SEMI-ANNUAL STATUS REPORT FOR THE NSC ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2014
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 9, 1955
• Content Type: MF

TnrefDL"T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
'Irse *cal
101933-c
IAC-D-55/8. 1
9 February 1955
Copy No. 87
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT; Semi-Annual Status Report for the NSC on the Foreign
Intelligence Program
1. Please substitute the attached pages 5, 6, and 8 for the
corresponding pages of IAC-D-55/8 (Revised Draft) dated 4 February
1955. Other minor editorial changes were noted by the representatives
at their final meeting. A new text will be issued subsequent to IAC
action.
2. This report as amended, has been prepared by representatives
of the IAC agencies and will be submitted to the IAC for approval at
its meeting on Tuesday, 15 February 1955.
PAUL A. BOREL
Secretary
This memorandum may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL when
attachments are removed.
IAC-D-55/8. 1
9 February 1955
pt-tirr,Drg,r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
STAT
rr/111 EV-113 Pr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
IAC-D-55/8.1
9 February 1955
(IAC-D-57/2) have been reviewed in order to identify and correct
intelligence deficiencies. In addition, there is now before the TAG
a special detailed "postmortem" of NIE 11-6-54 "Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field."
? 3, Basic Intelligence. The initial world coverage of the
National Intelligence Survey is essentially 45% completed, including
2400 individual sections, mainly on JCS high priority areas. Present
production is slightly below the scheduled rate of approximately 8
equivalent NIS per year. The over-all quality is being improved by
better collection in support of the program.
? 4. Military Intelligence
a. General. At the present time, military intelligence is
generally adequate to provide broad measurements of the military,
logistic, industrial, and governmental control strengths of the
USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites.
Limited gains were made during the past six months in
the following fields: analysis of performance characteristics of new
types of Soviet aircraft; data on the development of nuclear weapons;
technical methods and devices for intelligence collection; Chinese
Communist ground force dispositions; and knowledge of Soviet
warship construction.
Nevertheless, military intelligence on the USSR and, to
a lesser extent on Communist China and the Satellites, is inadequate
in many critical fields. There is a serious lack of specific and
detailed information on the following: the development, production,
and deployment of weapons in the nuclear and guided missiles fields;
other unconventional weapons; newly developed or modified conventional
weapons; delivery systems, logistical capabilities and support; some
components of the air defense system; and scientific and technical
strengths as they affect military capabilities. Our knowledge continues
to be inadequate on the movements and dispositions of Soviet Bloc
forces, particularly in the USSR. Intelligence coverage in Indochina
has been reduced as a result of the loss of combat intelligence
contact with the Viet Minh.
? IAC-D-55/8. 1
9 February 1955
? r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved f rlie r' r'
Release 1074703/18 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
'rim pr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
IAC-D-55/8. 1
9 February 1955
Significant detailed information available is fragmentary
and becoming progressively more so. Unless means are developed to
overcome present deficiencies in the collection field, our intelligence
may eventually become inadequate for the support of US military
plans, programs, and operations.
b. Target Materials Production. Approximately 80% of the
minimal requirements for air target materials, in the Air Objectives
Folder Program (AOFP), in support of joint war plans were completed
by the end of CY 1954. The remaining 20% of the minimal require-
ments are scheduled for completion by the end of CY 1955. Other air
target materials, desired by the Services for development of the
optimum opportunities for air action, were at the end of CY 1954
approximately 50% satisfied. Production to satisfy the remainder of
these requirements continues to the maximum extent practicable and
consonant with priority emphasis on highest and earliest readiness
in support of joint war plans.*
* The Director of Naval Intelligence notes that he lacks
comprehensive, basic information upon which to analyze the
percentages cited, and lacks primary cognizance in other matters
alluded to in this paragraph. However, rate of production of air
target materials for the highest priority (all-weather) Navy targets
continues to be a matter of concern. The Target Area Analysis
Radar (TAAR) is considered to be the most significant piece of
target material developed and produced for all-weather, medium to
high altitude operations. Between July 1952 and July 1954 the Navy
nominated 632 all-weather targets for inclusion in the Air Objectives
Folder Program for production of TAAR's. As of 1 December i954
TAAR production had not been started for 52%. TAAR production
was in process for 22%, and TAAR had been completed for 26%.
The TAAR is seldom useful for low-level, all-weather mining
but charts can serve adequately where there are steep gradients
along the shore. In other cases the capability for conducting these
operations is greatly reduced. No intelligence solution appears feasible.
Low level high speed aircraft missions require special charts
for navigation and approach which are not now availabl e. However,
such charts are under development.
6 -
IAC-D-55/8. 1
9 February 1955
rs-1 r,/". rt T rr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
TflPCrrorT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
ikaol IAC-D-55/8.l
9 February 1955
overt sources. Economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc has improved
as a result of additional systematic analysis of the Soviet potential for
economic growth and further basic studies of particular industries.
Experimentation is underway on new economic research techniques for
the evaluation of Soviet capabilities for supporting specialized weapons
programs. Among the major unsolved problems are Soviet defense
expenditures and Soviet agricultural growth capabilities. Significant
improvements in the quality of economic intelligence and its consequent
value will depend largely on the success of collection efforts.
b. Communist China. Economic research effort on Communist
China has been increased, resulting in a better appreciation of Sino-
Soviet economic relationships.
c. Economic Defense. In addition to a continuing review of
major commodity problems for East-West trade controls, intelligence
support for economic defense includes an assessment of possible long
run economic developments within the Soviet Bloc as they relate to
economic defense policies. Intelligence support for enforcement of
economic defense measures has been maintained in spite of diminishing
information on trade transactions.
d. Free World. Economic intelligence production on the
Free World has concentrated on analysis of (a) improved economic
conditions in Western Europe; (b) the unfavorable outlook for Japanese
foreign trade; and (c) the problem of economic development in
underdeveloped areas.
e. Coordination. The Economic Intelligence Committee
(EIC) has taken a more active part in guiding economic intelligence
production and has continued its surveys to uncover economic research
and collection deficiencies. In September, the EIC coordinated a
draft DCID 15/1, later approved by the IAC, which delineates IAC
agency responsibilities for production and coordination of foreign
economic intelligence related to national security.
- 8 -
IAC-D-55/8. 1
9 February 1955
Tnp QFPPPT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
50X1
tnt)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010033-7
Nime ,Nso
SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
0/0E 101933-c
IAC D 55/8,1
9 Fet055
Copy #
4T Page., tt
Top Secret
REGISTRY
SOURCE
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence
classified Top Secret within the CIA' and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is
destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control
and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive
release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
umns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling
right-hand columns.
Agency or
downgraded,
personnel
and/or
col-
in the
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE
DATE
ST
',:i---
,
/;;Ke)
/f,2
1/0
ll:30
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall he completed in the
spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
appropriate
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE
CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
DATE
DATE
OFFICE IDATE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18 : CIA-RDP82-00400R00030 -