiffi outside the arir (VVO)
12. The fundamental object of VVO is to train the whole civil population
to become efficient partisans in the event of war. When VVO began early
in 1950, it was not taken very seriously, but in October 1;,50, the
Central ',Committee ordered all mass organizations to give VVO priority
over all other activitieso Under the command of the ex partisans
association, the National Front, youth organizations, rifle clubs, and
sports associations mobilized their members and the trade unions mobilized
their members through their factory committees.
13. Mobilized members were then organized on partisan military lines into
sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and divisions.
Command of most of these units was given to reserve officers or members
of the ex-partisan association, though command of the higher formation
was entrusted to regular army.offioes. VVO training includes theoretical
instruction on partisan warfare and tactics and political instruction on
the necessity and'glory of partisan warfare.
144 The population as a whole is taking VVO seriously, and, in view of the
fact that civilians are not punished in any way if they do not take
part in VVO, the number of civilians who do take part is susTrisingly
high.
Civil defense
15. Civi1 defense includes, among other organizations, Red Cross, fire
services, salvage units and PAZ (anti-aircraft defense). With the exception of the Red Cross,, all these organizations are directly controlled
by the Ministry of Interior.
16a PAZ was founded in 1949 but only began to take shape in 1950. PAZ
centers have now been organized in all, cities, towns, large villages,
and industrial and mining centers. They maintain a smell permanent staff
of civil defense instructors, engineeres, chemists and police officers,
all carefully selected by the UDB.
17. PAZ centers are responsible for organizing air raid defenses in their
respective areas, and for training a corps of PAZ personnel which, in
an eMergency, could be instantly called up for permanent duty. Most
persons selected for duty with PAZ are unfit for military service,
though some young students are sometimes recruited.
18. PAZ training is modern and based, for the most part, on German experience
in World War Ila It does not, however, cover atomic warfare.
Theoretical PAZ training includes high explosive and sulphur bombs, in-
cendiary and napalm air raids, as well as bacteriological and chemical
warfare. Practical training is carried out in conjunction with the air
force and covers air raid exercises. Such exercises have, during the
last three months., 'taken place throughout Yugoslavia, especially in the
Hungarian and Rumanian border areas.
19. One of the main problems confronting 1'AZ is the acute shortage of air
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raid shelters. Most of the shelters built daring the war were
demolished in 1945 and 1946, and, because of a shortage of building
materials and labor, no new shelters are being constructed.
Material
20. With regard to the problem of how best to equip and supply the Yugoslav
armed forces, the Central Committee and the Yugoslav General Staff
have based their policy one
ao No requests for help from the Vesta
bo Development of indigenous armament industries.
21. Hel.p from the West: For internal political reasons the Yugoslav Govern-
could not and cannot afford to compromise its socialist integrity
by entering into military agreements with the 'least providing for the
supply of war materiel, since that might disrupt the unity of the
Yugoslav Communist Party and drive many members into the Cominform camp.
For external political reasons, the Yugoslav Government could not and
cannot afford to compromise its armed neutrality by accepting Western
war materiel and thereby providing the USSR and the Cominforsn with an
excuse to attack her.
22. Obviously enough if, in spite of this, the USSR clearly showed signs
of mounting an attack against Yugoslavia then the government would modify
its policy and ask for western military equipment. But, for the present,
the government does not think the situation quite so dangerous. Proof
of this lies in Titotss speech of 17 February when he asserted that there
was no imma iate danger of war. Two days later, Ivan Gosnjak repeated
Tito's views at the conference in Zagreb of the Communist Party of Croatia.
23. Develo sent of indigenous armament industries: Suddenly out off in 1948
from its main source of m lwy equipmetaand anxious not to accept
western equipment, the Yugoslav Government had obviously to develop its
own armament industry if it intended to remain in power and protect the
country against Russian and satellite aggression. Since 1948, develop-
ment of the armament industry has been given priority over all other
industries, and to this end the whole Five Year Plan has been modified
and subordinated. Because the Five Year Plan had not been modified
sufficiently and because the capital equipment requirements of the armament
industries had been raised so high and those of the other industries in-
sufficiently lowered., the Yugoslav Government found itself obliged:
a. To export more and more food and raw materials in order to buy more
capital equipment-formore non-productive armament factories,
b. To reduce imports of capital equipment for industries unconnected
with the defense program, and reduce production in these industries.
c. To ask for western credits. This has resulted in a reduction of
the standard of living for the masses and widespread economic
discontent.
24. One of the benefits of developing the indigenous armament industry is
that the Yugoslav General Staff now has a chance of standardizing the
equipment and munitions. The Yugoslav armed forced are well supplied
with light infantry weapons and the replacement of the extremely
heterogeneous collection of guns with which the army is equipped is pro-
ceeding slowly. The Tito tank is being produced at the rate of one tank
a day, but the progress with the construction of fighter aircraft is very
slow.
Terrain
25. With regard to the problem of how best to defend Yugoslav territory, the
Central Committee and Yugoslav General Staff decided not to attempt any
serious defense of the eastern plains, but to concentrate the main
defense effort of the regular armed forces in the mountainous areas of
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southern Serbia., ,Macedonia, Montenegro and western Yugoslavia behind
a line running roughly along the south bank of the Sava Rivera
26. The reasons for this policy are clear: the Yugoslav Army, inferior in
numbers and equipment, would be destroyed if it attempted to oppose a
determined Russian and satellite advance in the eastern plains by
presenting a continuous front and operating in mass. On the other hand,
it would be able to fight almost indefinitely if it:
a. Dispersed in ill, independent, mobile formations in the mountainous
areas west of the Sava River and avoided presenting the enemy with
a large, slow moving targets
b. Maintained contact with the West on the Adriatic. Hence the vital
necessity of occupying Albania and controlling the eastern entry
of the Adriatic.
c. Succeeded in defending the heavy industries and lines of communications
in Bosnia.
27. In accordance with the requirements of the strategic defense plan do-
scribed above, the Yugoslav Government decideds
a. To transfer, where and as quickly as possible, as many heavy in-
dustries - vital defense plants, munition, food and equipment dumps
as possible, from east to west.
b. To concentrate construction of now heavy industries, defense plants,
iron and steel plants, et cetera, in western Yugoslavia, particularly
Bosnia,,
c. To develop railway communications in Bosnia.
d. To develop Adriatic port facilities.
e. That partisan forces should be used to harass, attack and destroy
the .enemy in enemy-occupied territory, particularly the lines of
communications, rear headquarters, supply and munition dumps and
other logistic facilities.
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