ACTIVITIES OF PERUVIAN COMMUNISTS DURING OCTOBER 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002300660003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 21, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

FORM NO. 5 1.4A
SEPT.1948
Approved For
CLASS] LON SE
COUNTRY Peru
PORT CD NO.
SUBJECT Activities of Peruvian Commsts during
25X1 A6a October 1948
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF IN
25X1X6
PATE PI$TR? 21 Feb
NO. OF PAGES 8
wit t
The following report. covers the activities of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP)
during the mon h of October 1948 up to the time of the outbreak of the Arequipa
revolt on 27 October 1948.
The hopes of the PCP reached a high point when the Bustamante government out-
ltwed'the Aprista Party after the abortive Callao revolt of 3 October. With
their chief rival thus eliminated, the Communists hoped to make great progress
in a. fields, particularly on the labor front. The ineffectiveness of these
attempts served to.demonstrate once again the overall weakness of the Communists
iu 'erue
The =12.60L ME
on to the Callao Revolt
11 saw Ln the governmen"tts action against the APRA their chance -um gain LIM
.. % , V _, ___.... m,,- ur?v ~aQ t-,a fi,-gtt Peruvian volitical party
The immediate reaction of the POP to the Callao revolt was one of elation, for
The first disillusionment came when no newspaper printed the statement the follow-
t. d ti to
i
j'W V1-U vJ. U&J. ~.w wa.... 6 ----
to ue a statement condemning the revolt. This statement was prepared and dis-
tributed in leaflet form by the Political Commission the evening of 3 October.
s epu es
fin although it had been distrib1ted personally by the Commun
Party ea ers~to mean that whereas the right needed them in iias fight
ettgb his assurances that no action was contemplated against the Party. They
Ja Jed to await the return of Jorge del Prado, a fellow Arequipeno and personal frie .
of Bvgtamante who they believed, of all Party leaders carried the most weight
with the -President.
+9444 '- y
against AAA, and willingly published their statements, after the fall of the
A,p.stas, they would be dropped by the right and by the government as well,
The feared that the next step might be the outlawing of the PCP and planned to
a-ttitence with Bustamante to remind him agaih of his obligations and to
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The PCP was also disconcerted by the statement drawn up by the Convencion de
Partidos Democraticos on 4,October, condemning the revolt, and in effect, No
placing the Convencion at the disposal of the government in combating it.
;sresentative of the Communist Party was consulted by the Convencion before
,e,statement was issued. Although angered and annoyed at being by-passed,
Perty leaders did not dare to protest public3.y, lest the government construe
aty such protest as being in favor of the revolution rather than as directed
against the Convencion.
The fear that they would be outlawed is the theme of a statement issued by the
National Control Commission on the i0C anniversary of the Party on 7 October.
Plam.ng pressure toward that end on Yankee imperialism, on APRA, on the feudal
reactionary oligarchy, and on Juan P. Luna and his followers, the Control Com-
eal to "all honestly mistaken comrades" to return to the
de an a
_i
ia
pp
n ma
.ss
fold and to .close the Party's ranks in defense of its legal existence.
A new propaganda line began to appear soon, in which the Communists restricted
their attacks on the APRA, pointing out that the people had been deceived by
false leadership. The Callao revolt was a result of this disorientation, and
the PCP called on the masses to seek new leadership,- i.e., that of the Communist
Party in their struggle against the right wing. This new propaganda line is
clearly seen in the second Manifesto on the revolt, drawn up by the Political
Couds.sion of the POP on 8 October, and published in Labor of 10 October.
positive results from this effort were reported during October and there is no
aVidence that the Apristas showed any signs of accepting Communist leadership
or of moving toward the Communist Party during the month..
The Callao Local Committee drew up a leaflet attacking the Sechura Desert
petroleum contract. This once favorite object of attack had not been mentioned
for some time, and this instance appeared to be an isolated resurrection of the
formerly popular theme.
The government communique, dated 14 October 1948, expelling Alexander Koseleff,
his wife., Elizabeth Fuchs de Koseleff, andEudocio Ravines from Peru for"Narxist
activities of an international character" caused great concern in Party circles
in Lim. The Koseleffs were known as strong Communist sympathizers, but they were
not particularly active Party members. The POP feared that if individuals at this
level were objects of government action, it was a sure sign that the government
had finally determined to make the Party illegal, in a step to fulfill the Bogota
agreements signed by the Bustamante government,
10, A meeting of all Party leaders in the Lima area was called on 18 October to dis-
cuss preparations to be made in case the government should declare the Party
illegal. Matters discussed were the mechanics of meeting underground, assigning
pseudonyms to all Party leaders, continuing the publication of Labor in mimeograph
form. Source stated that no definite action was taken at this meeting, which had
been called for the purpose of discussing possibilities.
11. Preparations were also made to direct attacks against the American Ambassador if
he should appear to favor APRA in any way in his statements, or afford asylum for
escaping Aprista leaders. The Ambassadorts attitude, however, was considered
scrupulously correct by the Party, and no steps were taken to implement this pro-
posed campaign.
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ventral Committees National Secretariat
12. Complaints and murmurs against the new Secretary General, Manuel Ugarte Saldana,
had 'become so general that a special meeting of the National Secretariat was
cal ,.ed on.13 October to `warn Ugarte of these rumors and to make. suggestions for
dealingwith them. Ugarte made a spirited defense of his position, stating.that
it was;, a mistake to feel that the Secretary general of the Party should be a pro-
fess'ional.fan oran intellectual. A laboring man had so much better an under--
standin the problems of the workers that this advantage outweighed these of
the wider contacts a professional man might have. He continued his defense by
statin& that.'he did not, however, work alone, and that his decisions were the
product of the opinions of people of all strata of society whom he consulted.
13. Ugartes statement is said to have satisfied Party leaders, but there is increas-
ing evidence that'3orge del Prado remains the brains and the true leader of the
orthodox PCP.:
14. During the absence of del Prado, now National Secretary for Organization, his
offs ce hiae been in charge of Carlos- Arbulu Miranda. The latter sent out a
crc';1r on YC October to all Party orjanisms which had not been in recent contact
with Part head uarters.n Lima, reminding them that with the fall of APRA, the
Party must intensify its efforts to win-over both the masses and the elite of APRA.
rtmental Committee
~~eea G ~ .~.~c~mss."
15. Segundo'del Mar'was selected at a'meeting of the full'Lima Departmental Committee
on 4 October to replace Jose Marcos Godino as Secretary General of the Committee.
Max'ts.'had'receintly been designated a member of the National Control Commission
ah w:s unable to x:11 both positions. This meeting also approved a letter to be
sent to se.ected Party members, 'soliciting funds to enable the Party to rent the
apartment adjacent to Central Committee Headquarters,'669 Colmena.
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16. The talk'on'agrarian reform which was delivered to the Party by Antonio Chaves
Bedoya on 11 September 1948 met with such success that members of the Lima Depart-
me4t . Committee had the text mimeographed for wider distribution. omment.
C *61 Bedoyats report doss not embody the extreme suggestions generally expected
in Co jet proposals on this subject.)
rnr , National Svnd'i.ca1 Commission
17. The leaders of the PCP believed that the Callao revolt and the subsequent suppression
of the APSA presented the Party with an ideal opportunity to attain control of the
CQ ederacion de Traba5adores del Peru (CTP), which until 3 October had been firmly,
in the haic)s of APRA;
18, With the imprisonment of many,Aprista labor leaders after 3 October and'the flight
or disappearance underground of many others, the National Syndical Secretariat of
the PCP imm*diately laid plans to take advantage of the leaderless state of-the
CTe and put the Communisto back into control of the Confederation..
19. The" failec3n this for two reasons. First, the state of siege forbade all labor
meetings consequently "activitywas restricted to plans, and individual conversations,
and no dportant positive steps were possible. Second, the split in Communist and
pro-Communist labor prevented any concerted action by labor as a whole which might
conceivably have been effective in spite of the state of siege had unified action
been possible.
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20. As it was, rivalry between the del Prado-led "Colmena Communists" (the orthodox
PC,P),_the dissident Luna-Communists, still calling themselves "The Lima Depart-
mental Committee of the PCP" and the group of ex-Communists and fellow-travelers,
led '[y`Jose Senites and organized in the articulate but numerically unimportant
Frente de Unidad e Independencia Sindical (FUIS), prevented any unified action
by anti-Ap'rista labor. The three weeks and three days between Callao and Arequipa
quickly ran out with little accomplished except talk.
21. Like all other groups, the Communist Party found itself severely handicapped by
the state'ofsiege for, having strongly condemned the Callao Revolt, they did
not wish to be caught violating the government's dispositions against it. Conse-
quently they were"limited in their activities to plans and correspondence in anti-
cipation of the restoration of constitutional guarantees.
22, First concrete steps toward an effort to take advantage of the opportunity afforded
by the' outlawing of APRA to control the leadership of as many unions and labor
organizations as possible, culminating in control of the CTP, were taken by the
National Syndical Secretariat of the PCP in a circular dated 1. October 1948, dis-
tributed to Coiiiunist Syndical Secretaries throughout Peru.
23. The cIra Orr stated that a new eta has opened with the outlawing of APRA', that many
Apristas- will }lave- to abandon their positions as labor leaders, union officials
and the like, and that although many opportunists will seek to take advantage of
this "we, the Communists, are the only ones capable of guiding labor in the true
.path of .its own interests... for its interests are our interests, since the Peruvian
Communist Party is the party of the working class and of the laboring population."
For tFie foregoing reasons, the National Syndical Commission ordered all Communist
cells within unions to be activated immediately and instructed all such reorganized
cells to demand that new union officers be chosen as soon as the state of siege was
lifted,
24. In choosing such new officials, the circular directed that others as well as
Communists should be chosen, taking care only that the principal posts, such as
Secretary General and Secretaries of Organization, Defense, and Economy, remain
inoCoimuunist hands. This step was taken so as not to repeat the Aprista error of
:t ned .atelygrabbyng every~tkiing:in sight. The circular directed that these new
daft ates be?preserited ih the name of "Comites Democraticos Sindicales", which
should not be exclusively Communist. The circular indicated that such syndical
cells ("fracciones sindicales") should be made up of 3 to 9 persons and ordered
t,,t every effort be made to organize such meetings before the lifting of the
state of siege, then expected in about two weeks. The circular is signed by the
National: Syndical Secretary, Eliceo Garcia Lazo.
25. This line of the orthodox PCP, namely, that the'CTP and the existing labor federa-
tions should be kept intact, with fresh elections for new officers and newdblegates
to the CTP, was consistently advocated by the Party. The policy was supported in
the ` Party` news " orgah for for 23 October which reported an interview with German
Aragonez Mango, a Communist railway worker, and new Secretary of the Chosica Trattic
Committee of the Central Railway. An editorial, reportedly written by Eliceo
Garcia, also-attacked the Luna position that the CTP should be abolished and an
entirel new organization founded. Luna's position was expressed by a Luna stooge,
D`esio Minaya,"in'an interview published in La Prensa for 12 October.
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CELL. AGENCY
Ptical Commission
26. The Political Commission met on 15 October and decided after long discussion
that they would-be forced to abandon their campaign to raise funds to purchase
the press on'vhich the Party organs had been printed. Juan Barrio, who had
lift for the southern provinces on 28 September to seek funds for the Party
press, was recalled. It is noted that the communication which announced this
decision referred once again to the strength of the Party in the Arequipa.. Cuzco,
and Puno areas, which are described as the only ones in a position to fulfill
their`commitinefits towards the campaign. There were seven members of the Commission
preserit, in addition to"the Secretary of the National Control Conmiission and the
Administrator of the Press, Ernesto Rojas Zavala.
27. A second meeting of the Political Commission was held 26 October, and to avoid
tket'estrictions imposed by the state of siege, this meeting was held at the
hone of one of its members. A final report was made on the problem of the
liquidation of the press, and all possibilities for extending the lease or pur--
chasing the press were exhausted. Ugarte reported that he saw no possibility of
re,ehing a favorable agreement with the proprietor, who demanded that back rent,
amounting .to 113,000 soles, be paid before any further arrangements would be con-
sidered.
28. The committee in-charge of the campaign "Pro-Imprenta" under Dr. Leonidas Klinge,
and including Elias Tovar, Hugo Pesce, Rodolfo Ponce Martinez, Sergio Caller and
others; reported that they had. been able to raise only a relatively small amount.
29. Jorge del Prado, who had been recalled-'to Lima from Cuzco, reported that during his
trip to the south he had been promised 20,000 soles in Arequipa, 45,000 in Cuzco,
10''000"in Puno and 5,000 in Sicu"i but that these sums had been promised for the
I1dle of December, and could not be collected before then.
30. The" meet3.ng was rallied 'by' Jorge' del Prad`o, who one again showed himself to be
the strongman of the Party. He pointed out that the 80,000 soles which had been
pledged could be used in a new enterprise, which would emphasize the stock cone-
psny'angle. He suggested that these 80,000 soles be accepted in payment for shares
of 2,,bOO soles each. -A new campaign was initiated, to be known as Pro--Empresa
Editorar the goal of which was to be the raising of 200,000 soles to acquire a press
belonging wholly to the Party.
31. Notices of the new catnpa'3.gn were drawn up and mailed out 27 October. The covering
letter,`signed by the Secretary General, announced that two commissions would soon
be sent to-the north and center of the country in connection with the campaign.
The local committees were requested to bear the expense of these commissions. The
remainder of the letter was devoted to promoting the sale of shares in the new
ec-rporation to be formed by the Communists.
N ytiona1 Control Commission
32. The case of SergioVelez Raygada, a newspaperman employed by La Prensa was turned
o to the National Control Commission by the III National Congress of the PCP for
fur'thor'action. Velez Raygada had previously been before the control commission
in September 1947, for "breach of discipline"'but no further action was taken
against him at that time.
33. Velez Raygada was expelled from the PCP by a resolution of the Control Commission
in October, "for having betrayed the Party openly, going over to Ravinism (Eudocio
Ravines faction), and becoming an oligarchic agent in the service of La Prensa,'"
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Natjona? Secretary of Economy M ry
34. The National Secretary of Economy, Sergio Caller, sent out a separ+ a and special
apped to members and sympathizers for regular direct contributions to the Party
Treasury. These letters', which were sent out 18-19 October, pointed out that the
Party is largely dependent for funds on the salary assessment of the four Communist
Deputies, and on membership fees., It referred to decisions of the III National
Con so to ensure the collection of dues from all members through more rigid con-
trol of`the',sc rn t system, but-stated that a regular monthly contribution in addition
will be necessary from those who can afford it, if`the Party is to meet itsobliga-
tions. It urged all members to enroll new sympathizers to swell the Party's funds,
as soon as possible.
35. With reference to the contributions of the four Coomunist Deputies, who are required
to turn.a portion of their salaries over to the Party, the authorization by the
gov`ernmeiit,on 22 October for payment of the salaries of the Independent (i.e., non-
Aprista) Deputies, including the Communists, was very favorably noted by the Party,
for as will be'seen from the above, the Party was in its customary financial straits,
and `badly needed its proportion of the Deputies' salaries.
,memmi st Youth Movement
36. No activities o
October*
t of Prominent Co
37. As reported above, Jorge del Prado left Lima 28 September for a "trip through theHe
southern provinces, charged with several missions by the Political Commission.
otated that his trip had been largely ruined by the state of siege, which prevented
a1,1 public meetings. He reported, however, that before he returned to Lima on
17 October', the Communist leaders at the Quinta Eulalia, Cuzco, had staged a farewell
party;in'his honor, which he was able to turn into an effective Party "pep-rally"
in spite of the state of siege.
38. He stated that in'Puno, Juliaca, and Sicuano the state of siege had prevented all`
public` meetings, but that he was able to meet with individual local leaders, who
were,` particularly in Puno, liberal in their promises of help to the Central.Com-
mittee " 's press campaign.
39. Del Prado reported that the reaction throughout the country to the 3 October uprising
had been one of condemnation.
40. When the PC? National lectoral Commission was dissolved on 14`October following the
goverruftiefitis postponement of all elections for the year, Juan Jacinto Paiva returned
to Cuzco on 17 October for a month's vacation.
Correspondence and Contacts with Communists Abroad
414 Cu A letter received in mid-October from the Communist Party of Cuba referred
. 4 ___ r,.,,. +U,- 'Da>+.tr iinAwr +hw anvernment of Prio
Socaas. The letter referred to him as the number one agent of Yankee imperialism
whose primary' objective is the annihilation of the Communist Party of Cuba. The
letter was- signed by Bias Roca.
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sgrrpET 25X1 A
CBNTP4L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-7-
42. A second communication from Cuba arrived at Party headquarters on 26 October,
t
and urged the PCP to send an immediate protest to the Cuban government against?
the assassination of Aracelio Iglesias Diaz of the Cuban maritime workers. T
communication stated that if the Prio Socarras government lasts for another year
the Communist Party will have been broken in Cuba. I116 was therefore necessary'.
to demonstrate at once that the Cuban Communists are supported by the Communist
Parties of all Latin America and that they do not stand alone.
A communication was received from the Communist Party of Argentina
43. l,r.,ent
They
which, stated the position of the Argentine Communists in regard to Peron.
still oppose him, but are collaborating with him in his campaign to combat "the
murderous plans of American imperialism". The letter quoted a statement of Lenin's
to the effect that at times it was a matter of strategy to collaborate with the
enemy if the Party would eventually benefit by such action.
44. A letter arrived at Party headquarte $ on 21 October addressed to Emilia Casas
from the Proteccion de la Mujer, . ilegedly an Argentine Communist-front organ-
ization, In view of her present relations with the Party and the disciplinary
action recommended'against,her mother, it was decided to open the letter to
determine the exact nature of her dealings with this Argentine group. The letter
was reportedly found to be satisfactory.
45. C Salvador Ocampo passed through Lima on 9 October 1948 traveling from
Santiago, Chile, to Havana, Cuba via Peruvian International Airways Flight No.
10/09. No word was received by the PCP of his arrival and nothing was known of
his brief stop at the airport until after he had departed.
Publications
4. .~
6. Only two issues of tieomnuriist Party organ Labor appeared during the month of
October,, the first of these in honor of the XX Anniversary of the founding of
the PCP by Jose Carlos Mariategui on 7 October 1928.
47. In a letter published in that issue, the change in Directorship was announced
by the returning Director, Eliceo Garcia, who had held the position since May 1946.
Luis;Nieto appeared as the Director of Labor on the masthead of the last issue
of the month, on 23 October. Nieto is well known in Party'circles as a Cuzceno
poet, writer and newspaperman. He founded one of the first Communist cellsin
Cuzco and was the founder and first Director of the Cuzco Communist news organ
Jo
46$. These issues oi`. or were made posaibe through the partial success of the
efforts to collect outstanding debts owed to the paper. Before the end of October,
the local Committees of Huancayo, Piura, Sullana, Lampa, La Merced, Huamachuco,
Ica, Pisco, Aija, Chancay, Juliaca and Carhuaz were reported to have paid up their
debts to Labor in full, the Huancayo Committee forwarding a gift of 45.50 soles in
25X1A addition. Comment. The presence of Piitra and Sullana on this list is of
some interes , n eating, as it may, a revival of Party enthusiasm in the north.)
49, Jo of Cuzco continued to appear regularly during the month, four issues having
been published during October.
50. Issues of uta, theoCommun st Party paper published in Pugtio, continued to be
made available in Lima through Miguel Montoya Chacon, Communist Party leader in
L L:J
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Puruio now Director_ofathe ,pa'pe '`r ~he Alatest number to seed in Lima,
l
--s-so
s or the III Nationa
Delegae to the Congress from Puquio, who represented the Province of Lucanas.
swas poem iierte e1 Lenadorn
ong tn i-~impe
510 A sped-3a edition
et form on
d
N
a
eru
Pab o
Communist
by the Chilean Poe
newsprint by Luis Nieto, and copies were given to all those making financial con-
F,
,'butons toward the newspapers
t 4r'anizationt Movimiento Democratico del Ma 1 terio
52. The @ommuhist-front teachers' organization, Movimiento Demooratico del Magisterie,~
issued a second number of its newspaper Orientaatdiuaduring the tonth of October.
The, first number appeared July 194$The paper is still under the direction of
in
Angel 'Flores de Paz, now`Secretary of Economy of the Lima Departmental Committee of
25X1A29 the PC+P. Comment. At the time the first issue appeared in July, there were
three PCP mem rs among the five officers of this organization. They were Jose
Marcos ti., Secretary of Organization, Maximina Argote, Secretary of Economy, and
Angel' Pl:orez de Paz.." Press Secretary.)
P el
53. A series of meetings tiroughout the country was planned for I actober 1945 in
honor of . the' twentieth anniversary of the founding of the PCP on 7 October 1928.
Comnnuxst Party headquarters in Lima and the Cuzco departmental Committee announced
plans for large c& brations. The provisions of the state of siege declared by
Uwi,zoveitmi6nt on 3 October required that all these projected meetings be canceled.
The anniversary was celebrated only by special editions of the newspapers Labor
in tunaanl Jornada in Cuzco.`
B. :LM P. and his D "ident.Grou
54. Few specific activities of the dissident group surrounding Juan P Luna were re-
ported during October. Like the orthodox Communist Party, they laid their. plans
for,ta-king,acvantage of the elimination of APRA and gaining control of Peruvian
labor when the state 6f siege should be lifted, but like the PCP they restricted
these plans to talk, rather than action.
55. Whereas., however, the PCP was in favor of maintaining the CTP, advocating only
the election of new delegates'to the Confederation and new officers of that organ-
ization, the Luna group advocated dissolving the CTP and starting afresh with a
clean 'late to build a new organization. This now organization was to be known,
perhaps, as a Congress of Peruvian Workers or some similar title.. This view was
made public-by a Luna spokesman, Desiderio Minaya, of the Federacion de Panaderos
"+Estrej.ladel Peru" in an interview printed in La Prensa for 12 October 1948,
which'prompted an immediate attack in the pages of Labor.
56. The explanation for these two differing attitudes may be found in the fact, pre-
vious 7 reported, that the Central Committee maintained control of the organized
Communist Party machinery throughout the country whereas Luna had been obliged to
organize his group from scratch. In view of this, the Central Committee preferred
toproceed within the framework of existing organizations, whereas Luna probably
ss*W more favorable opportunities in a general shake-up and reorganization.
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