VISIT OF THE SVP DELEGATION TO ROME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000600310004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 2, 1947
• Content Type: IR

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. ERENCE CENTER OFFICIALS o14LY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP 80230 nEV4An-
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
COUNTRY Italy/Austria
SUBJECT Visit of the SVP Delegation to Rome
DATE:
INFO. See text
X IV* V. Z~ZIYP191
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(a) At the invitation of Italian Premier De Gasperi an S'P (South
Tirol Volkspartei) Delegation, comprising the President Erich
.inn, the second Deputy President Dr. Friedl Volgger, the
Se aetary-General Dra v, Quggenberg, and Dr. Raffeiner, left
for Rome on 15 April,, returning to Bolzano on 25 April.
(b) During their stay in Rorie the SVP delegates are reported to
have had conversations with the followings
Premier De Gaspers.,
Dr. Innocenti,
.:vanoe Bonomi, Chairman of the Autonomy
Commission,
Nicolo Carandin1, Italian Ambassador in London,
Giovanni Boeri, adviser to than Italian Govern-
ment on autonomy questions'
The Pope,
Dr.. Schwarzenberg, Austrian Charge d'Affaires
in tRome v
(c)
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The conversation with Bonomi was of a strictly confidential
nature. De Gaaperi told the SVP delegates that it would be
better if they did not contact the Bonomi Commi4sion, However, " 4t
.:i4a~ re "fiat lYL t:t,u 2:iut i . ti4:ir a. eei g one e".ie1P.1.:+?r .I - $
rand suggested Bonomi himself, on condition that they kept the
meeting secret o
20 feral Im& essic~a caf
Generally speaking the SYP delegates were satisfied with the results of their
trip. A surprisingly friendly atmosphere, prevailed in Rome. and the Italians
showed a certain willingness to recognize the South Tirolese viewpoint., On
the other hand,, no definite promises were made and the mm st delicate points of
issue were scarcely mentioned. Consequently the delegates are not unduly op-
tindstics While welcoming the cordiality of the reception accorded them, and
the consideration given to their proposals, their innate distrust of the Italians
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keeps them cautious. In particular, they fear that such concessions as
the Italians may be prepared to make will be in form rather than sub-
stance. They also foresee a hard struggle ahead when details are dis-
evzsed.
(a) On the basic question of a regional versus provincial auto-
nomy the SVP delegates found that De Gasperi and Innocenti
had been approaching this problem fr^m a Viewpoint directly
opposed to their own. For the Italians, Trentino and South
Tirol form one region, and it is merely a question of sepa-
rating them to the minimum extent required by the Paris Agree-
ment. The South Tirolese on the other hand regard the two
provinces as separate entities, and for them the question
is to what extent they may safely collaborate In common
matters.
(b) Defending the Italian viewpoint, Innocenti put forward tre
folio-wing thesis. The Paris Agreement may be divided into
three parts: the first provides for the minority rights of
the South Tirolese, which the Italian 0ove-rnment is in the
process of granting and guaranteeing; the third provides
for the settlement with Austria of certain problems arising
from the South Tirol question which directly affect Austria;
sandwiched between the two is the provision for a legisla-
tive and executive autnomy, but only as regards those mat-
ters referred to in Part I of the Agreement, namely the
minority rights. Innocenti asserted that if the Italian
Government were prepared to extend the autonorq beyond the
minority rights and he indicated that it was - then the
South Tirolese must regard this Italian generosity as "a
voluntary gift which might he taken back at any tiate". On
the basis of this thesis Innocenti maintained that the Italian
Government had every right to insist on a regional autonomy,
provided that the South Tirolese were given special autonomous
rights in connection with minority matters (schools, etc.).
(c) The SVP delegates vigorously countered this thesis, and put
forward their own proposals for separate diets in Bolzano
and Trento, and a joint diet of the two provinces for certain
specified common matters. It was here that the Italians made
their apparent concession,, De'Gasperi welcomed the SVP pro-
poaal as "an important step toward a possible solution". Sub-
sequently Innocenti -- presumably acting on instruction from
Do Gasperi - showed interest in the SVP proposals, and began
to discuss them in more detail. He finally told the SVP dele-
gates that he was preparing a new draft autonomy statute on
the lines of their proposals, and even read them extracts from
it, This draft will be submitted to the Bonomi Commission for
consideration, and then the SVP and other interested parties
(including the Trentiners) will be invited to Rome again to
discuss it. This invitation is expected in about three to four
weeks. Innocenti incidentally told the SVP delegates that the
Costituente hoped to deal with the South Tirol question before
discussing the other general autnony schemes.
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(d) The SVP delegates are said to believe that, provided
no undue pressure is exerted by the Trentlners or any
other outside party, there is a reasonable chance that
the autonoir statute will be based on their proposals.
They fear, however, that when it comes to the vital
question of the division of powers between the separate
Diets and the joint Diet, the Italians will insist that
all the important powers be vested in the joint, Diet,
with the final result that the autonomy will be provin-
cial in form, but regional in substance.
(e) This question of the division of powers is for the SVP
leaders the crucial one. They point out that in their
proposals they have gone as far as they possibly can.
They fear that the Italians will put forward counter-
proposals (if a nature which will place them in the dif-
ficult position of either having to reject the Italian
draft completely, or of agreeing to accept it as a basis
for negotiation which will inevitably' le,-d to a modifi-
cation in Italy?s favor of their final offer.
(f) The SVP leaders are already discussing what position
they should adopt if and when this situation arises.
Their former determinr-tion is somewhat weakened by
(a) the feeling that time is working against them in
that it is greatly in their interests to settle the
whole South Tirol question before the next Italian elec-
tions, and (b) the belief that failure to reach agreement
in M,acow on the Austrian Treaty has considerably weakened
their main outside support. On the other hand, in their
efforts to meet the Italians half way they have already
gone beyond their terms as agreed upon by the full Direc-
tion of the SVP, and they are doubtful that the South
Tirolese as a whole would consent to further concessions.
Jd Comment: In this connection the Direction of the
South Tirole?u Association for Returned Prisoners of War,
which comprises some 8,000 youths, has just decided that
the time is approaching to take a firm stand against the
Italians, and that preparations should be; made accordingly.)
(g) For the moment the SVP leaders are merely discussing, with-
out attempting to decide, this issue, realizing that the
final decision will depend on a. number of unknown factors,
such as the attitude of the Austrian Government and the
possible'measure of outside support from Austria and the
Vestern Powers. A split between the SVP leaders on this
issue is not out of the question.
(h) In the course of their conversations the SVP d443_7-:gates
noticed a marked difference of attitude concerning this
question of regional versus provincial autonomy between
De Gasperi and Innocenti on the one side, and Carandini,
Ronnm-i snd &aerl on the other- The two former were much
more insistent on the regional autonomy. De Gapseri stressed
the importance of settling the autonomy question immediately,
while simultaneously pointing out the internal political
difficulties in the way of a settlement. To the SVP dele-
gates it seemd clear that, being himself a Trentiner and
for the sake of the Trentinera, he wanted the autnoni
question settled while he was still in power, and in such
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a way that it amounts as nearly as possible to a re-
gional autonomy. Innocenti supports him, either as a
good official supporting his master oryfor his own per-
sonal reasons. Carandini took an entirely different
line. He saw the whole South Tirol question from the
European standpoint. To hin_ it is all important for
Italy to reach a real understanding with Austria, and he
even talked of the Brenner frontier slowly falling away.
He seemed to attach little or no importance to the ques-
tion of regional versus provincial autonomy. For him it
is essential that the South Tirolese should be given as
soon as possible the full rights assured to them in Paris,
so that an obstacle to the desired understanding between
Austria and Italy cen be removed. %eri followed much
the same line, indicating that he did not see "why so
much consideration was paid to the Trentiners". He in-
timated that Bonomi shared his views. Carandini promised
to put the South Tirolese case before De Gasperi again.
He warned the SVP.delegatea, however, that the granting
to South Tirol of its own and full autonomy would be some-
what of a shock to the average Italian, and that therefore
they would be advised to proceed cautiously. The SVP dele-
gates feel that if only Carandini (not Innocenti) were com-
petent in the South Tirol question, they could reach an agree-
ment with the Italians almost immediately.
(1) Innocenti had made a certain headway in his new draft auto-
non statute when the SVP delegates had their final talk
with him. This talk did not reassure them, for it showed
them that, while he is attempting to follow the SVP propo-
sals In form, he is still thinking in torms of disguised
regional autonomy.
(j) Thus, he talked a great deal about the need for three "juri-
dical'bodies" in the region (Trentino, South Tirol and the
joint body) and for three governors. He further mentioned
the difficulty of a suitable common capital town. The SVP
delegates objected to all these proposals as unnecessary.
In their opinion there need by only the two juridical bodies
of Trentino and South Tirol, with the joint Diet sitting some-
times in Trento, and sometimes in Bolzano to enact legislation
for both provinces, which the two executives will enforce in
their separate zones.
(k) Innocenti further foresees a common statute for the "Unions
regiorale Trentino-Alto Adige". The SVP delegates objected
to the Italian name "Alto Adige" and asked for "SlAdtirol".
Innocenti doubted if this were possible, but suggested that
the SVP might try to find a member of the Costituente who
would put forward the proposal that the name "Sfiidtirol"
should be allowed as "a generous Italian gesture". The SVP
delegates anticipate no difficulty in finding such a sponsor
from among the Saragat group. Simultaneously they hope to
enlist the sup rt of Austrian Fir 1.l ; Mi irterJ T ra (saber
in this question, which they consider of considerable impor-
tance, first for its effect on the South Tirolese as a whole,
secondly for tourist traffic reasons.
(1) The Italians further objected to the powers of the Italian
State being specifically defined in the autonomy statute, and
the other powers being left to the autonomous region. In their
view the powers of the autonomous region must be specifically
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(m)
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defined and the rest left to the Italian State. Among
the specific powers of the autonomous region, they would
agree to some such vague clause as "such other local mat-
tern as clearly fall within the competence of the region".
Strong opposition came from the Italians to the SVP sugges-
tion that local police should fall within the competence of
the autonomous authorities. Considering the daily abuses
of the Italian police in South Tirol and their policy of
intimidation of the local populace, the SITP leaders feel
very strongly on this point,, and hope to enlist Gruber's
support for it.
The SVP proposals contain the provision that only those who
have been resident in South Tirol for ten years shall be
entitled to vote at the first elections of the autonomous
parliament. Innocenti considered that ten years was too
long and suggested give, which the SVP leaders do not regare.
as wholly unreasonable. At the same time they point out that
if five years is accepted there is danger of oxiuding from
voting?all the optants for Germany under the Hitler-Mussolini
Agreement, who left South.Tirol before 1942. They are conse-
quently advising Gruber that, in settling the optants' ques-
tion, he must in..ist upon a clause to the effect that the ream
dence of the optants in Austria or Germany shall not count as
absence from South Tirol.
(a) Amonn and Raffeiner discussed the optants' question with Inno-
centi. From this discussion they learned that the Italian
Charge d'Affaires in Vienna, Coppini, was in. dbme to confer
with Innocenti, and further that the Mewrandum of the Austrian
Foreign Ministry on the optants' question had.,' finally reached
Rome.
(b) Innocenti stated that the optsnta' question must also be de-
cided by the Costituennte, and not by simple governmental decree
as the SVP leaders had assumed. He anticipated no difficulties
nor delay here, but the SVP leaders immediately saw:the danger
of the optants' question not being settled before the Costituente
terminated its business at the end of June? In this case it is
more than likely that the very considerable number of optants in
South Tirol will be deprived of their voting rights, which will
mean that the Italiam will gain almost an equality with the
South Tirolese In South Tirol. To meet this danger, Amonn is
particularly anxious that Gruber should proceed immediately with
the settlement of this question. Carandini told the SVP dele-
gates that Gruber hopes to meet De Gasperi in June, but Amonra
points out that this will be too late.
(c) The SVP delegates sought to convince Innocenti that sanctions
against politically coupromised optants in the form of theatr de-
s. Wionc? tzat1oa wesf: wrong raid i ticah1.. 3 In `he- " rsj il?re
such a principle ran counter to Article 17 of the new Italian
Constitution, which provides that no Italian subject shall lose
his nationality for political reasons. Secondly, no State will
want to take in the denationalized victims. Thirdly, it would
bp'difficult to find men prepared to serve on the Commission
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which is to pass judgment on these people. Innocenti main-
tained that !Article 17 of the Italian Constitution did not
coils into it, as the Italians did not consider optants who
had received German nationality as Italians. He further
stated that the Italians hoped to arrange for the inclusion
in the German Treaty of a clause compelling Germany to-tike
in the.:e denationalized persons. The SVP delegates pointed
out that there were many optants in South Tirol, who did not
even know whether or not they had lost their Italian nation-
ality. In many cases South Tirolese had been struck from the
Italian nationality lists without ever being informed. To pre-
vent confusion here the South Tirolese put forward the possi-
bility of making no distinction between those optants who had
received German nationality and those who had not. Both cate-
gories could be taken together, and both made to give a de-
claration renouncing their option. In such circumstances the
denationalization sanction might be replaced by loss of voting
rights for a number of years. It seems that Innocenti was not
unimpressed by this suggestion, and the SVP leaders hope that
Gruber may be able to obtain its acceptance.
5. Tba V~rband_5~ ` .
(a)
Signor Tabarelli of the DVS has also gone down to Rome to
present the Ital.Prin Authorities with his own autonon project.
The SVP delegates saw him in Rome, and are wondering whether
he came on his own initiative, or was invited by the Italians,
who may still desire to play him against the SVP. The SVP dele-
gates comp1 1ned bitterly to Innocenti of the IIJS. Innocenti
Joked about Tabarelli and his colleagues, suggesting that they
should not be taken very seriously. The SVP delegates then
asked Innocenti if he were aware that it was generally believed
in South Tirol that the DVS had been rounded on Italian inita-
tiva and was financed by the Italians. Innocenti replied that
he knew nothing of this, and could scarcely credit it. Then,
to the astonishment of the South Tirolese, he is reported to
have added; "Perhaps the Ministry of Interior is responsible".
The SVP delegates, who have always imagined that Innocenti and
}3roise are working hand in glove, can only assume that the two
must have fallen out over something.
(b) Incidentally, the SVP leaders have received a report that Sec-
retary-General Vildner of the Austrian Foreign Ministry recently
stated that there are two-German-speaking movement in South
Tirol, and that he must have statistics as to their relative
importance. Nothing is know of any such statements in Innsbruck.
Not unnaturally the report has infuriated the SVP leaders, and
considerably increased the present mistrust of Vienna.
6. Audi enc. with t
The Austrian Minister to the Vatican arranged a private audience for the SVP
delegates with the Pope. When the time came the SVP delegates were surprised
to find that they were rec. ivo,; in a group audience. They were further mysti-
fied when the Pope singled them out for special attention, and repeated three
times "a very special blessing sr your people". That evening the Osservatore
I i?en did not include the SVP delegates in its usual list of audiences, al-
though it mentioned all the others received in the same group. The Austrian
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Minister to the Vatican subsequently stated that the whole thing was a
mistake on the part of some Vatican official. The SVP delegates are not
so certain that the Italian Authorities. are not responsible,
25X1A6a
_ Comment: A more likely explanation would seem to be the
known caution of the Vatican in the :path Tirol question.)
(a) The SVP delegates were favorably impressed by the Austrian
Charge d'Affaires, Dr. Schwarzenberg, whom they found most
helpful, and intelligent in his grasping of the situation.
The informed him fully of the results'of their various con-
versations, and particularly of Innocenti's views on the
optants' question,
(b) They found Schwarzenberg a little too awed by Innocenti,
and regretted that he refused to engage Hans Sch8ffel
in the Austrian Legation merely because Innocenti was
against it.
8. X, U with Private Ind1yidua. s
(a) Guggenberg had several talks with an Italian friend of his
who knows De Gasperi personally. This friend visited t)e
Gasperi after he had received the SVP delegation, and re-
ported the Italian Premier as stating that he was more
convinced than ever that a solution to the South Tirol
problem would be found.
(b) Guggenberg'.friend , however, criticized the attitude of
the SVP delegation. In his opinion, theysahould have told
De Gasoeri that they were ready to assist in the reconstrue
tion of Italy and in b ringing about the desired understanding
between Italy and Austria; but they had their rights, assured
to them in Paris, and if the Italians were not prepared to
accept without modification their very conciliatory proposals,
then they would refuse all responsibility for what might hap-
pen in South Tirol. In short, De Gasperi should be made to
reflect on the situation if unrest were to break out in South
Tirol.
s " tru " T
9. SVP Threat ?o
In their talk with Bonomi, who incidentally Impressed them considerably by
understanding immediately their point of view, the SVP delegates did hint
that if the Italians forced an unfavorable solution on them, the South Tirolese
could always adopt the same obstructionist tactics as the Trentiners once em-
ployed by refusing to sit in the Tirolese Diet. Innocenti subsequently told
the SVP delegates that Bonomi.had informed De Gasperi of this, and that the
latter horrified at the poisbibi.' it j nau rekic Led rrio:st wi iien .y. iru ocenti.
expressed his opinion that such obstructionist tactics were a mutter for the
police, Amonn countered that this might be so in an ordinary Italian province
in the midal of Italy, but it was not poaaiUle jui south iixoi, w lose spsi
position and rights were internationally recognized. To this Innocenti did not
reply.
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23 LO)
(a) There was almost complete harmony between the various members
of the SVP delegation. Guggenberg, however, never felt at
ease with Dr. Raffeiner, who made several very tactless re-
marks in the course of the various conversations. TNith the
possibility in mind of replacing Raffeiner by Dr. Tinzl on
the next visit to Romer, he asked Innocenti for his views on
Tinzl. Innocenti replied that he had nothing personally
against Tinzl, but that "his time has not yet come". He was
for the moment opposed to his being included on an SVP offi-
cial delegation.
(b) On the other hand Amonn showed his usual exaggerated confi-
dence in Raffeiner, and has even suggested that the latter
should return to Rome and stay there as the SVP official
representative until the autonomy question has been settled.
(c) Guggenberg warns that any such step may well revive the old
split in the SVP, as Raffeiner remains as unpopular as ever,
and in wide circle, fears are still expressed of the Amann-
Raffeiner comb:tnation.
11. Drs innoSlenti?o Poste
(a) One fact which impressed the SVP delegates was the all-powerful
position of Innocenti in the South Tirol question, Innocenti
is technical adviser to the Government on autonomy questions.
He acts as liaison between De Gasperi and the Bonomi Commission
of which he is a member. He is entrusted with the elaboration
of the draft autonomy statutes on which this Commission later
works. He is also competent in the optanr.s? question.
(b) The SVP delegates are today slightly more favorably disposed
toward him than before their Rome visit. Volgger was particularly
impressed by his seeming amiability. Amonn inclines to the be-
lief that he is merely the competent and loyal official, who will
faithfully carry out whatever instructions De Gasperi gives him.
Guggenberg maintains his former mistrust of him, while admitting
respect for his intelligence and charm.
12. Present PoUUoy 2L the _ SV
On 26 April the SVP delegates reported to their colleagues on the SVP Direction
in Boizano. itt this conference present policy was discussed.
(a)
Emphasis was placed on the danger of giving the impression that
the SVp delegates are too pleased with the results of their Rome
trip. This might lead the Trentiners and others to the belief
that they had reached a definite understanding with the Italians,
and so cause them to go dcwn to ym me with a view to changing, the
present attitude of the Italian Government. Both De Gasperi and
Innocenti also advised against too much publicity being given to
the recent talks.
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(b) So far as the South Tirolese are concerned, it was decided
to give them a. vague picture of the results of the talks
in an interview by Erich Amonn given to the local StP organ,
the DR. on 28 Aprilo
(c) So far as the Austrians., and North Tiroleans in particular,
_.-------
are concerned, it was felt that it would be better if for
th? [aioiaerit~ttie~Aua r an prea~ refrained from wr tin, myth ngo
(d) No decision was reached on the very delicate question as to
how the Trentiners should now be treated. The Trentiner
Christian Democrats are due to visit the SVP leaders in Bol-
xano on 29 April. Gug ;enberg advocates that the SVP should
merely tell the Trentiners that they found a certain under-
standing for their viewpoint in Rome, but that in all cases
they are not worrying as a provincial autonomy has been as-
sured them in Paris. Either the Italians will accept their
proposals, or they will stick to their rights for a complete
provincial autonomy. In such circumstances the Trentiners
would be best advised to agree to the SVP proposals and to
present with them a common front when the next deli,erations
take place in Rome. Guggenberg, however, was unable to obtain
acceptance of this viewpoint at last Saturday's meeting.
13.~ct&hA,t
The greatest need is felt by the SVP leaders for immediate talks with Dr.
Gruber, so that the SVP and Austrian policies may be coordinated during
the fateful next weeks? Gruber at the moment has lost a great deal of his
prestige in Bolzano, because of his insistence on postponing discussion of
the South Tirol question until after Moscow. It is hoped, however, that he
will see the utmost urgency of his intervening now. If he does not,., there
is danger of the whole South Tirol problem being settled without him. The
SVP hope for an exchange of views with him almost immediately, at which a
joint program will be agreed on, and further that. they may count on his mat
active. intervention at this very crucial stage of their history.
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