PCCH STUDY OF REASONS FOR FAILURE IN ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002600240004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 11, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

CLASSIFICA1 ION SAINIP
Approved For Re1EW9&0Q,49YIt%EQJ6 -004578 024
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
125X1 A9a
OUNTRY Chile
SUBJECT PCCh Study of Reasons for Failure in Eloctio
25X1A2
DATE DISTR. 11 APR 1949
NO. OF PAGES 3
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF IN
25X1X6
25X1A6a
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
1, The Political Commission of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)' has been
meting with the -antiago regional directors and other Party officials to
study the results of the elections and to evaluate the present position of
the Party.
2. According to the studies which have been made, the reports which have been
received from the provinces, and the observations made in Santiago and
Valparaiso, the Communist Party electoral efforts failed for the following
reasonsffi
am Lack of labor union pressure;
b. Bribery exercised by political enemies;
c.. Existing fear of government repression;
d. Opportunism and optimism within the PCCh which made the Party believe
itself stronger than it really was,
3, Lack of labor union pressure was considered to have been a deciding factor in
the poor showing made by the Communists in the elections, and is blamed on
the disorganization and destruction of the CTCh by governmental repressive
measures. In elections since 1935, and especially in 1938, the CTCh represented
a large sector of the electoral votes Its authority over the workers was -
virtually undisputed, so that any candidate opposed by it had to face its power
throughout the entire country. This authority was exercised principally as
moral. pressure, but. few union members dared to vote against the Confederation's
candidates, and none had to accept the advice-of his employers or of political
chiefs. At present the directors of the labor unions no longer have the power
of the old directors and the new directors have no experience. There are no
directive boards to issue instructions on voting, and most employees at present
would be reluctant to follow advice from such boards for fear the employer might
consider that this indicated Communist sympathy. Lacking strong union direction,
the laborer follows the political line of his employers, and even sells his vote
openly as additional proof that the Communists do not control his vote.
f% r% TA I Rl""t.0000
C
A
STATE NAIK NSRB DISTRIBUTION
T
ARMY AIR FBI ___t
e'Y re9ra t
her
This document is. ft on
-or&a ow
F_ mr-L
letter of 76 pctov~'
nteigenas
aA
~l
pi: actor.O rItr
aA$tatel6.
56
SSIFICATION
L
ase 2000/04/18: CIA-RDP82-04t
 ,.. Approved For Release 20 2-00457ROO2600240004-7
."Wr
5.
25X1A2
4? The problem of combating the effect of bribery by political. enemies is re-
lated to the labor problem. The Party member who had previously voted with
the Coiimmnist Party, faced with a choice between a 500 peso bill and being
denounced as a Communist, preferred the 500 pesos. There is evidence from
persons outside the Communist Party, and even reports from Regional Committees,
indicating that Communist militants as well as sympathizers were bribed in the
southern provinces. In Santiago, especially in the Quinta Normal Commune,
voters who bela:iged to the Party did not vote and evidence is available to
indicate that they were bribed. This is reported to have occurred in Valdivia
also.
Government repressive measures were said to have influenced voters in the
laboring classes, particularly in the provincial towns. In tdelipilla, for
example, there was no one who dared work for Guillermo del Pedregal at the
voting tables. Those who volunteered were eliminated from the registers and
could not serge. It" was therefore necessary to send people from Santiago to
act for him.. Even in rantiago where the terror of government reprisal was not
as keen as in the provinces, not one teacher or government employee dared to go
to the voting tables to handle the votes of the Fronts Nacional Democratico
candidate. All those who assisted were laborers or independent professional
people. Communist leaders stated that they had noticed that the threat of
exile or imprisonment meant less to the staunch militants than the threat of
being fired from their jobs. Some former Communist voters had decided to leave
the Party and the elections gave them a magnificent opportunity to obtain a type
of "certificate" of anti-Communism.
b. Many of the members of the Party during its period of greater success were
simply opportunists, who dropped away when it was no longer expedient to be a
Communist openly.
7, The Political Commission also observed that some regional officials did not
obey the instruestions of the directive board of Santiago. In Coquimbo, where
the Communist Party had been told to support the FRAS candidates, the militant
Communists pretended to misunderstand and continued to support the Communists who
were running.
8. Among the cells there has been severe criticism of the Political Commission for
having been instrumental in furthering the candidacy of Guillermo del Fedregal
in Santiago. Most of the criticism emphasizes that the laborers and the Com-
munists Pro tired of so-called traitors and do not wish to support politicians
who have not followed the Party line. Smue of the criticism coming from the
lower echelons =s directed toward instigating come changes in the directives and
the political line of the Party.
9. Changes will be made in the Political Commission 'at the proposal of the
",ecretariat of the Central Committee. The secretariat is at present composed of
Ricardo Fonseca. Luis Reinoso and Luis Valenzuela Valenzuela, in-addition to Elias
Lafertte, President of the Party, and Galo Gonzalez. The Secretariat will call
a full meeting of the Central Cormittee to change the Political Commission while
the General Congress of the PCCh is in session. The Congress is expected to
tape place when Victor Contreras Tapia returns to Chiles
10, Among those expected to be most affected by this decision to change the directive
body are Carlos Contreras Labarca, Humberto Abarca Cabrera, Cesar Godoy Urrutia,
and Jul-iota Campusano. For the moment, no definite decision has been made, but
it is believed that a definite position will be taken
.;2t,t e general meeting.
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002600240004-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 :
P82-00457 R002600240004-7
Galo Gonzalez has stated that "overoptimism lost many leaders", and that
the present leaders may be required to yield their positions to rzen who can
do the work efficiently.
11. It has also been decided that the Party political line must be changed to
give it wider appeal:... The voting revealed thzt the non-partisan passes were
not aroused to enthttiasm by the issues stressed in the Communist electoral
campaign. The presfi-edited by the Party also failed to gain wide support.
Only El had some circulation, but it was not ;cold out in the newsstands
as Party leaders had expected, basing their hopes on the fact that any news-
paper or magazine which attacks the government usually has a large circulation.
The daily L siciqJ, had to be suspended because it was not well received by
Communists and did not pay its way.
:2, The new Party line which is being studied is expected to concern itself with
the following aimsa
a. Advocating international labor solidarity to prevent war potentials from
being developed against the USSR,
b, Gaining acceptance for the claim that the policies of the USSR represent
peace,
c. Securing direct declaration that the Communists will not fight against
the USSR.
d. Attempting to convince the masses that the newly elected Congress has no
moral validity, and that it is a product of fraud. This accusation of
fraud will be accompanied by a campaign in favor of convening a Constituent
Assembly for a new Political Constitution.
~J. These points will constitute the basis for a manifesto which will be presented
by the PCCh to the press, and which will be printed in flyers for distribution
in the streets and for posting on walls. This political renovation will be
accompanied by a reorganization in the cuadros and. their manner of functioning.
The report on organization will be presented by Luis Reinoso.
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002600240004-7