SOVIET ARMY INFANTRY TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400340001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 3, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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NFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised person is prohibited by law.
C -0 -N-F-I-D-E-N-T- -L
COUNTRY USSR REPORT NO.
SUBJECT Soviet Army Infantry Tactics DATE DISTR.
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MAY 3 1955
560
NO. OF PAGES
3 MAY 1955
22
DATE OF INFO.
REQUIREMENT NO.
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PLACE ACQUIRED
REFERENCES
DATE ACQUIRED
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES
223.I
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5/55
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STATEARMY JNAVY AIR ilk I FBI AEC
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X";
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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COWRY USSR
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT Soviet Army Infantry Tactics
DATE Of INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
50X1
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR. 21 Feb. 2933
NO. OF PAGES 23.
REFERENCES:
50
This report was prepared by a Department of the Army inter-
rogator in response to Soviet Standard Brieflio. 10. It is
forwarded essentially as received.
Note: Source's knowledge of Soviet infantry tactics was limited, for
the most part, to battalion level; however, he could also give
some information on regimental-level and, to a leaser degree,
on divisional-level tactics. The greatest portion of his
tactical knowledge was acquired while he was an officer-oandi-
date At the Utantry 00S in Tashkent. Most of the instruction
there was based largely on the nt tiv
vice latten,
1948 edition ( r Okt fITIT4 s uroe On ed-
008 from Octocer, o ovem r a the in antry tactics
described in this report are in accordance with the latest
Soviet doctrines outlined in the P d Se vice Re lat ons of
1950 and 1951 (source was not sure o
were evolved from the 1948 .1t
To a lesser degree, some o so oe $ 0 ?ge o n ary
tactios was derived from field service in the 287th Ods. Rifle Regt.,
95th Gdi Rifle Div:" B110ause-te.,was a rifle platoon leader during
most of his service and occasionally served as an acting company CO,
it must be ,kept in mind that his knowledge of infantry tactics at bat-
? talion level and below will be more precise than that on higher
w
ulations,
ni14041LIIMULtWil
2. The following manuals currently used by the Soviet armed forces
to outline infantry tactical procedures and techniqueswere listed
by source:
a. Palone (ItIktarittgt)- 1950 or 1951 edition -
a usivic--tHIN7Wii-the principal tactical
manual.
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b. Combat Re lations (yevoy Ustav) - 1950 or 1951 edition
quad to company incIusivets manual was the chief
manual used in rifle companies.-1
MN.
c. Other less important tactical handbooks were:
(1) Tactical Trainin of the Individual Soldier (Metodika
Ta at
(2) Tactical Trainin of the S uad (Metodika Taktichka
oveea
Both of these handbooks 'were Amdlaadified and 'were avail- '
' able to any enlisted man.
Chang Tao
2. The only changes in tactical training and doctrines known to source
since 1947 were those concerning atomic-defense training; his
knowledge on this was very limited.2
Att,fk
3. In the attack, prescribed frontages were:
a. Squad - Up to 40 in,
b. Platoon - Up to 150 m,
c. Company - Up to 500 me
d. Battalion - Up to 800-1000 m#
4. Types of attack formations included: frontal assault (lobnoye
nastupleniye), flanking attack (obkhod), and close envelopment
(okhvat). There were other forms of attack but source had for-
gotten them.
5. Source was familiar only with the frontal attack which was the only
tactical formation practiced in his regiment even at regimental
level- In this formation, units practiced this form in a line of
skirmishers (tsep). As a rule, the company did not have a reserve
in the attack. Al]. the rifle platoons, including the company MG
Platoon which was attached to the rifle platoons, attacked in one
line of skirmishers or one echelon.
6. From the rifle battalion on, up, it was taught that the attack was
1.11 two echelons with two rifle companies forward in the first
echelon and the third rifle company following in the second echelon
at about 200-300 in. The third company was the battalion reserve
and could be thrown into the attack as the situation demanded by
the battalion CO with permission of the regimental CO. As soon as
the first enemy positions were seized, the two forward companies
continued the attack without halting or eorganizing. The third
company continued to follow behind the forward elements. In the
regiment, there was usually one battalion in reserve which followed
behind the two attacking battalions at a distance of 300 in.
7. Source stated that there were still other formations which could
be used depending on enemy strength, own troop fire power, weather
conditions, and terrain features. Source could not elaborate on
the types of formations to be used in these instances.
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8. As a general rule, any attached weapons came under the direct tactical
control of the commander of the rifle unit in question. In the case
of mortars, AT pieces, artillery, tanks, and SP guns, these were
under the control of the senior artillery commander for the applica-
tion of the proper artillery techniques so that he might concentrate
their fires if needed.
Implamtat of the Battalion HMGs
9. The battalion MG company was usually broken down among the rifle
companies by platoons. The MG platoon might be further broken down
when attached to the rifle company or attached exclusively to one
rifle platoon. HMGs could be used independently or by pa1r3 de-
pending on the wishes of the rifle company CO. The HMGs joined in
the 4ast five minutes of the artillery preparation along with the
rifle company weapons. Each rifle company weapon and each HMG fired
on the nearest enemy trench at predetermined targets. As the rifle
company moved forward in the attack, the HMOS were manhandled
forward by bounds. The HMW picked out targets of opportunity and
covered the riflemen as they moved forward. They remained in firing
positions for short periods and tried to keep up with the riflemen.
They had to be ready to beat off any counterattacks thit developed
in the pursuit. The HMGa remained with the unit to which they
were attached.
10. Control of the HMGs was the responsibility of the rifle CO of the
unit to which the HMG6 were attached. Communication was carried
out by oral commands, runners, or prearranged signals. Because the
HMG company was split up, the HMG company CO could Join one of the
rifle company COs to which the HMGs were attached or he could be
at the disposal of the rifle battalion CO. H4O4 could support the
attack by overhead fire, flanking fire, or by firing at intervals
between platoons but, to the best of source's knowledge, only direct
fire. was employed.
52121-amtati21.11.1ti? rn MortarCompany_and the 120-mm Mortar Battetry
11. In mast cases, the 82 mm mortar company and the 120 mm mortar battery
fired as units; both took.pairt in: the artillery preparation. The
82 rilm mortar company could support only one of the two assault corn-
papies of its parent battalion or both if the situation demanded.
The regimental 120 mm mortar battery would support one or both
assanit battalions. ,Each battalion 82 mm mortar company and the
regimental 120 Mm morttribattery were assigned two or three targets
by the senior artillery commander,, who was normally the regimental
chief of artillery. These targets were in the immediate enemy front
line of trenches.
12. The 02 mm mortar company was emplaced as a battery immediately
behind the reserve company of the battalion. Normally, these pieces
Were emplaced forward of the regimental mortar but, in some eases,
could be on the same line. It could be placed on one of the flanks
of the battalion. After the first line of enemy trenches had been
seized, the ,,ortar company displacsd forward as a company. Mortars
could be manhandled for short distances but any long distance required
vehicular transport. In the meantime, the infantry companies kept
moving forward without hesitation and?, in the pursuit, the battalion
82 mm mortars stayed behind the battalion reserve company.
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13. The regimental 120 mm mortar battery was emplaced directly behind
the two leading assault battalions and ahead of the reserve battalion
in order to support both battalions in the attack. This battery
could also be emplaced directly behind one battalion and support only
that particular battalion. Source believed that this battery displaced
as a battery after the battalions started to press forward after
seizing the first line of enemy' trenches, just as the battalion 82
mm mortar company did. Source did not know the action of the 120
mm mortar battery in the pursuit. The 120 mm mortar battery emplaced
300-400 m from the frontline troops prior to the attack.
14. Both the 82 mm mortar company and the 120 mm mortar battery set up
their own respective OPs in the most advantageous spot. At each
OP there was the mortar company CO, one or two observers, and a
telephone operator. At the mortar emplacements, one of ilnt ,sstar
company or battery officers was designated as the seLto, of -!r.
The mortar company and mortar battery commander who wore 710 ttieir
respective OPs actually conducted the observation with the help of
the other observers at their OP. These two commanders also made all
the necessary corrections which were relayed back to the mortar
emplacements. The senior officer at the mortar positions relayed,
by voice, the corrections to the pieces and gave the fire commands;
however, the COS of the mortar units came under direct control of
the rifle unit to which they were attached and aleo to the senior
artillery commander. As the attack progressed and the forward
infantry unit displaced, the COs of the mortar units relayed firing
data and corrections by radio to the mortar emplacements.
Employment of 57 mm AT Guns
15. Both battalion and regimental 57 mm AT guns were placed as far
forward as possible between the first and second trenches just before
the attack. The trucks that pulled these pieces were located under
cover not too far from the pieces. As the assault companies started
to move toward the first enemy trenches, the trucks moved out and
the 57 mm AT guns hitched up and moved out as close as possible to
the assault companies. Because the main role of the 57 mm AT guns
was to beat off an enemy tank attack, they remained as close as
possible to the forward elements in the pursuit. They could be
manhandled for about 100 m if necessary.
16. The 57 mm AT guns were decentralized in the attack and could be
used singly or in pairs. The pieces were usually attached down
to rifle platoons and came under the command of the platoon to which
attached. All the battalion 57 mm AT guns took part in the att ck.
Source was quite sure that no regimental AT guns were kept back
in regimental reservesand, as far as he knew, the regimental pieces
also fully participated in the attack just as the battalion pieces.
Only direct fire was used. The 57 mm AT guns took part in the
artillery preparation. They were assigned to fire at MG emplace-
ments and other strongpoints in the enemy front line of trenches.
EmplIgment of SPG 82 mm AT Rocket Launchers
17. The $PG 82 mm AT rocket launchers of the rifle battalion were also
located as far forward as possible. In some cases, they could be
sissfar forward as 15 m beyond the first trench in a separate
emplacement or between the first and second trenches. They were
attached to rifle companies. Because there was only one truck to
carry these weapons, it was pointed out to source that these
weapOns should be used in pairs. He stated, however, that they were
separated and were manhandled. They loaded only for longer hauls.
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.5.
Alglealn_of,theJ&NCUMUWUJIZEL.813 Gunei
i8 The 76 mm SP guile were attached an a battery to one of the attacking
battalions and eOuroe thought they ()Mild be attached as low ais a rifle
company. Because the main role Of the SP guns was to engage enemy
tanks, they played a lesser role as a direct fire Weapon On enemi
emplacements in the first lino of trenches. If used in the attack,
all the firing was direct. Source did not believe that they were
tied in with the division artillery because they moved out in line
with the infantry. Although source was not certain, he thought
that it was possible that the guns made a limited amount of partici-
pation in the artillery preparation. In'this case, their fire was
coordinated in the regimental fire plan under direction of the
regimental chief of artillery.
Employment of AA MG8
19. The battalion ZPU (AA) platoon was used chiefly to protect the
battalion CP from air attack. The regimental AAA platoon was also
used to protect the regimental CP against air attack. In these
instances, they were kept under centralized control. Source did
not know how they would be emplaced. The battalion ZPU platoon
was more or less a reserve for the battalion CO. The guns could
be used against ground targets, in whieb case they could be decen-
tralized. They could be used to a limited extent against thin-
skinned vehicles. Because the CO of the battalion "artillery battery"
had his 57 mm AT platoon and the SPG 82 mm platoon detached to the
rifle companies, and the ZPU (AA) platoon at the battalion CP, he
was at the battalion CO's disposal. In units as low as the rifle
battalion the battalion CO was also considered the "Senior Artillery
Commander". He turned to the CO of the battalion artillery battery
for technical advice if there was no artillery element attached to
the battalion.
20. When used to support the attack, the ZPUs were placed in the forward
echelon. They took part in the last five minutes of artillery pre-
paration on predesignated frontline enemy targets and reverted to
the control of the battalion commander after the assault companies
jumped off. When the battalion ZPUs ar the regimental AAA platoon
were centralized (protecting the respective CP 6) , these units
displaced forward along with the CPe,.
Employment of the Medium Tank-SP Re iment of the Rifle Division
21. The divisional medium tank-SP regiment or the portion of it that
was attached to the rifle regiment was located, prior to the attack,
one or two kilometers from the front line in tank-attack positions.
Tanks and SPs of the regiment moved. .out from these positions five
minutes prior to the lifting of the artillery preparation. The
tanks and SPs moved on through the infantry, which immediately
moved into the attack behind them as soon as the tanks and SPs
moved through it.
22. The organic SPs of the rifle regiment normally were in forward
positions prior to the attack or possibly in the tank attack posi-
tions with the tanks and SPs of the tank-SP regiment. An entire
tank-SP regiment could be placed in support of the rifle regiment
although a tank-SP battalion was the more normal attachment. Tanks
and SPs could also take a limited part in the artillery preparation
before moving out, past the infantry; however, it was preferable to
have tanks and SP's use only direct fire which was rare.
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23. The mission of the tank-SP unit was to make a breakthrough, support
the infantry attack, and to pursue the withdrawing enemy. There
was no stopping at the first line of enemy trenches for reorganization.
According to the Field Service Regulations, the infantry, tanks,
and SPs were to seize the first line of enemy trenches by a specific
time which was always designated by the Cyrillic lettery(which
apparently stands for chas-hour). The infantry boarded tanks and
SPs in the pursuit only.
Preparation for the Attack
24. The attack was well-planned far in advance. Supplies and reserves
were brought forward and constant reconnaissance was maintained.
Prior to attacking prepared enemy positions, frontline troops were
relieved by the troops that would actually participate in tLe attack.
Relief was carried out at night one or two days prior to th- attack.
Regimental engineer company sappers cleared paths through minefields
the night before the attack and any barbed wire entanglements were
removed or cut. All trenches, positions, and firing points were
carefully camouflaged with all movement kept to a minimum.
25. The security of the build-up area was the responsibility of the
frontline units. An outpost MLR was established to warn units
of an unexpected enemy attack. Listening posts were established
by the outpost MLR some distance to its front.
26. Because the attacking units were already in place for an impending
attack, source repeatedly insisted that there would be no forward
assembly areas or concentration areas. He could give no information
on possible concentration and build-up areas deep in the rear of the
MLR.
Location of Command Posts
27. Platoon leaders were in the first trench or 50 m to the rear of the
first trench, company COs were up to 100 in from the front trench,
battalion COs were directly behind the second echelon or about
400 in from the front trench, and regimental COs 1.5 to 2 km from
the first line of trenches.
28. OPs or CPs were located closer to the front in the attack than in
the defense.3 There were several OPs and CPs. One of them was the
basic OP or CP,and there were also one or two alternates. The OP
or CP, as the case might be, was usually in an earthen dugout.
Source knew of no rear CPs on regimental level or lower. In the
battalion and regdmental CPs or OPs were: the infantry commander,
COO of any organic supporting weapons units, COs of any attached
units, the chief of staff, and other staff officers. Radio com-
munication was located a short distance from the CP so the operation
of the CP was not disperbed. This radio communication point ran
wire communication from it to the CP.
General Duties of Personnel at the Command Post
29. The general duties of personnel at the command post were the following:
a. To know at all times the situation of both the enemy and
friendly units.
b. To make proper recommendations to the CO for the proper employ-
ment of units and material.
c. To keep higher headquarters informed of the situation.
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21.11LeE-2S?Attlii?lean-q(2
30. Source Could give no specific duties of the battalion or higher
unit command post personnel nor did he know anything about lateral
liaison; however, he was able to enumerate the action and duties of
rifle company COs upon the receipt of the field orderwhich were:
a. To become familiar with the content of the field order and
fully understand the senior commander's intentions. Also,
to be Aware of the part that his own unit would play in the
overall operation and plan the most efficient use of his own
time in preparing for the operation.
b. To make an estimate of the situation, determining all avalable
information on the enemy situation relative to strength, dis-
positions, actions, and capabilities. To familiarize himself
with the friendly situation to include strength and capabilities
of his own troops, their state of combat readiness and any
available information of, supporting units, the disposition of
his unit in the attack, the location of the company ammunition
point, and the battalion aid station.
c. To make a reconnaissance, orient his location with the map,
point out to platoon leaders various orienting points, their
sectors of activity, and fire lanes. Also, to designate the
proposed location and disposition of defensive fires and to
aelect positions for supporting organic weapons.
d. To make his decision, based on his mission and his own troop
dispositions, note the line of departure, and inform the
battalion commander of his decision.
e. To inform his own troops and give them orientation on the
unit mission, information on the enemy, information on the
friendly situation which included the mission and location of
adjacent units, the mission of attached and supporting weapons
the manner of coordination with attached and supporting weapons,
if any, unit boundaries, his location during the attack, name
of his second in command, communication channels, and types of
aignals. He would also inform his troops of the time that re-
mained for preparation, the time of attack, location of the
company ammunition point, and the battalion aid station.
f. Supervise the organization and preparation of his unit for
the attack.
g.
Inform the battalion commander of his readiness.
31. As somas the attack started, the company and battalion COs dis-
placed from their CPs1which then ceased to exist as such. They
followed behind the second echelon and conducted the battle on the
move. Regimental CPs displaced forward after the seizure of the
first line of enemy trenches.
Objectives
32. The Soviets assumed that,because they occupied a main defense zone
consisting of three defense positions, the enemy would do the same.
(See page 21)
33. Rifle companies were not given specific objectives to seize but
were given a specific portion or sector of the battalion objectives
so as not to interfere with each other's fire. In turn, the rifle
companies broke down their sectors among their rifle platoons.
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34. The title battalion was given a primary objective (blizhayshaya
zadacha) which consisted of the first enemy defense positions.
Without halting or reorganizing, the rifle battalion continued
forward on to its secondary objective (posleduyushchaya zadacha)
which consisted of the enemy's third line of defense, six to eight
kilometers deep. This oNective was also detiggated as the regimental
primary objective. A minor reorganization could take place at this
point. The regiment continued on towards the regimental secondary
objective, 15 to 20 km in the enemy depth. This objective was also
designated as the division primary objective and usually consisted
of some dominant terrain feature or large enemy unit.
35. The rifle division continued the attack until the corps' objective
for the day (zadacha dnya) was seized. This objective was up to
30 km in the enemy depth.
36. If little or no resistance was met, the leading battalions which had
started the attack were expected to continue forward automatically,
even, up to the corps objective. After penetrating the enemy's
first positions and causing a rout, the troops could board SPs and
tanks in the pursuit. If the leading battalions ran into heavy
resistance, they were, nevertheless, expected to reach their own
unit objectives. Every effort was made to push on further with the
corps objective as their ultimate goal but, falling short of this,
as far as possible.
37. There was no reorganization on the seizure of the first enemy
positions. There could be a minor reorganization after the seizure
of the secondary objective but reorganization was normally effected
only when the objective for the day was seized. The units then
organized the defense (as shown in the defense portion of this report);
and,in the event of an enemy counterattack, the leading units were
expected to beat it off. The respective commanders committed their
reserve to beat off the counterattack only when they received per-
mission of the next higher commander. If the enemy showed a superiority
the unit went into the defense after receiving permission from the
next higher commander. It was stressed here by source that the enemy
had definitely to have a superiority before the Soviets would go into
defense positions;and, normally, it was expticted that there would be
no stopping until specified objectives were seized. The defense
could be momentary so that reserve units following close behind
could be committed to carry through the stalled drive.
Combat Teams
38. Combat teams were formed for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance,
setting up a separate defensive position in a designated area, de-
fending the outpost MLR of a rifle division front, or attacking on
a specified front. Source remembered this last point only as a
parroted phrase and could.not explain its meaning. The normal combat
team was the reinforced rifle battalion. It consisted of one rifle
battalion, one or two tank companies, one battalion of division
artillery attached, one or two batteries of 76 mm SP guns, up to
one company of sappers, and one or two mortar batteries. The CO
of the combat team would be the rifle battalion CO.
Communications
39. From company level xm, upward, the main means of communication was
the radio during the attack. Each rifle company was to have an RBM-1
radio tied into the battalion net. Radio operators and radios were
provided by the battalion signal platoon. The 82 mm mortar company
was also to have the same type of radio at its OP and at the mortar
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positions. All units higher than battalion maintained communication
by an unknown type of radio. Source could give no definite informa-
tion on radio communications beyond battalion; however, the battalion
57 mm AT guns, the ZPU platoonland the SPG 82 mm platoon had no
radio communication. Source did not know what type of communication
the rifle battalion CO had with the regiment, 120 mm mortar battery,
or any attached artillery elements but believed that these com-
manders would be at his CP with their own communications.
40. Rifle company sub-units had no radio communications and contact
at this level was made by voice, runners, signal flags, or by pre-
determined signal flares of various colors. Units lower than
company laid no wire in defense or offense.
41. There was no direct communication between infantry companies and
artillery attached to them or between higher infantry units.
Because the company CO had a radio, he was in contact with the
battalion commander through whom he could request artillery fire.
Rifle platoons could contact tanks or SPs only by voice and signals
or predetermined flares. The rifle sub-units could use tracer rounds
to point out targets to tanks and SPs. Tanks and SPs, when attached
to the rifle battalion, could contact the rifle company commanders
by switching their radios to the rifle battalion channel and, in
this way, be on the battalion network. Source felt that attached
tanks or SPs could be on a separate channel to their own CO who
would be at the rifle battalion commander CP with his own radio
and could, therefore, relay any messages of the rifle battalion
CO to the tanks and SPs.
42. Assault units lower than division had no communications with the
air force. Front line units could merely indicate their forward-
most positions by the use of air panels and smoke grenades. Source
was of the opinion that only the division CG had contact with air
support units and had the right to call for air support.
43. A mortar observer could not call for artillery fire. All observers
were responsible for reporting by radio to the next higher CP k-
any movement or massing of enemy troops or any enemy tank attack.
The infantry battalion CO called for artillery or mortar fire only
from those artillery or mortar units attached to him, i.e., as in
the case of a combat team. The rifle company CO "requested" artillery
or mortar fire from the rifle battalion commander and, in cases where
the rifle battalion CO had no attached mortar or artillery elements,
he could only "request" such fire from the infantry regiment com-
mander. Normally, only the regimental commanders could call for
or lift division artillery fire. Permission to use artillery fire
was carried out to ridiculous extremes, according to source. Even
in clear-cut cases where the battalion commander could call for
artillery fire, source claimed that the battalion commander would
normally seek permission first.
Defense
Purpose
44. The Soviet doctrine taught that the defense was used for the following
reasons: to mass troops and supplies prior to going into the attack-,
to defend and hold important objectives, to draw off enemy strength
from another sector which would weaken it, to preserve ones own
troops, equipment,and supplies because the attack Was-always more
costly than the defense, and to allow other sectors of the front to
go into the attack.
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Defense Frontages
45. In the defense position the following frontages were normal:
Squad - Up to 150 in.
Platoon - 350-500 in.
Company - 800-1,000 in.
Battalion - 1.5 to 2 km,
Regiment - Up to 4 km.
Defense Positions
46. Defense positions were supposed to be dapply_echeloned apd.prepared for
defense against armored, chemical, air attack, and also protected
against counterbattery fire. (For the various defense depths from
platoon to division see pages18, 19, and 20.) Trenches were sup-
posed to be 170-180 nm deep and wide enough to pull a Goryunov
HMG through laterally. MG firing points, ammunition storage points,
squad, and platoon shelters were also constructed in such a manner
as not to interfere in a lateral movement. These trenches had
overhead shelters and were reinforced whenever possible,and all
were connected by a series of connecting trenches; they were always
dug in all three positions. Infantry troops did the digging in the
rifle battalions under the supervision of the regimental engineer
company.
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47. The main defense zone of a rifle division consisted of three defense
positions, the first position (pervaya pozitsiya), the regimental
reserve position (pozitsiya polkovikh rezervov), and the division
reserve position (pozitsiya divizionnikh rezervov). Each position
consisted of three trenches with connecting passageways between
them (See page 20).
Disposition of Organic and Attached Weapons
48. For disposition or organic and attached supporting weapons, see
page 20:
Employment of HMG. t,
49. HMGs of the battalion were normally split up and attached to the
rifle companies, They came under operational control of the rifle
company CO and were to be placed in the forwardmost trench.
Employment of 82 mm Mortars
50. The 82 in mortar company of the rifle battalion was usually under
centralized control. It was normally emplaced between the second
and third trench of the first positions (see pages 18and 19).
Sometimes, an individual mortar was detached and used as a roving
piece (kachayushchiye) in order to deceive the enemy and prevent
him from locating the centralized positions of the 82 mm mortars.
The 82 mm mortar company prepared concentrations and also final
protective fires. In defense, the 82 mm mortar company remained
under control of the battalion commander. The 82 mm mortar
company commander set up his OPs just as in the attack and called
for mortar fire as needed. Normally, the 82 mm mortar commander
was located at the battalion Cait OP because the control of the
82 mm mortars was under the rifle battalion CO.
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Employment of 120 mm Mortars
51. The 120 mm mortar battery of the rifle regiment could be attached
to one of the rifle battalions or remain in the regimental artillery
group supporting both rifle battalions. In either case, the battery
remained centralized. Concentrations and final protective fires
were prepared. Although source did not know how the fire of the
120 mm mortars was directed and controlled, he was sure that the
battery had a fire-direction center known as a yacheyka which meant
cell". In the defense, the 120 mm mortars were echeloned farther
back than in the attack. In the attack, the 120 mm mortars were
emplaced directly behind the second trench of the first position;
in the defense, they were normally behind the third trench of the
first position. (See page 20).
Employment of 76 mm SP Guns
52. The 76 mm SPs of the regiment were attached to rifle battalions.
The entire regimental SP battery could be attached to only one of
the rifle battalions or could be split between the two forward rifle
battalions; they are not normally attached in less than pairs. When
attached to the battalions, their main role was to engage enemy
armor. Source was not sure if SPs were tied in with regimental
or divisional artillery but Was of the opinion that, in the defense,
they were used only as direct fire weapons. When attached to rifle
battalions, the SPs were under control of the rifle battalion com-
mander. SPs helped make up a part of the company or battalion anti-
tank "knot". (See paragraph 55 below.) If the enemy made a slight
penetration, both SPs and any tanks, attached together with some
elements of infantry? counterattacked following a light artillery
preparation. Some of the SPs could also be used as roving weapons;
however, source did not know if in this case they would fire directly
or indirectly.
Employment of 57 mm AT Guns
53. The battalion 57 mm AT guns were the main anti-tank weapons of the
rifle battalion and were emplaced, wherever practicable1 between
the first and second trenches and employed direct fire. The 57
mm AT battet.y of the rifle regiment attached some of its 57 mm
AT guns to the rifle battalion. About two thirds of the pieces,
counting both battalion and regiment, were located forward. The
remainder were positioned further in depth but, in all cases,
direct fire was utilized.
Emplacement of Units
54. In the rifle battalion, two rifle companies occupied the first two
trenches. The third rifle company Was the battalion reserve and
was emplaced in the third trench. The rifle regiment had two
battalions forward and one battalion to the back. The battalion
in back was the regimental reserve. It occupied a series of three
trenches two to two anda half kilometers behind the two front
battalions. This battalion also set up "switch positions" to mop
up any breakthrough (see page 214. The rifle division had two
regiments forward and one regiment held in reserve. The latter
regiment also set up a series of three trenches, six to eight
kilometers behind the front line units.
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AT Defense Plans
55. In the defense, each rifle company was required to establish a
company anti-tank 'knot" (rotnyy protivotankovyy opornyy punkt),
comprising seven to nine anti-tank pieces plus the personnel of
the rifle company (see page 18). The rifle battalion established
a "battalion anti-tank 'knot'" (batal'onyr: protivotankovyy uzel)
of up to 30 anti-tank units plus the battalion personnel (see page 19).
In each case, the "knots" were planned by the "senior" artillery
commander who, source felt, was the regimental chief of artillery.
The anti-tank units utilized in the "knots". could be the battalion
SPG 82 mm rocket launchers, the battalion 57 mm AT guns, the regi?
mental 57 mm AT guns, the regimental 76 mm SP80 and any attached
76 mm SPs and T-34 tanks from the division. All the weapon2, in the
company and battalion anti-tank "knots" were under the contvol of
the senior artillery commander of the rifle regiment who, under
normal circumstances, was the regimental chief of artillery, but
source could not elaborate on this plan.
56. The artillery groups were also used as a means of beating off tank
attacks. The regimental artillery group.(PAG-Polkovaya Artilleriskaya
Gruppa) was emplaced behind the regimental reserve position.
Usually, all the Organic regimental artillery was in the forward
positions, particularly the SPs and 57 mm AT guns; however, the
120 mm mortars were sometimes located far enough in the rear to be
included in the regimental artillery group. In most cases, however,
the regimental artillery group was composed of attached artillery,
not of organic. The division artillery group (DAGAUvizionnaya
Artilleriskaya GrUppa) was emplaced behind the division reserve
position with 30-40 pieces to cover one kilometer of front in
normal situations. Source was very vague on artillery-tbppoft
and tactics and could not elaborate on these points.
gosuriOutposts
57. Security outposts were set up to warn the main defense zone of
any sudden enemy attack and also to keep the enemy from learning
the location of the main defense zone. A well-defined trench was
dug up to two kilometers forward of the MLR. In addition to this
trench, a series of dummy or decoy positions -was also dug. A re-
inforced rifle battalion normally occupied this outpost MLR for
the entire division. This battalion was formed from one of the
reserve battalions of the division.
Protective Fire
58. Artillery of all types established concentrations and final pro-
tective fire. Concentrated fire (sosredotochennyy ogon') was numbered:
i.e.,80#1, S0#2, etc. Final protective fire (nepodvizhnyy 2agraditel'
nyy ogon') was given the name of an animal, i.e..LNZO "bear", NZO
"wolf", etc. All mortar units heavier than the -82 mm and all field
artillery had a fire-direction center (battre/g, upravlenlye) to
direct fire but source could give no information on this.4
Mobile Defense
59. Source knew of no mobile defense but claimed that,if a unit had a
fairly wide front, the continuous trenches served as a means of
maneuvering right or left in the direction of the enemy attack.
Source did not know what manner of defense would be used to cover
extreme frontages and did not believe that a case existed in which
the entire front would not be covered by a system of trenches.
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Delayiu or Retrogade Action
60. Source never received any training in this subject but the entire
doctrine presented, up to the time of his defection, placed almost
all emphasis on the attack. Source did not remember any literature
on retrogade movements. He was under the impression that the Soviets
never expected to be forced to use retroeteade tactics.
Special Operations
aL5221_22.9..Agg.g
61. Night attacks could be launched with or without an artillery pre-
paration. The element of surprise was preferred, in which the
attack would be without artillery preparation. Objecti'es were
limited and were usually commanding pieces of ground or come enemy
strongpoint not too far from the MLR. Source could give no dis-
tances but felt it would be only the first enemy trenches, i.e
the equivalent of the Soviet battalion defense positions.
62. Normally, the night attack was conducted by small units, such as a
reinforced rifle company. Control was by runners or close contact
between the rifle company CO with his platoon leaders. In order
to achieve the element of surprise, oral commands had to be kept
to a minimum. Signal flares of predetermined colors were used in
the final assault. At night, intervals between troops were less than
during daylight attacks and the troops wore white markings on their
helmets. There was no mention of the use of handkerchiefs or white
army bands.
63. Night attacks were launched only after careful reconnaissance of
enemy strength and positions. The lanes of approach were selected
and reconnoitered to determine the location of enemy outposts. The
company making the night attack was relieved and sent to the rear.
A similar piece of terrain was selected in the rear for training
purposes. Here, each subunit was instructed in its particular role
with each soldier made aware of the mission, the manner of attack, etc.
Searchlights were not used for illumination, as far as source knew,
but flares were used in the final assault. Tanks and SPs were in
readiness to enable them to move on order. They followed the infantry
at a considerable distance and took part in the battle only as a last
resort, moving up when ordered. Mortars, SPGs, and other crew-served
weapons that were attached were manhandled in the night attack.
64. The general form of the night attack was the frontal attack; however,
if the enemy was outflanked, the flanking attack was used. It was
considered very desirable to sneak up to the enemy's MLR and close
in hand-to-hand combat in the final assault. If the enemy illuminated
the area,. the Soviet soldier was instructed to "hit the ground".
Once near the enemy defensive positions, the final assault was made
with or without the battle cry of "ura" (hurrah).
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Mountain Warfare
65. Source received no training in mountain warfare, and, to the best
of his knowledge, there was no training of this type in the 95th
Gds. Rifle Div. He knew, however, of an unidentified mountain
rifle brigade which arrived from the Volga Military District at
the Tashkent OCS summer camp in summer 1948. At this time, source's
class .was nearing the end of its summer training period. When the
mountdin rifle brigade arrived, it took over the Tashkent OCS summer
camp as its permanent station and, as a result, the Tashkent OCS
was forced to set up their tents about 20 km northwest of the
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"Stalin Camp" at Chirchik (N 41-30, E 69-35); however, this entire
area. was wasteland, and it was not difficult to establish the new
camp,. Firing ranges were set up for the mountain rifle brigade
and, about four kilometers from the new Tashkent OCS summer camp,
an artillery-firing range was set up. Source never saw this range
but heard the firing and saw 152 mm howitzers move to and from the
range.
66. The transportation used by the mountain rifle brigade was half horse
and mule with the other half vehicle. Source was certain that the
horses were used only for transport purposes and not as mounts for
the troops. He noticed that this mountain rifle brigade also had
truck-towed 37 mm AA guns and horse-packed mortars. He believed that
the latter were 120 mm.
Fortified Zones
67. Assault teams (shturmovaye gruppy) were selected to attack enemy
pitl6oxes or concrete emplacements. They consisted of one rifle
platoon-, three or four chemical soldiers, three or four sappers,
one OP two heavy tanks, and up to a Platoon of 57 mm AT guns.
68. The mission of the assault team was to tie up the emplacement e: and
demolish it to allow the main forces to pass through. The ATAuns
fired directly at the emplacements to neutralize their firing points.
While the emplacements was engaged by the AT guns, chemical troops
moved forward and set up a smoke screen in front of the emplacement.
The AT guns then lifted their fire. The remainder of the asitault
team moved towards the emplacements together with th* tanks. The
tanks moved ahead of the infantry as close as possible to the emplace-
ment, halted, and engaged the firing Ports of the emplacement with
their MG's while the infantry encircled the emplacement. The sappers
moved out to the emplacement and set up demolition charges and the
tanks and sappers pulled back to allow the demolitions to explode.
Following the explosion, the infantry moved in on the pillbox for
mop-up operations.
River Crossings
69. For Making small river crossings) the infantry regiment had certain
T/O&E stream-crossing equipment which was found in the regimental
engineer company. For crossing large streams or rivers, source
believed that heavier engineer river-crossing equipment, such as
amphibious tractors, pontoon bridges, and local materials, was used.
Source did not know if the division engineer battalion had this
equipment; if not, he believed that separate pontoon companies or
battalions would be attached to the division for a large river
crossing.
70. The size of the group that made these crossings depended on enemy
strength. During World War II, small units such as rifle squads,
platoons, and companies were used to establish bridgeheads. These
units were heavily supported by artillery fire with much attention
given to the seizure of a bridgehead.5 All personnel who had made
a river crossing during World War II and who had held out until the
arrival of reinforcements, were given special recognition. Those
that remained alive were recognized as "Heroes of the Soviet Union."
71. Light artillery was ferried across rivers in boats as soon as the
infantry established a defense. Heavier artillery and armor waited
until a bridge was constructed. Source did not know how much time
this took, if crossings were made on a narrow or a broad front, or
how much time was necessary to plan a deliberate river crossing.
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Armor supported the river crossing with direct fire at enemy emplace-
ments on the opposite bank but source did not know how the armored
fire was tied in or coordinated with artillery fire.
72. River crossings could be made during the day or during the night;
however, it was preferable that they be made at night. In this
case, the crossing could be made without the aid of supporting
weapons in order to achieve the element of surprise. During day-
light river-crossing operations, smoke screens were laid by the
regimental chemical unit 'with the use of smoke pots. Source did
not know if artillery or airplanes were used to set up these smoke
screens. Air support was always used to support a river-crossing
and later to hold the beachhead but source did not know how it would
be coordinated.
73. Source could give no example of a typical river crosslng. As own
training in this type of operation was very limited and he knew
nothing concerning the order of crossing or any phases involved in
establishing a bridgehead. He participated only once in a limited
river crossing ex6rc1se.6
Airborne Tactics
74. Source had never received any training in airborne tactics and
could give no information.
Foreats and Swamps
75. There was no special equipment in source's regiment for operation
in swamps or forests and the unit received little special training
in forest or swamp operations. Troops were told that trenches should
be dug 150-200 m from the edge of forests or 200-300 m inside the
fOrest. Trees were felled to serve as anti-tank barriers and AT
guns were placed in the front lines in small numbers. The remaining
guns were held back in reserve. Source's knowledge of forest opera-
tions was very limited and he could give no information on tactical
dispositi(dn, artillery fires, control, formation, sizes, etc. The
only information known to source on operations in swamps was that:
"foxholes would be constructed above ground from rocks, logs, or
other accessible materials."
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Infanta_aaining7
76. One-third of all physical training was devoted to the une of the
bayonet. This training was given mostly during the winter training
period. The Soviet soldier was taught that when the entv could not
be stopped by fire, the bayonet would be used to fight off all counter-
attacks and that the bayonet was to be used during night attacks
when the element of surprise was desired.
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50X1
1,
Cf.
for further information of these .manuals.
2.
Cf.
for information on atomic defense training.
3.
-------Comment:
OPs of regiments and higher were also known as 50o
command posts.
4.
Comment:
The use of the terin4 whatareye, here should not be
its normal meaning of a company-sized artillery unit.
50X1
--15rinigii7e70,7117
In this case,
it merely means 'team".
5.
50X1.
7.
50X1
Comment: Source did not know the size of a bridgehead before
a bridge was constructed.
Cf. paragraph 80, for further details of the river-crossing
exer
Cf. for all infantry training known to source, including
mar
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Soviet Army Tactical..Signe_anA Symbols
The following represent only a small percentage of the symbols
which source recalled as being listed in the Combat Regulations
(Souad-CompanYll either the 1950 or 1951 edition
English, Rua:34n
Co MG (light) Ruohnoy PUlemet
eIN HMG
111; 82-mm Mort-
120-mm_Mort
Mort_Plat (82-mm)
Mort Co (82 mm)
Tank
Heavy Tank
SP Artillery
41 Field Gun
(Source did not know
distinguish a field
AT Gun
A OP
Its4 Bn?CP
Regtl CP
(*Note: Flag bore
Rlfle Squad in the
Stankovyy Puiemet
-82-41a-4inomet
.120r-mm Minomet
Minometnyy Vzvod
Minometnaya Rota
Tank-
Tyazhelyy Tank
Samokhodnaya Artilleriskaya
Ustanovka
OrUdiie
what symbol, if any, was used to
gun from a hOWitzer0
Protivotankuvoye grudiye
Nablyudatellnyy Punkt
Komandnyy Punkt Batalona
Komandnyy Punkt Polka
unit designation on its)
Attack Otdeleniye V Nastupleniye
tRifle Platoon in the Attack Vzvod V Nastupleniye
4)
0
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English
Rifle Company in the attack
Barbed Wire Fortifications in
Three Rows
&tide
Rota V Nastupleniye
Provolochnyye Zagrazh-
deniya V Tri Ryada
Kol'yev
Mine Field Ninnoye Pole
(Source did hot know what symbols distinguished AP
)ittnaa-fronLAT mines.)
.141"4"6144/44.1 Trench Outline
)"460 "441J. kl" Decoy or Dummy Positions
010
Company AT defense position and
battalion AT defense center of
resistance
Reinforced Concrete Pillbox
Tank Company in the Attack
Artillery POsitionti
? Defense Zone Fire
02We
Artillery Concentrations
CONFIDENTIAL
Naohertaniye Transhey
Lozhnyye Pczitsii
Rotnyy Pitotivotankovyy
Opornyy Punkt i Bat-
al'onnyy Protivotank-
ovyy Usel
DOT - Dolgovremennaya
OboronitWnaya Tochka
Tankovaya'Rota V
Nastupleniye
Artilleriyskiye
Positsii
NZO - Nepodvisbilyy
Zagraditel'nyy Ogon'
SO Sosredotochenmyy
Ogon'
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Rifle Company in Defensive Positions
Front - 800-1000.s.
Can be Attached -.1.4 platoons fromIn_MG Co, 1-2 57..ma AT Guns, up to
a oompany of 82-mm Mortars, 1-2 platoons of T.r34
tanks or SP (76-mm) guns, up to a platoon of SPG
82S up to a squad of flamethrowers (from -a separate
flamethrower company which would be attached to a
division from GHQ reserve troops.)
2d Rifle Plat
44
1st Rifle Plat
150-
300a
ompany anti-tank "knot" (Rotnyy protivotankovyy opornyy
punkt)
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Rifle Battalion An Defensive Positions
Front - Up to 2
Defensive Depth
Can be Attached
km.
- Up to 1,5 km.
- 1-2 57-mm AT batteries, 1-2 oompanAes of T-34 tanks
or SP (76-mm) guns:, 0 to a battalion of artinery
(120-mm) and up to a platoon of flamethrowece (fir9m
a separate flamethrower comnsny which #ou)d be
attached' to a division from GHQ reservL ,Adope).
0.10?111.111=1?111?1111111.11141M111111110M),
Battalion anti-tank "
(Batallonyy protivotankovyy usell)
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Fir
Poe
MLR
=MO .111111?11.
tion
Positions of
regimental
reserve (ono
rifle batta-
lion)
6-8 km
=prim=
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Main Defense Zone (Glavnaya Poloia Oborony) utpost' MLM
00?0040"?
ALLUM, LW -LULU
300 m
60o-
800 a
(one rifle
egiment)
,
sitions
reserve
f
eisInft 1111?11.1
f
2-2.5
km
Regimental ArtillerY
Grour 04);:
attal-
ion
Reserve
Posi-
tions
(usual
l)' _one
rifle
regi-
ment)
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Objective Depths in Soviet Offensive Operations
Soviet Corps objective of the da
1/111111111111M
X g
Soviet regimental
secondary and
division
primary
objectives
Soviet bat:Eon
secondary aid
regimental
primary
objective
Soviet
battali n
primer/
objeoti
te-
Division
1 &Luis, to
Regiment
i
6-8
km
(Enemy defensi
system equi-
valent to a
oviet
at tali
defense
setup)
OVI ET EFFORT
CONFIDENT /AL
15-
20
km
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