PROCEEDINGS AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE LIOPIS GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 17, 1947
• Content Type: IR

25X1
25X1A
000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
NTROL 25X1A 263
u.s. ONTICIALS ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
COUNTRY SPata
SUBJECT Proceedings at the Last Meeting of the Llopis
Government
25X1A
ORIGIN
DATE:
INFO. 6 Allem t 1947
DIST. E September 1947
PAGES 5
SUPPLEMENT
1. 111 the ministers attended the meeting except Vicente Dribs, the tommunist
minister. Llopis reported an the Socialiet-UGT meeting at Toulon 2 and
on the resignation of Uribe. He also referred to resole:dons adoeted by
the car which indicated that the CNT miaister would reeign from Vei Govern-
ment. Llopis devoted about an hour to a resume of the chief actieities of
the Government sines he became Prime Minister. He reviewed the relations
established with the monarchiets for the purpose of arriving at fie easement
following the line of the tripartite note of March 194S and the reaclutions
of the UN. Ilrourteen times * he said, *we held conferences with -Apr.-
sontative monarchists. Night of the conferences resulted from th -personal
activity of Trifon Gomes. All attempts to get together ended whe- the
monarchist agents realized that the Socialist Party, when it caa to
electieg a regime, would vote for the Republic, and would not sua eet a
proclamation of the monarchy prior to the electoral consultation. The
monarchists accept no alliance which does not start with the rest of us
becoming monarchists or at least being disposed to support the moelechy.
They seek stbmission rather than an understanding. They are take rade
vantage of the present world situation, which they believe would eermit
them to impose the monarchist solution on OA as the only feasible e'en
within the western democratic framework. A11 that is said to hid this
stark reality is perversion of the facts. I have details provine et.1 this,
which will be at the disposition of my successor so that he can ceetinue
the work of the Government without letting himeelf be deceived by 7;hs lare
of an understanding with the monarchists, for we kaow from our owe repeated
experience what that means in the view of all the monarchist agents without
exteption. The conversations were not definitely terminated. Ra the
trnth is that since the constitution of the Confederation of Monaechist
Rightists, the monarchist movement has evidenced three tendencleir first,
to establish the monarchy by agreement with. Franco; second. to restore the
menarchy with the aid of the generals: third - and least attractive to them -
to restore the monarchy by prior agreement with the leftists, the. proceeding
to a free election I imagine that the first tendency considerea Its hopes
vanished with the adoption of the law of %megaton. The second teill has
r.SSI_FICATION sxprir! mann U.S. 'IMICIALS ONLY
Do cumAnt No ? .?
. 0 DECLASSIFIED ?
NO CHKI1GE in -(7;:15. 0
NFIDENT ? ?
CIaBS. ChArnirl TO: TS
,Auth:
DDA nO
CENTR
IRFFFRDIPF ee\
pro'? W.ta ? 5" intio
edror Rdlease 2000/05/16 : C1AMDP137-40157R01713900270002-5
'Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
? 25X1 A 110741
SECRET
CENTRAL INTeLLIGENCE GROW'
-2-
its advocates; recently Oeudpo de Llano suggested the following three-stage
plan to the Peetender:. a) to restore the monarchy by cooperation with
Yranco; b) then to dispose of Franco; and 0) to make an agreement with the
leftists so that constituent elections might then take place, without
bringing the nature of the regime into question. It is to the Pretender's
credit that he did not accept. I know that be later received another visit
and the same peoposal, and that he gave the same reply. Monarchist activity
is very intease at present. They know, as do we, that Franco is much
weakened. I have a copy of a letter sent by the Secretary of the Pretender
to a friend of mine, in which he appears to be very optimistic concerning
Franco's early downfall, because of Me difficulties in internationel affairs
and because it is obvious that the domestic economic situation is Ceaotic.
He says that Lopez Olivan, a man of ability and prestige, has gone to New
York. Unser is also at present in New York, working feverishly on behalf
of Franco to arrange some loans. I have sufficient evidence of the financial
catastrophe of the Franvist regime. Gil Robles is now in Rome, having
arrived at the Vatican from England; his itinerary includes Faris, Switzerland,
Itelye Recent rumors indicate that the Pretender is in Tangier. All this
activity relates to the United Nations Assembly, the various factioas vylitg
for prestige. The Spanish problem is the 19th item on the agenda 0T the
United Nations meeting which has been called for 16 September. As to the
Security Council, my most recent information, which accords with Parodi'
prophecy previously brought to the attention of the Ministers, is that the
volume of more pressing business will prevent the discussion of the Spanish
problem. This i* not to be regretted, for at present we have few friends
in the Council, and if the Spanish matter were brought up it would only be
turned over to the Assembly.
2. *The preparations which I have undertaken with an eye to the Assembly have
been made known by means of a circular distributed to our various conetitu.
encies. In furtherance of them, a conference took place in London On 26 July,
to which I was invited but which I could not attend because of the vesting
of the Socialist Party at Toulouse. I received a list of the persees who
were to be called together in London for collaboration in action eeeinst
Franco. I was asked to name the Spanish personalities who, in my eedgment,
ought to be invited to the meetings. One of our friends had succeeded in
interesting three significant British persons in arranging a Londoe meeting
Of the outstanding Spanish anti-Franoists to consider possible soeueions
of the Spanish question, This conference, sponsored by Labor deputies and
leaders of the trade unions, agreed, in the name of their millions of af-
filiates, to exert pressure upon the British. Government concernin pain,
Furthermore, I sent Noel-Baker a study on economic sanctions, with apacific
details as to terms and as to the products the withholding of whic could
bring about the collapse of the Franquist economy.*
3. Llopis then referred to the outstanding nonederanquist groups other than the
monarchists: the military men and the Christian Democrats. He seed that
contacts had existed with both groups, although not so frequent as the
contacts with the monarchists. He said that the military men with commands
and potentialities for the creation of a strong group are all with Franco,
and that if they ever ceased to be obedient to Franco it would be eo proclaim
the monarchy. "This is the truth" he said, * as I can say from t:c experience
born of overtures made to them. As to the Christian Democratic glwups, I
will say that they are still without form or organization. We apeeeached
the persons who could signify a political directorate of these groees. The
principal meals Jimenez Fernandez, who is a great professor and e very fin*
person, but who lacks political flexibility. I think it will be very
difficult for a solid, extensive and strong movement to be built up around
him. Everything that might facilitate our joint action has been offered to
Jimenez Fernandez, from a post in the Government to cooperative aceivity
outside of the Government. The truth is that we have advanced very little
in any of these efforts, and throligh no fault of the Government.
SECRET
CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
- Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002rlo147
25X1A
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
-3-
4. III em sure that none of you have taken seriously certain statements which
have been attributed to me, to the effect that I have not been able to
bring to fruition the actions which the Government proposed becease of
difficulties which you have imposed upon me. I am sure that I have no need
to correct that unfounded lie, because you know, as I do, the trust you
have confided in me, and the facilities which you have given me to work
freely. I am particularly grateful to Varela for his kindness and gener-
osity in the correction of those unfounded reports. I have nothinc,bnt
gratitude to show toward the Cabinet, which in such an exemplary :wiener
has helped me to carry out the plans made."
5. Llopis read Uribels letter of resignation and called on the ministers in
order of precedence to express frankly their opinions on the present political
situation. He said that the Toulouse resolutions shaping the policy of the
Socialist Petty to the formula of the Tripartite Note and the resolution of
the United Nations and requesting that the Oovernment reduce itseli to a
symbol, had disrepted the ministerial program and weakened the authority
of the Government and of the Prime Minister. wSuch is my opinion,6 he
said. "Not wishing to influence my colleagues, whose advice I solleit for
comparison with sly own views, I will not say now what py decision ie."
6. After the Ministers had been invited to speak in the order of precclonce,
Llopis recognized Irujo, who stated: 'Ater the sessions of the Sceialist
Assembly in Toulouse, Ministers Santalo, Just, Valera and I, toglitlactrith repre-
sentatives of their political groups and of the Partido Federal hell several
meetings, to consider the problem that might be created because of the action
taken by the Assembly. The four ministers and the members of their party
executive committees were informed of the incidents which President Llopis
has just explained, in a report using terms similar to those employed by the
President. They agreed thek in case the impressions contained in that report
were confirmed, Just, in the name of the four, would set forth to the Cabinet
the terms under which the (straight) Republican ministers consider that the
Government can continue in the exercise of its function. At the lelt of
their meetings, at which the note setting forth those points of vice wac
drawn up, Santalo was not present, and therefore he will announce Iv'03 own
view, but nevertheless we can affirm that in a general way we were all in
agreement in our analysis of the situation and in the solution proposed.
Just, then speaks for 1213 all, at least for the three who particieated in
the editing of the noted
7. Valera, who followed Irujo, said that Irujo had expressed his feereees, and
declined to speak further. Just read the note which the Republicae Ministers
had prepared (see 5O-7674, paragraph 6), stating that its acceptanee, in the
opinion of the Republican ministers, would permit the continuance ee the
Government.
8. Santalo then spoke. He beema by confirming the statements made by Irujo
and Just about the meetings and about the drawing up of the note. 7e said
that he did not oppose the adoption of the agreement proposed, by tee Republican
ministers, although the formula had not been worked out with the Cetalan
reeresentatives, who were not able to attend the meeting.* He adeeeated that
each group keep its post and fill its function. He then recalled e proposal
formulated by Esquerra Republicans de Catalunya, anticipating the eresent
moments, which was presented to the Ptesident of the Republic and ehich was
not given the honor of being taken into consideration. Stressing the imp-
portance of continuing the life of the Government, he ended by asklng everyone
to seek a remedy for the situation.
25X1A
1111.111111,1Lommaent: According to the Esquerra Bepublicana de
Catalunya, Santaloos party, was represented at the 31 July meeting when
It was finally agreed to present the note at a cabinet meeting, but the
party reserved decision on the note until its executive committee- could
be coneulted.
SECRET
CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
25X1A
'Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
1107471
25X1 A
sECREF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
9. Montoliu stated that the Government ought to continue, and guarantee& the
cooperation of the CNT. He said that the circumstances were difficult
and that the Congress of the CNT had been inclined to revise fundamentally
the present set-up. Llopis, visibly annoyed, read a document attributed
to the National Council of the CNT, in which the resignation of its minister
from the Government was approved, and asked Montoliu if what he had just
read meant what it said.. Montoliu, surprised by the reading of that text,
asked who had authorized it. Llopis read the whole document which proved
to be the official text of the resolutions adopted at the last Coneress of
the CNT, the text also communicated officially to the Government aed made
public in the press, Montoliu attacked the policy of the Governebnt be-
cause it had not accepted the general line of conduct approved be the
ANY]) and because that organization had not been accorded the financial
assistance essential to its development. At this point, he said that be
would resign but would not resign, that he would withdraw but would not
withdraw, ending by declaring that for him the true government was the
ANFD. To this attack Llopis replied "I do not wish to disturb the atmos-
sphere of cordiality in which this meeting has been held, But I must
clarify Montoliuss insinuations in regard to the Interior and to the AliFD,
in what amounts to a reproach to us that it was not able to function for
lack of financial assistance on our part. I am still waiting for its repre-
sentatives to answer a proposal for a budget which I asked of them the
day following the setting up of the Government. On 27 June a new request
was made to them, and a proposal was made whose aim and basis for action
were the affirmation of the principle of defense of the Republic, and
they have not replied to that either."
10. Trifon Gomez then spoke at some length, The first part of his epoech was
devoted to an outline of the present situation. "After what occurred in
Toulouse, and in view of the resignations of the two ministere," he said,
"the Government cannot continue. The crisis is necessary. It would have
been so even without the resignations. The resolutions of Toulouse and
the sentiment of that Assembly would in any case have obliged the head of
the Government to ask for a vote of confidence," Re then went oh to
consider the Position adopted by the Republicans. He characterized their
proposal as made by Just as a formula of conciliation, generous and
indicative of a great sense of responsibility and political discretion.
He said that he greatly regretted that the situation created in the Governe
ment by the circumstances to which he had referred did not permit this
proposal to be converted into an agreement. He said, however, that the
ministers were not responsible for these circumstances, nor were the
Republican parties, national or regional, which on their part ha e done
everything in their power to come to a cordial, generous and poW.tive
solution of this matter. "The attitude taken by the Republicans in
this difficult moment gives assurance of the continuity of the republican
institutions," he said. "Me, in leaving the Government, do not go over
to the opposition. We cannot consider ourselves in opposition te a
Government composed of you," he said, addressing the Republicans, "We
shall then be friends, partners and loyal collaborators of the Gevernment,
although we may not form part of it. Our absence will be transieory and
will last a short time, months or perhaps weeks. We shall reture here
to collaborate with you. And when we retvrn, we shall not lave the .
opposition, because we shall never have entered it. The correct ead
united attitude of the, Republicans leaves us with an obligation. If I
concealed these sentiments I consider that I would not fully comply with
my duty in the present moment, a difficult moment, but capable f solution
because ;(3u will form a renublican government which will permit conti-
nuity of the Institutions and will preserve them for all, so that in the
not too distant future all of us can form part of the same goveeeeent, as
we do today." Trifon Gomez referred to the resolutions endoreine the
Republic adopted unanimously at Toulouse by the Socialist Party ee well
SECRET
CONTROL
LS, OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000900270002-5
This document contains information affecting. the
national defense of the United '7,tates within the meaning
' Approved FoolletlbasIKO11514ecepalpF/13140453%0:000$2701:02001ded?
Its trpnsmission or the revelation of ,its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
25X1A 44074:1
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
as by the UGT, In referring to the latter group, he said that it Ilas the
first 'time in its history that the UGT had declared itself officiaely re-
publican, adopting this agreement unanimously and by acclamation. Addressing
the Republican ministers, he told. them not to forget that they were thus
assured that behind them was the whole mass of the UGT, which loved, believed
in and wanted the Republic.
11, Speaking harshly, he characterized the statements of Mentoliu as inconsistent,
trivial and unjust. "Who but you," he said, "could quarrel with the attitude
of the Government toward the ANFD104 He said that the latter was at organi-
zation whose actions were stupid and equivocal. The attempts which it had
made to align itself with the monarchists had failed, because they could do
nothing else but fail, since they were not intelligently directed, but with
a-naivete unbecoming to those who considered themselves leaders of the re-
sistance. They were rejected with scorn and without any sort of consideration.
He went on to speak of the monarchists and of his relations with them. H?
repeated the statements which Llopis had made regarding the fourteen different
approaches and the eight in which he personally had participated. "The
monarchists," he said, " are mounted on their burro and. / do not grieve about
It. They want the aid of the republicans, but they want them to cease to be
republicans and. sumport the. monarchy., If they say anything else in public,
they are lying. We are in a position to prove their sophistry. They know
that they cannot go into A Plebiscite, in which their loss is a foregone
conclusion. Therefore they want the monarchist institution to continue. to
be by divine right, untouchable and indisputable, and they want us all to
accept it aprioil, without any reserve except as regards later agreement
OA the administrative and organic formulas of the Constitution of the State,
To the Government of the Republic, and solely to the Government of the
Republic, can the circumstance be attributed that the monarchy Is not already
ihstalled in Spain as successor to Franco and to Palangism. The plain duty
of the Republican Government and likewise of the reeublican parties, is to
maintain the spirit of the note read by Just, in order to impede the procla-
mation of the monarchy in Spain, a thing which might well bring on the disap-
pearance of the republican institutions. It is no secret to anybely that
in spite of the differences between Franco and Don Jean, the motaeehy is a
solution which would he much more agreeable to Franco than the Republic. If
the economic strangulation of the Franco regime which we are trying to obtain
from the UN produces retults, we run serious danger that Franco will call
the monarchy to succeed him. This should be prevented at all coins, because
it would mean permanent civil war. I say to the Republican Ministers who
will succeed us that it is essential to,maintain-the republican ieatitutiom0
with the greatest dignity possible." He then made allusion to the circumstances
which had terminated in the current situation. He discussed diviO.ons of
the parties, from which, he said, only the Basques escaped. He eeeel on the
same cordial.note on which he had begun, telling the Republicans eent the
Socialist were leaving the Government still feeling indebted to '6ele spirit.
of understanding, generosity and conciliation which the Republicans had
shown which spirit was sufficient guarantee that they all continuel to
share the common desire to maintain and strengthen the republican insti-
tutions, and eventually to take them to Spain, after the overthrow of Franco
was achieved and a suitable atmosphere created for the Republic aeain to
constitute itself in the place to which it was entitled,
12. There were various additional remarks by Valera, Just, Santalo, Meatoliu
and Trifon Gomez, all made in terms of great cordiality. Llopis ceded
the session with a long speech in which he summed up the situation, Bi
then left to present his resignation to Martinez Barrio, and returned a
short time later with the dismissal of the whole Government. Ha escounted
the conversation be had had with the President and announced the beginning
of consultations the following day, adding that he would advise tae formation
of a homogeneous Republican government, as the best and most feasible
solution for the present time.
ONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/05/16 : CIA-RDP82c9u457R000900270002-5