RESUME OF THE SPANISH POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000300440007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 11, 1947
• Content Type: IR

,Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-0045780 QQ1 Q0A40007-7
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- L INTELLIGENCE- GROUP
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Resume o ? the S4aa ish Politi.cai? Si tua::ivxi
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'-A the present :state of Spsnish affairs, three sectors are the exponents
Of opinion ins:?tde the country and among the Spanish o ties:
The faction euppnox trop t ho Franco regime,
awe a,-Iti-Praruco forces Inside the oox,- tz=y,
The e oarior snti-FrW1---'0 fo.r. cess "
lers~entc 'ni
Gr:
:upanit the Franco
G' i'xtf9
.
The regime is fundamentally dependent on the support of the ~~r and
t e -Police.. here forces authoritatively control the oo try; supported
by theca, diverse groups are active which are motivated more by a common
fear for their own continu1 it; exist )ce than by any co. n ideological
ground,.
The .!'~.rmy Fre a to s the Army many prriv:i.? en s in raturn for its
V ,
The eaciree of yow officers, formed for the most ifit ~?,
the civil Tw" and ofLerY rd;,, ,..Ye F'r i t
arzas~~=r,. ndef ~,, On i-.~~.e:ti:rar henc~~, t: ~
them
A'e siges of di e id nce. or of ] E -e -m loyalty .towards I'i~~xri oR wrong the
r, t.erals,. Any chango that would guarantee, Or not Dreatiy diminish, the
}~rivi.le;eai position they now hold in Spanish .life, could count on the
= ipnor?t or at lee,st the neiutra1 ity of the majority of a~fu~.i sh ene..ra s .
4 . ire Fa e, This nrgcurixst c~ra is the only def`inItively politic ,l body
uupport:.ng the regime. Fana.tico.1 And capable of going to extreestee, it
epi e?aeria-.s a distinct Minority in the coxmtry. Its phobia to rd the
astern de1eoracier takes-the form of intense nationalicru- For Its
political action,, the Fal4ange relies on the Goers-ive d e:aources of the
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affecting the l
United States wit
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32, as amended. Its, t
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or ' the revelation of its 'Co"
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9/08 : CIA-RDP82-004 9 Q4 QQ7niauthorise
on is prohibited by law.
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PAGES 7
SUPPLEMENT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
5., Isolated Political Versonalitiest More moderate than the Falange, but
completely submissive to and supporting the regime, are isolated indi-
viduals drawn from various rightist groups such as the monarchists,
Cedistas, and Carlists,or from elements which did not directly partici-
pate in political life before the civil war. Among these can be mentioned
Esteban Bilbao (President of the Cortes), Antonio Goicoachea (Governor of
the Bank of Spain), Ibanez Aartin (Minister of Education)$ Fernandez
Ladreda (Minister of Public %.orks), and Martin Artajo (Foreign Minister)t
Politically, they represent an exclusively personal position on the fringe
of the factions to which they originally belonged, and in many cases they
have been repudiated by those factions.
6. The Church; Recently, the attitude of the Church toward the regime has
been somewhat doubtful. However, certain hierarchies continue to give
full support to it. Like the military men, they are influenced by the
fear that any chan,;e in the regime may have fatal repercussions for the
Church in Spain because of the degree to which it has been involved with
the regime since the beinning of the Civil War. An instinct for self-
Li preservation colors its present attitude
7--. Others; Tnol?}deed also A3ltonrl the elements supporting the regime is. en
3ndaterminate but widespread group composed of those whoa under t:over
of the existing; situation and in many oases thanks to the official
duties they perform in the regime, have built up considerable fortunes
through graft. The prospect of a change in regime poses for them the
threat of investigation of the source of their fortunes; consequently,,
they adhere to Franco,. They cone from all political factions, including
some which formerly belonged to the republican camp.
8.. It will thus be seen that the axis of Franquism is formed by the coercive
forces of the Staten surrounded by the elements and interests cited above.
The coercive resources, along with the more or less influential propaganda
which is constantly presenting its only theme,, "Franoo or u;smmunism"
meaninti; the status quo or chaos m have some effect on other factions
which are merely cowardly or indifferent, Thus, the regime presents the
appearance of having popular support to a much greater degree than can
be deduced from an analysis of its political components,
Anti Franco Forces Inside the Country
9;, At the beginning of 1947, the situation of the anti-Franco forces- inside
Spain was as follows.
10. The Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democraticas. The ANFD is composed of
thethe a.lianza Republicana Espanola, the Socialist Party, the Confederation
fdacion al del Trabajo d Movimiento Libertario, and the Communist Party,
The presidency of the organization is held by the Republican representative.
Twice, the entire directing group of the ANFD has been arrested,, necessi-
tating its reorganization. The principal center of the PaNFD is Madrid.
There are some regional centers. The Communist tarty belongs to the
A!TFD, but the other components look upon it with distrust even though
they with it to assume some responsibility for the organization's policy
so that it will not operate independently of it. The republicanism of
the ANFD has varied in degree with the times. Its loaders have nearly
always professed adherence to the President of the Republic, even though
they have disputed the authority of the Republican Government. The
ANFDD has a delegation in France. On occasion, its members have travelled
outside the country. Also. some of its members have furthered their
activities by travel inside Spain. In general, the position of the AHFD
has corresponded to that maintained abroad by Prieto,,
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CENTAL INTELLI,:INCE GROUP
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I1.. The Bloc ue Re ublicano. The Bloque was formed by the official joining
of the nfon Reuublicuna and the Izquierda Republicans, As is true of
the ,f1MMFD, most or the leaders of the Bloque are to be found in Madrid-,
They have little contact with the masses. In general, the Republicars
of the ARE have been more active than those of the Bloqueo
12, Jimenez Fernandez. During the past year, attention has been focussed
on i.nenez Fernandes and his Christian democratic proposal. As his
declarations have been circulated publicly, their existence will nererely
be mentioned in this picture of the situation. Jimenez Fernandez works
mainly in Andalusia. He is thorou,hly anti-Franco, but does not main-
tain a very clear or constant position as to what his aims are,
13. The fionarchistso' The monarchist scone has diverse aspects and divisions
of al eiance. The supporters of the Archduke Curios de Ilapaburg do
Lorene (usually referred to as Carlos VIII), who is the grandson of
Carlos VII, are few in number. This pretender is actually controlled
by Franco, who uses him as a convenience to weaken the monarchist
cause, T ho second pretender is Prince 'tevi er de Borbon Parma, who wan
named re: ent in thewill of Don Alfonso Carlos do Borbon. The latter
died in 1936. The authority of Javier as regent was accepted by the
majority of Carlists, but at present the outstanding leaders of the
Carlist movement, headed by Conde de Rodezno, support the pretender
Don Juan de Borbon y Battenberg,> The present supporters of Don Juan
can be classified as follows
a) The Cedistas: The Cedistas comprise the Ytallowers of uil Robles in
his support of Don Juan, as opposed to those who-collaborate with the
Frenquists. The most outat -.ding persons of the latter group are the
Herrera brothers and 11artin Artajoo sil Robles' Cedista Faction is
small and its influence does not reach the masseso
b) The Alfonsine &bnarchist Faction: The Alfonsine rionarchists
are the re-nnants of Aceion spanola and RenovRcion Lspanola. The
most important figure at the present time is Jose Yang;uss de Mesias,
Their numerical and organizational importance is slight;
c) The Juan Yentas- ,croup: Various fi;ures of social, economic and
'financial importance form the Ventoaa group.
d) The Traditionalist (Carlist) Faction: The most important Tradition-
alist group is that of Navarre. The Traditionalists of Navarre
enjoy a certain protection through the Deputation. Their leader is.,
the Conde.de Rodezno. (Rodezno is President of the Navarre Depu-
tation to the Cortes.)
As is known, Don Juan, before coin, to Portugal, published in Lausanne,
a manifesto of liberal character. However, at Estoril, under the
influence of Rodezno and the pressure of the pro-Franco nonarchists, he
published the so-called "Bases of Estoril" of absolutist character.
(For information on the "Bases of Lstoril" see A..69065.) Division
among the monarchists has arisen over the circulation of these "Bases".
kihile the Carlists wish them to be known, considering them as their
own triumph, the more liberal elements think that they will redound
to the discredit of the monarchists. The "Bases of hstoril" are
almost unknown in Spain.
14~ The Military =fen. As has been stated earlier in this report, the majority
of the officers evidently support Franco, There is a group of generals
who do not hide their opposition to the regime. The most outstanding are
Antonio Aranda +4ata, Juan Beigbeder y Atienza, Alfredo xindelan and mi guel
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,the least monarchist is Aranda and the
Foote y Manse de zuniga0 Of these
must political is 23eigbeder. These are actually the ones who have closest
contact with the anti-Franco forces. These military men are concerned,
regardless of the regime established, with maintaining their position as
a class and with guaranteeing the preservation of order and the defense
of the fundamental interests now supported by the Frenquists.
lbw The Catalans? The Catalans of the interior have progressed toward unifi-
cation,, asst of their forces are grouped in the Consell de la Demooraoia
Catalana. Their liaison with elements outside Spain is weak. They ac-
knowledge the authority of the President of the 4eneralitat, but they
have no real relations with the Catalan Government->in-Exile. They have
close contact with the Consejo Uelegado Vasco.
16. The Galioians;, The internal situation of the ..alicians has not improved.
Relations between the 4alicians of the interior and the Galician movement
outside Spain are poor. They maintain contact with Basque resistance
forces
17:: The Has lies., Basque forces are united in and controlled by the Coneejo
ega , Do which serves as a supreme resistance council as well as the
delegate body of the Basque Government--in-Exile. This double significance
is indicative of the essential unity of the Basque movement inside and
outside Spain. The Consejo Uelexadois composed of representatives from
all the parties making upthe Basque Government, plus representation from
the CAT. The Consejo meats periodically. The political attitude of the
Consejo Dele?ado is determined by the directives of the Basque Jovernment-
in-Exile.
M The Monarchists and the A1FD. Since the borinning of 1946, a mutual
tendency to cooperate has been shown on the part of the A!V1) and a group
of monarchists. This tendency was apparent especially in the month of
July. Subsequently, the Giral -vernment sent emissaries to the interior
who succeeded in obtainin; the support of the A11FD to the efforts which
the Republican Government proposed to make before the Assembly of the
United Nations. However, having given this assurance to the -viral
Government, the ANFD again manifested its desire to reach an agreement
with the monarchists. as a result of this attitude, a trip was made by
a representative of the MIT to Lisbon. According to an informant tine
representative proposed the dissolution of the Giral jovarnment and of
the Cortes, the openingof a constituent period, the formation of a coa-
lition government in the interior, the holding; of a plebiscite on the
question of the regime, and the granting of amnesty.
19. While the attitude of the CNT representative as described above may not
be exact in detail, it is certain that on his return he was repudiated
by the C?'.T, and that the monarchists themselves, considering that his
position did not interpret thefeeling;s of the anti-Franco masses inside
Spain, doubted his statements,,
20. As the year advanced, there gradually Fern in the minds of those mili-
tary men who maintained contacts with the anti-Franco elements, Aranda
and Beigbeder, the idea of getting in touch with the republicans outside
apain0. The Fact that contact in the interior between the military men
and the & Ft) is less close than formerly indicates that the idea is
beint, realized.
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CEU1TRAL ItlTELLI-1E! CE GROUP
Anti-Franco 1-ction Outside ~pain
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21, Anti-Franco action is represented outside the country by the monarchist
group surrounding Don Juan in Portugal, as well as by the Republican
Government-in-Exile headed by Giral, with headquarters in Paris.
220 The :donarohistso The divergencies existing among; the different monarch-
let ;maps inside Spain have been outlined above. Outside the country,
those divergencies do not exist to any important degree; Don Juan
polarizes monarchist support, although there are some doubts among his
adherents as to his personal abilityo The monarchists seek their ex-
ternal support principally in En.-land, among "City" circles having inter-
ests in Spain. They have also the sympathy of influential persons in the
Viestern European Department of the Forei n Office, who believe that the
strategic, political and economic interests of =reat Britain in Spain
would be better safeguarded by a moderate monarchy, backed more or less
by the Army in the absence of popular support, than by a republic more
or less widely supported but open to extremist influences. Apart from
these British supports, which do not include the Labor +rovernmentg the
monarchists outside Spp..ir are workin= on the V-ti.oar_ and. on financial
interests in several countries, without arousing any support or sympathy
in popular political circles.
23. The Re tblican 4.jovernment-in-Exile. In August 1945, the exiled deputies
of the last Republican Co es met in Mexico and agreed to reconstruct
the republican institutions which had practically ceased to function
since the end of the civil taro In accordance with the Spanish Consti-
tution, Diego Martinez Barrio was elected interim President of the Re-
public, and the Premiership was conferred on Joac ;kiral
24. The composition of the Government is as followsi
Premier and Minister of Forei n Affairs0OJose Giral - Isquierda Republicans,
Defenseoaooooooovoooooooaoooot.coooaoooooo~=eneral Juan Hernandez Sarabia -
Professional military Than without
political affiliation
Justice-?o.o.........0.~.0..0...........o0Alvaro de Albornoz - Isquierda
Republicans
Industry, Commerce and Navigationcooo0.00Manuel de Irujo - Basque nation-
alist,~]Catholic
FinanoeOVOGUOGO.G.V.G?l090DG00000000...0?Augu8to Barcla - Izquierda
Republicana
L'Migration~Y.0oo.0...0900,.....o.o.oo..ooTrifon Gomez San Jose - moderate
Socialist, anti-Communist;
represents the UGT
Public Wo-rksooooo0oooooooovoooonoooooooo.lioracio Prieto - GNT
LaberGO...oo00..0