THE STRENGTH OF THE NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS IN JAVA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002900620008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 12, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002900620008-8
CLASSIFICATION G0NTaUL - U c S. c iczi. : ONLY 25X1 A
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO:
INTRY Tndoresin
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT The ::strength of the nationalists and
Commuhists in Java
PLAC5X1 ?
ACQUIRE
25X1A
DATE OF INFO.
25X1X
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO,.
I A Survey of the Strength of Nationalists and --2munists in Java
West Java
1. Bantam Residene : More than half of the Residency is st 11 Republican,
There are a few intellectual leaders, the troops are poorly supplied and
Moslem influence is strong.
2.
Batavia Residenc: Besides the Teentera Nasional Indonesia(TNI),'there
is the strong Peoples Army of Batavia whir:}' is under: the influence of
Tan Malaka. Chairu.l Saleh IF, a repreE:entative . of Tan.:; Ia2:a u s ;
in this Residency.
3. Bea. ten org Residency Most Of the Republican troops are in the southern
sector. Many of the officers of these troops are.intellectJals. The
troops are well armedo
,Pr,-anr9at? Residency: Most of the TNT officers are former students. The
TNT has many unorganized members of the Tentera Peladjaran `Student Army)
handling civil administration in the country The Darul Islam is active
in the eastern sector under Kartasuwirjo, whose chief of staff is Kamran,
They have a full battalion, but the troops are poorly disciplined and it
is rumored that they have already been infiltrated with Communist'. Gradually
the Darul Islam is retreating eastward because of the TNI attack?y,
5. Cheri,bon_ esidenov: There are a few intellectual leaders here. The TNI
is fighting against the Dutch o The Darul Islam has a battalion of active
troops,
Central ~ ~aa
6P Peen Resice; there are a few educated leaders, CuerriIla units
have retreated to the mountains. There are several units of former Hisbullahs
in the Residency.
CONFIDENTIAL
>
IM
th
J {X N~WY }taSRF RtST?l3u-rt
4R
N;
Y
This document Is hereby regraded to-
CONFIDENTIAL In accordancfewith the
otter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
.rchivis'i of the i pp-aa .For R
text F.oview Date: 2008
CLASSIFICATION +GONTROL - U,S, OFFICIALS ONLY
lease 2000/04/18 CIA-RDP82 04v91
Date:
CD NO,,
D/TE DISTR. J aay !-I
NO. OF PAGES 4
ArA
a 140. OF ENCLS.
k-'JA (LISTED BELOW)
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002900620008-8
SM /CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
25X1A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL
7. Baniumas Residency: The leaders are old Republican officials who are still
in the interior. The TNI is resisting Dutch occupation. Members of
the Tentera Peladjaran have considerable influence on the TNI. There is
some activity on the part of Darul Islam troops in Madjenang.
8. Semarang Residency: This Residency is practically under Dutch control.
There are unconfirmed reports that Communists are engaged in illegal activity
In the City of Semarang.
9. Diptara-Rembang R esidenex: The TNI is disorganized here and the Residency
is not patrolled by the Dutch. Communists are the undisputed masters here.
In W.'irosari there is a Communist unit, consisting of about one and a half
armed battalions under Lt. Col. Sudiarto. He gets moral support from
Communist leaders such as Surnarsono.
10. Kedu Residency: Students organized in fighting units are active in areas
south of Purworedjo and southwest of Magelang. They have about 300
commando troops and, about one battalion of ordinary combat troops. There
are many educated TNI officers in this Residency. There has been no
Communist activity observed in this area, but well known Communist leaders
such as Ir. Sakirman, former commander of the Peoples Army, are in the
Tentera Nasional Indonesia.
11. Josiakarta: ?ost of the Communist leaders have settled in this area,
mainly in the southwest and southeast sectors. Their military leaders
include Lt. Col. Marton, Capt. L&.if and Djokosujono. Their policy leaders
include TAN Ling Djie, Tikana, Dr. Madjid, Trugito and many others.
Their exact whereabouts is unknown at present. Communist units are operating
mostly in platoons and sections. Their objective is to.increase their
strength by increasing their. military equipment and by enlarging their
influence. After the van Royen?Rum Agreement has been implemented the
Tentera Peladjaran is to remain in these backlands and develop nationalism
in an effort to neutralize the Communists.
12. Surrta: The Tentera Peladjaran has one battalion of commando troops
and several companies of auxiliary combat troops here. The civil and military
administration is partially in the hands of students. Almost the entire
TNI in this area, important officers of which are Lt. Col. Suadi, and
Lt. Col. Slamet Rijadi, has been infiltrated by Communists. It may be
possible to neutralize these-forces by skill and tact backed by force;
however, at present force is lacking. Northwest of Surakarta there is
a completely Communist area under Setiadjit. Possibly Surakarta will
become the stronghold of Communism with centers in the north and south.
.The extremist-Barisan Banteng is also in this area.
East Java
13. In East Java there are few intellectuals among the troops, which are
well organized and disciplined. They are not an easy prey for direct
Communist propaganda and infiltration, but they are easily influenced
by e_~treme or radical ideas and are unconsciously adopting the Communist
pattern. The influence of Tan Malaka's followers is increasing,.
14. ~?adiun Residency: Armed units here were crushed during the Mduao revolt.
There are now only small TNI units in the south, which are aided by armed
Moslem groups. There are small Communist bands operating throughout the
Residency. Student units are concentrated in the eastern part of the
Residency.
15. 1adionegoro Residency: There is unimportant sporadic Communist activity
throughout this area. Republican officials are still in the mountains in
the southern part of the Residency.
CONTROL U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
(~~Approved For Release 200/~l4/'I 00-TIAL
RD~P82-00457R002900620008-8
 4 0
? Approved For Releas 000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002900620008-8
ONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
25X1A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCt
16. Surabaya Residency: In the environs of the City of Surabaya there are
a few small units of Sutomo's Barisan Pembrontakan Republik Indonesia
(BPRI). The TNI operates in the M.;odjokerto area. There are about 300
student commando troops which are active. There is no Communist activity,
17. Kediri Residency: This_is a stronghold of extremist TNI units. Blitar
and environs is the center of student activity in East Java. They are
relatively well armed and receive considerable support from the people.
18. Mahn Resi dencrr, The TNI in the north has been infiltrated by followers
of Tan Malaaka. Sabaruddin is the battalion comraandor in this area.
The Republican administration in the southern sector of this Residency is in
the hands of student units.
19. Besuki Residency: The TNI is organized in small unite with a few
intellectual leaders. The Masjumi's influence in this area is strong.
II. jndirect Su~?port for C unists
20. There are two types of groups in Indonesia which,waile they do not
receive orders from Moscow, indirectly support Communist tactics. One type com-
prisRo the fanatic religious groups such as the Darul Islam. They
condemn anyone who opposes them -- both the Dutch and the TNI. They
have little influence among the intelligentsia and have to suppress the
people in order to maintain their authority. This results in disorder and
discontentment and thus enables the Communists to gain a foothold.
21. The other type of group which indirectly supports Communist tactics includes
the extreme nationalist followers of Tan Malaka. They demand that negotiations
with the Dutch be carried on as between two equal independent nations.
that Dutch troops first leave Indonesia, and that there be no:recognition
of the transfer-of power until the first two demands have been ita.lfi:i1i a.
Emotional nationalists are influenced by these demands. Also Tan
Plalaka's followers are encouraging discontent concerning the situation
caused by 'Outch.troops. Tan's greatest influence is in some sections of
East Java and primarily in the Batavia area. Here they have partially
achieved their aim. They are far more dangerous than the Darul Islam.
The quickest way to eliminate Tan Mtalaka's groups is through intellectual
infiltration rather than b, frontal attack.
III. Summary
The summary was prepa-ed by source
and represents his interpretation
of the present situation.
22. The Dutch have caused deep discontent among the people by using fascist
methods when they could have used other means. This has strengthened
the Communists and aided in the destruction of nationalism.
23. Most Communist leaders admit the Communists have made mistakes. It is
difficult to say whether themistakes were.due to the Kremlin or to local
leaders. The leaders. all agree that the greatest error was the Ihuso revolt.
Their greatest weakness has been their inability to create disorder
in the areas held by the Republic prior to the Renville Agreement and vu
create a strong Communist party. Setiadjit's order, to destroy estates
was carried out effectively, but at present their entire pre-M so organization
has been almost completely broken. up by the Republic. However, the
Communists have profited from their experiences and know how to work among
the people. The next time they organize it will be on a more scientific
CONFIDENTIAL
MWWCONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002900620008-8
 Approved For Re______ %$t1$ . 9A fcg2i Ooi.k OO2900620008-8
25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
24. TAN Ling Djie, Wdikana and others are mainly intellectual Communists.
D3okosujono is a product of Australian Communism.
25. The Communist potential should not be underestimated because there is
a danger that the nationalists may be exhausted by their efforts to
survive. In the interim period the Communists and extreme nationalists
plan to make a strong effort to organize the people in areas which are
not controlled by either the Dutch or the Republic. By the time a final
agreement is reached by the Dutch and the Republic it is possible that
the Communists will have established strong positions as the Peoples
Army has succeeded in doing in the Batavia area since the Renville`Agreement.
The Communists are consolidating and it is unlikely that they will clash
with Dutch troops. They are saving their ammunition and buying more arms
on the black market.
26. Communist agitators are active in the TNY wherever discontent appears.
Discontent has been caused by two factors: a. the entire command has been
crushed by the Dutch, which has given rise to the formation of small units;
b. the troops lose confidence in their commanders. The latter is the
largest factor. Small units often branch out and become bandit units which
are open to Communist infiltration.
27. The intellectuals are nearly always supported as leaders by the masses.
In the Djapara-Rembang area the intellectuals sided with the Dutch and
as a result the masses lost faith in them. At this point Communism
took over.
28. The problem now is to save areas which are showing signs of disintegration
and to revive healthy nationalism.
CONFIDENTIAL
CON ROL a? U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002900620008-8