REVISION OF ANNEX NO. 6 TO NSC 114/2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000200060023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 15, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REVISION OF ANNEX NO. 6 TO NSC 114/2
hereto the final version of the redraft of Annex No. 6
to NSC 11I+/2 as approved by the IAC at its meeting on
14 April 1952. This paper has been transmitted to the
NSC.
James Q. Reber
Secretary
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Draft Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
Foreign Intelligence
1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the
intelligence agencies and CIA are tied into the President's over-all
program for Fiscal Year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It
should be noted, however, that many of the functions and programs
of intelligence must be of a continuing nature quite apart from the
specific aspects of any given over-all annual program. Thus the
departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which compose the
Federal Intelligence Community, must make certain that the sub-
stantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and
estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed
by the Soviet world and to others which confront the National
Security Council. These activities must be so developed and related
that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment
of these objectives. Many intelligence programs have an intimate
bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental programs
and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means
of collaboration is in a sense a major part of the intelligence program.
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2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal
of the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their
goals for Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the follow-
ing are analyzed below separately:
a. National Intelligence Estimates;
b. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates
and intelligence programs for departmental needs;
c. Current intelligence; and
d. The collection of intelligence information.
3. National Intellirgence Estimates: These Estimates, under
the arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authori-
tative intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support
of the programs for research and collection discussed below, and
with the existing resources employed directly in the estimating
program, it is expected that continued improvement in the quality
of our National Intelligence Estimates can be expected during the
period under discussion.
4+. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates:
The achievement of the standard of research in support of National
Intelligence MA'biYawt?e, which is our goal, must be viewed in terms
of years rather than a limite. period such as FY x153? This achit
ment is dependent on a sharper definitive ode the essential research
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required, on new methods of cooperative effort, and in certain
cases on increases in staff.
a. Political intelligence research: The political intel-
ligence programs of the Department of State are oriented
towards the urgent problems confronting the NSC and the policy
makers in the Department, towards research-in-depth into the
situations out of which the immediate problems arise, and
towards new demands for specialized intelligence products,
notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have
been made, and will continue to be made, in organization and
in priorities with a view to meeting these objectives. However,
it remains true that the intelligence production resources of
the Department are insufficient to meet urgent and specialized
needs and at the same time to maintain the research effort
essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts directed
at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.
b. Military intelligence as a result of Korea and the
threat of hot war is faced with increased demands of an
operational nature. At the same time it is faced with
responsibilities in support of National Intelligence Estimates.
The Military Services will also bear the brunt of the increas-
ing demands of NATO and its commands for tactical and strategic
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intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence
research activities to meet these demands, the resources
presently allocated to these activities will not permit such
demands to be met as they should.
c. Economic intelligence: It is expected that the coordin-
ated program which has been launched for the systematic analysis
of Soviet and satellite economies will have made considerable
progress during this period. It should provide a better,
though by no means complete, appraisal of the long-range
capabilities of the USSR and should suggest possible avenues
of U. S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnerabilities.
By the end of PY 1953 the cooperative research in this area
under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee
should have made satisfactory progress toward defining the
major problems, identifying the available and relevant informa-
tion existing in the Government, developing new methods of
research and producing a substantial number of studies which
will provide a firm foundation for National Intelligence
Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey
and apprui.sal of sovlot ocanomic activity. The needs of
intelligence support for economic warfare have not yet been
clearly defined though it is believed they will be of a magni-
tude beyond the existing resources of the intelligence: eOMMun;ty.
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d. Scientific and technical intelligence, to a certain
extent like economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the
agencies in respect of their individual needs. The intelligence
community is seeking to define clearly the areas-of responsi-
bility in this field and will develop mutually satisfactory
arrangements for pooling of resources requiring joint effort.
This planned cooperative attack on vital scientific and
technological intelligence problems should result by the end
of FY 1953 in considerable improvement. Notable success in
these respects has already been achieved in the coordination
of atomic energy intelligence.
e. National Intelligence Survey: The production schedule
for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into
account changed world conditions. It is expected that the
goals established for the coming year will be substantially
met with the existing resources available for this program.
This year's program will be the equivalent of eight complete
country national intelligence studies. This will leave
approximately 60% of the high priority areas to be completed.
5. Current intelligence programs are of course related to
both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the
President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to
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provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers
tions abroad affecting U. S. security. For purposes
of this warning
the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of
the departments and CIA are brought together through the IAC Watch
Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual
and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection
of hostile threats as well as current trends which necessarily
have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.
6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to
collection activities both overt and covert should be materially
improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature
of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs
are being designed to exploit more effectively existing U. S. govern-
mental and other available sources of overt foreign intelligence
information which have hitherto gone unexploited. Although by far
the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected
by overt means, much of the most critical information needed can be
obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The objective here,
because of the difficulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit,
must be to define clearly the most important targets. United States
efforts in clandestine operations are relatively new and the number
of personnel trained and qualified as is necessary for successful
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operation is small. Clandestine intelligence, therefore, must
be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and our objectives
for the Fiscal Year 1953 call for the elimination of marginal
targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the
building up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require
a great deal of time and are frequently faced with setbacks arising
from counterespionage activities of the enemy or detection and
exposure of our effort. It is recognized, of course, that the
military services have urgent tactical intelligence requirements
which also require the use of clandestine collection activities.
By the end of this period considerable strides will have been made
toward isolating the most essential elements of information which
must be collected by covert means giving proper attention to
priorities. There has been some success in the collection of
intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine techno-
logical and scientific means. The achievement of greater success
in this field is to a great extent dependent on the establishment
of arrangements for cooperative concentration of efforts.
7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelli-
gence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is
confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result in
a margin of uncertainty both in our estimate and in our ability to
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give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the
security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high
state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in
making decisions and the speed with which, under their system,
such decisions can be implemented. It should be emphasized that the
best collective effort of which the United States intelligence
community -- or any other -- is capable cannot guarantee adequate
advance warning of a surprise attack.
Related Activities
8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned
in support of the President's programs will require increasing
financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the
financial requirements are not large. However, their size in
relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that
special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed.
A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty
in recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs
will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.
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