REVERSAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY ON INTERVENTION IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R006200760004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 9, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 20006 A. tA-RDP82-00457R006200760004-0
25X1 A CLASSIFICATION s~: ~'T
CENTRAL TELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
'1 , RM I
REPORT
.
COUNTRY China/Hong Kong/norea DATE DISTR. 9 Nov. 1950
SUBJECT Reversal of Chinese Communist NO. OF PAGES 1
25X1A Policy on Intervention in Korea
PLACE NO. OF ENCLS.
ACQUIRED RETURN TO ~~ GUSTED BELOW)
25)R OF BABY SUPPLEMENT TO
20 REPORT NO.
the Chinese Communist government had no chance of admission to the qntteA
3. it was originally decided that CHOU En-lai would represent Communist a c,
at the session before the United rations. This decision was revers dy {
the Politburo on the grounds that it would involve a loss of face, irye,'-^..
1. The Chinese Communists in Long Kong were amazed and confused at the
decision to intervene in Korea. As late as 6 Aovember 1950, HUANG Tso-mei,
Hong Kong head of the dew China dews Agency, stated that he did not believe
that the Chinese Communists would intervene in n.orea, and that it would be
a mistake for them to do so since their efforts should be concentrated to
help Viet i.cinh. On 3 November 1950 the hang Kong Ta Kung Pao received a
directive from the &inistry of information of the Chinese Communist govern.
meat, dated in reiping on 26 October 1950, stating that the paper should
use a minimum of propaganda in printing international news and articles, and
should avoid offending the 4estern powers.
2. The decision to'intervene represented a reversal of the policy previously
decided upon, and was made very recently. It was the result of the fear,
which the Soviets have played upon, that the United States would invade
i.:anohuria, and of the fact that the Soviets had persuaded the Chinese
Communists that they would not be admitted to the United nations. Another
aspect of Communist thinking is reflected by CIHU Teh?s recent statement:
"We must fight the aggressors sometime; better fight them outside China."*
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the 3Lth parallel, and have left the door open to negotiation by ke pin.
Korean situation, should the United 1`lations forces be withdrativn souh~bf
n
4. The Chinese Communists would probably accept political settlement oy tne.,: .
7 Ca CD _7 n f
their intervention on a volunteer basis. They may be willing to deel wtt4
the United a ations Committee for Korea.* Ed
meat. These paragraphs appear to represent the i i -
Comment.
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STATE x N