COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00357R000300100016-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2005
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Content Type:
MISC
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP82-00357R000300100016-5.pdf | 457.57 KB |
Body:
S-E-C-R-E-T
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25X1 Communications Specialists
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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25X1
Operations Officers
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Intelligence Analysts
In the Congressional-approved budget for FY-1981 the National Foreign
25X1 Assessment Center NFAC) was authorizedO new positions, and projects losses
25X1 of an additional =people through the end of FY-1981.
-- NFAC's research.on geographic, economic and political issues will be
most affected by the freeze. NFAC does not have enough people working on n;equired
aspects of the Third World. Critical subjects cannot be addressed because of the
25X1 lack of analysts with the necessary backgrounds, and because the people presently
employed. on Third-World subjects are heavily engaged in current intelligence on
crises rather than in research. The areas where we are unable to meet our research
ob`ectives include:
25XI
25X1 -- At least I new analysts with the following skills are needed:
25X1 economists wi various area specialties and/or background in energy topics;
people from among the disciplines of anthropology, political/cultural geography,
-
emo a h critical non-fuel resources; an eo le with area expertise in 25X1
25X1 -- If we do not hire at least =to meet attrition and augment the above
categories, I expect serious degradation of CIA's intelligence production on
subjects that will be of critical importance during the remainder of the 1980s.
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S-B-C-R-E-T
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We experience our highest attrition rates in the clerical fields and yet,
in many ways, are most dependent upon these skills to make our daily intelligence
collection and production processes operate effectively and efficiently. We are
talking here not only about typists and stenographers who produce our large numbers
of intelligence reports, but also with the file clerks who help compile voluminous
data and with the payroll clerks who ensure that our employees are paid. CIA
has historically utilized spouses of its employees to satisfy clerical requirements
in the field. This has obviated the need in some instances to send secretaries to
various locations around the world at a significant annual savings. This hiring
freeze, while precluding us from satisfying clerical requirements overseas, is
also precluding us from satisfying these requirements in the most efficient
manner. This is just one example of our clerical difficulties. Others of equal
magnitude exist everywhere in the Agency.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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1
Engineers and Physical Scientists
All agencies-of government have difficultly competing with the private
sector for the skills of these professionals. As a part of the improvements
made in the Agency's selection and processing procedures, major recruiting
emphasis was placed on this category. It has taken us eight months to get
people with these skills into our pipeline.
?
25X1 During FY 1981 the Science and Technolog Directorate alone iv ill be
responsible for the execution of about of contract and other program
activities which will support programs across the full spectrum of intelligence
functions requiring the application of technology.
ecause o the ec i.ca c a enge we are ae to otter, the
inheren excitement and dynamism of our programs, and the reputation we have in
the high technology community, we are able to attract and hold individuals of
high competence- -despite our inability at many levels to compete with private
sector salaries and benefits.. We do, however, face some attrition in our work-
force. Experience tells us that we are most likely to lose the people whose
skills we most require. They are the people with mobility, contacts, significant
future growth potential, and professional experience gained here of great value
to the private sector.
If we cannot replace these key people as we lose them, we will have to shift
.qualified people, where.we have them, from other programs. This will cause
significant disruption. More critical to us is the fact that in many cases'we
will simply not have the talent required anywhere within our organization, and
in those cases critical positions will go unfilled. The Directorate of Science
and Technology has two such key senior positions unfillable today from within our
organization. Extending this state of affairs for any significant period of time
will substantially increase the risk of serious and expensive mistakes in judgment,
25X1
25X1
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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omissions, and schedule adjustments within ongoing developmental activities.
In addition, the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research will have increasing
difficulty in providing the analyses that is is uniquely qualified to perform.
It is our judgment that failure to approve the limited exemptions in critical
skills areas proposed in the letter above will prove exceedingly costly to the
government over the next two to three years.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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Computer Specialists
IThe CIA has as_much difficulty acquiring computer specialists as it
does engineers and h sical scientists for all the reasons previously cited.
25X1 Programs like the SAFE System--a large computer system being
developed to improve t e tools available to intelligence analysts--will be
significantly affected because of an inability to acquire supervisory and
operating personnel to man the computer center scheduled for initial operation
in 1982. Again, because of the length of the pipeline for people with these
skills and their need for extensive training, the SAFE System may not begin
operation as scheduled at.the end of next year. Because of the dynamic nature
of the marketplace for these skills, attrition in this category is typically
higher than others and will impact adversely ongoing computer operations that
this Agency has become so dependent upon.
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Security Officers and Couriers
The CIA relies, on people with these skills to protect our classified informa-
tion and to protect our facilities, both at home and abroad, that contain not only
classified information, but our people as well. Given increasing political
instability in the major areas of the world, as most recently evidenced by inci-
dents in the Near East and Latin America, CIA security officers are taking on
increasing responsibility with respect to the protection of our employees and our
property located overseas.
Our security officers play critical roles in performing security investigations,
not only for prospective CIA employees, but also for the myriad of people in the
private sector working on classified CIA contracts--some with the very highest
clearance requirements of our government. CIA security officers are also very
heavily and continually involved in counterintelligence and antiterrorist activi-
ties overseas.
Regarding our couriers, we rely on them to routinely service over Odelivery 25X1
and pickup points around the world on a 24-hour-a-day basis. We are presently
25X1-somettpercent under strength in this occupational category and, without relief,
will have no recourse but to divert professional employees from their primary
intelligence and related support responsibilities to perform these courier duties.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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Linguists
Skilled linguists are a vanishing breed in America. This comes at a time of
increased demand for linguists by both the government and multinational corporations.
For example, increased requirements to translate documents from
have been levied on the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The Operations
Directorate is debriefing and
has requirements for overseas operations officers wit very esoteric languages.
25X1 At this time, the DDO is ercent below its language capability need. In many
cases, there are only a Jew people in the United States who speak and read the
more difficult languages--Chinese, Russian, and Arabic, for example. Once an,
applicant with a language capability is found, it is absolutely necessary to
hire the person if he/she meets other necessary qualifications.
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25X1
25X1
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Attorneys
Because of high turnover, our General Counsel's office expects to be at only
25Xlhalf strength if the freeze continues for the rest of this fiscal year. At
least one-half the work of the Office is devoted to dealing with cases in active
25Xlliti ation a roximatel to which the Agency is a party at present; plus some
To reduce the attention being given to these cases wolud
risk public disclosure of classified intelligence information, degradation of the
Director's authority to protect intelligence sources and methods, and judicial
interference in Agency operations. If new vacancies in the Office of G-eneral
Counsel are not filled, and in light of the fact the Office cannot diminish atten-
tion to active litigation, virtually all other legal activity would have to be
curtailed. This would result in an inability to assist the Directorate of Operations
in implementing clandestine activities and in assuring that clandestine and cover
necessities in the United States do not expose intelligence officers to criminal
or civil liability. In addition, the Office would be severely hampered in carry-
ing out present efforts to simplify-legal regulation applicable to intelligence
activities and to remove -unjustified restrictions imposed in the past.
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ILLEGIB
MEMORANC FOR:
25X1
'OUS
FORM RFV
5
-75 101 EDITIONS
5-75
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Hiring Freeze
FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Director of Personnel
Policy, Planning, and Management
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
Director of Central
Intelligence
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
9 February 1981
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column oft,, each comment.),
The attached paper is lengthy
but considered necessary to state
our case. It represents the result
of several meetings for coordina-
tion with the Deputy Directors and
the ,Comptroller. The Comptroller
and I are available to discuss
the paper at your convenience.
You may prefer to have the Deputy
Directors present so that you may
hear from them directly their
justifications for the exemptions
requested or, if more specificity .
is needed, for justification of
certain skills.
7IY E_ Fi -. ater
FORM 10 u eolrio ous
1-79
KIT
AT