REPORTED PLANS FOR A MILITARY COUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000800260003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 12, 1947
• Content Type: IR

Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP82-00457R000800260003-6
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
MNTELLICENCE REPORT
COUNTRY Spain
SUBJECT Reported Plans for a Military. Coup
25X1A
25 QN
DATE:
25X1POO
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D ST. X August 19$?
PAGES 2
SUPPLEMENT so-4369.;
1. According to information of 30 June 1947, General Antonio Aranda hater
after a short period during which he abstained from activity on orders
that Don Juan, has resumed leadership of the military group which has
been planning the overthrow or Franco for more than a year. Other
military men involved are Generals Alfredo Kindelan Duany, Miguel Ponta
y Man.so de Zuniga, Jose Solchaga Zala, Juan Beigbeder y Atien.sa, and to
a loss extent, General Gonzalo Queipo de Llearro.
2. Briefly, the plan consists in the establishment of a military directorate,
preferably upon the voluntary resignation of Franco; if he refuses to
resign, revolts in one or more military regions are planned to pave the
way for the dirry.?torate. In either case, it is envisaged that the
Generals spearheading the plan will. publish a manifesto requesting the
cooperation of the people throughout Spain;s
3. The main objectives of the military directorate, during its term of
power, will be to maintain, public order and to prepare for the establichb
ment of a coalition government including leftists and monarchists, with
the ultimate purpose of holding; a plebiscite to determine whether Spain
wishes a republican form of government or a monarchy. Although the
directorate would be composed entirely of military men, subordinate
25X1X posts would be filled by civilixns.
Some six months prior to Aranda's two-months' exile to the Balearics,
he, speaking as high chief, and Jose Maria Moutas Mere., as repreO
rerntative of Gil Robles, held interviews *ith several generals to find
out if they would join in the plan. (The interviews detailed below
therefore took place about July 1946.)
. The first consultation was with General Camilo Alonzo Vega, Director
General of the Civil Guard. Aranda and Moutas, pointing out the pro-
gressively deteriorating situation. of Spain under Franco's rule, con-
cailuded that it probably would be necessary to bring about a military
uprising in order to effect a change. They asked for General Alonso's
assurance that he would take no action to quell such an upr?isin.f;.
General Alonao listened to them sympathatioally, and said that he war
discouraged and pessimistic about the future of Spain, but that he
could not make the promise they requested since his oirounstar.oee were
somewhat special because of hie close friendship with General Franco,,
He added that more than once he had considered vequesting retirement
CLASSIflCATION LCESftaroo
Document No. CONFIDENTIAL"
NO CHANGE In Class. 0
Q DECLASSIFIED
Class CHANGED T0? TS s c C
~E CE
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DDA Memo, 4 Apr ??
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Auths JPAA REG. 7711763_
Date 1; 11dd3F a 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP82-00457R000800260003-6
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CONFIDEIIrIAI,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
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so that he could give up his post, but that his personal friendship with
Franco had deterred him because there was no adequate replacement for
hint who had the same relationship with the Caudillo. He added that
the position of Director venoral of the Civil Guard was a vexatious one
because of the constant casualties suffered by the personnel of the
rank and Site. He said that his losses avera'!ed three guards every two
days and that he was having; great difficulty in filling; vacancies.
6. Later, Aranda and Moutas approached General Agustin Munoz Grandes, who
reacted in a violent manner and, pounding vigorously on the table, said
that he personally would take charge of settling the Franco a'fair since
Franco would not go of his own free will. About two months later, Munoz
Grandee requested a private interview with Aranda, at whicth he told
xranda that he would make available all the forces of the Madrid garrison
as well as the forces of his district, to take the Pardo. At that time,
ueneral Aranda replied that the moment had not yet arrived but that he would
keep the proposition in mind for consideration at the opportune moment.
General Jose Eaarique Varela approved of the plan, but wondered who would
"bell the cat," veneral Aranda replied that hewould take the responsibility;
he only required that in the event of revolt in one zone, the other
captain generals and generals with troop aormiands would stand by and
permit matters to take their cc?urse. Varela sug ested calling a meeting
of the lieutenant generals to present a demand to Franco theit he nave
up the reins of government or suffer the consequences. This suggestion
was rejected.
8. General Carlos ILrsensio Cabzanillas was the roost enthusiastic and the most
eager to proceed with the campaign against Franco. However, General
Aranda feels that Asonsio is not entirely to be trusted.
9. Source states that several other ,enerals, whose names were not men-
tioned, also were consulted and that all shared the opinions oP the
pruta;;oni.sts of the plan,,
25X1X 10? while tentative steps had been taken
come months ago in the direction of a military coup, as of late June the
monerohiat military camp was very quiet. It was his opinion that, given
the fact that most of the high?rarleing Army men are bound to Franco. through
personal loyalty or acceptance of privileges, no great number of them would
make any serious effort to displace him unless conditions, beyond their control,,
such as a deterioration in the economio situation, made his withdrawal neces-
sary.)
REFERENI3F: CEN
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Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP82-00457R000800260003-6