MOSCOW CENSURE OF CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002200650005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 28, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

FORM NO. 51.4A
SEPT.1948
25X1A2g
Approved For Release 1999/09/09': CIA-RCP82-D0457R002200 -
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY Chile/USSR
SUBJECT Moscow Censure of Chilean Communist Par
PLACE
ACQUIRED Chile, Santiago
2IIT/ 6QF INFO. Prior to 28 December 1948
SOURCE
25X1A2g,
DATE DISTR. 27 Jan 1949 i
NO. OF PAGES 2
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
furnishedftcesxte the following
account of the difficulties confronting the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)
at present:
1. The Cominform is now taking action against the Chilean Party, which is being
accused of responsibility for its own political failure. All its leaders
and their activities are being subjected to an examination by the Cominform.
The findings of this latter group will be forwarded to Chile through Deputy
Contreras Tapia, former Minister of Lands and Colonization, who is at present
in Prague., Czechoslovakia.
2, The Cominform believes that the Chilean Communist Party had an excellent
opportunity to take over the government, but did not know how to take ad-
vantage of it. It feels that the'Chilean Party has destroyed the Chilean
labor movement through its mistakes and intransigent attitude,
3. One of the most grave accusations is that the PCCh has "sold itself out
politically", Moscow cannot understand how the Party, having had the keys
to the government in its hands, could have lost them so rapidly, thus creat-
ing a difficult situation for the Soviet Union. [camples noted in Moscow
of this "political sell-out" and bourgeois development are photographs of
,Miguel Concha, former minister of Agriculture, dressed in shorts at a picnic
in Vina del Mar. Also cited,are photographs of the ostentatious life of
Pablo'eruda, and accounts of the social events attended by Chilean Communist
leaders,
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It is believed that this information was furnished Moscow by members of the
Soviet Embassy in Santiago. The Embassy always held a pessimistic opinion
of the Chilean Communist Party. The gravity of the accusations is increased
nel that the Chilean
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oscow
by the report given to
Communist Party had had control of all the vital industries in the country,
such as copper, coal, and nitrate mining, to such an extent that no operations
in these fields could be carried out without the consent of the Party, All
of this control or influence gradually melted away, and now the Party finds
itself outlawed from Chilean political life.
ci.;~ The Party line has been analyzed and the conclusion reached that not only
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P#Lic
 C:",NTIi IL INTELLIGr,NC ~, C ~NCY
25X1A2g
were fundamental errors made, but Party leaders were guilty of a lack of
foresight and ability. The Third international had had confidence in the
PCCh and had considered it as a Party exercising a decisive influence in
the country. It is now disorganized and its principal leaders are either
under arrest or in hiding.
Moscow feels that the Chilean Communists need to receive instructions and
orders from abroad. This lack of instruction caused the collapse, since the
PCCh was accustomed to receive orders from such leaders who elaborated and
laid down the policy of joint action with the other Communist Parties in
America. The latest instructions received in Chile were given by Victorio
Codovilla, one of the leading members of the Communist Party of :rgentina,
In Chile, Codovilla imparted instructions concerning the formation of the
national union (Popular Front) in which it was hoped that differences
between the leftist and rightist political groups could be smoothed out,
Codovilla. forced Carlos Contreras Labarca from the office of Secretary
General of the PCCh and opened the way for Luis fteynoso, who is the real
power in the party of Chile. At the present moment it is believed that
there are no contacts or liaison with the Communist Parties in other
countries, Although Communist Party leaders in Chile have attempted to go
to Buenos ?ires, none are known to have got further than Mendoza. Codovilla
himself has not been in Chile. Codovilla does not wish to take a hand in
Chilean affairs at this time, since he believes any efforts would fail,
and he has no desire to be blamed by Moscow for any failure which might
result from his efforts,
8. As a result of this criticism from Moscow, Ricardo Fonseca will probably
be removed from his position as Secretary General. At the present, he is
said to be physically broken and unable to talk to people because of his
highly nervous state. His possible successor is Luis Reynoso, the present
Party secretary of Organization,,
9, ddhile the matter is being studied.in Moscow, the Communist Party in Chile
is attempting to find a way out and is awaiting the results of the con-
sultations concerning Carlos Ibanez del Campo, who, they hope, may become
their salvation. As soon as a decision is reached in this matter, a definite
line will be formulated and made known. Meanwhile, the Party is attempting
to do something which will regain for it some of its lost prestige. One
of these attempts was the hunger-strike in the Pisagua prison camp, which
failed for lack of adequate preparation, IIowever, the idea of a hunger-
strike has not been abandoned. The Party is considering carrying out
another such hunger-strike with the view of using it as a propaganda issue,
Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : JQ-RIM1U~0650005-5
T~ 1 #J%16