1. POLITICAL ATTITUDES 2. DEVELOPMENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400490001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400490001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400490001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400490001-3
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT NO.
COUNTRY Czechoslovakia
SUBJECT l.Politieal Attitudes 2. Developments
in Higher Education
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
DATE DISTR. 16 Fsb. 1955
NO. OF PAGES 5
50X1 Attitudes Toward Communism
1. at least 90% of the population
was opposed to the Commun s government. Police controls were so
50X1 severe and punishment for remarks against the' government so heavy
that nearly everyone was obliged--t-suppress his true feelings.,
50X1 About the only thin as, an expression of
opposition to the regime was the willingness of the peasants to
neglect upkeep of farm buildings and the tendency of people in
50X1 general to do careless and slovenly work.Odid not think there
was any significant difference in attitudes of Slovaks and Czechs
50X1 to the rigime. Indeed..[ one could no longer speak
of a:Slovak question. Slovaks and Czechs were both equally dis-
gusted with. Communism.
2. In reply to a question on the religious situation, he said that the
churches were nearly holding their own. They were being persecuted,
somewhat, but he thought that this fact caused many people who were
anti-Communists to rally to the churches more-strongly than they
50X1 would. have done otherwise.
3. I the peasants were the segment of the obulation
which was most likely to remain unaffected by Communism. did
not think that the peasants would ever be converted to Co nistm.
50X1 The intelligentsia had also stood up well against Communist in-
doctrination. There were few Communist fanatics among the intelli-
gentsia. Communist economic teaching might have caused some in-
tellectuals to accept the economic and social arguments for a con-
siderable measure of socialism but, because of the intolerant,
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undemocratic, and tyrannical methods of the Communists, such in-
tellectuals were more likely to become anti-Communist Social
Democrats than pro-Communists.
Attitudes . T 2, , , , r d ;;the USSR and the Soviets
4, There were no.Soviet agriculture officials in Brno. Ten`o`r12 Soviet
agricultural experts in a visiting delegation were shown around a
50X1 model state farm
one of th
b
t
,
e
es
in Moravia, at Pohorelice u Brna
(N 48--59, E 16-31) in 1952. This,was the only visit to Moravia. of
1
. ous unwillitsgiees: of
the Soviets to allow outsiders to travel freely in the USSR was
often cited by the.Czechs as proof that Communism had been an
economic and political failure in the Soviet Union as in Czeoho-.
Slovakia.. People jokingly said, ,,I'll believe in Communism se
Soon as T Am t
_ .__ _ -- __0. w . wr ~ w? v.rr-.....aNYf Yi. Y f4 Y V ii M
an sent to the farm to help greet the Soviets
d
h
an
s
ow them about
the farm. The Soviets acted as if,they already knew everything and
50X1 the Czechs knew nothing..,
6.
50X1
50X1
claims of technical superiority The notori
1
n ravel to Moscow myself
At the Agricultural Institute in Brno in 1952-
wnetner or not it might be --- - v w.aci. ko&-WJ6 ."iiAp~,7~'~,j+
possible for them to spend their. third
year summer vacation doing agricultural work in the Soviet Union,
on an exchange basis with Soviet students who might be Invited to
come: to Czechoslovakia. The professor, a non-Communist flamed
Vladimir Fr^antek, made-inquiries and informed the students that
such an arrangement was not possible. The students spoke no more
of their proposal thereafter, as the word soon got around that one
or two of the Party fanatics among the students were making
assiduous inquiries as to who thought of the scheme in the.fjret
place, his real motive, and so on
A
WLAWW
asie?
50X1 MO. eve , that a war between America and the Soviet Union w
inerritable, but might not come for some time, The Soviet Union
would not start the war because America was stronger and because.
the Satellites were unreliable. Since America; would a1.so not start
the war, it would probably break out by accident in the Par East
or elsewhere. Though few people in Czechoslovakia were convinced
supporters of the regime, it was fairly widelybelieved--
..
baps the Communists area tin ~ her
50X1 poor countries, port in the
th
e C?mn+umists
mi
ht
g
be gaining among the
g peasantry in Poland, where it
was assumed that conditions had formerly been very bad and were
perhaps better now, or at least no worse, than they had been in
past years.
People in Czechoslovakia thought that Titoism was perhaps possible
in the other Satellites but wa
t
s ou
of the question in Czechoslovakia..
50X1 `There was, however, ssome n that Cepiaka might :like to be
a Tito. the rumor that Cepicka, the
Min Ste se, m g replace either the prime minister' or the
president. Cepioka was thought to have quarrelled with`Zapatoeky
and to have lost influence since Gottwald 's death. Nevertheless,
neither Cepicka, nor Zapotooky, nor anyone also could ever be aTito in Czechoslovakia, because the Soviet Union would occupy the
country, if necessary, rather than lose the uranium ore in Czeoho..
Slovakia. The average Czechoslovak took it for granted that his
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50X1
country was one of the principal sources of uranium for the USSR
and'that, consequently;, there was nothing anyone in Czechoslovakia.
could do to eliminate Communist rule in the country.
There was still some fear and mistrust of the Germans, but Communist
propaganda about the dangers of West German rearmament had not made
anyone in Czechoslovakia less hostile to Communist rule. Communist
propaganda on the subject was generally disbelieved. Many Czechs
listened to West German radio broadcasts, however; bird occasional
items about the activities of the Sudeten Germans in West Germany
sometimes aroused apprehension. This concern was offset to a con-
siderable degree by the comforting reflection that
di
i
con
t
ons in
Czechoslovakia were In general so poor that few Sudeten Germans
would wish to return.
10. The United States was still the country on which most Czechoslovaks
relied for help.. The Czech Communists argued that manyAmericana
were Communists and were opposed to their government. They cited
speeches of Senator McCarthy to prove that there were indeed'many
Communists in the United States, but hardly anyone in Czechoslovakia
took such Communist propaganda seriously.
Foreign Radio Broadcasts
50X1 every evening between six and seven o'clock. He rarely listened
to VOA because he was accustomed to the BBC and RFE broadcasts,
and because their times of transmission were most convenient for
him. He had never heard the VOA agricultural broadcast. He listened
to the news on Prague Radio, but never tuned in Radio Moscow.. He kept
himself informed on the international situation by listening to
foreign broadcasts and by reading between the lines In the Communist
press. He had no comment to make on the content of Western broad-
casts beyond the remark that BBC news broadcasts were completely
dependable and that RFE would have a stronger reputation for
accuracy and reliability if it would make more admissions of7
occasional Western shortcomings in its treatment of the news.
He added, however, that he realized that it was not always feasible
or relevant to include such information in,programs devoted to
particular domestic Czechoslovak topics, as was frequently the
case with the broadcasts of RFE.
12? Damming was bad'th t that it was always pos0ible for
50X1 someone who wanted to tune in'a foreign station broadcasting; in
Czech to do so. There were many people who had no irate-eest':at all
in news broadcasts of anything other than the results of the latest
football gae
could not e-tfima,te.. how lame the Western radio
audience or the OA audience was, at,. , g se n that there
were at least as .many people who 1ietened :tom fore .gu broadcasts
as there were who followed the general world and political news
broadcasts on Radio Prague.
Western Leaflet Operations
13..
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
- - -- - - ~~~ 46 11 . ,.a.V %PVVVIa, UU did not have any
The first Western leaflet ever saw ,48's.- the hunger.` ~rdwn,b- July
1953. A farm-worker at Kyjov (N 49-01, E 17-07) in Moravia foundv
one of the crowns in the fields After
both had read it, they tore it up lest heir persons.
In July and August 1954, an acquaintance found three
copies of No. 16 of the "News of Free Europe which had fallen in
a garden at a village in the Sternberk area in northern Moravia
Later, in the same village, a neighbor found a few es of No.
. 17
of the same new leaflet series n .,,,ems
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close friends there, and so did not know what happened to most of
50X1 the leaflets. In the summer of 1954, a student friend
50X1 showed one of the "Ten Point" leaflets which had fallen at
Podivin N 48-50, E 16-51), southern Moravia.
1* most people read the leaflets and destroyed' them.
50X1 He thought that the only people who turned the leaflets in, to the
police were those who picked up the leaflets in the company of other
people.. He never heard of anyone mailing the leaflets to the Communist
authorities or putting,the "Ten Demands" in the ballot boxes.
15. In September 1954, a member of the border ards at Ta.chov (N 49-48,
50X1 B 12-38), western Bohemia, the border guard soldiers
had instructions to try to shoot down the leaflet balloons. The
50X1 soldier had never heard of any balloons brought down in this, Way,
50X1
16,
no other knowledge of action taken to prevent circulation
of the leaflets.
practically everyone in Czechoslovakia had
heard. of the leaf lets, but he thought that people who did not visit
the countryside or work in the fields were less likely to have seen
the leaflets. In short, the leaflets.were better suited to reach
people in the country than town dwellers. Nevertheless., the cam
paignwasa generally effective weapon in maintaining opposition
to the regime
50X1
17.. though nearly everyone approved of the leaflet
campaigns, two or three peasants he spoke. to were slightly critical
of the wording of some of the leaflets. They said that, while they
approved of the leaflets, advice to refuse to. meet delivery` quotas
was unrealistic and impractical a They would gladly withheld 'the
deliveries if they could, but they, themselves, did not see how
they could do so without being?punished. A farmer who did-not meet
50X1 his quotas would not receive fertilizer, seed,. and so on. ,,He also.
could not sell the grain on the free market or to otherspea6ants
50X1 the writers
sometimes appeared.
of the leaflets
,
.
to be a ' 'bit misinformed. One of the .leaflets had spoken of hunger
in Czechosl'ovkia. There was less food in Czechoslovakia than, in
the West, but. he was sure it was not correct to speak of hunger in
50X1 Czechoslovakia. id not think hat the r.'~atr.a "tenhad
_ becomea well known popular symbol.
18. Apart from the above remarks of .some peasants, had heard no
criticisms of the leaflet operation and was not aware of any
occupational or age differentiation in attitudes toward this
operation. He was confident that the operation was generally
welcomed, and believed that'it should be repeated per.odioally.
:.,His own view wait that the leaflets should std could? y:. a a more .
educational purpose in giving accurate informat.on on ' to cost of
1ivi ig abroad. How much wheat must a farmer in weste?n Europe
or tote United ,States produce to pay for a pair of boots or to r . a
f tractor? What was the weekly consumption per capita of meat. .In
.other countries? How did old-age pensions and health insurance
'in the United States and western Europe compare with social security
provisions in Czeeheslovakia? Such were questions to'which everyone
50X1 wanted accurate answers.
19 id not mean that the Wedt should always insist that its
s sa? and of living was higher than in eastern Europe. People "al
50X1 ready 'knew this was true. They did not believe the Communist pro-
paganda that there was already an economic crisis in the' West.
What they' felt they needed wire_faets to equip
them to see through communist propaganda now and in the future.
This meant that they needed dependable facts about difficulties
as well as accomplishments in the West.
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50X1!0, in the 1953 class of about 60 in the agronomy
50X1 faculty of the Agricultural Institute in Brno, about six or Seven
students R re perhaps convinced Communists,. another 10 were oppor-
tnni+ is t-o p o e i6 td to be cot winced, and the remaining tyro th rd:s
:of a students .could more or less definitely be classed as anti--
Coeaiuniaets p " ?The glass had consisted of about 80 students in 1949,
n _d/ a Jexpelled in August and September 1,9528. on this grounds
in the fall of 195*, a number of the
,-studentst1b pun
e in953were probalyermitted to retr
h0p#o e . yo, g people to make the financial sacrifices
t relt attendance when they had no prospect of
S .ftnanc.i&.l reward. . A eomDatent worker earned about 1.100
14e,10eta fop university attendance. Another roaeon
'
ta political requirements was that some schodle
'
i e .iAding sufficient qualified students to Sill
was told by a friend that, in August 195, - only
-d 'applied for admission to the 100 yaeanoies in
cal ld enter the. Animal Husbandry Faculty in Brno
classes began, sufficient students more
50X1 this as evidence, of a growing
tp' t and perhaps for this reason had lowered :the
; 'st sh Of his own expense, was usually paid .from 1,3O0.
00 ;crowni . ' ,ln the source's opinion,, this differential wads so
tart )0:1 young people had no desire to go to a university.
o:t gnaw assumed that they were doing eo tm
.a,complaint to the school authorities about his
jeot. He at once threw. down his book in anger
'.the roams _declaring that he would not continue.
r- .~___~ --rte --_r___
I.:1, the elan s, amd so did the three fanatics. The
remtly tacitly cropped,
00m 2949 to 1953, no faculty members f the
eta In Brno were d aschaerged, but one pre eeear,
5 tQ p lied . to retire in 195,1 strew though he
sittnue teaching. Prc reaaa
"Pro-Western-minded professor of forestry.'' with an
Iutaation, was punished. for his Known ant1-!UoiJmuni.8Tr.
' ai to Consisted mostly of non-Communists who taunt
,ve.rsity instrodtion was quite good., The . faculty
Moo.
c'o_ ec ively Denunciations of vrofemovre. by studon$?.,
i
._, `ear 1952-?53 for example, selections we're' based
;`?in t!~.dons .eerati n, in addition to his polit
cal "'background.
y < "a r !?e c, previous scn?ia s ic ravings or an app weans
wt ,n y enta for the school year 1953.54, for both' .sir
got finding professionally qualified replacements,,
alNi 1 pll etant to fire non--Communist prafeasbre b cause
ding notes what the teachers one Professor
t%rde students with reputations as fanatical communists:
a infrequoent p cancee 83 one.
k4d8i0e . they were expected to attain.
d ite in prey- Iona years could not measure up toT the
?
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n 'aoe1a1i0as The students in that class were
e ected. to take notes on such matters and did not
Wha thf th thretdtiti
me proessor--sawee suens wrn
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