CHILEAN INVESTIGACIONES REPORT ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R004000160009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 9, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For ReleaseTZO~bd v 'I~58Fi -I~D Z-00457 b J66 = IJX~ kjoi
IINF R TION REPORT CD NO. 25X1A
COUNTRY Chile SATE DISTR, 9 JAN 50?
SUBJECT Chilean Investigaciones Report oni(t e.
Communist Party of Chile
25X1A
NO. OF PAGES 2
PLACE NO. OF ENCLS.
ACQUIRED Tg CJA IJBM (USTED BELOW
DATE OF IN SUPPLEMENT TO
25X1 X REPORT NO.
The following report on the Communist Party of Chile (PO;Ch) was prepared
in the Chilean Investigaciones by order and for the guidance of its
director general, Luis Brur... gAvogl.io,,
1, According to Communists supporting the present Political Cor*mission of the
PCChsds Executive Committee, the 7 November 1949 shooting affray in the Plaza
de Armas of Santiago was an unforeseen result of the brief demonstration
ordered for that day by the Party's, Santiago Local Committee. It had been
planned to have the Communists from the First and Eighth Communes meet in
front of the central building of the University of Chile from where they
would neet other marching groups. The main demonstration was to be held on
Avenida latta after which the Party members were to return home. Although
general orders were issued in June 1949 that the Communists should defend
themselves from police aggression, Party leaders had no intention of pro--a
yoking an armed clash with the police. Although the Communists admit that
the first shot was fired by a Party member, PCCh leaders have branded him
ae ana ^roh'fzt and are attempting to identify him and obta in proof of his guilt
with the intention of turning him over to the authorities.
2. Opponents of the present Political Commission rn aintain that the Commission
has planned for a long tire to provoke an incident in the hope that such would
lead to serious trouble.
3, The outstanding leader of the Chilean Communist Party at the present time is
Gabe Gonzalez vhose political policy is being, supported by Volodia Teitelboirr
and. Luis Reinoso but opposed by Carlos Contreras Labarca and his faithful
followers. The Chilean government should not forget that during the time
Contreras Laharca served as Secretary General,, the Party helped elect three
presidents and had 17 Congressmen, some cabinet ministers, ample funds, prestige,
a vigorous press, and supporters in strategic positions throughout Chile, By
handling the matter carefully, the government could have called attention to
the Partyts present difficulties and could have played on the differences between
Contreras Tabarca and Gonzalez with a view toward provoking a schism v.thin the
Party. This v u)d have been possible because of the Party"s unique situation
today. It should not be forgotten that in the PCCh?s last National Congress,,
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 -Approved For Release 2000/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004000160009-5
CONFID&
. CENIMAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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the position of Contreras Labarca was so weak that it was believed he
would be expelled from the Party. Salvador Ocatnpo Pastene, a.man of
political vision, defended Contreras Labarca and managed to swing the
coal miners' votes in his favor. Even though Contreras Labarca's situate
Lion deteriorated after the Congress, it was not possible for Co sunist
leaders to call another Congress because the Party had been declared
illegal in the meantime. The Political Commission did not dare expel
Contreras Labarca from the Party-since it was feared that this would arouse
the twrath of the coal miners. As a result, he and his followers were isolated
and though they no longer had any rights v thin the Party they were given tasks
to perform and vmre asked for finencial contributions.
4. The govertuctent policy of persecuting the PCGh as a hole rather than certain
of its leaders has resulted in a move toward reconcilation between the two
factions. Consequently,, the Party will soon be stronger than before.
5o The arrest of Graciela (Chela) Alvarez and her banishment to Concepcion twos
a desirable measure since she is strongly pro-Stalin and nothing can be done
with hero', However, the arrest of Jorge Jiles Pizarro was an error since he
is hated by so many Party members. An even more grievous and potentially
dangerous mistake was the search of the house and office of Raul Barra Silva,
-who is pro-Tito but who may collaborate actively -vrlth the Gonzalez faction if
persecuted by the police.
6n If the present unselective persecution of the Communists continues, there is
reason to fear that they may reach a state of desperation in tahieh they may
be used by anarchists to unleash ridespread violence of incalculable harts to
the country.
SSPW.110
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004000160009-5