MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R007600040015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 16, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Appr F Rye, a Iq-UDP82-004578007600040015-225X1A
; lr?dc, _ r~ t~LI5 Q 'F10-TAI-9 i x r.T
CEN IRTELLWGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION CD NO.
?'SUBJECT Mobilization Capabilities of the
25X1A
DATE DJSTR 16 S-lay 1951
NO. OF PAGES 7
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
25X1 X -TJLe_ Y b o the L obili zat ' on of th Sovie A
40
STATE IBU
TIT!.:
2The figures arrived at in the final computation have been verified by other
.methods of calculation, These methods include a comparison of the maximum
proportion of men mobilized to the total population., and a comparison of
those suitable for service tothe total male population. Apossible figure
for the number mobilized was furnished indirectly by Vosnesenski in his book
The Soviet conomy During the Great Patriotic 6+ar", i n which he indicated
that in 1944 more than 70 percent of workers and employes in the US.P were
women or adolescentFinally, General Larsha.11 in his report to tae Presi-
dent of the United States indicated the number of men mobilized. According
to him, there were 27,000,000 such in the Soviet Union. In the calculation
of the enclosed table no account has been taken of the number of women mobi...
lized into the array, the number of which was, according to the most modest
estimates, however, between 700,000 and 800,000
Theattached table is an estimate of the manpowerr resources available to the
Soviet Union at the beginning of the Second Vorld War. It was compiled on
the basis of personal observations of the author, interrogations of former
Soviet officers,and several sources familiar with the mobilization problems
ofthe old ImperialRussian Army. The table does not, in any fashion, pre-
tend . to be without gaps or to be absolutely accurate, but its figures are
a reasonable approximation of the truth. The author estimates that this
approximation is of the order of plus or minus five percent
b o Column2 and 3 can for no particular discussion,, It is recognized that the
increase of merle population is constantly equal to 48 percent of the total
increase in population. The sagging or augmentation of the total population
increase has been calculated, bearing in minds approximately, the condition
of.the country in this or that year, wars, economic condition, epidemics,
harvests, etc,
Columns.5 and 6. For 'normal" years, in other Woxds, without wars or epi-
demics and with good harvests, the minim= rate of rejection for physical
disqualif cation has been. accepted for approxiraatiou as being percent
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of the total increase of male population. By "rejected" is meant those
men who have been recognized as unfit for service, removed from the mili-
tary lists, and thenceforth are not counted in the manpower resources for
mobilization. For certain years the percentage of rejection is clearly
greater. For ten born in 1916 it is five percent; for those born in 1920
the rate is 15 percent; and for those born in 1918 it is 12 percent.
5. Column 7 lists the number of men subject to call. This figure results from
the subtraction of the figure in Column 6 from that given in Column 3.
6. Columns 8 and 9. Column 8 lists the percentage of men (in relation to the
figure in Column 7) who have obtained deferment. Column 9 expresses in fig-
ures the percentages carried in Column 8. Lien obtaining a temporary or
permanent deferment, for whatever reason, are not removed from the military
lists. In the old Intp..ria1 Army such man were imnedLately shunted into the
reserve and the general levy. During war the reserve could be called-up
in its entirety, and the general levy in part.
7.
No entries have been made in Columns 8 and 9 for the years of birth 1900
and 1901 because these classes were never fully called, either by the EXapire
or by the Soviet Government., During the civil war, some men born in 1900
and 3931 were called to service by the two adversaries. These calls were
only martial, and not mare than 50 percent of mren born in the years in ques-
tion were affected. For the calculation and determir;ation of the number
of ten "trained", "partially trained", and "untrained" (Columns 17, 18, 19)
40 percent of the total number of male births during these years has been
taken as representing the number mobilized during the civil war. Under
the Soviet regime all men born in 1900 and 1901. were placed in the first re-
serve. Normal conscription was started in 1924;, whe.x men born in 1902 and
1903 were summoned.
8. In Column 10 is listed an approximate calculation separating from the num-
ber of eligibles the cadres of active troops. Abut half of the class affec-
ted served in the army or the navy. Normally, n:ither under the Empire,
nor in the first years of the Soviet regime, did the army absorb the total
annual class. It was not until 1937-38 that the irholo class was called into
service, and even this was not sufficient, so that it was felt necessary
to call older men to the colors, under the prete;t of "great training assom-
blies" or by way of an official partial mobiliza~ 457R007600040015 X1A
C1 NTRAL INT LL.IG.ENC AG&a'CY
as a reserve during the mobilization of front line units. Second-line and
following formations were supplied by central depots located in the various
districts but not subordinate to the commanders of those districts. Even
the guard of these depots was not under the district comna,nder, but entrusted
to WIVE units. The military districts disposed of nothing but plans for the
complement of active units and the creation of front line units, and were
even ignorant of the succeeding steps in the mobilization.
40. The mobilization of reservists in the Soviet :may is on a non territorial
basis, which involves the large-scale use of railways. The can to the colors
and the discharge both took place in the autumn, and the majority of the
movements were accomplished by rail. Air transport was definitely not em-
ployed, and water transport only on a limited scale and for short distances,
primarily in the Volga basin.
41. The essential rail lines used for the transport of conscripts were: Ups-
cow-Smolensk-Minsk-Bialystok; Kiev-Zhitomir-Lvov; Moscow-Donbas-North Cau-
casus- Mosc=-West Siberia-Far vast; Kazakhstan-Ural (via task and Sverd-
lovsk)-Chelyabinsk; Central Asia-West Siberia, etc. These were the routes
involved, but it is obvious that not every train traversed the entire route.
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