VIETNAMESE MILITARY TACTICS - TONKIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R001900170002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 23, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 00/11%24 CIA=1&$=00457h
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1
R E NA F, C) R M,
UEhIECT Vietnamese Militaryy Tactics - Tonkin
DATE DISTR. 23 Se ntemhe r 19a6
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HIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEAR ,H
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The Viet Minh, in the earlier -'ages of the war, employed scorched earth
tactics with great thoroughness and ruthiassneas when faced with a French
attack too strong to rosis ., In mid-1947, however, ci new -tactic was de-
vealopc d and, at presrn?v, the scorched earth polio;a is hardly employed at
all. For want of a bett~lr name the now tactics might be called "collap,sible
The scorched earth t'letics were abandahoned in part because of the ls.r,g:a
proportion of large installations and big houses which had already been
destroyed and Partly because it was found that the "collapsible" tactics
were lei costly and eclvallr effective. The new tactics, in general, -;:re
characterized by tha following
a. Construction and use of a simplified form of house which may easily
be to ::en apart and the -pieces scattered before the French arrive, and ten
es,sil, reconstructed after the departure of the French.
a. Stocks of rice are lar;,eely removed from the locality before thb~
French attack, but sufficient is left for the nourishment of the copulation
during; the expected period of French, occupation. Thesc stocks a.r,a removod
from their bags, and the ,,reins scattered on the ground over a large area
so that it is imz:oscyiiale for the French either to gather the grain or to
destroy it. The loo- al popula vion, at night,, gathers enough of it for the
next dal,ts use.
Growing rice is doait with in the following manner. N ither side
wishes to destroy it while it is still green, 1`4hen it ripens there is
sort of race between the French and the Vint P.'_inh to see who can =,:et a-t:
the Frain first to harvest it., The Viet Minh is usually su cessful as
rest of the crop riooeris at one t+i ie and they are far more numerous.
tYz.res e : d cones th,;f Viet fliwa-h employs large r t ? ?aa. aons of local.
who sre able to 1?arv, st a large field an a ri_ngle night.
d As many cattle a:a possible are removed before the French sa taok.
The remainder are left in .tables which are heavily guarded with booby
traps.
e._ The population rotires from the villages and ref-Appears only a
night. 12-vary one mu:3t be prepared to evacuate at short no rice, G ::t ryl.`:1.i;
only absolute necesait?es.
fn A-cc elaborate watching system has been develoT.od to observes the
,novensnts of the French. 13ine?culars are in groat demand.
g;r In threatered -zones markets themselves acre "Col laps ibie". Thom
are A.
ills tallations. The word is sirngnl.y passed around the n L.ht before
that the market will be he: d ?:h next day at a certain spot. r~ess~a.zcs
With their Produce to sell. A system of fi::ed price-s, plainly f:F rkei.
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or listed, is used so that no time will be wasted in 1,argaining. The
markets are not held twice in the same place.
h. Markets may be held as close as 6 1-. lomaters from a French post.
In such a case there is casually a screen -,f watchers and Tu-Ve at varying
distances up to 2 kilometers from'the post. Between the Tu-Ve and the
r7arkot, a distance of about L kilometers, there is a screen of 0u-Kich
(literally "walking attack" or guerrillas). If the French attack in the
direction of the market, but in small force, the Tu-11* and Du-Rich may
counterattack. .If the attack is in rolativoly large foroe, the market
disperses. The Tu-Vo and the Du-Kich also go into temporary hiding.
Normally, however,, the French would not dare to make a very deep attack
as it is usually necessary for them to return to their post at night.
From the point of view of weapons the backbone of the "collapsible" tactic
of the Viet Minh is land-mines, grenades and booby traps. The Japanese
lent large stocks of 200, 300, and 500 kilogram aerial bombs in the Thai
Nguyen and T3ac-Nan regions. The explosive in thee. bombs has been ox-
tensivoly used by the Viet L inh for making nines., grenades, and booby trapf;.
The Viet ASinh have succeeded in establishing numerous, though not veery;?lart;e.,
security zones. The principal ones are in the Thai-Nguyen Tuyen-quang ar;t.
It is in this zone that the various seats of the Viet Nam Govern-ant.. lisprsed
and mobile, are at the present tit:,'. A
I . The French, being unable '`o launch a large-scale attack on the whole of for:;din,
have been obliged to divide it up into triangles and attempt to deal svpart.t?ly
with the various triangles? The effort is to occupy the three sides of the
triangle and push inward, attempting to pocket the Vint ;,inh inside and grad-
ually "reduce than. The Viet Minh countermeasures have been:
a. To break off the Pre oh pincers movements. For this purpose it w s
found necessary to !-,Ave the army under unified command. This explains the
incorporation of the Tu-Ve into the Regular Army in 1947. ',.hen thio Viet l nh
have been able to make advance preparations in the ba,,tle areas they have
riearly always been successful in breaking off the pincers movements.
b. When the Viet Minh are unable to make advance preparations of the
battle area they find it wiser to retiree for the time being and prepare a.
later attack to coincide with an attack from within the triangle, in order
to break the siege and permit the recovery of the Viet Minh porsonrrsl and
material besieged within the triangle. These tactics have been quite succ ss-
ful inasmuch ar, the French have not sufficient forces to besiege sowwral pc,c?-
?ts at once..
CONTI?O.L, / U.S. 0FFI MLS ONLY
FIDE Aq...
Approved For Release 2005/11/24: CIA-RDP82-00457R001900170002-5