REVIEW OF KKE ACTIVITY IN 1946 AND ESTIMATE FOR 1947

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000300520001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1947
• Content Type: IR

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INTELLOFAX 4roved For Release 1999/09Ii4T>
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTEWGENCE REPORT
COUNTRY Greece
SUBJECT
ORIGIN
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DATE:
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:NFO. 17 January 1947
MST. February 1947
PAGES
SUPPLEMENT
1,- The extreme left wing in Greece. as represented by KX/EAY, realized
Fyubstantial moral and political gains during 1946.
ILI
Among the moral gains, possibly the most important one was the emergence
of the extreme left from the position of "accused" in which it found
itself during 1945, as a result of the December uprising, into a position
of considerable importance in the evolution of Greek and Balkan politics;
and it achieved this great improvement without compromise and without
once having to abandon its policy of provooation.
34 Thanks to the "semi-official" policy of neutralizing the M and its
CLASSIF ICATIQN
Dnnmm~nt No. 001
NO C.NA,N
Review of KKE Activity in 1946 and
Estimate for 1947
various organs,, a policy pursued by the government during the greater
part of 1946 either by plan or compulsion, the party was given con-
siderable grounds on which to base its passwords of "rightist terrorism,
persecution of democrats", etc,,, and it contrived to maintain and
elaborate the aura of a party unfustly attacked nd on the defensive,
whereas in point of fact it was actually the attacking party all long.
The efforts of the party to nourish and enhance this illusion were aided
very largely by the fact that the government, mindful of what the party
likes to refer to as the "international atmosphere", was unwilling to
declare open war on the party and chose to entrust the work unofficially
and secretly to individuals both within and without the government
structure and to certain rightist organizations. The frequent excesses
inevitable in the pursuit of a policy such as this in a politically
vindictive people were of no small help to the KKE'a plan and program.
The result has been an increase in party members and adherents, especially
among traditionally anti-Coxaminist classes such as white-collar employees,
small real-estate owners, craftsmen, etc. who had previ. .sly been
identified with a center or moderate leftist ideology.
The open support and sympathy which the KKR/EM has enjoyed from that
part of the world under Russian domination and the common development
and use of left-wing arguments and slogans have created an impression
in the storm-tossed minds of many underprivileged Greeks that the
09/08 : C
This document is hereby regrad
CON FID E"
~..,lv'Tlr'i t_ ii~ r..:: co ", d.::?sZv iCf the
~.t '"r . ; e~ o From the
Director cf C`e~tral i ence to the
Archivist of ih , ited States.
Next F'e. ' Date: 2008
00FO(092hy-4falR
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l;KE/FJJ1 is the only political group in the country Bich knows that
it wants and hi& the potential capacity for achieving it , whereas
all its opponents are divided atom; the nualvess turd do .~,t enjoy either
a singularity of objoctivc or a solid external oupport.
5e. ).tore tanj able krone as pear to have accrued to they Party as a result of
its 194C policies ur:d activities. For extunple. i;horous the anti-party
groupu such au thu Putoopoulos group, ELD (Leaguo of Popular lle muraoy),
Fourth Tr.tc rnationaliats, este. have cos:-pletely lost l;round, the Klc.L' has
increuued ito Ltunbershi.p, an noted in pnrac;rttph 3 above., gird or;;:rstizations
such at; the Hellenic-Soviet League hove prospered in their activities.
These party gains have ertubled the left tiring; to latutich variouss slogans
and oarnpa: L;ns with coi if.arative success. 1'cakinE; the i.rritiettive in 1946
after tt year of de.fenssive retrenchment, the party, in Kay, 1946, arutourtced
its policy of "conciliation" anti rcrtetred its drive to expel the British.
",any r=.i ht-wine; exponents are nou; ct.lliii ; for w;.thdrawal of the: British
and lornu:tiun u:' tt broudened f;avc:rr;r_tent. To rrauiy of the blind nretnbors
of the party this rcprctse:nts a t:otublts political success. The party does
not emphasize that by tr.t1idruvrttl of the British it rac:ars erttr7, fil'uratively
at leaflt, of the Rusuixais. Whereas the right taeana#igurctive or actual
entry of thtu l.merict-r_s and an end to the "ayrtar.tie" rn thods of the Cent sunis ts.
6. In its bmbiguous character of a legal party and an illegal, conspiratorial,
forui+;rt-directed and rebellious machine, the party ivui ages to give the
appearance of incrveisir. ; strength curd ttttppor t As a legal party, its
members "unjustly" incur the "excesses and persecutions" c,f the government,
are terrorized at.u exiled in droves, and still the party refuges to bend.
~" an inspirer, organizer and supplier of "dynamic muvcrtenta" (the armed
hands), it has driven thLc gvvernu.tent to, the brink of disaster and has
s:rovm it. incapab1t of reacting successfully.
7. The KU-v1E 1 is now reported to be expecting; to derive aigrtifieant gain
from the impending visit of the Till Investigation Connnission. It bc.ses
its optimiser on the rollowiri lines of reasoning: evidence of M's
direct connection with the anted lands will be hard to find, Lind if any
exists it can be quashed, whereas the acts of the government agencies
and their individuals are tatters-of record; orders issued to burn villages,
exile suspects. arm civilian, extra can be proved; the reports of foreign
correspondents are on record; the Jouheux episode, the report of the.
British Parliamentary Committee cannot be invalidated; and though one
conversant vrith the ft.ets tisould not be swayed, the u:rsuspeeting representa-
tive of Chile or the predisposed rfpresentati.ve of Poland trill rind the
evidence at hand much easier to believe.
8. The party is naturally prepared to set aside all these proofs; against the
rent if a new goverment were to be forLued in which the party could
expect to have some representation. If this v.~ere to occur, however, the
next phase in the party's progrum would be obvious. That is, the party
would endeavor to penetrate the state orgunisrt to such an oxtent as to
ut ke party control of it a rulaLivc;ly simple, furthur and final step,
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L darrinig intervouinC, everts Which Loulc', cause a change in plan (cxtarnal
, :irect.ve, change of t,overw.Lents etc )r it is be:~if~ved that the party
::iii pursue the following general linos in early 1947
a) A partial elu%*~i'e in the, co:ipocition of tho Politburo o.'.the
r_trel Coniattee of 14:J: in favor of rx,re noderate elements au it tk oeptive
- r- ti ice intended to prc;st;rve- the r item?;ctt.red tturh of lerallty,
b) tternrit? -reriods of intensification and rc1r atiou of bend
activity in tidely sep?-roted aroas or the country to corifluse Arai .inaken
the effect of army opereitions,
c) Cotruission of kidneippiugs and executions, especially ei? ainat
the "reueh-ht ted" cantor, r,ith the blame laid conatuntly on the right.
` he:se lines of policy aid action are not new; they are the one., r::ich,
in the hinds of the pe,r-ty lendors, have produced reei,lts :,c faze, and it
is intended that they be ir:tertsified. The party lenders see victory not
1'kir off, rnd efiort:r, r.111 be acoordini;ly strengthened and incr?c:etsedn
This deci ,.nt castain* for
~feettDg the aatio&. dot at the
ted States v thin or
the lepdoaage Act #0C . 3:1 sad
32 s as to tran~# ea3 an or the
~s its cantests is
an mauthized psrOon It
ihitede
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