INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE PSP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R001900750009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 15, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
Approved For Rep AC9IV9 11EC 82-0045
INFORMATI REPORT.
COUNTRY Cuba{~, P
SUBJECT Internal Difficulties of the PSP
25X1A
25X1X
n~ ATE DISTR. 15 ?ctober 1948
1. During recent months, there have been disagreements between the leaders and
the militants of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP-Cuban Communist Party)
which reportedly will result in some members leaving the PSP and the Communist-
oontrolled labor movement in order to join the legal Confederation de
Trabajadores Cubanos (CTC). One of the basic difficulties of the party today
Is the difference of opinion between the young militants and the older leaders.
The young militants are in favor of resorting to violence and struggle. This
however is contrary to the opinion of the older leaders who definitely oppose
a policy of violence. Therefore, the internal political 25X1X
situation of the PSP at the present time is unpredictable.
an the past, it has been the policy of the PSP to attempt to associate itself
with the winner of any national election in Cuba, thereby obtaining numerous
advantages for the workers who were associated with the CTC. The PSP, which
is isolated from association with other political parties at the present time,
lacks political pacts with the Cuban Revolutionary Party and the Republican
Party, which were the successful parties in the-recent elections. It will be
.impossible, according to source, for the PSP to establish alliances in the
future with these parties, and the Party faces four more years of the same
situation.
3. Because the PSP in the past has been a party of the masses and the workers,
it has been able to control their activities primarily through the CTC and the
Party. Promises which the PSP made to the political parties with which it has
been allied have been fulfilled primarily because the PSP, in control of the
CTC, dictated the activities of the workers. But now, reportedly, the workers
are no longer deceived into believing that the PSP is actually the workers'
party; this condition has resulted in numerous disagreements and quarrels
between the directors of the PSP and the militants. Blas Poca, Secretary
General of the PSP, has accused some of the leaders and members of being
traitors and defeatists because many PSP militants have been avouching admission
of defeat in the labor union movement and have expressed the desire of entering
the CTC, which is controlled by Angel Cofino. Allegedly, their purpose is
to carry out, from within the framework of the CTC, a fractional labor move-
ment with a view to the coming Sixth National 'Workers' Congress of Cuba which
will be held sometime between April and August 1949.
"ERG MUST
25X1A
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R001900750009-4
25X1A
4. The plans of the directors of the PSP for the period following 1 June 1948
were based upon the election of the Liberal and Democratic candidate,
Dr. Ricardo Nunez-Portuondo, as President of Cuba. The directors of the PSP
felt that if Nunez-Portuondo had been successful in the recent Cuban elections,
the man of the hour would have been ex-President Fulgencio Batista, a great
friend of theirs, and the party status would have been improved. Source
stated that for this reason the PSP, before the June elections, tried to weaken
the position of Carlos Prio Socarras by working on behalf of Eduardo Chibas and
the Orthodox Party while secretly they were allied with the forces of Nunez-
Portuondo. Prior to the June elections, Ramon Nicolau, PSP leader, made
several trips to the United States to interview Fulgencio Batista. The pur-
pose of these pre-election contacts was to fix the conditions of an alliance
of the PSP with the Liberal and Democratic forces despite the fact that these
parties are the most reactionary in Cuba,
5. PSP members hope to establish political union with Fulgencio Batista upon the
latter's return to Cuba to assume his seat in the Cuban Senate. Reportedly,
Batista has promised the leaders of the PSP to repair the present situation
by means of his triumph as president in the elections which will be held in
Cuba in 1952. If the election of Batista should occur in 1952, PSP members and
Batista followers believe the Communists should be able to regain the direction
of the workers' movement, utilizing fear and official favors in order to hasten
the arrival of political support. the leaders of the PSP, 25X1X
for these reasons, even though they are pro ema ca , tell militants at the
various meetings that Batista is going to play a very lively role in the Cuban
Senate.
6. The PSP believes in Batista's promise to create a united opposition movement
and to organize a great party in which the Communists would have a predominate
role in spite of numerical deficiencies. The PSP feels that it would be useful
to Batista because of its combativeness and its organs of propaganda.
25X1A Comment, the leaders of the PSP seem to give 25X1X
little consideration to the effects of international affairs on this program
nor do they give any consideration to the possible measures which President
Carlos Frio Socarras will take against them. By following the course out-
lined above, it is believed that the PSP will. liquidate itself.)
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R001900750009-4