THE VIET MINH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 4, 1948
• Content Type: IR

,f
iiirtiatiapired For Release 4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WINTRY
SU8JEC
ORIG14N
?Tomb. Indo
te Vivi-.
25X1
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Ch4T
Minh
25X1
25X1
DATE: 25X1
45e ? tember
DIST. ;1).;;;;.1. .1.9147
PAGES 15
SUPPLEMENT
OuVRIBLerieli
3t
Wren 'WAR
Li
R&E J C&D La_
-I--
2 5X1
25X1
25X1
BACKGROUND
14 The first peel evoltin It.oceifee piace ie 1927. It as rut'
reprsed t ., 171e-eel leperialiets efi, not -eacceed in ceuele,,ee t
of the struggle, n the .:oetraryv it heeeroe Inree,dre and 6trcncer.. C.
1930 the l'relee''e4te Cerevre!ce, !tete' fe.,:e.7e.7i eesuit r
several ree:teee.3. C;;,!ruels rt1e or ft,f whi V been inspir(il
Third Int cle i7 1; The 1:oOiT("Zi corinunist affilfleted t;se
and submitte itte .to tee ee5sre ofr? the Mire' Inlernationel.. ehe
of 1930/31 eid nee :uac t ing eese2te from the eiint of
Indochinese indele eeece. leeeeeee fr6r the polnt ef view of the Ind
Communist Party tbA9 e7/20e.,- Ne.,ere a period of ho rie and exTeeaio
this decade; flizZ`r C..;.L 100 1, 'DRA.f7; eg yeueg t name le foe& it I opsib
leave Indochine 11:1 var'!' )1,7;3 TUTIteS 71:'; Eually eir via anee or
arrived in the13':I.:7eei, wt .re elee ;:ce-it-;: courses er ye-tying length wet Int.
The greater peoeui ,Jon ftt reeeeens attended clesses at the eun
University in Nose It thle University it wa exral1y recognized
Annawse converts 0i:eerie:ft 3111 1#0 :170 thou the VC'S t f?..7.tel1igent and as
any nationality. *e nueber o them attained the degree of "Agreges Re'
highest degree which thet se lee]. of COITIMUltirint accorded. 41,t the same
number of them esteeliehed themselves on terms of int: late friendship
French students or the Zuropeae seetion of the Uctrevueet 'University t
fol.expl the fe:teeezhii, tetweee 110 oh l Minh and .:.'%er Indochinese f.
with Thorez and ot'esr French Commurist leaders of future as well t
future Marshal Throe., eerie, In Indochina ire]!, after anothe7
struggle. from 71936 77, o 1939 he Ccrirunists fai3ed 't 7 make any importa.
CLAS8iF;CATI0N COTIDENTIn
DcivJrAt Yr",
17,
viz:. A SS reit
Ciess. eleNeet TO:
DDA AI,Nnts, 4
kith: DDA REG.
Dateli tJ1_
r-ees.
o r
TS
Apr 77
/76
jirit
Juno
;6:r of
-110
withs,
1tations
4:T.," of
,:dnese.
. During
to
tanco.
sen
at the
110118 of
e, the
3, a
oscow;
lente
with the
'lsperate
7ains,
25X1
s
1REFERAL CR L13141
25X1
aritill101110
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00080077000
25X1
3-5
Approved For Releate 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R0008007700
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
-2.
25X1
08-5
except for the coneolidati-1 ce'he Pam/ and the acquisition of new r-erutts.
Tlis was' achieviin desointe the re-t that a large number of the leadere :end Party
members were thrown into orfison, The last and most violent insurrectien before
the Japanese occuration was thii of Coehinchina in 1940: but it also rutlleesly
repressed, with much bloodshed. .ns a result of this repr.seirn, two 'mportant
leaders met their death: WIIH Kai, sister-in-law of VO nguyen Map, led
NGVFon Phone. These two lad been the Indochinese delerates to ,e 193P
World Conoress cE the Third int, rnati(nal in oscow. A ).are number Party
members in Indochina were throTh into prison: The Ienal colony of P( ito Condor
(Con-Lon, Cochinchina), where NCUYnr van Tao, DAD duy Ky, NOM!! an Ninh and
many others were confined; the Triscos cf Lao pao (106-40, 16-35), E'
(l0'-U1, 14-20), an re Thuot (10E-05, 12-40) in Annan; the rrisens r: Song-La
(103-54, 21-20) and Nohia-ne (104-311 21-35) in Tonkin (TRAN huy Lier as
confinrd at Nghia-Lo); and the Central frisces in Hanoi, Hue, Saigon led Vinh.
2. With the outbreak of th rar in Furoye in 1939, Germany's attack on
1941 and the complete ehaerc in the policy of the Comrunist rarties J
countries of the ,orld, the Indeelfreee norrunist Party, like the re:.
adopt new tactics, It ?8- to idc ireler et er the USSR to conceal he3
with the Cermunist -arLies cf ieri,us centries, in order to avoid r.
to the Allies who -ere hel-'-o the USSR in the ear. In accord with A
policy of the Th:ed Internatierol, the Indochinese Corrvnist Party lit
dip-vise itself an r tiro into secrecy. Ferino'rg in 1940 Oommunisr
rive rar to Natiealisr in "J.ndocnioa. Tile history cf Vietnan entered
rhase with this 'r rcrtant t. 'nene wliele was taken ny the Indochinese
Party; it was a turning or Teat ronseepence.
Jb USSR in
n all the
t, had to
eelations
n.ng offense
ceneral
to.
nad to
n new
enmunist
irvruoir-rT An JnnTRL7-rTS nr? V11 'T T.T.71! COnTRCL
3. reg!nning in 1940 and re cl':o elime at the end of 1941 arid the bE.1 ming
of 1942, there wale Wati-nalist f'eeelts ruch no those at Fac Son (106 2, 21-52)
and at Dinh Ca (11)6-04, 21-44), duerrilla arhies were formed. The IT rniam
Lneratien Army (Viet ram (ini-rnorg-q1pn) was founded. The Resist, Movement
against both the French anr Teraecse became est nlished. And as the e(anter-
mcaseres and orrrcssieo ter lloth the Frfnch and Japanese grew rrogrese ly more
brutal and unbearable, the lorle brear6 more and more rcady to Sein rolutionary
organizatiens. advcin,age of th's etatc of affairs, the Commul Party
embarked on the following tarties
(1) Creaticr of new reee'lutionary lertics such as (a) The Pemoc 1.c Party
(Dan Chu rang); this Tarty --r3.; in fact organized by a Communist, NGUN dinh Thi
who later--under the rrEsent Viet n'inh Coyernment--'recare Pr(sident c
Cultural Associat'en for Yat:eral nelfare, In organizing the "Deacer 0 Party
he we- assisted by DUOnG due Hioo, a former President of the Students .ssociation,
by VU dinh Poe, ni rr sent t'ei_ster of T?istice In the Vietnam Gover 'nt, and
by DO due nue, who became the nceretery-Cinerel cf the Democretic Par n (b) The
Vietnam Revolutierary Youth arty (Viet ram T'anh Wien each nenh Dom, .oi Hoi).
created at Liuchol (Kwarrsi, Cl-'ne) by 110. chi Vinh (nossibly under a lionym),
who retired as its leader shrtly after its cre-tion. (c) The New Vi am Party
(Tan Viet rr,,Y rree nang) rt el 7LT, also cre-ted by HO chi Minh, but or a
different ore cf his nueerce? aliases; thin tire, LY Thuy.
(:)) Strengthe-nino and c Leoirneerent cf the Indochinese Coommist rty itself,
but now in a more lel-tle and eeeret form.
(1) Cr- tion 'of Natiera' n:farc Associations (Doan The Cuu Quoc Examples
of thcee arc: NaLn nal nelfer( n:sociatiens of youth, of ',omen, of I. ants, of
)7ornere; and esrocially cf the PTe-Ven (Tv Ve Cuu Quoc)--"Self-Defens ssociations)
(4) Fermatice1 of a roli'ica: front: The Viet rinh. This Front, ' a-Tearance,
was the result of the merger of e71 the Tletiena elfere Associallons d of several
political eartieo of wh,ch the most important as the Indo-Chinese Cor nist Party
and the second meet important?but. 'far less so--the Democratic Party,
4? Turin" the Jamanes- Oecurnticr, te organizat'rn cf the Vi,' Minh was follows:
(1) On the 7)ne est level then- were the Tieu-To ("little nests"), V !eh in fact
were cells renoistieo of P te10 rersons each. Each Tieu To chose a .e:ate
Thede deleeates formed a comr.rit'ee on thr next hieler level. Thus, s ny step by
the 885T process on aserndie,' levrns, thr following came into existent
CeNFIDnnenen
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-
25X1
Approved For ReleaseRpy28/30,,,,p)1117,172c-RF47R00080077
?
-3..
(2) Khu-EJ--Committee for a Khu (district) in the coun-f-ry, or Thanh-Bo--
Committee for a town;
(3) Tinh-rw--CommIttce 20,, o
4) 'Cu-Bo?Committee for a Xu (largr rerjrnal division); and rim gy,
.(5) Tong-Po--General Directi,g Comittee.
The role of the Tin-To was that of a cell which multirlied and rccruiced new
party memhrrs. Th Tanh-Bo (Town Cormittees) and Tinh-Bo (Provincial qommittees)
organized Peolle's Committees which were at tat tine called "National Liberation
Committees." The PeoTio's Committees, :'urifr the Japanese Occuratio:, had a
character rhich wao at orre &minl3tr(tiv-, rditical and military. T e Tong-Bo
(General rireftinr Commitee) durinr th( Jaralz:se Occupation elected an Txecutive
Committee which wat name( the "Vietnam 1,111raticn Committee", with HO 4 ) Minh
as President. Aft'r th',: urrlinr nf Aurust 1",5, it was this Committe( , with the
addition of a few nemlurs wile were neutral an( in rarticular harmless, lich
became the ProvisA, Covernrem. The Tieu-'Jc2 oo longer havinc any : -ticular
function to fulfill, (Alarrealed, and the Peort-*s Committees became tl
provisional organs -)f addlinistraticr,. liorever, they soon tended to bee
Flectoral Colleges )ily) leaving all active adri,i-Aratirn to the "Exeo-ive
Committees" of ti-e 'oo3"_e's Cf-pittees.
r
. In August 1945 the tie' V,n1 o.;1.2.. the po-Er in -'he name-of the People cild
formed a Nat1rra.71' , ,i,vcrnrnt. '2111:. Government oas a Provonal Go % .,iment
ane was recornized :.s illa. I,; 7flo C:e Viet rinh \hich dominated both f?,L5
Covernrent and the :(irle's CoilLIc,,,es; and, more ,v2tIcular1y, it was
Communist Party rld("t ,'orinatec t le Viet Einh. (3e1 raragrar)-s 23-40 f( ' Eistory
of Viet rinh rasio (.1.1c:i rrof, .1?i,f," 1-,,o 17)47),
6. But the Communists ..,!,nter' knoTn to the reorl of Vietnam and th
at larre that Vi-tri 7:as a "Dcrc zorn nn' that the 'tetnrim Govc.vnment a
"Dcmocrotic" Cover- rt /-,-r,,ented all -f th, reorle and ! ,luded
non-partisahs also, :or,se-lu(nt-:.y, ", February 19/(,, ,?lectir-nsw held.
Fror the Viet r:,W r,'n% 02 vie tl' follc-inr is t.'e ;tory:
"Lone lists o arddatew.:TE t-(sonted and I1L12,07,tc macl?_ry set ..2; to
make certain ti, true si,s or tie reoy ?slcud h( ex:v-ssed. 'et
since if wa th rt rereal eiectien ev r 1 ld Jr Vietnam, `,h(- vo s
natura115, ,. 7 a:Ct. f.on ?(Hf,7bedy, and was necessary Hr th ro-
visional 'o Trovid,,2, th;t:,.dance. Th,s s'hey by
meals of n a6eq'litc "Inforrat, crr 3.ervite, wil?t pave the ,e6,1e th, -cessary
details who were t1( truly latrJeti andidates. The r n was
that thr people 7)ted overwl-clrc2-Fly for a Coation Government--whtc:, Included
represeatives o all al-L(,:1 an: a nuir(r of 'h'partisans. Thus
as
impossJlr to Lose the V:,,-tn(r. Government of L. ,,ch 1946 of being do ,1 lated
by a ,i1T1d larv% , since t as elected by univer', 1 suffrage of all t
prorie and eci,.,_ff,d only a dre'ity of Viet tinh mbr's. An: this ,
certanly had qrht tc br Hvovernment, t,111( it as a arty w
rerr .3ented a eerLip pereci.v-of the oorulati(n a23o had the r. y a
hn,: 1: led the si:if-gle for he vo-ntry's inde!enden,o, ll7iy, i as
iLrossible to ace the Co:, on., f fart:, of dor,r&tinr the Viol, Minh, asnIch
ie., in rovertEr 19! the comrunfFt iarty voluntarily (ssolve-1 itself , ti
-
ood of the Republic."
On hi-!-et level (1, c Coi-ernmLnL), this was c Co-ri,nst-dor Ited
st'to in arrearance. C. the lo-or levcis t was now, at lecw in ori-earanc the
I.' oriels Corriti-es ba -:(re in cflarr of local afrinlsir t,:n.
7. The nature of the adrin'
Government (3o7toml:.rr
and rr-sint
there Is the Vietnam Cc-;,ftsed (even now) of 1
r:he Vit rinh fail to 7.c
otr en of indoe; ina as it evolved Lier Lr Provi
4Fehruex 1)4(,), the Coalition Gove_nmen`,
Vietnam Co-cr-rent is an follows: On .,!-d 7t-A.1;cst 1
ernmont itoelf, viichIs, as the Viet /}cihi r-,Int co
rs ( ' -qrtios and sore nor-rart\san
int out that ?11l the ment imortent po5 ar eut
CoNFIV 1, 25X1
sters.
by
,.....?._
1, I ,., I LALI V
p L.,,,,,,,, 4, .1E , .pt ! ,,? ,
' c) eN ,
x.ts TI,M,1.46514
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
Approved For Releast-RFAIVA522gftM8M1007R000800
0008-5
25X1
Viet Linh members. The Covernno1-0 {-tees directives and crliers to tae txecutive
Committees on each level: no (the three large dIvisions of Toridn, Araam,
Cochinchina); Province (Tinh); ristrici (Huyen); and Village (al). Tt
Executive Committees of the ka and Tinh are chosen b: the People's Cor it,tees
of those divisicn:, with the a-rroval of the Txecutive Committees on h ecier
levels. The People's Corritia=es are elected by he 'people by direct u,versal
srffrape. The Executive Committee of the no is chosen he all the Fxer-tive
Committees of the Tinh in that 90; and the Executive Comrittee of the Poyen is
chosen by all the Executive Corrittees in the Xa of that Huyen Thus ;.ere is
at least an arreararre of der,cratic methra's of choosing thc local adr nistration.
rtut the Viet Mint intimate ti
"It must br recognized t.t. Viatnar has eratoyed the benefits and lotfilled
the duties of 'Demooracy- for only a very short time. Democracy represents
the most reasenable rolisical trPnd for the Torld in general; and mast there-
fore be prfserved in Vietnam at all costs. Vietnam must certainl: not retrace
its sters and r turn to 31aorry and feudalism. Th.rofcre it is ert'rely
loairal to fear that the reorle's Cormittees mirht risunc:erstand ry orders
of the Governoent and ri roo the risk of rfvertinr to the Imre, -at
aosition of the frrrer 411(ro;ells des rotal-les' which -ore rere ru,pts of
the Frrnch. In order to. or t-eract an evil which is rore than a sibility,
ane to avert t'is donrer it in logical to rrovide these Too-le's ommittees
(or their rae7.otive Gera tt) with Advisors."
This has been doro with rreat coercy and efficiency. At Freocnt such a visors
arc very nurcrous arid roe erono-.terce in variruo ferns (Fararrt:hs
State Can-no
The State Can-Po (Can no !rhe 7uoc) , This 1,crr ray hedefin(d as "!.on rs
provided by tirr 2late" (See rota torrtnology at era- CP rep
fiurina the Japanese Cco' Tati r the Coo-no were aoarts who had already Teived
adelra'e training .arost earl 'ere yciano roaolotionarics, In ti Tions
controlled hr the 'Jet rirh ouarril1as there were about 30 Car-Po schoo The
course lasted free' 115 to 30 ,a.ys rach school coarrhsed taut 30 stu .ts, who
were being rrerared to 1-ercre at the sere tire political leaders and ,,,!rrilla
chiefs. Som( +reinirr -ai r-von in rolitical doctrine and organizati but
priociral emphasis was (r course on rilitary zatters--wearcns, ieioli .ns,
sabetare, esplora o. The re' rses were conducted by Can-ro, the stude them-
selves bccoriro rotential (arello oron ihe co tietier. of their -ourse. he
irrortance V-eat !tol to those qohcals Is evale:ced by : ae fact
that they were oroaani7ed h 140 -hi Frill 1-1rse:f are his irredilte ent .oage of
senior political aderi., sr :eray insrired schools were h,P even - the
regions defiri'ely controller' by 'Jto Jalaresc. These schools :ere of ursa
clooducted in Frcat oecrecy, ond roaed a'oot frequently from r)doe to .ce. The
eueler of ,r each ct sually not ;,cre .t.'-an 10 at an one tit - In
Vats latter tyre -f ,r4leiral earhanis :as en educatian fo larv'estine
rolitical organisation ond poi,l000C,a to create thy gre 'oot -ossible mber of
Tieu-To, and to oloT nca rerooi?,- eleaeotar:- leo-ors in weapons in or to
enal-le the to deCond -Ureraelvoo ord to cruani2e the "Tu-Ne" clf Ief e Units .
and to ansaosioato Ja7arese Tro-Jaren, 3' tr''ters r!en necc oary. fter the
Jaranese Surrondea ;test a!' t.e country came ealokly unr'er the dor:Inst. r of the
Viet rinh; corseqoently the ferara Can-'c orratly exceeded the sui -'y and it
vas receosarT 'o rrtn nm-: ores hacti17, Can--o sr' cols srranr ur in tntity.
rtriog the -rriodo of the Pr t oisi-2 al Govern nt artl cf the ic-1::tien a a. rnment,
rocr?tie-o yore lo:- lor-rtlnt; therefore, althourh rJ:itary ocirline
continued :to ho ea'ervee in tla? n-' ools, leas than half of the course. ,ere
military; tle rera'rder wer. en ,(::tIcal selatects Ar., the teconique o (rope-
randa-arartierlari: a -r Clrlo of tla Viet 'int, Party an( ti" , it
Government. At t' sane care ti-r Icopoor, there ,erf sore Can-'o ho rece 'ed acre
"let lied r'litar: sastrootifo; t'r:e were rer were destined to ta! charge of
the crrariza+4en (Tu-ve) which :ere to replace the ,' lee and
fulfill the sate anotiros, Py 4?9 tire, the Tu-Veo-originally rati ,a1 Nelfare
AsscciatIrls for 5elf-1efense--'oae ceased to be Nati(nal Welfare Assaf oAiens and
had "-,ecore a rerc srecialize isird cr organ37at-,o (See raraorork 11) ;Mile its
25X1/
=FEY,.
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
Approved For Releasea3g704346k4i6146-660AR000800770008-5
25X1
primary functirn was tlat of a Militia and Police Force, its intimate knowledge
of local conditions and leronali'les even within a minute quarter of a city
(the Tu-Ve were organizedotroets and hlocks within a city) result in its
intelligence bervicee being culled upon by various sorts of political and police
organizatirns (see below) toolvally also, as Naticnal Welfare Aseoc4ctions for
all class s an caterories sprang up in almost every regicn, the Viet !Intl deemed
it neresqary to rrovitle them -nit, Specialist Technical Advisors (Can e Ky Thuat
Chuyen he), such as the Can-4o assiEned tr advise the local Nati-nal ,olfure
Associlt!cns of Iea-ants, of Fnrrers, of Nor'ers, etc. The State Can-ro as the:
creually d;velered in the F.ovisional anc'. Ccalificn Goveronerr% periods into
the full flowering of the rresent period may be divided roughly into several
catcrories:
(1) Can-Po for adrinistrativc services--to help the Exccutivo Cwmittees of
the People's Comnittees.
2 Mtlitary Can-Po for the crganizaticn of Local Militias.
( 25X1
0 Can-Po for the Cultnral Associatirns and for Propaganda, excivaing the
teachers used in the program cf mass educat4cn in reading and writing.
(4) Can-Po to act as Srn:ialiot Technical Advisors--for Anriculturs, Handi-
crafts, Fighway C:TmlIsions, etc. Ts category is given only enough o,litical
indoctrination to make sure ."hat they will net run counter to governmenn directives,
(5) Can-Bo to act as nr, Meld' representatives and observers in .leiahhorirg
countries
9,, State Can-no are usually cho en from anon E the porulaticn of the locally to
which they are de5-tined to anoirned in order to be on more friendly Lald
intimate terms with the reorie with whom they have to deal. The State ran-Bo
ForriAa sursrficial instruec'n in Viet Linh organizaticn and doctrine. In the
instructirn on doctrine, a cnrtir amount of Marxist phraseology is used; but the
theory enunciated is chiefly "anti-Fascist"; much emphasis is placed on,the
dominant role of the "majority.' This is becauE,e the Viet Minh do not oish the
true Communist character of th( tc.tc to be toe widely known among the ',tate Can-Bo.
PurinP the course of instrocticr on doctrine, discussien groups are fre:nlently
'cad, 'hich enables the instructora to fulfill another important (sec2 t) role:
that of spies for the Goyormnnt, for the Turiene of checkirg on the :ralty,
opinicrs and activities of local allele:Ls. The St te Can-Bo are give i titles
indicating the function ohlch tYey falfia; for example, Mr. X is a I ,paganda
Can-Pc; tr. Y Is Ye t Can-ro, r s an :,rIicultnre Can-Pod o Th cs a:Len-Bo
receive their tr,' ,ing i se' nolo controlled IT the r(sree'ive Ministr '.s; for
examrle, Administr tive an-no 1- school contrcr.ed by the Ministry c' the Interior.
These schools are more or less overs.:thot is, C,eir existcnce as well no the idery
,of the pupils is '.nown. The oorrseo arc ernfidentiall and stronrero &o not
permitted to attend. ncse Can-c are teoretically under the orders i the
Ministry TI'ler ants them, and ti.eir rower is confined to the fund c.i and
area specifically ass:lc-rod to them.. As seen as one or them is assinec o a
certrin locality, he proceed to that locality and reRains there with . Peoples
Committee or o Welfare Associati(n of that, locality. They fill the role of
advisers to these Coomitteen or tl'o;e Associaticls and submit their re;oots to
their rc7reelive riristre.J. iu i r(0,23ty these rercrts are oulmitt:c through
another Committee, known as the "Tint Minh Committee
11122111I-Einh-galriat222
10., The Viet 1 inh Commi tees (Uy-nun lie: Li oh). Mhourh the urrisi:, of
resulted in tic scizure of re er hi the Vietnamese, the Viet Vtchntil.
to find To s-ons fcn not ananOon'nr its role, claiTinn that:
"(1) The Viet Minh is a ,folitical Front which led the Vietnamese r,
freedom; (2) Tic Viet Mini is a Front 19hich Terin!ents a pot oft
and (3) The Vit Minh claims the privilege cc being the Front whin
the most revolutionary and most democratic restioe; therefore, it
of continuing ,o guide the Troll(' along the lath of 'democr-cy', a.
thf- People's Cormitteos from dereneratng into Reactirn, These Pe(
Committees, of course, arc Cormittees ciente(' by tie people, but an
sAjfet to human error which vould run th( risk of injuring rather
the people," 25X1
colFlUo -1-n"
Joust 1945
ontinued
rle to
masses;
presents
the duty
preventing
naturally
an serving
REFERLNCE CENT k LIBRARY
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
'REFERENCE CENTER LIBRAkil
Approved For Release .?..0911/Relitricztrni,,-08TtFjp000800770008-5
25X1
The funetices of the Viet Eilh Committees which consist o rersonrel who are
State ran-o, arc tis follows:
(1) To act es advisors to the Peorleis Coemittees and the rxecut ee Com-
mittees of the Pecrleis Comr4ttees. The Viet Virh intiate that
since it is the duty of the Viet V.-irh Corrittces to act as advisere to the
People's Committees, it is entirely lorical that the Viet linh Comittees
should control the activities of the Stf.te Can-Po, who are at the 3me time
themselves advisors to the Peerle's (ommittees and (nearly all) rhers of
the Viet Yinh Party. T17lse Can-"o must Ty advised hew to obey both the State
.and the Party"0
(2) To continue to aet as "Fnlir'Iteners" of the ?eerie, inasmuch the Viet
Eirb is a "revoluticrar7 ane a derocrritic" rarty. In order rrr:erly te fulfill
t' Is second funct4rn, it le necessary for the Viet Yinh Committees to extend the
circle of their nctivities ale to r'cruit new Party Tembers to consol-dlte the
Party's rrsiticr in the rarTs of the reople. The sl-plest method for 'le Viet
rel..nh to aceorel'eh tiI rurrese is:
(a) To serree Troraeanea or 1,ehelf cf thc --rty ane of the Gov lement at
the same time; t1-:is rroraganla is maee ur by the Proraeanda Can-Bo an( the
Cultural Associat/(ne;
? (b) To ex4end the activity of the Nat4cnal iclfare Assrciation- and to
arouse everyboey eo becore a rember of one or rem of these Acv3c(iat Farners
are rut under rrrssnrr to join Farrerts Asscciatiens, women to join-4 ranis
Assoriations, isael,crs to on Pers Associat4cns. Pressure to joi these
Associations rests on the thesis thst they are essociatiens for Publi ,elfare
(the Annamese name l'qs alreqt tlo sier4ficance of Illaticnal Srlvatior , and that
it' is the duty of eeeryone to he Tatriotic and to work for the salvat of his
fatherland and naticn. Thus, without beloneinr to any rolitical Tart, at ally
it is sufficient for a rersrn to eri any one of these Associations to find
himself in the Vet Mieh. This lesees no oprortunity to the individe ... to join
any other party than the Viet VIA% This situation has been conraeteiy fulfilled
in nearly all the rrovinces, hut to a siirhtly lesser extent in the c.'Aies, But
in the cities as well thi pre-Gin:es there is always a Teredy in cale the ,
reelllation Is reluctant to :Icin the Associatices. This reredy is ca2. d the ',-;ong-Ar
paryzU
(c) The Gong-An (Pub3ic Safety or Surete). The Viet Kith Ter out that
"the Peoele'e Corittc te care rf admiristration in the varic localities
and, with the aid of Cee-90 ard of Viet Mirh CorTiitees, are char y3 with the
'"uty of inrrevine rereitirrs In tl-et lo ality and of advaerine tt mork of
reconstructier in order to make the people hal-ey This, therpfoz, is a
ronetructeve and rceitiee t'sk. The Cone-An, on the other handy charged
with a ''estrective drty--not, of course, deetructive of the procr .s of
recorstru,t4-r. and bae-iness, but deutruc:tve of tic eleicnts ane factors
--t4ch are tt.erselvet :lertrertivc of tat Irogress--or, a regativr uty so to
sreak--that of se-ere:P.44-- thc elerent4 an( factors eich deny t: -csitive
value of that rcsitive eoele,"
The a-ents of the Con--An arc called Trinh-Sat (Trilh rears to eerier( r to co-quer;
but also ecaes e!reer or ur*--ei'diced;")Lkt mernE to cbserve,) The Tr -Sat of the
Cor-An must not corfnree it} the Cvil Yolice -hich are l':.orn as e-An for
the rrovinres and ranh-Sat Per the cities. '.:!or should it be cenfused ?.-th the Tu-Ve
or rilitia. Yest e the Tri ,bee;et are ardent youne men eith zealous 100 alert minds,
,Some of them aro eraduatee re Can-Bo schools. Otters are veteran memt Les of the
Viet L'irh Party focr the eaee of the Ja-anese Cccuration. There are ' ,t kinds of
TrinheSat for the eong-An: ?41) TrArh-Set Chinh-tri (Political Trinh-e,) They
are charged with relitical arfairs and 'eve the duty of watch*!-e suse; OUS
charicters and ralccrteetc---n a word t-csr who belong or m'eht belom ,o a party
other than the ViPt Yinh ane who rirht riot against the Government. Trinh-Sat
Kinh-te (rconomic Trinh-Sat) They are obargcd with economic affairs (?ad have the
duty cf 'rrostirating smumrlinr, garbling, thefts, crires and all und, eaorld activit:
The Trinh-Sat have a rreat deal of rower, As seen as they she their credentials to
the local authorities, they .re riven all eossiele assistance. Altho 'a the Govern-
ment of Vietnam has declared that "Vietnar is a democratic country ane therefore has
no Secr't Police", ie rust b- admitted that the activitics of the Tri h.-Sat are
always secret, 25X1
CC,TTIT; 'JL
-6-
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
, CENTRAL INTKLIGLee2 GROUP
-7_
25X1
The Tu-Vc, althourh they are not directly charg-d with the duty of prevantine
the reople from de-meting from the rath of "derocrecy", are exceedingly ueeful,
because of their intimate knowledge of local core:iticre and rersonalities, in
assisting those 170 arc more directly charged with this duty. (See paragraph 8)
The -resent ce?e'nis+retier of Vietnar has a acre ec,ular base than tie- eh:ch
existed uWer the French realre hecause of the eurticiratirn of a arer r number
of stenta cf the recele The ri(t rirY dorrates this adm'nisirat5cn, The
Viet rinh i'-self heccre a very broad Front ecause of the extensila eartici-
ration of the dif'ee-nt strata of scelety. Aceordine to the Viet Yinh theme-lves,
the 'Mi.,- r'rh Free' is the rrsu.:t of the "fueien of several rolitical rarties
ate of elfrcrent le3fare Assoe!;itrnst The General Pirectil ?,orrittee
of the Front (Tong ro Viet nh) is coeposee of delegates fror those 11:itical
rartiee ane those Aesociatiers. The Directing Corwittee gives orders ed
direetiv'n to the Repi(nal Ceerritteee or the Viet Minh, to the local 1.1,icnal
lelfer( Asseciat!ons, to the -an-Bo and to the Trinl -Sat of the Gone-p
Naturally thee crders -re ccorelnated rith the ver-us riristries of ,;:e Govern.
merit , Nitheut the Viet r'nh 3creittees, the lutlic 'selfare Associatic al, the
Sete Can-Po and theeTrirh-Sat of the Cone-An the Viet Pia would lose rentrol
of the recr)e, -entre' of the arrInistr,tirn and control of rower.
13., The met irTe:tar party of the Vit rrh vas the Indechinese Corrunis Party,
and naturally Its delegates hecere mem'ers of the Viet Eleh Tonr-Bo. .L as
tl.e Viet t,..:1;:h assumed the miseicr of serving the Fati..n, it has to ser also
the (derece-itic) tovernment or that ratirn--the hirhest organ reer(sertEtive
of thc ricsna!rose nernblic. 'ecarse of this r seien, ane in a esire tr avoid
rerrittire either the Geverneent or the ratien free arpearinc too Cor listic
in the e:T:, of tl'r eorld, the Indochirese Ccerunist 1art voluntarily 2-a3olved
in reverie. 1945.
Imeeeiately after the dissolpticn, this Fatty eac rer3acee by the Assc
for rares4 3tl'ei_rs. In tr-carance t' !s Isac-iaticn is col- rSfe of p,
wish to study ',le ,h12osoe'leal theory cf rareile? "with( ut the lealt
of elYr274,"C 4t 4" rraCtlee." It -rlishes books and ?a newsaaaer whict
Corrunit teWerp; for eeerrle, ii ccoo- 211.-That ("mtalth"- cf. Pravd:
rlee'r Cee-in'e+ in tone; aled it enjoys ar erivilege than the non-t
244_1 eraan of the Tena-Pe itself.. The Ocveenrent, clai inr to be
"Der:? ',le' -no, 'ntira4ee that
is entirely natural that tl ere sheu30 be freceor of thought a
rrees and thee such lealleatie s sh-uld be eermitted."
The Virt r1".1 also Intimate that, hecauee the Aolociatlen is a -rivate
meeite eeturel that the public should know cf only onereeresenta
assecla.len, rarely rr eHAN van Moe., and that the names of the
sheeld -,t aelear rublicly "
leaar22 'Viet ir rirectier -orrittee)
15. Put what is not at all natural 'Te that even after the dissolution of )
chinese Cornunlet Party 3te revere reeberc contlnued to remair eember:
Viet rinh Tong-Be Per exer:lr, he official spokesman of the Viet Mi
is still roryTT ?Ilene an icreelly eel: 'eel= ee a realer cf the Corr
better 'neer lee !h( n:chrare f eao-re ("Re:, Oaar"), and affect'onatel
Anh-Ca ("Flder rether") +c, ail Can-Pol (1 whew ee is the official ch=
more, the Toe--T'o !,e always sereereeed be an a4rostlere of the ereatef
public oelnion 'ea- for the Teea-Pc (rether than for the Govererent) a
respect -lieh eersines veneration, fear and eeeeeeive consideret'cn.
the Tong-Po la officia3le corer-eel -f d'C)A CC (Iele atee, the teal Tcnr
of eo-i-!ttee 'ith'r a cc-ritt:e) 's rer:ncee of ahont 1C members
25X1
1.ation
rens rho
reentien
erhibit a
is
C;entiens
of the
cae, it is
Ire of this
ier members
e Indo-
-! the
Tong-no
eeist Party,
anown as
Further-
eystery;
ling of
aehough
-'10 (a sort
o sufficontly
WIEREN,L
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
ki
kil
Approved ForReleaSiNOMM57,1ClinalliZMEA57R0008TE6008-
.8.
mysterious to be little known and who are certainly neither members of the
Democratic Party nor delegates from any of the Natitral 'Nelfare Associations.
They must therefore belong to the Co-munist larty.
16. It is quite well known that the Tonr-ro rives orders and directives t- the
Regional Committees of the V.Let rinh, which, sith their Associations, heir
State Can-Bo who are members o/ the Viet rinh, and their Trinh-Sat of Cae Conr-
An, control the leople's CorrIttees which arE charged with local admilintrtticn.
But it is far less well know: that the Tong-Bo the h=ghest orman of Viet
rinh, is constantly arprehensive that the Peoples Committees 'Eine?eve A more
important--the Regional Committees, of the Viet rinh, may stray "unintnitienalle
from the desired path. Fnr this reason they have decided to place Can-Po
Viet rtrh or Can-B0 Cuu QV?C (Viet rinh Can-Po or National Welfare Can-o) in
each region.
312111:1.1.ezds_sx vatierIllagartjaa:Ru
17. Tho Viet rinh Can-Po must lot be confused with the State Can-Bc? rho relort
to their re:Tee-Ivo rinistrins and whose authority is strictly limited to their
assigned duties within their a-sirned arras. Although the same Annamese word,
Can-Po, is used to 'esirnate these two different categories of men, the mord
Can-Bo as applied to the Viet dnh Can-Bo has i.e r,Tlish equivalent; Its French
translation is "cadre". The Viet rinh Can-Bo is a norson who can mn"ne decisions
on all military, political and economic affairs in :the reri-n to which r3 is
anno4nted. The following is an examrle to illurtrete the functirn and authority
of the Viet rinh Can-Pc:
Chem-Ve is a suburban di-t/ict of Hanoi, ettrndArn for a distnce of nearly
20 kilometers alorm th( right bark of the Red Rix'''. In this district at the
ere) of 3945 and thc beginning of 1946 there wero 6 Viet Minh Can-Bo, cf whom
ore, by the name of CHU, was tln- most imeortant. He was directly rnsin?31ble
to the Tong-Bo of the Viet rint, not to the Government. The rroof of -ft:9 fact
'sat that when, for personal r:asons, be had arrested 22 young girls or v trumped-
up charge of Trotskyism without co-sulting or recoivinr The approval of the
local Feenle's Committee, he refused to yole.14 to the demands of HOANG PiD* Giam,
rinister of the Interior, that they should be released.
18. The Viet Minh Can-Bo not only does pot take orders from the Peopleos C'
but hirdelf rives orders tb it. He has the rover to control commerce,
portation and corrunication. He can cormand the lwal militia (Tu-Ve)
local office of the'Sureze (Conn-An) and the local units of the Army 1
For examrle, in January :.946 the same CHU mentioned above Used 200 sol
kill all the 70 members (f a local unit of the Chinese occupsAional fo
rossession ef their arms and throw the bodies into the Red River. Thi
however, cr.,' rent too far. The result ra that Vie Vietnam Gonnrnment
indemnity te the Chinese, nnd Clu was executed as well as the looal mr
corrander rho had obeyed his orders.
19, It is clnar thal- the Viet rinh Can-Po is a very ronerful finurn, and r
rose "enlightened" viers norrand great r-srect. He is res-onstble on
..bod;' of ten mon wl-Ich constitute thc true inner circle of the Tcrg-'3o
Viet rot.' In choosing the Viet rinh Can-Po, therefor, the Tonn-Do t
to confine Itself to men rtom they can trust absolutely, in order to
least possible risk of buncling the orders of th( Tong-Bo and to mCite
carr:ing ck.'t its policy without deviation. Since the true Tong-Pc ir
.onsists exclusively of memters of the Co7runist Party of the Third In
,it Inay he lorically deduced that the Viet Minh Canuxo can hardly avoid
me7.ber7 of the Communist Party,
vwittee
trans-
the
fn)rs to
,T3s, take
time,
lid an
,ary
nnief
, to the
the
tns care
n the
'.ire of
circle)
ennatirnal,
.ning
20,A The schools, in which are trained the guiding stirits of the Viet Minh Ci their
rntential successors, exhibit even mere striking *peculiarities than 7n which
' 25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
Approved For ReleasepAR9.81EktaHRF132dpip7R000
s9s.
the State Can-no are trained. The very existence of these schools is 8
closely-guarded secret. At these sehools the training is highls sreciolized and
Is rure Comsunism. The ilsiortence with which these schools are reserded by the
hirh command is indicated by the fact that HO chi Linh himself someti-es gives
lectures in them. In these lectures he addresses the students as "Celradeu are
they are invited to address him similarly. Occasional lectures are a given
by VO nguyen Clap, rHAr van Dons., TRAr van Giau and other leading Cor esists.
The regular lectures, or course, are given ,7 instructors of less imp JSance,
whose time is not fully occupied with other duties. Courses isclude 'e following:
(1) Definitions?liberty, derocrscy, corrunism, etc. (2) History of he
Communist Party. (?) Mass ssychclosy--how to lead the masses by flat,ery or
control then by fear, etc. (4) Foe to orgenize reasant and workers ements.
(5) How to sabotage Trotskyiets and the rationalist Frcnt. (6) How tL rganize
hunger strikes In rrisons and ether strikes in French-controlled terr- rys
(7) How to terrorize the porUia4len in French-controlled territory.
21. Technically, the lectur,S arr of high suality. The theories expresser
and coherent and a wealth of concratc exarrles is giver.. Ssecial
invited to se-count personal experiences to illustrate theories, such a
hunger strikes in French prisors. Many of the textbooks used are secs
the lectures, they are clear and ccncrete. Some are translatisns or E
fror the Russian, Exan!les of these include: extracts from thc works
and SVIlin, Manifesto of the coPmunist Party at the Third Intcrnationa.
new Stalinist theories s fch ev,lored after the expulsion of the Trot
the "Death-Struggle of Cap5ta1l3e, The eureose of these textbooks is
the Soviet doctrioe'sseeificolls to Indochinese froblcss. Other textb
written by Vietnamese--always unier a pseudonym0
22.
are clear
ners are
j that of
2t. Like
'aptations
If Lenin
(19307),
tuistso
apply
sks are
Amearance versus Reality
It may therefore be concluded that the ar'nistretien of Vistnaro, with aSs
Governnont and its Peorlots Ccerittees, has a deoccr-tic asssaranee; it is
Under the control of the Viet rnh; the Viet rioh ?rent, in turn, is under the
contra of the Indochinese Cusunist Party, desse1te the fact that the rasty
was dissolved in 1945.
HISTORY CF VIT rI-11 PUTC ICIaCY---1945-1947
23. O. ing to a flexibllo solicy, the Indochinese Corrunis4 Party, through the Viet
Minh?after the laLter had leecomc a broad Front with the rarticisatien o:' broad
strata of the people?Imposed to ,olitical control over Vietnam: it ov& came,
without toe much difficulty, the so-called Natisnalist Parties (Q.D.D.v hong
Minh Hal, etc.) are out uf s determined rosistence first against the demonds of
the Chinese Occusaeien troops are leter agesfnst the French.
2,0 The following factors and con tions were fevers:bit to a general insurrection
of the Viet Minh at the time when it actually took rlace, in the summer :f 1945:
Internal conditIons in Vietnam: (1) War, poverty, fa" me, Orought. -.2) Ruth-
less oppressicn by loth F'ench and Japanese. (3) Consicous awakening by in
()Messed people; i difference toward deeth, which often seemed prefer to
the u&earable conAirns of life; ecnsequent readiness to join levolut lary
,organizat*ons (4) Esergence of the Viet Vinh Front with, or of, the Jsschinese
Communist Party, at the most favorble resent; flexibility of its strut -Ey, which
shifted emphasis asay fror Communism to raticnalism,,
External conditicsS: (1) Iicrld Sar between Axis and Allies?propase ,'s of
rn and of future frefdoe to e ac ordee to these who participat? on
the side of the Allies; consciousness of their own strength on the part 0 ' the
Teeple in general and of the eeople of small countries in particular. f: Con-
flict between Jaranesc and Fr-ech Imperialism; these two oppressive fore: were
were
=estroying each other and ma!-ins rcrr for a thfrd force?that of rcvoluil )n.
CONFID
a
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
Approved For ReleaaE1100.310ata5FITCLAWDB821-00457R0008007mq-
-10-
2 . In general it was these coeditions whlch favored riots, revel and, atoire
all, organized revoluticn. All classes in Vietnam were rrofoundly affecteds
The proletariat sere the most exrloited of all, the workers beine kept in
subleetii,n Le a lets which -"RS more military than civil, and being red- eed
to 'eats of burden rather than human beingsc The reasants, under insreas-
inely difficult economic conditions, were deprived of their tiny rror rties
and died of farine and disease. The Petite-Bourgeoisie became disloc
runcticnaries were poorly raid, small merchants were no longer able t 'ind
goods to sell; swell artisans eonld not find the necessary materials :es their
handicrafts. The rich rourgeois were turned out of their properties, houses
and factories by the military There was only one category of the ref le who
rere able to profit by this state of affairs: these who served the .1: ranese,
who made profits in the black market, illegal acquisitiens of lard and Porce-
ful cerfiscations,
26. The Viet !nh in the face of the general discontent of almost all cles es and
with the change ir etraiery of thr Indoetnese Coerunist Party: advoeLtsd
coorrratien and thc nler of all classes in a bread Front. There was t) be
reither a dtctairrohir of the rroleteriat nor a dictatorship of caritellsts;
no one class ra- te doeineie the oilers. Th're ra- to be only a geneaal Front
for inderendence, and against ortreesien, Fascism and imperialism. 11( ewer,
since the various eLass s had intercets which vere somewhat creosed to one
ancther and it was imrossible to evolve a eroraganda which would suit 'tem all,
the Viet rIrth advor'tized jt-elf as a Front ccnsistine of several different
political rarties 11 'ch eesr-sertee eiffereet classfs and permitted erseth party
to issue its cwn reo-aganda on be-1f of the class which it re-resents'. The
Communist Party, although clair4ne to be the defender of the Prcletarile was in
reality the rartr of the Ietite-nurgeoisle. This class as in decor.' 14 Mon
Inat at the same tire remained eetremely numerous; and even in its deers, osition
attempted to halt )he bifurceticn of the tele orsoeine currents?the re tively
rich and the poor-'an d to unite tter, Thls strstegy of the Viet rinh u
remitting diverre,t troraaanda worked smoothly and functioned excellently as
long as there ra- a concrete serrene: independence and liberty at the ;creme
of a concrete ?nerd.; tho Jarcrese The clesses at both extremss of so.iety
wee not strong enc,ugh +0 fight for themselves The Preletnriat was its-efficiently
organized and unitee; she Trcts"yss9 for exaerle, had rromisee the Viet Minh
to help ther in the ccrIne Insurrectien, while inteneine in due course 4o ruSh
tels insurrection 'tether and trite:form it into a rrrletarian rvolutior The
earitelistn exhilsieed the Sare realfness as the Frcletariat. If the cc?saratively
wealthy oiirg elsie allored itself to 're easily led by the Petite-Bouretsisie,
it wae because the former "as net truly e Revelutierary class in Indeseela All
the revolts that had taken rlace since the French conquest were revolts by repre-
sentatives of the 4"rnfial aristocracy--former Mars'erins and scholars, or - later--
Insurrretif-s of seasnnin and strikes by rrrkere, The Viet Minh's relicts of
Uni,n is the exelenation of the success of the Viet Minh in defending ths vague
interests of the Petite-Beurgecisie It is also the explanation of the 3trength
of the insurrectise of Aueuat 1945, lemediasely after the Japanese suseelder.
27. Ihrediatelr after the fa.7.2 of the Jaranese
and irrediatrly after the seizure of power
cf the cenprote terroseS Inderordence,
collaboratien ef classes beenn to totter,
the Viet Y.inh remarted undecided reesrding
additional disadvartaees: lack ofSCan-Bc,
lack of detailed rformation because of the
28 flavine been sweet leyond ite
ancther Vast sebeee In its
comrrorise, atteartire to 7,,yt
time least danrerees referms.
two extremes which had beceee
the one bane and the releeivel
(disaryearance of the con eete enemy) e
by the Viet Minh'(arearent eeainment
orty, hatriness), that etreese7y of the
At this nee tarning-point it eistery,
the strsteay to adost. There were
lack ef an adequate entellierece service,
general confusicn, and lac ef materials.
ntended sebore, the Viet Minh found itse
ndecisien, it could only continue its pc
through the .easiest, most rreseine and e
The ereatsst dancer of decosresition la
mor or less astsceed to it: the Prolet
er rich on the ether., The Viet Minh trie
25X1
,10e
' in
4ey of
the same
- an the
rlat on
to satisfy
REFERENCE CENTER MY'
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
Approved ForRelesiRN/SEL:ITAA,IFRI,457R0008007700
25X1
08-5
the Proletariat by rromises alone, Ovine the wcrkers a rlieree of better
living coeditioes for the future, but hastily adding that the most important
duty for everyone at pr sent ie to rake sacrifices before makinr derenls, in
order that the e7;e:17e-eon iteeleneence rieht be raintaired and firmly setablished.
29. These prorines reee by the Vi(t rfeh ere not entirely successful; a - it
continued to be the two extreres (Proletariat anti relatIvelr rich P,o eeisie)
which rut to the t-et the Vit reh's rclicy of cerTremise. en the Land,
the Proletriat--earticularly the worl-ers--showed riainlr their disc( ent.
The rar vas ended, the covntre lieerated, the netien had its ern cov('.nment--and
ret eenditieos of life were no different from efore. Tie Ireletert remained
poor and unharpy. Discontent, indignation and the,sririt of revolt ipok hold
of them. Trotskyist nuclei rere formed and grew apace, Desrite the Teet rinh
censorship, clandestine TretskyIst rel-licatiors "'ere distributed in rorkers
circles in greater ane greater abunanee. Secret meetinee were held hth
rreater and creator frequency. The conflict threatened to becere biee,r and
violent. In the 'ace of the threat, the Viet rinh employed its two est power-
ful weapons: rreraeanea and terror. TA thu Mau, the most important erotskyist
leader was executed; LITC'G duc Thier and a Erect number of ether Trot,'yists
rere arrestee ane place in coecentraten camps, Temporarily, at the hegineing
of 1946, the threat free the left aTreered to have been averted.
30. On the other hare', even before the leftist threat had been euTeresse
other troublesome elements appeared on the right, brought hy the Chir
Oceurction Troops: namely the Quoc Dan Dane (qAD) and the Pone Minh
parties found adlerents among the Reergeois whe were still in doubt v
Viet Minh would eotntain the degree of order necessary for business
as had been rromised. The Viet rinh tried to satisfy the relatively
Pourgeois by pro:Tieing them that private erelerte would not be touche
order would be maintained, These Peergeeis were formerly the lackeys
? French and the Jaiarese_ They had been temrorarfly deprived of the m
were necessary for them to maintain their control over the rasses. T
worried. Now that the'Clinese had, arrived, they though they saw the
araltee meters and hcree to use them as a surport and to erofit by t
nese also wished to eeeleit ane rake the rreatest ressile prefit
of rich Vietnamese joined the ODD and the Deng VIA Hoi. Their aim le
threw the Viet rire- Governeent. Put thie atteret was entirely unsucc
the follorine reasons:
(1) The Chinese realized that the period of' their se in Indochf
limited. They therefore ereovrnrg-r' disorder so ti-et thy mirFt fish
waters, rather than attempting to estublIsh t3,,-mselves strongly amore
and makinr the leet(r truly ciereedent toen them, This error Lad Its
the reakress of the Chinese Central Governrent.
(2) The Chinese, having been accustored to such poverty themselve
even the smallest inter(ets, without lernim a r(escrale rrefit for
Annarese folleeere. It arteal'.ed that tee Chine were too grasping a
to seize everything.
(3) The Arnallese followers of the rh'nese, cf the qDD and of the
Hol, ":ere ineor'7tent. They laclme a concrete organizatien are their
as unskillful. Th e rcerpreis geeerle vale:zee that those rm.-ties we
rod masters nor eyed fclleeere. In a -ere+, they eere use les an in:
Poerecols relicy.
31. Althceeh for a c,--rtein tire both th( TretskyIste ane the 11DID.Dong Le'
arried to "relien the Viet the lateerls eolley of corererise
to hel/ and to awl(' decisive tests. Trotele-et extremism was suorre
the T3oereecie or:esition allfee to the ^5D-Dong reh flci gradually di
leevine a bear of embers which -ere eventually eceetered on Menese
only occaalcealJ: flared 17 arlr rementerily.
32. Although tee 110 rinh ov(rcere these ar' eati, es with much clear their
timeliness, chstp les centinue0. The Vic+, nL policy, eeinr eased (
, two
71:
These
ether the
erosper
'eh
tnd that
e7 the
e'6ers who
-- were
gerly'
el. The
A number
e to over
-
e tul for
would. be
?- troubled
tee masses
-Lein In
exrloi ted
-eeir
wanted
00111711Ife7:TIt
-11-
-1g Minh
-oparanda
neither
rents of
?.,nagr.ed
le! and
down,
and
J.: and
romyrorise,
25X1
"IT 010
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RD1382-645/Kuu080077
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R0OM0700
?
CINTRbL Ii77.IIITNOE GROUP
-12-
08-5
was unale to rid itself of its furdarentel inconsistencies. In the face of
tin immediate ateeek by the French in Tonkin, the Viet V1nh was forcen to
nigotiate the Pr-liminary Accord of 6 Merch 1946. Conferences and r-eotiations
for a final treaty dregred on for months and ended with the Fontaineelcau Modus
Vivendi of 14 Seetember 1946. The situation in France was also full :f incon-
sistencies, and Frsnee herself need6A settle these inconsistencie
3. Outwardly, in the period between September and the renewal of hosti3 ties in
December 1946, there did net appear to be serirns contrenictions in ne internal
affairs of Vietnam. The HO chi Minh Government rested solidly on the corpses
of Trotskyist and QDD opposition, The Peonle's Cormittees and the ret Minh
organizations--ratienall';elfare Associations, Can-Po, Trinh-Sat--took deep root
among the merle, and were able to guide them eithout too much difficulty in
the desired direction. After the siFninr of the Modus Vivendi there sere indeed
evidences of discontent and accusations anainst the Government for h 'ng made
too many concessions to the French. Put the Viet Minh was able to r over
a clever trick. It wae not the Vietnamese relegation which had sign (e the Modus
Vivendi: it was rather HO chi Minh himself. For a long tire clever ropaganda
had created about the personality of HO ehi rinh an atmospl-ere of myrtery
amounting almost to religious mysticism: it lad made him immensely peerlar; and
it had presented hie to the public as a leader who was enlightened i ell
matters, a fath(r of wisdorr and a man whJse relieles were infallible It was
PO chi rinh hiretlf therefore who supported thr whole weight of ress ibility
for this signature, and the Viet rIeh ralained intact and blareless.
34. The annearance of Viet rinh staLilitye:e to bo noted estecially in -1
opinion. After the rarch 194( arreerert, and esnecially after the S
rodus Vivendi, there -erre in general te: opesinr currents of oTinice
to raha small corcessicns to the French in order tp have seac as lc
possible and to avoid e. disastrous conf:Ict. The other one was vere
misins: to struggle at all rests as-alert the French and to achieve c
unquestioned lenenenderco rather than t( accept a relative :Liberty wl
ranch akin to tutelars.. rut this dIffer4nce cf erinien wee not carnal c
irreconcilab:el hecause hardly enyeee tolding the locoed c'-inion darcd
that those hollirr the fire?, ,T-(Te pro-Plench teeters. Evernoec dec'-
self to be anti-French, hut with differnt shades of views,
bile
i-,ember'1946
One was
as
scompro-
enlete and
11 was too
ely 25X1
to say
"ed hit-
35. But the absence of eeeicus contradcticre in Vietnam was apparent or
the surface the situation val herinnire to holl. The frame of mind
Vietnamese people after September 1946 wee in fact very complicated,
(I) First th6r-f, wns the class of forner Mandarins, former high
and merchants who had grown rieh under the Preneh regime, These pec
able at the 7.0mcmt to canoe the French; but a tha latter rrshed Co
restoration of their reeler, this class of'AlnamItes saw tore clearly
rossibilfty of ore day becee'nn nerpet instluments of the French, wh-
a-ermit ther to heild or re-build their forteeeee ?
? (2) There eels the category of new caritslists, who had grown ri
saeas_ in +11P rOOPTVE illemal seizure of laz.ln, or in advantageous
Peneath
the
Attionaries
were not
,rd to a
eould
25X1
h on black
e contracts.
25X1 I I The class of newl "rich ourgeois Is not a,
with the Ten Par Chu Bang, alllou7h tge lateer contains some element
class. The Tan Dan Chu Dang also includes, Sowever, a numter of nee
have noesessed fertunes for A long tire, as lell as a number of int:
The Tan Dan Chu rang is still a relatively mall organizetior and ec
not include all, or even a majority of the ney-rich Pourroeis (lase.
These roorlo -ere Smrersely rich in corparlsol with the ere-rat penis
invested their future In theyiet rinh Covernnt. Their interest ee
eontrary to that of the French caeitalists, wlese former wealth, pro
means of nroductien and exeloitatien were now their handse This
25X1.
CON?'" ;YE
Approved For For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-
CLICE-1,
ef this
a who
ectuals.
inly does
'eed here),
', and had
e entirely
eeties and
'Senors?
25X1
Approved ForRelea N119140?(\n-Lcjtapy8320#457R000800170008
25X1.
?13?
-5
was definitely anti-French; comcare for example the questions of the Haiphong
Customs and Tariffs, +he Pongay eines, the mines in the mountainous region
of Tonkin, imeort and eaecrt withOh;na and the United States.
() As to the Petits-Bourgeois, some were on the side of these vho wanted
a fight to the finish against the French; others wanted peace at any erice.
Consequently, their efforts were confused. This class, being in decceposition,
but at the same time very numerous, was incapable of irpesing a clear policy
aimed at a specific interest. Thrir efforts--confused but never violent--never-
theless demonstrated clearly the uncertainty of the situatien and the lelpossi-
bility of statilizine this class cf society. Although there was no epee' warfare
at this time between France and Vietnam, there was a scarcity of everething.
The small merchant lacked erodecte to sell, and his profits were less than his
expenses; the small functionary lived like a soldier, working almost ithout
salary; the artisan felt that lie eae working for someone other than hiraelf.
(4) On the ether hand, if the tendencies of the Petits-Bourgeois were very
vapue, those of the workers were more clear: they had become purely eonscripts.
Their conditions of life had becore even more miserable than before, la con-
'tradiction to the promises vnivh the Viet nnh had offcred, their rig t'; were
further restricted. Strikes were forbidden (except one strike on the part of
workers in a printing-shor whose proprietor had agreed to publish ant Minh
tracts for the QDD) and unions Irohlhited (there was only the Nationa lfare
Association of nerkers, ihch reduced the worker to the roeitien of a cf.nscrip*
The only concession made le the r4nistry of Labor (which was heaoed bz :tta/inistse-
at first LE vete Miens, and leter YGUYEr van Tao) was the e-hour day ane u holiday
on the first of Inv with pay. Three concession; were certainly insuf 'ient.
Gradually the workers beean to re ?_ze that they were being exploited .st as
much as before, if not more so. In concert with the peasants (anothe: iroletarian
group which was as much exploited !.1 they, but less conscious of the i ,,er of the
Proletariat) these workers had sueroeted the Indochinese Comrunist Paa o and bad
contributed largely to its advance olone the reed to power. Tneir for r 25X1
comrades claimed to be still their friends?these comrades who were n / all-power-
ful Ministers. Feaertheless, in exchange for a few flatteries i the w,e,ers were
being asked to work harder and herder for a cause which appeared to ti i to be
too noble to become a reality.
36. The thorny eroblere for HO chi MIna, for the Indoehlnese Communist Pa:
the domleant fraction in the Goverment, after the September 1946 Meal
were as folloes:
(1) Ho' to ra-ntain euarnianship over the category of hourgeois wl
be inclined to ally themselves with the French, and escape from Viet W
(2) Ho- to satisfy the caeegery of newly-rith Bourgeois who nc7bf
all the means of production in their hands, and who mieht overthrow ti
ment when they saw that it was becoming weak?
(3) Ho 4 to areeane the ereat mass of Pet4te-Pourgeois who were st
the French co1onia1ists for their present Foes, hut who richt one day
accuse the Goverment itself of its inah!lity lac save and defend them?
(a) How to coetinue to control the Proletariat, cf whom the Corner
alwaye claimed to be the Advance Guard? Hoe' te avoid the disintegra
these irrrrtant forces le favor of a regrorpine in, which there might
infiltrand,cn of tte elements most feared by the Stalinists, namely the
37. The TO chi Minh Government saw clearly these difficulties. Its equili
be lost as a result cf the aeneral disintegratl(n of the different sty
society into two opposing categories lukewarm elements who richt bee
reactienariee against the Go-ernrent; and extremists who might attempt
throw everythieg in order to eseera from the suffocating impasse, wit!.
ing themselves about the future an without fn. ring the precipitation
anarchy. In order to avoid this disinteeration, and to ward off this
danger, the Government could only rut up a screen: namely, propagandt
country was still an daneer, 25X1
CONFn",
ee, for
4ivendi,
might
al control?
eearly
lovern-
accusing
al and
tl.e.s had
?1 of
in
Y.otskyists?
:tum Might
of
111
over-
et concern-
e complete
eventual
taat the
REFERENCE CENTEClial
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
CENTRAL IITELLIGENCE GROU?
Approved For Relegse 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00080077
25X1
0008-5
38., It wee at this eretical moment that the great solution care: the Franco-
Vietnamese conflict. Instantly the military question overshadowed all others.
With dts own organizaticnn firmly tce. tcgr, Viet Winh found e palpable
Samd concrete enemy against whom all possible forces must be concentrateee In
the face of the necessity for filling all the pressing needs of wars terrorism
was justified and the Viet Minh did not hesitate to abuse it in the name of the
sacred motherland. Inconsistencies vanished--to rearpear later.
39.
The present conflict was awaited calmly by the HO chi Minh Government.
additien to the ieeortant reason that this conflict provided at least
solution to the dangerously unstable situation which had existed since
the Government he several other reasons to accept this conflict with?,
Internal tactors t (1) The aerthistrative racninery was unified--it
beer. in March 1946, (2) The Army?both rrgular and irregular?were b
oreanized than forrerly. Guerrilla tactics were better understccd and
(3) They were able to threaten the French be proposing to adorn, Score
tactics. (4) The mo'lt important political factor vas a clearly eefir
fighting: people :new why they were forced to fight. Proeneanea was
eery; and it ras c:neucted rith skill.
External factors (1) rxcept frr superiority in arms and munitions
French were extreuely weak from every point of view. (2) Neighboring
Siam, nurma9 India *eresyreathetic.
In
temporary
Septembers
t, fear;
ed not
'ter
eflrfected.
Earth
aim for
refore
he
:.untriesee
40. All these vactors.centributed greatly to the stability _of the Governmey in the
pre!:tcht conflict. It was alrost a re-birth of the former favorable fae?rs
which contributed te the General Uprising of the Viet Minh immediately enter
the Jaranese surrender. Put it must be noted that the present conflie ontains.
dangerous germs for the future of Vietnam. As a result of war--bomber( entsn
devastating tetles, and Scorrned Earth Policy?production will for a eg time
be totally insufficient to satisfy rants. The people will suffer from _!.sery,
Poverty and scarcity cf goods. At the termination of this conflict, en
situation from this point of view will be far worse than in September re5.
25X1
Note: As an aid in understanding Annemese terminology used r
above reeorts the followine list of Annarese terms, Chinese character
lents and Wade-Gilee roranization of tYe Chinese characters 10 present(
Viet Nam Giai Mang (Illan
Yueh Fan ChiiI 1T'ang Chun
2, Dan Chu Dan
rin Chu Tang Ad 11
,
Viet Tar Thanh Men tang ?
Yueh Nan Ch ing ren. Tanc.
Viet rar Thanh nien Cach renh Dong Chi .Hei nn n
Yueh Nan Ch'ing Nen Ming Tung Chih?Hui Mdt 4,4
?
hg
ATM',
Doan The Cuu WOC
T'uan Tli Chin nuo
Tu Ve Cdu Quoc
T211 Wei Chiu Kuo
7. Viet Minh ? n
Yueh Meng
ate 4,4
AA_ '11A.
It A 4
CONFLE'rf_EAL
25X1
seal4e,
the
Approved For For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5
CENTRAL INTSLLIGENCE Motir ,
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 ? CIA-RDP82-00457R00080077
.8. Tieu To
Msiac Thu ijt
9. Khtii,Bo
Pu.
O. Tinh Bo
Shong Pu 4p.
11. Tong Po .Ay
Taunt:: Pu
12. Thanh Bo
Chteng Pu -f:gr
33. Xu Bo
Ch'u Pu ,4j j3
V, Can Bo Ky Thuat Chuyen mon
Kan Pu CM Shi Chuan Men
15. Uy Pan Viet 'Minh
Wei Pan Yueh Veng 4
/--qc,tJM
16. Cong An
sung An
11. Trinh Sat
Chen8Ch a
Trial Sat Phil,. Tri
Chenrhea CI.enc chih ts
19. Trinh Sat Kinh Te
Cher4Chta Ching Chi
20. Pao An
Pao An 4.1
21, Canh Sat
Mar Chea iT
22, Can Po Cuu Quo?
Kan Pu Chin Yuo 4,;k
25X1
"itt. 443 4 pI
0008-5
This document contains inr-)rmation
affecting the national defame of the
United States within the nearing of
the Espionage Act, 50, U.S.0 31 and
32 as amended. Its transmis:ion or
the revelation of its contens in any
manner to an unauthorized pe: :on Is
ptohibited by law.
25X1
Approved For For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5