COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO UNIFY ANTI-GOVERNMENT PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002400330012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 3, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORM
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4W~fftAM IN
COUNTRY Chile
PLACE
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DATE OF IN
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SUPPLEMENT 25X1A2g
REPORT NO. bmim
The follovtng report oovvrs t*i line of the Cormumist Party of Chile ( Ch)
from 31 :am u7 to 6 Fatbrua j '1949. Sul cequent events, as reported in
have modified this program.
1. Unificatioc of anti-?gover nt parties was the principal work of the PCCh, and
the calls were kept constantly buoy. The policy of keeping the cells occupied
was of prim importance in eviiding disturbances in the negotiations betvnen
parties. i'bc, regional o:fficos were riven definite tasks, such as the formation
of committees, and organizati3n of plane for local economic improvement. These
tasks kept the militants occupied, so that they did not lose their training and
did not Cain^s difficultio!9 in the negotiations of the Party leaders.
Uiations with the Socialists were very difficult, because of the opposition
4.
The rr~oet ? effective work me csarried out in the provinces, where efforts to 3nprove
conditions were going forward under the direction of local committees - The
Convmmist :sponsorship of the work of these committees was concealed, and people
par".ies as c matter of vital 1 portance to the PCCh.
of saversi of the directors and in particular of Raul Ampuero. Although Eugenio
Gonstles is ,earstary, General of the Party, Raul Ampuero Dias has the greatest
influence, wnrich he used agalEst attempts at unification. On the other lido,
Communist le.sders had difficulty in convincing their Party members that they must
not attack the !"ocial.ists, and that they must accept the alliances with various
who are antipathetic to the I''*rty were unwittingly working to carry out Conrmmist
diroctivee
While this work was being carried out among the masses, the national directorate
worked with the top Levels, or national heads of the various parties. The
Cirim nists figured that if the negotiations were successful, the work *rould be
well under tray, and if uuntueccasful, at least the Consvunist Party eler tints would
have penetrated other fields, which while less closely directed and with less
political e7psrience, would be easily guided by cambers of the Communist Party
along Party lines.
5. The Party, endeavored to maintain, its own objectives, without closing the door on
people who could aid itV 8 it for the candidacy of Carlos Ibanes del. Campo
cams about b:,r following this aoa.. Ibanez has great influence among the military
arc? also with the worcers in the provinces. The latter remember him for the many
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 Approved For Release 1999/09//009 ::CIIA-RRD}P~822-00457R002400330012-0
QON IDEI`I t IAL 25X1A2g
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I,a'.,'e he sponsor d w1airh beno d tfzem. if; 'bulTi, bridges, roam, pa bl a:c built -
th n, and a-,.used roctn1 i c t : to passed. The Con nmints realized t1 t he had
t , ~ e : upport of 1 . a xn ab:-ex-i of lsborisag people, and supported his c i &e
Thcy oounted on his td.':i.a*,ncc'o Ath the '{wrier-Laborists to ass= is ~?n cf the
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Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002400330012-0